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By Sefa Yürükel

The steps taken by Turkey in West Asia recently are the product of a strategic cunning concealed behind the government’s “multidimensional foreign policy” rhetoric. Joint military exercises and defense industry cooperation with Pakistan, the surprisingly rapid thawing of years long diplomatic ice with Egypt, economic integration and joint fund mechanisms with Saudi Arabia. This triple pillar, though decorated with the rhetoric of regional peace and stability, is in reality an operational alignment orchestrated from Washington and locked directly onto opposition to Russia and Iran. Russia, China, and Iran are not only watching this activity carefully but are transforming each move into countermeasures through their joint defense and intelligence mechanisms. This article analyzes how the relations in question constitute an operation carried out on behalf of the United States and how the rising powers of Asia are in a position to foil this game.

The Pakistan Alliance: The Afghanistan and Central Asia Pincer

Turkey Pakistan relations are deepening rapidly under the banner of the defense industry. MİLGEM corvettes, exports of Bayraktar TB2 and AKINCI UAVs, joint exercises. This picture is too strategic and hasty to be explained by the bonds of brotherhood between the two countries. The real objective is to establish a corridor of influence stretching through Pakistan into Afghanistan and Central Asia. Filling the vacuum left in post Taliban Afghanistan and gaining observation and intervention capability along the critical routes of China’s Belt and Road constitutes the essence of this alliance. Although the United States appears to have militarily withdrawn from Afghanistan, it has not completely abandoned the region. The Turkey Pakistan duo is being positioned as Washington’s indirect intervention apparatus in the region. This situation directly targets Russia and China, which have been increasing their effectiveness in Central Asia, and is a direct challenge to the security architecture of the two powers under the umbrella of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Russia and China clearly see this Atlanticist operation hidden behind Turkey’s “brother country” rhetoric in Central Asia and are strengthening their own military and economic engagements accordingly.

The Egypt Opening: A Front Against Russia in the Mediterranean and Eastern Mediterranean

The renewed diplomatic traffic between Turkey and Egypt is an operation to corner Russia in the Eastern Mediterranean equation. In recent years, Egypt had deepened its military cooperation with Russia, directed its arms purchases to Moscow, and given tacit approval to Russia’s military presence in Libya. Turkey’s reconciliation with Egypt is the implementation of a scenario desired by Washington: adding Egypt to the US axis encirclement line that began with Greece, Southern Cyprus, and Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean. While ostensibly consolidating its claims in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean by agreeing with Egypt, the government is committing behind the scenes to rolling back Russia’s military influence in the region. This situation is an open threat to Russia’s presence in Tartus and Tobruk. Moscow is evaluating the Ankara Cairo rapprochement in this context and is further consolidating its presence in Libya.

Economic Integration with Saudi Arabia: The Strategy to Financially Strangle Iran

The rapid normalization with Saudi Arabia is not merely an improvement in personal relations with Crown Prince Salman but is part of the financial war waged by the United States against Iran. In the face of its chronic foreign exchange crisis in recent years, Turkey has become dependent on the flow of foreign currency from Saudi Arabia. This dependency leaves Ankara’s foreign policy maneuverability at the mercy of Riyadh and consequently Washington. While Saudi Arabia is taking steps toward normalization with Iran in the Gulf, ensuring that Turkey remains in an anti Iran bloc is of vital importance to the United States. By opening its doors to Saudi capital, the government is trying to keep its economy afloat on one hand, while on the other becoming an active element of the economic sanctions and isolation policy conducted against Iran. Iran assesses this economic integration as a threat to its national security and is responding by diversifying its energy and trade channels with Turkey.

The Careful Monitoring and Countermeasures of Russia, China, and Iran

Russia, China, and Iran are not merely watching the Turkish government’s triple cunning; they are simultaneously activating their own countermeasures. Russia is balancing Turkey’s influence attempts in Central Asia within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, increasing its military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, and narrowing Turkey’s operational space in northern Syria. China is drawing the Turkey Pakistan axis under its own economic umbrella by deepening its Belt and Road investments in Pakistan, thereby preventing this axis from remaining solely military and intelligence based. Iran, for its part, is encircling Turkey through its proxy forces and energy diplomacy in the region, damming Ankara’s strategic depth ambitions by fortifying its influence in Iraq and Syria.

A Doomed Cunning

The relations established by the Turkish government with Pakistan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia are nothing more than cunning marketed under the rhetoric of regional leadership and strategic autonomy, yet at their core serving the United States’ operational architecture against Russia and Iran. This cunning is built on a shallow calculation that fails to account for the flow of history and the deep dynamics of the region. Russia, China, and Iran are reading this game clearly and responding to every move. The Turkish government will pay a heavy price in the long run for positioning itself as the United States’ subcontractor in the region, and each day it prefers to be the cunning figurant of the Atlantic rather than establishing genuine and balanced relations with its neighbors, it darkens its own regional future. The real winners in West Asia will be the powers that define their own interests independently and correctly read the rise of Asia.

Bibliography

Presidency of Defense Industries, Turkey Pakistan Defense Industry Cooperation Agreements and Joint Exercise Documents, Official Statements, 2023-2024.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Joint Statement on the Reestablishment of Turkey Egypt Diplomatic Relations, 2024.
Ministry of Trade, Turkey Saudi Arabia Economic Partnership and Fund Agreements, Official Gazette Publications, 2023.
SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), Trends in International Arms Transfers: Turkey’s Growing Role in Middle East and South Asia, 2024 Report.
Andrew Korybko, Hybrid Wars: The Indirect Adaptive Approach to Regime Change, Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015. (Geopolitical analysis of the Turkey Pakistan military alliance.)
War on the Rocks / Foreign Policy, Turkey’s Role in the Eastern Mediterranean: Balancing or Bandwagoning? Current Analyses, 2024.
Carnegie Middle East Center, Recalibrating Alliances: Turkey, Egypt and the New Eastern Mediterranean Geopolitics, 2024.
ORSAM (Center for Middle Eastern Studies), Turkey Gulf Relations and Their Impact on Iran, 2023-2024 Reports.
Al-Monitor / Amwaj.media, Iran’s Response to Turkey’s Expanding Influence in West Asia, 2024 Original News and Analyses.
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Official Declarations on Central Asian Security Architecture and Military Cooperation of Member States, 2023-2024.
The Diplomat / South China Morning Post, China’s Strategic Calculations in Pakistan Amid Turkey’s Rising Military Profile, 2024.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Statements on Military Presence and Security Assessments in the Eastern Mediterranean, 2024.

Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
Aarhus University, 1997
Independent Researcher
Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures.

By Sefa Yürükel

Global geopolitics stands on the brink of a new fracture. We are witnessing a deepening power struggle not only on the East West axis but also along the global North South divide. In the latest act of this struggle, two moves initiated by the United States to fortify its military presence and intelligence network stand out: a new space based satellite intelligence web and a series of new NATO branches intended to be established across the Islamic world, Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Yet this strategy, which ignores the direction of history’s flow and the unstoppable momentum of a rising Asia, is, to put it mildly, flogging a dead horse. What is worse is that the government in Turkey has been assigned a role in this scheme, and by trusting the United States during the forty day Iranian missile crisis and committing such impertinence, it has doomed itself to this scenario. This article analyzes these developments and demonstrates that such adventurism will inevitably suffer delirium and defeat in the face of Asia’s rise.

The New Satellite Project: A Global Surveillance Trap

The new generation satellite systems developed by the United States are built not only for communication and navigation but also for hypersonic missile tracking, the coordination of cyber attacks from space, and most critically, the collection of real time data from the missile batteries of “target countries” like Iran, known as data linking. The essence of the project is to create a “shield from space” by monitoring every mobile ramp and launch system behind enemy lines in real time and sharing this data with land and naval forces. While reminiscent of the Cold War’s Star Wars delusion, this is a technologically more refined trap. However, this trap creates an illusion of trust that entraps America’s own allies, because this satellite network is a system that fosters dependency: only the United States provides the data, and only the Pentagon deciphers the codes. Countries that join this network completely mortgage their intelligence sovereignty to Washington.

NATO’s Branching Fantasy: Islam, Africa, Latin America, and Asia

Parallel to this, NATO’s plan to open new branches in the Islamic world, Africa, Latin America, and Asia represents the alliance’s effort to morph into a “global gendarme” format. The Atlanticist mindset, having learned nothing from the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, is now taking to the field with the rhetoric of “NATO’s local partners” in order to dissolve centers of regional resistance from within. In the Sahel belt of Africa, in a Latin America where BRICS is rising, and in Asia, under the sphere of influence of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), such an expansion has no chance of finding a foothold. These steps are concrete proof that the United States cannot accept the multipolar reality and is acting on old imperial reflexes. History has written extensively on how forcibly established alliances dissolve in the face of local dynamics. The structure presented as an “Islamic NATO” will be perceived by the vast majority of the Islamic world as a new colonial mechanism and will be rejected.

The Role Assigned to the Turkish Government and the Impertinence of Data Linking During the Forty Day Iranian Missile Crisis

It is precisely at this point that the role assigned to the Turkish government comes into play. According to leaked information and regional observations, it is rumored that Turkey has been offered a mission as a “model country” or even a “co chair” within NATO’s branch for the Islamic world. This reflects the government’s desire to still position itself as an indispensable element of the Atlantic system, despite all the rhetorical crises it has experienced with the West in recent years. Yet this desire is diametrically opposed to regional realities and Turkey’s interests.

The claims that Turkey participated in the “data linking” (data monitoring and targeting) process of Iranian missiles by relying on U.S. satellite data during forty days of Iranian ballistic missile tests show that the government is venturing into a dangerous game. Monitoring Iran’s military movements through real time satellite data provided by the United States and sharing this information under the NATO umbrella is an impertinence that could bring Turkey to the brink of military tension with Iran and dynamite its longstanding relationship with its neighbor. This is a strategic lapse of reason committed by trusting the United States, because throughout history, the United States has never provided a genuine security guarantee to any of its allies; on the contrary, it has used its allies as forward outposts in every crisis. Such intelligence sharing, targeting a regional power like Iran, which also holds strategic partnerships with the rising powers of Asia (Russia and China), carries the potential to drag Turkey into the very middle of a conflict.

Delusion and Doom in the Face of Asia’s Rise

The core of the matter is this: the world’s center of gravity has irreversibly shifted from the Atlantic to the Asia Pacific. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Russia’s energy corridors, India’s technological leap, the security architecture of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and the expanding BRICS+ platform have created a brand new economic and political ecosystem. This rise is fortified not only by economic data but also by institutional structures: the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the BRICS New Development Bank, the use of national currencies in bilateral trade, SWIFT alternative payment systems… No regional crisis can now be read independently of Asia’s rising powers. Iran is a critical component of this equation; it is a full member of the SCO and a key junction on China’s Belt and Road route.

A Turkish government that takes a stance against Iran by relying on U.S. satellite data and the NATO umbrella has missed this colossal Asian rise and has taken a position against the winds of history. This is more than strategic blindness; it is a state of delirium. While in a position where it could establish balance in its own region and bring the principle of zero problems with neighbors to life, subordinating Turkey to the Atlantic’s global gendarme role contradicts the government’s own “domestic and national” rhetoric and binds the country in a dependency chain from which return is difficult.

History is full of moments when empires and alliances flogged a dead horse. The United States’ new satellite project and NATO’s ambition to establish branches in the Islamic world, Africa, Latin America, and Asia are doomed to be drowned sooner or later by the dynamics of the multipolar world, and the partners in this doom are candidates to be left under the wreckage. By trusting the United States’ data linking operation during the forty day Iranian missile crisis and committing such impertinence, the Turkish government has placed itself directly beneath this wreckage. However, Asia’s rise is the main current directing the future of humanity, both economically and politically. Not those who stand against this current, but those who move with it will win. The government will either grasp this reality and shift its course towards cooperation with its neighbors, a policy of regional balance, and the rising institutional architecture of Asia, or it will take its place as a figurant in America’s delusions doomed to defeat, on the scrapheap of history. The choice belongs to the government itself; however, the entire nation pays the price.

Bibliography
Space Development Agency (SDA), Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA) Tracking Layer, Official Technical Document.
CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies), Space Based Missile Warning: An Analysis of Next Generation Architectures, 2023 Report.
Breaking Defense / SpaceNews, News and analyses titled SDA’s Tranche 1 Tracking Layer Satellites.
NATO, NATO 2030: United for a New Era, Reflection Group Report, 2020.
NATO, Official Statements and Partnership Documents of the Partners Across the Globe Program.
Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror, 2004.
USAK / ORSAM, Reports and analyses on Turkey Iran Relations and Regional Intelligence Cooperation.
The New York Times / The Washington Post, Investigative reports titled Iran Missile Program Satellite Imagery and US Intelligence Sharing (2023 2024).
Amwaj.media / Al Monitor, Original news and analyses on Iran’s domestic politics, military doctrine, and missile program.
Parag Khanna, The Future Is Asian: Commerce, Conflict, and Culture in the 21st Century, 2019.
BRICS Summits, 2023 Johannesburg Summit Final Declaration and 2024 Kazan Summit Final Declaration.
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Official declarations and documents regarding Iran’s full membership process.
Foreign Affairs / International Relations Journals, Contemporary articles on Turkey’s NATO Membership and Strategic Autonomy.
Works of critical academics such as İlhan Uzgel and Cenk Saraçoğlu on the historical materialist critique of Turkish foreign policy.

Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
Aarhus University, 1997
Independent Researcher
Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures.

By Sefa Yürükel

Since its establishment in 1949, the North Atlantic Alliance has presented itself to the public as the guardian of collective defense and democratic values. Yet behind this shining facade lies an extremely dark operational record, particularly in the case of Turkey. NATO’s presence in Turkey has turned into a structural instrument of domination that interferes in the country’s internal affairs, targets its political regime, harbors terrorism, and sheds the blood of the Turkish nation, rather than contributing to the security of a sovereign state. The Gladio type clandestine structures built during the Cold War functioned as NATO’s invisible hand in Turkey; they played a central role in overthrowing democratically elected governments, carrying out unsolved murders, and fueling social chaos. Simultaneously, the logistical, financial, and political support provided to terrorist organizations targeting Turkey, especially the PKK, reveals the true face of the alliance. The ultimate aim of all these processes has been to keep Turkey weak, dependent, and regionally isolated.

NATO Backed Coup Attempts and Political Engineering

The military coups and coup attempts Turkey has endured since transitioning to a multiparty system largely bear the traces of transatlantic planning. The May 27, 1960 coup is recorded as an intervention that punished Turkey’s search for an independent foreign policy and fortified the NATO centered security bureaucracy. The March 12, 1971 memorandum and the September 12, 1980 coup were political engineering operations deployed to prevent Turkey from drifting away from the Atlantic axis during periods when the Cold War intensified. The July 15, 2016 coup attempt, as the most recent link in this chain, went down in history as a betrayal in which elements nested within NATO’s headquarters and command echelons sought to destroy Turkish democracy. The common denominator of all these interventions is that the overthrown governments had adopted national and independent policy lines. Far from protecting democracy in Turkey, for decades NATO has sheltered, trained, and when necessary deployed the coup mentality that is the greatest enemy of democracy.

The Anatomy of the Gladio Structure and Unsolved Murders

The Turkish leg of the stay behind secret armies that NATO established in various European countries throughout the Cold War formed the backbone of the structure known as the deep state, which has been responsible for countless unsolved murders. This formation, known as the Counter Guerrilla, was designed as part of NATO’s psychological war against communism. Over time, however, it strayed from its objective and turned into a terrorist apparatus that targeted all segments loyal to Turkey and the Turkish nation, regardless of whether they were nationalist, conservative, leftist, rightist, Kemalist, revolutionary, idealist, Alevi, or Sunni. The social chaos, massacres, and provocations of the 1970s were the work of this NATO linked structure. In Kahramanmaraş, Çorum, Sivas, Malatya, and many other cities, the children of the Turkish nation lost their lives in incidents incited by this dark network operating in cooperation with mandate puppets. Gladio’s activities in Turkey are not a manifestation of alliance solidarity and the ideal of collective defense, but of a systematic strategy aimed at intimidating, dividing, and subjugating the Turkish nation. The primary motive behind this strategy is to prevent Turkey from rising as a regional power and to keep the country within the boundaries drawn by NATO.

Support for Terrorist Organizations and Its Bloody Consequences

NATO’s gravest betrayal of Turkey has been the indirect and direct support provided to the separatist terrorist organization PKK and its extensions. For decades, certain European members of the alliance have not only turned a blind eye to the PKK’s financing, propaganda, recruitment, and logistical activities but have also actively facilitated them. The overt military and political support given to the PYD and YPG, derivatives of the PKK in northern Syria, has proven that NATO’s counterterrorism rhetoric is a complete deception. The weapons, training, and intelligence support provided to the terrorist organization by NATO member countries bear direct responsibility for the deaths of thousands of Turkish citizens, soldiers, police officers, and innocent civilians. The NATO infrastructure financed by the taxes of the Turkish nation has indirectly served to sustain a terrorist organization that butchers the children of that very same nation. This betrayal is not an ordinary diplomatic disagreement; it is a bloody hostility waged under the mask of an ally. For every drop of blood shed by the Turkish nation, the NATO circles providing this support bear responsibility.

The Strategy of Making Turkey an Enemy of Its Neighbors and Regional Isolation

NATO membership has not only weakened Turkey internally but has also driven it into an isolation in foreign policy that contradicts its historical depth and geographical advantages. The alliance’s threat definitions transformed Turkey from a regional power with organic ties to its neighbors into the West’s forward outpost against the East. Throughout the Cold War, relations with the Soviet Union, and subsequently with Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Russia, were shaped along the axes of enmity determined by NATO; Turkey’s national interests were sacrificed to the strategic preferences of the alliance. In tensions with Greece, NATO often sided with Athens rather than maintaining an equidistant stance, and on the Cyprus issue, far from supporting Turkish theses, it did not hesitate to impose an embargo on Turkey. Independent diplomatic initiatives, such as the zero problems with neighbors policy, were viewed with suspicion and occasionally sabotaged by the NATO centered security bureaucracy. At the point reached today, Turkey’s loneliness in its region is largely the product of this zero sum and hostile strategic culture imposed by NATO.

Conclusion

For Turkey, NATO is not a security umbrella but a coup apparatus that has sought to destroy its sovereignty, a terrorism sponsor that sheds the blood of its nation, a dark network that commits unsolved murders through Gladio, and an architect of hostility that isolates it in its region. The alliance’s record in Turkey is a dense register of betrayal and enmity that can never be reconciled with discourses of friendship and alliance. This dark legacy, stretching from coup attempts to support for terrorist organizations and from unsolved murders to artificial tensions fabricated with neighbors, is engraved in the memory of the Turkish nation. Breaking this chain of dependency and betrayal and building a fully independent security and foreign policy line by leaving NATO is now a historical obligation. The account for the blood shed by the Turkish nation must be called to account, and no so called alliance relationship should be considered legitimate until that account is rendered. An independent Turkey possesses more than enough strength and determination to ensure its own security with its own mind, its own weapons, and its own children.

References

Ganser, D. (2005). NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe. London: Frank Cass.

Birand, M. A. (1984). 12 September: 04.00 AM. Istanbul: Karacan Yayınları.

Özdağ, Ü. (2008). The PKK and Terror: The Unwearying Guardians of the Republic. Ankara: Kripto Kitaplar.

Jacoby, T. (2008). Understanding Conflict and Violence: Theoretical and Interdisciplinary Approaches. London: Routledge.

Bodansky, Y. (1999). Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America. New York: Forum.

Kurubaş, E. (2004). Turkish American Relations After the Cold War. Ankara: Nobel Yayın Dağıtım.

Ümit, A. (2017). “The International Dimensions of the July 15 Coup Attempt.” Security Strategies Journal, 13(26), 85-112.

Balcı, A. (2013). Turkish Foreign Policy: Principles, Actors and Practices. Istanbul: Alfa Yayınları.

Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
Aarhus University, 1997
Independent Researcher
Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures.

Takla attırılmış bir plan: Holguín Planı
Doç. Dr. Yurdagül Atun

BM Genel Sekreteri Kişisel Temsilcisi Maria Ángela Holguin’in Temmuz sonu, Ağustos başı taraflara sunmaya hazırlandığı stratejik planın içeriği iki kurucu devletli ve sınırlı ortak yetkili “gevşek çözüm” olarak nitelendiriliyor.
Maraş, Güzelyurt ve Mesarya bölgesinin Rumlara iadesi karşılığında tanınmanın da gündeme gelebileceği iddia edilen plana göre Türkiye’nin garantörlüğü kalkacak, Kıbrıslı Türkleri NATO koruyacak!
Planın uygulanması için 2-3 yıllık geçiş süreci tartışılıyor. Bu dönemde ilk toprak iadeleri (özellikle Maraş), Türk tarafının istediği 3D (doğrudan ticaret, doğrudan temas, doğrudan uçuşlar) aşamalı olarak hayata geçirilecek.
Tanınma dedik diye hemen elleri ovuşturmayalım. Bu planda tanınmanın T’si bile yok. Yeni plan, Annan Planının, Crans Montana’nın ve daha önce yapılan görüşmelerde ortaya konan Rum taleplerinin takla attırılmış hali. Ki başlığa “tanınma” havucu koyarak diğer önemli maddeleri geçiştiren algı mühendislerine çok geçmeden Rum Başkan Nicos Christodulides’den cevap geldi bile.
Rum Ulusal Konseyi’ne bilgi veren Rum Başkan Nicos Christodulides, Kıbrıs sorunun çözümü ile ilgili olarak ‘kırmızı çizgiler’i olduğunu, esas niyetin AB’yi de sürecin içerisine çekmek istediği, Kıbrıs Türklerinin süreçteki en önemli motivasyonunun AB vatandaşlığı olduğunu söyledi.
Peki Rumların kırmızı çizgileri nelermiş;
-Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti devam edecek.
-Tek vatandaşlık, tek kişilik, tek egemenlik olacak.
-AB’nin 4 temel özgürlüğü olacak.
– Güvenlik ve garantiler kalkacak.
-Anlaşma Avrupa Birliği müktesebatıyla tam uyumlu olacak.
Rum Meclis Başkanı Annita Demetriou Türkiye’nin Kıbrıs’ta iki devlet talebinden vazgeçmesi gerektiğini, Türkiye AB ilişkilerinin buna bağlı olduğunu, DIKO Başkanı Nikolas Papadopoulos da Avrupa’nın Türkiye’ye baskı yapacağı savundu.
Yani görüldüğü üzere tanınma manınma yok. Rumların istediği şekilde hazırlanan bir plan daha önümüze konacak ve tıpkı Annan Planında olduğu gibi, “evet derseniz, yarın AB’ye gireceksiniz, Türkiye’nin de AB yolunda önü açılacak” yalanıyla fikir önderleri algı operasyonlarına başlayacak. Sonrasında kimse “ya bize öyle dediniz, biz de onay verdik, evet dedik ama siz size itaat eden tarafı cezalandırdınız, tam tersi davranan tarafı ödüllendirdiniz. Madem bildiğinizi okuyacak ve Rumların çıkarlarını savunacaktınız, niye bizi bu kadar uğraştırdınız” demediği ve Kıbrıs Türk halkının hafızasının nisyanla malul olduğunu bildikleri için dalga geçmeye devam edecekler.
Peki ne olur?
Rahat olun, hiçbir şey olmaz. Rumlar adanın sahiplerinin kendileri olduğuna inançla Kıbrıs Türklerinin hiçbir hakkı olmadığını düşünüyor ve onlara verilecek en ufak hakka bile karşı çıkıyor. İçimiz rahat, daha önceki planlar gibi bu plan hayata geçirilecek olursa buna da onay vermezler. 1948 Kıbrıs Danışma Meclisi önerileri (Consultative Assembly), 1955 Harding Planı, 1956 Radcliffe Anayasası, 1958 Macmillan Planı, 1959-60 Zürih-Londra Anlaşmaları, 1964 Acheson Planı, 1972’de Rauf Denktaş-Glafkos Klerides görüşmeleri, 1975 iki toplumlu (bicommunal) görüşmeler, 1978 Anglo-Amerikan-Kanada Planı (ABC Planı), 1981 Waldheim modeli, 1983-85 Cuelliar belgeleri, 1992 Gali fikirler dizisi, 2004 Annan Planı, Crans Montana ve aralarda yapılan bir çok görüşmede ortaya konan öneriler… Bilindiği üzere Rumlar her zaman her planı ellerinin tersiyle iter zira tek bir düşünceye odaklanmışlardır: Kıbrıs bizim, biz tanınan bir devletiz, Türkler bu tanınan devletin içinde olmak istiyorlarsa taviz vermek zorundalar, biz bir şeye mecbur değiliz!
“Biz yoldaşlar yıl sonuna varmadan bu sorunu çözeceğiz” diyen, Rumların maksimalist taleplerini görmezden gelip, uzlaşılamamanın suçunu rahmeti kurucu liderimiz Rauf Raif Denktaş’a yükleyen çok hevesli başkanların bile sonunda havlu atmaları, Rumların gerçek niyetini kavramalarından.
Durumun özeti şu ki; Kıbrıs Rum tarafı, asla Kıbrıslı Türklerle eşitlik zemininde yetki paylaşımı istemiyor. Niyet adanın tümüne sahip olmak ve çeşitli algı oyunlarıyla, AB desteğiyle, KKTC’yi Anavatan Türkiye’den kopararak sağladığı büyük güvenceden mahrum etmeye çalışmak. Zaten Türklerin azınlık haklarından daha fazlasına sahip olamayacaklarını defalarca dile getirdiler, getiriyorlar. Bu konudaki aracılar da ya konuyu bilmediklerinden, ya derslerine Rumların notlarıyla çalıştıklarından, ya da tamamen batı çıkarları doğrultusunda Kıbrıs sorununun 1974’de başladığını varsayıp, mevcut duruma göre bir şeyler ortaya koyuyorlar. Niyetleri gerçekten bir sorun çözmek mi, yoksa Rum taleplerine aracılık etmek mi siz karar verin.
Rumlar 1959’da imza attıklarında da, 60 Cumhuriyeti kurulduğunda da Türkleri eşit görmediler, hiçbir zaman haklarını -söz verseler de- teslim etmediler, Türklere hizmet götürmediler, Enosis ülküsünden vazgeçmediler, kendilerini hep üstün ırk olarak gördüler, ekonomik olarak nefes aldırmadıkları Türkleri “lokmacı, şamişici, hamamcı” diye aşağıladılar. Doktora tezimde yer alan gazete taramalarından birkaç örnek vereyim ki, Rumların hiçbir anlaşmaya sadık kalmadıkları iyi anlaşılsın.
Nacak gazetesinde 11 Mart 1960’da yayımlanan (ortaklık cumhuriyeti imzaları atılmıştı) Türk Köylerine Zulüm başlıklı yazıda “Zeytinlikten iki mil kadar uzakta olan (Mitsero) Rum köyü ile köyümüz arasındaki yolun tamiri için gön derilen Rum memur, köyümüz toprağına geldiğinde geri dönmüş ve yarım millik mesafeyi tamir etmemiştir. Halbuki köyümüze gelen yolun o kısmı daha fazla tamire muhtaçtı. Mitsero toprağında maden çıkaran Yunan Maden Şirketi, köyümüz toprağından da, faydalandığı halde tek bir köylümüzü işletmiyor.” deniyor.
1 Nisan 1960 tarihli Nacak gazetesinde, Zürih Antlaşmasının en mühim esası olan yüzde 70-30 memur meselesinin hâlâ çıkmazda olduğu ve Rumların bu anlaşmaya uymadıkları belirtiliyor.
Yine 29 Nisan 1960 tarihli Nacak gazetesinde yer alan bir haber, EOKA’nın isim değiştirerek EDMA adı altında yeni bir örgüt kurduğunu, bu örgütün de Ledra sokağında Enosis çağrısı yaparak “henüz başlıyoruz” başlıklı bir bildiri dağıttığını duyuruyor. EDMA’nın dağıttığı bu tarihi vesikada “Faaliyetimiz durmayacaktır. Hıyanete vuracak ve halkın ve Anavatanın menfaatlerini koruyacağız. Muvaffak olmak için bütün inanç ve cesarete malik bulunuyoruz. Mücadele devam ediyor.” sözleri yer alıyor.
Mayıs 1960 tarihli Nea Gazetesinde Rum gençlerinin Yunanistan’da silâh talimi gördüğü açıklanıyor.
18 Mayıs 1960 tarihli Alithia’da “Kabul edilemez” başlıklı bir yazıda, yüzde 70:30 nispetleri konusunda şöyle diyor Rum başyazar: “Açık söyleyeceğiz: Türklerin şimdi de son olarak bizi tırpanlamakta oldukları 70:30 yüzdelik nispetleri esas itibariyle haksızdır ve kabul edilemez. Haksızdır, çünkü hiçbir memleketin yüzde 17 nispetinde nüfusa malik azınlığı çoğunluğun zararına âmme hizmetlerinde yüzde 30 ve 40 hakkına malik değildir. Kabul edilemez, zira halkımıza empoze edilmiş olan bir paçavrada (1960 anlaşmaları kastediliyor) dahil olmasına ve nüfus nispetinin yüzde 17’yi teşkil etmeleri nedeniyle Türkler bir paçavrayı siper alarak bu haksız ve mantıksız şartın derhal tatbikini olsun istemesinler ve tahammülümüzün âzamisi olan Başpiskoposun tedrici tatbik teklifini kabul etsinler.”
Görüldüğü üzere Rumlar hiçbir zaman Kıbrıs Türklerini yönetime dahil etmemişler, 1960 Cumhuriyeti imzalarını kerhen attıklarını her defasında dile getirmişler, azınlık haklarından fazlasını vermeyeceklerini söylemişler, Türklere bir gıdım hak veren her anlaşmayı da ellerinin tersiyle itmişlerdir. Bugün de yarın da önümüze sunulan anlaşma metni, Kıbrıs Türklerinin devlet verip, azınlık haklarına sahip olmasını içerecektir ki dünyada böyle bir örnek yok.
Yazım uzun oldu farkındayım ancak bu konuların bilinmesi, kayıtlara geçmesi gerekiyordu. Türkiye’yi Akdeniz’den koparma ve Akdeniz’in bize kıyıda yüzmek için bırakacakları küçük bir kısmı hariç tümünü AB’ye katma hayalleri ise başlı başına bir yazı konusu. NATO güvencesi, AB garantisi gibi konulara hiç giremedim, size dünyadaki en korkunç katliamların Kıbrıs başta olmak üzere BM’nin gözü önünde yaşandığını söyleyeyim.

Doç. Dr. Yurdagül Atun – K K T C / TURKİSHFORUM – ABDULLAH TÜRER YENER

By Sefa Yürükel

Discussions on the political structuring of the “Islamic world,” particularly since the second half of the twentieth century, have intensified around dependency relations, hegemonic struggles, and the hierarchical nature of the international system. When examining the foreign policy choices, security architectures, and economic orientations of states where the Muslim population constitutes the majority, the observation that almost all actors, except the Islamic Republic of Iran, have developed deeply entrenched ties with the United States has become a frequent finding in academic literature. This finding points not merely to a superficial political alignment but to military, financial, and ideological dependency mechanisms that directly affect the survival of regimes. The fact that governments in most parts of Islamic geography act in harmony with Washington centered strategic interests should be evaluated as a combination of historical continuities, structural constraints, and transformations at the elite level.

The origins of this dependency relationship lie in post colonial state building processes, the polarizing dynamics of the Cold War, and the core periphery structure of the modern capitalist world system. Islamic countries in the Middle East, North Africa, Southeast Asia, and Sub Saharan Africa have continued to be the stage for global power struggles since the moment they gained independence; the ruling elites of these countries adopted recourse to the patronage of great powers as a rational strategy to consolidate their own power. Iran’s remaining outside this general trend can be explained by the paradigmatic rupture created by the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the subsequent institutional transformation. After the revolution, the Tehran administration adopted a radical course aimed at breaking the dependency chain by making anti imperialist discourse a fundamental pillar of state ideology.

One of the most important factors determining the nature of political regimes in Islamic countries is the manner of their integration into the international system. It is observed that even in states possessing strategic energy resources such as oil and natural gas, decision making processes are largely shaped by Washington’s geopolitical calculations. The Gulf monarchies, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain, have built their military security on American bases and weapons supply chains. In North Africa, countries like Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco maintain regime stability thanks to financial aid and political support from the USA. This picture reveals that almost the entire Islamic world faces serious constraints regarding its sovereignty capacity.

When contemplating the strategies required for transforming existing dependency structures, grasping the multidimensional nature of the problem is imperative. Interlocking dependency relations at military, economic, political, and ideological levels can only be overcome through a holistic and long term transformation program. The Iranian experience at this point offers both an inspiring example and a cautionary model in terms of its costs. The Iranian route, shaped under the discourse of exporting the revolution, regional proxy wars, and international sanctions, demonstrates how heavy the price of breaking free from dependency can be. Nevertheless, it also proves that an alternative conception of sovereignty is within the realm of possibility.

The discussion presented below examines the historical roots of dependent governance structures in Islamic countries, the economic and military mechanisms, elite structuring, Iran’s distinctive position, and ultimately the parameters of the search for strategic autonomy. Under each heading, a different dimension of the issue is analyzed in depth; the interaction between historical continuities, structural constraints, and actor preferences is scrutinized. The aim is not merely to describe the current situation but also to draw an intellectual map of the possibilities of liberation and autonomy that lie before the Islamic world.

Historical Roots and the Colonial Legacy

The political structures of modern Islamic states are a direct product of the process by which Western imperialism dismembered and reshaped Islamic geography in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the weakening of the Qajar dynasty in Iran, and the dissolution of the Mughal Empire, almost the entire Islamic world came under the direct or indirect control of British, French, Dutch, and Russian colonial empires. The artificial borders drawn by the Sykes Picot Agreement ignored ethnic and sectarian fault lines, creating the infrastructure for the dynamics of instability and conflict that extend to the present day. The mandate administrations and protectorate regimes established during this period served as a critical laboratory for cultivating local collaborative elites and constructing dependent state apparatuses.

The colonial powers acted with great skill in manipulating traditional sources of legitimacy while governing Islamic lands, using tribal leaders, religious authorities, and the commercial bourgeoisie in line with their own interests. The preservation of the monarchy under British protection in Egypt, French cooperation with local sultans and beys in North Africa, and the Dutch incorporation of the traditional aristocracy into the colonial apparatus in Indonesia are manifestations of the same dependency logic in different geographies. These practices led even the nationalist cadres who came to power in the post independence period to inherit colonial mentality patterns and institutional structures. Indeed, even radical nationalist regimes in countries like Algeria, Libya, and Iraq could not fully transform the bureaucratic mechanisms and political economic dependency relations shaped during the colonial period.

Although the wave of decolonization following the Second World War brought formal sovereignty to Islamic countries, economic and political independence remained largely on paper. The newly independent states were trapped in monetary areas centered on the former metropole, such as the French Franc zone or the Sterling area; infrastructure investments, trade routes, and raw material flows were designed according to the needs of Western Europe. The foundations of international financial institutions were also laid precisely in this period; the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund integrated Islamic countries into the global capitalist system as dependent clients through structural adjustment programs. This asymmetric integration process largely dashed the hopes of development and prosperity promised by the post independence era.

Perhaps the most destructive dimension of the colonial legacy is the profound erosion of the legitimacy basis of politics and state governance in Islamic societies. While traditional Islamic governance concepts contained participatory and accountable mechanisms shaped around institutions such as the circle of justice, shura, hisbah, and waqf, colonial administrations either completely eliminated these institutions or hollowed them out, turning them into instruments of authoritarian rule. The nationalization of waqf lands, the bureaucratization of the ulama, and the narrowing of the scope of sharia law should be recorded as the principal interventions that erased the organic institutional memory of Islamic societies. This historical trauma is of vital importance in understanding the governance crises and legitimacy deficits in contemporary Islamic countries.

In the post colonial period, Islamic countries inherited three fundamental mechanisms that sustain or deepen dependency relations: distribution coalitions based on rentier economies, military bureaucratic elites integrated with external powers, and repressive apparatuses ensuring social control. The oil monarchy in Saudi Arabia, the military republic in Egypt, and the bureaucratic tutelage regime in Pakistan, despite having different appearances, are essentially different manifestations of the same dependency logic. All of these regimes owe their internal legitimacy not to social consent but to external patronage and force based control mechanisms. Iran’s ability to break this chain in 1979 was possible precisely because it simultaneously targeted these three mechanisms and was able to substitute new sources of legitimacy in their place.

The most important lesson revealed by historical experience is that dependency structures do not tend to dissolve on their own. The post colonial institutional architecture has turned into an equilibrium where interest groups are reproduced and dependency becomes institutionalized. Shaking this equilibrium is only possible through strong social mobilization, an alternative ideological framework, and a strategic reading of the international conjuncture. The uniqueness of the Iranian Islamic Revolution lies in its ability to bring these three elements together at the same historical moment. The reasons why similar attempts in other Islamic countries have failed or were never even attempted will be examined in detail under subsequent headings.

The Cold War Period, Alliance Systems and Patronage Relations

The bipolar international system that took shape after the Second World War forced Islamic countries to make strategic choices, and these choices largely resulted in the institutionalization of dependency relations. Within the framework of its strategy to contain the Soviet Union, the United States defined Islamic geography as a critical geopolitical belt and established an alliance chain extending from Turkey to Pakistan and from Iran to Saudi Arabia. This security architecture, woven together by the Baghdad Pact, CENTO, and bilateral defense agreements, subordinated the foreign policy and security choices of participating countries to Washington’s strategic calculations. Throughout the Cold War, the discourse of the Soviet “threat” served as a convenient tool to legitimize the repressive practices of authoritarian regimes in Islamic countries and to guarantee American support.

The approach of American foreign policy towards the Islamic world during the Cold War rested on three main pillars: control of strategic energy resources, prevention of Soviet influence, and ensuring Israel’s security. The simultaneous realization of these three objectives necessitated support for status quo oriented, pro Western regimes in the region that were insensitive to social demands. Indeed, the CIA backed coup that overthrew the Mosaddegh government in Iran in 1953 should be considered the symbolic beginning of the liquidation of democratic nationalism in the Islamic world and the consolidation of dependent authoritarian regimes. This coup demonstrated in all its starkness the extent to which Washington could disregard the popular will and constitutional legitimacy in Islamic countries.

Although the rise of populist nationalist currents such as Nasserism and Baathism in the Arab world led to tactical changes in American strategy, the objective of consolidating dependency relations essentially remained unchanged. Gamal Abdel Nasser’s initial rapprochement with the Soviet Union in Egypt prompted Washington to strengthen its other allies in the region; particularly Saudi Arabia and the Pahlavi monarchy in Iran were promoted as the regional gendarmes of American strategy. In accordance with the “twin pillars” policy formulated during the Nixon era, Iran and Saudi Arabia were positioned as the two allies undertaking the guardianship of American interests in the Persian Gulf. This policy led to astronomical levels of military spending in both countries and the diversion of societal resources towards armament.

The end of the Cold War, far from diminishing American influence over Islamic countries, on the contrary, allowed Washington to intervene more directly in the region as an unrivaled hegemon. With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, Islamic movements were constructed as the new other; the demonization of Iran and the Gulf War launched upon Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait paved the way for the permanent stationing of the American military presence in the region. The deployment of American troops on Saudi Arabian soil drew the ire of radical Islamic circles, particularly Osama bin Laden, and this situation became one of the catalysts for the process that would later lead to the September 11 attacks.

The most important benefit that alliance systems provide for ruling elites in Islamic countries is the opportunity to compensate for the lack of internal legitimacy with external support. Many regimes, from the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the Moroccan monarchy, from the Gulf emirates to the Egyptian military administration, owe their power not to social consent but to the patronage relationship they have established with Washington. This asymmetric dependency directly affects not only foreign policy choices but also domestic political arrangements, economic reform programs, and even cultural transformation projects. In return for American aid and security guarantees, these regimes fulfill obligations such as normalization with Israel, allocation of military bases, harmonization of energy policies, and suppression of Islamic movements.

The most concrete contemporary reflection of the alliance structures shaped during the Cold War is the wave of Arab Israeli “normalization” that gained momentum with the Abraham Accords process. The establishment of diplomatic relations by the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco with Israel reveals the extent to which these countries’ foreign policy autonomy is limited. Despite the central position that the Palestinian issue has occupied in the Islamic world for decades, the regimes in question have preferred integration into Washington’s geopolitical agenda over the discourse of Islamic solidarity. This preference demonstrates that dependency relations carry not only a material but also a normative dimension; the value systems and hierarchies of priorities of governments in Islamic countries are also shaped by dependency structures.

Oil Economy, Rent Dependency and Economic Subordination

In the vast majority of Islamic countries, the material basis of political dependency is formed by the political economic structure based on oil and natural gas rent. The process of discovering and exploiting hydrocarbon resources was carried out under the control of Western energy companies from the outset; this led producer countries to become dependent on international markets and technology transfer. Giant structures such as ARAMCO in Saudi Arabia, the Kuwait Oil Company in Kuwait, and the Anglo Persian Oil Company in Iran were managed by Western shareholders for many years; the share of host countries from oil revenues remained extremely limited. Despite nationalization waves, technological dependency in the energy sector and Western control over global market mechanisms largely persisted.

The political consequences of rentier economies have been decisive on the governance structures of the Islamic world. State revenues not based on taxation sever the accountability link between rulers and ruled; citizens’ demands for political participation are suppressed through welfare distribution and patronage networks. Contrary to the principle of “no taxation without representation,” an understanding of “no representation without taxation” has become institutionalized in the Gulf monarchies. Thanks to oil revenues, the state provides material resources to society while curtailing political rights; this serves as a social contract that enables the maintenance of authoritarian stability. The relative stability of the Gulf countries during the Arab Spring points precisely to the effectiveness of this rent distribution mechanism.

The petrodollar cycle constitutes one of the most concrete and least discussed dimensions of the dependency relationship between Islamic countries and the United States of America. In accordance with the informal agreement established between Saudi Arabia and Washington in the 1970s, pricing oil exports in dollars and investing the resulting revenues in US Treasury bonds consolidated the dollar’s status as the global reserve currency; in return, the US provided a military security guarantee to the Saudi monarchy. This symbiotic relationship has led to the integration of Gulf capital into the global financial system via Wall Street and the erosion of the financial sovereignty of Islamic countries. A large portion of oil revenues is invested in Western financial institutions, and as a result, the resources of the Islamic world are used to finance Western economies.

The arms trade stands out as one of the most striking manifestations of economic dependency. Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Kuwait are among the world’s largest arms importers, and the overwhelming majority of these purchases are made from the American, British, and French defense industries. Multibillion dollar arms deals not only deepen military dependency but also serve the function of purchasing influence and securing political support in the eyes of Western decision makers. The maintenance, spare parts, and training requirements of weapons systems chain these countries to Western suppliers for decades and carry the risk of this chain being used as a geopolitical lever in the event of any crisis.

Another dimension of economic subordination is the systematic weakening of the agricultural and industrial sectors in Islamic countries and the rendering of food security dependent on foreign sources. Monoculture agricultural practices that began in the colonial period continued after independence; agricultural policies focused on export crops such as cotton, tea, coffee, and peanuts increased dependency on imports for basic foodstuffs. Egypt becoming one of the world’s largest buyers of wheat imports, and Algeria and Saudi Arabia attempting to secure food security through land leasing, are current manifestations of this structural fragility. Food dependency keeps a constant channel open for political blackmail and manipulation, leaving Islamic countries extremely vulnerable in times of international crisis.

The credit relationships entered into with international financial institutions and structural adjustment programs should be addressed under a separate heading in the deepening of economic subordination. Countries such as Egypt, Pakistan, Tunisia, and Jordan continually sign stand by agreements with the IMF to finance chronic foreign trade deficits; the neoliberal reforms imposed in return, such as privatization, deregulation, and cuts to public spending, weaken state capacity and fuel social discontent. Numerous examples, from the infitah policy implemented in Egypt during the Anwar Sadat era to Pakistan’s IMF programs after Zia ul Haq, reveal how this vicious cycle traps Islamic countries in a constant spiral of dependency.

Military Integration and Security Dependency

The backbone of the relations between regimes in Islamic countries and the United States of America is formed by military cooperation and security dependency. This dependency has become institutionalized through arms supply, military training programs, joint exercises, intelligence sharing, and, in its most concrete form, the presence of American military bases. The Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, the Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain, the Al Dhafra Base in the United Arab Emirates, and deployments in Kuwait are the fundamental elements of Washington’s permanent military architecture in the Persian Gulf. Incirlik Base in Turkey, air bases in Jordan, and logistics facilities in Pakistan are other links completing this picture. These bases function as forward posts that erode the sovereignty of host countries and allow for Washington’s direct intervention in times of crisis.

Military education and doctrine transfer is a less visible but at least as effective dimension of security dependency as military bases. Within the scope of the International Military Education and Training Program conducted by the United States, officer cadres of Islamic countries are trained at American war academies; this process serves to embed a pro American mentality and institutional culture among military elites. The predominance of officers who received American training in the upper command echelons of the armies of Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia is striking. These officers tend to align not only their military doctrine and tactics but also their political preferences and threat perceptions with Washington’s geopolitical perspective.

Intelligence cooperation is another critical mechanism integrating Islamic countries into Washington’s security architecture. The deep partnership between the CIA and NSA and local intelligence services directly affects the internal security policies and regional strategies of these countries. Egypt’s General Intelligence Service, Saudi Arabia’s General Intelligence Presidency, Turkey’s MIT, Jordan’s General Intelligence Directorate, and Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence are among the institutions with the closest relations with the American intelligence community. These relations, spanning a wide spectrum from monitoring and suppressing Islamic movements to balancing regional rivals, have a quality that narrows the sovereignty space of host countries and increases Washington’s operational capabilities.

The air defense systems, early warning radars, and missile defense architectures of the Gulf countries operate in a fully integrated manner with American technology and personnel. Patriot and THAAD batteries, as one of the most visible elements of the American military presence in the Gulf, symbolize these countries’ defenselessness against threats that may come from Iran and their dependency on Washington. The ineffectiveness of American defense systems during the UAV attack on Saudi ARAMCO facilities in 2019 laid bare in all its starkness the strategic vulnerability and asymmetric costs of this dependency. Despite this, the Gulf monarchies choose the path of further deepening their security ties with Washington instead of turning to alternative suppliers or developing their own defense capabilities.

The situation of Turkey, a NATO member, exemplifies a different dimension of military integration. Forming the alliance’s southeastern flank during the Cold War, Turkey developed a deep dependency relationship through American military aid and nuclear weapons deployments. The tensions experienced after the 2016 coup attempt and the S 400 air defense system crisis demonstrate how painful and costly efforts to partially break free from this dependency can be. Washington’s steps, such as removing Turkey from the F 35 program and CAATSA sanctions, prove that military dependency creates a kind of strategic hostage situation and that allies wishing to escape this situation have to pay heavy prices.

One of the most dangerous consequences of security dependency is that armies in Islamic countries increasingly become alienated from their own societies and orient towards regime guardianship rather than national defense. The perpetuation of the rule of the “Sunni minority” regime over the “Shia majority” in Bahrain through the army and security forces, the Egyptian military’s manipulation of the political process to preserve its vast presence in the economy, and the military bureaucracy’s constant overshadowing of civilian governments in Pakistan are different manifestations of this pathological situation. While the primary duty of armies, external defense, is pushed to the background; functions such as internal security, regime protection, and even economic rent sharing come to the fore. This transformation ensures the emergence of the kind of military apparatuses desired by Washington: ones that do not answer to society and are dependent on external powers.

Iran’s Differentiated Position and Analysis of the Revolutionary Model

The Islamic Republic of Iran stands out as a radically different example within the general dependency landscape of the Islamic world. The 1979 Revolution not only eliminated the Pahlavi monarchy, the most important pillar of American influence in Iran, but also laid the foundations of a new political model, institutional architecture, and ideological orientation. The constitutional order shaped around the doctrine of velayat e faqih, by bringing together Islamic legitimacy and republican representation, developed an authentic form of governance that constitutes an alternative to Western democracy models and secular authoritarian regimes. The state of enmity with the US, which began with the hostage crisis immediately after the revolution, became the founding element of Tehran’s foreign policy and made the process of breaking away from dependency relations irreversible.

The most important dynamic behind Iran’s breaking of the dependency chain is the mass character of the revolution and its basis of social legitimacy. The millions of people who filled the streets of Iran in 1979 rose up not only against the Shah’s regime but also against the American imperialism behind it. This mass mobilization enabled the new regime to consolidate its power without needing external support, but by directly targeting external support mechanisms. The revolutionary cadres led by Khomeini were able to implement radical steps such as purging the army, establishing the Revolutionary Guards, Islamizing the judiciary, and nationalization policies in the economy thanks to broad social support. Coups or top down reform attempts in other Islamic countries failed to transform dependency relations because they lacked a similar basis of social legitimacy.

To understand Iran’s uniqueness, one needs to look closely at the institutional consequences of the revolution. The Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution was designed not merely as a military force but also as the ideological guardian of the revolution, an economic actor, and a center of political influence. The Basij militia force under the Guards fulfills the functions of social mobilization and internal control; the Quds Force serves as the fundamental instrument of regional influence projection. These institutional innovations allowed Iran to build a security architecture that both prevents the re emergence of dependent elites internally and enables it to gain strategic depth externally. However, the expanding control of the Guards over the economy and their weight in the political process have also led over time to the emergence of a new type of elite dependency and corruption networks in Iran.

In the economic sphere, the resistance economy strategy pursued by Iran constitutes the most difficult and least successful dimension of the effort to break free from dependency. Developed under international sanctions, this strategy includes a combination of import substitution, promotion of domestic production, the quest for scientific and technological autonomy, and financial mechanisms to circumvent sanctions. Iran’s missile program, its advances in nuclear technology, and the distance it has covered in unmanned aerial vehicle production prove that military industrial autonomy is possible. However, in the civilian economy, chronic problems such as inflation, unemployment, corruption, and inefficiency persist; this situation stands out as the most significant factor eroding the regime’s social support. The Mahsa Amini protests and periodically erupting economically based social movements reveal the limits of the resistance economy and the fatigue it creates among the people.

Iran’s regional strategy constitutes the geopolitical dimension of the goal of breaking free from dependency. Strategic partnerships established with Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Hashd al Shaabi groups in Iraq, and Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine are instruments Tehran resorts to in order to balance American influence and expand its own sphere of influence. This informal alliance system, referred to as the axis of resistance, allows Iran to compensate for its conventional military deficiencies through asymmetric methods and to keep Washington’s allies in the region under constant threat. However, the cost of this strategy is also quite high: billions of dollars spent on proxy wars are deducted from the people’s welfare; the fueling of sectarian tensions deepens the divisions within the Islamic world.

The Iranian model shows that breaking free from dependency is possible, but it is an extremely costly and risky path. A revolutionary rupture can only succeed through a combination of strong social mobilization, charismatic leadership, an alternative ideological framework, and a suitable international conjuncture. Iran’s ability to survive for over forty years stems from its ability to maintain a certain combination of these elements. Nevertheless, internal social discontent, the corrosive effect of economic sanctions, and the risk of escalation of regional tensions raise serious question marks regarding the sustainability of the model. The Iranian experience is both inspiring and cautionary for the rest of the Islamic world; breaking free from dependency is possible, but the price of this path is heavy, and each society needs to develop a strategy suitable to its own specific conditions.

Elite Structuring, Authoritarian Consolidation and the Reproduction of Dependency

The composition of ruling elites in Islamic countries and the mechanisms of their reproduction constitute one of the most critical factors ensuring the continuity of dependency relations. The nationalist, monarchic, or military origin elites who came to power in the post independence period preferred to consolidate their own power within the institutional structures shaped during the colonial period and the externally dependent political economic order, rather than transforming them. This preference has, over time, led to the emergence of an elite class that transforms dependency itself into a source of benefit. This class, educated in Western educational institutions, integrated with transnational financial networks, and adopting luxury consumption patterns, becomes increasingly alienated from its own societies and derives its legitimacy not from the social base but from its external connections and repressive apparatuses.

The domination of military bureaucratic elites over the political process is a phenomenon observed in almost the entire Islamic world. The eras of Hosni Mubarak and Abdel Fattah el Sisi in Egypt, Kenan Evren in Turkey, Zia ul Haq and Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan, the Suharto regime in Indonesia, the military tutelage system in Algeria, and the post 1960 coup tradition in Turkey demonstrate how the army, by narrowing the political space and sidelining civilian alternatives, consolidates dependency structures. Military elites preserve their institutional autonomy and political influence using the weapons, training, and financial resources they obtain from Western allies; this cycle serves to divert national resources towards military expenditures instead of productive investments and to deepen dependency.

Dynastic structures in the Gulf monarchies represent a different form of elite dependency. The Al Saud family, the Al Nahyan, Al Maktoum, Al Sabah, and Al Thani dynasties, using their monopoly over the distribution of oil rent, have succeeded in binding extended family networks, tribal connections, and business circles around the regime. In this patrimonial system, there is a direct relationship between the survival of the dynasty and the country’s dependency choices in foreign policy. The assumption that dynastic regimes cannot survive without American security guarantees makes these countries’ relations with Washington a strategic necessity. Power struggles among crown princes and reform attempts cannot change this fundamental structural reality; on the contrary, they make the need for external support even more visible.

At the ideological level, the integration of ruling elites in Islamic countries with Western value systems and lifestyles forms the cultural and psychological basis of dependency. Frantz Fanon’s diagnosis of “black skin, white masks” in colonial societies is also largely valid for the ruling classes of the contemporary Islamic world. These elites, educated at Western universities, speaking English and French better than their native languages, and spending their vacations in London, Paris, and New York, are alienated from the religious and cultural values of their own people; they have often developed a mentality that despises these values. This cultural alienation leads to the formation of an elite consciousness that internalizes and does not question dependency relations; it undermines the intellectual foundations of an authentic quest for development and sovereignty.

One of the most dangerous consequences of dependent elite structuring is the systematic erosion of state capacity and institutional decay. Corruption, nepotism, and the abandonment of the merit principle have rendered state apparatuses dysfunctional in large parts of the Islamic world; while the quality of public services declines, citizens’ trust in the state has eroded. The governance indicators of the World Bank and the corruption indices of Transparency International reveal that the vast majority of Islamic countries exhibit a highly negative performance in these areas. Institutional decay creates a vicious cycle that deepens dependency; weak and corrupt state apparatuses need external support more to close the legitimacy gap, and this support further reinforces dependency.

In the face of this picture, what needs to be done is to develop mechanisms that will enable elite transformation in Islamic countries. The construction of a public sphere that allows for the cultivation of alternative elites through political parties, civil society organizations, independent media, and academic institutions is a prerequisite for breaking the dependency cycle. However, in none of the partial and different examples has a radical rupture similar to that in Iran occurred; instead, attempts have been made to expand the maneuvering space within the existing international system. For elite transformation to deepen and become permanent, a holistic strategy is required that targets the transformation of all institutional fields, not just the ballot box, from the education system to the economy, from the media to the judiciary.

Search for Solutions and the Parameters of Strategic Autonomy

The strategies to be developed for an exit from the dependency spiral in which the Islamic world finds itself must grasp the multidimensional nature of the issue and be based on a long term transformation vision beyond short term tactical moves. The interlocking character of military, economic, political, and ideological dependency mechanisms demonstrates that improvement in any one area cannot be permanent unless supported by transformations in other areas. This situation constitutes the greatest intellectual and political challenge facing Islamic countries: how can a holistic strategic autonomy program that simultaneously targets all dimensions of dependency be formulated and implemented.

Economic independence is the most fundamental and most difficult dimension of strategic autonomy. Islamic countries need to carry out structural reforms that will enable the transition from a rentier economy to a production economy; they need to build self sufficiency capacity in agriculture, industry, and technology. This transformation necessitates not only macroeconomic policy changes but also a mental transformation. The progress made by Malaysia and Indonesia in the areas of “food and finance,” Turkey’s breakthroughs in the defense industry, and the technological capabilities Iran has developed under sanctions demonstrate that a production oriented transformation is within the realm of possibility. A common market established within the body of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, preferential trade agreements, and the strengthening of Islamic development banking can form the institutional infrastructure of economic independence.

The search for strategic autonomy in the military and security field constitutes one of the greatest dilemmas of Islamic countries. The existing security architectures are largely dependent on the American military presence, intelligence networks, and weapons supply chains. To break free from this dependency, “Islamic countries” need to develop a security cooperation mechanism among themselves, carry out joint defense industry projects, and increase domestic production capacity in critical technologies. Turkey’s advancement in unmanned aerial vehicle technology and its export of these systems to various Islamic countries, Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence capability, and Iran’s missile program prove that different dimensions of military autonomy are possible. However, geopolitical rivalries and lack of trust among Islamic countries continue to exist as the greatest obstacle to the construction of a common security architecture.

The issue of political legitimacy lies at the center of the strategy for liberation from dependency. Regimes that do not rely on social consent and base their power on external patronage and repressive apparatuses cannot be expected to embark on a quest for strategic autonomy. Therefore, the establishment of participatory, accountable, and just governance mechanisms in “Islamic countries” is the indispensable condition for breaking the dependency chain.

Ideological and cultural independence is one of the most neglected yet most vital dimensions of the strategic autonomy program. The revival of the institutions of knowledge and culture that have been systematically eroded since the colonial period; the purification of education systems from the manipulative aspects of West centered “knowledge” hierarchies; and the strengthening of the intellectual and artistic production capacity in “Islamic countries” are imperative for the establishment of cultural self confidence. In this context, expanding student and academic exchange programs among “Islamic countries,” establishing joint research centers, encouraging translation activities, and deepening cooperation in the media field can contribute to overcoming ideological dependency. The success of international broadcasters such as Al Jazeera and TRT demonstrates the capacity of the “Islamic world” to produce alternative narratives in the global media ecosystem.

Regional integration and solidarity within the “Islamic world” stand out as one of the most powerful instruments for breaking the dependency chain. Existing institutional structures such as the fifty seven member Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the D 8 Developing Eight, the Economic Cooperation Organization, and the Islamic Development Bank perform far below their potential. Increasing the effectiveness of these structures requires resolving political disputes among member states and coming together around common interests. Recent positive developments such as the Iran Saudi Arabia normalization, the Turkey Egypt rapprochement, and the end of the embargo on Qatar indicate that a favorable ground for regional reconciliation and integration is taking shape. Increasing the share of trade among “Islamic countries” within total foreign trade from the current level of around ten percent to higher levels would be the most concrete indicator of economic independence.

The adoption of a multi dimensional and balanced strategy in the field of foreign policy can accelerate the process of liberation from dependency. Just as Islamic countries were forced to choose between Washington or Moscow during the Cold War, today the great power rivalry between Beijing and Washington offers strategic maneuvering space to the Islamic world. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Russia’s return to the Middle East, and India’s increasing regional weight present alternative economic and strategic partnerships that can balance the dependency of Islamic countries on the West. However, it is of vital importance that this balancing strategy aims for genuine strategic autonomy rather than substituting one dependency relationship with another. The relations Iran has developed with China and Russia contain important lessons on how to manage this fine line.

In the final analysis, the liberation of the “Islamic world” from the dependency spiral requires a long term, multidimensional, and patient transformation strategy. The success of this strategy depends on the simultaneous mobilization of political will, social mobilization, intellectual depth, and institutional innovation capacity. The over forty year experience of the Islamic Republic of Iran shows that breaking away from dependency is possible, but that it is a painful process requiring heavy prices to be paid. Other Islamic countries need to learn lessons from Iran’s experience and develop strategic autonomy models that are suitable for their own specific conditions, less costly, and more inclusive.

Awareness raising and mobilization activities to be carried out at the social level are indispensable for the sustainability of the strategic autonomy program. Through civil society organizations, professional associations, universities, madrasa circles, and media platforms, awareness should be raised about the cost of dependency structures to society and an alternative vision of sovereignty should be promoted. The adoption of Islamic finance at the grassroots level in Malaysia and the spirit of national solidarity developed against embargoes in Iran should be recorded as successful examples of social mobilization. The ultimate goal is the construction of a self confident and resilient social structure that grasps that dependency is not only a political and economic issue but also a matter of mentality and consciousness.

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Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
Aarhus University, 1997
Independent Researcher
Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures.