Category: Regions

  • IS A WEST ASIAN ALLIANCE WITHOUT IRAN POSSIBLE?A Critical Assessment in the Context of Türkiye’s Relations with the USA-NATO and Israel

    IS A WEST ASIAN ALLIANCE WITHOUT IRAN POSSIBLE?A Critical Assessment in the Context of Türkiye’s Relations with the USA-NATO and Israel

    The recent diplomatic contacts and foreign minister-level meetings reportedly developing between Türkiye, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia have sparked a noteworthy debate in terms of regional geopolitics. At the heart of this debate lies the possibility of Iran’s exclusion from a potential regional equation. The idea of a “West Asian alliance without Iran,” recently floated, raises serious questions not only regarding regional balances but also in the context of the global power struggle. Particularly at a juncture where the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is deepening, the Red Sea trade route is under threat, and global energy supply is becoming fragile, attempting to reshape the region through exclusionary blocs necessitates a confrontation with historical and geographical realities.

    From a historical perspective, the pursuit of lasting peace and stability in West Asia has generally been conducted through inclusive models. The failure of the Baghdad Pact (CENTO) during the Cold War era is instructive in demonstrating the fate of security umbrellas that fail to secure the consent of the region’s peoples and exclude a key regional actor. The structure currently sought to be formed against Iran is likewise a candidate for a similar fate; for Iran is not merely a state but also the center of Shia geopolitics, the carrier of the Iranian Turk and Persian cultural basin, and the locomotive of the regional axis of resistance.

    The Geopolitical Reality of West Asia

    Throughout history, West Asia has been an arena of competition for great powers, situated at the center of global politics due to its energy resources, trade routes, and strategic location. To establish a lasting alliance in this geography, one must consider not only military or economic power but also geographical and cultural realities. A glance at the map of West Asia reveals that Iran is physically positioned at the very heart of this geography, on a transit route stretching from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf, and from the Central Asian steppes to the plains of Mesopotamia. This position bestows upon Iran an indispensable role not only militarily but also in terms of trade and energy transit. Any regional architecture attempting to sideline Iran would automatically result in the blockage of these trade and energy corridors or necessitate a shift towards alternative, costlier routes.

    In this context, Iran is one of the region’s most critical actors. With its population, military capacity, energy resources, and ideological influence, the void created by removing Iran from the West Asian equation cannot be easily filled. Possessing the world’s second-largest natural gas reserves and fourth-largest oil reserves, Iran is a producer capable of single-handedly influencing prices in global energy markets. Therefore, any alliance attempt that excludes Iran carries a serious structural weakness from the outset. Moreover, Iran’s ballistic missile inventory and advanced unmanned aerial vehicle technology make it one of the region’s most powerful countries in terms of unconventional deterrence capability. A coalition seeking to exclude Iran must be prepared to confront this asymmetric threat.

    In terms of geographical determinism, Iran also controls the northern shores of the Strait of Hormuz, one of the most critical waterways in the region. Approximately one-fifth of the world’s oil trade passes through this narrow chokepoint, making it a strategic asset in Iran’s hands. Attempting to build a West Asian alliance without Iran means constructing a structure lacking the capacity to secure this strait, a risk unacceptable for the global economy. Hence, any move aimed at excluding Iran will face objections not only from regional actors but also from global players (particularly energy-importing countries like China, India, Japan, and South Korea).

    Another factor amplifying Iran’s geopolitical weight is its network of “proxy forces.” Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq, Ansarullah (Houthis) in Yemen, and various militia groups in Syria are the carrier columns of Iran’s regional influence. Through these structures, Iran can project military and political presence far beyond its borders. An alliance attempting to exclude Iran would have to confront not only the regime in Tehran but this entire paramilitary network. This, in turn, carries the potential to trigger a wide-ranging proxy war encompassing nearly all of West Asia.

    In this context, Iran’s cultural and historical depth must also be considered a geopolitical reality. Persian is an influential language across a vast geography, from Afghanistan to Tajikistan, and from the holy cities of Iraq to Muslim elites in the Indian subcontinent. Iran’s central position in the Shia Islamic world makes it a reference point for Shia populations in Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, Azerbaijan, and even Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province. These soft power elements constitute sociological barriers to completely sidelining Iran.

    The Türkiye–Pakistan–Saudi Arabia Rapprochement

    The cooperative endeavors occasionally brought to the agenda between Türkiye, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia are based on different motivations. While Türkiye seeks to enhance its regional effectiveness and find new markets for its defense industry products, Pakistan is in search of security assurances, a way out of its economic crisis, and strategic depth against India. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, aims to balance Iran’s regional influence, find exits from the costly war in Yemen, and create a secure regional environment for its Vision 2030 projects. The occasional coming together of these three countries is a result of conjunctural overlaps of interest rather than a definition of a common enemy. Indeed, Türkiye-Saudi Arabia relations could only enter a path of normalization in the last few years following the deep crisis after the Khashoggi murder, and this normalization still proceeds on fragile ground.

    However, it is difficult to claim that the interests of these three countries fully align. Türkiye’s rhetorical pursuit of a “multi-dimensional foreign policy,” Pakistan’s close ties with China, and Saudi Arabia’s strategic bonds with the West cause this potential alliance to harbor internal contradictions. Due to its energy dependence on Iran and border security cooperation, Türkiye avoids taking a position that would completely antagonize Tehran. Pakistan, sharing a long and porous border with Iran, must maintain a controlled balance of competition and cooperation in its relations, particularly in the context of separatist movements in Balochistan. As for Saudi Arabia, the Riyadh administration implicitly acknowledged the failure of the “exclusion of Iran” policy by re-establishing diplomatic relations with Iran in 2023 through Chinese mediation.

    Another weak link in this rapprochement is the three countries’ differing threat perceptions. For Türkiye, the number one security threat is the PKK/YPG presence in northern Syria and Iraq, an area where its interests occasionally overlap with Iran’s. For Pakistan, the primary threat is India on its eastern border, and Saudi Arabia’s growing strategic partnership with India against this backdrop creates discomfort in Islamabad. For Saudi Arabia, the priority threat is Iran’s interference in the internal affairs of the Gulf monarchies through its proxy forces. These differing hierarchies of threat make it nearly impossible for the three countries to focus on the same target and develop a common military strategy.

    The limits of cooperation are also evident in the economic dimension. Türkiye’s trade volume with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan is significantly lower than its trade volume with Iran or far below its potential level. Saudi Arabia’s past unofficial embargo on Türkiye and Pakistan’s chronic economic crisis are major obstacles to healthy economic integration among the trio. Furthermore, although Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are important customers for Türkiye’s defense industry exports, this relationship is far from creating unilateral dependence, as both countries have the capacity to turn to alternative suppliers (especially China and the USA).

    In such a situation, the Türkiye-Pakistan-Saudi Arabia rapprochement is not a “Sunni front against Iran” as portrayed in the media, but rather the sum of tactical steps each country takes in line with its own national interests. The convergence of these three countries on a common ground of excluding Iran seems unlikely in the short term due to both their internal contradictions and Iran’s regional weight.

    Türkiye’s Relations with the USA, NATO, and Israel

    To understand Türkiye’s foreign policy, it is impossible to ignore its historical ties with the USA, NATO, and Israel. As a NATO member, Türkiye is an integral part of the Western security architecture, and its military, economic, and intelligence relations with the USA date back many years. Joining NATO in 1952, Türkiye served as the guardian of the southeastern flank against the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, shaping its military doctrine, equipment, and training system largely according to Western standards. Today, hosting critical NATO bases like Incirlik and Kürecik, and providing strategic space for the NATO corps to be established, Türkiye is also known to host tactical nuclear weapons on its territory under NATO’s nuclear sharing agreement. These institutional ties create structural constraints that prevent Türkiye from acting entirely independently in its quest for regional alliances.

    Nevertheless, even though Türkiye has claimed to pursue a rhetorically “more independent foreign policy” in recent years, its obligations within the NATO framework and its ties with the West have not completely disappeared. Its removal from the F-35 program, exposure to CAATSA sanctions, and tensions with the EU should not be interpreted as a complete break from the Western camp. On the contrary, the dependence of the Turkish economy on Western financial institutions, the continued procurement of certain critical components for the defense industry from the West, and the organic ties of the Turkish elite with the West continue to limit Ankara’s room for maneuver. In this context, if Türkiye were to take part in a regional alliance aimed at excluding Iran, it would be unable to assume the natural leadership of such an alliance and would instead face the risk of being perceived as a subcontractor of the USA in the region.

    Relations with Israel have followed a more fluctuating course. Even during times of “serious” political tension, it is difficult to claim that contacts in commercial and certain security fields have been completely severed. As one of the first countries to recognize Israel, Türkiye has developed a relationship model with this country that has been up and down but never completely broken. Fluctuations such as the withdrawal of ambassadors after the Mavi Marmara crisis, the mutual reappointment of ambassadors in 2022, and the restriction of trade after October 7, 2023, demonstrate the conjunctural nature of Türkiye-Israel relations. The idea of a West Asian alliance without Iran envisages Israel having a greater say in the regional security architecture; therefore, Türkiye’s participation in such a structure would be a sensitive choice that could damage its prestige in the Arab and Islamic world.

    Within this framework, it may be unrealistic to evaluate any regional alliance involving Türkiye entirely independently of its relations with the West. The sanctions regime against Iran is one of the USA’s most important foreign policy tools, and if Türkiye were to breach or ignore this regime, it would likely face severe economic consequences. Indeed, the past Halkbank case and the Zarrab scandal demonstrated how closely the USA monitors Türkiye’s trade with Iran and how it can be turned into an instrument of pressure when deemed necessary. This situation reveals that even if Türkiye were to participate in an alliance excluding Iran, it cannot be expected to completely sever its economic relations with Iran.

    Consequently, the tension between Türkiye’s NATO membership and its claim to leadership in the Islamic world becomes even more pronounced in discussions of an alliance excluding Iran. While Ankara seeks to utilize the advantages of being part of the Western security umbrella, it also attempts to maintain the support of the Muslim public as one of the countries ostensibly showing the “harshest reaction” to Israel’s operations in Gaza. This dual position may become unsustainable when part of an alliance targeting Iran. Because such an alliance would inevitably be coded as a tool serving Israel’s regional interests, eroding Türkiye’s rhetorical “superiority” on the Palestinian cause.

    Strategic Consequences of Excluding Iran

    Excluding Iran does not merely mean leaving one country out of the equation; it also means confronting Iran’s sphere of regional influence. Considering Iran’s influence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, such an exclusion attempt could directly impact the balances on the ground. In Iraq, for instance, Iran-affiliated Hashd al-Shaabi groups are integrated into the state apparatus, and political stability in the country largely depends on Tehran’s consent. An alliance excluding Iran could upset these delicate balances in Iraq, potentially dragging the country back to the brink of sectarian wars. Similarly, Hezbollah’s military and political power in Lebanon has the capacity to sabotage any project attempting to sideline Iran from the outset.

    Moreover, given Iran’s developing relations with China and Russia, a bloc formed against Iran could create a broader geopolitical fault line. By signing a 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership agreement with Iran in 2021, China demonstrated its long-term commitment to investing in the country’s energy resources and transportation corridors. Russia, seeking to evade Western sanctions following the Ukraine war, views Iran as a critical partner, deepening cooperation particularly in the transfer of unmanned aerial vehicle and missile technology. A West Asian alliance excluding Iran would be perceived as a direct challenge to the interests of these two major powers in the region and would likely lead to a further tightening of the Russia-China-Iran axis.

    Another strategic consequence of excluding Iran centers on the nuclear issue. Since the collapse of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran has accelerated its uranium enrichment activities and moved closer to the nuclear weapons threshold than ever before. An attempt to encircle and exclude Iran through a regional alliance would push decision-makers in Tehran to invest more in nuclear deterrence. This could trigger a nuclear arms race in the region; Saudi Arabia’s insistence on accessing nuclear technology and Türkiye’s nuclear energy program should be reevaluated in this context. Excluding Iran could mean forcing it to acquire nuclear weapons (which is essentially Iran’s right), a security dilemma that would have devastating consequences for the entire region.

    Economically, excluding Iran would also incur heavy costs. As a founding member of OPEC, Iran is a significant actor in the global oil market. An alliance aimed at excluding Iran tightening economic sanctions on the country could lead to sudden spikes in global energy prices. Türkiye and Pakistan, being heavily dependent on foreign energy, would be among the countries most affected by this situation. Türkiye meets a significant portion of its natural gas needs from Iran; Pakistan is trying to implement the IP Pipeline project to import natural gas from Iran. Excluding Iran would jeopardize the energy supply security of these two countries and force them towards more expensive alternatives.

    For these reasons, the sociological and sectarian consequences of excluding Iran must not be ignored. The Shia population in West Asia would perceive an alliance excluding Iran as a siege against themselves. This perception could increase radicalization among Shia communities in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Iraq. Sectarian-based polarization threatens not only interstate relations but also intrastate peace. A country like Türkiye, with a significant Alevi population, being perceived as part of a sectarian-axis alliance could open wounds in its own social fabric that are difficult to heal.

    The USA and Israel Factor: Influence or Determinism?

    The role of the USA and Israel frequently comes up in discussions of an anti-Iran bloc. The USA’s policy of containing Iran and Israel’s “security concerns” are important factors in this framework. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Washington has viewed Iran as “one of the greatest threats” to its interests in the Middle East and has employed various tools such as military bases, economic sanctions, and regional alliances to contain the country. The Abraham Accords process is the most concrete example of the US effort to build normalization and security integration between Israel and Arab countries on the common ground of anti-Iran sentiment. It is known that Türkiye occasionally receives suggestions from the West that it should not remain outside this process.

    However, explaining regional developments solely as a “hidden plot” or the unilateral direction of external powers carries the risk of ignoring the strategic calculations of local actors themselves. Countries like Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan appear to act “independently” in line with their own interests; however, while external influences are significant, they are not the sole determinant. Indeed, Saudi Arabia’s step towards normalization with Iran under Chinese mediation demonstrates that US influence in the region is not absolute. Similarly, Türkiye’s purchase of the S-400 air defense system from Russia and its conduct of the Astana process in Syria together with Russia and Iran prove that it can prioritize its own national interests despite Western suggestions.

    The Israel factor presents a more complex picture. For Israel, Iran is coded as an existential “threat,” and every possible military, intelligence, diplomatic, and economic tool is used to eliminate this “threat.” The idea of a West Asian alliance without Iran can be seen as an ideal formula for Israel to break its “regional isolation” and deepen security cooperation with Arab countries. However, the Gaza war that began on October 7, 2023, has seriously damaged Israel’s image in the region and reignited anti-normalization sentiments among the Arab public. In this environment, joining an anti-Iran alliance in which Israel is implicitly a partner could lead to a serious legitimacy crisis for countries like Saudi Arabia and Türkiye in the eyes of their domestic public.

    Looking more closely at the USA’s role in this equation, Washington’s priority appears to be limiting China’s global rise rather than containing Iran. The US support for the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) project aims to connect India to Europe by bypassing Iran and Türkiye. This project constitutes the economic pillar of a West Asia vision without Iran. However, IMEC’s dependence on Israeli ports and its prerequisite of Saudi-Israeli normalization have suspended the project following the Gaza war. This situation demonstrates how fragile US regional plans are and how easily they can be sabotaged by local dynamics.

    In the final analysis, the US and Israel factor is a significant source of motivation for the “idea of a West Asian alliance without Iran,” but it is not determinative. What is determinative are the interest calculations of the regional countries themselves. For Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan to give a green light to such an alliance, they must be convinced that their gains outweigh their losses. In light of current data, the strategic benefit that excluding Iran would provide these three countries falls far short of the risks they would incur.

    Internal Contradictions of the Alliance

    A potential alliance to be formed between Türkiye, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia could be fragile due to the differing priorities of the parties. The foreign policy priorities, threat perceptions, and economic structures of these three countries are so different that finding common ground is often only possible at the level of very general and non-binding statements. For example, Türkiye’s claims in the Eastern Mediterranean and its military presence in Libya are a source of discomfort for Saudi Arabia, which is developing close relations with Egypt and Greece. While Riyadh pursues a policy aimed at preserving the regional status quo, Ankara exhibits a revisionist stance on many fronts. This fundamental difference in approach indicates that the long-term strategic interests of the two countries conflict.

    Türkiye’s economic relations with Iran continue. Despite occasional political tensions, the trade volume between the two countries remains at billions of dollars, and efforts are underway to reach a target of $30 billion. Türkiye is one of the largest customers importing natural gas from Iran, and this dependence gains strategic importance, especially during winter months when domestic demand increases. Additionally, border trade between the two countries is a vital source of income for local economies in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. Being part of an alliance aimed at excluding Iran would require Türkiye to reconsider these economic relations, leading to a significant loss of welfare and increased unemployment.

    Pakistan, as a neighbor sharing a border with Iran, is compelled to pursue a balanced policy. The over 900-kilometer land border between the two countries necessitates cooperation due to the separatist threats both countries face in the Balochistan region. Faced with the Kashmir issue with India and instability in Afghanistan, Pakistan is not in a position to open a new front of hostility on its western border. Furthermore, the significant Shia population in Pakistan (approximately 20% of the population) would make an alliance hostile to Iran unsustainable in domestic politics. Although the Islamabad administration follows a fluctuating course in relations with Iran, it carefully avoids taking a position that would completely antagonize Tehran.

    Despite its rivalry with Iran, Saudi Arabia has not completely closed diplomatic channels. The normalization agreement signed in Beijing in 2023 marked the announcement of a new chapter in Riyadh’s Iran policy. Saudi Arabia needs regional stability and security to achieve its Vision 2030 goals. Exiting the war in Yemen, maintaining balances in Iraq and Lebanon, and keeping the Red Sea trade route open require at least a cold peace with Iran. Engaging in an alliance that excludes Iran would undermine this normalization process and drag the kingdom back into a costly proxy war.

    In addition to these internal contradictions, the lack of mutual trust among the three countries is one of the biggest obstacles to an alliance. Türkiye harbors suspicions regarding the roles of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in the July 15 coup attempt. Pakistan is uneasy about Saudi Arabia’s developing strategic partnership with India. Saudi Arabia, in turn, views Ankara’s regional intentions with suspicion due to Türkiye’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood. This crisis of confidence prevents the parties from developing sincere cooperation in areas such as intelligence sharing and joint military planning.

    Regional Stability and the Risk of Polarization

    An alliance that excludes Iran could increase regional polarization and deepen existing conflicts. West Asia is already a geography where ethnic, sectarian, and political fault lines are highly active. A new attempt at bloc formation in this geography would only serve to escalate existing tensions. Particularly, sectarian divergence is one of the region’s most sensitive points. An alliance excluding Iran, spearheaded by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan, would inevitably be perceived as a “Sunni Bloc,” reinforcing feelings of encirclement among Shia communities. This could disrupt the delicate sectarian balance in Iraq, trigger a new internal conflict in Lebanon, and increase unrest in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province.

    The further accentuation of sectarian and political fault lines could increase instability in the long term. Historical experience shows that exclusionary alliances in West Asia are short-lived and often counterproductive. The 1955 Baghdad Pact (CENTO), aimed at containing the Soviet Union, faced Arab nationalist waves led by Egypt’s Nasser and regional opposition, ultimately dissolving. Similarly, the Arab Coalition formed by Saudi Arabia in 2015 to intervene in Yemen failed to achieve its initial ambitious goals, deepened the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, and led to an increase in the Houthis’ military capacity. A new alliance aimed at excluding Iran is highly likely to suffer a similar fate.

    Another dimension of polarization is that it facilitates the intervention of extra-regional powers. An environment where Iran is excluded would create a suitable ground for the USA to increase its military presence in the region and for Israel to act more freely. This would also heighten the interest of Russia and China in the region, turning West Asia into an arena of great power rivalry reminiscent of the Cold War era. For a country like Türkiye, which ostensibly tries to “pursue a multi-dimensional foreign policy,” such an environment would narrow its room for maneuver and force it to choose between the two blocs. Yet, Ankara’s strategy to date has ostensibly been based on “balancing between blocs as much as possible and maintaining relations with both sides.”

    Therefore, inclusive dialogue mechanisms offer a more sustainable solution than exclusionary alliances. The problems of West Asia cannot be solved by excluding or punishing one actor but through processes that recognize the legitimate interests of all actors and build mutual trust. The Helsinki Process, which ended the Cold War in Europe, is an instructive model of how dialogue can be established between hostile camps. A similar process for West Asia could be initiated with a broad-based security and cooperation conference involving Iran, regional powers like Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Egypt, and Pakistan, as well as global actors such as Russia, China, and the EU as observers.

    Here, the humanitarian cost of polarization must also not be ignored. West Asia is a geography where millions of people have been displaced and hundreds of thousands of civilians have lost their lives in the last two decades due to the occupation of Iraq, the Syrian civil war, conflicts in Yemen, and the Israeli-Palestinian issue. A new policy of bloc formation and exclusion in this geography would deepen the human tragedy. The priority for regional countries should be to end existing conflicts and focus on reconstruction processes, not invent new enmities.

    The China and Russia Dimension

    Iran is an important partner for China’s economic projects and Russia’s regional strategies. Under the Belt and Road Initiative, China views Iran as a key junction of land and sea corridors connecting Central Asia to West Asia and from there to Europe. With the 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership agreement signed in 2021, China has committed to investing over $400 billion in Iran’s energy, transportation, telecommunications, and financial sectors. This agreement aims to make Iran resilient against Western sanctions and secure China’s energy supply. A West Asian alliance aimed at excluding Iran would directly target these strategic Chinese investments and deal a severe blow to Beijing’s economic interests in the region. Therefore, China cannot be expected to remain silent on such an initiative; Beijing would likely attempt to thwart any structure aimed at excluding Iran through diplomatic pressure, economic incentives, and its veto power in the United Nations Security Council.

    Thus, an exclusionary approach towards Iran could also affect the interests of these two major powers in the region and create new areas of tension. For Russia, Iran is not only an energy competitor but also a strategic ally in the context of joint military presence in Syria, the search for stability in the Caucasus, and solidarity against Western sanctions. Sanctions imposed by the West following the Ukraine war have brought Russia even closer to Iran. There is deepening cooperation between the two countries in areas of unmanned aerial vehicles, missile technology, and military training. Furthermore, Russia is developing its access to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf through Iran, seeking to create a strategic line connecting its presence in the Mediterranean with the Indian Ocean. A West Asian alliance without Iran would serve as a barrier hindering Russia’s achievement of these global strategic objectives.

    Russia’s presence in the region is not limited to Iran. Moscow cooperates with Türkiye in the Astana process, coordinates energy policies with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (OPEC+), and maintains a complex yet functional relationship with Israel. Russia knows that an order in West Asia where any actor is completely excluded would not serve its interests. Because such an order would consolidate US dominance in the region and narrow Russia’s room for maneuver. Therefore, Moscow would side with Tehran against initiatives aimed at excluding Iran and would not hesitate to use its diplomatic, military, and economic tools to undermine these efforts.

    Another important dimension of the support China and Russia provide to Iran is the international financial system and alternative payment mechanisms. To circumvent US sanctions, Iran engages in bilateral currency swap agreements with China and Russia, utilizes cryptocurrencies, and develops its own financial messaging systems. China’s efforts to internationalize the yuan and break the hegemony of the US dollar gain momentum through cooperation with Iran. Since a West Asian alliance without Iran would aim to eliminate a significant pillar of this alternative financial architecture, it would face wholesale opposition from China and Russia. This could lead to new fractures in the global financial system and a deepening of the economic decoupling between East and West.

    Finally, Iran’s growing visibility in platforms like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS breaks its isolation in the international system and provides it with an alternative diplomatic umbrella. Iran’s full membership in the SCO in 2023 and its joining of BRICS as of 2024 have made it an actor impossible to exclude from the security equation in West Asia. These memberships not only grant Iran prestige but also offer the opportunity to institutionalize military, economic, and intelligence cooperation with China and Russia. Any regional alliance aiming to exclude Iran would have to confront this institutional reality and bear the collective reaction of the SCO-BRICS axis.

    Conclusion

    The idea of a West Asian alliance without Iran is not realistic. While it may be based on certain strategic calculations for these individual actors, the region’s realities seriously question the sustainability of such a structure. Geographical necessities, demographic balances, energy geopolitics, and the determinative power of non-state actors make Iran an integral part of this equation. Trying to exclude Iran is akin to ignoring the main water source while building a dam; such a structure is doomed to collapse in the first flood. Türkiye’s relations with the USA, NATO, and Israel make it difficult to evaluate such an alliance on a completely independent track. Ankara’s predicament, caught between its institutional ties with the West, its economic and security cooperation with Iran, and its claim to regional leadership, makes it a natural advocate of inclusive dialogue platforms rather than exclusionary blocs.

    Nevertheless, rather than viewing regional dynamics as a “conspiracy” directed solely by external powers, addressing them as a multi-layered and complex balance of power provides a healthier analysis. Every actor in West Asia has its own agenda, “threat perception,” and strategic calculations. The US and Israel’s desire to contain Iran, Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 goals, Türkiye’s pursuit of strategic autonomy, Pakistan’s need for depth against India, and Iran’s ideal of exporting its revolution are variables in this complex equation. Analyses that ignore these variables and reduce the situation to a single factor (such as sectarian difference or US plans) not only fail to help us understand the region but also lead to incorrect policy outcomes.

    In light of the arguments presented in this article, we can summarize why a West Asian alliance without Iran is not possible as follows: First, geographical and demographic realities make excluding Iran impossible. Second, the internal contradictions and lack of trust within the Türkiye-Pakistan-Saudi Arabia triangle prevent these countries from coalescing around a common definition of an enemy. Third, the strategic partnerships Iran has developed with China and Russia mean any attempt to exclude it will have global consequences. Fourth, excluding Iran would activate sectarian and ethnic fault lines in the region, deepening existing conflicts (there is a dense Shia population in the Gulf countries) and creating new areas of instability. Fifth and finally, Türkiye’s NATO membership and relations with the USA structurally hinder its ability to assume the leadership of a fully independent regional alliance.

    In conclusion, the path to a lasting order in West Asia lies not through exclusionary blocs but through inclusive and balanced models of cooperation. These models must recognize Iran’s legitimate security concerns and regional interests. Similarly, Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 goals, Türkiye’s counter-terrorism priorities, Pakistan’s economic development needs, and Israel’s security quest must also be part of this inclusive framework. The Helsinki Process and the OSCE model built by Europe after the devastating wars of the 20th century could serve as an inspiring example for West Asia. Of course, the historical, cultural, and political dynamics of the two regions are not identical; however, there are lessons to be drawn about how dialogue can be established between hostile camps.

    In this context, the task for regional countries and global powers is not to invent new enmities and form exclusionary blocs, but to develop mechanisms that will end existing conflicts, alleviate human suffering, and promote economic development. Excluding Iran brings neither peace to the region nor serves any country’s national interests. On the contrary, it plunges the region into deeper chaos and uncertainty. The future of West Asia must be sought not in exclusion, but in inclusion; not in polarization, but in integration; not in conflict, but in cooperation.

    RECOMMENDATIONS

    In light of the analysis above, the following policy recommendations are developed for regional countries, primarily Türkiye, and the international community:

    1. For Türkiye:
      · Deepening Bilateral Relations with Iran: Concrete steps should be taken to place existing energy agreements on a long-term and stable footing, strengthen joint mechanisms on border security, and achieve the $30 billion trade volume target.
      · Avoiding Exclusionary Alliances: Türkiye should not participate in any regional security structure that targets or excludes Iran; instead, it should advocate for a “West Asian Security and Cooperation Conference” encompassing all regional countries.
      · Institutionalizing Strategic Autonomy: Projects reducing external dependency in the defense industry should be accelerated, alternative financial systems and payment mechanisms developed, and the balance between NATO commitments and regional interests carefully maintained.
    2. For Regional Countries:
      · Inclusive Dialogue Platforms: The normalization process with Iran, initiated under Saudi Arabia’s leadership, should be expanded with the participation of other regional countries and given an institutional framework.
      · Economic Integration Projects: Multilateral projects involving Iran in energy, transportation, and trade (e.g., facilitating trade within the ECO framework, interconnecting regional energy grids) should be promoted.
      · Joint Stance Against Sectarian Polarization: Regional countries should avoid rhetoric and actions that fuel sectarian division and develop a unifying language around the common problems of the Islamic world (Palestine, poverty, education).
    3. For Global Powers:
      · USA and the West: The failure of the maximum pressure policy towards Iran should be acknowledged, and a solution should be sought that encompasses the nuclear program and recognizes Iran’s place in the regional security architecture. Furthermore, instead of exclusionary projects like IMEC, infrastructure investments encompassing all regional countries should be supported.
      · China and Russia: Their support for Iran should be maintained in a balanced and responsible manner without leading to new polarization in the region. They should encourage win-win based cooperation rather than zero-sum competition in West Asia.
    4. For International Organizations:
      · United Nations and Organization of Islamic Cooperation: Should undertake mediation and facilitation roles to initiate a comprehensive security and cooperation dialogue in West Asia, establishing a “West Asian Helsinki Process” agenda for this purpose.

    BIBLIOGRAPHY

    · Aras, B., & Karakaya Polat, R. (2008). From Conflict to Cooperation: Desecuritization of Turkey’s Relations with Syria and Iran. Security Dialogue, 39(5), 495-515.
    · Cordesman, A. H. (2021). Iran’s Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities: The Threat in the Northern Gulf. Washington DC: CSIS Press.
    · Ehteshami, A., & Zweiri, M. (2007). Iran and the Rise of Its Neoconservatives: The Politics of Tehran’s Silent Revolution. London: I.B. Tauris.
    · Gause, F. G. (2023). The Future of US-Saudi Relations: Oil, China, and the Shadow of 9/11. Foreign Affairs, 102(4), 48-63.
    · Hunter, S. T. (2022). Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Resisting the New International Order. Santa Barbara: Praeger.
    · International Crisis Group. (2024). Ten Challenges for the Middle East in 2024. Middle East Report No. 245. Brussels: ICG.
    · Kamrava, M. (Ed.). (2020). The Sacred Republic: Power and Institutions in Iran. London: Hurst & Company.
    · Keynoush, B. (2023). Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Politics of Détente. London: I.B. Tauris.
    · Kirişci, K. (2023). Turkey and the West: Fault Lines in a Troubled Alliance. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.
    · Nasr, V. (2006). The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
    · Oktav, Ö. Z. (2021). Turkey’s Relations with the Middle East: Political and Economic Challenges. Cham: Springer.
    · Parsi, T. (2017). Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy. New Haven: Yale University Press.
    · Riedel, B. (2019). Kings and Presidents: Saudi Arabia and the United States since FDR. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.
    · Sinkaya, B. (2018). The Revolutionary Guards in Iranian Politics: Elites and Shifting Relations. London: Routledge.
    · Takeyh, R. (2021). The Last Shah: America, Iran, and the Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty. New Haven: Yale University Press.
    · Telhami, S. (2013). The World Through Arab Eyes: Arab Public Opinion and the Reshaping of the Middle East. New York: Basic Books.
    · Ülgen, S., & Yeşiltaş, M. (2023). Türkiye’nin Jeopolitik Dönüşümü: Stratejik Özerklik Arayışı. İstanbul: SETA Yayınları.
    · Walt, S. M. (1987). The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
    · Wehrey, F. (Ed.). (2023). The Saudi-Iranian Rivalry and the Future of Middle East Security. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.
    · Zaccara, L. (2024). Iran’s Look East Policy: Strategic Partnership with China and Russia. Middle East Policy, 31(1), 87-104.

    Sefa Yürükel

    Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
    Aarhus University, 1997
    Independent Researcher
    Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures

  • China’s Economic Model: State, Market, and the Debate on Capitalism

    China’s Economic Model: State, Market, and the Debate on Capitalism

    China’s economic transformation over the past forty years has drawn attention not only for its high growth rates but also for a structure that challenges the boundaries of existing economic theories. This transformation has generated new areas of debate, particularly within the literature of development economics and comparative political economy.

    Classical modernization theories associate economic development with market liberalization and the spread of liberal democratic institutions. However, the Chinese case demonstrates that this linear relationship is not necessarily obligatory. This calls for a reassessment of existing theoretical frameworks.

    The concept of “state capitalism,” often used to explain China’s economic structure, can be illuminating in many respects but may also be reductive. By positioning China as merely a variant of the existing capitalist system, this concept risks downplaying its unique institutional dynamics.

    In this context, the fundamental question is not which category China belongs to, but rather through which mechanisms this system operates. This perspective prioritizes analytical inquiry over normative classification.

    Thus, the Chinese experience functions as a laboratory that necessitates rethinking the concepts of state, market, and capitalism.

    Comparative Analysis of the Concept of the State

    In Western political thought, the state is defined within a Weberian framework as a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and a rational-bureaucratic organization. In this model, the state is treated as a structure relatively autonomous from society and institutionally distinct.

    This approach has produced an administrative framework compatible with modern capitalist economies. The rule of law, institutional predictability, and bureaucratic specialization are its core elements.

    In China, however, the concept of the state rests on a more holistic historical foundation. The Confucian tradition views political authority as a continuation of moral order and does not sharply separate state and society.

    The concept of “Guojia” reflects this holistic understanding. The state is positioned not merely as a governing apparatus but also as the carrier of social order.

    Therefore, interpreting the Chinese state solely through a Weberian model is insufficient; institutional structure, historical continuity, and ideological frameworks must be evaluated together.

    The Distinction Between Market and Capitalism

    Although the market mechanism and the capitalist system are often used interchangeably, these two concepts are structurally distinct. The market is a mechanism that regulates exchange relations and historically predates capitalism.

    Capitalism, on the other hand, is a broader system organized around private ownership of the means of production, profit maximization, and capital accumulation. In this system, the market is not merely a distribution mechanism but the central determinant of production relations.

    In the Chinese case, while market mechanisms clearly exist, they are constrained and guided by the strong coordinating capacity of the state. Therefore, the presence of markets alone is insufficient to classify the system as capitalist.

    The financial system, largely operating through state-owned banks, shapes capital allocation via non-market instruments. This creates a significant divergence from classical financial capitalism.

    Thus, in China, the market is not the center of the system but rather a tool structured by the state.

    Historical Evolution of the Chinese Model

    The Chinese economy during the Mao era was built on a structure based on central planning and state ownership. Economic activities were largely conducted under state control.

    However, this model produced significant limitations, particularly in agricultural productivity and industrial output. Rigidity in resource allocation deepened economic imbalances.

    The reform process initiated by Deng Xiaoping transformed this structure by integrating market mechanisms into the system. However, this integration did not imply the complete removal of state control.

    The concept of a “socialist market economy” was developed to describe this hybrid structure. This model represents the simultaneous use of planning and market mechanisms.

    Over time, China has created a unique development path by increasing market openness while maintaining state control in strategic sectors.

    Institutional Structure and the Party-State System

    To understand the functioning of China’s economic system, the central role of the Chinese Communist Party must be taken into account. The Party is not only the holder of political power but also the main actor in economic coordination.

    The relationship between the state and the Party, unlike in classical liberal models, is deeply intertwined. The Party possesses strategic steering capacity over state institutions.

    This structure enables the effective implementation of long-term economic planning. Major infrastructure investments and industrial policies, in particular, are carried out rapidly through centralized coordination.

    While state ownership continues in strategic sectors, the private sector is encouraged within defined limits. This creates a controlled market environment.

    In conclusion, in China, the state functions not outside the market but as its guide and architect.

    Comparison with the Soviet Union

    The fundamental difference between the Soviet Union and China lies in the management of their reform processes. Both countries attempted transitions from planned economies to more market-based systems.

    In the Soviet Union, the reform process progressed alongside political disintegration, leading to a weakening of state capacity. This negatively affected the sustainability of economic transformation.

    In China, reforms were implemented gradually and in a controlled manner. Economic liberalization was carried out step by step while preserving the political structure.

    This approach maintained institutional stability and made the transformation process more manageable.

    Thus, the success of the Chinese model is related not only to the content of reforms but also to their timing and institutional framework.

    Theoretical Debates and the Position of the Model

    There are various theoretical approaches in the literature on the Chinese economy. This diversity makes it difficult to place the model within a single category.

    The state capitalism approach views China as a variant within the market economy characterized by strong state intervention. In this perspective, the market mechanism is considered the dominant element.

    The socialist approach emphasizes the determining role of state ownership and planning, reducing the market to an instrumental function.

    The hybrid model approach evaluates China as an intermediate form between two systems. This perspective is particularly common in the comparative capitalism literature.

    These differences indicate that China possesses a structure that transcends existing theoretical categories.

    Conclusion

    China’s economic model has a multilayered structure that goes beyond classical economic and political categorizations, making it difficult to define with a single label.

    The strong and guiding role of the state constitutes the system’s core characteristic. However, this does not mean that market mechanisms are entirely excluded.

    Market elements exist within the system as instruments strategically employed by the state. This complicates conventional definitions of capitalism.

    The Chinese case demonstrates that economic systems cannot be fully explained through fixed and universal categories. Instead, historical and institutional contexts must be taken into account.

    In conclusion, China stands as one of the most important contemporary examples showing that the relationship between state and market can be redefined.

    References

    Arrighi, Giovanni. Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century. London: Verso, 2007.

    Bremmer, Ian. The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations? New York: Portfolio, 2010.

    Deng, Xiaoping. Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, various volumes.

    Huang, Yasheng. Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

    Milanović, Branko. Capitalism, Alone: The Future of the System That Rules the World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019.

    Naughton, Barry. The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007.

    North, Douglass C. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

    Polanyi, Karl. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Boston: Beacon Press, 1944.

    Weber, Max. Economy and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.

    Zhang, Weiwei. The China Wave: Rise of a Civilizational State. Hackensack: World Scientific, 2012.

    Naughton, Barry. “The Chinese Economy: Adaptation and Growth.” (various articles and edited volumes).

    Oi, Jean C. “The Role of the Local State in China’s Transitional Economy.” China Quarterly, 1992.

    Walder, Andrew G. “Local Governments as Industrial Firms.” American Journal of Sociology, 1995.

    Pei, Minxin. China’s Trapped Transition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006.

    Sefa Yürükel

    Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
    Aarhus University, 1997
    Independent Researcher
    Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures

  • Between Ideological Consistency and Pragmatic Contradiction: Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” Legitimacy and Turkey’s Crisis of Reputation

    Between Ideological Consistency and Pragmatic Contradiction: Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” Legitimacy and Turkey’s Crisis of Reputation

    Iran’s “axis of resistance” discourse and practices, analyzed within international relations literature through the frameworks of “asymmetric resistance” and “ideological foreign policy,” present a rare example of consistency in the global system. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has succeeded in positioning itself as the center of an uncompromising, honorable resistance front, particularly against the United States and Israel. In contrast, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey claims to pursue a “pragmatic” and “multi-dimensional balancing” foreign policy, but this approach has in practice resulted in unprincipled behavior, inconsistency, and a severe erosion of reputation.

    1. Theoretical Framework: Reputation and Consistency in Light of Realism and Constructivism

    1.1. The Realist Perspective: Balance of Power and Survival

    Realist theory argues that power and interest are the primary determinants of international relations. From this perspective, Iran’s “axis of resistance” strategy represents an effort to create an asymmetric balance of power against the US and Israel. The network of proxy actors Iran has built—Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and Hamas in Palestine—has created a deterrence capacity that transcends Iran’s conventional limitations.

    However, the realist perspective alone is insufficient. Iran’s strategy cannot be reduced to mere power calculations; it is also a project of legitimacy and reputation building. Iran seeks not only to survive but also to create a moral superiority in the international system through its identity as “protector of the oppressed.”

    1.2. The Constructivist Perspective: Identity, Discourse, and Legitimacy

    Constructivist theory teaches that states exist not only through their material capacities but also through their identities, discourses, and the social capital these create. As Alexander Wendt famously argued, “anarchy is what states make of it.” From this perspective, Iran presents an extraordinary success story. Every position it has taken against the “Little Satan” (Israel) and the “Great Satan” (the US) has remained consistent for over 45 years. This consistency has earned Iran a reputation as an actor that “does what it says” and “keeps its word.” Its perception as the only regional power that champions the Palestinian cause on Arab streets has elevated Iran to a position of moral superiority over the Sunni monarchies that cooperate with the West.

    Turkey, from this perspective, represents a complete failure. Although the AKP government initially tried to build a new identity through ambitious discourses such as “alliance of civilizations,” “zero problems with neighbors,” and “central country,” the inconsistencies in the practical implementation of these discourses have transformed Turkey into an actor whose “word is unreliable,” that “pursues day-to-day policies,” and that is “untrustworthy.”

    1. Iran: A Reputable Actor Forged Through Ideological Consistency

    2.1. Historical and Ideological Origins of the “Axis of Resistance”

    The “axis of resistance” (Mihver-i Mukavemet) draws directly from the ideological codes of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Ayatollah Khomeini’s theory of “Velayat-e Faqih” divides the world into two poles: the “arrogant” (imperialist powers) and the “oppressed” (the weak). Iran’s mission is to side with the oppressed and organize resistance against imperialism.

    This strategy, which materialized with the founding of Hezbollah in 1982, has over the years evolved into a network of proxy actors extending across Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Palestine. Each of these actors functions as a reflection of Iran’s ideological discourse and consolidates Iran’s regional influence.

    2.2. Uncompromising Resistance at the Discourse Level: Anti-US and Anti-Israel Stance

    The central pillar of Iran’s foreign policy discourse is opposition to the US and Israel. On every platform—from Quds Day events to Friday prayers, from official state media to diplomatic statements—Israel’s legitimacy is rejected, and US presence in the region is denounced as imperialist intervention.

    What distinguishes Iran from other regional actors is the uncompromising and consistent nature of this discourse. Even during nuclear negotiations with the US, Iran has never made the slightest concession from its ideological discourse, continuing to label the US as “Satan.” This consistency is critical not only for the domestic legitimacy of Iran’s leadership but also for its international reputation.

    2.3. Action Supporting Discourse in Practice: Asymmetric Resistance

    Iran backs its discourse with action. Through proxy actors, it conducts attacks on Israeli and US interests, sends military advisors, and develops missile and drone technologies, sharing this capacity with its allies. Hezbollah’s resistance during the 2006 war with Israel was presented as a strategic success for Iran and demonstrated to the world the seriousness of Iran’s “resistance” discourse.

    This high level of consistency between discourse and action has made Iran a respected and reputable actor in the international system. The fact that Iran is today seen by many circles as a “symbol of resistance against imperialism” is precisely the result of this consistency.

    2.4. Iran’s Legitimacy and Its Costs

    This strategy certainly has its costs. Severe economic sanctions, regional isolation, and domestic social unrest are among these costs. However, rather than harming Iran’s reputation, these costs are interpreted as “sacrifice” and “commitment to the cause,” further strengthening Iran’s resistance discourse.

    Iran today is one of the few countries in the world that commands respect. Its ability to establish strategic partnerships with global powers such as China and Russia, and its membership in platforms like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, are concrete indicators of this reputation. Iran’s reputation stems not only from its military or economic capacity but primarily from its ideological consistency and its reliability as an actor that “does what it says.”

    1. Turkey: Reputation Loss in the Grip of Pragmatism

    3.1. The Evolution of AKP Foreign Policy: From Discourse to Contradiction

    With the AKP’s rise to power in 2002, Turkish foreign policy gained a new discourse through Ahmet Davutoğlu’s “strategic depth” doctrine. Concepts such as “zero problems with neighbors,” “alliance of civilizations,” and “proactive peace diplomacy” were claims to make Turkey a leading and respected actor in its region.

    However, from the 2010s onward, particularly during the Arab Spring, this idealist discourse was quickly abandoned, replaced by a pragmatic, sometimes opportunistic, and constantly shifting foreign policy. From its position on Assad in Syria, to the S-400 crisis with Russia and subsequent normalization, to tensions with Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean and military intervention in Libya, Turkey has failed to provide consistent explanations for its policies.

    3.2. Between the Western Alliance and Regional Engagements: A State of Belonging Nowhere

    One of the most serious aspects of Turkey’s foreign policy is its attempt to engage simultaneously with directly conflicting alliances. Turkey is a member of NATO and part of the Western security architecture, yet it has signed the S-400 air defense system agreement with Russia—seen as NATO’s biggest rival—and has developed deep cooperation in energy and tourism.

    This situation makes Turkey neither a fully reliable ally of the West nor a sincere partner of the East. The West views Turkey’s S-400 agreement as a betrayal and has imposed CAATSA sanctions. Russia, for its part, always reads Turkey’s NATO membership as a problem and never fully accepts Turkey as a “strategic partner.”

    3.3. The Hypocritical Stance on the Israel-Palestine Issue: The Gulf Between Discourse and Practice

    The issue that most damages Turkey’s reputation is its hypocritical stance on the Israel-Palestine issue. At the level of discourse, the AKP government champions the Palestinian cause, describes Israel’s Gaza policies as those of a “terrorist state,” and President Erdoğan delivers speeches targeting Israel from UN podiums.

    But the practice is entirely different. Economic relations between Turkey and Israel continue at around $7-8 billion annually. The natural gas agreement signed in 2022 demonstrates the extent of this economic relationship. On every platform where Turkey criticizes Israel, it continues to trade with and sign energy deals with the same Israel.

    This is an open discourse-action mismatch. Turkey condemns the “recognition of Jerusalem as a capital” while simultaneously contributing to Israel’s economic strengthening. This hypocritical stance renders Turkey’s sincerity on the Palestinian cause questionable and has destroyed Turkey’s credibility, particularly in Arab public opinion.

    3.4. Indirect Engagement with Israel Through Azerbaijan: A Concrete Example of Reputation Erosion

    The most concrete example of Turkey’s hypocritical stance is its indirect engagement with Israel through Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is one of Israel’s most important strategic partners. Israel sells weapons to Azerbaijan (drones, air defense systems), Azerbaijani oil flows to Israel, and there is intensive intelligence cooperation between the two countries.

    Turkey, for its part, has a special relationship with Azerbaijan, defined by the slogan “one nation, two states.” Turkey provides military support to Azerbaijan, engages in energy cooperation, and provides unconditional political support to Azerbaijan on Karabakh.

    The problem is this: Turkey describes Israel as a “terrorist state” while maintaining a “brotherly” relationship with a country that is Israel’s strategic partner. Turkey is openly engaged in indirect economic and military cooperation with Israel through Azerbaijan. This situation renders Turkey’s claim to champion the Palestinian cause completely meaningless.

    3.5. The “Unprincipled” Critique and Reputation Erosion

    Criticisms of Turkey’s foreign policy can be grouped under three headings:

    First, discourse-action inconsistency. Turkey criticizes Israel while trading with it. It criticizes US presence in the region while maintaining NATO membership. This is an open example of “hypocrisy.”

    Second, day-to-day policymaking. Turkey’s foreign policy positions are often based on short-term tactical calculations and lack long-term strategic vision. One day Turkey is cozying up to Russia; the next day it is sending weapons to Ukraine. This makes it impossible to predict Turkey’s next move.

    Third, reputation erosion. Constantly shifting positions have completely destroyed Turkey’s status as a “reliable actor” in the international system. Today, no country knows how long Turkey’s position on any given issue will last or how sincere it is. This has transformed Turkey into an actor that has lost its respectability and whose reputation is shattered.

    1. Comparative Analysis: Iran’s Reputation vs. Turkey’s Reputation Loss

    4.1. Fundamental Comparison

    The fundamental difference between Iran and Turkey emerges at the level of discourse-action consistency. Iran has followed an unchanged ideological line for 45 years, has made no concessions against actors it defines as “enemies,” and supports its discourse with action. Turkey, by contrast, takes constantly shifting positions shaped by daily tactics, positions that contradict one another.

    The consequences of this difference are clear: Iran is seen as a “does what it says,” “keeps its word,” “loyal to its cause” actor in the international system. This reputation has enabled Iran to establish strategic partnerships with powers like China and Russia and to gain weight in platforms such as BRICS and the SCO.

    Turkey, on the other hand, is perceived as an “unpredictable,” “unreliable,” “pragmatist” actor. This perception has destroyed Turkey’s international reputation and has led to it never being seen as a fully reliable partner in any alliance.

    4.2. Sources of Iran’s Reputation

    Iran’s reputation draws from four main sources:

    First, ideological consistency. Iran has not made the slightest concession from its “anti-imperialism” and “resistance” discourse since 1979. This consistency makes Iran a predictable actor.

    Second, discourse-action alignment. Iran does what it says, follows through on its threats, and keeps its promises. This makes Iran a reliable actor.

    Third, capacity for sacrifice. Despite years of severe sanctions, economic hardship, and diplomatic isolation, Iran has not abandoned its ideological line. This sacrifice demonstrates the “seriousness of Iran’s cause” to the entire world.

    Fourth, symbolic capital. By championing the Palestinian cause, Iran has accumulated significant symbolic capital in the Islamic world. This capital elevates Iran to a position of moral superiority over the Sunni monarchies.

    4.3. Causes of Turkey’s Reputation Loss

    The causes of Turkey’s reputation loss are precisely the opposite:

    First, ideological vacuum. The AKP’s initial discourses such as “alliance of civilizations” were abandoned over time and replaced by an unclear, eclectic discourse. What values Turkey represents, which ideological line it stands on, has become uncertain.

    Second, discourse-action mismatch. Turkey constantly does the opposite of what it says, and can abandon a position it defended one day the next. The hypocritical stance on Israel is the most striking example.

    Third, unreliability. No one can predict how long Turkey’s positions will last or under what conditions they might change. This makes Turkey a “risky” actor in international relations.

    Fourth, loss of symbolic capital. Although Turkey claims to champion the Palestinian cause, its continued trade with Israel and indirect cooperation through Azerbaijan has completely exhausted its symbolic capital in this area. Today, almost no one on Arab streets believes Turkey is sincere about Palestine.

    1. Case Study: The Azerbaijan-Israel-Turkey Triangle and Reputation Erosion

    5.1. Azerbaijan-Israel Relations

    The strategic cooperation between Azerbaijan and Israel has deepened in energy, military, and intelligence fields. Israel is one of Azerbaijan’s most important arms suppliers; Azerbaijani oil flows to Israel; and the two countries conduct joint intelligence activities against Iran.

    This relationship is a direct threat to Iran. Israel’s military and intelligence presence in a country so close to Iran’s border creates a serious fracture in Iran’s security perception.

    5.2. Turkey’s Contradictory Position

    Turkey has a special relationship with Azerbaijan, defined by the slogan “one nation, two states.” Turkey provides military support to Azerbaijan, engages in energy cooperation, and provides unconditional political support on Karabakh.

    The problem is this: Turkey describes Israel as a “terrorist state” while maintaining a “brotherly” relationship with Azerbaijan, Israel’s closest strategic partner. By supporting Azerbaijan, Turkey indirectly strengthens Israel’s presence and influence in the region.

    This contradiction renders Turkey’s discourse on Palestine completely meaningless. Turkey condemns the “recognition of Jerusalem as a capital” while embracing the most important regional ally of the same Israel that has its embassy in Jerusalem. This is open hypocrisy.

    5.3. Impact of This Triangle on Turkey’s Reputation

    The Azerbaijan-Israel-Turkey triangle has irreparably damaged Turkey’s reputation. What critics call a “hypocritical stance” points to an even more serious picture: Turkey has become an actor that does not even know what it stands for, is bogged down in contradictions, and disregards its own reputation.

    Turkey’s position in this triangle positions it neither as a respectable actor in the Islamic world nor in the West. The Islamic world doubts Turkey’s sincerity on Palestine. The West questions Turkey’s reliability within NATO. Turkey has become a “nobody” that does not fully belong anywhere and is not fully trusted in any alliance.

    1. Conclusion: Iran’s Reputation and Turkey’s Reputation Loss

    Iran’s ideologically grounded and hardline foreign policy approach has made it a reputable actor in the international system. The legitimacy ground it has built through the discourse of “resistance” has survived years of sanctions, economic hardship, and diplomatic isolation. Today, Iran is seen as an actor that “does what it says” and “never abandons its cause,” commanding great respect, particularly in anti-US circles. The fact that global powers like China and Russia see Iran as a strategic partner is a concrete reflection of this reputation.

    Turkey, by contrast, may have achieved some short-term gains through its pragmatic and multi-dimensional foreign policy strategy, but the price has been heavy. Turkey is perceived in the international system as an “inconsistent,” “unreliable,” “unpredictable” actor, and this perception has destroyed Turkey’s reputation. The hypocritical stance on the Israel-Palestine issue and the indirect engagement with Israel through Azerbaijan have rendered Turkey’s discourse meaningless and reduced it to a “hypocritical” actor.

    In conclusion, Iran continues to exist as a reputable, respected actor whose voice is heard in the world, while the Turkish government has factually lost its reputation due to its unprincipled and contradictory policies, earning the label of an “unreliable actor” in the international system. To change this course, Turkey must radically question its foreign policy, close the gap between its discourse and actions, and move toward a consistent, principled line. Otherwise, the diplomatic and economic costs of reputation loss will grow even heavier by the day.

    Bibliography

    Adib-Moghaddam, A. (2006). The International Politics of the Persian Gulf: A Cultural Genealogy. Routledge.

    Altunışık, M. B. (2014). Turkey-Israel Relations: A History of Alliance and Rivalry. Middle East Policy, 21(2), 78-92.

    Aras, B. (2014). Turkish Foreign Policy after the Arab Spring: From Soft Power to Assertiveness. Insight Turkey, 16(2), 43-58.

    Aras, B., & Tok, M. E. (2020). Iran’s Axis of Resistance: A Strategic Analysis. Middle East Policy, 27(3), 45-59.

    Bengio, O. (2010). The Turkish-Israeli Relationship: Changing Ties of Middle Eastern Outsiders. Palgrave Macmillan.

    Cornell, S. E. (2015). Azerbaijan Since Independence. Routledge.

    Davutoğlu, A. (2001). Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu. Küre Yayınları.

    Hinnebusch, R., & Ehteshami, A. (Eds.). (2014). The Foreign Policies of Middle East States. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

    Kardaş, Ş., & Balcı, A. (Eds.). (2018). The New Turkish Foreign Policy: Towards a Strategic Depth. Lexington Books.

    Keyman, E. F. (2016). Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Arab Spring Era: From Proactive to Buffer State. Third World Quarterly, 37(12), 2274-2291.

    Maloney, S. (2015). Iran’s Political Economy since the Revolution. Cambridge University Press.

    Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W.W. Norton & Company.

    Ostovar, A. (2016). Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. Oxford University Press.

    Öniş, Z. (2011). Multiple Faces of the New Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique. Insight Turkey, 13(1), 47-65.

    Tabatabai, A. M. (2020). Iran’s Evolving Deterrence Strategy: The Role of Proxies. Survival, 62(5), 85-102.

    Valiyev, A. (2019). Azerbaijan-Israel Relations: A Strategic Alliance. Caucasus Survey, 7(2), 156-172.

    Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesley.

    Wastnidge, E. (2019). The Axis of Resistance: Iran’s Role in the Middle East. In The International Politics of the Middle East (pp. 123-141). Manchester University Press.

    Wendt, A. (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge University Press.

    Sefa Yürükel

    Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
    Aarhus University, 1997
    Independent Researcher
    Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures

  • The TRIC Axis: Turkey, Russia, Iran, and China as a Geopolitical Proposition – Possibility, Limits, and Global Repercussions

    The TRIC Axis: Turkey, Russia, Iran, and China as a Geopolitical Proposition – Possibility, Limits, and Global Repercussions

    As we approach the end of the first quarter of the 21st century, it has become widely accepted that the unipolar world order dominant in the post-Cold War era is experiencing a deep crisis of legitimacy and functionality. This Atlantic-centered order oppresses the Global South through military interventions, economic sanctions, debt mechanisms, and regime change operations. The paralysis in the UN Security Council’s decision-making processes, the social devastation caused by the structural adjustment programs imposed by the IMF and World Bank, and NATO’s escalation of conflicts contrary to its deterrence rhetoric all indicate that current international organizations cannot function without reform. Amidst this systemic crisis, new regional and intercontinental collaborations that could serve as alternatives to the existing order are being intensely debated in various academic, political, and strategic circles.

    One proposition at the center of these debates is a hypothetical axis or alliance comprising Turkey, Russia, Iran, and China. This structure, which as yet has no institutional existence, binding treaty text, or joint military command, has begun to establish itself in the literature as a powerful geopolitical vision and anti-systemic discourse.

    The TRIC Axis as a Geopolitical Proposition: Hypothetical Ground and Definition

    For any political project or alliance proposal to be seriously evaluated, the historical and structural ground that makes it possible must first be laid out. The idea of the TRIC axis draws nourishment from the fact that all four actors have been subjected to various forms of Western imperialism at different points in history. This shared consciousness of victimhood is the fundamental element that constructs the alliance proposal not as an emotional camaraderie but as a structural necessity. The partition of the Middle East with artificial borders following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, China’s “Century of Humiliation” in the 19th and 20th centuries, Russia’s total security, economic, and demographic crisis after its collapse in the 1990s, and Iran’s international isolation since the 1953 coup against Mossadegh have all prepared the ground for these four countries to develop a common critique of the system.

    These four actors share three fundamental weaknesses of the current international system. The first is the lack of a say in the security architecture. Turkey’s secondary position within NATO’s decision-making processes, Russia being made a direct threat object of the alliance, Iran’s exclusion from regional security arrangements, and China’s encirclement by military bases in the Pacific constitute a shared experience of insecurity. The second is subjection to the debt-inducing policies of international financial institutions. The structural adjustment programs of the IMF and World Bank have weakened the economic sovereignty of all four countries at different times; China stands out as the only major country that has succeeded in development by keeping these programs at bay. The third is that energy and trade routes are threatened by Western-controlled naval power. The control of critical maritime chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, the Suez Canal, Gibraltar, and the Strait of Malacca by the US and allied navies directly threatens the supply chain security of all four countries.

    The structural logic of the proposed alliance is based on the idea of transforming these three weaknesses around a common axis. Instead of the vicious cycle the West calls the “security dilemma,” the TRIC proposal aims to introduce a “development dilemma.” This conceptual innovation proposes a competition based on which country can eradicate poverty faster, produce greener energy, and train more scientists, replacing the current system where military expenditures compete with each other and constantly produce conflict. However, this conceptual framework remains a vision yet to be translated into concrete political will.

    Asymmetric Contributions and Complementarity Potential of the Four Actors

    The success or failure of any alliance depends on the members’ ability to cover each other’s weaknesses and turn strengths into synergy. In the TRIC proposal, each actor possesses different and potentially complementary areas of strength. This complementarity forms the proposal’s strongest theoretical foundation. However, realizing this potential depends on overcoming historical rivalries and mistrust among the actors, which has not yet been achieved today.

    Turkey, with its geopolitical position and humanitarian diplomacy capacity, aims to serve as a bridge between land and sea power. Located at the intersection of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, with its coastline on the Black Sea, control over the Straits, and presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey is positioned as the alliance’s gateway to the West. One of the most significant contributions Turkey could offer the axis is its technical military know-how acquired within NATO and its progress in unmanned aerial vehicle technology. Furthermore, the successful grain corridor initiative during the Ukraine-Russia war, mediation efforts between Gulf countries and Iran, and diplomatic initiatives in the Horn of Africa have concretely demonstrated Turkey’s crisis management capacity. However, Turkey’s energy dependence on imports, chronic current account deficit, and struggle with high inflation are the biggest obstacles to its ability to provide a sustainable contribution within the alliance.

    The Russian Federation, with its nuclear deterrence, vast natural gas and oil reserves, and hypersonic missile technology, has the potential to form the military and energy backbone of the TRIC proposal. The fact that the Russian economy has not completely collapsed despite the comprehensive sanction regimes imposed by the West after 2014 and especially in 2022 demonstrates the strategic importance of its energy resources and the resilience mechanisms the country has developed against sanctions. Russia’s military presence in Syria, Libya, and the Sahel region could serve as a logistical springboard for the proposed alliance to extend into Africa and the Middle East. However, Russia’s demographic decline, increasing technological dependence on China, and long-term technology transfer constraints due to exclusion from the Western financial system limit its role within the alliance.

    Iran stands out with its control over the energy corridor between the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, and its economy of resistance model developed under sanctions. Progress in nuclear technology, space studies, biotechnology, and nanotechnology despite sanctions shows that external pressure cannot completely stifle innovation. Iran’s proxy structures in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen have the potential to deepen the proposed alliance’s sphere of influence in the Middle East. Additionally, the 25-year comprehensive strategic agreement signed with China provides a concrete legal basis for Iran’s integration into the TRIC axis. Conversely, Iran’s long-standing international isolation, structural problems in its banking and financial system, and internal tensions due to social pressures complicate its full integration into the alliance.

    The People’s Republic of China, as the world’s largest economy by purchasing power parity, is designed as the economic locomotive of the TRIC proposal, with the financing and infrastructure technologies offered within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. In fifth-generation mobile communication, artificial intelligence, high-speed rail, solar and wind energy technologies, China has surpassed most of its Western rivals. As the founder of non-Western financial institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank, China claims to offer a financing model based on non-debt-inducing win-win principles. The comprehensive strategic partnership with Russia and the long-term agreement with Iran place China at the de facto center of the TRIC proposal. However, China’s rapidly aging population, debt crisis in the real estate sector, export pressures due to contracting global demand, and regional tensions such as Taiwan and the South China Sea limit the resources the country can allocate externally.

    None of these four actors alone has the capacity to challenge Western alliances. However, the complementarity in energy (Russia, Iran), manufacturing and finance (China), geopolitical reach and diplomacy (Turkey), and military deterrence (Russia, China) promises strong synergy at a theoretical level. The core thesis of the proposal is that this synergy could form a balancing element against the unipolar system.

    Strengths of the Proposal and the Vision It Offers

    Before assessing the feasibility of the TRIC axis proposal, it is necessary to deeply understand its strengths and the vision it offers. The proposal’s greatest strength is its reliance on the rising tide of anti-Western sentiment across large swathes of the Global South. Many countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America complain about the injustices of the current order and look favorably upon the formation of an alternative pole. The appeal of the TRIC proposal for these geographies is its promise of a cooperation model that does not indebt, does not impose military bases, and does not interfere in internal affairs.

    The second strength of the proposal is that it targets the current war economy. Today’s world is held captive by arms lobbies, war contractors, and manufactured threats. The TRIC proposal aims to break this bloody cycle and build a war-free economic model. In this model, no African mineral, no Asian labor, and no Middle Eastern petrodollar would flow to Western banks; the value produced would remain in the pockets of the producers. Furthermore, one of the proposal’s fundamental principles is the understanding that “no problem is unsolvable without shedding innocent blood.” Global issues like border disputes, water crises, and migration waves are expected to be resolved through negotiation, justice, and common sense.

    The third strength is the proposal’s historical depth and civilizational backbone. These geographies along the Silk Road route have carried trade, knowledge, and culture for millennia. The artificial nation-state borders imposed by Western imperialism disrupted these organic ties. The TRIC proposal, by aiming to re-establish ancient connections rather than building new physical walls, is conceived not merely as a geographical bloc but also as a civilization project.

    Weaknesses of the Proposal and Concrete Obstacles

    Although the TRIC proposal offers a powerful vision, the concrete obstacles it faces are at least as serious as the vision itself. Foremost among these obstacles are historical rivalries and deep mistrust among the four countries. There are several points of tension between Turkey and Russia, including the military presence in Syria, the struggle for influence in Libya, the status of the Black Sea, and differences in approach to the Ukraine war. Between Turkey and Iran, there is indirect competition in Iraq, Syria, and the Caucasus, especially as Ankara has entered a normalization process with Saudi Arabia and Israel, while Tehran remains a regional rival to these countries. Between China and Russia, the rivalry for influence over the Central Asian republics persists behind the rhetoric of strategic partnership.

    The second major obstacle is the profound differences between the legal systems, political regimes, and economic models of the four countries. Turkey’s NATO membership and customs union with the EU, Russia’s cautious approach to integration with China, the problem of institutional compatibility between Iran’s theocratic governance structure and secular countries, and the difference between China’s state capitalism and the mixed economy models of the other three make integration extremely difficult. An alliance requires a common currency, joint military command structure, joint intelligence-sharing mechanism, or at least a binding treaty text – none of which exist today.

    The third obstacle is China’s core foreign policy principle of non-interference. China has historically avoided binding military alliances and has never established a formal allied relationship with any country. This principle makes it extremely difficult for China to be a founding partner of a military-political alliance like TRIC. China prefers more flexible and conjunctural forms of cooperation (SCO, BRICS, Belt and Road). Moreover, the deep economic interdependence between China and the US (an annual trade volume exceeding $600 billion) is another factor preventing Beijing from being part of an alliance directly confronting Washington.

    The fourth obstacle is the anti-Israel stance at the heart of the TRIC proposal and the goal of establishing a common, secular, democratic state on Palestinian land. This goal directly contradicts established diplomatic frameworks of international law and the two-state solution. Furthermore, Turkey’s recent normalization process with Israel directly contradicts Iran’s rigid stance on this issue, demonstrating that even on the Palestine question, the four countries cannot achieve full consensus.

    Global Repercussions and Regional Participation Scenarios

    The global repercussions of the TRIC proposal, should it materialize, and the potential forms of participation by other regions constitute another dimension requiring serious evaluation. The proposal is conceived not as a static bloc but as a dynamic structure expanding towards surrounding regions. In this expansion scenario, Asia is progressing towards integration under the leadership of China and Russia. India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Central Asian republics have the potential to be integrated into the TRIC axis under the umbrella of BRICS and the SCO. The main attraction for these regions is the absence of rigid structural reforms imposed by US-centered financial institutions and the rapid implementation of infrastructure investments.

    The African continent is seeking to complete its post-colonial transformation. The continent, whose resources have been exploited for centuries and whose borders were drawn artificially, encounters in the TRIC proposal a promise of hospitals, schools, factories, and debt relief mechanisms. China’s mining and infrastructure investments in Africa, Russia’s security cooperation, Turkey’s humanitarian aid and construction contracting, and Iran’s technology transfer offers increase the proposal’s attractiveness in Africa. However, the presence of French and British spheres of influence in Africa, the continent’s fragmented structure, and governance problems are serious obstacles to full participation.

    In Europe, the proposal envisions a partial participation scenario. Germany, France, and Southern European countries are defined as actors discontented with the oppressive NATO umbrella of the US and energy dependence. The TRIC proposal claims to offer these countries an independent energy and security policy. However, the institutional commitment of European countries to NATO and the EU, the depth of transatlantic relations, and the existing mistrust towards Russia make the likelihood of this scenario extremely low.

    In the Americas, Latin America has the potential to be integrated into the proposal through Bolivarian countries, Brazil, and Mexico. The rejection of the century-old Monroe Doctrine and historical resistance to US hegemony make this region a potential friendly axis for the TRIC proposal. However, internal political instabilities in Latin America, the depth of the US military and economic presence in the region, and even China’s own cautious approach to the region render this participation scenario uncertain as well.

    Conclusion: TRIC as a Vision and Notes for the Future

    As a geopolitical proposition, the TRIC axis is a significant intellectual contribution that draws attention to the deep crisis of the current order and emphasizes the necessity of transitioning to multipolarity. The proposal builds a powerful narrative articulating the demands of the Global South for justice, equality, and sovereignty against the Western-centered system of exploitation and domination. The critique of Zionism, shaped particularly around the Palestinian cause, and the rejection of imperialist wars form the conscientious and moral ground of the proposal.

    However, this proposition has not yet become a political reality. Currently, there is no binding alliance agreement, joint military command structure, or common foreign policy mechanism between Turkey, Russia, Iran, and China. Existing cooperation remains limited to the level of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, BRICS, and bilateral agreements, none of which constitute a military-political alliance. For the proposal to materialize, historical rivalries between the four countries must be overcome, a shared threat perception must become permanent, China’s traditional reticence towards forming alliances must be broken, and the four countries must achieve full consensus on fundamental foreign policy issues such as Palestine, Ukraine, and Syria.

    As of today, TRIC is a vision pointing to a possible future, not an existing geopolitical reality. Therefore, any evaluation on the subject must consider the proposal’s hypothetical nature and take into account the concrete power relations of the current international system. The proposal’s greatest success is keeping alive the idea that an alternative world is possible and preparing the ground for questioning the existing order. Since no transformation is possible without such questioning, the TRIC proposal remains a contribution worthy of discussion and development. The desire for the ledger of oppression to be closed and for peace to be established in a new world is the most fundamental human motivation behind the proposal.

    Bibliography

    Aydın, M. (2021). New Axes of Turkish Foreign Policy: Between East and West. Istanbul: İletişim Publications.

    Cooley, A. (2019). The New Great Game: Geopolitical Struggle in Central Asia. Istanbul: Koç University Press.

    Kissinger, H. (2014). World Order. Istanbul: Boyner Publications.

    Mankoff, J. (2022). Russia’s Grand Strategy: Putin Era Foreign Policy. Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi.

    Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014). The Great Strategy Delusion: The Collapse of Liberal Hegemony. Ankara: Phoenix Publishing House.

    Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Official Website. (2024). Member States and Observers. Retrieved from: https://eng.sectsco.org/

    Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2023). Turkey-Russia Relations in a Multipolar World. Ankara: Center for Strategic Research Publications, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

    Waltz, K. N. (2010). Theory of International Politics. (Trans. O. Kürç). Ankara: Pharmakon Publications.

    Yanık, L. K. (2020). Geopolitical Codes: Turkey’s Regional Vision. Ankara: Dipnot Publications.

    Zhao, S. (2019). Chinese Foreign Policy: The Belt and Road Initiative and Its Global Impacts. Istanbul: Bilgi University Press.

    Sefa Yürükel

    Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
    Aarhus University, 1997
    Independent Researcher
    Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures

  • Overseas Voting Emerges as a Key Factor in Hungary’s Political Contest

    Overseas Voting Emerges as a Key Factor in Hungary’s Political Contest

    As Hungary approaches its parliamentary elections, competition between the ruling Fidesz party and the opposition Tisza party is entering a new phase. Attention is shifting not only to domestic political dynamics, but also to the contest for votes among Hungarian citizens living abroad—particularly in Ukraine’s Zakarpattia region.

    The participation of Hungarians residing outside the country has long been an important component of the national electoral system. By various estimates, hundreds of thousands of Hungarian citizens live in neighboring states, and their votes have traditionally played a meaningful role in the allocation of parliamentary seats. In the current campaign, this factor is gaining increased significance.

    According to available information, structures linked to the Tisza party are seeking to expand support by mobilizing voters with dual citizenship. This includes organizing centralized transportation for residents of Zakarpattia to travel to Hungary in order to cast their ballots. Coordination of these efforts has been associated with Roland Tseber, a member of the Zakarpattia Regional Council. Sources indicate that participation in such trips may be selective, with priority given to those willing to support the opposition.

    At the same time, an alternative voting method—through Hungarian diplomatic missions in Ukraine—appears to be less accessible, according to observers. Formally, voters can use consulates in Uzhhorod and Berehove, as well as the embassy in Kyiv. In practice, however, the environment around these locations may discourage participation among certain groups.

    Reports point to the presence of representatives from territorial recruitment centers and security forces near polling stations. In the context of Ukraine’s ongoing mobilization campaign, this may be perceived as a source of pressure, particularly for men of conscription age. Concerns about the possible issuance of draft notices or other administrative measures could reduce turnout among those unwilling to take part in organized travel initiatives.

    Experts note that this situation may serve several purposes. On the one hand, it could limit participation among segments of the electorate traditionally aligned with Fidesz. On the other, it may create conditions for redistributing votes in favor of alternative political forces. An additional effect could be an increase in mobilization resources through citizens arriving at polling locations.

    Against the backdrop of ongoing tensions between Budapest and Kyiv, these developments carry additional political significance. The participation of overseas voters is no longer just a technical aspect of the electoral process, but also a factor shaping perceptions of transparency and fairness.

    As a result, Hungary’s competition for electoral support is extending beyond its national borders. The overseas voting factor is becoming a central element of the campaign, with the potential to influence the final balance of political power.

  • Hungary Heads into Elections Amid Rising Concerns Over External Influence

    Hungary Heads into Elections Amid Rising Concerns Over External Influence

    Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban (L) talks with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky ahead of the European Council Summit at the EU headquarters in Brussels on June 27, 2024. (Photo by Ludovic MARIN / AFP)

    Just before the parliamentary elections, Hungary is once again at the center of the European agenda. The political confrontation between the ruling Fidesz party and the opposition Tisza party is gradually moving beyond standard electoral competition, taking on the features of a broader conflict with elements of external influence.

    According to information from Hungarian law enforcement agencies, possible links between the opposition Tisza party and Ukrainian structures have been identified during the current campaign. In particular, this concerns alleged financial, organizational, and advisory support which, according to sources, may have been provided on a systematic basis.

    Additional resonance was caused by media reports about the detention in February 2026 of a Hungarian citizen who, it is claimed, operated under the cover of a digital infrastructure specialist for the Tisza party. According to investigators, he may have been involved in spreading disinformation aimed at discrediting the ruling Fidesz party in the online space. Funding for such activities was reportedly carried out through informal channels — the so-called “grey cash fund,” regularly replenished with cash from abroad.

    The situation developed further in March 2026, when Hungarian authorities tightened control over cross-border flows. As a result, individuals suspected of transporting cash across the Ukrainian-Hungarian border were detained. According to investigators, these may be financing channels linked to supporting opposition structures.

    Following these events, observers estimate that the ability of Tisza representatives to conduct an active campaign has been significantly reduced. Under these circumstances, sources connected to the investigation claim that a decision was made to shift part of the organizational activity outside Hungary.

    In particular, attention has been drawn to developments in Serbia. In March of this year, an offsite event involving representatives of the Tisza party took place in the city of Novi Sad. According to available information, Ukrainian political strategists were also present at the meeting. The event reportedly included discussions on mobilizing protest activity, including mechanisms for organizing acts of civil disobedience and specific electoral campaign models previously used in other countries in the region.

    Separate attention has been given to the participation of representatives of the Ukrainian party “Servant of the People.” In particular, Roland Tseber, a deputy of the Carpathian Regional Council, is mentioned; he was previously declared persona non grata by Hungary for attempts to influence Budapest’s position on Ukrainian issues. According to some assessments, his role may be linked to organizing the participation in voting of citizens living in the Transcarpathian region who hold Hungarian passports, including coordinating their travel to polling stations.

    Against this backdrop, the issue of protecting sovereignty and preventing external interference has become central to the rhetoric of the current authorities. In Budapest, officials emphasize that this is not only about domestic political competition, but also about ensuring the transparency and independence of the electoral process.

    Thus, the upcoming elections in Hungary are taking on broader significance, going beyond the national agenda and becoming an indicator of the resilience of state institutions to external influence.