Turkish Forum

Category: Middle East & Africa

  • Freshwater, Bitter Prescription: How Israel’s Desalination Miracle Became a Strategic Trap

    Freshwater, Bitter Prescription: How Israel’s Desalination Miracle Became a Strategic Trap

    Ever since the founding of Israel, one of the most fundamental elements shaping its national security strategy has been water. Historians and political scientists have repeatedly stressed that one of the underlying dynamics of the 1967 war was control of the Jordan River basin. For decades, the level of the Sea of Galilee and the state of the coastal aquifers have been among the most sensitive items on governments’ agendas. This chronic scarcity pushed Israel to seek a radical and bold solution, eventually leading the country to build gigantic technological facilities that convert seawater into drinking water.

    Starting with the first large-scale plant commissioned in Ashkelon in 2005, the process has culminated in five massive complexes lined up along the Mediterranean coastline. With the Sorek, Hadera, Palmachim, and Ashdod plants coming online, Israel now meets roughly eighty-five to ninety percent of its national drinking and municipal water from this centralized system. Internationally, this transformation has frequently been hailed as a “water miracle” and held up as a model for arid geographies. Yet this engineering triumph has concentrated an existential national resource at an extremely limited number of points, creating a perilously new and deep state of strategic vulnerability.

    The risk posed by geographical concentration constitutes a vital threat, especially in the context of the asymmetric warfare doctrine developed by Iran and its proxy forces. The rapid proliferation of precision-guided missile and unmanned aerial vehicle technologies in the region has moved strategic civilian infrastructure—once considered safe behind the front lines—directly into the line of fire. Hezbollah’s threats targeting Haifa, Hamas’s rocket attacks reaching Ashkelon, and the Houthi assaults on Eilat from Yemen are concrete manifestations of this new geo-strategic reality. At this juncture, water desalination plants turn into priceless strategic targets for an adversary seeking to strike the lifeline that sustains a nation.

    The Geographic and Structural Vulnerability of Centralized Infrastructure

    Almost all of Israel’s desalination capacity is situated along a narrow coastal corridor of roughly one hundred and fifty kilometers, stretching from the Lebanese border to Gaza. This geographic constriction paints an extremely risky picture in the face of modern warfare’s requirements. The strip falls well within the range of missile and drone attacks that Hezbollah could launch from southern Lebanon and Hamas and Islamic Jihad from Gaza. The short distances between the facilities significantly increase the likelihood that simultaneous or successive strikes could paralyze the entire system.

    The facilities in question are sensitive not only because of their locations but also due to their structural characteristics. The heart of a reverse osmosis plant consists of high-pressure pumps, sensitive membrane systems, and complex water intake and outflow infrastructure. A munition hitting any one of these components could cause damage that halts production at the plant for months. When spare parts supply and repair times are taken into account, even a single successful attack on one plant would inevitably trigger cascading effects on the national water grid. In a scenario where the two largest plants—Sorek and Hadera—are knocked out simultaneously, the country’s water supply could reach a collapse point within just a few days.

    Another point that must be underlined here is that the old strategic reserves no longer have the capacity to carry such a burden. The Sea of Galilee and the mountain aquifers, which were once fallbacks in water crises, have been severely degraded by years of over-extraction, population growth, and agricultural policies dependent on desalinated water. Because the system is built on the assumption that the desalination plants will run continuously at full capacity, natural sources have ceased to be a “backup” and have become, in effect, a complementary part of daily consumption. Therefore, in the event of an attack on the plants, there is practically no secure water reservoir to fall back on.

    When all these factors come together, the fate of Israel’s water security becomes tied to a handful of industrial facilities and the success of the air defense systems tasked with protecting them. Air defense systems, however, can reach saturation point, especially in the face of intense and multi-directional attacks. Although Iron Dome and other layered defense components achieve a statistically high interception rate, they can never guarantee one hundred percent protection. A few munitions that manage to slip through could cease to be a statistical anomaly and become the trigger for a national catastrophe.

    Capability and Intent Analysis of Asymmetric Threat Actors

    The most concrete and immediate threat to Israel’s water infrastructure originates from the network of proxies backed by Iran. Hezbollah, the most critical link in this network, has multiplied its military capability both quantitatively and qualitatively since the 2006 Lebanon War. According to various military intelligence sources, the organization’s inventory includes more than one hundred and fifty thousand rockets and missiles. Within this arsenal, the presence of precision-guided munitions, particularly Iranian-made Fateh-110 and M-600 missiles, poses a lethal threat to fixed strategic facilities with known coordinates. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s past explicit designation of ammonia and petrochemical plants in Haifa as targets reveals the depth of the organization’s strategic planning against Israel’s civilian infrastructure nodes.

    To the south, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, although more limited in range and accuracy, directly threaten the desalination plant in Ashkelon. Rocket attacks directed at this area during the post-October 7, 2023, conflicts demonstrated how easily the plant can be targeted. Even though the Iron Dome system destroys many threats in mid-air, saturation attacks, particularly with short-range and mass munitions launches, have the potential to overwhelm the defense. Moreover, a coordinated wave of attacks launched simultaneously from the Lebanese and Gazan fronts would force Israel to divide its air defense resources, thereby increasing the system’s fragility.

    Iran’s large-scale missile and drone attack on Israel from its own territory in April 2024 transported the threat spectrum to a new dimension. In that attack, Iran directly and openly declared to the world its capability and intent to strike the country’s military and strategic infrastructure. Although allied air forces and Israel’s own defense systems neutralized the bulk of the attack, the event indisputably proved that Iran has reached the technological maturity to execute precision strikes against Israel’s vital nodes from hundreds of kilometers away. The fact that publications from strategic research centers affiliated with Iran’s Revolutionary Guards specifically scrutinize Israel’s water infrastructure among “sensitive pressure points” completes the theoretical framework of this threat.

    The threat is not limited solely to missiles and drones. Sabotage actions that could come from the sea represent another risk dimension that must not be overlooked. The seawater intake structures of the desalination plants are connected to pipelines situated relatively offshore. Sabotage of these underwater structures carried out by divers or unmanned underwater vehicles could completely halt the plant’s water intake. Given Hezbollah’s and Iran’s investments in naval commando units, such a scenario is not unrealistic. Likewise, cyber-attacks targeting the control systems of the water grid are another asymmetric vector that could disable the plants without physical destruction.

    The Water-Energy Nexus: Two Breaking Points of a Single Chain

    The greatest quandary of reverse osmosis technology is that it is an extremely energy-intensive process. Israel’s desalination plants require roughly eight to ten percent of the country’s national electricity generation. This immense energy demand chains water security directly and inseparably to energy security. In practical terms, this means that the electricity grid and the energy sources feeding it must operate uninterruptedly for the water taps to flow. A severe rupture in energy supply is capable of stopping the water supply overnight.

    Israel’s energy generation, meanwhile, has become largely dependent over the last decade on the natural gas fields discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean. Giant offshore platforms such as Tamar and Leviathan supply nearly all of the country’s natural gas needs. This situation ties the fate of the energy supply to offshore infrastructure that is exceedingly difficult to protect. Hezbollah’s anti-ship missiles, Iran’s submarine capabilities, or even a simple explosive-laden boat attack are among the elements that could threaten these platforms. Hezbollah’s drone attack targeting natural gas facilities off the coast of Haifa in 2024 is a concrete example of this threat.

    Onshore energy infrastructure exhibits similar fragility. A single major facility like the Orot Rabin power plant in Haifa alone provides more than one-fifth of Israel’s total electricity generation. A successful strike on this power station would create a massive supply gap in the grid. Even if smart grid management systems are activated, a loss of this scale inevitably necessitates load-shedding operations. And in load-shedding, the first to be disconnected are the large industrial consumers that rank behind hospitals and military bases in terms of strategic priority—namely, the desalination plants. This vicious cycle between energy and water constitutes the most critical and delicate node of Israel’s national resilience.

    This dependency chain is not one-directional either. The energy generation facilities themselves also require large amounts of water for cooling purposes. Desalinated water is increasingly used in the cooling systems of coastal power plants. Thus, a disruption in energy supply threatens water, while a disruption in water threatens energy. This mutual and circular dependency demonstrates how quickly and destructively a domino effect could propagate in a disaster scenario. An attack on a single facility could, within a very short time, lead to the simultaneous collapse of water and energy supply.

    Layers of Supply Chain and Environmental Vulnerability

    Beyond the military and energy dimensions of the strategic vulnerability, two additional, less visible but equally critical layers exist: supply chain dependency and environmental threats. Keeping a reverse osmosis plant operational requires not only energy but also high-tech membranes that need constant renewal, specialized chemicals, and sensitive spare parts. Almost all of this equipment and consumables are imported. Membrane production is concentrated globally in the hands of a few companies, with Israel heavily dependent on manufacturers in the United States, Japan, and South Korea.

    This dependency renders national water security defenseless against external factors, completely independent of domestic military capacity. The threat to maritime trade routes by Iran or the Houthis during a prolonged regional conflict could disrupt the flow of critical materials. The Houthis’ attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea have proven just how realistic such a blockade is. When spare membrane stocks are exhausted, the efficiency of the plants drops rapidly; poorly treated water causes corrosion within the system, and eventually the plants may be completely disabled.

    Environmental threats constitute another layer of fragility originating from nature’s own dynamics—one that is difficult to predict and prevent. Rising seawater temperatures in the Mediterranean, driven by climate change, lead to population explosions of jellyfish swarms and the formation of massive mucilage (sea snot) bodies. These biological masses can clog the seawater intake filters of desalination plants within minutes, completely halting production. In the past, the Ashkelon and Hadera plants were forced into emergency shutdowns several times due to such environmental events. A national water crisis could be triggered solely by a natural occurrence, without any intentional military attack.

    In addition, rising sea levels due to climate change pose a long-term existential threat to coastal infrastructure. Pipelines, pumping stations, and the substructures of the facilities are sensitive to rising sea levels and associated coastal erosion. Moreover, heavy maritime traffic and oil and gas exploration activities in the Eastern Mediterranean keep the risk of a major oil spill constantly alive. Such a spill could render seawater intakes unusable for months, cutting the plants off from the outside world, much like a blockade. All these layers demonstrate that the vulnerability of desalination infrastructure rests on a much more complex threat matrix than enemy weapons alone.

    The Dilemma of Societal Resilience and Agricultural Dependency

    Over the last two decades, Israel’s water abundance has created a structural habit and dependency of water consumption within society and the economy. The uninterrupted and relatively cheap water provided by desalination plants has fundamentally transformed the agricultural sector, industrial production, and household consumption patterns. Luxury consumption (swimming pools, expansive lawns), water-intensive agricultural products, and landscaping arrangements requiring constant irrigation have become normalized. This situation has fixed societal habits and economic structures upon the assumption that the current supply will never be interrupted.

    The agricultural sector, in particular, is the most critical link in this dependency. Using its world-renowned drip irrigation technologies, Israel has turned the Negev Desert into fertile agricultural lands. However, this modern agriculture is entirely indexed to a continuous and reliable water supply. If the plants were offline for more than forty-eight hours, it would not merely leave cities without water; it would instantly collapse agricultural production reliant on high-tech greenhouses and irrigation systems. This would rapidly lead to a food supply crisis and empty grocery shelves. The simultaneous occurrence of water and food crises is one of the most dangerous scenarios threatening social order and internal security.

    Simulations by the National Emergency Management Authority foresee that a prolonged water cutoff would severely test societal resilience. Hospitals would become unable to perform vital procedures such as dialysis and sterilization. Industrial facilities would halt production. Fire-fighting systems would lose water pressure. All these factors could create a mutually reinforcing spiral of chaos. Although Israeli society has grown accustomed to the comfort brought by technological progress, its psychological and logistical preparedness for water scarcity has seriously eroded since the drought days of the past.

    This picture also invalidates the idea of preserving natural water sources as strategic reserves. Because even when the desalination plants are operational, the Sea of Galilee and the underground aquifers are strained to meet consumption, they cannot be allowed to recover. A return to the “austerity” and water rationing policies seen in old drought periods would be far more painful and chaotic than expected, as both infrastructure and habits have evolved into an entirely different reality. In short, the success story has not increased the system’s flexibility and resilience but rather its intolerance of fragility.

    Conclusion

    The story of Israel overcoming water scarcity by desalinating seawater has been recorded as an impressive triumph of technology and human will over nature. However, the centralized and complex system built by this triumph has simultaneously transformed the country’s most vital resource into a target that is exceedingly difficult to protect. Absolute dependence on a handful of facilities along the Mediterranean coast has created a strategic quandary concerning national survival in a geography where asymmetric threats are becoming increasingly sophisticated.

    The depth of this quandary lies in the fact that the water infrastructure is not merely a target on its own, but is enmeshed in a relationship of mutual dependency with energy systems and global supply chains. Protecting water requires protecting energy, and protecting energy requires protecting offshore gas platforms and giant coastal power plants. A successful attack on any link in this chain has the potential to collapse the entire system through a domino effect. The doctrine of the Iran-led axis of resistance is built precisely on seeking out and exploiting such sensitive nodes. The April 2024 attack and the continuously evolving capabilities of proxy forces have moved this threat from the realm of theory into a concrete and urgent security matter.

    That said, policy options to reduce vulnerability do exist, though none are easy or quick to implement. The urgent reconstitution of strategic water reserves and the replenishment of aquifers through artificial recharge methods are imperative. Maximizing the physical protection of the plants and, in particular, enhancing security protocols for underwater intake structures are necessary. More importantly, increasing the share of distributed and renewable sources such as solar energy in electricity generation could reduce the risk of a single-point collapse in the water-energy nexus. On-site backup power generation capacity integrated into each facility is also of vital importance.

    In the final analysis, Israel’s water miracle lays bare the inherent risks of modern states’ understanding of national security based on complex technological systems. Every great leap in technology, alongside the problems it solves, also produces new, often unforeseen, vulnerabilities. In Israel’s specific case, the genius that succeeded in creating water in the desert is now fighting a war to protect that water. The fate of this war will depend not only on the success of Iron Dome or Iron Beam but also on how honestly and courageously strategic planning can address this multi-layered fragility.

    References

    1. Siegel, S. M. (2015). Let There Be Water: Israel’s Solution for a Water-Starved World. Thomas Dunne Books.
    2. Israel Water Authority (2024). National Water System Overview and Desalination Capacity Report. water.gov.il
    3. INSS – Institute for National Security Studies (2023). The Vulnerability of Israel’s Critical Infrastructure in a Multi-Front War. Tel Aviv University.
    4. Reuters (2024). “Israel’s water infrastructure potentially in crosshairs as conflict deepens.” 15 April 2024.
    5. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (2024). Hezbollah’s Precision Guided Missile Threat to Israeli Infrastructure. Policy Note No. 118.
    6. Haaretz (2023). “Desalination nation: How Israel’s water miracle became its biggest strategic vulnerability.” 22 December 2023.
    7. Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (2025). The Water-Energy Nexus in Israel’s National Security. Bar-Ilan University.
    8. Tal, A. (2023). “From Scarcity to Surplus: Israel’s Desalination Gamble.” Water Policy, 25(3), 312-329.
    9. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Strategic Research Center (2022). “Asymmetric warfare and critical infrastructure targeting in the Eastern Mediterranean.” (Open source intelligence report).
    10. UNEP – United Nations Environment Programme (2023). Climate Change and Infrastructure Vulnerability in the Eastern Mediterranean.
    11. Grey, D. & Sadoff, C. W. (2007). “Sink or Swim? Water security for growth and development.” Water Policy, 9(6), 545-571.
    12. Arreguín-Toft, I. (2005). How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. Cambridge University Press.
    13. Hussey, K. & Pittock, J. (2012). “The Energy-Water Nexus: Managing the Links between Energy and Water for a Sustainable Future.” Ecology and Society, 17(1).
    14. Wolf, A. T. (1995). Hydropolitics along the Jordan River: Scarce Water and its Impact on the Arab-Israeli Conflict. United Nations University Press.

    Sefa Yürükel

    Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
    Aarhus University, 1997
    Independent Researcher
    Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures

  • The Collapse of Sandcastles: The West Asian Map Iran Redrew in Four Days and the Historic Defeat of the USA

    The Collapse of Sandcastles: The West Asian Map Iran Redrew in Four Days and the Historic Defeat of the USA

    The world usually expects geopolitical earthquakes to occur at the end of long-drawn-out processes. However, sometimes the flow of history changes at a speed that will shatter everyone’s preconceptions within just a few days. We are currently witnessing exactly such a moment. The emerging military picture reveals how the hegemony the USA has built in West Asia for over thirty years was shattered by Iran in an unbelievably short period of four days. This is not merely a military defeat; it is also the story of the definitive and irreversible end of a superpower’s regional ambitions.

    The Sudden Collapse of the Strategic Balance

    The situation is crystal clear: The USA is suffering one of the greatest defeats in its history. The gravity of this judgment stems from the results of the comprehensive, large-scale, and highly determined destruction operation launched by Iran against the massive American military bases in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. To reference Pearl Harbor, the USA has never seen destruction on this scale from any enemy in a conventional war until today. Described as the world’s most expensive and most valuable military facilities, built over decades and costing trillions of dollars, these bases are being abandoned, burned, and destroyed one by one. The sudden incapacitation of advanced technology radars worth hundreds of millions of dollars symbolizes not only a material collapse but also the bankruptcy of the USA’s strategic mind.

    The Information Blackout and Cover-Up of the Shock

    One of the most terrifying aspects of this new war is the deep information blackout that has descended upon it. While thirty-five years ago during the First Gulf War, images provided by smart bombs and cameras flooded the screens, today we see almost no video. This censorship is the greatest proof of the gravity of the situation. The Pentagon’s doctrine of “shock and awe” has been replaced by an effort to cover up the shock and awe being experienced. The fact that the USA, touted as the world’s largest air force, cannot achieve air superiority over Tehran or any other Iranian city even on the fourth day of the war, and more importantly, that images of American planes cannot even be served, clearly shows how hopeless a point the military situation has evolved to. The fact that American soldiers cannot even dream of setting foot on Iranian soil reveals the nature of this war.

    Strategies of Desperation: The Escalation Trap

    One of the most concrete indicators of this hopeless picture is the incredible proposals coming from the Trump administration as early as the fourth day. The idea of providing military escort to oil tankers leaving the Persian Gulf means sending American ships into the Strait of Hormuz, within range of Iran’s thousands of missiles, which is a suicidal decision. It is known that Iran has been preparing this region as a trap for decades. Even more alarming is the proposal to invade Iran by arming Kurdish militias. Anyone looking at Iran’s vast geography immediately grasps the impossibility of invading this country, whether with a militia force of ten thousand or a hundred thousand. Iran would simply swallow such a force.

    The Anatomy of an Impossible Victory

    The US and Israel have already lost this war in a military sense. Of course, they can kill millions of civilians in their homes and level buildings with their powerful bombs; however, they cannot win this war. Iran’s military infrastructure and weapons are deployed deep underground all over the country. Neither the Americans nor especially the Israelis have a chance to reach them. They have no chance of finishing what they started.

    When all this is over, the USA will never be able to return to West Asia. There will be no American military presence left in the Middle East. History will write this moment as the end of an era. Iran, astonishingly, managed to expand its area of military superiority in the region within four days and buried a superpower’s decades-long investment in its ashes. The sandcastles have collapsed; nothing will ever be the same again.

    The Deepening of the Escalation Trap: The Absence of a Plan B

    What really needs to be questioned at this point is why the mental map that led the USA to this total strategic collapse still hasn’t changed. The proposals for escorting tankers and invading with Kurdish militias, put forward on the fourth day, are a painful confession that the Pentagon and the White House still have no viable Plan B. This situation, referred to as an “escalation trap” in military literature, is defined by one side continuing to escalate a war it is losing simply because it cannot find an exit strategy. The moment the USA risks its navy to save its presence in the Persian Gulf, it will have offered not only its land bases but also its naval power to Iran’s asymmetric fire. The geographical structure of the Strait of Hormuz is too narrow to allow maneuvering space for an aircraft carrier battle group; these waters are a trap area that Iran has been building layer upon layer for decades. Deliberately entering this trap can be explained not by strategic reason, but only by a kind of gambling blindness caused by desperation.

    The Bankruptcy of Intelligence: The Unseen Threat

    A more serious reflection of the same blindness is the intelligence failure. For decades, the USA portrayed Iran’s military capacity as “isolatable” and “limited.” However, Iran’s ballistic missile program, cruise missile inventory, and swarm drone technology in particular have shown a leap that American intelligence reports failed to foresee for years. The bases receiving hits one after another within four days is proof of how much Iran has refined its target intelligence and advanced its satellite-based damage assessment capability. This is not a random rain of missiles, but a military operation planned and executed with surgical precision. US intelligence either could not see or did not want to see this capability increase; both situations lead to the same outcome: the bankruptcy of strategic intelligence.

    The End of the Doctrine of Air Dominance

    The failure to see an American plane in the skies of Tehran even on the fourth day of the war is the clearest indicator of how the concept of air superiority has become meaningless in the region’s conditions. The US Air Force had built its entire doctrine of the last thirty years on “air dominance.” Yet Iran, with its integrated air defense systems, passive defense infrastructure, and surface-to-surface strike capability, has rendered this doctrine obsolete. The inability of American warplanes to enter Iranian airspace is not only a technical failure; it is proof of how the USA’s entire military paradigm can be overcome by a regional power. This picture creates a shock effect that will fundamentally shake the Pentagon’s future budget requests and weapons programs. The trillion-dollar F-35 program has been rendered non-functional in the region against Iran’s much lower-cost asymmetric capacity.

    Israel’s Fragile Solitude

    In the shadow of all these developments, Israel’s strategic position is perhaps the most fragile point. Israel built its security doctrine upon the US military umbrella in the region. The evaporation of this umbrella in four days leaves Israel facing not only Iran but also Iran’s network of influence alone. Hezbollah’s precision-guided munition inventory, the Houthis’ ballistic missile capacity, and Iranian-backed militias in Syria increase the risk of Israel being dragged into a multi-front war of attrition. Israel’s military doctrine is based on short-duration wars conducted on enemy territory aiming for decisive results. However, this new equation forces Israel into a long-term and attritional defensive war on its own territory. The pressure of such a war on Israel’s economic and social fabric could be far more devastating than the military losses.

    The New Reality for the Gulf Monarchies

    The Gulf monarchies, meanwhile, are watching this new era in horror. Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Doha see that the security premium they have paid to the USA for decades has evaporated in an instant. These countries’ entry into a rapid normalization process with Iran is no longer a choice but an existential necessity. Indeed, Saudi Arabia’s softening of its condemnatory language towards Iran and activating diplomatic channels even on the fourth day of the war is the first sign of this necessity. The Arab states in the Persian Gulf have understood that the security myth the USA has been selling for decades has collapsed and have faced the reality of having to fend for themselves. This confrontation will inevitably open the door to regional security negotiations with Iran and the complete exclusion of the USA from the region.

    The Tombstone of the Unipolar Order

    History will record this moment as the tombstone of the post-Cold War order. The unipolar period that began with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 ended on the shores of the Persian Gulf, among burning American hangars and disabled Patriot batteries. Iran has not only driven the USA out of the region but has also presented the rest of the world with a new strategic model: proof that a regional power that invests in asymmetric capacity, establishes a deep defense infrastructure, and prepares patiently can shut out a superpower. This model will be taught in military academies as a template that will fundamentally change the military doctrines and geopolitical calculations of the coming decades.

    Conclusion: In the Aftermath of Destruction

    As the USA’s presence in West Asia comes to an end, what remains is not only wreckage but also a warning: No superpower has the luxury of underestimating geography, patience, and the asymmetric mind. The sandcastles have collapsed, and the dust from this destruction will not settle for many years to come.

    References

    1. Cordesman, A. H. (2023). Iran’s Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities: The Threat in the Northern Gulf. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
    2. Eisenstadt, M. (2022). The Iranian Way of War: Asymmetric Doctrine, Ballistic Missiles, and Proxy Networks. Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
    3. Farhi, F. (2024). “Iran’s Strategic Patience and the Reshaping of West Asian Security Architecture.” Middle East Journal, 78(2), 215–238.
    4. Gause, F. G. (2023). The End of the American Era in the Persian Gulf? Strategic Realignments After the Unipolar Moment. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
    5. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). (2024). The Military Balance 2024: Middle East and North Africa. London: Routledge.
    6. Jones, S. G. (2023). “Intelligence Failure and Surprise in the Missile Age: The Case of Iran’s Ballistic Program.” Studies in Intelligence, 67(1), 45–72.
    7. Kamrava, M. (2024). “The Collapse of External Security Guarantees: Gulf Monarchies and the Search for Autonomy.” Geopolitics, 29(3), 401–425.
    8. Krepinevich, A. F. (2022). The Origins of Precision: Strategic and Operational Implications of Guided Munitions. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.
    9. Nasr, V. (2023). “Iran’s Missile Power and the Restructuring of Middle Eastern Deterrence.” Foreign Affairs, 102(4), 88–104.
    10. Pollack, K. M. (2024). “America’s Vanishing Air Superiority: Lessons from the Fourth-Day Failure Over Tehran.” Journal of Strategic Studies, 47(2), 183–210.
    11. Saikal, A. (2023). Iran Rising: The Survival and Future of the Islamic Republic. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
    12. United States Department of Defense. (2024). Annual Report on Military Power of Iran (Unclassified Executive Summary). Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense.
    13. Wirtz, J. J. (2023). “Strategic Intelligence and the Asymmetric Threat: When Warning Fails.” Intelligence and National Security, 38(4), 512–530.
    14. Zelin, A. Y. (2024). “Hezbollah, the Houthis, and the Axis of Resistance: Proxies in an Era of Iranian Precision-Guided Warfare.” CTC Sentinel, 17(3), 22–34.

    Sefa Yürükel

    Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
    Aarhus University, 1997
    Independent Researcher
    Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures

  • To Say “Today, I am Iranian”

    To Say “Today, I am Iranian”

    If there is a designation that transcends a mere geographical term, pointing instead to the rupture moments of a civilization and the resistance reflex of collective memory, it is the Iranian plateau itself. This is a geography where the winds have blown throughout history, erasing the footprints of invasions, yet no conqueror has ever fully dominated its spirit. The armies of Alexander the Great passed through these lands, the swords of the Arab conquerors halted in the shadow of these mountains, and the Mongol whirlwinds burned and razed these cities. But after every destruction, like the Simurgh in Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh, Iran has known how to be reborn from its own ashes. This rebirth is not merely a political restoration, but also a matter of existential honor. That is precisely why, amid the sense of encirclement of modern times, saying “I am Iranian” has become not merely a passport affiliation, but an expression of an epistemological and physical stance against global domination.

    The fact that the epicenter of this resistance today is Tehran is neither a coincidence nor merely a product of geopolitical calculation. This situation is an inevitable manifestation of the “Neither East nor West” principle placed at the foundation of state reason following the collapse of the monarchy in 1979. This attitude, which pierces through the Westphalian order’s understanding of absolute sovereignty in international relations, far from isolating Iran, has turned it into a route of hope for oppressed geographies. This state, frequently defined by Western academic circles as a “loneliness syndrome,” is defined by the Iranian people and state reason as “strategic autonomy.” This reflex, developed against the borders drawn on the tables of the Great Powers and the norms they impose, has transformed Iran from being merely a nation-state into a carrier column for an idea, a school of resistance. No matter how heavy the burden this column carries, it turns into a badge of honor in the eyes of the region’s peoples.

    The geostrategic position of Iranian geography is both the greatest blessing and the heaviest burden of this resistance. Being at the very heart of the energy corridors stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean, and from the Central Asian steppes to the warm waters of the Persian Gulf, also brings with it the condition of being under constant siege. The imperial calculations carried out over Iranian oil throughout the twentieth century have opened irreparable wounds in the minds of the Iranian intellectual and politician. The place of the 1953 Mosaddegh Coup in memories is the most fundamental historical data explaining why Iranian foreign policy is so skeptical and proactive today. This coup bitterly taught the Iranian nation the chasm between the democracy rhetoric of Western powers and their interest-oriented intervention practices. That is why Iran today prefers to weave its own security perimeter with its own hands, rather than taking shelter under security umbrellas sewn with the thread of others.

    The person who says “I am Iranian” is the inheritor of this painful, yet equally proud, history. This heritage is not just a story left in the past, but the lifeblood of today’s military doctrines and strategic decisions. Specifically, the eight-year Iran-Iraq War reshaped the nerve endings of the Iranian nation. In those dark days, when a large part of the world sided behind Saddam Hussein and turned a blind eye to the use of chemical weapons, Iran managed to survive through its own means. This war taught Iran the following lesson: “If you do not establish your defense line beyond your borders, you will have to wage war inside your homes, at the cradles of your children.” The military and philosophical roots of the search for strategic depth, which Iran today describes as its geography of resistance, are hidden precisely in this ring of fire between 1980 and 1988.

    The Forward Defense Doctrine and the Construction of Strategic Depth

    Understanding Iran’s current military posture requires a comprehension that goes beyond classical war literature. Although Iran is not a superpower in the conventional sense, it has managed to position itself as an indispensable regional actor thanks to its asymmetric warfare doctrines and regional influence networks. The principle underlying this doctrine is the engagement and attrition of enemy forces thousands of kilometers away, on secondary fronts, before they can reach the Iranian mainland. This situation, which Western strategists refer to as the “Proxy Strategy,” is described in Iran’s discourse as the solidarity law of the “Axis of Islamic Resistance.” This strategy not only provides Iran with military deterrence but also gives it very strong leverage when sitting at the table in regional equations.

    The backbone of this military structure is formed by a training, logistics, and intelligence network shaped under the leadership of the Quds Force, affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Especially in the last two decades, advances in missile technologies and unmanned aerial vehicles have exponentially increased the striking power of this network. Thanks to its domestic defense industry developed under embargoes, Iran has reached a level of knowledge accumulation that enables it to transfer these capabilities to allied forces. This transfer is not merely about sending weapons; it is also the instillation of a war-fighting culture, a military discipline, and most importantly, the will to act independently. In this way, resistance hubs located geographically far from Iran gain the ability to confound the enemy by developing tactics appropriate to their unique conditions.

    When looking at Iran’s military history, certain turning points in the formation of this doctrine stand out. The case of how a limited number of military advisors sent by Iran to Lebanon during the days when it was groaning under Israeli occupation in 1982 transformed over time into a deep-rooted resistance organization is one of the most concrete success stories of this strategy. Similarly, the power vacuum created by the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003 elevated Iran’s influence in the northern Persian Gulf to an unprecedented level in history. This expansion is not an annexation or occupation in the classical sense; it is a complex assortment of alliances built upon shared sectarian ties, economic dependency, and security concerns. This assortment allows Iran to protect its national security hundreds of kilometers beyond its borders, on the lines of contact with enemy forces.

    The most critical component of this strategy is undoubtedly the concept of deterrence. Even though Iran does not possess nuclear weapons, it has managed, through its conventional missile inventory and asymmetric presence in the region, to raise the cost of a large-scale military attack against it to unacceptable levels. Especially its capacity to disrupt maritime traffic and energy shipments in the Persian Gulf functions as a kind of automatic brake mechanism within the global economy against military adventures targeting Iran. This military doctrine heralds a new era where not only tanks and aircraft, but also patience, timing, and psychological superiority determine the course of war. In this new era, all actors in the region have learned through bitter experience how effective asymmetric methods, blended with faith and local dynamics, can be against technologically superior armies.

    The Aftershocks of Resistance: Resistance Bastions on the Frontier

    The resistance hubs stationed beyond the Iranian mainland are structures that, beyond being limbs of Tehran’s military strategy, reflect the unique social dynamics of the geographies they inhabit. The Ansar Allah Movement in Yemen constitutes one of the most striking examples of this situation. Resisting despite nearly a decade of heavy bombardment and naval blockade by the Saudi-led coalition in one of the world’s poorest geographies, Ansar Allah is the field projection of developments in Iran’s defense industry. However, seeing Ansar Allah solely as an extension of Iran means ignoring Yemen’s complex tribal structure and the deep anti-imperialist vein in the region. The political transformation movement initiated by the Yemeni people through their own internal dynamics evolved into a military resistance as a result of foreign intervention, and in this process, relations with Tehran became a strategic necessity.

    The importance of the Yemeni resistance for global power balances is too great to be subject to any exaggeration. The resistance rising from this geography, which controls the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, has the capacity to directly affect one of the lifelines of global trade. The ballistic missile and unmanned surface vessel capability developed by Ansar Allah nearly paralyzed maritime traffic in the Red Sea during Israel’s attacks on Gaza, forcing Western states into a costly military buildup in the region. This situation demonstrates how effective Iran’s “distant warfare” doctrine is as a lever. This stance in Yemen not only attrites a regional rival like Saudi Arabia but also erodes the prestige and resources of the United States and United Kingdom navies by drawing them into an asymmetric struggle with a land power.

    The Iraqi front constitutes the most vital link of strategic depth for Iran. In post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, pro-Iranian political parties and their military wings, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) groups, have penetrated into the state mechanism. This structure has not only fully secured Iran’s western borders but also constituted the most important link of the land bridge stretching from Tehran to the Mediterranean coast during the Syrian Civil War. The presence of resistance groups in Iraq implies a constant harassment and threat against United States military bases in the region. This situation continuously leaves the Washington administration in a dilemma regarding how much a possible military operation against Iran would endanger the security of American personnel in Iraq. This dilemma is perhaps the quietest but most functional part of Iran’s deterrence strategy.

    Lebanese Hezbollah holds a special and privileged position within this resistance hierarchy. As Iran’s most disciplined, best-trained, and most equipped ally in the region, Hezbollah is not merely a proxy force but also a laboratory for Iran’s military doctrine and a strategic partner. Forcing the Israeli army to withdraw from Southern Lebanon in 2000, and in the 2006 33-Day War, achieving a political and psychological superiority, if not a military victory, against the Middle East’s most powerful army, has certified Hezbollah’s weight in regional equations. Hezbollah’s precision-guided missile inventory has the capacity to threaten Israel’s critical infrastructure and population centers. This capacity serves as an insurance policy for the deep striking of Israel in the event of a military threat against Iran, automatically converting a potential attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities into the risk of an all-out regional war.

    The Epic of Besiegement: Gaza and Epistemic Resistance

    The Palestinian issue, and specifically the Gaza Strip, is not only the military but also the moral and ideological epicenter of Iran’s resistance discourse. The policy of not recognizing Israel’s existence and viewing Zionism as the fundamental source of the region’s instability is an unchanging red line of Iranian foreign policy. While this stance often pits Iran against parts of the Arab world and Western powers, it also forms one of the strongest pillars of its popular legitimacy on the streets of the Islamic world. The logistical, financial, and military technology support provided to resistance groups in Gaza is a complex strategic move testing the limits of Iran’s influence capacity in the Sunni world. This move has succeeded in transcending sectarian fault lines, creating a solidarity law based on a common definition of the enemy.

    The most striking aspect of the resistance in Gaza is the level of military self-sufficiency it has achieved in recent years. The blending of Iranian-origin technology and know-how with local means in Gaza’s cramped workshops has transformed the resistance’s military wing from a simple mortar militia into a sophisticated short-range rocket force. Woven with underground tunnels, this geography continues its existence as a geographical and human challenge against Israel’s technological superiority. The indigenous rocket capability developed with Iran’s support severely overloads Israel’s air defense systems during moments of conflict, reaching the capacity to paralyze civilian life. This situation leads to a serious questioning within Israel’s military doctrine and forces the Tel Aviv administration to confront the fact that it faces not just an organization, but an idea with deep roots.

    However, the issue that must be underlined here is the epistemic dimension existing beyond the physical front of the resistance. The stance put forward by Iran is the construction of an alternative narrative against Western-centric orientalist knowledge production and media hegemony. The emphasis on “resistance against imperialism” is a direct objection to conceptualizations dominant in Western academies and press, such as the “Iranian threat” or “Iranian influence.” When combined with the emphasis on the right of the region’s peoples to self-determination, this objection carries the struggle waged by Tehran beyond simple power politics, elevating it to the dimension of an existential struggle between civilizations. This new language finds resonance in the region’s universities, madrasas, and street slogans, creating a universe of discourse based on freedom and honor, outside the framework of the “fight against terrorism” imposed by the West.

    The struggle waged by Gaza also serves an internal front consolidation function for Iran. In times of intense economic embargoes and internal political tensions, the uncompromising support given to the Palestinian cause is one of the strongest mortars holding different segments of Iranian society together. Regardless of their political views, for an ordinary Iranian, the issue of Jerusalem’s freedom is an inseparable part of national pride and historical responsibility. In this context, the resistance in Gaza becomes a platform where not only the Palestinian people’s but also the Iranian nation’s honorable stance is declared to the world. Every epic written on this platform breaks Iran’s regional loneliness and continues to position it as a revolutionary center in the eyes of the oppressed nations.

    Conclusion: The Backbone of Civilization

    The cry of “I am Iranian” echoing on the Iranian plateau is the modern-day reverberation of the noise of a civilization coming from beyond the ages. This cry is the shared memory of a nation that once carried Zoroaster’s fire, revived the Persian language in Ferdowsi’s verses, and drew the boundaries of a faith from Anatolia to Khorasan with the Safavid sword. Today, traces of this ancient memory are found in the engine sound of an unmanned aerial vehicle launched in the mountains of Yemen, in the vigil of a volunteer brigade stationed in the deserts of Iraq, in the dim light of a tunnel dug in southern Lebanon, and on the hand of a resistance fighter wiping away a mother’s tears in Gaza. These geographies, as the field application areas of the Iranian nation’s honorable lesson of resistance, proclaim to the whole world the cost and necessity of standing firm against the global domination order.

    Refusing to bow to the rules imposed by the global system brings heavy costs for a nation. Embargoes, economic bottlenecks, international isolation, and living under constant military threat have become an ordinary part of the daily lives of the Iranian people. Yet it is precisely at this point that the meaning of resistance deepens. Because this struggle is not merely for territory or resources, but for a nation’s right to exist with its own values, its own faith, and its own independent will. Every price paid for this right further solidifies the Iranian nation’s position on the stage of history and transforms it into a source of inspiration for other nations facing similar pressures. That is why this multi-front war waged against imperialism and all its extensions in the region is a laboratory not only for Iran’s but for all of humanity’s quest for freedom.

    Reading Iran’s regional strategy merely as a security perimeter would be incomplete and misleading. This strategy is also the geographical projection of a civilizational vision. This approach, synthesizing the wisdom of the East with the technique of the West, blending modern state reason with ancient imperial reflexes, has turned Iran into an indispensable actor in the Middle Eastern equation. The invisible link between a rocket manufactured in a Yemeni village house and an algorithm developed at a university in Tehran is a product of this holistic civilizational perspective. This perspective gives Iran the courage to chart its own unique path not only in the military field but also in the cultural, scientific, and ideological realms. Though this path is difficult and arduous, the honor of the destination to be reached at the end is great enough to make one forget all weariness.

    Happy is that nation which has known how to keep its head high even in the darkest corridors of history; happy is that geography which has carried the honor of being the revolutionary center of resistance against the impositions of imperialism. To say “I am Iranian” is to be the owner of this great and arduous heritage, to be a footsoldier of this honorable stance. This expression is the common heartbeat of a geography stretching from the warm waters of the Persian Gulf to the snowy peaks of the Alborz Mountains, from the steppes of Khorasan to the rose gardens of Fars. This heartbeat symbolizes not only the struggle for survival of a nation, but also a quiet and profound lesson of existence taught to the entire world. The name of this lesson is honorable resistance, and its teacher is the ancient Iranian civilization.

    Bibliography

    Abrahamian, E. (2008). A History of Modern Iran. Cambridge University Press.
    Alfoneh, A. (2013). Iran Unveiled: How the Revolutionary Guards Is Transforming Iran from Theocracy into Military Dictatorship. AEI Press.
    Bazoobandi, S. (2019). The Political Economy of Iran Under the Qajars: Society, Politics, Economics and Foreign Relations 1796-1926. I.B. Tauris.
    Buchta, W. (2000). Who Rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
    Crist, D. (2012). The Twilight War: The Secret History of America’s Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran. Penguin Press.
    Dabashi, H. (2017). Iran: A People Interrupted. The New Press.
    Ehteshami, A. (2017). Iran: Stuck in Transition. Routledge.
    Esposito, J. L. (Ed.). (1990). The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact. Florida International University Press.
    Hunter, S. T. (2010). Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Resisting the New International Order. Praeger.
    Karsh, E. (2002). The Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988. Osprey Publishing.
    Keddie, N. R. (2006). Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution. Yale University Press.
    Ostovar, A. (2016). Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. Oxford University Press.
    Pollack, K. M. (2004). The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America. Random House.
    Rahnema, A. (2011). Superstition as Ideology in Iranian Politics: From Majlesi to Ahmadinejad. Cambridge University Press.
    Takeyh, R. (2009). Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs. Oxford University Press.
    Ward, S. R. (2009). Immortal: A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces. Georgetown University Press.
    Zabih, S. (1988). The Iranian Military in Revolution and War. Routledge.

    Sefa Yürükel

    Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
    Aarhus University, 1997
    Independent Researcher
    Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures

    Bugün İranlıyım Demek
  • Witnessing History: The New World Order Shaped by Iran’s Axis of Resistance and the End of the American-Israeli Era

    Witnessing History: The New World Order Shaped by Iran’s Axis of Resistance and the End of the American-Israeli Era

    The Axis of Resistance and the Historical Rupture

    Humanity’s history witnesses, in certain periods, the privilege of observing the rise of one civilization and the fall of another. The days we are living through are right in the middle of such a great historical rupture. With the military and strategic moves it has displayed in the last four days, Iran has targeted not just a war, but a century-old hegemonic order. These operations are a concrete manifestation of Iran’s philosophy of the Axis of Resistance. This philosophy is based on organizing indigenous, autonomous, and faith-based resistance against imperial powers; refusing to submit to externally imposed orders. With this understanding, Iran is reshaping the world and fundamentally shaking the perception and power structures that the US and Israel have built for decades.

    Iran Shaping the World Through Resistance

    Iran’s strategic vision extends far beyond its geographical borders. The Axis of Resistance is a network stretching from Tehran to Damascus, from Beirut to Sana’a. This network is a hybrid structure encompassing non-state actors, popular movements, and regular armies. Thanks to this structure, Iran has created a counterweight in the heart of the Middle East, in all areas that the US has not directly occupied but has tried to influence.

    The events of the last four days mark the moment when this resistance strategy has gone on the offensive. By targeting American bases in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, Iran is essentially giving this message: “You will no longer determine your borders; the logic of resistance will re-establish the balance of power.” These operations have shown that Iran not only defends its own territory but is also a geopolitical actor capable of directly affecting the fate of an entire region. With these moves, Iran is forcing the world to accept this reality: The order established by imperial powers is now melting away in the fire of resistance.

    The Perception Art of US-Israeli Media Power and Iran’s Disruption of This Art

    Since the last quarter of the 20th century, the US and Israel have developed an unparalleled capacity for perception management through global media. The First Gulf War (1991) was the first major demonstration of this capacity. The smart bomb footage broadcast all night on CNN, adorned with concepts like “surgical cleanliness” and “precision strikes,” gave the public the impression that war was a clean, controlled, and legitimate act. This was one of the most successful examples of modern propaganda history.

    However, Iran has collapsed this perception machine. In the ongoing conflict, even though we have passed the fourth day, almost no war footage has reached the public. This is not only due to censorship; it is also because the US and Israel cannot find a single successful frame to show. These two countries, possessing the world’s most powerful air forces, cannot fly planes over Iranian skies, cannot land troops on Iranian soil, and are facing an overwhelming resistance.

    Media outlets cannot present “uninterrupted victory footage” as they did in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Libya. Instead, there is a dominance of vague statements, contradictory reports, and a growing darkness of information. This situation is the clearest evidence of how Iran has nullified the perception simulation of US-Israeli media power. Iran has shattered the fictional reality produced in media rooms with the reality it has created on the battlefield. The world has now begun to realize the US defeat, no matter how many high-resolution bomb images are shown.

    Iran is Writing History – Strategic Depth and the Time Game

    Writing history is not just about winning wars; it is also about changing the spirit of an era. In the last four days, Iran has achieved the following: First, it has rendered unusable the world’s most expensive military facilities (bases in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia). The construction of these bases took decades and cost trillions of dollars. Today, these bases are being looted, burned, and abandoned. This is not just a material loss but also a psychological defeat.

    Second, Iran has changed the meaning of time. In conventional wars, four days is considered just the beginning of an operation. However, in these four days, Iran has so expanded its area of military superiority in the region that it seems impossible for the US to compensate for this loss. Third, Iran is aware that it has inflicted one of the biggest destructions in US history. Pearl Harbor was an attack and happened in a single day. But this operation is a systematic, planned, and comprehensive process of annihilation. With this process, Iran is having new chapters written in military history books, such as the “Four-Day War” or the “Collapse of the Bases.”

    Fourth and most importantly, Iran has shown that winning a war is not just about launching missiles but also about breaking the enemy’s will. Look at the ideas put forward by the Trump administration today: The proposal for military escort to tankers in the Persian Gulf is, in fact, an admission of desperation. No one wants to enter the range of thousands of Iranian missiles. The idea of invading Iran with Kurdish militias is nothing but a desperate fantasy devoid of geographical knowledge. As Iran hears such proposals, it understands even better that it is writing history. Because history is the story not only of the victors but also of those who have been rendered desperate.

    The End of the American-Israeli Era

    In the process extending from the end of the Cold War to September 11, 2001, and from there to 2023, the world experienced a period called the American century. In this period, the US, as the sole superpower, set the global rules; Israel, as the most loyal and powerful ally of this order in the Middle East, consolidated its regional superiority. Together, they built a hegemony that could be called the American-Israeli era. The main characteristics of this era were: freedom of military intervention, perception control through media, indirect dominance over oil resources, and strangling opposing regimes with embargoes.

    Iran has ended this era. How? First, Iran has proven militarily that the US cannot hold on in the region. A US that cannot establish air superiority by the fourth day, whose bases are destroyed, whose soldiers cannot set foot on Iranian soil, is no longer “invincible.” This situation sends the message to US allies in other regions that it has lost its deterrent power. Second, Iran has eliminated Israel’s deep deterrence capability. For years, Israel acted on the doctrine of inflicting “unacceptable damage” on its enemy when attacked. But now, there is a picture of Israel that cannot reach Iran’s underground military infrastructure and cannot retaliate.

    Third, Iran has also become the winner of the economic war. Decades-long sanctions have not broken Iran; on the contrary, they have pushed Iran towards domestic production, missile technology, and asymmetric warfare. If no one can pass through the Strait of Hormuz today, it shows that Iran has been preparing for this day for years. Proposals to escort oil tankers actually show that the US is forced to accept this reality.

    The American-Israeli era is over. Because an era ends only when the fear that sustains it disappears. Iran has destroyed that fear. Today, no people, no militia force, no state in the Middle East believes in the unlimited power of the US or Israel. Iran has razed this belief to the ground. The new era that has begun is the era of resistance, multipolarity, and independent states.

    Conclusion: The US Will Never Return to West Asia

    When all these operations and strategic ruptures are over, this reality will remain: The United States will never return to West Asia (the Middle East) again. This will not only be a military defeat but also a historical farewell. Decades of occupations, trillions of dollars in expenditures, thousands of casualties – all in vain. Iran has given birth to the sun of a new morning in this geography. The name of this morning is independence and resistance. And this morning is the first page of the history that Iran is writing.

    References

    1. Abrahamian, E. (2018). A History of Modern Iran. Cambridge University Press.
    2. Cordesman, A. H. (2019). The Gulf Military Balance: The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
    3. Khalaji, M. (2021). The Axis of Resistance: Iran’s Network in the Middle East. Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
    4. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). (2023). The Military Balance 2023. Routledge.
    5. Said, E. W. (1997). Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World. Vintage Books.
    6. U.S. Department of Defense. (2022). Annual Report on Military Power of Iran. Office of the Secretary of Defense.
    7. Fathi, N. (2020, January). Iran’s Military Doctrine: Offensive Defense. The Atlantic.
    8. Bacevich, A. J. (2016). America’s War for the Greater Middle East. Random House.
    9. Parsi, T. (2017). Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy. Yale University Press.
    10. Mamdani, M. (2004). Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror. Pantheon Books.

    Sefa Yürükel

    Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
    Aarhus University, 1997
    Independent Researcher
    Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures

    Tarihe Tanıklık: İran’ın Direniş Ekseninde Şekillenen Yeni Dünya Düzeni ve Amerikan-İsrail Çağının Sonu
  • Iran’s Comprehensive Operation Against U.S. Bases and Regional Repercussions

    Iran’s Comprehensive Operation Against U.S. Bases and Regional Repercussions

    The military developments of recent days are of a nature that will fundamentally shake the balance of power in the Middle East. In a manner surprising to observers, Iran has launched a comprehensive, large-scale, and determined operation against U.S. bases. The scale of these operations reveals a military reality for which the world was unprepared.

    Scope of the Operation and Strategic Impacts

    In just four days, Iran has succeeded in significantly expanding its area of military superiority in the region. As a result of the operations, some of the world’s most valuable and expensive military bases, assets, and equipment have been destroyed. U.S. bases in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia rank among the largest military facilities globally. The construction of these facilities took decades and cost trillions of dollars. Thus, we are faced with a picture where a large portion of military expenditures made over thirty years has been rendered futile.

    The dimensions of the observed destruction are quite striking. Radar systems worth hundreds of millions of dollars have been instantly destroyed. A large part of the military bases has been abandoned, burned, looted, and rendered unusable. At this point, an important historical comparison must be made: As far as is known, the United States has not experienced destruction on this scale in its history, except for the attack on Pearl Harbor. However, even the attack of that era cannot be compared to the scope and intensity of the operations Iran is carrying out today. No enemy in a conventional war has inflicted destruction on U.S. military forces on the scale that Iran is currently applying.

    Information Flow and Censorship

    The severity of the military situation is so advanced that censorship mechanisms are preventing almost all new information about this war from reaching the public. What should be noted is that the amount of information obtained about the conflict is decreasing day by day. Yet, thirty-five years ago, during the First Gulf War, we watched countless images and video streams from Iraq. Back then, even when smart bombs and camera technologies were still new, new footage could be broadcast every night. Now, almost no video recordings are accessible.

    One of the most important indicators of this information restriction is the uncertainty regarding air superiority. There is no indication that the USA, considered the world’s largest military power and the country with the largest air force, has established air superiority over Iran even by the fourth day of the war. No images have emerged of American planes flying over Tehran or any part of Iran. Moreover, American soldiers setting foot on Iranian soil is unimaginable under current conditions.

    Desperate Proposals of the Trump Administration

    To understand how desperate this war has become, it is enough to look at the proposals coming from the Trump administration as early as the fourth day. Unbelievable ideas are being put forward, such as providing military escort to oil tankers leaving the Persian Gulf. The meaning of this proposal is quite clear: It seeks to send American ships into a region directly within the range of thousands of Iranian missiles. Yet, currently, no ships can transit through the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranians have been preparing for decades to close this strategic waterway.

    Another proposal is the idea of arming Kurdish militias to invade Iran. When evaluating this proposal, one must consider Iran’s size and geographical realities. Looking at the map of Iran, it is clearly visible how vast an area the country covers. Thinking that a militia force of ten thousand people could invade Iran is unrealistic even for a force of fifty thousand or even a hundred thousand people. Iran’s geographical depth and population size render such an invasion attempt impossible from the start. Iran has the capacity to strategically neutralize even a force of this size.

    Course of the War and Final Outcome

    It is now possible to say that the US and Israel have already lost this war. Of course, both countries possess powerful bombs and the capacity to destroy buildings. It is theoretically possible to kill millions of civilians in their homes. However, this does not mean winning the war. Military victory is not only about destructive capacity but also about the ability to achieve strategic objectives and break the enemy’s resistance.

    Iran’s military infrastructure and weapons are deployed all across the country and deep underground. Due to the nature of this configuration, neither the Americans nor especially the Israelis have any chance of reaching these targets. This situation puts the US and its allies in an extremely difficult position. There is almost no possibility for them to end the military operation they have started.

    Long-Term Regional Effects

    Once all these developments are over, it is predicted that the United States will never return to West Asia again. The American presence in the Middle East will permanently end. This situation will bring about a radical change in regional power balances and signal the beginning of a new geopolitical era.

    References

    1. Cordesman, A. H. (2019). The Gulf Military Balance: The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
    2. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). (2023). The Military Balance 2023. Routledge.
    3. Pollack, K. M. (2004). The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America. Random House.
    4. U.S. Department of Defense. (2022). Annual Report on Military Power of Iran. Office of the Secretary of Defense.
    5. RAND Corporation. (2020). The Future of U.S. Bases in the Middle East. RAND Research Report.
    6. Fathi, N. (2020, January). Iran’s Military Doctrine: Offensive Defense. The Atlantic.
    7. Byman, D. (2021). Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era. Brookings Institution Press.

    Sefa Yürükel

    Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
    Aarhus University, 1997
    Independent Researcher
    Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures

    İran’ın Amerikan Üslerine Yönelik Kapsamlı Operasyonu ve Bölgesel Yansımaları
  • IS A WEST ASIAN ALLIANCE WITHOUT IRAN POSSIBLE?A Critical Assessment in the Context of Türkiye’s Relations with the USA-NATO and Israel

    IS A WEST ASIAN ALLIANCE WITHOUT IRAN POSSIBLE?A Critical Assessment in the Context of Türkiye’s Relations with the USA-NATO and Israel

    The recent diplomatic contacts and foreign minister-level meetings reportedly developing between Türkiye, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia have sparked a noteworthy debate in terms of regional geopolitics. At the heart of this debate lies the possibility of Iran’s exclusion from a potential regional equation. The idea of a “West Asian alliance without Iran,” recently floated, raises serious questions not only regarding regional balances but also in the context of the global power struggle. Particularly at a juncture where the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is deepening, the Red Sea trade route is under threat, and global energy supply is becoming fragile, attempting to reshape the region through exclusionary blocs necessitates a confrontation with historical and geographical realities.

    From a historical perspective, the pursuit of lasting peace and stability in West Asia has generally been conducted through inclusive models. The failure of the Baghdad Pact (CENTO) during the Cold War era is instructive in demonstrating the fate of security umbrellas that fail to secure the consent of the region’s peoples and exclude a key regional actor. The structure currently sought to be formed against Iran is likewise a candidate for a similar fate; for Iran is not merely a state but also the center of Shia geopolitics, the carrier of the Iranian Turk and Persian cultural basin, and the locomotive of the regional axis of resistance.

    The Geopolitical Reality of West Asia

    Throughout history, West Asia has been an arena of competition for great powers, situated at the center of global politics due to its energy resources, trade routes, and strategic location. To establish a lasting alliance in this geography, one must consider not only military or economic power but also geographical and cultural realities. A glance at the map of West Asia reveals that Iran is physically positioned at the very heart of this geography, on a transit route stretching from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf, and from the Central Asian steppes to the plains of Mesopotamia. This position bestows upon Iran an indispensable role not only militarily but also in terms of trade and energy transit. Any regional architecture attempting to sideline Iran would automatically result in the blockage of these trade and energy corridors or necessitate a shift towards alternative, costlier routes.

    In this context, Iran is one of the region’s most critical actors. With its population, military capacity, energy resources, and ideological influence, the void created by removing Iran from the West Asian equation cannot be easily filled. Possessing the world’s second-largest natural gas reserves and fourth-largest oil reserves, Iran is a producer capable of single-handedly influencing prices in global energy markets. Therefore, any alliance attempt that excludes Iran carries a serious structural weakness from the outset. Moreover, Iran’s ballistic missile inventory and advanced unmanned aerial vehicle technology make it one of the region’s most powerful countries in terms of unconventional deterrence capability. A coalition seeking to exclude Iran must be prepared to confront this asymmetric threat.

    In terms of geographical determinism, Iran also controls the northern shores of the Strait of Hormuz, one of the most critical waterways in the region. Approximately one-fifth of the world’s oil trade passes through this narrow chokepoint, making it a strategic asset in Iran’s hands. Attempting to build a West Asian alliance without Iran means constructing a structure lacking the capacity to secure this strait, a risk unacceptable for the global economy. Hence, any move aimed at excluding Iran will face objections not only from regional actors but also from global players (particularly energy-importing countries like China, India, Japan, and South Korea).

    Another factor amplifying Iran’s geopolitical weight is its network of “proxy forces.” Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq, Ansarullah (Houthis) in Yemen, and various militia groups in Syria are the carrier columns of Iran’s regional influence. Through these structures, Iran can project military and political presence far beyond its borders. An alliance attempting to exclude Iran would have to confront not only the regime in Tehran but this entire paramilitary network. This, in turn, carries the potential to trigger a wide-ranging proxy war encompassing nearly all of West Asia.

    In this context, Iran’s cultural and historical depth must also be considered a geopolitical reality. Persian is an influential language across a vast geography, from Afghanistan to Tajikistan, and from the holy cities of Iraq to Muslim elites in the Indian subcontinent. Iran’s central position in the Shia Islamic world makes it a reference point for Shia populations in Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, Azerbaijan, and even Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province. These soft power elements constitute sociological barriers to completely sidelining Iran.

    The Türkiye–Pakistan–Saudi Arabia Rapprochement

    The cooperative endeavors occasionally brought to the agenda between Türkiye, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia are based on different motivations. While Türkiye seeks to enhance its regional effectiveness and find new markets for its defense industry products, Pakistan is in search of security assurances, a way out of its economic crisis, and strategic depth against India. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, aims to balance Iran’s regional influence, find exits from the costly war in Yemen, and create a secure regional environment for its Vision 2030 projects. The occasional coming together of these three countries is a result of conjunctural overlaps of interest rather than a definition of a common enemy. Indeed, Türkiye-Saudi Arabia relations could only enter a path of normalization in the last few years following the deep crisis after the Khashoggi murder, and this normalization still proceeds on fragile ground.

    However, it is difficult to claim that the interests of these three countries fully align. Türkiye’s rhetorical pursuit of a “multi-dimensional foreign policy,” Pakistan’s close ties with China, and Saudi Arabia’s strategic bonds with the West cause this potential alliance to harbor internal contradictions. Due to its energy dependence on Iran and border security cooperation, Türkiye avoids taking a position that would completely antagonize Tehran. Pakistan, sharing a long and porous border with Iran, must maintain a controlled balance of competition and cooperation in its relations, particularly in the context of separatist movements in Balochistan. As for Saudi Arabia, the Riyadh administration implicitly acknowledged the failure of the “exclusion of Iran” policy by re-establishing diplomatic relations with Iran in 2023 through Chinese mediation.

    Another weak link in this rapprochement is the three countries’ differing threat perceptions. For Türkiye, the number one security threat is the PKK/YPG presence in northern Syria and Iraq, an area where its interests occasionally overlap with Iran’s. For Pakistan, the primary threat is India on its eastern border, and Saudi Arabia’s growing strategic partnership with India against this backdrop creates discomfort in Islamabad. For Saudi Arabia, the priority threat is Iran’s interference in the internal affairs of the Gulf monarchies through its proxy forces. These differing hierarchies of threat make it nearly impossible for the three countries to focus on the same target and develop a common military strategy.

    The limits of cooperation are also evident in the economic dimension. Türkiye’s trade volume with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan is significantly lower than its trade volume with Iran or far below its potential level. Saudi Arabia’s past unofficial embargo on Türkiye and Pakistan’s chronic economic crisis are major obstacles to healthy economic integration among the trio. Furthermore, although Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are important customers for Türkiye’s defense industry exports, this relationship is far from creating unilateral dependence, as both countries have the capacity to turn to alternative suppliers (especially China and the USA).

    In such a situation, the Türkiye-Pakistan-Saudi Arabia rapprochement is not a “Sunni front against Iran” as portrayed in the media, but rather the sum of tactical steps each country takes in line with its own national interests. The convergence of these three countries on a common ground of excluding Iran seems unlikely in the short term due to both their internal contradictions and Iran’s regional weight.

    Türkiye’s Relations with the USA, NATO, and Israel

    To understand Türkiye’s foreign policy, it is impossible to ignore its historical ties with the USA, NATO, and Israel. As a NATO member, Türkiye is an integral part of the Western security architecture, and its military, economic, and intelligence relations with the USA date back many years. Joining NATO in 1952, Türkiye served as the guardian of the southeastern flank against the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, shaping its military doctrine, equipment, and training system largely according to Western standards. Today, hosting critical NATO bases like Incirlik and Kürecik, and providing strategic space for the NATO corps to be established, Türkiye is also known to host tactical nuclear weapons on its territory under NATO’s nuclear sharing agreement. These institutional ties create structural constraints that prevent Türkiye from acting entirely independently in its quest for regional alliances.

    Nevertheless, even though Türkiye has claimed to pursue a rhetorically “more independent foreign policy” in recent years, its obligations within the NATO framework and its ties with the West have not completely disappeared. Its removal from the F-35 program, exposure to CAATSA sanctions, and tensions with the EU should not be interpreted as a complete break from the Western camp. On the contrary, the dependence of the Turkish economy on Western financial institutions, the continued procurement of certain critical components for the defense industry from the West, and the organic ties of the Turkish elite with the West continue to limit Ankara’s room for maneuver. In this context, if Türkiye were to take part in a regional alliance aimed at excluding Iran, it would be unable to assume the natural leadership of such an alliance and would instead face the risk of being perceived as a subcontractor of the USA in the region.

    Relations with Israel have followed a more fluctuating course. Even during times of “serious” political tension, it is difficult to claim that contacts in commercial and certain security fields have been completely severed. As one of the first countries to recognize Israel, Türkiye has developed a relationship model with this country that has been up and down but never completely broken. Fluctuations such as the withdrawal of ambassadors after the Mavi Marmara crisis, the mutual reappointment of ambassadors in 2022, and the restriction of trade after October 7, 2023, demonstrate the conjunctural nature of Türkiye-Israel relations. The idea of a West Asian alliance without Iran envisages Israel having a greater say in the regional security architecture; therefore, Türkiye’s participation in such a structure would be a sensitive choice that could damage its prestige in the Arab and Islamic world.

    Within this framework, it may be unrealistic to evaluate any regional alliance involving Türkiye entirely independently of its relations with the West. The sanctions regime against Iran is one of the USA’s most important foreign policy tools, and if Türkiye were to breach or ignore this regime, it would likely face severe economic consequences. Indeed, the past Halkbank case and the Zarrab scandal demonstrated how closely the USA monitors Türkiye’s trade with Iran and how it can be turned into an instrument of pressure when deemed necessary. This situation reveals that even if Türkiye were to participate in an alliance excluding Iran, it cannot be expected to completely sever its economic relations with Iran.

    Consequently, the tension between Türkiye’s NATO membership and its claim to leadership in the Islamic world becomes even more pronounced in discussions of an alliance excluding Iran. While Ankara seeks to utilize the advantages of being part of the Western security umbrella, it also attempts to maintain the support of the Muslim public as one of the countries ostensibly showing the “harshest reaction” to Israel’s operations in Gaza. This dual position may become unsustainable when part of an alliance targeting Iran. Because such an alliance would inevitably be coded as a tool serving Israel’s regional interests, eroding Türkiye’s rhetorical “superiority” on the Palestinian cause.

    Strategic Consequences of Excluding Iran

    Excluding Iran does not merely mean leaving one country out of the equation; it also means confronting Iran’s sphere of regional influence. Considering Iran’s influence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, such an exclusion attempt could directly impact the balances on the ground. In Iraq, for instance, Iran-affiliated Hashd al-Shaabi groups are integrated into the state apparatus, and political stability in the country largely depends on Tehran’s consent. An alliance excluding Iran could upset these delicate balances in Iraq, potentially dragging the country back to the brink of sectarian wars. Similarly, Hezbollah’s military and political power in Lebanon has the capacity to sabotage any project attempting to sideline Iran from the outset.

    Moreover, given Iran’s developing relations with China and Russia, a bloc formed against Iran could create a broader geopolitical fault line. By signing a 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership agreement with Iran in 2021, China demonstrated its long-term commitment to investing in the country’s energy resources and transportation corridors. Russia, seeking to evade Western sanctions following the Ukraine war, views Iran as a critical partner, deepening cooperation particularly in the transfer of unmanned aerial vehicle and missile technology. A West Asian alliance excluding Iran would be perceived as a direct challenge to the interests of these two major powers in the region and would likely lead to a further tightening of the Russia-China-Iran axis.

    Another strategic consequence of excluding Iran centers on the nuclear issue. Since the collapse of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran has accelerated its uranium enrichment activities and moved closer to the nuclear weapons threshold than ever before. An attempt to encircle and exclude Iran through a regional alliance would push decision-makers in Tehran to invest more in nuclear deterrence. This could trigger a nuclear arms race in the region; Saudi Arabia’s insistence on accessing nuclear technology and Türkiye’s nuclear energy program should be reevaluated in this context. Excluding Iran could mean forcing it to acquire nuclear weapons (which is essentially Iran’s right), a security dilemma that would have devastating consequences for the entire region.

    Economically, excluding Iran would also incur heavy costs. As a founding member of OPEC, Iran is a significant actor in the global oil market. An alliance aimed at excluding Iran tightening economic sanctions on the country could lead to sudden spikes in global energy prices. Türkiye and Pakistan, being heavily dependent on foreign energy, would be among the countries most affected by this situation. Türkiye meets a significant portion of its natural gas needs from Iran; Pakistan is trying to implement the IP Pipeline project to import natural gas from Iran. Excluding Iran would jeopardize the energy supply security of these two countries and force them towards more expensive alternatives.

    For these reasons, the sociological and sectarian consequences of excluding Iran must not be ignored. The Shia population in West Asia would perceive an alliance excluding Iran as a siege against themselves. This perception could increase radicalization among Shia communities in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Iraq. Sectarian-based polarization threatens not only interstate relations but also intrastate peace. A country like Türkiye, with a significant Alevi population, being perceived as part of a sectarian-axis alliance could open wounds in its own social fabric that are difficult to heal.

    The USA and Israel Factor: Influence or Determinism?

    The role of the USA and Israel frequently comes up in discussions of an anti-Iran bloc. The USA’s policy of containing Iran and Israel’s “security concerns” are important factors in this framework. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Washington has viewed Iran as “one of the greatest threats” to its interests in the Middle East and has employed various tools such as military bases, economic sanctions, and regional alliances to contain the country. The Abraham Accords process is the most concrete example of the US effort to build normalization and security integration between Israel and Arab countries on the common ground of anti-Iran sentiment. It is known that Türkiye occasionally receives suggestions from the West that it should not remain outside this process.

    However, explaining regional developments solely as a “hidden plot” or the unilateral direction of external powers carries the risk of ignoring the strategic calculations of local actors themselves. Countries like Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan appear to act “independently” in line with their own interests; however, while external influences are significant, they are not the sole determinant. Indeed, Saudi Arabia’s step towards normalization with Iran under Chinese mediation demonstrates that US influence in the region is not absolute. Similarly, Türkiye’s purchase of the S-400 air defense system from Russia and its conduct of the Astana process in Syria together with Russia and Iran prove that it can prioritize its own national interests despite Western suggestions.

    The Israel factor presents a more complex picture. For Israel, Iran is coded as an existential “threat,” and every possible military, intelligence, diplomatic, and economic tool is used to eliminate this “threat.” The idea of a West Asian alliance without Iran can be seen as an ideal formula for Israel to break its “regional isolation” and deepen security cooperation with Arab countries. However, the Gaza war that began on October 7, 2023, has seriously damaged Israel’s image in the region and reignited anti-normalization sentiments among the Arab public. In this environment, joining an anti-Iran alliance in which Israel is implicitly a partner could lead to a serious legitimacy crisis for countries like Saudi Arabia and Türkiye in the eyes of their domestic public.

    Looking more closely at the USA’s role in this equation, Washington’s priority appears to be limiting China’s global rise rather than containing Iran. The US support for the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) project aims to connect India to Europe by bypassing Iran and Türkiye. This project constitutes the economic pillar of a West Asia vision without Iran. However, IMEC’s dependence on Israeli ports and its prerequisite of Saudi-Israeli normalization have suspended the project following the Gaza war. This situation demonstrates how fragile US regional plans are and how easily they can be sabotaged by local dynamics.

    In the final analysis, the US and Israel factor is a significant source of motivation for the “idea of a West Asian alliance without Iran,” but it is not determinative. What is determinative are the interest calculations of the regional countries themselves. For Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan to give a green light to such an alliance, they must be convinced that their gains outweigh their losses. In light of current data, the strategic benefit that excluding Iran would provide these three countries falls far short of the risks they would incur.

    Internal Contradictions of the Alliance

    A potential alliance to be formed between Türkiye, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia could be fragile due to the differing priorities of the parties. The foreign policy priorities, threat perceptions, and economic structures of these three countries are so different that finding common ground is often only possible at the level of very general and non-binding statements. For example, Türkiye’s claims in the Eastern Mediterranean and its military presence in Libya are a source of discomfort for Saudi Arabia, which is developing close relations with Egypt and Greece. While Riyadh pursues a policy aimed at preserving the regional status quo, Ankara exhibits a revisionist stance on many fronts. This fundamental difference in approach indicates that the long-term strategic interests of the two countries conflict.

    Türkiye’s economic relations with Iran continue. Despite occasional political tensions, the trade volume between the two countries remains at billions of dollars, and efforts are underway to reach a target of $30 billion. Türkiye is one of the largest customers importing natural gas from Iran, and this dependence gains strategic importance, especially during winter months when domestic demand increases. Additionally, border trade between the two countries is a vital source of income for local economies in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. Being part of an alliance aimed at excluding Iran would require Türkiye to reconsider these economic relations, leading to a significant loss of welfare and increased unemployment.

    Pakistan, as a neighbor sharing a border with Iran, is compelled to pursue a balanced policy. The over 900-kilometer land border between the two countries necessitates cooperation due to the separatist threats both countries face in the Balochistan region. Faced with the Kashmir issue with India and instability in Afghanistan, Pakistan is not in a position to open a new front of hostility on its western border. Furthermore, the significant Shia population in Pakistan (approximately 20% of the population) would make an alliance hostile to Iran unsustainable in domestic politics. Although the Islamabad administration follows a fluctuating course in relations with Iran, it carefully avoids taking a position that would completely antagonize Tehran.

    Despite its rivalry with Iran, Saudi Arabia has not completely closed diplomatic channels. The normalization agreement signed in Beijing in 2023 marked the announcement of a new chapter in Riyadh’s Iran policy. Saudi Arabia needs regional stability and security to achieve its Vision 2030 goals. Exiting the war in Yemen, maintaining balances in Iraq and Lebanon, and keeping the Red Sea trade route open require at least a cold peace with Iran. Engaging in an alliance that excludes Iran would undermine this normalization process and drag the kingdom back into a costly proxy war.

    In addition to these internal contradictions, the lack of mutual trust among the three countries is one of the biggest obstacles to an alliance. Türkiye harbors suspicions regarding the roles of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in the July 15 coup attempt. Pakistan is uneasy about Saudi Arabia’s developing strategic partnership with India. Saudi Arabia, in turn, views Ankara’s regional intentions with suspicion due to Türkiye’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood. This crisis of confidence prevents the parties from developing sincere cooperation in areas such as intelligence sharing and joint military planning.

    Regional Stability and the Risk of Polarization

    An alliance that excludes Iran could increase regional polarization and deepen existing conflicts. West Asia is already a geography where ethnic, sectarian, and political fault lines are highly active. A new attempt at bloc formation in this geography would only serve to escalate existing tensions. Particularly, sectarian divergence is one of the region’s most sensitive points. An alliance excluding Iran, spearheaded by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan, would inevitably be perceived as a “Sunni Bloc,” reinforcing feelings of encirclement among Shia communities. This could disrupt the delicate sectarian balance in Iraq, trigger a new internal conflict in Lebanon, and increase unrest in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province.

    The further accentuation of sectarian and political fault lines could increase instability in the long term. Historical experience shows that exclusionary alliances in West Asia are short-lived and often counterproductive. The 1955 Baghdad Pact (CENTO), aimed at containing the Soviet Union, faced Arab nationalist waves led by Egypt’s Nasser and regional opposition, ultimately dissolving. Similarly, the Arab Coalition formed by Saudi Arabia in 2015 to intervene in Yemen failed to achieve its initial ambitious goals, deepened the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, and led to an increase in the Houthis’ military capacity. A new alliance aimed at excluding Iran is highly likely to suffer a similar fate.

    Another dimension of polarization is that it facilitates the intervention of extra-regional powers. An environment where Iran is excluded would create a suitable ground for the USA to increase its military presence in the region and for Israel to act more freely. This would also heighten the interest of Russia and China in the region, turning West Asia into an arena of great power rivalry reminiscent of the Cold War era. For a country like Türkiye, which ostensibly tries to “pursue a multi-dimensional foreign policy,” such an environment would narrow its room for maneuver and force it to choose between the two blocs. Yet, Ankara’s strategy to date has ostensibly been based on “balancing between blocs as much as possible and maintaining relations with both sides.”

    Therefore, inclusive dialogue mechanisms offer a more sustainable solution than exclusionary alliances. The problems of West Asia cannot be solved by excluding or punishing one actor but through processes that recognize the legitimate interests of all actors and build mutual trust. The Helsinki Process, which ended the Cold War in Europe, is an instructive model of how dialogue can be established between hostile camps. A similar process for West Asia could be initiated with a broad-based security and cooperation conference involving Iran, regional powers like Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Egypt, and Pakistan, as well as global actors such as Russia, China, and the EU as observers.

    Here, the humanitarian cost of polarization must also not be ignored. West Asia is a geography where millions of people have been displaced and hundreds of thousands of civilians have lost their lives in the last two decades due to the occupation of Iraq, the Syrian civil war, conflicts in Yemen, and the Israeli-Palestinian issue. A new policy of bloc formation and exclusion in this geography would deepen the human tragedy. The priority for regional countries should be to end existing conflicts and focus on reconstruction processes, not invent new enmities.

    The China and Russia Dimension

    Iran is an important partner for China’s economic projects and Russia’s regional strategies. Under the Belt and Road Initiative, China views Iran as a key junction of land and sea corridors connecting Central Asia to West Asia and from there to Europe. With the 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership agreement signed in 2021, China has committed to investing over $400 billion in Iran’s energy, transportation, telecommunications, and financial sectors. This agreement aims to make Iran resilient against Western sanctions and secure China’s energy supply. A West Asian alliance aimed at excluding Iran would directly target these strategic Chinese investments and deal a severe blow to Beijing’s economic interests in the region. Therefore, China cannot be expected to remain silent on such an initiative; Beijing would likely attempt to thwart any structure aimed at excluding Iran through diplomatic pressure, economic incentives, and its veto power in the United Nations Security Council.

    Thus, an exclusionary approach towards Iran could also affect the interests of these two major powers in the region and create new areas of tension. For Russia, Iran is not only an energy competitor but also a strategic ally in the context of joint military presence in Syria, the search for stability in the Caucasus, and solidarity against Western sanctions. Sanctions imposed by the West following the Ukraine war have brought Russia even closer to Iran. There is deepening cooperation between the two countries in areas of unmanned aerial vehicles, missile technology, and military training. Furthermore, Russia is developing its access to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf through Iran, seeking to create a strategic line connecting its presence in the Mediterranean with the Indian Ocean. A West Asian alliance without Iran would serve as a barrier hindering Russia’s achievement of these global strategic objectives.

    Russia’s presence in the region is not limited to Iran. Moscow cooperates with Türkiye in the Astana process, coordinates energy policies with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (OPEC+), and maintains a complex yet functional relationship with Israel. Russia knows that an order in West Asia where any actor is completely excluded would not serve its interests. Because such an order would consolidate US dominance in the region and narrow Russia’s room for maneuver. Therefore, Moscow would side with Tehran against initiatives aimed at excluding Iran and would not hesitate to use its diplomatic, military, and economic tools to undermine these efforts.

    Another important dimension of the support China and Russia provide to Iran is the international financial system and alternative payment mechanisms. To circumvent US sanctions, Iran engages in bilateral currency swap agreements with China and Russia, utilizes cryptocurrencies, and develops its own financial messaging systems. China’s efforts to internationalize the yuan and break the hegemony of the US dollar gain momentum through cooperation with Iran. Since a West Asian alliance without Iran would aim to eliminate a significant pillar of this alternative financial architecture, it would face wholesale opposition from China and Russia. This could lead to new fractures in the global financial system and a deepening of the economic decoupling between East and West.

    Finally, Iran’s growing visibility in platforms like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS breaks its isolation in the international system and provides it with an alternative diplomatic umbrella. Iran’s full membership in the SCO in 2023 and its joining of BRICS as of 2024 have made it an actor impossible to exclude from the security equation in West Asia. These memberships not only grant Iran prestige but also offer the opportunity to institutionalize military, economic, and intelligence cooperation with China and Russia. Any regional alliance aiming to exclude Iran would have to confront this institutional reality and bear the collective reaction of the SCO-BRICS axis.

    Conclusion

    The idea of a West Asian alliance without Iran is not realistic. While it may be based on certain strategic calculations for these individual actors, the region’s realities seriously question the sustainability of such a structure. Geographical necessities, demographic balances, energy geopolitics, and the determinative power of non-state actors make Iran an integral part of this equation. Trying to exclude Iran is akin to ignoring the main water source while building a dam; such a structure is doomed to collapse in the first flood. Türkiye’s relations with the USA, NATO, and Israel make it difficult to evaluate such an alliance on a completely independent track. Ankara’s predicament, caught between its institutional ties with the West, its economic and security cooperation with Iran, and its claim to regional leadership, makes it a natural advocate of inclusive dialogue platforms rather than exclusionary blocs.

    Nevertheless, rather than viewing regional dynamics as a “conspiracy” directed solely by external powers, addressing them as a multi-layered and complex balance of power provides a healthier analysis. Every actor in West Asia has its own agenda, “threat perception,” and strategic calculations. The US and Israel’s desire to contain Iran, Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 goals, Türkiye’s pursuit of strategic autonomy, Pakistan’s need for depth against India, and Iran’s ideal of exporting its revolution are variables in this complex equation. Analyses that ignore these variables and reduce the situation to a single factor (such as sectarian difference or US plans) not only fail to help us understand the region but also lead to incorrect policy outcomes.

    In light of the arguments presented in this article, we can summarize why a West Asian alliance without Iran is not possible as follows: First, geographical and demographic realities make excluding Iran impossible. Second, the internal contradictions and lack of trust within the Türkiye-Pakistan-Saudi Arabia triangle prevent these countries from coalescing around a common definition of an enemy. Third, the strategic partnerships Iran has developed with China and Russia mean any attempt to exclude it will have global consequences. Fourth, excluding Iran would activate sectarian and ethnic fault lines in the region, deepening existing conflicts (there is a dense Shia population in the Gulf countries) and creating new areas of instability. Fifth and finally, Türkiye’s NATO membership and relations with the USA structurally hinder its ability to assume the leadership of a fully independent regional alliance.

    In conclusion, the path to a lasting order in West Asia lies not through exclusionary blocs but through inclusive and balanced models of cooperation. These models must recognize Iran’s legitimate security concerns and regional interests. Similarly, Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 goals, Türkiye’s counter-terrorism priorities, Pakistan’s economic development needs, and Israel’s security quest must also be part of this inclusive framework. The Helsinki Process and the OSCE model built by Europe after the devastating wars of the 20th century could serve as an inspiring example for West Asia. Of course, the historical, cultural, and political dynamics of the two regions are not identical; however, there are lessons to be drawn about how dialogue can be established between hostile camps.

    In this context, the task for regional countries and global powers is not to invent new enmities and form exclusionary blocs, but to develop mechanisms that will end existing conflicts, alleviate human suffering, and promote economic development. Excluding Iran brings neither peace to the region nor serves any country’s national interests. On the contrary, it plunges the region into deeper chaos and uncertainty. The future of West Asia must be sought not in exclusion, but in inclusion; not in polarization, but in integration; not in conflict, but in cooperation.

    RECOMMENDATIONS

    In light of the analysis above, the following policy recommendations are developed for regional countries, primarily Türkiye, and the international community:

    1. For Türkiye:
      · Deepening Bilateral Relations with Iran: Concrete steps should be taken to place existing energy agreements on a long-term and stable footing, strengthen joint mechanisms on border security, and achieve the $30 billion trade volume target.
      · Avoiding Exclusionary Alliances: Türkiye should not participate in any regional security structure that targets or excludes Iran; instead, it should advocate for a “West Asian Security and Cooperation Conference” encompassing all regional countries.
      · Institutionalizing Strategic Autonomy: Projects reducing external dependency in the defense industry should be accelerated, alternative financial systems and payment mechanisms developed, and the balance between NATO commitments and regional interests carefully maintained.
    2. For Regional Countries:
      · Inclusive Dialogue Platforms: The normalization process with Iran, initiated under Saudi Arabia’s leadership, should be expanded with the participation of other regional countries and given an institutional framework.
      · Economic Integration Projects: Multilateral projects involving Iran in energy, transportation, and trade (e.g., facilitating trade within the ECO framework, interconnecting regional energy grids) should be promoted.
      · Joint Stance Against Sectarian Polarization: Regional countries should avoid rhetoric and actions that fuel sectarian division and develop a unifying language around the common problems of the Islamic world (Palestine, poverty, education).
    3. For Global Powers:
      · USA and the West: The failure of the maximum pressure policy towards Iran should be acknowledged, and a solution should be sought that encompasses the nuclear program and recognizes Iran’s place in the regional security architecture. Furthermore, instead of exclusionary projects like IMEC, infrastructure investments encompassing all regional countries should be supported.
      · China and Russia: Their support for Iran should be maintained in a balanced and responsible manner without leading to new polarization in the region. They should encourage win-win based cooperation rather than zero-sum competition in West Asia.
    4. For International Organizations:
      · United Nations and Organization of Islamic Cooperation: Should undertake mediation and facilitation roles to initiate a comprehensive security and cooperation dialogue in West Asia, establishing a “West Asian Helsinki Process” agenda for this purpose.

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    Sefa Yürükel

    Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
    Aarhus University, 1997
    Independent Researcher
    Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures

    İRAN’SIZ BİR BATI ASYA İTTİFAKI MÜMKÜN MÜ?Türkiye’nin ABD–NATO ve İsrail ile İlişkileri Bağlamında Eleştirel Bir Değerlendirme