The international security environment in the second half of the 2020s is witnessing one of the most complex and multi-layered crises of the post-Cold War era. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally shaken the security architecture in Europe, while the concept of nuclear deterrence has once again taken center stage in alliance strategies. In this context, the possibility that the United States might expand its nuclear sharing arrangement and deploy its nuclear weapons closer to Russia’s border, which was the subject of a Financial Times report in June 2026, is being assessed as a harbinger of a new era in transatlantic security relations.
This development has come to the fore simultaneously with the US administration’s decisions to reduce its conventional military presence in Europe. The Pentagon’s decision in May 2026 to withdraw 5,000 troops from Germany has heightened concerns among European allies regarding Washington’s long-term security commitments. The US administration views the expansion of the nuclear umbrella as a balancing factor to compensate for this gap and to avoid compromising deterrence.
US Plans to Expand the Nuclear Sharing Mechanism
NATO’s Nuclear Sharing mechanism is a structure developed during the Cold War era that allows non-nuclear weapon state allies to participate in the alliance’s nuclear planning. Under this mechanism, US nuclear warheads are deployed at air bases on the territory of allied countries, but the control of the weapons remains in the hands of the United States. The countries currently included in this system are Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Within this scope, an estimated 60 to 70 B61 type tactical nuclear bombs are located at Turkey’s Incirlik Air Base.
According to a report published by the Financial Times in June 2026, the US administration is considering expanding this existing structure by deploying more “Dual-Capable Aircraft” (DCA), fighter jets that can perform both conventional and nuclear missions, in more allied countries. In this context, Poland and the Baltic states on NATO’s eastern flank are shown among the most willing candidates to host new DCA bases. Polish President Andrzej Duda has reiterated his call for the deployment of nuclear weapons in his country in previous statements, arguing that this step would make Poland more secure against Russia. Duda particularly cited Russia’s decision in 2023 to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus as a precedent, emphasizing that the US should take a similar step.
Polish Defense Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz confirmed in a statement in June 2026 that the US is conducting talks with European allies on expanding nuclear sharing, but he noted that due to the sensitivity of the issue, details would be announced through official NATO channels. These talks are expected to be addressed at the NATO Defense Ministers meeting in Brussels on June 18, 2026.
There are two main motives behind this expansion plan. The first is the need to reassure allies in the face of the US reducing its conventional military presence in Europe. The Trump administration advocates that Europe must assume primary responsibility for its own conventional defense, while it guarantees the continuity of nuclear deterrence. The second is the necessity to enhance deterrence in response to Russia’s war in Ukraine and its deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus. Western countries argue that Russia’s actions have increased the need for stronger deterrence.
The Expiration of the New START Treaty and the Strategic Vacuum
One of the most important background elements of the US plans to expand nuclear sharing is the expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the last nuclear arms control agreement between the two countries, on February 5, 2026. This treaty, signed in 2010, limited both sides to a maximum of 1,550 nuclear warheads deployed on 700 missiles and bombers ready for use. The treaty was extended for five years in 2021, but with the end of that extension in February 2026, for the first time in over half a century, there are no binding legal limits on the strategic nuclear arsenals of the US and Russia.
United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres described this situation as “a grave moment for international peace and security” and warned that the risk of nuclear weapons being used is at its highest level in decades. Guterres called on Washington and Moscow to return to the negotiating table for a new agreement without delay. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced in September 2025 that he was ready to adhere to nuclear weapons limits for another year and invited Washington to take the same step, but this call was not reciprocated by the US administration.
This legal vacuum is a factor directly influencing US nuclear deployment plans. The elimination of the verification mechanisms provided by the treaty means that both sides have greater room for maneuver to increase and redeploy their nuclear arsenals. This situation makes the possibility of the US increasing its nuclear presence in Europe even more strategically significant.
NATO’s Nuclear Posture and the 2026 Ankara Summit
The future of NATO’s nuclear policy constitutes one of the most important agenda items of the NATO Leaders Summit to be held in Ankara on July 7-8, 2026. This summit, announced by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on August 19, 2025, will be the second NATO summit hosted by Turkey after the 2004 Istanbul Summit.
Within the scope of summit preparations, NATO’s annual Nuclear Policy Symposium was held in Istanbul in April 2026. At this symposium, attended by 150 experts from across the alliance, issues such as the reliability of nuclear deterrence, arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation were addressed. Mark Rutte, who participated virtually, emphasized that it is critically important for NATO’s nuclear deterrence to remain reliable, safe, and effective in times of great instability. Rutte also stated that as the Ankara Summit approaches, “critical decisions must be made on how to further adapt NATO’s nuclear posture to adjust to the deteriorating security environment.”
Another significant dimension of the Ankara Summit is the transformation of NATO’s defense spending targets into concrete capabilities. At the 2025 Hague Summit, allies decided to allocate 5 percent of GDP to defense by 2035, with 3.5 percent of that to be allocated to core defense capabilities. The Ankara Summit is expected to provide guidance on converting these commitments into concrete military capacities.
Turkey’s Role in Nuclear Sharing and Incirlik Base
Turkey is one of the oldest and most important members of NATO’s nuclear sharing mechanism. According to a report by EDAM (Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies), Turkey is one of five countries where a total of 200 American tactical nuclear weapons are deployed across six European air bases of NATO. The estimated 60 to 70 B61 nuclear bombs located at Incirlik Air Base have been stationed in the region since the Cold War era.
Turkey’s approach to this nuclear presence is based on a complex equation with strategic and symbolic dimensions. As the EDAM report notes, for Turkey, the presence of American tactical nuclear weapons is a vital symbol demonstrating the Alliance’s continued commitment to the transatlantic security partnership. In the eyes of Turkish security officials, these weapons are seen as a status symbol, and their presence is believed to reinforce the American-Turkish defense partnership. Despite growing opposition from other NATO countries, Turkey supports retaining the nuclear weapons on its soil and hopes that nuclear stewardship will continue as part of the alliance’s burden-sharing principle.
The 2026 Ankara Summit is closely related, for Turkey, not only to a security meeting but also to economic and defense industry goals. Turkey sees this summit as an opportunity to increase arms sales and joint production agreements with Western markets. Turkey’s defense exports have more than tripled since 2021, reaching 10 billion dollars in 2024, with defense exports to Europe and the US rising nearly fourfold to 5.6 billion dollars during this period. Turkey, which supplies 65 percent of the armed unmanned aerial vehicles used in the world, aims to showcase its defense industry capabilities to its allies and establish new collaborations on the occasion of the summit.
Strategic Reflections and Risks of Expanding Nuclear Deterrence
The US plans to expand nuclear sharing bring with them a series of strategic risks and uncertainties. First and foremost, deploying nuclear weapons closer to Russia’s border carries the potential to be perceived by Moscow as a direct threat and to increase the risk of mutual escalation. Russian Chief of General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov stated in previous remarks that NATO’s military presence near Russia’s borders had “significantly increased” and that the proportion of modern weapons in strategic nuclear forces had reached 92 percent, emphasizing that if the US were to resume nuclear testing, “appropriate retaliatory measures would follow.”
Secondly, with the expiration of the New START treaty and the absence of any verification mechanism, conditions are set for both sides to enter into a scaled-up competition in increasing their nuclear arsenals. Experts warn that this situation could trigger a process reminiscent of the arms race of the Cold War era.
Thirdly, the expansion of nuclear sharing creates a potential area of tension with the fundamental principles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The NPT’s structure, which provides security guarantees to non-nuclear states in return for their commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons, runs the risk of erosion with the proliferation of US nuclear weapon deployments on allied territories. It is assessed that the tendency of regional powers to pursue their own nuclear programs may especially increase.
It can be said that the Ankara Summit is a critical opportunity to manage these risks and to forge a common nuclear posture within the alliance. NATO officials emphasize that the alliance is a defensive organization and that nuclear deterrence should be seen solely as a balancing element against Russia’s actions. However, the paradoxical nature of the US increasing its nuclear presence while reducing its conventional troop presence, and the roles European allies will assume in this new balance, seem likely to be the subject of intense debate within the alliance in the coming period.
Conclusion
The possibility of the United States deploying its nuclear weapons to areas closer to Russia’s border points to one of the most significant strategic transformations of the post-Cold War era. This move is not merely a consequence of the US reducing its conventional military presence in Europe; it is also the product of multidimensional factors such as the legal vacuum created by the expiration of the New START treaty, the growing security concerns of eastern flank countries, and changes in Russia’s nuclear posture.
The 2026 Ankara NATO Summit will be a decisive juncture in shaping this new nuclear posture. The needs expressed at the Nuclear Policy Symposium in Istanbul and Mark Rutte’s calls to “adapt to the deteriorating security environment” indicate that the decisions to be taken at the summit may involve not just tactical-level adjustments but fundamental changes in the alliance’s strategic doctrine.
Turkey, with both its existing nuclear presence at Incirlik Base and its rapidly developing defense industry capabilities post-2024, is positioning itself as one of the alliance’s important actors in this new era. Ankara’s approach to nuclear sharing preserves its character as a status and partnership symbol that goes beyond traditional security concerns.
Nevertheless, the risks accompanying the expanding nuclear deterrence strategy should not be ignored. The risk of mutual escalation, the absence of arms control mechanisms, and the potential for nuclear proliferation stand as the fundamental challenges the alliance will have to confront in the coming period. For these risks to be manageable, NATO must address its new nuclear posture in a holistic manner that includes diplomatic and legal dimensions beyond a purely military deterrence perspective.
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Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
Aarhus University, 1997
Independent Researcher
Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures.
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