For over 35 years, I have held US elected officials members of US. Congress, US, governors, US, senators, and community leaders accountable by questioning and, when necessary, criticizing their actions. In the United States, this kind of scrutiny is not only accepted, it’s a fundamental part of civic engagement.
What’s troubling is the double standard I’ve experienced. The same people who remain silent when I criticize U.S. officials react very differently when I raise concerns about Turkish diplomats. Instead of open dialogue, I face intimidation, threats, and harassment both directly and indirectly directed by Turkish Consul General Ahmet Yazal.
Criticism of any public official, including consuls general, should not be labeled as anti country or anti government. Holding officials accountable is not an attack on a nation; it’s a necessary way for communities to voice concerns and demand better representation. Labeling dissent as harmful or “weaponizable” is often just a tactic to silence inconvenient voices rather than address the issues being raised.
The third decade of the 21st century is witnessing the most complex security dilemma of the post-Cold War era in international relations. The only remnants of the optimistic “end of history” discourses of the 1990s are the resurgence of great power competition, the spread of regional wars, and the normalization of war as an instrument of foreign policy. While armament expenditures are reaching record levels all over the world, especially in developed and developing countries, militarist discourses are not limited to authoritarian regimes but are also gaining legitimacy in established democracies. This situation not only transforms military balances but also the collective memory of societies regarding peace.
However, the current picture indicates a situation far more complex than the mere resurgence of traditional power blocs. Unlike the rigid polarization of the Cold War, today’s actors are both intertwining and breaking apart just as rapidly. While NATO members’ strategies diverge on internal disagreements, there is a deep rift between the US and Europe in terms of strategic depth; Iran is transforming its military deterrence into a diplomatic victory, while Gulf states are experiencing the bewilderment of being unable to form a united front. This article will analyze this state of “liquid chaos” in the global security architecture through six fundamental dimensions.
New Dynamics of the Global Arms Race
1.1. Record Increases in Defense Budgets of Developed Countries
1.1.1. The US defense budget, set at $886 billion for fiscal year 2024, has surpassed even the peak periods of the Cold War. A significant portion of this budget is allocated to strategic priorities such as the development of hypersonic missiles, the expansion of space forces, and the modernization of the nuclear triad. However, the size of this budget reflects not so much the actual military power of the US, but rather the extent of its current engagements and logistical fatigue. The Pentagon is trying to maintain deterrence simultaneously in Europe, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific, which brings with it the risk of strategic overstretch.
1.1.2. NATO member European countries have largely achieved the target of raising defense spending to 2% of GDP, committed at the 2014 Wales Summit. While Poland is progressing towards raising this ratio to 4%, Germany is restructuring its Bundeswehr using a €100 billion special fund. However, these increases serve as an “insurance policy” against the possibility of a partial US withdrawal from Europe. Europe’s rearmament stems not merely from responding to US demands, but from the necessity of self-sufficiency in case Washington pivots to Asia.
1.1.3. China, for its part, spends well above its officially announced defense budget of $293 billion, with unofficial estimates suggesting the figure is nearly double that. China’s island-building activities in the Indo-Pacific, hypersonic weapons tests, and cyber capabilities play a decisive role in its competition with the US. However, China’s real strategic success lies in reducing its rivals’ room for maneuver through economic dependency while increasing its military capacity. This represents a form of hybrid competition, different from the traditional arms race.
1.2. Regional Arms Races in Developing Countries
1.2.1. India is steadily increasing its defense spending due to border disputes with both Pakistan and China. The purchase of S-400 air defense systems from Russia, defense agreements with the US, and the procurement of Rafale fighter jets from France show that India is pursuing a multi-faceted armament strategy. However, India’s real success is its ability to maintain relations with all parties without fully engaging with any major power. This “multi-alignment” strategy offers the most serious alternative to the bloc logic of the Cold War era.
1.2.2. In the Middle East, Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have raised defense spending to record levels against the Iranian threat. However, faced with the military successes of Iran’s axis of resistance and waning US engagement, these countries have long lost the will to form a united front. The inadequacy of the US-UK intervention against the Houthis’ operations in the Red Sea has turned the Gulf monarchies towards a “muddling through” diplomacy with Iran. This shows that the Arab world is being rendered passive against Iran.
1.2.3. Turkey has made significant progress in the last decade with the goal of independence in its defense industry. Having become one of the world leaders in UAVs and UCAVs, Turkey is also drawing attention with its national combat aircraft KAAN and its first aircraft carrier projects. However, this breakthrough by Turkey is also part of a strategy of being a “flying state” within NATO. While remaining in the Western alliance, Ankara positions itself as an independent actor through steps like the purchase of S-400 systems from Russia, which deepens discord within the alliance.
1.3. Disruptive Technologies and Military Transformation
1.3.1. AI-powered warfare systems are no longer just a matter of science fiction; they have begun to be used on real battlefields. Autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles can make target recognition and engagement decisions without human intervention, bringing along ethical and legal debates. However, the biggest risk is that these systems make human intervention nearly impossible in cases of false alarms. A faulty threat assessment by an algorithm could trigger automatic retaliation.
1.3.2. Hypersonic weapons (Mach 5 and above) render existing missile defense systems almost useless. Systems like Russia’s Kinzhal and Avangard, China’s Dongfeng-17, and the US’s AGM-183 ARRW have the potential to radically change strategic balances. The short reaction time of these weapons makes controlling escalation almost impossible during a crisis. By giving decision-makers only minutes, these systems dangerously test humanity’s confidence in its own composure.
1.3.3. Cyber warfare and the weaponization of space have completely redefined the boundaries of conflict. Cyberattacks that paralyze a country’s energy grid, financial system, or communication infrastructure can now be carried out without a traditional declaration of war. However, the biggest problem of cyber deterrence is the attribution crisis. Determining which state an attack originated from is technically difficult; an action by a “hacktivist” group could be interpreted as a direct state attack and trigger disproportionate retaliation.
The US-Israel Axis and Iran’s Resistance Strategy
2.1. Evolution of the US-Israel Threat Perception
2.1.1. The US and Israel’s threat perception regarding Iran has undergone a significant transformation in the last two decades. Initially focused solely on the nuclear program, this perception has gradually come to encompass Iran’s influence over regional proxy forces (Hezbollah, Hashd al-Shaabi, Houthis), its ballistic missile program, and its cyber capabilities. However, this expansion is an acknowledgment that the threat has truly become multi-dimensional, rather than a containment strategy. The US no longer sees Iran through a single file, but as an “empire of proxy wars.”
2.1.2. Cyberattacks (Stuxnet worm), covert actions (assassinations of nuclear scientists), and sabotage of nuclear facilities carried out over the last decade are considered parts of a low-intensity war. These actions aimed to slow Iran’s nuclear progress while avoiding a direct declaration of war. However, they have also increased pressure among Iranian political elites towards acquiring nuclear weapons for deterrence. Each sabotage has brought Iran one step closer to the nuclear threshold.
2.1.3. The possibility of a large-scale Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities is constantly on the agenda. However, US administrations have historically been unsupportive of such unilateral operations. The mutual direct attacks in April 2024 marked a new phase in this balance. Iran’s first direct attack from its own territory on Israel, in response to Israel’s strike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus, has changed the rules of the long-standing “shadow war.” Direct engagement is no longer a theoretical scenario but a factual reality.
2.2. Iran’s Victory: Military Deterrence and Diplomatic Success
2.2.1. Iran has developed a unique asymmetric warfare doctrine against the military and economic superiority it faces. Key elements of this doctrine include a vast ballistic missile inventory, a network of regional proxy forces, cyberattack capacity, and the threat to close the Strait of Hormuz. However, Iran’s real strategic success is turning this military deterrence into a diplomatic victory. Tehran has effectively forced the international community to accept its 10-point nuclear ethics and security memorandum. Many items previously defined as “red lines” by the West are no longer even subjects of negotiation.
2.2.2. This diplomatic success is a “Forced Victory” for Iran. Although sanctions continue, Iran has largely broken the pressure of the “military option” on its nuclear file. The West has begun pragmatically normalizing Iran’s effective behavior as a threshold nuclear power. The goal is no longer to stop Iran’s nuclear program but to manage it. This has given Iran immense prestige and permanently altered regional balances.
2.2.3. The encirclement Iran has created through its regional allies is carefully managed. Hezbollah’s over 150,000 rockets in Lebanon, the Hashd al-Shaabi forces in Iraq, and the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea threaten Israeli and US interests on different fronts. This multi-front structure makes it impossible for Israel to eliminate all threats with a single major operation. Each front functions as an independent layer of deterrence.
2.3. Regional and Global Repercussions: The Fragmented Arab Front
2.3.1. Iran’s increasing military cooperation with Russia (use of Shahed-136 drones in Ukraine, joint military exercises) and the 25-year strategic agreement with China serve as a balancing mechanism against the US’s tendency to withdraw from the region. This rapprochement reduces the impact of Western sanctions while also opening a new maneuvering space for Iran internationally. Russia and China have become Iran’s geopolitical insurance.
2.3.2. Although the normalization process of Arab countries like Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt with Israel (Abraham Accords) initially seemed to accelerate the formation of an anti-Iran front, this front quickly disintegrated. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt have long lost the political will and military coordination needed to form a united front against Iran. The military successes of Iran’s resistance axis and the waning US engagement have turned these countries from active actors into passive observers. Egypt’s economic crisis has completely paralyzed its capacity to act as a regional power.
2.3.3. The recent war in Gaza (post-Al-Aqsa Flood operation) has inflicted irreparable wounds on the alliance system of the US and its allies. The unconditional US support for Israel has exhausted all of America’s soft power vis-à-vis the Global South. Protests beginning on its own university campuses and streets have led to a decline in the advocacy of the “Jewish lobby” in US domestic politics and the questioning of pro-Israel policies. This is a breaking point in US foreign policy. Likewise, the discord between the US and Europe has not remained at a diplomatic level but has turned into direct political struggles. The tension between “pro-Israel advocacy” and “the rights of the Palestinian people” on European streets and in parliaments has divided governments and strained the Transatlantic alliance’s strategic coherence in the Middle East.
The Russia-Ukraine War: A Symbol of Global Rupture
3.1. The War Reshaping the International System
3.1.1. The full-scale invasion that began in February 2022 has opened deep and permanent rifts in the international system unseen since the end of the Cold War. The unprecedented military, financial, and intelligence support provided to Ukraine by the Western alliance in the first year of the war led to NATO’s tactical revival, leaving behind the days when it was declared “brain dead.” However, this revival conceals a deep strategic incompatibility. While the US organizes Europe against Russia through NATO, it has shifted its own strategic priority to the Asia-Pacific. Europe, on the other hand, faces the necessity of building its own defense against a scenario of a partial US withdrawal from the alliance during a future presidential term.
3.1.2. The war has laid bare the dysfunctionality of the UN Security Council. The fact that one of the permanent members is effectively a belligerent has confirmed the collapse of the collective security system. More importantly, the war has deeply affected the Global South. Rising food prices, the energy crisis, and disruptions in fertilizer supply have made many countries in Africa and Asia direct victims of the war. These countries have pursued a pragmatic balancing policy by refusing to join Western sanctions against Russia, which has weakened the West’s rhetoric on the “democracy-authoritarianism” axis.
3.1.3. The necessity for neutral countries to redefine their positions has been one of the most important consequences of the war. While Finland and Sweden’s decision to join NATO meant abandoning centuries-old neutrality policies, Switzerland’s increase in defense spending and closer military cooperation with the EU suggests that the concept of “non-alignment” has lost its validity. However, even the NATO membership of these countries reflects a search for “US insurance” rather than full integration into the alliance. These countries are pursuing a multi-layered security strategy by also increasing their own defense capabilities under the NATO umbrella.
3.2. New Dimensions of Hybrid Warfare
3.2.1. The Russia-Ukraine war exhibits a hybrid character where traditional and modern warfare tools are used together. Drones (Bayraktar, Orlan, Shahed) and cyberattacks share the same stage as artillery units and tanks. This situation transforms the nature of war, expanding the battlefield horizontally and vertically. However, the most notable development is the Iranian-made Shahed drones becoming a decisive tool in the war. This is of great importance in demonstrating Iran’s progress in military technology and the depth of its strategic cooperation with Russia.
3.2.2. Economic sanctions have become one of the most effective weapons of war. The comprehensive sanctions imposed on Russia (freezing central bank assets, removal from SWIFT, energy embargo) constitute an unprecedented economic pressure mechanism in history. However, the failure of these sanctions to have the expected devastating effect has raised serious questions about their effectiveness. Russia has managed to limit the impact of sanctions by redirecting its energy exports to Asia and transitioning to a war economy. This has shown that sanctions alone cannot end a war; on the contrary, they can create a reverse effect by boosting the defense industry in the target country.
3.2.3. Information warfare and disinformation are among the factors determining the course of the war. Both Russia, Ukraine, and the West are conducting intense information operations to shape public opinion in their favor. However, the most important consequence of this information war has been the complete fragmentation of reality. Different camps believe in completely different narratives, making it almost impossible to find common ground on reality. This will remain as a deep wound that will make it difficult for societies to reconcile even after the war ends.
3.3. Revival of Defense Industries
3.3.1. The prolonged war has led to a revival of defense industries in both Russia and Western countries. Russia has tripled its artillery ammunition production while also accelerating tank production. Western observers acknowledge that the Russian defense industry, with its transition to a war economy, has performed beyond expectations. This is interpreted as meaning that, instead of collapsing Russia’s military capacity as targeted by the sanctions, they have actually strengthened it. Russia has effectively entered a process of “industrialization on a war footing.”
3.3.2. European Union countries have increased joint defense spending and strengthened the European Defence Fund. Germany’s €100 billion special fund, Poland’s target of raising defense spending to 4% of GDP, and the Nordic countries’ integration into NATO signal a significant leap in Europe’s military capacity. The US has set a target of increasing 155mm artillery shell production from 14,000 to 100,000 per month. However, the most important consequence of this production boom is that, even in a scenario where the war ends, reducing production capacity back to peacetime levels is economically and politically almost impossible.
3.3.3. Defense industries have become sectors employing hundreds of thousands of people with powerful lobbies. This situation risks consigning the concept of “peace dividend” to history and condemning the world to a permanent semi-war economy. The employment and economic growth created by the defense industry now make calculating the cost of peace difficult and strengthen war lobbies. This is the most concrete economic indicator of the normalization of war.
New Alliance Quests and Military Structuring
4.1. NATO’s Dilemma: Revival or Strategic Divergence?
4.1.1. Although NATO appears to have tactically strengthened with the Ukraine war, the biggest divergence since the Cold War is occurring strategically between the US and Europe. The US’s focus on the Asia-Pacific and pressures that Europe should be primarily responsible for its own defense have initiated a new era within NATO where “US guarantee is being questioned.” European allies must now seriously consider the possibility of a partial US withdrawal from the alliance during the next presidential term in Washington.
4.1.2. With the accession of Finland and Sweden, reaching 32 members, NATO has experienced its biggest enlargement since the Cold War. However, this enlargement reflects the extent of the Russian threat rather than the strength of the alliance. While new members have brought military capacity and strategic depth to NATO, they have also extended the alliance’s defense line and increased its logistical burden. NATO’s eastern flank has become a vast front stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.
4.1.3. Therefore, NATO has ceased to be a single bloc and has evolved into a structure that “has to unite very quickly but has the potential to disintegrate just as fast.” The alliance, which shows solidarity in times of crisis, experiences deep disharmony regarding strategic priorities. While Europe focuses on the war on its own continent, the US’s eyes are on Asia. This disharmony raises serious questions about the future of the alliance.
4.2. Multi-layered and Flexible Alliances
4.2.1. The current security environment forces states to establish flexible and multi-layered alliances that go beyond traditional alliance relationships. Structures like AUKUS (Australia, UK, US) involving narrow but deep cooperation, broader but looser platforms like the QUAD (India, Japan, US, Australia), and regional organizations like the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) show the emergence of multiple and partially overlapping security networks simultaneously. Unlike the rigid bloc logic of the Cold War, these structures offer states a wider maneuvering space.
4.2.2. The most important feature of these structures is that the same states can come together on different platforms for different interests. For example, while India cooperates with the US within the QUAD, it is also a member of the SCO and purchases S-400 systems from Russia. This “multi-alignment” strategy provides flexibility to states but also creates uncertainty about which alliance will be valid in times of crisis. Which side India will take in a crisis will depend on the concrete situation and its interests.
4.2.3. This uncertainty also complicates traditional deterrence calculations. A state’s ally does not necessarily mean it will stand by it under all circumstances. Alliances are no longer absolute but conditional. This situation makes crisis management difficult and makes the effort of parties to read each other’s intentions even more important. A wrong signal can lead to overestimating or underestimating an ally’s support.
4.3. Japan’s Historic Transformation
4.3.1. Japan is implementing its most comprehensive security reforms since World War II. The National Security Strategy announced in December 2022 represents a historic break in the country’s interpretation of the pacifist Article 9 of its Constitution. The new strategy gives Japan the capability to “strike enemy bases,” which effectively means preemptive strike authority. This change has brought the long-standing “normal country” debates in the country to a concrete conclusion.
4.3.2. The target of raising the defense budget to 2% of GDP by 2027 will make Japan the world’s third-largest defense spender. This budget increase includes the purchase of up to 400 Tomahawk cruise missiles, extending the range of domestically developed Type 12 surface-to-surface missiles to over 1,000 km, and the deployment of two AEGIS sea-based ballistic missile defense systems. Japan has also accelerated its own hypersonic missile program, aiming to deploy these missiles in the 2030s.
4.3.3. The main driving force behind this transformation is China’s increasing military power and North Korea’s nuclear threat. Japan is also deepening its alliance with the US and establishing new security partnerships with Australia, India, the UK, and the Philippines. However, this transformation is being closely watched, especially by its neighbors China and Korea, and risks triggering a new arms spiral in the region. In a region where historical wounds have not yet healed, Japan’s rearmament further deepens the security dilemma.
Dangerous Escalation and the Normalization of War
5.1. Legitimization of War Discourse
5.1.1. The most important dimension of dangerous escalation is that war is no longer seen as an exception or a state of failure, but as a normal instrument of international politics. Concepts such as “war option,” “military solution,” “preemptive strike,” and “forced intervention” are being used more comfortably in the discourse of political leaders, leading to a desensitization in public opinion regarding the destructiveness of war. The word “war” has ceased to be a political taboo and has become part of routine political debates.
5.1.2. The media’s role in this process is significant. 24-hour news cycles, war simulations by retired generals as “experts,” strategic analyses, and discussions of possible scenarios turn war into an abstract and technical issue. The real cost of war – dead children, destroyed cities, refugee crises – gets lost in this technical language, desensitizing the audience. On television screens, war is presented as if it were a video game. The Gaza war, in particular, is the most striking example of this desensitization; tens of thousands of civilian deaths have become a mundane statistic.
5.1.3. Another dimension of the normalization of war manifests itself in education systems. In some countries, civil defense drills have become mandatory in schools, teaching young people how to behave in case of war. While this prepares societies for a possible war, it also reinforces the perception that war is a “normal” life event. Societies that have read about war only in history books for generations are now experiencing war preparations as part of daily life.
5.2. Decline of Peace Movements and the Silence of Civil Society
5.2.1. Peace movements and civil society organizations are experiencing a serious decline in the face of this normalization. Similar to the anti-nuclear movements that brought millions to the streets in Europe during the Cold War, the mass peace demonstrations of the 1980s are almost non-existent today. There are many reasons for this: The fragmented structure of the media and the pressure of digital platforms have weakened the organizational capacity of social movements. While digital activism enables fast and widespread mobilization, it also remains limited to “clicktivism,” replacing street actions.
5.2.2. More worryingly, in some countries, pro-peace discourse is stigmatized as “anti-patriotic,” “naive,” or even “treasonous.” In the context of the Ukraine war, those calling for “negotiations for peace” are sometimes accused of serving Russia. In the Gaza war, those calling for a ceasefire are accused of “anti-Semitism.” This polarizing environment narrows the space for moderate voices, creating a debate ground where only radical positions (total war or total surrender) remain.
5.2.3. Peace activists are seen as “unrealistic idealists,” which further narrows the social base of the movement. Current problems like economic crises, inflation, and income inequality push peace activism to the background. People struggling to make ends meet find it difficult to find motivation to participate in anti-war actions. This silence indicates that one of the most important mechanisms with the potential to stop escalation has become dysfunctional.
5.3. New Forms of Deterrence and the Risk of Inadvertent Escalation
5.3.1. The concept of deterrence has moved far away from the Cold War paradigm of “Mutually Assured Destruction” (MAD). Traditional population-destroying deterrence has been replaced by regional, technological, and hybrid deterrence models. Cyber deterrence (threat of retaliation for a cyberattack), space-based deterrence (capability to target satellite systems), and AI-powered deterrence (automatic response systems) are the main elements of these new models. However, these new forms make the threshold of escalation extremely uncertain.
5.3.2. AI-powered early warning systems and autonomous weapons platforms can make decisions at speeds that make human intervention nearly impossible. A false threat assessment by an algorithm could trigger automatic retaliation. A human decision similar to the one made by Soviet officer Stanislav Petrov in 1983, which saved the world from nuclear war, has become a luxury that now needs to be made in much shorter timeframes. The “black box” nature of AI systems makes it nearly impossible to understand which actor triggered what during an escalation.
5.3.3. The biggest risk of these new forms of deterrence is “accidental escalation” or “false alarm” situations. Determining which state a cyberattack originated from is technically difficult; an attack by a “hacktivist” group acting on behalf of a state could be interpreted as a direct state attack and trigger disproportionate retaliation. Similarly, it may be impossible to distinguish whether an intervention against a satellite in space is a test or an act of war. In this environment of uncertainty, even the smallest incident can spiral out of control and turn into a major conflict.
Military Preparations in Scandinavia, Germany, and Japan
6.1. Integration of Nordic Countries into NATO
6.1.1. Finland, immediately after joining NATO in April 2023, increased its defense budget by 30%. The country is strengthening its military presence along the 1,300 km border with Russia, building border fences, and hosting NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). Finland’s “total defence” concept refers to a system where all citizens are prepared for military or civil defence duties. Under this system, regular civil-military cooperation exercises are conducted, and shelters are being renovated in every corner of the country.
6.1.2. Sweden, after officially becoming a NATO member in March 2024, decided to militarize the island of Gotland. This strategic island in the middle of the Baltic Sea is of great importance due to its proximity to Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave. Sweden has also renewed its submarine defense systems and increased naval patrols in the Baltic Sea. Having reinstated conscription in 2017, Sweden now enlists approximately 8,000 young people annually, along with voluntary reserves, as of 2024. Civil defence plans have been renewed, and the capacity of shelters to be used in crises has exceeded 3 million people.
6.1.3. Norway and Denmark, although longer-standing NATO members, have significantly increased their defense spending recently. Norway has expanded its hosted NATO exercises (Trident Juncture, Cold Response) and strengthened its military presence in the Arctic. Denmark has set a target to double its defense budget by 2033, has granted the US base access, and has sent F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine. The coordination of these four Nordic countries within NATO shows that a new “Nordic Defense Alliance” is effectively being formed. However, even if this alliance remains a subgroup of NATO, it also functions as a solidarity mechanism against a potential US withdrawal.
6.2. Germany’s “Zeitenwende” Policy
6.2.1. Chancellor Scholz’s declaration of “Zeitenwende” (Historic Turning Point) in February 2022 initiated Germany’s most comprehensive military reform since World War II. At the center of this policy is a €100 billion special defense fund and the modernization of the Bundeswehr. This fund aims to renew the long-neglected military inventory, strengthen logistical infrastructure, and ensure full compliance with NATO standards. However, the most important dimension of this transformation is that Germany is abandoning its “transformative diplomacy” model and moving towards a more classical power politics.
6.2.2. One of the most concrete steps taken within the scope of “Zeitenwende” is the reorganization of the military command structure. A new “Space Command” and a “Cyber and Information Space Command” have been established within the Bundeswehr. Germany has decided to purchase F-35 fighter jets (for the nuclear sharing mission against the Russian threat) and is modernizing its existing Eurofighter and Tornado fleets. Furthermore, Germany, which sent a warship to the Indo-Pacific region for the first time, signed a military cooperation agreement with Japan, thus showing that it has abandoned its traditional Europe-centric security policy. Berlin is ceasing to be a civilian power and is progressing towards becoming a military actor.
6.2.3. Significant changes are also taking place in Germany’s military personnel policy. The Bundeswehr, which is overhauling the voluntary military service system, aims to increase the number of soldiers to 203,000 by 2031. To close the military personnel gap, the age limit has been raised, and legal regulations have been initiated to allow foreign nationals (EU citizens) to join the German army. Furthermore, the “civil service” model is being debated again, and pilot applications for a return to compulsory military service have been launched in some federal states. These changes imply a questioning of the peaceful identity Germany built after the war.
6.3. Japan’s Military Normalization
6.3.1. With the National Security Strategy announced in December 2022, Japan has created a historic break in its pacifist security policy that has continued since World War II. The new strategy gives Japan the “capability to strike enemy bases,” which effectively means preemptive strike authority. This change is a radical transformation in the interpretation of the pacifist Article 9 of the Constitution and has brought the long-standing “normal country” debates in the country to a concrete conclusion. Japan now aims to be not only defensive but also offensive when necessary.
6.3.2. The target of raising the defense budget to 2% of GDP by 2027 will make Japan the world’s third-largest defense spender. The most concrete reflections of this budget increase include the purchase of up to 400 Tomahawk cruise missiles from the US, extending the range of domestically developed Type 12 surface-to-surface missiles to over 1,000 km, and the deployment of two AEGIS sea-based ballistic missile defense systems. Additionally, Japan has accelerated its own hypersonic missile program, aiming to deploy these missiles in the 2030s. Japan is gradually turning into a missile state.
6.3.3. The main driving force behind this military transformation is China’s increasing military power and North Korea’s nuclear threat. Japan is also deepening its alliance with the US and establishing new security partnerships with Australia, India, the UK, and the Philippines. Taking a more active role within the QUAD and AUKUS+ mechanisms, Japan is positioning itself at the center of the regional security architecture. However, this transformation is being closely watched, especially by its neighbors China and Korea, and risks triggering a new arms spiral in the region. In a region where historical wounds have not yet healed, Japan’s rearmament further deepens the security dilemma. China uses Japan’s steps as a pretext to increase its own military budget, thus a vicious cycle reproduces itself.
Conclusion
The global system is experiencing the most complex and unpredictable security dilemma since the end of the Cold War. Increasing armament expenditures, the risk of regional conflicts spreading, the normalization of great power competition, and the rapid military structuring of previously neutral countries point to a world order where peace has been replaced by a state of constant alert. However, this picture reflects a situation far more complex than the mere resurgence of traditional power blocs. Unlike the rigid polarization of the Cold War, today’s actors are both intertwining and breaking apart just as rapidly.
While the pressure of the US-Israel axis on Iran and the resistance strategies developed against it keep the Middle East as a potential volcano, the Russia-Ukraine war has fundamentally shaken the entire security architecture in Europe. However, the most important result of these two crisis lines is the rising strategic prestige of Iran and the questioning of US regional deterrence. Iran has turned its military deterrence into a diplomatic victory, effectively invalidating the West’s “military option” rhetoric. Arab countries, on the other hand, cannot form a united front against Iran and are regressing to the position of passive observers.
The state of the Transatlantic alliance constitutes the most paradoxical dimension of this picture. Although NATO appears tactically united with the Ukraine war, the biggest divergence since the Cold War is occurring strategically between the US and Europe. The US’s focus on the Asia-Pacific and pressures that Europe should be responsible for its own defense have initiated a new era within NATO where “US guarantee is being questioned.” The recent war in Gaza has deepened this divergence, and the unconditional US support for Israel has exhausted all of America’s soft power vis-à-vis the Global South, while carrying the discord between Europe and the US to the streets and parliaments.
The most striking result of the dangerous escalation is that the war option is being multiplied on one hand while being narrowed in specific contexts on the other. States avoid direct major war but normalize conflict through hybrid, asymmetric, and proxy wars. This situation necessitates the revision of classical deterrence theories, rethinking the civil-military distinction, and urgently strengthening global governance mechanisms. Particularly, false alarms caused by cyber space and artificial intelligence could be a sufficient spark for an unintentional war. A mistake by an algorithm could determine the fate of humanity.
While the network structures created by new alliance quests increase security cooperation, they also lead to a greater perception of threat in excluded actors. However, the most important feature of these alliances is that they are conditional and temporary. Actors like India, by being part of multiple alliances simultaneously, expand their maneuvering space, which creates uncertainty about which alliance will be valid in times of crisis. Alliances are no longer absolute but conditional. This situation complicates crisis management and makes the effort of parties to read each other’s intentions even more important.
As seen in the examples of Scandinavia, Germany, and Japan, the acceleration of military preparations even by countries previously known for their peaceful and limited defense understanding shows how widespread the perception of threat has become. The preferences of these countries are too profound to be explained solely by regional concerns; each assumes that the international system no longer rests on reliable rules and that there is a possibility of being attacked at any moment. This assumption risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, because the arming of one country is perceived as a threat by its neighbors and initiates a chain reaction.
On the other hand, focusing only on the military and geopolitical dimensions of this picture may cause the integrity of the problem to be missed. The ongoing transformation is also a deep social and psychological transformation. Generations that grew up in a world where peace was “normal” are now forced to learn to live in an atmosphere where war preparations have become part of daily life. Shelter drills, recruitment campaigns, and the way war scenarios are handled in the media erode societies’ psychological resistance to war, thus making it easier for political leaders to deploy military options. This psychological transformation is perhaps the most dangerous, because it shifts the perception of war from a disaster to a normal policy tool.
The decline of civil society in peace activism is one of the gloomiest dimensions of this picture. Similar to the anti-nuclear movements that brought millions to the streets in Europe during the Cold War, mass peace demonstrations are almost non-existent today. Reasons for this include the fragmented structure of the media, digital activism substituting for action, economic crises changing priorities, and anti-war discourse being stigmatized as “anti-patriotic.” This silence indicates that one of the most important mechanisms with the potential to stop escalation has become dysfunctional. The weakening of peace movements allows pro-war voices to be heard more easily and military solutions to be legitimized more readily.
Despite all these negativities, it may be too early to abandon optimism entirely. Historical experience is full of examples where even in the deepest moments of polarization, diplomacy channels were kept open, crisis communication mechanisms were operated, and the worst scenarios were avoided. The re-establishment of direct military communication lines between the US and China, the continuation of indirect talks between Iran and the US, and the survival, albeit dysfunctional, of platforms like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) are hopeful signs. However, it is becoming increasingly difficult for these mechanisms to keep pace with the speed of escalation. Diplomacy lags behind military preparations, which increases the role of chance in times of crisis.
Ultimately, in the mid-2020s, the world stands at a crossroads. On one hand, a worsening scenario where current escalation spirals out of control and regional wars spread; on the other, a scenario where actors curb escalation and build a new security architecture. Which scenario will materialize depends largely on the steps taken in the next few years. These steps include re-introducing measures to limit the arms race, strengthening ceasefire mechanisms in conflict zones, and most importantly, questioning the legitimacy of war as a policy tool. Reform of international law and the UN system is also an indispensable part of this process.
In conclusion, the current situation has invalidated the classical distinctions between peace, deterrence, and war, creating one of the most dangerous periods in international relations. There is no trace of unipolarity; a state of ‘liquid chaos’ prevails where actors both intertwine and break apart, and where a new front can open at any moment. In an atmosphere of uncertainty where any crisis could spiral out of control, even the most rational actors can make miscalculations. Therefore, in a world where military preparations are accelerating, the way to maintain peace, paradoxically, lies in strengthening diplomacy at the same pace. Otherwise, humanity will be left alone on the brink of a new great war, risking the repetition of past mistakes. At this critical moment in history, the greatest responsibility falls on the leaders of great powers and the conscience of global public opinion.
References
· SIPRI. (2020). SIPRI Yearbook 2020: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford University Press. · NATO. (2021). NATO 2030: United for a New Era. Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division. · International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). (2022). Armed Conflict Survey 2022. London: IISS. · Mearsheimer, J. J. (2022). “The Causes and Consequences of the Ukraine War”. Foreign Affairs, 101(4), 28-43. · Japan Ministry of Defense. (2022). National Security Strategy of Japan. Tokyo: MOD. · Bundeswehr. (2023). Zeitenwende: Die Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien. Berlin: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. · SIPRI. (2023). Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2022. Stockholm: SIPRI Fact Sheet. · Finnish Government. (2023). Finland’s Accession to NATO: Government Report. Helsinki: Prime Minister’s Office. · The White House. (2023). Interim National Security Strategic Guidance. Washington D.C.: The White House. · Congressional Research Service (CRS). (2024). Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status and U.S. Policy. CRS Report R43333. · International Crisis Group (ICG). (2024). The New Face of Deterrence in the Middle East. Brussels: ICG Middle East Report No. 245. · Stockholm University. (2024). Conscription and Total Defence in the Nordic Countries. Stockholm: Stockholm University Press. · UNIDIR. (2024). Emerging Military Technologies and Strategic Stability. Geneva: UN Institute for Disarmament Research. · Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). (2024). The Gaza War and the Future of the Transatlantic Alliance. New York: CFR Special Report No. 98.
Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA) Aarhus University, 1997 Independent Researcher Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures
The world economy is a vast circulatory system shaped around the compulsory transit corridors imposed by geography. In an era where approximately eighty percent of international trade volume is transported by sea and a large portion of global energy supply depends on tanker traffic, certain waterways have transcended being mere geographical formations. These corridors provide the controlling states not only with economic rent but also with disproportionate bargaining power and strategic depth in global politics. From the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal, which form the backbone of trade between Asia and Europe, to Gibraltar, the gateway to the Mediterranean; from the Turkish Straits, the lifeline of the Black Sea, to Bab el-Mandeb, the southern lock of the Red Sea, and the Northern Sea Route, a new arena of competition emerging from the climate crisis—these corridors are at the center of naval deployments, legal disputes, and proxy wars among great powers.
The Capillary of the Indo-Pacific and the Malacca Dilemma
The Strait of Malacca, the most critical artery of the Southeast Asian maritime geography, constitutes the most economical route between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. This waterway, riparian to Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, is the backbone of the supply chain between Northeast Asian economies and the Middle East and Africa. A significant portion of the crude oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) transported globally transits through this narrow passage. The section converging at the Phillips Channel off Singapore witnesses the world’s densest maritime traffic, with over one hundred thousand vessels passing annually.
The geopolitical tension in this region largely revolves around the existential anxiety of the People’s Republic of China regarding its energy supply security. The fact that the overwhelming majority of China’s energy imports come through the Strait of Malacca is defined as a vulnerability by the Beijing administration, a situation that has entered the strategy literature as the “Malacca Dilemma.” In a potential military conflict or regional instability scenario, the capacity of the US Navy or the Indian Navy to disrupt this transit directly shapes China’s foreign policy and infrastructure investments. To reduce this dependence, China has activated oil and gas pipelines extending from the Kyaukpyu Port in Myanmar to Yunnan province and keeps the idea of opening the Kra Canal in southern Thailand alive as a strategic option. Simultaneously, the US logistical presence in Singapore and India’s military fortification of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands serve as strategic watch posts overlooking the western and eastern entrances of Malacca.
Artificial Bridges Between the US, Europe, and Asia: The Suez and Panama Canals
The Suez and Panama Canals, two massive engineering projects built by human hands, are interventions that have altered the course of global shipping. The Suez Canal, located in Egyptian territory, connects the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, shortening the Asia-Europe sea route by approximately seven thousand kilometers compared to the Cape of Good Hope at Africa’s southern tip. About twelve percent of global container traffic and a significant portion of daily oil shipments flow through this route. The strategic importance of the canal is not limited to the billions of dollars in foreign exchange revenue it provides to the Egyptian economy; it is also a vital area of interest for powers like Russia, China, and India, which lack Mediterranean coastlines. Particularly, the fact that Bab el-Mandeb Strait at the canal’s southern entrance is vulnerable to asymmetric threats stemming from the civil war in Yemen reveals the reality that Suez’s security actually begins thousands of miles beyond Egypt’s borders.
The Panama Canal assumes a similar strategic function in the Western Hemisphere. Cutting through the narrowest land strip of Central America to connect the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean, this waterway is indispensable, especially for trade between the US East Coast ports and Asia, and for commodity exports from South America’s western coasts. After the US fully transferred sovereignty rights of the canal to Panama in 1999, the geopolitical vacuum formed in the region has been filled by China’s port investments and infrastructure projects under its Belt and Road Initiative. Port operating concessions held by Chinese companies around the canal fuel debates in Washington about “Chinese influence in the backyard.” Additionally, the decline in the canal’s operational capacity due to irregularities in the rainfall regime feeding Lake Gatun in Panama is accelerating the search for alternative routes, such as the Tehuantepec Isthmus Railway in Mexico or the proposed canal projects in Nicaragua.
The Fierce Sentinel of Energy Supply: The Strait of Hormuz
The Strait of Hormuz, connecting the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean, holds an unparalleled position for the stability of global energy markets. This corridor, lying between Iran and Oman and narrowing to about thirty-three kilometers at its most constricted point, hosts approximately one-third of globally seaborne crude oil and a significant portion of LNG trade. The geopolitics of the strait are largely shaped by the regional rivalry between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Western powers and Sunni Arab monarchies. When sanction pressures over Iran’s nuclear program increase, the first deterrent instrument the Tehran administration resorts to is the threat of disrupting strait traffic. Fast attack craft belonging to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, coastal batteries, and mining capability demonstrate that the strait can be destabilized to create a serious risk premium, even if not physically closed. The permanent presence of the US Fifth Fleet in Bahrain and additional military deployments to the region are the military reflection of this narrow waterway’s dominance over global inflation and recession dynamics.
The Southern Lock of the Red Sea: The Bab el-Mandeb Strait and Yemeni Geopolitics
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, located between the southwestern tip of the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen) and Djibouti and Eritrea in the Horn of Africa, is a strategic maritime passage connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and onwards to the Indian Ocean. This narrow waterway, meaning “Gate of Tears” in Arabic, derives its name from the historical difficulty of navigation and the turbulent political climate of the region. Approximately twenty-nine kilometers wide at its narrowest point, the strait is divided into two channels by Perim Island. As Bab el-Mandeb is a mandatory route for all vessels transiting the Suez Canal, it is the southern complementary element of the Mediterranean-Indian Ocean connection, and its strategic value is directly linked to the Suez Canal.
Commercially, Bab el-Mandeb provides passage for approximately six to eight percent of globally seaborne oil and a significant portion of container traffic between Europe and Asia. It is the sole gateway to the Suez Canal, especially for oil tankers traveling from the Persian Gulf to Europe and North America. Furthermore, China’s investments in the Horn of Africa and its first overseas military base established in Djibouti prove how vital Bab el-Mandeb’s security is for Beijing. If the strait closes, tankers and container ships are forced to circumnavigate the Cape of Good Hope at Africa’s southern tip, exponentially increasing freight costs and adding weeks to delivery times.
The power struggle at Bab el-Mandeb is largely shaped under the shadow of the civil war in Yemen that has continued since 2014 and the regional proxy rivalry. The Iranian-backed Houthis’ control over Yemen’s northwestern coastline and the capital, Sana’a, has created an asymmetric risk directly threatening the strait’s security. Ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, naval mines, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and unmanned surface vessels (USVs) in the Houthis’ possession pose a constant threat to commercial and naval vessels passing through the strait. The dramatic increase in Houthi attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb following the Gaza War that began in October 2023 has exposed the systemic risk the strait poses to global trade. As a result of these attacks, many major shipping companies suspended the Red Sea route, diverting their vessels to the Cape of Good Hope, leading to serious disruptions in global supply chains and sharp increases in freight prices.
In response to this threat, the US-led “Operation Prosperity Guardian” and the European Union’s “Operation Aspides” are multinational naval task forces aimed at preserving freedom of navigation in Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea. The Arab Coalition, led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, also attempts to contribute to the strait’s security through its military presence in Yemen. On the African side, military bases belonging to the US, France, Japan, Italy, and China stationed in Djibouti have made Bab el-Mandeb one of the waterways with the highest number of foreign military bases in the world. China’s military presence in Djibouti, as part of its strategy to protect sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean, also encompasses Bab el-Mandeb, increasing Beijing’s strategic footprint in the region. All these dynamics show that Bab el-Mandeb is not merely a maritime passage but also an intersection point of power projection in the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, and the Indian Ocean.
The Western Lock of the Mediterranean: The Strait of Gibraltar
The Strait of Gibraltar, located at the southwestern tip of the European continent between Spain and Morocco and only fourteen kilometers wide at its narrowest point, is the sole natural passage connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Atlantic Ocean. Its geostrategic importance stems from the fact that the maritime traffic of all states bordering or obliged to use the Mediterranean is bottlenecked at this narrow passage. It is the gateway to the global oceans for commercial vessels arriving from Asia via the Suez Canal and for warships of Russia’s Black Sea fleet.
The power struggle at Gibraltar is historically shaped around sovereignty rights over the Rock of Gibraltar, a British Overseas Territory. This small peninsula, whose return Spain continually demands, is not only a matter of prestige for the United Kingdom but also serves as a forward outpost controlling the entrance to the Mediterranean for NATO. In the post-Brexit era, negotiations between Spain and the United Kingdom regarding Gibraltar’s status have brought uncertainties about the strait’s legal status back to the agenda. Furthermore, Morocco transforming the Tanger-Med Port on the strait’s southern coast into Africa’s largest container transshipment hub, and China’s investment interest in this port, have made Gibraltar a keystone not only for Europe but also for China’s Mediterranean strategy.
The Montreux Regime and the Unique Status of the Turkish Straits
The Turkish Straits System, comprising the Istanbul Strait (Bosphorus), the Sea of Marmara, and the Çanakkale Strait (Dardanelles), is the sole route by which states bordering the Black Sea can access the open seas due to its geographical location. The most fundamental aspect distinguishing these straits from other strategic waterways is that their transit regime is regulated not by customary international law or a general convention, but exclusively by the 1936 Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits. This convention grants the Republic of Turkey full sovereignty over the straits and imposes significant restrictions on the passage of warships in terms of tonnage, class, and duration of stay in the Black Sea.
From a commercial perspective, the Istanbul Strait is one of the world’s most risky and narrowest natural waterways, with approximately forty thousand vessels passing through annually. It plays a critical role in delivering oil and grain extracted from the Caspian Basin, primarily Russia and Kazakhstan, to world markets. Geopolitically, the Montreux Convention is the most significant legal barrier preventing the Black Sea from becoming a “NATO lake.” The restrictions on the passage of warships of non-riparian states particularly ensure the Russian Federation’s naval superiority in the Black Sea and the security of its southern flank. In the context of the Ukraine crisis, Turkey’s faithful application of Montreux provisions by closing the straits to warships of belligerent parties has once again proven the strategic value of this historic convention. The Kanal Istanbul initiative, aimed at bypassing the Turkish Straits, has led to intense international debate regarding the future of the Montreux regime and military balances in the Black Sea.
The New Arena of Competition: The Northern Sea Route and Arctic Geopolitics
As a tangible consequence of global warming, the seasonal retreat of the ice sheet in the Arctic Ocean has opened a brand new front in maritime trade and power struggle: the Northern Sea Route. This passage, stretching along the northern coastline of the Russian Federation from the Barents Sea to the Bering Strait, has the potential to shorten the distance between Asia and Europe by approximately forty percent compared to the Suez Canal route. A ship traveling from Shanghai to Rotterdam can reduce its sailing time by more than ten days if using this route.
The unique dynamics of the Northern Sea Route distinguish it from classical straits and canals. Here, the struggle is not about closing a narrow passage but about freedom of navigation and the capacity to establish infrastructure across a vast geography. Russia, claiming that most of the route passes through its Exclusive Economic Zone, imposes mandatory icebreaker escort and transit fees on vessels wishing to use it, defining the route as a “National Transport Corridor.” In contrast, the US, China, and the European Union argue that the Northern Sea Route should have the status of an “international strait” under international law and be open to free passage. China’s large investments in Russia’s Yamal LNG projects under its “Polar Silk Road” vision and its efforts to build its own nuclear-powered icebreaker fleet indicate that the Arctic will not only be Russia’s but also a stage for new bipolar rivalry. In the long term, this new route is expected to relieve traffic pressure on the Suez Canal and shift the center of gravity of global maritime trade northward.
From Supply Security to Systemic Risk: The Cost of Closure and the Search for Alternatives
The impact of strategic waterways on the global economy is measured not only by the efficiency they provide when open but also by the systemic shock waves that emerge when they are disrupted. The grounding of the Ever Given vessel in the Suez Canal, paralyzing the supply chain for six days, meant billions of dollars in losses per hour for global trade and exposed the fragility of the “just-in-time” production model. Similarly, the diversion of vessels to the Cape of Good Hope due to security vulnerabilities in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea drives freight prices to astronomical levels and increases inflationary pressure in Europe.
This fragility pushes states and major logistics companies to search for alternative corridors. The Middle Corridor via the Caspian Sea, the Development Road Project planned to reach the Mediterranean through Iraq, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), and Israel-India-Arabian Peninsula connections are mega-projects aimed at reducing absolute dependence on traditional maritime straits. Although each of these new routes faces geographical challenges, regional political instabilities, and financing problems, the very existence of these searches proves how vital straits geopolitics truly is.
The Maritime Projection of Geopolitical Fault Lines
The geographical constraints upon which global maritime trade flows persist as constant parameters determining the fundamental dynamics of international relations. Each waterway examined is defined by its unique legal regime, different threat perception, and overlapping interests of rival states. The dependency relationship in the Strait of Malacca, the military buildup in Hormuz, the proxy war and asymmetric threat at Bab el-Mandeb, the colonial legacy at Gibraltar, the contractual exception of the Turkish Straits, and the environmental transformation on the Northern Sea Route reflect different tones of the global power struggle.
The opening of the Arctic Ocean as a new trade artery due to global climate change and the possibility of new logistics corridors enabled by technological developments indicate that geopolitical competition will intensify further in the coming years. The recent crisis in Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea has proven that even non-state armed actors can paralyze global supply chains, necessitating a revision of the maritime security paradigm. In this context, the struggle for control over maritime trade routes has transformed into a multi-dimensional chess game to be won not only by the firepower of navies but also by infrastructure investments, interpretation of legal conventions, and diplomatic engagement capacity. While ensuring the openness and security of these narrow passages, the arteries of the global economy, emerges as a common responsibility of the international community, the question of how this responsibility will be shared will remain one of the greatest political challenges of the twenty-first century.
Bibliography
(Note: The bibliography is a translation of the titles. Original English titles are preserved where applicable.)
Aljefri, Y. M. (2021). The Geopolitics of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait: Maritime Security and Regional Competition. Journal of Arabian Studies, 11(2), 245-267. Bekkevold, J. I., & Till, G. (Eds.). (2016). International Order at Sea: How it is challenged. How it is maintained. Palgrave Macmillan. Blunden, M. (2016). Geopolitics and the Northern Sea Route. International Affairs, 88(1), 115-129. Bueger, C., & Edmunds, T. (2021). Understanding Maritime Security. Oxford University Press. Buszynski, L., & Roberts, C. B. (Eds.). (2015). The South China Sea and the Malacca Strait: Maritime Security in Southeast Asia. Routledge. Cordner, L. (2020). Maritime Security Risks, Threats and Vulnerabilities in the Indian Ocean. Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 16(3), 267-289. Gürdeniz, C. (2018). Montrö: Türk Boğazları’nın Stratejik Önemi ve Montrö Sözleşmesi [Montreux: The Strategic Importance of the Turkish Straits and the Montreux Convention]. Kırmızı Kedi Yayınevi. International Maritime Organization (IMO). (2024). Reports on Security Incidents in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. IMO Maritime Safety Committee. Kaplan, R. D. (2011). The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate. Random House. Kraska, J., & Pedrozo, R. (2013). International Maritime Security Law. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Lanteigne, M. (2021). Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction (4th ed.). Routledge. Mabon, S. (2022). The Struggle for the Red Sea: Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Geopolitics of the Bab el-Mandeb. Middle Eastern Studies, 58(4), 512-530. Oğuz, Ş. (2020). Küresel Deniz Ticaretinde Stratejik Geçiş Noktaları ve Jeopolitik Riskler [Strategic Chokepoints and Geopolitical Risks in Global Maritime Trade]. Deniz Strateji Dergisi, 2(4), 45-78. Østreng, W., Eger, K. M., Fløistad, B., Jørgensen-Dahl, A., Lothe, L., Mejlænder-Larsen, M., & Wergeland, T. (2013). Shipping in Arctic Waters: A comparison of the Northeast, Northwest and Trans Polar Passages. Springer Praxis Books. U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). (2024). World Oil Transit Chokepoints. EIA Official Report. Ünlü, N. (2021). Türk Boğazları’nda Geçiş Rejimi: Montrö Sözleşmesi ve Güncel Gelişmeler [The Transit Regime in the Turkish Straits: The Montreux Convention and Current Developments]. İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Mecmuası, 79(3), 891-930. Vertin, Z. (2019). Red Sea Rivalries: The Gulf States and the Horn of Africa. Brookings Institution Press.
Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA) Aarhus University, 1997 Independent Researcher Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures
The recent diplomatic contacts and foreign minister-level meetings reportedly developing between Türkiye, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia have sparked a noteworthy debate in terms of regional geopolitics. At the heart of this debate lies the possibility of Iran’s exclusion from a potential regional equation. The idea of a “West Asian alliance without Iran,” recently floated, raises serious questions not only regarding regional balances but also in the context of the global power struggle. Particularly at a juncture where the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is deepening, the Red Sea trade route is under threat, and global energy supply is becoming fragile, attempting to reshape the region through exclusionary blocs necessitates a confrontation with historical and geographical realities.
From a historical perspective, the pursuit of lasting peace and stability in West Asia has generally been conducted through inclusive models. The failure of the Baghdad Pact (CENTO) during the Cold War era is instructive in demonstrating the fate of security umbrellas that fail to secure the consent of the region’s peoples and exclude a key regional actor. The structure currently sought to be formed against Iran is likewise a candidate for a similar fate; for Iran is not merely a state but also the center of Shia geopolitics, the carrier of the Iranian Turk and Persian cultural basin, and the locomotive of the regional axis of resistance.
The Geopolitical Reality of West Asia
Throughout history, West Asia has been an arena of competition for great powers, situated at the center of global politics due to its energy resources, trade routes, and strategic location. To establish a lasting alliance in this geography, one must consider not only military or economic power but also geographical and cultural realities. A glance at the map of West Asia reveals that Iran is physically positioned at the very heart of this geography, on a transit route stretching from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf, and from the Central Asian steppes to the plains of Mesopotamia. This position bestows upon Iran an indispensable role not only militarily but also in terms of trade and energy transit. Any regional architecture attempting to sideline Iran would automatically result in the blockage of these trade and energy corridors or necessitate a shift towards alternative, costlier routes.
In this context, Iran is one of the region’s most critical actors. With its population, military capacity, energy resources, and ideological influence, the void created by removing Iran from the West Asian equation cannot be easily filled. Possessing the world’s second-largest natural gas reserves and fourth-largest oil reserves, Iran is a producer capable of single-handedly influencing prices in global energy markets. Therefore, any alliance attempt that excludes Iran carries a serious structural weakness from the outset. Moreover, Iran’s ballistic missile inventory and advanced unmanned aerial vehicle technology make it one of the region’s most powerful countries in terms of unconventional deterrence capability. A coalition seeking to exclude Iran must be prepared to confront this asymmetric threat.
In terms of geographical determinism, Iran also controls the northern shores of the Strait of Hormuz, one of the most critical waterways in the region. Approximately one-fifth of the world’s oil trade passes through this narrow chokepoint, making it a strategic asset in Iran’s hands. Attempting to build a West Asian alliance without Iran means constructing a structure lacking the capacity to secure this strait, a risk unacceptable for the global economy. Hence, any move aimed at excluding Iran will face objections not only from regional actors but also from global players (particularly energy-importing countries like China, India, Japan, and South Korea).
Another factor amplifying Iran’s geopolitical weight is its network of “proxy forces.” Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq, Ansarullah (Houthis) in Yemen, and various militia groups in Syria are the carrier columns of Iran’s regional influence. Through these structures, Iran can project military and political presence far beyond its borders. An alliance attempting to exclude Iran would have to confront not only the regime in Tehran but this entire paramilitary network. This, in turn, carries the potential to trigger a wide-ranging proxy war encompassing nearly all of West Asia.
In this context, Iran’s cultural and historical depth must also be considered a geopolitical reality. Persian is an influential language across a vast geography, from Afghanistan to Tajikistan, and from the holy cities of Iraq to Muslim elites in the Indian subcontinent. Iran’s central position in the Shia Islamic world makes it a reference point for Shia populations in Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, Azerbaijan, and even Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province. These soft power elements constitute sociological barriers to completely sidelining Iran.
The Türkiye–Pakistan–Saudi Arabia Rapprochement
The cooperative endeavors occasionally brought to the agenda between Türkiye, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia are based on different motivations. While Türkiye seeks to enhance its regional effectiveness and find new markets for its defense industry products, Pakistan is in search of security assurances, a way out of its economic crisis, and strategic depth against India. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, aims to balance Iran’s regional influence, find exits from the costly war in Yemen, and create a secure regional environment for its Vision 2030 projects. The occasional coming together of these three countries is a result of conjunctural overlaps of interest rather than a definition of a common enemy. Indeed, Türkiye-Saudi Arabia relations could only enter a path of normalization in the last few years following the deep crisis after the Khashoggi murder, and this normalization still proceeds on fragile ground.
However, it is difficult to claim that the interests of these three countries fully align. Türkiye’s rhetorical pursuit of a “multi-dimensional foreign policy,” Pakistan’s close ties with China, and Saudi Arabia’s strategic bonds with the West cause this potential alliance to harbor internal contradictions. Due to its energy dependence on Iran and border security cooperation, Türkiye avoids taking a position that would completely antagonize Tehran. Pakistan, sharing a long and porous border with Iran, must maintain a controlled balance of competition and cooperation in its relations, particularly in the context of separatist movements in Balochistan. As for Saudi Arabia, the Riyadh administration implicitly acknowledged the failure of the “exclusion of Iran” policy by re-establishing diplomatic relations with Iran in 2023 through Chinese mediation.
Another weak link in this rapprochement is the three countries’ differing threat perceptions. For Türkiye, the number one security threat is the PKK/YPG presence in northern Syria and Iraq, an area where its interests occasionally overlap with Iran’s. For Pakistan, the primary threat is India on its eastern border, and Saudi Arabia’s growing strategic partnership with India against this backdrop creates discomfort in Islamabad. For Saudi Arabia, the priority threat is Iran’s interference in the internal affairs of the Gulf monarchies through its proxy forces. These differing hierarchies of threat make it nearly impossible for the three countries to focus on the same target and develop a common military strategy.
The limits of cooperation are also evident in the economic dimension. Türkiye’s trade volume with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan is significantly lower than its trade volume with Iran or far below its potential level. Saudi Arabia’s past unofficial embargo on Türkiye and Pakistan’s chronic economic crisis are major obstacles to healthy economic integration among the trio. Furthermore, although Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are important customers for Türkiye’s defense industry exports, this relationship is far from creating unilateral dependence, as both countries have the capacity to turn to alternative suppliers (especially China and the USA).
In such a situation, the Türkiye-Pakistan-Saudi Arabia rapprochement is not a “Sunni front against Iran” as portrayed in the media, but rather the sum of tactical steps each country takes in line with its own national interests. The convergence of these three countries on a common ground of excluding Iran seems unlikely in the short term due to both their internal contradictions and Iran’s regional weight.
Türkiye’s Relations with the USA, NATO, and Israel
To understand Türkiye’s foreign policy, it is impossible to ignore its historical ties with the USA, NATO, and Israel. As a NATO member, Türkiye is an integral part of the Western security architecture, and its military, economic, and intelligence relations with the USA date back many years. Joining NATO in 1952, Türkiye served as the guardian of the southeastern flank against the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, shaping its military doctrine, equipment, and training system largely according to Western standards. Today, hosting critical NATO bases like Incirlik and Kürecik, and providing strategic space for the NATO corps to be established, Türkiye is also known to host tactical nuclear weapons on its territory under NATO’s nuclear sharing agreement. These institutional ties create structural constraints that prevent Türkiye from acting entirely independently in its quest for regional alliances.
Nevertheless, even though Türkiye has claimed to pursue a rhetorically “more independent foreign policy” in recent years, its obligations within the NATO framework and its ties with the West have not completely disappeared. Its removal from the F-35 program, exposure to CAATSA sanctions, and tensions with the EU should not be interpreted as a complete break from the Western camp. On the contrary, the dependence of the Turkish economy on Western financial institutions, the continued procurement of certain critical components for the defense industry from the West, and the organic ties of the Turkish elite with the West continue to limit Ankara’s room for maneuver. In this context, if Türkiye were to take part in a regional alliance aimed at excluding Iran, it would be unable to assume the natural leadership of such an alliance and would instead face the risk of being perceived as a subcontractor of the USA in the region.
Relations with Israel have followed a more fluctuating course. Even during times of “serious” political tension, it is difficult to claim that contacts in commercial and certain security fields have been completely severed. As one of the first countries to recognize Israel, Türkiye has developed a relationship model with this country that has been up and down but never completely broken. Fluctuations such as the withdrawal of ambassadors after the Mavi Marmara crisis, the mutual reappointment of ambassadors in 2022, and the restriction of trade after October 7, 2023, demonstrate the conjunctural nature of Türkiye-Israel relations. The idea of a West Asian alliance without Iran envisages Israel having a greater say in the regional security architecture; therefore, Türkiye’s participation in such a structure would be a sensitive choice that could damage its prestige in the Arab and Islamic world.
Within this framework, it may be unrealistic to evaluate any regional alliance involving Türkiye entirely independently of its relations with the West. The sanctions regime against Iran is one of the USA’s most important foreign policy tools, and if Türkiye were to breach or ignore this regime, it would likely face severe economic consequences. Indeed, the past Halkbank case and the Zarrab scandal demonstrated how closely the USA monitors Türkiye’s trade with Iran and how it can be turned into an instrument of pressure when deemed necessary. This situation reveals that even if Türkiye were to participate in an alliance excluding Iran, it cannot be expected to completely sever its economic relations with Iran.
Consequently, the tension between Türkiye’s NATO membership and its claim to leadership in the Islamic world becomes even more pronounced in discussions of an alliance excluding Iran. While Ankara seeks to utilize the advantages of being part of the Western security umbrella, it also attempts to maintain the support of the Muslim public as one of the countries ostensibly showing the “harshest reaction” to Israel’s operations in Gaza. This dual position may become unsustainable when part of an alliance targeting Iran. Because such an alliance would inevitably be coded as a tool serving Israel’s regional interests, eroding Türkiye’s rhetorical “superiority” on the Palestinian cause.
Strategic Consequences of Excluding Iran
Excluding Iran does not merely mean leaving one country out of the equation; it also means confronting Iran’s sphere of regional influence. Considering Iran’s influence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, such an exclusion attempt could directly impact the balances on the ground. In Iraq, for instance, Iran-affiliated Hashd al-Shaabi groups are integrated into the state apparatus, and political stability in the country largely depends on Tehran’s consent. An alliance excluding Iran could upset these delicate balances in Iraq, potentially dragging the country back to the brink of sectarian wars. Similarly, Hezbollah’s military and political power in Lebanon has the capacity to sabotage any project attempting to sideline Iran from the outset.
Moreover, given Iran’s developing relations with China and Russia, a bloc formed against Iran could create a broader geopolitical fault line. By signing a 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership agreement with Iran in 2021, China demonstrated its long-term commitment to investing in the country’s energy resources and transportation corridors. Russia, seeking to evade Western sanctions following the Ukraine war, views Iran as a critical partner, deepening cooperation particularly in the transfer of unmanned aerial vehicle and missile technology. A West Asian alliance excluding Iran would be perceived as a direct challenge to the interests of these two major powers in the region and would likely lead to a further tightening of the Russia-China-Iran axis.
Another strategic consequence of excluding Iran centers on the nuclear issue. Since the collapse of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran has accelerated its uranium enrichment activities and moved closer to the nuclear weapons threshold than ever before. An attempt to encircle and exclude Iran through a regional alliance would push decision-makers in Tehran to invest more in nuclear deterrence. This could trigger a nuclear arms race in the region; Saudi Arabia’s insistence on accessing nuclear technology and Türkiye’s nuclear energy program should be reevaluated in this context. Excluding Iran could mean forcing it to acquire nuclear weapons (which is essentially Iran’s right), a security dilemma that would have devastating consequences for the entire region.
Economically, excluding Iran would also incur heavy costs. As a founding member of OPEC, Iran is a significant actor in the global oil market. An alliance aimed at excluding Iran tightening economic sanctions on the country could lead to sudden spikes in global energy prices. Türkiye and Pakistan, being heavily dependent on foreign energy, would be among the countries most affected by this situation. Türkiye meets a significant portion of its natural gas needs from Iran; Pakistan is trying to implement the IP Pipeline project to import natural gas from Iran. Excluding Iran would jeopardize the energy supply security of these two countries and force them towards more expensive alternatives.
For these reasons, the sociological and sectarian consequences of excluding Iran must not be ignored. The Shia population in West Asia would perceive an alliance excluding Iran as a siege against themselves. This perception could increase radicalization among Shia communities in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Iraq. Sectarian-based polarization threatens not only interstate relations but also intrastate peace. A country like Türkiye, with a significant Alevi population, being perceived as part of a sectarian-axis alliance could open wounds in its own social fabric that are difficult to heal.
The USA and Israel Factor: Influence or Determinism?
The role of the USA and Israel frequently comes up in discussions of an anti-Iran bloc. The USA’s policy of containing Iran and Israel’s “security concerns” are important factors in this framework. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Washington has viewed Iran as “one of the greatest threats” to its interests in the Middle East and has employed various tools such as military bases, economic sanctions, and regional alliances to contain the country. The Abraham Accords process is the most concrete example of the US effort to build normalization and security integration between Israel and Arab countries on the common ground of anti-Iran sentiment. It is known that Türkiye occasionally receives suggestions from the West that it should not remain outside this process.
However, explaining regional developments solely as a “hidden plot” or the unilateral direction of external powers carries the risk of ignoring the strategic calculations of local actors themselves. Countries like Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan appear to act “independently” in line with their own interests; however, while external influences are significant, they are not the sole determinant. Indeed, Saudi Arabia’s step towards normalization with Iran under Chinese mediation demonstrates that US influence in the region is not absolute. Similarly, Türkiye’s purchase of the S-400 air defense system from Russia and its conduct of the Astana process in Syria together with Russia and Iran prove that it can prioritize its own national interests despite Western suggestions.
The Israel factor presents a more complex picture. For Israel, Iran is coded as an existential “threat,” and every possible military, intelligence, diplomatic, and economic tool is used to eliminate this “threat.” The idea of a West Asian alliance without Iran can be seen as an ideal formula for Israel to break its “regional isolation” and deepen security cooperation with Arab countries. However, the Gaza war that began on October 7, 2023, has seriously damaged Israel’s image in the region and reignited anti-normalization sentiments among the Arab public. In this environment, joining an anti-Iran alliance in which Israel is implicitly a partner could lead to a serious legitimacy crisis for countries like Saudi Arabia and Türkiye in the eyes of their domestic public.
Looking more closely at the USA’s role in this equation, Washington’s priority appears to be limiting China’s global rise rather than containing Iran. The US support for the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) project aims to connect India to Europe by bypassing Iran and Türkiye. This project constitutes the economic pillar of a West Asia vision without Iran. However, IMEC’s dependence on Israeli ports and its prerequisite of Saudi-Israeli normalization have suspended the project following the Gaza war. This situation demonstrates how fragile US regional plans are and how easily they can be sabotaged by local dynamics.
In the final analysis, the US and Israel factor is a significant source of motivation for the “idea of a West Asian alliance without Iran,” but it is not determinative. What is determinative are the interest calculations of the regional countries themselves. For Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan to give a green light to such an alliance, they must be convinced that their gains outweigh their losses. In light of current data, the strategic benefit that excluding Iran would provide these three countries falls far short of the risks they would incur.
Internal Contradictions of the Alliance
A potential alliance to be formed between Türkiye, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia could be fragile due to the differing priorities of the parties. The foreign policy priorities, threat perceptions, and economic structures of these three countries are so different that finding common ground is often only possible at the level of very general and non-binding statements. For example, Türkiye’s claims in the Eastern Mediterranean and its military presence in Libya are a source of discomfort for Saudi Arabia, which is developing close relations with Egypt and Greece. While Riyadh pursues a policy aimed at preserving the regional status quo, Ankara exhibits a revisionist stance on many fronts. This fundamental difference in approach indicates that the long-term strategic interests of the two countries conflict.
Türkiye’s economic relations with Iran continue. Despite occasional political tensions, the trade volume between the two countries remains at billions of dollars, and efforts are underway to reach a target of $30 billion. Türkiye is one of the largest customers importing natural gas from Iran, and this dependence gains strategic importance, especially during winter months when domestic demand increases. Additionally, border trade between the two countries is a vital source of income for local economies in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. Being part of an alliance aimed at excluding Iran would require Türkiye to reconsider these economic relations, leading to a significant loss of welfare and increased unemployment.
Pakistan, as a neighbor sharing a border with Iran, is compelled to pursue a balanced policy. The over 900-kilometer land border between the two countries necessitates cooperation due to the separatist threats both countries face in the Balochistan region. Faced with the Kashmir issue with India and instability in Afghanistan, Pakistan is not in a position to open a new front of hostility on its western border. Furthermore, the significant Shia population in Pakistan (approximately 20% of the population) would make an alliance hostile to Iran unsustainable in domestic politics. Although the Islamabad administration follows a fluctuating course in relations with Iran, it carefully avoids taking a position that would completely antagonize Tehran.
Despite its rivalry with Iran, Saudi Arabia has not completely closed diplomatic channels. The normalization agreement signed in Beijing in 2023 marked the announcement of a new chapter in Riyadh’s Iran policy. Saudi Arabia needs regional stability and security to achieve its Vision 2030 goals. Exiting the war in Yemen, maintaining balances in Iraq and Lebanon, and keeping the Red Sea trade route open require at least a cold peace with Iran. Engaging in an alliance that excludes Iran would undermine this normalization process and drag the kingdom back into a costly proxy war.
In addition to these internal contradictions, the lack of mutual trust among the three countries is one of the biggest obstacles to an alliance. Türkiye harbors suspicions regarding the roles of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in the July 15 coup attempt. Pakistan is uneasy about Saudi Arabia’s developing strategic partnership with India. Saudi Arabia, in turn, views Ankara’s regional intentions with suspicion due to Türkiye’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood. This crisis of confidence prevents the parties from developing sincere cooperation in areas such as intelligence sharing and joint military planning.
Regional Stability and the Risk of Polarization
An alliance that excludes Iran could increase regional polarization and deepen existing conflicts. West Asia is already a geography where ethnic, sectarian, and political fault lines are highly active. A new attempt at bloc formation in this geography would only serve to escalate existing tensions. Particularly, sectarian divergence is one of the region’s most sensitive points. An alliance excluding Iran, spearheaded by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan, would inevitably be perceived as a “Sunni Bloc,” reinforcing feelings of encirclement among Shia communities. This could disrupt the delicate sectarian balance in Iraq, trigger a new internal conflict in Lebanon, and increase unrest in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province.
The further accentuation of sectarian and political fault lines could increase instability in the long term. Historical experience shows that exclusionary alliances in West Asia are short-lived and often counterproductive. The 1955 Baghdad Pact (CENTO), aimed at containing the Soviet Union, faced Arab nationalist waves led by Egypt’s Nasser and regional opposition, ultimately dissolving. Similarly, the Arab Coalition formed by Saudi Arabia in 2015 to intervene in Yemen failed to achieve its initial ambitious goals, deepened the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, and led to an increase in the Houthis’ military capacity. A new alliance aimed at excluding Iran is highly likely to suffer a similar fate.
Another dimension of polarization is that it facilitates the intervention of extra-regional powers. An environment where Iran is excluded would create a suitable ground for the USA to increase its military presence in the region and for Israel to act more freely. This would also heighten the interest of Russia and China in the region, turning West Asia into an arena of great power rivalry reminiscent of the Cold War era. For a country like Türkiye, which ostensibly tries to “pursue a multi-dimensional foreign policy,” such an environment would narrow its room for maneuver and force it to choose between the two blocs. Yet, Ankara’s strategy to date has ostensibly been based on “balancing between blocs as much as possible and maintaining relations with both sides.”
Therefore, inclusive dialogue mechanisms offer a more sustainable solution than exclusionary alliances. The problems of West Asia cannot be solved by excluding or punishing one actor but through processes that recognize the legitimate interests of all actors and build mutual trust. The Helsinki Process, which ended the Cold War in Europe, is an instructive model of how dialogue can be established between hostile camps. A similar process for West Asia could be initiated with a broad-based security and cooperation conference involving Iran, regional powers like Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Egypt, and Pakistan, as well as global actors such as Russia, China, and the EU as observers.
Here, the humanitarian cost of polarization must also not be ignored. West Asia is a geography where millions of people have been displaced and hundreds of thousands of civilians have lost their lives in the last two decades due to the occupation of Iraq, the Syrian civil war, conflicts in Yemen, and the Israeli-Palestinian issue. A new policy of bloc formation and exclusion in this geography would deepen the human tragedy. The priority for regional countries should be to end existing conflicts and focus on reconstruction processes, not invent new enmities.
The China and Russia Dimension
Iran is an important partner for China’s economic projects and Russia’s regional strategies. Under the Belt and Road Initiative, China views Iran as a key junction of land and sea corridors connecting Central Asia to West Asia and from there to Europe. With the 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership agreement signed in 2021, China has committed to investing over $400 billion in Iran’s energy, transportation, telecommunications, and financial sectors. This agreement aims to make Iran resilient against Western sanctions and secure China’s energy supply. A West Asian alliance aimed at excluding Iran would directly target these strategic Chinese investments and deal a severe blow to Beijing’s economic interests in the region. Therefore, China cannot be expected to remain silent on such an initiative; Beijing would likely attempt to thwart any structure aimed at excluding Iran through diplomatic pressure, economic incentives, and its veto power in the United Nations Security Council.
Thus, an exclusionary approach towards Iran could also affect the interests of these two major powers in the region and create new areas of tension. For Russia, Iran is not only an energy competitor but also a strategic ally in the context of joint military presence in Syria, the search for stability in the Caucasus, and solidarity against Western sanctions. Sanctions imposed by the West following the Ukraine war have brought Russia even closer to Iran. There is deepening cooperation between the two countries in areas of unmanned aerial vehicles, missile technology, and military training. Furthermore, Russia is developing its access to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf through Iran, seeking to create a strategic line connecting its presence in the Mediterranean with the Indian Ocean. A West Asian alliance without Iran would serve as a barrier hindering Russia’s achievement of these global strategic objectives.
Russia’s presence in the region is not limited to Iran. Moscow cooperates with Türkiye in the Astana process, coordinates energy policies with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (OPEC+), and maintains a complex yet functional relationship with Israel. Russia knows that an order in West Asia where any actor is completely excluded would not serve its interests. Because such an order would consolidate US dominance in the region and narrow Russia’s room for maneuver. Therefore, Moscow would side with Tehran against initiatives aimed at excluding Iran and would not hesitate to use its diplomatic, military, and economic tools to undermine these efforts.
Another important dimension of the support China and Russia provide to Iran is the international financial system and alternative payment mechanisms. To circumvent US sanctions, Iran engages in bilateral currency swap agreements with China and Russia, utilizes cryptocurrencies, and develops its own financial messaging systems. China’s efforts to internationalize the yuan and break the hegemony of the US dollar gain momentum through cooperation with Iran. Since a West Asian alliance without Iran would aim to eliminate a significant pillar of this alternative financial architecture, it would face wholesale opposition from China and Russia. This could lead to new fractures in the global financial system and a deepening of the economic decoupling between East and West.
Finally, Iran’s growing visibility in platforms like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS breaks its isolation in the international system and provides it with an alternative diplomatic umbrella. Iran’s full membership in the SCO in 2023 and its joining of BRICS as of 2024 have made it an actor impossible to exclude from the security equation in West Asia. These memberships not only grant Iran prestige but also offer the opportunity to institutionalize military, economic, and intelligence cooperation with China and Russia. Any regional alliance aiming to exclude Iran would have to confront this institutional reality and bear the collective reaction of the SCO-BRICS axis.
Conclusion
The idea of a West Asian alliance without Iran is not realistic. While it may be based on certain strategic calculations for these individual actors, the region’s realities seriously question the sustainability of such a structure. Geographical necessities, demographic balances, energy geopolitics, and the determinative power of non-state actors make Iran an integral part of this equation. Trying to exclude Iran is akin to ignoring the main water source while building a dam; such a structure is doomed to collapse in the first flood. Türkiye’s relations with the USA, NATO, and Israel make it difficult to evaluate such an alliance on a completely independent track. Ankara’s predicament, caught between its institutional ties with the West, its economic and security cooperation with Iran, and its claim to regional leadership, makes it a natural advocate of inclusive dialogue platforms rather than exclusionary blocs.
Nevertheless, rather than viewing regional dynamics as a “conspiracy” directed solely by external powers, addressing them as a multi-layered and complex balance of power provides a healthier analysis. Every actor in West Asia has its own agenda, “threat perception,” and strategic calculations. The US and Israel’s desire to contain Iran, Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 goals, Türkiye’s pursuit of strategic autonomy, Pakistan’s need for depth against India, and Iran’s ideal of exporting its revolution are variables in this complex equation. Analyses that ignore these variables and reduce the situation to a single factor (such as sectarian difference or US plans) not only fail to help us understand the region but also lead to incorrect policy outcomes.
In light of the arguments presented in this article, we can summarize why a West Asian alliance without Iran is not possible as follows: First, geographical and demographic realities make excluding Iran impossible. Second, the internal contradictions and lack of trust within the Türkiye-Pakistan-Saudi Arabia triangle prevent these countries from coalescing around a common definition of an enemy. Third, the strategic partnerships Iran has developed with China and Russia mean any attempt to exclude it will have global consequences. Fourth, excluding Iran would activate sectarian and ethnic fault lines in the region, deepening existing conflicts (there is a dense Shia population in the Gulf countries) and creating new areas of instability. Fifth and finally, Türkiye’s NATO membership and relations with the USA structurally hinder its ability to assume the leadership of a fully independent regional alliance.
In conclusion, the path to a lasting order in West Asia lies not through exclusionary blocs but through inclusive and balanced models of cooperation. These models must recognize Iran’s legitimate security concerns and regional interests. Similarly, Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 goals, Türkiye’s counter-terrorism priorities, Pakistan’s economic development needs, and Israel’s security quest must also be part of this inclusive framework. The Helsinki Process and the OSCE model built by Europe after the devastating wars of the 20th century could serve as an inspiring example for West Asia. Of course, the historical, cultural, and political dynamics of the two regions are not identical; however, there are lessons to be drawn about how dialogue can be established between hostile camps.
In this context, the task for regional countries and global powers is not to invent new enmities and form exclusionary blocs, but to develop mechanisms that will end existing conflicts, alleviate human suffering, and promote economic development. Excluding Iran brings neither peace to the region nor serves any country’s national interests. On the contrary, it plunges the region into deeper chaos and uncertainty. The future of West Asia must be sought not in exclusion, but in inclusion; not in polarization, but in integration; not in conflict, but in cooperation.
RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of the analysis above, the following policy recommendations are developed for regional countries, primarily Türkiye, and the international community:
For Türkiye: · Deepening Bilateral Relations with Iran: Concrete steps should be taken to place existing energy agreements on a long-term and stable footing, strengthen joint mechanisms on border security, and achieve the $30 billion trade volume target. · Avoiding Exclusionary Alliances: Türkiye should not participate in any regional security structure that targets or excludes Iran; instead, it should advocate for a “West Asian Security and Cooperation Conference” encompassing all regional countries. · Institutionalizing Strategic Autonomy: Projects reducing external dependency in the defense industry should be accelerated, alternative financial systems and payment mechanisms developed, and the balance between NATO commitments and regional interests carefully maintained.
For Regional Countries: · Inclusive Dialogue Platforms: The normalization process with Iran, initiated under Saudi Arabia’s leadership, should be expanded with the participation of other regional countries and given an institutional framework. · Economic Integration Projects: Multilateral projects involving Iran in energy, transportation, and trade (e.g., facilitating trade within the ECO framework, interconnecting regional energy grids) should be promoted. · Joint Stance Against Sectarian Polarization: Regional countries should avoid rhetoric and actions that fuel sectarian division and develop a unifying language around the common problems of the Islamic world (Palestine, poverty, education).
For Global Powers: · USA and the West: The failure of the maximum pressure policy towards Iran should be acknowledged, and a solution should be sought that encompasses the nuclear program and recognizes Iran’s place in the regional security architecture. Furthermore, instead of exclusionary projects like IMEC, infrastructure investments encompassing all regional countries should be supported. · China and Russia: Their support for Iran should be maintained in a balanced and responsible manner without leading to new polarization in the region. They should encourage win-win based cooperation rather than zero-sum competition in West Asia.
For International Organizations: · United Nations and Organization of Islamic Cooperation: Should undertake mediation and facilitation roles to initiate a comprehensive security and cooperation dialogue in West Asia, establishing a “West Asian Helsinki Process” agenda for this purpose.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
· Aras, B., & Karakaya Polat, R. (2008). From Conflict to Cooperation: Desecuritization of Turkey’s Relations with Syria and Iran. Security Dialogue, 39(5), 495-515. · Cordesman, A. H. (2021). Iran’s Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities: The Threat in the Northern Gulf. Washington DC: CSIS Press. · Ehteshami, A., & Zweiri, M. (2007). Iran and the Rise of Its Neoconservatives: The Politics of Tehran’s Silent Revolution. London: I.B. Tauris. · Gause, F. G. (2023). The Future of US-Saudi Relations: Oil, China, and the Shadow of 9/11. Foreign Affairs, 102(4), 48-63. · Hunter, S. T. (2022). Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Resisting the New International Order. Santa Barbara: Praeger. · International Crisis Group. (2024). Ten Challenges for the Middle East in 2024. Middle East Report No. 245. Brussels: ICG. · Kamrava, M. (Ed.). (2020). The Sacred Republic: Power and Institutions in Iran. London: Hurst & Company. · Keynoush, B. (2023). Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Politics of Détente. London: I.B. Tauris. · Kirişci, K. (2023). Turkey and the West: Fault Lines in a Troubled Alliance. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. · Nasr, V. (2006). The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. · Oktav, Ö. Z. (2021). Turkey’s Relations with the Middle East: Political and Economic Challenges. Cham: Springer. · Parsi, T. (2017). Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy. New Haven: Yale University Press. · Riedel, B. (2019). Kings and Presidents: Saudi Arabia and the United States since FDR. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. · Sinkaya, B. (2018). The Revolutionary Guards in Iranian Politics: Elites and Shifting Relations. London: Routledge. · Takeyh, R. (2021). The Last Shah: America, Iran, and the Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty. New Haven: Yale University Press. · Telhami, S. (2013). The World Through Arab Eyes: Arab Public Opinion and the Reshaping of the Middle East. New York: Basic Books. · Ülgen, S., & Yeşiltaş, M. (2023). Türkiye’nin Jeopolitik Dönüşümü: Stratejik Özerklik Arayışı. İstanbul: SETA Yayınları. · Walt, S. M. (1987). The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. · Wehrey, F. (Ed.). (2023). The Saudi-Iranian Rivalry and the Future of Middle East Security. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. · Zaccara, L. (2024). Iran’s Look East Policy: Strategic Partnership with China and Russia. Middle East Policy, 31(1), 87-104.
Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA) Aarhus University, 1997 Independent Researcher Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures
New York Turkish Consul General Ahmet Yazal / Silence about terrorist origination Fethullah Gulen foot Soldiers in New York
Since the appointment of Consul General Ahmet Yazal, there has been little visible public response or outreach regarding activities in New York involving individuals believed to be linked to the terrorist origination Fethullah Gulen and their engagement with various NGOs. This silence is raising questions as many in community are wondering whether enough attention is being given to the issue in New York by Consul General Ahmet Yazal about the terrorist origination , and whether Turkish interests are being actively represented and protected, especially considering the responsibility to the Turkish public. Yazal is just collecting his $12,000 salary and waiting for his retirement and walking his two dogs. (picture attached)
The political transformation observed in Turkey since the early 2000s encompasses structural ruptures too comprehensive to be understood solely through the limited lens of traditional political science concepts. Internal factors such as electoral dynamics, party competition, or societal demands alone remain insufficient to explain this transformation. Phenomena including the redefinition of state-society relations, the dissolution of bureaucratic tutelage, and the acceleration of economic integration processes necessitate examination within a broader international context.
At this juncture, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s political rise transcends being a phenomenon limited to individual leadership qualities. This ascent has developed in tandem with a period of international system restructuring and has established organic ties with this system. Therefore, the resulting political structure is not merely a product of national dynamics but also a concrete manifestation of global power relations at the local level.
When examining the formation processes of political power, the question of how global projects are implemented through local actors carries decisive importance. In this context, the “Greater Middle East Project” (GMEP) framework offers a critical analytical tool for understanding the transformation in Turkey. Particularly, Erdoğan’s discourse of “co-presidency” indicates that this relationship is a constitutive element rather than mere cooperation. Since political actors’ language often reveals their positions and functions within the system, these expressions should be read not as rhetorical choices but as expressions of structural belonging.
Geopolitical Framework and Global Strategic Design
The GMEP, shaped under the leadership of the United States, is a comprehensive strategic initiative aimed at restructuring global power balances at the beginning of the 21st century. This initiative is based on a multi-layered strategy targeting the transformation of political, economic, and social structures in the Middle East and North Africa. While classical power politics elements such as control over energy resources and geostrategic regions lie at the foundation of the strategy, rather than direct military intervention, processes of political transformation, institutional reforms, and ideological reproduction have been employed to achieve these objectives.
This situation demonstrates that modern forms of hegemony have become increasingly indirect and multi-dimensional. Within this framework, the GMEP is not merely a foreign policy instrument but also a form of structural intervention aimed at ensuring the continuity of the global capitalist system. Local actors involved in the project become not just passive implementers but active elements transforming the system. Turkey’s role within this framework is shaped not only by its geographical location but also through the relations its political power establishes with the global system. In this way, Turkey transcends being a passive regional object and rises to the position of an active subject in regional transformation processes.
Construction of Political Power and Structural Adjustment
The transformation of the power structure in Turkey cannot be explained solely by election results. This process encompasses changes in the institutional structure of the state, the reorientation of economic policies, and the radical reorganization of the social sphere. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s leadership has played a decisive role in this process. However, this role stands out not within the framework of charismatic leadership in the classical sense, but rather as the carrier of structural adjustment mechanisms.
In the construction of political power, relations established with international actors have become a determining factor. Strategic collaborations developed particularly with the United States and Israel have directly influenced Turkey’s foreign policy orientations. These relations have not been limited to the diplomatic level but have also deepened in the areas of security, economy, and ideology. The political structure emerging in this context has taken shape at the intersection of local and global dynamics. While producing internal legitimacy on one hand, this structure follows a path compatible with the international system on the other. This dual-directional functioning is one of the fundamental mechanisms ensuring the sustainability of power. Therefore, the current political power should be evaluated not as an independent formation but as a structure integrated with the global system.
Discourse, Identity, and Ontological Bond
The discourse of “co-presidency” serves beyond being a mere expression in terms of political analysis, functioning as a tool for identity construction. This discourse reveals how the political actor positions himself and within which structural context he operates. These expressions belonging to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan should be treated not as a temporary political preference but as an indicator of a deeper structural relationship. For this relationship has become an integral part of the actor’s political identity over time.
The concept of “ontological bond” offers an important theoretical tool for explaining this situation. According to this concept, the relationship between the political actor and the structure in which he exists is not superficial but possesses a constitutive quality. Therefore, eliminating this relationship necessitates not merely a political change but also an identity-based transformation. Within this framework, Erdoğan’s relationship with the GMEP should be evaluated not as a conjunctural cooperation but as structural integration. This integration manifests itself across a wide spectrum from political discourse to policy production. The continuity of this relationship should be explained not only by external factors but also by internal dynamics.
Conclusion
A sound analysis of the political structure in Turkey requires a multi-layered and interdisciplinary approach. This approach must consider internal dynamics together with global power relations. Otherwise, analyses will remain incomplete and reductionist. In this context, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s political role should be evaluated not only at the national level but also through his position within the global system.
The GMEP framework offers a strong theoretical ground for analyzing the last twenty years of transformation in Turkey. However, it is also clear that this framework alone is insufficient and must be considered together with other factors. The structural nature of political power necessitates moving beyond individual leadership debates. Leadership should be evaluated through its function within the system. In conclusion, the current political structure in Turkey is a complex formation shaped at the intersection of global and local dynamics. To understand this formation, analyses that are critical, multi-dimensional, and centered on dependency relations are needed.
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Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA) Aarhus University, 1997 Independent Researcher Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures
