The waves crashing against the rocky shores of Kastellorizo (Meis) carry not only the salt water of the Mediterranean but also one of the most complex and distorted issues of international law. While Greece, relying on the letter of the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, claims “full sovereignty”, it systematically ignores the most fundamental condition woven into the fabric of that sovereignty: the permanent demilitarized status. This situation is far more than a simple treaty violation; it is a fundamental undermining of the legal and political balance upon which the transfer of sovereignty was built. The debate is no longer about who owns the islands; it has shifted to the conditions under which this ownership was defined and the grave legal consequences of violating those conditions. For every breached article erodes not only an obligation but also the legitimacy of the treaty order that created that obligation.
A Chain of Sovereignty: The Legal Line from Lausanne to Paris
To understand the current status, it is essential to examine the first link in the legal chain: the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty. Under Article 15 of Lausanne, Turkey renounced its rights over the Dodecanese and Kastellorizo in favor of Italy. This renunciation also laid the groundwork for future disputes, as the transfer was part of a specific strategic balance, implicitly based on the assumption that Italy would not cede these islands to another state, thus safeguarding the security of the Western Anatolian coast. The Second World War disrupted this equation. The 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, signed with defeated Italy, constitutes the second and most critical link in the chain. Article 14 of the treaty, while ceding the islands to Greece, bound this transfer to a strict condition. The critical point here is that Greece’s sovereignty exists in conjunction with this condition, which is a constituent element of the treaty itself. It is akin to a property right being transferred not as an unlimited power of use but as one encumbered with a specific servitude.
The Precise Command of the Treaty Text: The Clear Language of Article 14
At this juncture, looking directly at what the binding source of international law, the treaty text itself, says provides a clarity that transcends all political interpretations. The first paragraph of Article 14 of the Treaty of Peace with Italy (Paris Treaty) of 1947, registered in the United Nations Treaty Series, after enumerating the islands ceded to Greece, lays down the following peremptory provision, leaving no room for any exception: “These islands shall be demilitarized and shall remain so.” In the original English text, the auxiliary verb “shall” indicates an absolute obligation in international law. The subsequent paragraphs of the article detail the definition of this demilitarized status and the prohibited military installations and activities, but the main rule itself is drafted in absolute terms. Similarly, Article 15 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty established the ground for the transfer by stating that Turkey renounced its rights over the said islands in favor of Italy. When these two treaties are read together, it is indisputable that the passage of the islands to Greece was encumbered with a status of permanent military neutralization.
“Shall Be and Shall Remain So”: The Immutable Meaning of the Peremptory Provision
The phrase “shall be demilitarized and shall remain so” in the treaty text possesses a clarity and precision rarely seen in international law. This wording does not describe a temporary measure but an objective regime envisaging the permanent separation of the islands from any military status. The justification Greece puts forward for arming the islands, the “presence of the Turkish army and landing crafts in the Aegean”, is legally baseless. A state cannot, by citing a threat perceived from another state, unilaterally suspend or terminate an obligation arising from a fundamental provision of a treaty to which it is bound. Even the “Rebus Sic Stantibus” (fundamental change of circumstances) provision of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties can only be invoked in cases of unforeseen circumstances that radically alter the scope of obligations; Turkey’s existence and military capacity are by no means an unforeseeable phenomenon. Moreover, the treaty makes no distinction whatsoever; it differentiates neither between light and heavy weapons, nor between offensive and defensive troops. The aim is to keep the islands entirely outside military activities. The presence of tanks, armored vehicles, and air defense systems deployed on Rhodes and Kos constitutes a direct and grave violation of this provision.
The Islands are Western Anatolia: The Testimony of Geography and Geology
Beyond legal texts, there is an indisputable truth recorded by the sciences of geography and geology: the Dodecanese and Kastellorizo are geologically and morphologically inseparable parts of the Anatolian peninsula. This chain of islands, including Rhodes, Kos, Symi, and Kastellorizo, are the natural extensions of the mountain ranges and coastal plains of Western Anatolia, submerged under the waters of the Aegean Sea. As the geological continuation of the Menderes Massif to the west, these landmasses share the same tectonic structure, the same rock formations, and the same continental shelf as the mainland. During the Last Glacial Period, when sea levels were approximately 120 meters lower than today, a large portion of these islands were connected to the Anatolian mainland by land bridges, and today’s Aegean islands rose as the high peaks of Western Anatolia. This geological truth indisputably ties the geographical belonging of the islands to Anatolia, defining them as landmasses naturally integrated with the mainland but severed by political borders. Throughout history, from the Carian and Lycian civilizations to the Ottoman era, these islands have been part of the administrative, economic, and cultural basin of Western Anatolia. Greece’s effort to fortify these islands like forward bastions violates not only the treaties but the natural order dictated by geography itself. Stationing foreign military buildups on a geography that is the natural extension of the Anatolian mainland amounts to constructing an artificial threat architecture that contradicts the geological and geopolitical reality of that geography.
Third-Party Effect and Turkey’s Legal Standing
Another argument to which Greece frequently resorts is the claim that Turkey is not a party to the 1947 Paris Treaty. This defense loses its validity in the face of the doctrine of “objective regimes” or “status-creating treaties” in international law. If a treaty creates an objective status directly related to the security of a non-party state, and this status is accepted as part of regional peace and stability, the third state affected thereby has the right to demand the preservation of that status. Article 14 of the Paris Treaty is not merely the establishment of a bilateral right between Italy and Greece; it is a multilateral security arrangement that limits armament in the Eastern Mediterranean and safeguards Turkey’s coastal security. Therefore, Turkey, as a direct beneficiary and a state whose interests are violated, has full authority to raise this violation.
The Key Equation of the Blue Homeland: The Geopolitical Function of the Demilitarization Regime
What elevates the issue beyond a mere treaty violation is the geographical and geopolitical reality at the heart of the Blue Homeland doctrine. The Dodecanese and Kastellorizo are situated on the natural extension of the Anatolian peninsula’s continental shelf and continental margin, immediately adjacent to the Turkish coast. The demilitarized status of these islands was designed as a safety valve, securing Turkey’s access to the high seas and protecting the integrity of the Blue Homeland. Today, by arming these islands, Greece is not only violating the treaty but is also attempting to transform this de facto situation into a legal gain, thereby constricting the Blue Homeland. This is the very essence of the debate surrounding the Blue Homeland doctrine. By advocating, under the guise of “full sovereignty”, that the islands should generate maximal maritime jurisdiction areas, Greece aims to sever Turkey’s connection to the open seas, block its access to energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean, and control subsea cable and pipeline projects. Yet, in international law, the sovereignty of an island is one thing, and the effect of that island on maritime boundary delimitation is another. The demilitarized status is precisely intended to prevent these islands from being used as “unsinkable aircraft carriers” or forward bases, and this logic also weakens the claim that they should generate exaggerated maritime jurisdiction areas in a way that encloses the mainland.
The Collapsing Treaty Balance in the Shadow of Violation
Greece’s grave violation of the treaty upon which its sovereignty claim rests is a contradiction that could produce irreversible consequences in international law. For a treaty is built upon the mutual balance of the obligations and rights of the parties. By trampling its demilitarization obligation, Greece continues to exercise the right of sovereignty that the same treaty has bestowed upon it. This situation ruptures the synallagmatic (reciprocal) balance that forms the foundation of the treaty. If one party unilaterally nullifies an essential provision of a treaty, the right of the other party to question its own commitment to the treaty may arise. This does not mean that Turkey does not recognize the sovereignty of the islands; however, it does mean that Greece’s violations erode the integrity of the treaty and, consequently, the legal basis of the transfer. The point is that Greece, through its de facto actions, is corroding the legitimacy of its own sovereignty with its own hands. The international community’s silence in the face of this grave violation undermines the treaty-based security system and provides a legal guise for revisionist ambitions.
Conclusion and Recommendations: Time to Strengthen the Blue Homeland on the Legal Front
Article 14 of the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty has determined the military status of the Dodecanese and Kastellorizo with a clarity that leaves no room for debate: “These islands shall be demilitarized and shall remain so.” When this provision is read together with Article 15 of the Lausanne Treaty, it is legally established that the transfer of the islands to Greek sovereignty was conditional upon their being kept free from military use. In addition, the geological and geographical reality indisputably demonstrates that these islands are natural parts of the Anatolian peninsula, thereby grounding the Blue Homeland’s security concerns not only on a legal but also on a geographical foundation. The systematic armament policy pursued by Greece constitutes a violation not only of this clear provision but also of the treaty order to which it owes its sovereignty and of the integrity of the Blue Homeland. Turkey must address this issue not merely as a political discourse but through a multi-dimensional legal strategy.
· Strengthening Justiciability: To overcome Greece’s objection that “Turkey is not a party”, the dispute resolution mechanisms of the 1947 Paris Treaty should be examined in detail. Even if we are not a party to the treaty, the argument that the violation damages a status of an erga omnes (enforceable against all) nature and threatens regional peace should be brought before the International Court of Justice or through arbitration.
· Diplomatic Record and Internationalization: All evidence of violations (satellite imagery, military reports) should be regularly registered with the United Nations and brought to the attention of states such as the United Kingdom, the United States, and France, in their capacity as guardians of the treaty, through diplomatic notes. Their silence makes them political partners in this violation.
· Linking the Legal Argument with Maritime Jurisdiction Areas: Comprehensive legal studies should be conducted so that the islands that violate the demilitarized status may be evaluated as a “special circumstance” or a “factor correcting disproportionality” in maritime boundary delimitation before international courts. A strong thesis should be developed against the attempt to derive legal rights from an unlawful de facto situation.
· Integrating Geographical and Geological Arguments with Law: The fact that the islands are the geological and continental shelf continuation of Anatolia should be systematically voiced within the framework of the natural prolongation principle of the continental shelf in international law; this geographical truth should become one of the fundamental pillars of the Blue Homeland’s diplomatic and legal initiatives.
· Continuous Emphasis on Treaty Provisions: In all diplomatic and legal processes, the wording of Article 14 of the Paris Treaty (“shall be demilitarized and shall remain so”) and Article 15 of the Lausanne Treaty should be constantly cited to explain to the international public that the basis of the violation lies in the treaties themselves.
Turkey’s determination on this issue means not only defending a treaty provision but also protecting the maritime jurisdiction areas of the Blue Homeland, the supremacy of international law, the requirements of geographical reality, and the foundation of peace and stability in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean.
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Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
Aarhus University, 1997
Independent Researcher
Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures.
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