By Sefa Yürükel
Discussions on the political structuring of the “Islamic world,” particularly since the second half of the twentieth century, have intensified around dependency relations, hegemonic struggles, and the hierarchical nature of the international system. When examining the foreign policy choices, security architectures, and economic orientations of states where the Muslim population constitutes the majority, the observation that almost all actors, except the Islamic Republic of Iran, have developed deeply entrenched ties with the United States has become a frequent finding in academic literature. This finding points not merely to a superficial political alignment but to military, financial, and ideological dependency mechanisms that directly affect the survival of regimes. The fact that governments in most parts of Islamic geography act in harmony with Washington centered strategic interests should be evaluated as a combination of historical continuities, structural constraints, and transformations at the elite level.
The origins of this dependency relationship lie in post colonial state building processes, the polarizing dynamics of the Cold War, and the core periphery structure of the modern capitalist world system. Islamic countries in the Middle East, North Africa, Southeast Asia, and Sub Saharan Africa have continued to be the stage for global power struggles since the moment they gained independence; the ruling elites of these countries adopted recourse to the patronage of great powers as a rational strategy to consolidate their own power. Iran’s remaining outside this general trend can be explained by the paradigmatic rupture created by the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the subsequent institutional transformation. After the revolution, the Tehran administration adopted a radical course aimed at breaking the dependency chain by making anti imperialist discourse a fundamental pillar of state ideology.
One of the most important factors determining the nature of political regimes in Islamic countries is the manner of their integration into the international system. It is observed that even in states possessing strategic energy resources such as oil and natural gas, decision making processes are largely shaped by Washington’s geopolitical calculations. The Gulf monarchies, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain, have built their military security on American bases and weapons supply chains. In North Africa, countries like Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco maintain regime stability thanks to financial aid and political support from the USA. This picture reveals that almost the entire Islamic world faces serious constraints regarding its sovereignty capacity.
When contemplating the strategies required for transforming existing dependency structures, grasping the multidimensional nature of the problem is imperative. Interlocking dependency relations at military, economic, political, and ideological levels can only be overcome through a holistic and long term transformation program. The Iranian experience at this point offers both an inspiring example and a cautionary model in terms of its costs. The Iranian route, shaped under the discourse of exporting the revolution, regional proxy wars, and international sanctions, demonstrates how heavy the price of breaking free from dependency can be. Nevertheless, it also proves that an alternative conception of sovereignty is within the realm of possibility.
The discussion presented below examines the historical roots of dependent governance structures in Islamic countries, the economic and military mechanisms, elite structuring, Iran’s distinctive position, and ultimately the parameters of the search for strategic autonomy. Under each heading, a different dimension of the issue is analyzed in depth; the interaction between historical continuities, structural constraints, and actor preferences is scrutinized. The aim is not merely to describe the current situation but also to draw an intellectual map of the possibilities of liberation and autonomy that lie before the Islamic world.
Historical Roots and the Colonial Legacy
The political structures of modern Islamic states are a direct product of the process by which Western imperialism dismembered and reshaped Islamic geography in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the weakening of the Qajar dynasty in Iran, and the dissolution of the Mughal Empire, almost the entire Islamic world came under the direct or indirect control of British, French, Dutch, and Russian colonial empires. The artificial borders drawn by the Sykes Picot Agreement ignored ethnic and sectarian fault lines, creating the infrastructure for the dynamics of instability and conflict that extend to the present day. The mandate administrations and protectorate regimes established during this period served as a critical laboratory for cultivating local collaborative elites and constructing dependent state apparatuses.
The colonial powers acted with great skill in manipulating traditional sources of legitimacy while governing Islamic lands, using tribal leaders, religious authorities, and the commercial bourgeoisie in line with their own interests. The preservation of the monarchy under British protection in Egypt, French cooperation with local sultans and beys in North Africa, and the Dutch incorporation of the traditional aristocracy into the colonial apparatus in Indonesia are manifestations of the same dependency logic in different geographies. These practices led even the nationalist cadres who came to power in the post independence period to inherit colonial mentality patterns and institutional structures. Indeed, even radical nationalist regimes in countries like Algeria, Libya, and Iraq could not fully transform the bureaucratic mechanisms and political economic dependency relations shaped during the colonial period.
Although the wave of decolonization following the Second World War brought formal sovereignty to Islamic countries, economic and political independence remained largely on paper. The newly independent states were trapped in monetary areas centered on the former metropole, such as the French Franc zone or the Sterling area; infrastructure investments, trade routes, and raw material flows were designed according to the needs of Western Europe. The foundations of international financial institutions were also laid precisely in this period; the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund integrated Islamic countries into the global capitalist system as dependent clients through structural adjustment programs. This asymmetric integration process largely dashed the hopes of development and prosperity promised by the post independence era.
Perhaps the most destructive dimension of the colonial legacy is the profound erosion of the legitimacy basis of politics and state governance in Islamic societies. While traditional Islamic governance concepts contained participatory and accountable mechanisms shaped around institutions such as the circle of justice, shura, hisbah, and waqf, colonial administrations either completely eliminated these institutions or hollowed them out, turning them into instruments of authoritarian rule. The nationalization of waqf lands, the bureaucratization of the ulama, and the narrowing of the scope of sharia law should be recorded as the principal interventions that erased the organic institutional memory of Islamic societies. This historical trauma is of vital importance in understanding the governance crises and legitimacy deficits in contemporary Islamic countries.
In the post colonial period, Islamic countries inherited three fundamental mechanisms that sustain or deepen dependency relations: distribution coalitions based on rentier economies, military bureaucratic elites integrated with external powers, and repressive apparatuses ensuring social control. The oil monarchy in Saudi Arabia, the military republic in Egypt, and the bureaucratic tutelage regime in Pakistan, despite having different appearances, are essentially different manifestations of the same dependency logic. All of these regimes owe their internal legitimacy not to social consent but to external patronage and force based control mechanisms. Iran’s ability to break this chain in 1979 was possible precisely because it simultaneously targeted these three mechanisms and was able to substitute new sources of legitimacy in their place.
The most important lesson revealed by historical experience is that dependency structures do not tend to dissolve on their own. The post colonial institutional architecture has turned into an equilibrium where interest groups are reproduced and dependency becomes institutionalized. Shaking this equilibrium is only possible through strong social mobilization, an alternative ideological framework, and a strategic reading of the international conjuncture. The uniqueness of the Iranian Islamic Revolution lies in its ability to bring these three elements together at the same historical moment. The reasons why similar attempts in other Islamic countries have failed or were never even attempted will be examined in detail under subsequent headings.
The Cold War Period, Alliance Systems and Patronage Relations
The bipolar international system that took shape after the Second World War forced Islamic countries to make strategic choices, and these choices largely resulted in the institutionalization of dependency relations. Within the framework of its strategy to contain the Soviet Union, the United States defined Islamic geography as a critical geopolitical belt and established an alliance chain extending from Turkey to Pakistan and from Iran to Saudi Arabia. This security architecture, woven together by the Baghdad Pact, CENTO, and bilateral defense agreements, subordinated the foreign policy and security choices of participating countries to Washington’s strategic calculations. Throughout the Cold War, the discourse of the Soviet “threat” served as a convenient tool to legitimize the repressive practices of authoritarian regimes in Islamic countries and to guarantee American support.
The approach of American foreign policy towards the Islamic world during the Cold War rested on three main pillars: control of strategic energy resources, prevention of Soviet influence, and ensuring Israel’s security. The simultaneous realization of these three objectives necessitated support for status quo oriented, pro Western regimes in the region that were insensitive to social demands. Indeed, the CIA backed coup that overthrew the Mosaddegh government in Iran in 1953 should be considered the symbolic beginning of the liquidation of democratic nationalism in the Islamic world and the consolidation of dependent authoritarian regimes. This coup demonstrated in all its starkness the extent to which Washington could disregard the popular will and constitutional legitimacy in Islamic countries.
Although the rise of populist nationalist currents such as Nasserism and Baathism in the Arab world led to tactical changes in American strategy, the objective of consolidating dependency relations essentially remained unchanged. Gamal Abdel Nasser’s initial rapprochement with the Soviet Union in Egypt prompted Washington to strengthen its other allies in the region; particularly Saudi Arabia and the Pahlavi monarchy in Iran were promoted as the regional gendarmes of American strategy. In accordance with the “twin pillars” policy formulated during the Nixon era, Iran and Saudi Arabia were positioned as the two allies undertaking the guardianship of American interests in the Persian Gulf. This policy led to astronomical levels of military spending in both countries and the diversion of societal resources towards armament.
The end of the Cold War, far from diminishing American influence over Islamic countries, on the contrary, allowed Washington to intervene more directly in the region as an unrivaled hegemon. With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, Islamic movements were constructed as the new other; the demonization of Iran and the Gulf War launched upon Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait paved the way for the permanent stationing of the American military presence in the region. The deployment of American troops on Saudi Arabian soil drew the ire of radical Islamic circles, particularly Osama bin Laden, and this situation became one of the catalysts for the process that would later lead to the September 11 attacks.
The most important benefit that alliance systems provide for ruling elites in Islamic countries is the opportunity to compensate for the lack of internal legitimacy with external support. Many regimes, from the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the Moroccan monarchy, from the Gulf emirates to the Egyptian military administration, owe their power not to social consent but to the patronage relationship they have established with Washington. This asymmetric dependency directly affects not only foreign policy choices but also domestic political arrangements, economic reform programs, and even cultural transformation projects. In return for American aid and security guarantees, these regimes fulfill obligations such as normalization with Israel, allocation of military bases, harmonization of energy policies, and suppression of Islamic movements.
The most concrete contemporary reflection of the alliance structures shaped during the Cold War is the wave of Arab Israeli “normalization” that gained momentum with the Abraham Accords process. The establishment of diplomatic relations by the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco with Israel reveals the extent to which these countries’ foreign policy autonomy is limited. Despite the central position that the Palestinian issue has occupied in the Islamic world for decades, the regimes in question have preferred integration into Washington’s geopolitical agenda over the discourse of Islamic solidarity. This preference demonstrates that dependency relations carry not only a material but also a normative dimension; the value systems and hierarchies of priorities of governments in Islamic countries are also shaped by dependency structures.
Oil Economy, Rent Dependency and Economic Subordination
In the vast majority of Islamic countries, the material basis of political dependency is formed by the political economic structure based on oil and natural gas rent. The process of discovering and exploiting hydrocarbon resources was carried out under the control of Western energy companies from the outset; this led producer countries to become dependent on international markets and technology transfer. Giant structures such as ARAMCO in Saudi Arabia, the Kuwait Oil Company in Kuwait, and the Anglo Persian Oil Company in Iran were managed by Western shareholders for many years; the share of host countries from oil revenues remained extremely limited. Despite nationalization waves, technological dependency in the energy sector and Western control over global market mechanisms largely persisted.
The political consequences of rentier economies have been decisive on the governance structures of the Islamic world. State revenues not based on taxation sever the accountability link between rulers and ruled; citizens’ demands for political participation are suppressed through welfare distribution and patronage networks. Contrary to the principle of “no taxation without representation,” an understanding of “no representation without taxation” has become institutionalized in the Gulf monarchies. Thanks to oil revenues, the state provides material resources to society while curtailing political rights; this serves as a social contract that enables the maintenance of authoritarian stability. The relative stability of the Gulf countries during the Arab Spring points precisely to the effectiveness of this rent distribution mechanism.
The petrodollar cycle constitutes one of the most concrete and least discussed dimensions of the dependency relationship between Islamic countries and the United States of America. In accordance with the informal agreement established between Saudi Arabia and Washington in the 1970s, pricing oil exports in dollars and investing the resulting revenues in US Treasury bonds consolidated the dollar’s status as the global reserve currency; in return, the US provided a military security guarantee to the Saudi monarchy. This symbiotic relationship has led to the integration of Gulf capital into the global financial system via Wall Street and the erosion of the financial sovereignty of Islamic countries. A large portion of oil revenues is invested in Western financial institutions, and as a result, the resources of the Islamic world are used to finance Western economies.
The arms trade stands out as one of the most striking manifestations of economic dependency. Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Kuwait are among the world’s largest arms importers, and the overwhelming majority of these purchases are made from the American, British, and French defense industries. Multibillion dollar arms deals not only deepen military dependency but also serve the function of purchasing influence and securing political support in the eyes of Western decision makers. The maintenance, spare parts, and training requirements of weapons systems chain these countries to Western suppliers for decades and carry the risk of this chain being used as a geopolitical lever in the event of any crisis.
Another dimension of economic subordination is the systematic weakening of the agricultural and industrial sectors in Islamic countries and the rendering of food security dependent on foreign sources. Monoculture agricultural practices that began in the colonial period continued after independence; agricultural policies focused on export crops such as cotton, tea, coffee, and peanuts increased dependency on imports for basic foodstuffs. Egypt becoming one of the world’s largest buyers of wheat imports, and Algeria and Saudi Arabia attempting to secure food security through land leasing, are current manifestations of this structural fragility. Food dependency keeps a constant channel open for political blackmail and manipulation, leaving Islamic countries extremely vulnerable in times of international crisis.
The credit relationships entered into with international financial institutions and structural adjustment programs should be addressed under a separate heading in the deepening of economic subordination. Countries such as Egypt, Pakistan, Tunisia, and Jordan continually sign stand by agreements with the IMF to finance chronic foreign trade deficits; the neoliberal reforms imposed in return, such as privatization, deregulation, and cuts to public spending, weaken state capacity and fuel social discontent. Numerous examples, from the infitah policy implemented in Egypt during the Anwar Sadat era to Pakistan’s IMF programs after Zia ul Haq, reveal how this vicious cycle traps Islamic countries in a constant spiral of dependency.
Military Integration and Security Dependency
The backbone of the relations between regimes in Islamic countries and the United States of America is formed by military cooperation and security dependency. This dependency has become institutionalized through arms supply, military training programs, joint exercises, intelligence sharing, and, in its most concrete form, the presence of American military bases. The Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, the Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain, the Al Dhafra Base in the United Arab Emirates, and deployments in Kuwait are the fundamental elements of Washington’s permanent military architecture in the Persian Gulf. Incirlik Base in Turkey, air bases in Jordan, and logistics facilities in Pakistan are other links completing this picture. These bases function as forward posts that erode the sovereignty of host countries and allow for Washington’s direct intervention in times of crisis.
Military education and doctrine transfer is a less visible but at least as effective dimension of security dependency as military bases. Within the scope of the International Military Education and Training Program conducted by the United States, officer cadres of Islamic countries are trained at American war academies; this process serves to embed a pro American mentality and institutional culture among military elites. The predominance of officers who received American training in the upper command echelons of the armies of Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia is striking. These officers tend to align not only their military doctrine and tactics but also their political preferences and threat perceptions with Washington’s geopolitical perspective.
Intelligence cooperation is another critical mechanism integrating Islamic countries into Washington’s security architecture. The deep partnership between the CIA and NSA and local intelligence services directly affects the internal security policies and regional strategies of these countries. Egypt’s General Intelligence Service, Saudi Arabia’s General Intelligence Presidency, Turkey’s MIT, Jordan’s General Intelligence Directorate, and Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence are among the institutions with the closest relations with the American intelligence community. These relations, spanning a wide spectrum from monitoring and suppressing Islamic movements to balancing regional rivals, have a quality that narrows the sovereignty space of host countries and increases Washington’s operational capabilities.
The air defense systems, early warning radars, and missile defense architectures of the Gulf countries operate in a fully integrated manner with American technology and personnel. Patriot and THAAD batteries, as one of the most visible elements of the American military presence in the Gulf, symbolize these countries’ defenselessness against threats that may come from Iran and their dependency on Washington. The ineffectiveness of American defense systems during the UAV attack on Saudi ARAMCO facilities in 2019 laid bare in all its starkness the strategic vulnerability and asymmetric costs of this dependency. Despite this, the Gulf monarchies choose the path of further deepening their security ties with Washington instead of turning to alternative suppliers or developing their own defense capabilities.
The situation of Turkey, a NATO member, exemplifies a different dimension of military integration. Forming the alliance’s southeastern flank during the Cold War, Turkey developed a deep dependency relationship through American military aid and nuclear weapons deployments. The tensions experienced after the 2016 coup attempt and the S 400 air defense system crisis demonstrate how painful and costly efforts to partially break free from this dependency can be. Washington’s steps, such as removing Turkey from the F 35 program and CAATSA sanctions, prove that military dependency creates a kind of strategic hostage situation and that allies wishing to escape this situation have to pay heavy prices.
One of the most dangerous consequences of security dependency is that armies in Islamic countries increasingly become alienated from their own societies and orient towards regime guardianship rather than national defense. The perpetuation of the rule of the “Sunni minority” regime over the “Shia majority” in Bahrain through the army and security forces, the Egyptian military’s manipulation of the political process to preserve its vast presence in the economy, and the military bureaucracy’s constant overshadowing of civilian governments in Pakistan are different manifestations of this pathological situation. While the primary duty of armies, external defense, is pushed to the background; functions such as internal security, regime protection, and even economic rent sharing come to the fore. This transformation ensures the emergence of the kind of military apparatuses desired by Washington: ones that do not answer to society and are dependent on external powers.
Iran’s Differentiated Position and Analysis of the Revolutionary Model
The Islamic Republic of Iran stands out as a radically different example within the general dependency landscape of the Islamic world. The 1979 Revolution not only eliminated the Pahlavi monarchy, the most important pillar of American influence in Iran, but also laid the foundations of a new political model, institutional architecture, and ideological orientation. The constitutional order shaped around the doctrine of velayat e faqih, by bringing together Islamic legitimacy and republican representation, developed an authentic form of governance that constitutes an alternative to Western democracy models and secular authoritarian regimes. The state of enmity with the US, which began with the hostage crisis immediately after the revolution, became the founding element of Tehran’s foreign policy and made the process of breaking away from dependency relations irreversible.
The most important dynamic behind Iran’s breaking of the dependency chain is the mass character of the revolution and its basis of social legitimacy. The millions of people who filled the streets of Iran in 1979 rose up not only against the Shah’s regime but also against the American imperialism behind it. This mass mobilization enabled the new regime to consolidate its power without needing external support, but by directly targeting external support mechanisms. The revolutionary cadres led by Khomeini were able to implement radical steps such as purging the army, establishing the Revolutionary Guards, Islamizing the judiciary, and nationalization policies in the economy thanks to broad social support. Coups or top down reform attempts in other Islamic countries failed to transform dependency relations because they lacked a similar basis of social legitimacy.
To understand Iran’s uniqueness, one needs to look closely at the institutional consequences of the revolution. The Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution was designed not merely as a military force but also as the ideological guardian of the revolution, an economic actor, and a center of political influence. The Basij militia force under the Guards fulfills the functions of social mobilization and internal control; the Quds Force serves as the fundamental instrument of regional influence projection. These institutional innovations allowed Iran to build a security architecture that both prevents the re emergence of dependent elites internally and enables it to gain strategic depth externally. However, the expanding control of the Guards over the economy and their weight in the political process have also led over time to the emergence of a new type of elite dependency and corruption networks in Iran.
In the economic sphere, the resistance economy strategy pursued by Iran constitutes the most difficult and least successful dimension of the effort to break free from dependency. Developed under international sanctions, this strategy includes a combination of import substitution, promotion of domestic production, the quest for scientific and technological autonomy, and financial mechanisms to circumvent sanctions. Iran’s missile program, its advances in nuclear technology, and the distance it has covered in unmanned aerial vehicle production prove that military industrial autonomy is possible. However, in the civilian economy, chronic problems such as inflation, unemployment, corruption, and inefficiency persist; this situation stands out as the most significant factor eroding the regime’s social support. The Mahsa Amini protests and periodically erupting economically based social movements reveal the limits of the resistance economy and the fatigue it creates among the people.
Iran’s regional strategy constitutes the geopolitical dimension of the goal of breaking free from dependency. Strategic partnerships established with Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Hashd al Shaabi groups in Iraq, and Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine are instruments Tehran resorts to in order to balance American influence and expand its own sphere of influence. This informal alliance system, referred to as the axis of resistance, allows Iran to compensate for its conventional military deficiencies through asymmetric methods and to keep Washington’s allies in the region under constant threat. However, the cost of this strategy is also quite high: billions of dollars spent on proxy wars are deducted from the people’s welfare; the fueling of sectarian tensions deepens the divisions within the Islamic world.
The Iranian model shows that breaking free from dependency is possible, but it is an extremely costly and risky path. A revolutionary rupture can only succeed through a combination of strong social mobilization, charismatic leadership, an alternative ideological framework, and a suitable international conjuncture. Iran’s ability to survive for over forty years stems from its ability to maintain a certain combination of these elements. Nevertheless, internal social discontent, the corrosive effect of economic sanctions, and the risk of escalation of regional tensions raise serious question marks regarding the sustainability of the model. The Iranian experience is both inspiring and cautionary for the rest of the Islamic world; breaking free from dependency is possible, but the price of this path is heavy, and each society needs to develop a strategy suitable to its own specific conditions.
Elite Structuring, Authoritarian Consolidation and the Reproduction of Dependency
The composition of ruling elites in Islamic countries and the mechanisms of their reproduction constitute one of the most critical factors ensuring the continuity of dependency relations. The nationalist, monarchic, or military origin elites who came to power in the post independence period preferred to consolidate their own power within the institutional structures shaped during the colonial period and the externally dependent political economic order, rather than transforming them. This preference has, over time, led to the emergence of an elite class that transforms dependency itself into a source of benefit. This class, educated in Western educational institutions, integrated with transnational financial networks, and adopting luxury consumption patterns, becomes increasingly alienated from its own societies and derives its legitimacy not from the social base but from its external connections and repressive apparatuses.
The domination of military bureaucratic elites over the political process is a phenomenon observed in almost the entire Islamic world. The eras of Hosni Mubarak and Abdel Fattah el Sisi in Egypt, Kenan Evren in Turkey, Zia ul Haq and Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan, the Suharto regime in Indonesia, the military tutelage system in Algeria, and the post 1960 coup tradition in Turkey demonstrate how the army, by narrowing the political space and sidelining civilian alternatives, consolidates dependency structures. Military elites preserve their institutional autonomy and political influence using the weapons, training, and financial resources they obtain from Western allies; this cycle serves to divert national resources towards military expenditures instead of productive investments and to deepen dependency.
Dynastic structures in the Gulf monarchies represent a different form of elite dependency. The Al Saud family, the Al Nahyan, Al Maktoum, Al Sabah, and Al Thani dynasties, using their monopoly over the distribution of oil rent, have succeeded in binding extended family networks, tribal connections, and business circles around the regime. In this patrimonial system, there is a direct relationship between the survival of the dynasty and the country’s dependency choices in foreign policy. The assumption that dynastic regimes cannot survive without American security guarantees makes these countries’ relations with Washington a strategic necessity. Power struggles among crown princes and reform attempts cannot change this fundamental structural reality; on the contrary, they make the need for external support even more visible.
At the ideological level, the integration of ruling elites in Islamic countries with Western value systems and lifestyles forms the cultural and psychological basis of dependency. Frantz Fanon’s diagnosis of “black skin, white masks” in colonial societies is also largely valid for the ruling classes of the contemporary Islamic world. These elites, educated at Western universities, speaking English and French better than their native languages, and spending their vacations in London, Paris, and New York, are alienated from the religious and cultural values of their own people; they have often developed a mentality that despises these values. This cultural alienation leads to the formation of an elite consciousness that internalizes and does not question dependency relations; it undermines the intellectual foundations of an authentic quest for development and sovereignty.
One of the most dangerous consequences of dependent elite structuring is the systematic erosion of state capacity and institutional decay. Corruption, nepotism, and the abandonment of the merit principle have rendered state apparatuses dysfunctional in large parts of the Islamic world; while the quality of public services declines, citizens’ trust in the state has eroded. The governance indicators of the World Bank and the corruption indices of Transparency International reveal that the vast majority of Islamic countries exhibit a highly negative performance in these areas. Institutional decay creates a vicious cycle that deepens dependency; weak and corrupt state apparatuses need external support more to close the legitimacy gap, and this support further reinforces dependency.
In the face of this picture, what needs to be done is to develop mechanisms that will enable elite transformation in Islamic countries. The construction of a public sphere that allows for the cultivation of alternative elites through political parties, civil society organizations, independent media, and academic institutions is a prerequisite for breaking the dependency cycle. However, in none of the partial and different examples has a radical rupture similar to that in Iran occurred; instead, attempts have been made to expand the maneuvering space within the existing international system. For elite transformation to deepen and become permanent, a holistic strategy is required that targets the transformation of all institutional fields, not just the ballot box, from the education system to the economy, from the media to the judiciary.
Search for Solutions and the Parameters of Strategic Autonomy
The strategies to be developed for an exit from the dependency spiral in which the Islamic world finds itself must grasp the multidimensional nature of the issue and be based on a long term transformation vision beyond short term tactical moves. The interlocking character of military, economic, political, and ideological dependency mechanisms demonstrates that improvement in any one area cannot be permanent unless supported by transformations in other areas. This situation constitutes the greatest intellectual and political challenge facing Islamic countries: how can a holistic strategic autonomy program that simultaneously targets all dimensions of dependency be formulated and implemented.
Economic independence is the most fundamental and most difficult dimension of strategic autonomy. Islamic countries need to carry out structural reforms that will enable the transition from a rentier economy to a production economy; they need to build self sufficiency capacity in agriculture, industry, and technology. This transformation necessitates not only macroeconomic policy changes but also a mental transformation. The progress made by Malaysia and Indonesia in the areas of “food and finance,” Turkey’s breakthroughs in the defense industry, and the technological capabilities Iran has developed under sanctions demonstrate that a production oriented transformation is within the realm of possibility. A common market established within the body of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, preferential trade agreements, and the strengthening of Islamic development banking can form the institutional infrastructure of economic independence.
The search for strategic autonomy in the military and security field constitutes one of the greatest dilemmas of Islamic countries. The existing security architectures are largely dependent on the American military presence, intelligence networks, and weapons supply chains. To break free from this dependency, “Islamic countries” need to develop a security cooperation mechanism among themselves, carry out joint defense industry projects, and increase domestic production capacity in critical technologies. Turkey’s advancement in unmanned aerial vehicle technology and its export of these systems to various Islamic countries, Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence capability, and Iran’s missile program prove that different dimensions of military autonomy are possible. However, geopolitical rivalries and lack of trust among Islamic countries continue to exist as the greatest obstacle to the construction of a common security architecture.
The issue of political legitimacy lies at the center of the strategy for liberation from dependency. Regimes that do not rely on social consent and base their power on external patronage and repressive apparatuses cannot be expected to embark on a quest for strategic autonomy. Therefore, the establishment of participatory, accountable, and just governance mechanisms in “Islamic countries” is the indispensable condition for breaking the dependency chain.
Ideological and cultural independence is one of the most neglected yet most vital dimensions of the strategic autonomy program. The revival of the institutions of knowledge and culture that have been systematically eroded since the colonial period; the purification of education systems from the manipulative aspects of West centered “knowledge” hierarchies; and the strengthening of the intellectual and artistic production capacity in “Islamic countries” are imperative for the establishment of cultural self confidence. In this context, expanding student and academic exchange programs among “Islamic countries,” establishing joint research centers, encouraging translation activities, and deepening cooperation in the media field can contribute to overcoming ideological dependency. The success of international broadcasters such as Al Jazeera and TRT demonstrates the capacity of the “Islamic world” to produce alternative narratives in the global media ecosystem.
Regional integration and solidarity within the “Islamic world” stand out as one of the most powerful instruments for breaking the dependency chain. Existing institutional structures such as the fifty seven member Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the D 8 Developing Eight, the Economic Cooperation Organization, and the Islamic Development Bank perform far below their potential. Increasing the effectiveness of these structures requires resolving political disputes among member states and coming together around common interests. Recent positive developments such as the Iran Saudi Arabia normalization, the Turkey Egypt rapprochement, and the end of the embargo on Qatar indicate that a favorable ground for regional reconciliation and integration is taking shape. Increasing the share of trade among “Islamic countries” within total foreign trade from the current level of around ten percent to higher levels would be the most concrete indicator of economic independence.
The adoption of a multi dimensional and balanced strategy in the field of foreign policy can accelerate the process of liberation from dependency. Just as Islamic countries were forced to choose between Washington or Moscow during the Cold War, today the great power rivalry between Beijing and Washington offers strategic maneuvering space to the Islamic world. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Russia’s return to the Middle East, and India’s increasing regional weight present alternative economic and strategic partnerships that can balance the dependency of Islamic countries on the West. However, it is of vital importance that this balancing strategy aims for genuine strategic autonomy rather than substituting one dependency relationship with another. The relations Iran has developed with China and Russia contain important lessons on how to manage this fine line.
In the final analysis, the liberation of the “Islamic world” from the dependency spiral requires a long term, multidimensional, and patient transformation strategy. The success of this strategy depends on the simultaneous mobilization of political will, social mobilization, intellectual depth, and institutional innovation capacity. The over forty year experience of the Islamic Republic of Iran shows that breaking away from dependency is possible, but that it is a painful process requiring heavy prices to be paid. Other Islamic countries need to learn lessons from Iran’s experience and develop strategic autonomy models that are suitable for their own specific conditions, less costly, and more inclusive.
Awareness raising and mobilization activities to be carried out at the social level are indispensable for the sustainability of the strategic autonomy program. Through civil society organizations, professional associations, universities, madrasa circles, and media platforms, awareness should be raised about the cost of dependency structures to society and an alternative vision of sovereignty should be promoted. The adoption of Islamic finance at the grassroots level in Malaysia and the spirit of national solidarity developed against embargoes in Iran should be recorded as successful examples of social mobilization. The ultimate goal is the construction of a self confident and resilient social structure that grasps that dependency is not only a political and economic issue but also a matter of mentality and consciousness.
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Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
Aarhus University, 1997
Independent Researcher
Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures.
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