By Sefa Yürükel
The Security State and the Democratic Contradiction
One of the most fundamental tests for modern democracies is maintaining the balance between security and freedom. It is legitimate and necessary for states to provide security; however, the continuous curtailment of freedoms on the grounds of security creates a situation that contradicts the very raison d’être of democratic regimes.
The security policies implemented in Turkey during NATO summits and international diplomatic organizations constitute a concrete example of precisely this contradiction. Turning cities into vast security corridors, severely restricting transportation, closing public spaces, and besieging the daily lives of citizens with extraordinary measures cannot be regarded as mere technical security precautions. They are also practices that reveal how the political power defines the state citizen relationship.
The picture that emerges is striking: while the state does not hesitate to restrict the sphere of freedom of its own citizens in order to ensure the security of international alliances, it treats the resulting social costs as a secondary matter. This situation is not merely a security preference but also a governing mentality.
Securitization and the Normalization of the State of Exception
The securitization theory developed by the Copenhagen School is highly explanatory for understanding contemporary politics. According to this approach, by defining certain issues as security problems, governments can step outside normal democratic processes and legitimize practices that would be unacceptable under ordinary conditions.
The security atmosphere created around international summits in Turkey constitutes a typical example of this mechanism. As the security discourse expands, the sphere of freedom contracts. As the perception of threat widens, state intervention increases. What ultimately emerges is not the protection of security but the installation of a security logic at the very center of social life.
This is precisely what Giorgio Agamben described as the “normalization of the state of exception.” Extraordinary measures that were once implemented temporarily become routinized over time, and citizens become subject to ever increasing surveillance.
This is one of the greatest dangers for democratic regimes: that states of exception cease to be exceptions and become the very form of governance.
Whom Is the State For?
One of the most fundamental questions in the history of political thought is this: why does the state exist? The common point of the extensive literature stretching from Hobbes to Locke, from Rousseau to Rawls, is clear. The legitimacy of the state derives from its citizens. The primary duty of the state is also to protect the rights, security, and welfare of its citizens.
For this reason, the first responsibility of a democratic government is not to NATO delegations, foreign statesmen, or international bureaucratic structures, but to its own people.
It is precisely for this reason that the security policies implemented during NATO summits bring along a debate on legitimacy. Because the picture that emerges raises serious questions regarding the state’s order of priorities.
If a government affects the daily lives of millions of citizens to extraordinary extents in order to ensure the smooth functioning of international organizations, what must be questioned here is not only the security policy but the political priorities themselves.
To the extent that the state ceases to be the servant of the citizen and transforms into an apparatus that disposes over the citizen, it begins to lose its democratic character.
Being More NATOist Than NATO: The Perception of Political Dependency
The expression “more NATOist than NATO,” long used in Turkish public discourse, is not a simple slogan. This expression represents a deep rooted critique of the relationship between the government’s foreign policy preferences and national sovereignty.
The essence of the critique is this: Turkey’s ruling elites at times do not show the same sensitivity toward their own citizens that they show toward international alliances.
This situation becomes visible not only in the field of foreign policy but also in domestic security practices. The picture that emerges during NATO summits strengthens the conviction that while the state fulfills its international obligations, it relegates the burdens placed on the citizen to the background.
The essence of the concept of sovereignty is that the state is primarily responsible to its own people. If citizens constantly face restrictions due to international organizations and are forced to pay the price for this, the question of how the concept of sovereignty is interpreted in practice begins to be asked.
Open Air Prison: The Curtailment of Public Space
Democracy does not consist of elections alone. Democracy is also a social order in which people can move freely, use public space without hindrance, and sustain their daily lives without state intervention.
However, security oriented governing mentalities increasingly constrict public space.
The panorama that emerges during NATO summits means, for many citizens, that cities are temporarily transformed into high security zones. Transportation networks are disrupted, certain areas are closed off to access, and public mobility is severely restricted.
For this reason, the “open air prison” analogy is not merely a rhetorical exaggeration but emerges as a political metaphor that describes the intense state control over public space.
A citizen feeling like a guest in their own city is an alarming situation for democratic governance. The duty of the state is not to distance the citizen from public space but to provide the conditions in which they can live freely.
The Erosion of the Principle of Proportionality
In constitutional democracies, one of the fundamental principles limiting state power is proportionality. The principle of proportionality necessitates that every step taken by the state be necessary, appropriate, and proportionate. The essence of the democratic state of law lies precisely here.
However, when it comes to security, the principle of proportionality is often pushed into the background. The absolutization of the goal of security renders the boundaries of state intervention indistinct.
Yet, in a democratic state of law, security is a means, not an end. The end is to ensure the continuation of a free society.
Mentalities that attempt to produce security by eroding freedoms end up damaging both freedom and democratic legitimacy.
The Crisis of Democratic Legitimacy
Political powers do not obtain legitimacy merely by winning elections. Legitimacy is also related to the trust that the citizen feels toward the state. Citizens support the government to the extent that they believe the state protects them. In contrast, when they begin to perceive the state’s priorities as distant from their own needs, legitimacy begins to erode.
The debates that form around NATO summits point precisely to this point. The essence of the debate is not the technical dimension of security measures but for whom and in whose name the state acts.
Practices that impose heavy burdens on the daily lives of citizens widen the psychological distance between the state and society.
As this distance grows, the sense of democratic representation weakens, and the relationship of trust between the governed and the governors erodes.
Conclusion: Sacrificing Freedom in the Name of Security
In democratic societies, the greatness of a state is measured not by the harshness of its security measures but by its capacity to protect freedoms.
The security policies that emerge in the context of NATO summits bring to the fore a serious debate about the state’s priorities. A security mentality that curtails the sphere of citizens’ freedom, besieges public life with extraordinary measures, and treats social costs as secondary is problematic from the standpoint of democratic legitimacy.
The true power of a state is revealed not in its capacity to protect foreign delegations but in its will to protect the rights of its own citizens.
When the balance between security and freedom is disrupted, it is not only fundamental rights that are harmed; the moral and political foundations of the democratic regime also begin to erode.
For this reason, the real question is this: does the state produce security to protect its citizen, or does it restrict the citizen’s freedom in the name of producing security?
From the perspective of democratic politics, this question still awaits an answer.
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Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
Aarhus University, 1997
Independent Researcher
Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures.
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