Turkish Forum

Author: Sefa Yürükel

  • The Geopolitical Anatomy of Global Maritime Trade: Canals, Straits, and the Struggle for Sovereignty on the Polar Route

    The Geopolitical Anatomy of Global Maritime Trade: Canals, Straits, and the Struggle for Sovereignty on the Polar Route

    The world economy is a vast circulatory system shaped around the compulsory transit corridors imposed by geography. In an era where approximately eighty percent of international trade volume is transported by sea and a large portion of global energy supply depends on tanker traffic, certain waterways have transcended being mere geographical formations. These corridors provide the controlling states not only with economic rent but also with disproportionate bargaining power and strategic depth in global politics. From the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal, which form the backbone of trade between Asia and Europe, to Gibraltar, the gateway to the Mediterranean; from the Turkish Straits, the lifeline of the Black Sea, to Bab el-Mandeb, the southern lock of the Red Sea, and the Northern Sea Route, a new arena of competition emerging from the climate crisis—these corridors are at the center of naval deployments, legal disputes, and proxy wars among great powers.

    The Capillary of the Indo-Pacific and the Malacca Dilemma

    The Strait of Malacca, the most critical artery of the Southeast Asian maritime geography, constitutes the most economical route between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. This waterway, riparian to Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, is the backbone of the supply chain between Northeast Asian economies and the Middle East and Africa. A significant portion of the crude oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) transported globally transits through this narrow passage. The section converging at the Phillips Channel off Singapore witnesses the world’s densest maritime traffic, with over one hundred thousand vessels passing annually.

    The geopolitical tension in this region largely revolves around the existential anxiety of the People’s Republic of China regarding its energy supply security. The fact that the overwhelming majority of China’s energy imports come through the Strait of Malacca is defined as a vulnerability by the Beijing administration, a situation that has entered the strategy literature as the “Malacca Dilemma.” In a potential military conflict or regional instability scenario, the capacity of the US Navy or the Indian Navy to disrupt this transit directly shapes China’s foreign policy and infrastructure investments. To reduce this dependence, China has activated oil and gas pipelines extending from the Kyaukpyu Port in Myanmar to Yunnan province and keeps the idea of opening the Kra Canal in southern Thailand alive as a strategic option. Simultaneously, the US logistical presence in Singapore and India’s military fortification of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands serve as strategic watch posts overlooking the western and eastern entrances of Malacca.

    Artificial Bridges Between the US, Europe, and Asia: The Suez and Panama Canals

    The Suez and Panama Canals, two massive engineering projects built by human hands, are interventions that have altered the course of global shipping. The Suez Canal, located in Egyptian territory, connects the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, shortening the Asia-Europe sea route by approximately seven thousand kilometers compared to the Cape of Good Hope at Africa’s southern tip. About twelve percent of global container traffic and a significant portion of daily oil shipments flow through this route. The strategic importance of the canal is not limited to the billions of dollars in foreign exchange revenue it provides to the Egyptian economy; it is also a vital area of interest for powers like Russia, China, and India, which lack Mediterranean coastlines. Particularly, the fact that Bab el-Mandeb Strait at the canal’s southern entrance is vulnerable to asymmetric threats stemming from the civil war in Yemen reveals the reality that Suez’s security actually begins thousands of miles beyond Egypt’s borders.

    The Panama Canal assumes a similar strategic function in the Western Hemisphere. Cutting through the narrowest land strip of Central America to connect the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean, this waterway is indispensable, especially for trade between the US East Coast ports and Asia, and for commodity exports from South America’s western coasts. After the US fully transferred sovereignty rights of the canal to Panama in 1999, the geopolitical vacuum formed in the region has been filled by China’s port investments and infrastructure projects under its Belt and Road Initiative. Port operating concessions held by Chinese companies around the canal fuel debates in Washington about “Chinese influence in the backyard.” Additionally, the decline in the canal’s operational capacity due to irregularities in the rainfall regime feeding Lake Gatun in Panama is accelerating the search for alternative routes, such as the Tehuantepec Isthmus Railway in Mexico or the proposed canal projects in Nicaragua.

    The Fierce Sentinel of Energy Supply: The Strait of Hormuz

    The Strait of Hormuz, connecting the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean, holds an unparalleled position for the stability of global energy markets. This corridor, lying between Iran and Oman and narrowing to about thirty-three kilometers at its most constricted point, hosts approximately one-third of globally seaborne crude oil and a significant portion of LNG trade. The geopolitics of the strait are largely shaped by the regional rivalry between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Western powers and Sunni Arab monarchies. When sanction pressures over Iran’s nuclear program increase, the first deterrent instrument the Tehran administration resorts to is the threat of disrupting strait traffic. Fast attack craft belonging to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, coastal batteries, and mining capability demonstrate that the strait can be destabilized to create a serious risk premium, even if not physically closed. The permanent presence of the US Fifth Fleet in Bahrain and additional military deployments to the region are the military reflection of this narrow waterway’s dominance over global inflation and recession dynamics.

    The Southern Lock of the Red Sea: The Bab el-Mandeb Strait and Yemeni Geopolitics

    The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, located between the southwestern tip of the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen) and Djibouti and Eritrea in the Horn of Africa, is a strategic maritime passage connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and onwards to the Indian Ocean. This narrow waterway, meaning “Gate of Tears” in Arabic, derives its name from the historical difficulty of navigation and the turbulent political climate of the region. Approximately twenty-nine kilometers wide at its narrowest point, the strait is divided into two channels by Perim Island. As Bab el-Mandeb is a mandatory route for all vessels transiting the Suez Canal, it is the southern complementary element of the Mediterranean-Indian Ocean connection, and its strategic value is directly linked to the Suez Canal.

    Commercially, Bab el-Mandeb provides passage for approximately six to eight percent of globally seaborne oil and a significant portion of container traffic between Europe and Asia. It is the sole gateway to the Suez Canal, especially for oil tankers traveling from the Persian Gulf to Europe and North America. Furthermore, China’s investments in the Horn of Africa and its first overseas military base established in Djibouti prove how vital Bab el-Mandeb’s security is for Beijing. If the strait closes, tankers and container ships are forced to circumnavigate the Cape of Good Hope at Africa’s southern tip, exponentially increasing freight costs and adding weeks to delivery times.

    The power struggle at Bab el-Mandeb is largely shaped under the shadow of the civil war in Yemen that has continued since 2014 and the regional proxy rivalry. The Iranian-backed Houthis’ control over Yemen’s northwestern coastline and the capital, Sana’a, has created an asymmetric risk directly threatening the strait’s security. Ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, naval mines, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and unmanned surface vessels (USVs) in the Houthis’ possession pose a constant threat to commercial and naval vessels passing through the strait. The dramatic increase in Houthi attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb following the Gaza War that began in October 2023 has exposed the systemic risk the strait poses to global trade. As a result of these attacks, many major shipping companies suspended the Red Sea route, diverting their vessels to the Cape of Good Hope, leading to serious disruptions in global supply chains and sharp increases in freight prices.

    In response to this threat, the US-led “Operation Prosperity Guardian” and the European Union’s “Operation Aspides” are multinational naval task forces aimed at preserving freedom of navigation in Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea. The Arab Coalition, led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, also attempts to contribute to the strait’s security through its military presence in Yemen. On the African side, military bases belonging to the US, France, Japan, Italy, and China stationed in Djibouti have made Bab el-Mandeb one of the waterways with the highest number of foreign military bases in the world. China’s military presence in Djibouti, as part of its strategy to protect sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean, also encompasses Bab el-Mandeb, increasing Beijing’s strategic footprint in the region. All these dynamics show that Bab el-Mandeb is not merely a maritime passage but also an intersection point of power projection in the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, and the Indian Ocean.

    The Western Lock of the Mediterranean: The Strait of Gibraltar

    The Strait of Gibraltar, located at the southwestern tip of the European continent between Spain and Morocco and only fourteen kilometers wide at its narrowest point, is the sole natural passage connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Atlantic Ocean. Its geostrategic importance stems from the fact that the maritime traffic of all states bordering or obliged to use the Mediterranean is bottlenecked at this narrow passage. It is the gateway to the global oceans for commercial vessels arriving from Asia via the Suez Canal and for warships of Russia’s Black Sea fleet.

    The power struggle at Gibraltar is historically shaped around sovereignty rights over the Rock of Gibraltar, a British Overseas Territory. This small peninsula, whose return Spain continually demands, is not only a matter of prestige for the United Kingdom but also serves as a forward outpost controlling the entrance to the Mediterranean for NATO. In the post-Brexit era, negotiations between Spain and the United Kingdom regarding Gibraltar’s status have brought uncertainties about the strait’s legal status back to the agenda. Furthermore, Morocco transforming the Tanger-Med Port on the strait’s southern coast into Africa’s largest container transshipment hub, and China’s investment interest in this port, have made Gibraltar a keystone not only for Europe but also for China’s Mediterranean strategy.

    The Montreux Regime and the Unique Status of the Turkish Straits

    The Turkish Straits System, comprising the Istanbul Strait (Bosphorus), the Sea of Marmara, and the Çanakkale Strait (Dardanelles), is the sole route by which states bordering the Black Sea can access the open seas due to its geographical location. The most fundamental aspect distinguishing these straits from other strategic waterways is that their transit regime is regulated not by customary international law or a general convention, but exclusively by the 1936 Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits. This convention grants the Republic of Turkey full sovereignty over the straits and imposes significant restrictions on the passage of warships in terms of tonnage, class, and duration of stay in the Black Sea.

    From a commercial perspective, the Istanbul Strait is one of the world’s most risky and narrowest natural waterways, with approximately forty thousand vessels passing through annually. It plays a critical role in delivering oil and grain extracted from the Caspian Basin, primarily Russia and Kazakhstan, to world markets. Geopolitically, the Montreux Convention is the most significant legal barrier preventing the Black Sea from becoming a “NATO lake.” The restrictions on the passage of warships of non-riparian states particularly ensure the Russian Federation’s naval superiority in the Black Sea and the security of its southern flank. In the context of the Ukraine crisis, Turkey’s faithful application of Montreux provisions by closing the straits to warships of belligerent parties has once again proven the strategic value of this historic convention. The Kanal Istanbul initiative, aimed at bypassing the Turkish Straits, has led to intense international debate regarding the future of the Montreux regime and military balances in the Black Sea.

    The New Arena of Competition: The Northern Sea Route and Arctic Geopolitics

    As a tangible consequence of global warming, the seasonal retreat of the ice sheet in the Arctic Ocean has opened a brand new front in maritime trade and power struggle: the Northern Sea Route. This passage, stretching along the northern coastline of the Russian Federation from the Barents Sea to the Bering Strait, has the potential to shorten the distance between Asia and Europe by approximately forty percent compared to the Suez Canal route. A ship traveling from Shanghai to Rotterdam can reduce its sailing time by more than ten days if using this route.

    The unique dynamics of the Northern Sea Route distinguish it from classical straits and canals. Here, the struggle is not about closing a narrow passage but about freedom of navigation and the capacity to establish infrastructure across a vast geography. Russia, claiming that most of the route passes through its Exclusive Economic Zone, imposes mandatory icebreaker escort and transit fees on vessels wishing to use it, defining the route as a “National Transport Corridor.” In contrast, the US, China, and the European Union argue that the Northern Sea Route should have the status of an “international strait” under international law and be open to free passage. China’s large investments in Russia’s Yamal LNG projects under its “Polar Silk Road” vision and its efforts to build its own nuclear-powered icebreaker fleet indicate that the Arctic will not only be Russia’s but also a stage for new bipolar rivalry. In the long term, this new route is expected to relieve traffic pressure on the Suez Canal and shift the center of gravity of global maritime trade northward.

    From Supply Security to Systemic Risk: The Cost of Closure and the Search for Alternatives

    The impact of strategic waterways on the global economy is measured not only by the efficiency they provide when open but also by the systemic shock waves that emerge when they are disrupted. The grounding of the Ever Given vessel in the Suez Canal, paralyzing the supply chain for six days, meant billions of dollars in losses per hour for global trade and exposed the fragility of the “just-in-time” production model. Similarly, the diversion of vessels to the Cape of Good Hope due to security vulnerabilities in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea drives freight prices to astronomical levels and increases inflationary pressure in Europe.

    This fragility pushes states and major logistics companies to search for alternative corridors. The Middle Corridor via the Caspian Sea, the Development Road Project planned to reach the Mediterranean through Iraq, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), and Israel-India-Arabian Peninsula connections are mega-projects aimed at reducing absolute dependence on traditional maritime straits. Although each of these new routes faces geographical challenges, regional political instabilities, and financing problems, the very existence of these searches proves how vital straits geopolitics truly is.

    The Maritime Projection of Geopolitical Fault Lines

    The geographical constraints upon which global maritime trade flows persist as constant parameters determining the fundamental dynamics of international relations. Each waterway examined is defined by its unique legal regime, different threat perception, and overlapping interests of rival states. The dependency relationship in the Strait of Malacca, the military buildup in Hormuz, the proxy war and asymmetric threat at Bab el-Mandeb, the colonial legacy at Gibraltar, the contractual exception of the Turkish Straits, and the environmental transformation on the Northern Sea Route reflect different tones of the global power struggle.

    The opening of the Arctic Ocean as a new trade artery due to global climate change and the possibility of new logistics corridors enabled by technological developments indicate that geopolitical competition will intensify further in the coming years. The recent crisis in Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea has proven that even non-state armed actors can paralyze global supply chains, necessitating a revision of the maritime security paradigm. In this context, the struggle for control over maritime trade routes has transformed into a multi-dimensional chess game to be won not only by the firepower of navies but also by infrastructure investments, interpretation of legal conventions, and diplomatic engagement capacity. While ensuring the openness and security of these narrow passages, the arteries of the global economy, emerges as a common responsibility of the international community, the question of how this responsibility will be shared will remain one of the greatest political challenges of the twenty-first century.

    Bibliography

    (Note: The bibliography is a translation of the titles. Original English titles are preserved where applicable.)

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    Sefa Yürükel

    Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
    Aarhus University, 1997
    Independent Researcher
    Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures

    Küresel Deniz Ticaretinin Jeopolitik Anatomisi: Kanallar, Boğazlar ve Kutup Rotasında Egemenlik Mücadelesi
  • IS A WEST ASIAN ALLIANCE WITHOUT IRAN POSSIBLE?A Critical Assessment in the Context of Türkiye’s Relations with the USA-NATO and Israel

    IS A WEST ASIAN ALLIANCE WITHOUT IRAN POSSIBLE?A Critical Assessment in the Context of Türkiye’s Relations with the USA-NATO and Israel

    The recent diplomatic contacts and foreign minister-level meetings reportedly developing between Türkiye, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia have sparked a noteworthy debate in terms of regional geopolitics. At the heart of this debate lies the possibility of Iran’s exclusion from a potential regional equation. The idea of a “West Asian alliance without Iran,” recently floated, raises serious questions not only regarding regional balances but also in the context of the global power struggle. Particularly at a juncture where the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is deepening, the Red Sea trade route is under threat, and global energy supply is becoming fragile, attempting to reshape the region through exclusionary blocs necessitates a confrontation with historical and geographical realities.

    From a historical perspective, the pursuit of lasting peace and stability in West Asia has generally been conducted through inclusive models. The failure of the Baghdad Pact (CENTO) during the Cold War era is instructive in demonstrating the fate of security umbrellas that fail to secure the consent of the region’s peoples and exclude a key regional actor. The structure currently sought to be formed against Iran is likewise a candidate for a similar fate; for Iran is not merely a state but also the center of Shia geopolitics, the carrier of the Iranian Turk and Persian cultural basin, and the locomotive of the regional axis of resistance.

    The Geopolitical Reality of West Asia

    Throughout history, West Asia has been an arena of competition for great powers, situated at the center of global politics due to its energy resources, trade routes, and strategic location. To establish a lasting alliance in this geography, one must consider not only military or economic power but also geographical and cultural realities. A glance at the map of West Asia reveals that Iran is physically positioned at the very heart of this geography, on a transit route stretching from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf, and from the Central Asian steppes to the plains of Mesopotamia. This position bestows upon Iran an indispensable role not only militarily but also in terms of trade and energy transit. Any regional architecture attempting to sideline Iran would automatically result in the blockage of these trade and energy corridors or necessitate a shift towards alternative, costlier routes.

    In this context, Iran is one of the region’s most critical actors. With its population, military capacity, energy resources, and ideological influence, the void created by removing Iran from the West Asian equation cannot be easily filled. Possessing the world’s second-largest natural gas reserves and fourth-largest oil reserves, Iran is a producer capable of single-handedly influencing prices in global energy markets. Therefore, any alliance attempt that excludes Iran carries a serious structural weakness from the outset. Moreover, Iran’s ballistic missile inventory and advanced unmanned aerial vehicle technology make it one of the region’s most powerful countries in terms of unconventional deterrence capability. A coalition seeking to exclude Iran must be prepared to confront this asymmetric threat.

    In terms of geographical determinism, Iran also controls the northern shores of the Strait of Hormuz, one of the most critical waterways in the region. Approximately one-fifth of the world’s oil trade passes through this narrow chokepoint, making it a strategic asset in Iran’s hands. Attempting to build a West Asian alliance without Iran means constructing a structure lacking the capacity to secure this strait, a risk unacceptable for the global economy. Hence, any move aimed at excluding Iran will face objections not only from regional actors but also from global players (particularly energy-importing countries like China, India, Japan, and South Korea).

    Another factor amplifying Iran’s geopolitical weight is its network of “proxy forces.” Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq, Ansarullah (Houthis) in Yemen, and various militia groups in Syria are the carrier columns of Iran’s regional influence. Through these structures, Iran can project military and political presence far beyond its borders. An alliance attempting to exclude Iran would have to confront not only the regime in Tehran but this entire paramilitary network. This, in turn, carries the potential to trigger a wide-ranging proxy war encompassing nearly all of West Asia.

    In this context, Iran’s cultural and historical depth must also be considered a geopolitical reality. Persian is an influential language across a vast geography, from Afghanistan to Tajikistan, and from the holy cities of Iraq to Muslim elites in the Indian subcontinent. Iran’s central position in the Shia Islamic world makes it a reference point for Shia populations in Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, Azerbaijan, and even Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province. These soft power elements constitute sociological barriers to completely sidelining Iran.

    The Türkiye–Pakistan–Saudi Arabia Rapprochement

    The cooperative endeavors occasionally brought to the agenda between Türkiye, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia are based on different motivations. While Türkiye seeks to enhance its regional effectiveness and find new markets for its defense industry products, Pakistan is in search of security assurances, a way out of its economic crisis, and strategic depth against India. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, aims to balance Iran’s regional influence, find exits from the costly war in Yemen, and create a secure regional environment for its Vision 2030 projects. The occasional coming together of these three countries is a result of conjunctural overlaps of interest rather than a definition of a common enemy. Indeed, Türkiye-Saudi Arabia relations could only enter a path of normalization in the last few years following the deep crisis after the Khashoggi murder, and this normalization still proceeds on fragile ground.

    However, it is difficult to claim that the interests of these three countries fully align. Türkiye’s rhetorical pursuit of a “multi-dimensional foreign policy,” Pakistan’s close ties with China, and Saudi Arabia’s strategic bonds with the West cause this potential alliance to harbor internal contradictions. Due to its energy dependence on Iran and border security cooperation, Türkiye avoids taking a position that would completely antagonize Tehran. Pakistan, sharing a long and porous border with Iran, must maintain a controlled balance of competition and cooperation in its relations, particularly in the context of separatist movements in Balochistan. As for Saudi Arabia, the Riyadh administration implicitly acknowledged the failure of the “exclusion of Iran” policy by re-establishing diplomatic relations with Iran in 2023 through Chinese mediation.

    Another weak link in this rapprochement is the three countries’ differing threat perceptions. For Türkiye, the number one security threat is the PKK/YPG presence in northern Syria and Iraq, an area where its interests occasionally overlap with Iran’s. For Pakistan, the primary threat is India on its eastern border, and Saudi Arabia’s growing strategic partnership with India against this backdrop creates discomfort in Islamabad. For Saudi Arabia, the priority threat is Iran’s interference in the internal affairs of the Gulf monarchies through its proxy forces. These differing hierarchies of threat make it nearly impossible for the three countries to focus on the same target and develop a common military strategy.

    The limits of cooperation are also evident in the economic dimension. Türkiye’s trade volume with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan is significantly lower than its trade volume with Iran or far below its potential level. Saudi Arabia’s past unofficial embargo on Türkiye and Pakistan’s chronic economic crisis are major obstacles to healthy economic integration among the trio. Furthermore, although Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are important customers for Türkiye’s defense industry exports, this relationship is far from creating unilateral dependence, as both countries have the capacity to turn to alternative suppliers (especially China and the USA).

    In such a situation, the Türkiye-Pakistan-Saudi Arabia rapprochement is not a “Sunni front against Iran” as portrayed in the media, but rather the sum of tactical steps each country takes in line with its own national interests. The convergence of these three countries on a common ground of excluding Iran seems unlikely in the short term due to both their internal contradictions and Iran’s regional weight.

    Türkiye’s Relations with the USA, NATO, and Israel

    To understand Türkiye’s foreign policy, it is impossible to ignore its historical ties with the USA, NATO, and Israel. As a NATO member, Türkiye is an integral part of the Western security architecture, and its military, economic, and intelligence relations with the USA date back many years. Joining NATO in 1952, Türkiye served as the guardian of the southeastern flank against the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, shaping its military doctrine, equipment, and training system largely according to Western standards. Today, hosting critical NATO bases like Incirlik and Kürecik, and providing strategic space for the NATO corps to be established, Türkiye is also known to host tactical nuclear weapons on its territory under NATO’s nuclear sharing agreement. These institutional ties create structural constraints that prevent Türkiye from acting entirely independently in its quest for regional alliances.

    Nevertheless, even though Türkiye has claimed to pursue a rhetorically “more independent foreign policy” in recent years, its obligations within the NATO framework and its ties with the West have not completely disappeared. Its removal from the F-35 program, exposure to CAATSA sanctions, and tensions with the EU should not be interpreted as a complete break from the Western camp. On the contrary, the dependence of the Turkish economy on Western financial institutions, the continued procurement of certain critical components for the defense industry from the West, and the organic ties of the Turkish elite with the West continue to limit Ankara’s room for maneuver. In this context, if Türkiye were to take part in a regional alliance aimed at excluding Iran, it would be unable to assume the natural leadership of such an alliance and would instead face the risk of being perceived as a subcontractor of the USA in the region.

    Relations with Israel have followed a more fluctuating course. Even during times of “serious” political tension, it is difficult to claim that contacts in commercial and certain security fields have been completely severed. As one of the first countries to recognize Israel, Türkiye has developed a relationship model with this country that has been up and down but never completely broken. Fluctuations such as the withdrawal of ambassadors after the Mavi Marmara crisis, the mutual reappointment of ambassadors in 2022, and the restriction of trade after October 7, 2023, demonstrate the conjunctural nature of Türkiye-Israel relations. The idea of a West Asian alliance without Iran envisages Israel having a greater say in the regional security architecture; therefore, Türkiye’s participation in such a structure would be a sensitive choice that could damage its prestige in the Arab and Islamic world.

    Within this framework, it may be unrealistic to evaluate any regional alliance involving Türkiye entirely independently of its relations with the West. The sanctions regime against Iran is one of the USA’s most important foreign policy tools, and if Türkiye were to breach or ignore this regime, it would likely face severe economic consequences. Indeed, the past Halkbank case and the Zarrab scandal demonstrated how closely the USA monitors Türkiye’s trade with Iran and how it can be turned into an instrument of pressure when deemed necessary. This situation reveals that even if Türkiye were to participate in an alliance excluding Iran, it cannot be expected to completely sever its economic relations with Iran.

    Consequently, the tension between Türkiye’s NATO membership and its claim to leadership in the Islamic world becomes even more pronounced in discussions of an alliance excluding Iran. While Ankara seeks to utilize the advantages of being part of the Western security umbrella, it also attempts to maintain the support of the Muslim public as one of the countries ostensibly showing the “harshest reaction” to Israel’s operations in Gaza. This dual position may become unsustainable when part of an alliance targeting Iran. Because such an alliance would inevitably be coded as a tool serving Israel’s regional interests, eroding Türkiye’s rhetorical “superiority” on the Palestinian cause.

    Strategic Consequences of Excluding Iran

    Excluding Iran does not merely mean leaving one country out of the equation; it also means confronting Iran’s sphere of regional influence. Considering Iran’s influence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, such an exclusion attempt could directly impact the balances on the ground. In Iraq, for instance, Iran-affiliated Hashd al-Shaabi groups are integrated into the state apparatus, and political stability in the country largely depends on Tehran’s consent. An alliance excluding Iran could upset these delicate balances in Iraq, potentially dragging the country back to the brink of sectarian wars. Similarly, Hezbollah’s military and political power in Lebanon has the capacity to sabotage any project attempting to sideline Iran from the outset.

    Moreover, given Iran’s developing relations with China and Russia, a bloc formed against Iran could create a broader geopolitical fault line. By signing a 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership agreement with Iran in 2021, China demonstrated its long-term commitment to investing in the country’s energy resources and transportation corridors. Russia, seeking to evade Western sanctions following the Ukraine war, views Iran as a critical partner, deepening cooperation particularly in the transfer of unmanned aerial vehicle and missile technology. A West Asian alliance excluding Iran would be perceived as a direct challenge to the interests of these two major powers in the region and would likely lead to a further tightening of the Russia-China-Iran axis.

    Another strategic consequence of excluding Iran centers on the nuclear issue. Since the collapse of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran has accelerated its uranium enrichment activities and moved closer to the nuclear weapons threshold than ever before. An attempt to encircle and exclude Iran through a regional alliance would push decision-makers in Tehran to invest more in nuclear deterrence. This could trigger a nuclear arms race in the region; Saudi Arabia’s insistence on accessing nuclear technology and Türkiye’s nuclear energy program should be reevaluated in this context. Excluding Iran could mean forcing it to acquire nuclear weapons (which is essentially Iran’s right), a security dilemma that would have devastating consequences for the entire region.

    Economically, excluding Iran would also incur heavy costs. As a founding member of OPEC, Iran is a significant actor in the global oil market. An alliance aimed at excluding Iran tightening economic sanctions on the country could lead to sudden spikes in global energy prices. Türkiye and Pakistan, being heavily dependent on foreign energy, would be among the countries most affected by this situation. Türkiye meets a significant portion of its natural gas needs from Iran; Pakistan is trying to implement the IP Pipeline project to import natural gas from Iran. Excluding Iran would jeopardize the energy supply security of these two countries and force them towards more expensive alternatives.

    For these reasons, the sociological and sectarian consequences of excluding Iran must not be ignored. The Shia population in West Asia would perceive an alliance excluding Iran as a siege against themselves. This perception could increase radicalization among Shia communities in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Iraq. Sectarian-based polarization threatens not only interstate relations but also intrastate peace. A country like Türkiye, with a significant Alevi population, being perceived as part of a sectarian-axis alliance could open wounds in its own social fabric that are difficult to heal.

    The USA and Israel Factor: Influence or Determinism?

    The role of the USA and Israel frequently comes up in discussions of an anti-Iran bloc. The USA’s policy of containing Iran and Israel’s “security concerns” are important factors in this framework. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Washington has viewed Iran as “one of the greatest threats” to its interests in the Middle East and has employed various tools such as military bases, economic sanctions, and regional alliances to contain the country. The Abraham Accords process is the most concrete example of the US effort to build normalization and security integration between Israel and Arab countries on the common ground of anti-Iran sentiment. It is known that Türkiye occasionally receives suggestions from the West that it should not remain outside this process.

    However, explaining regional developments solely as a “hidden plot” or the unilateral direction of external powers carries the risk of ignoring the strategic calculations of local actors themselves. Countries like Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan appear to act “independently” in line with their own interests; however, while external influences are significant, they are not the sole determinant. Indeed, Saudi Arabia’s step towards normalization with Iran under Chinese mediation demonstrates that US influence in the region is not absolute. Similarly, Türkiye’s purchase of the S-400 air defense system from Russia and its conduct of the Astana process in Syria together with Russia and Iran prove that it can prioritize its own national interests despite Western suggestions.

    The Israel factor presents a more complex picture. For Israel, Iran is coded as an existential “threat,” and every possible military, intelligence, diplomatic, and economic tool is used to eliminate this “threat.” The idea of a West Asian alliance without Iran can be seen as an ideal formula for Israel to break its “regional isolation” and deepen security cooperation with Arab countries. However, the Gaza war that began on October 7, 2023, has seriously damaged Israel’s image in the region and reignited anti-normalization sentiments among the Arab public. In this environment, joining an anti-Iran alliance in which Israel is implicitly a partner could lead to a serious legitimacy crisis for countries like Saudi Arabia and Türkiye in the eyes of their domestic public.

    Looking more closely at the USA’s role in this equation, Washington’s priority appears to be limiting China’s global rise rather than containing Iran. The US support for the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) project aims to connect India to Europe by bypassing Iran and Türkiye. This project constitutes the economic pillar of a West Asia vision without Iran. However, IMEC’s dependence on Israeli ports and its prerequisite of Saudi-Israeli normalization have suspended the project following the Gaza war. This situation demonstrates how fragile US regional plans are and how easily they can be sabotaged by local dynamics.

    In the final analysis, the US and Israel factor is a significant source of motivation for the “idea of a West Asian alliance without Iran,” but it is not determinative. What is determinative are the interest calculations of the regional countries themselves. For Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan to give a green light to such an alliance, they must be convinced that their gains outweigh their losses. In light of current data, the strategic benefit that excluding Iran would provide these three countries falls far short of the risks they would incur.

    Internal Contradictions of the Alliance

    A potential alliance to be formed between Türkiye, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia could be fragile due to the differing priorities of the parties. The foreign policy priorities, threat perceptions, and economic structures of these three countries are so different that finding common ground is often only possible at the level of very general and non-binding statements. For example, Türkiye’s claims in the Eastern Mediterranean and its military presence in Libya are a source of discomfort for Saudi Arabia, which is developing close relations with Egypt and Greece. While Riyadh pursues a policy aimed at preserving the regional status quo, Ankara exhibits a revisionist stance on many fronts. This fundamental difference in approach indicates that the long-term strategic interests of the two countries conflict.

    Türkiye’s economic relations with Iran continue. Despite occasional political tensions, the trade volume between the two countries remains at billions of dollars, and efforts are underway to reach a target of $30 billion. Türkiye is one of the largest customers importing natural gas from Iran, and this dependence gains strategic importance, especially during winter months when domestic demand increases. Additionally, border trade between the two countries is a vital source of income for local economies in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. Being part of an alliance aimed at excluding Iran would require Türkiye to reconsider these economic relations, leading to a significant loss of welfare and increased unemployment.

    Pakistan, as a neighbor sharing a border with Iran, is compelled to pursue a balanced policy. The over 900-kilometer land border between the two countries necessitates cooperation due to the separatist threats both countries face in the Balochistan region. Faced with the Kashmir issue with India and instability in Afghanistan, Pakistan is not in a position to open a new front of hostility on its western border. Furthermore, the significant Shia population in Pakistan (approximately 20% of the population) would make an alliance hostile to Iran unsustainable in domestic politics. Although the Islamabad administration follows a fluctuating course in relations with Iran, it carefully avoids taking a position that would completely antagonize Tehran.

    Despite its rivalry with Iran, Saudi Arabia has not completely closed diplomatic channels. The normalization agreement signed in Beijing in 2023 marked the announcement of a new chapter in Riyadh’s Iran policy. Saudi Arabia needs regional stability and security to achieve its Vision 2030 goals. Exiting the war in Yemen, maintaining balances in Iraq and Lebanon, and keeping the Red Sea trade route open require at least a cold peace with Iran. Engaging in an alliance that excludes Iran would undermine this normalization process and drag the kingdom back into a costly proxy war.

    In addition to these internal contradictions, the lack of mutual trust among the three countries is one of the biggest obstacles to an alliance. Türkiye harbors suspicions regarding the roles of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in the July 15 coup attempt. Pakistan is uneasy about Saudi Arabia’s developing strategic partnership with India. Saudi Arabia, in turn, views Ankara’s regional intentions with suspicion due to Türkiye’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood. This crisis of confidence prevents the parties from developing sincere cooperation in areas such as intelligence sharing and joint military planning.

    Regional Stability and the Risk of Polarization

    An alliance that excludes Iran could increase regional polarization and deepen existing conflicts. West Asia is already a geography where ethnic, sectarian, and political fault lines are highly active. A new attempt at bloc formation in this geography would only serve to escalate existing tensions. Particularly, sectarian divergence is one of the region’s most sensitive points. An alliance excluding Iran, spearheaded by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan, would inevitably be perceived as a “Sunni Bloc,” reinforcing feelings of encirclement among Shia communities. This could disrupt the delicate sectarian balance in Iraq, trigger a new internal conflict in Lebanon, and increase unrest in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province.

    The further accentuation of sectarian and political fault lines could increase instability in the long term. Historical experience shows that exclusionary alliances in West Asia are short-lived and often counterproductive. The 1955 Baghdad Pact (CENTO), aimed at containing the Soviet Union, faced Arab nationalist waves led by Egypt’s Nasser and regional opposition, ultimately dissolving. Similarly, the Arab Coalition formed by Saudi Arabia in 2015 to intervene in Yemen failed to achieve its initial ambitious goals, deepened the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, and led to an increase in the Houthis’ military capacity. A new alliance aimed at excluding Iran is highly likely to suffer a similar fate.

    Another dimension of polarization is that it facilitates the intervention of extra-regional powers. An environment where Iran is excluded would create a suitable ground for the USA to increase its military presence in the region and for Israel to act more freely. This would also heighten the interest of Russia and China in the region, turning West Asia into an arena of great power rivalry reminiscent of the Cold War era. For a country like Türkiye, which ostensibly tries to “pursue a multi-dimensional foreign policy,” such an environment would narrow its room for maneuver and force it to choose between the two blocs. Yet, Ankara’s strategy to date has ostensibly been based on “balancing between blocs as much as possible and maintaining relations with both sides.”

    Therefore, inclusive dialogue mechanisms offer a more sustainable solution than exclusionary alliances. The problems of West Asia cannot be solved by excluding or punishing one actor but through processes that recognize the legitimate interests of all actors and build mutual trust. The Helsinki Process, which ended the Cold War in Europe, is an instructive model of how dialogue can be established between hostile camps. A similar process for West Asia could be initiated with a broad-based security and cooperation conference involving Iran, regional powers like Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Egypt, and Pakistan, as well as global actors such as Russia, China, and the EU as observers.

    Here, the humanitarian cost of polarization must also not be ignored. West Asia is a geography where millions of people have been displaced and hundreds of thousands of civilians have lost their lives in the last two decades due to the occupation of Iraq, the Syrian civil war, conflicts in Yemen, and the Israeli-Palestinian issue. A new policy of bloc formation and exclusion in this geography would deepen the human tragedy. The priority for regional countries should be to end existing conflicts and focus on reconstruction processes, not invent new enmities.

    The China and Russia Dimension

    Iran is an important partner for China’s economic projects and Russia’s regional strategies. Under the Belt and Road Initiative, China views Iran as a key junction of land and sea corridors connecting Central Asia to West Asia and from there to Europe. With the 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership agreement signed in 2021, China has committed to investing over $400 billion in Iran’s energy, transportation, telecommunications, and financial sectors. This agreement aims to make Iran resilient against Western sanctions and secure China’s energy supply. A West Asian alliance aimed at excluding Iran would directly target these strategic Chinese investments and deal a severe blow to Beijing’s economic interests in the region. Therefore, China cannot be expected to remain silent on such an initiative; Beijing would likely attempt to thwart any structure aimed at excluding Iran through diplomatic pressure, economic incentives, and its veto power in the United Nations Security Council.

    Thus, an exclusionary approach towards Iran could also affect the interests of these two major powers in the region and create new areas of tension. For Russia, Iran is not only an energy competitor but also a strategic ally in the context of joint military presence in Syria, the search for stability in the Caucasus, and solidarity against Western sanctions. Sanctions imposed by the West following the Ukraine war have brought Russia even closer to Iran. There is deepening cooperation between the two countries in areas of unmanned aerial vehicles, missile technology, and military training. Furthermore, Russia is developing its access to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf through Iran, seeking to create a strategic line connecting its presence in the Mediterranean with the Indian Ocean. A West Asian alliance without Iran would serve as a barrier hindering Russia’s achievement of these global strategic objectives.

    Russia’s presence in the region is not limited to Iran. Moscow cooperates with Türkiye in the Astana process, coordinates energy policies with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (OPEC+), and maintains a complex yet functional relationship with Israel. Russia knows that an order in West Asia where any actor is completely excluded would not serve its interests. Because such an order would consolidate US dominance in the region and narrow Russia’s room for maneuver. Therefore, Moscow would side with Tehran against initiatives aimed at excluding Iran and would not hesitate to use its diplomatic, military, and economic tools to undermine these efforts.

    Another important dimension of the support China and Russia provide to Iran is the international financial system and alternative payment mechanisms. To circumvent US sanctions, Iran engages in bilateral currency swap agreements with China and Russia, utilizes cryptocurrencies, and develops its own financial messaging systems. China’s efforts to internationalize the yuan and break the hegemony of the US dollar gain momentum through cooperation with Iran. Since a West Asian alliance without Iran would aim to eliminate a significant pillar of this alternative financial architecture, it would face wholesale opposition from China and Russia. This could lead to new fractures in the global financial system and a deepening of the economic decoupling between East and West.

    Finally, Iran’s growing visibility in platforms like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS breaks its isolation in the international system and provides it with an alternative diplomatic umbrella. Iran’s full membership in the SCO in 2023 and its joining of BRICS as of 2024 have made it an actor impossible to exclude from the security equation in West Asia. These memberships not only grant Iran prestige but also offer the opportunity to institutionalize military, economic, and intelligence cooperation with China and Russia. Any regional alliance aiming to exclude Iran would have to confront this institutional reality and bear the collective reaction of the SCO-BRICS axis.

    Conclusion

    The idea of a West Asian alliance without Iran is not realistic. While it may be based on certain strategic calculations for these individual actors, the region’s realities seriously question the sustainability of such a structure. Geographical necessities, demographic balances, energy geopolitics, and the determinative power of non-state actors make Iran an integral part of this equation. Trying to exclude Iran is akin to ignoring the main water source while building a dam; such a structure is doomed to collapse in the first flood. Türkiye’s relations with the USA, NATO, and Israel make it difficult to evaluate such an alliance on a completely independent track. Ankara’s predicament, caught between its institutional ties with the West, its economic and security cooperation with Iran, and its claim to regional leadership, makes it a natural advocate of inclusive dialogue platforms rather than exclusionary blocs.

    Nevertheless, rather than viewing regional dynamics as a “conspiracy” directed solely by external powers, addressing them as a multi-layered and complex balance of power provides a healthier analysis. Every actor in West Asia has its own agenda, “threat perception,” and strategic calculations. The US and Israel’s desire to contain Iran, Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 goals, Türkiye’s pursuit of strategic autonomy, Pakistan’s need for depth against India, and Iran’s ideal of exporting its revolution are variables in this complex equation. Analyses that ignore these variables and reduce the situation to a single factor (such as sectarian difference or US plans) not only fail to help us understand the region but also lead to incorrect policy outcomes.

    In light of the arguments presented in this article, we can summarize why a West Asian alliance without Iran is not possible as follows: First, geographical and demographic realities make excluding Iran impossible. Second, the internal contradictions and lack of trust within the Türkiye-Pakistan-Saudi Arabia triangle prevent these countries from coalescing around a common definition of an enemy. Third, the strategic partnerships Iran has developed with China and Russia mean any attempt to exclude it will have global consequences. Fourth, excluding Iran would activate sectarian and ethnic fault lines in the region, deepening existing conflicts (there is a dense Shia population in the Gulf countries) and creating new areas of instability. Fifth and finally, Türkiye’s NATO membership and relations with the USA structurally hinder its ability to assume the leadership of a fully independent regional alliance.

    In conclusion, the path to a lasting order in West Asia lies not through exclusionary blocs but through inclusive and balanced models of cooperation. These models must recognize Iran’s legitimate security concerns and regional interests. Similarly, Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 goals, Türkiye’s counter-terrorism priorities, Pakistan’s economic development needs, and Israel’s security quest must also be part of this inclusive framework. The Helsinki Process and the OSCE model built by Europe after the devastating wars of the 20th century could serve as an inspiring example for West Asia. Of course, the historical, cultural, and political dynamics of the two regions are not identical; however, there are lessons to be drawn about how dialogue can be established between hostile camps.

    In this context, the task for regional countries and global powers is not to invent new enmities and form exclusionary blocs, but to develop mechanisms that will end existing conflicts, alleviate human suffering, and promote economic development. Excluding Iran brings neither peace to the region nor serves any country’s national interests. On the contrary, it plunges the region into deeper chaos and uncertainty. The future of West Asia must be sought not in exclusion, but in inclusion; not in polarization, but in integration; not in conflict, but in cooperation.

    RECOMMENDATIONS

    In light of the analysis above, the following policy recommendations are developed for regional countries, primarily Türkiye, and the international community:

    1. For Türkiye:
      · Deepening Bilateral Relations with Iran: Concrete steps should be taken to place existing energy agreements on a long-term and stable footing, strengthen joint mechanisms on border security, and achieve the $30 billion trade volume target.
      · Avoiding Exclusionary Alliances: Türkiye should not participate in any regional security structure that targets or excludes Iran; instead, it should advocate for a “West Asian Security and Cooperation Conference” encompassing all regional countries.
      · Institutionalizing Strategic Autonomy: Projects reducing external dependency in the defense industry should be accelerated, alternative financial systems and payment mechanisms developed, and the balance between NATO commitments and regional interests carefully maintained.
    2. For Regional Countries:
      · Inclusive Dialogue Platforms: The normalization process with Iran, initiated under Saudi Arabia’s leadership, should be expanded with the participation of other regional countries and given an institutional framework.
      · Economic Integration Projects: Multilateral projects involving Iran in energy, transportation, and trade (e.g., facilitating trade within the ECO framework, interconnecting regional energy grids) should be promoted.
      · Joint Stance Against Sectarian Polarization: Regional countries should avoid rhetoric and actions that fuel sectarian division and develop a unifying language around the common problems of the Islamic world (Palestine, poverty, education).
    3. For Global Powers:
      · USA and the West: The failure of the maximum pressure policy towards Iran should be acknowledged, and a solution should be sought that encompasses the nuclear program and recognizes Iran’s place in the regional security architecture. Furthermore, instead of exclusionary projects like IMEC, infrastructure investments encompassing all regional countries should be supported.
      · China and Russia: Their support for Iran should be maintained in a balanced and responsible manner without leading to new polarization in the region. They should encourage win-win based cooperation rather than zero-sum competition in West Asia.
    4. For International Organizations:
      · United Nations and Organization of Islamic Cooperation: Should undertake mediation and facilitation roles to initiate a comprehensive security and cooperation dialogue in West Asia, establishing a “West Asian Helsinki Process” agenda for this purpose.

    BIBLIOGRAPHY

    · Aras, B., & Karakaya Polat, R. (2008). From Conflict to Cooperation: Desecuritization of Turkey’s Relations with Syria and Iran. Security Dialogue, 39(5), 495-515.
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    · Hunter, S. T. (2022). Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Resisting the New International Order. Santa Barbara: Praeger.
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    · Kamrava, M. (Ed.). (2020). The Sacred Republic: Power and Institutions in Iran. London: Hurst & Company.
    · Keynoush, B. (2023). Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Politics of Détente. London: I.B. Tauris.
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    · Nasr, V. (2006). The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
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    · Wehrey, F. (Ed.). (2023). The Saudi-Iranian Rivalry and the Future of Middle East Security. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.
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    Sefa Yürükel

    Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
    Aarhus University, 1997
    Independent Researcher
    Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures

    İRAN’SIZ BİR BATI ASYA İTTİFAKI MÜMKÜN MÜ?Türkiye’nin ABD–NATO ve İsrail ile İlişkileri Bağlamında Eleştirel Bir Değerlendirme
  • The Construction of Political Power within Global Dependency Relations in Turkey (GMEP): A Geopolitical Analysis

    The Construction of Political Power within Global Dependency Relations in Turkey (GMEP): A Geopolitical Analysis

    The political transformation observed in Turkey since the early 2000s encompasses structural ruptures too comprehensive to be understood solely through the limited lens of traditional political science concepts. Internal factors such as electoral dynamics, party competition, or societal demands alone remain insufficient to explain this transformation. Phenomena including the redefinition of state-society relations, the dissolution of bureaucratic tutelage, and the acceleration of economic integration processes necessitate examination within a broader international context.

    At this juncture, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s political rise transcends being a phenomenon limited to individual leadership qualities. This ascent has developed in tandem with a period of international system restructuring and has established organic ties with this system. Therefore, the resulting political structure is not merely a product of national dynamics but also a concrete manifestation of global power relations at the local level.

    When examining the formation processes of political power, the question of how global projects are implemented through local actors carries decisive importance. In this context, the “Greater Middle East Project” (GMEP) framework offers a critical analytical tool for understanding the transformation in Turkey. Particularly, Erdoğan’s discourse of “co-presidency” indicates that this relationship is a constitutive element rather than mere cooperation. Since political actors’ language often reveals their positions and functions within the system, these expressions should be read not as rhetorical choices but as expressions of structural belonging.

    Geopolitical Framework and Global Strategic Design

    The GMEP, shaped under the leadership of the United States, is a comprehensive strategic initiative aimed at restructuring global power balances at the beginning of the 21st century. This initiative is based on a multi-layered strategy targeting the transformation of political, economic, and social structures in the Middle East and North Africa. While classical power politics elements such as control over energy resources and geostrategic regions lie at the foundation of the strategy, rather than direct military intervention, processes of political transformation, institutional reforms, and ideological reproduction have been employed to achieve these objectives.

    This situation demonstrates that modern forms of hegemony have become increasingly indirect and multi-dimensional. Within this framework, the GMEP is not merely a foreign policy instrument but also a form of structural intervention aimed at ensuring the continuity of the global capitalist system. Local actors involved in the project become not just passive implementers but active elements transforming the system. Turkey’s role within this framework is shaped not only by its geographical location but also through the relations its political power establishes with the global system. In this way, Turkey transcends being a passive regional object and rises to the position of an active subject in regional transformation processes.

    Construction of Political Power and Structural Adjustment

    The transformation of the power structure in Turkey cannot be explained solely by election results. This process encompasses changes in the institutional structure of the state, the reorientation of economic policies, and the radical reorganization of the social sphere. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s leadership has played a decisive role in this process. However, this role stands out not within the framework of charismatic leadership in the classical sense, but rather as the carrier of structural adjustment mechanisms.

    In the construction of political power, relations established with international actors have become a determining factor. Strategic collaborations developed particularly with the United States and Israel have directly influenced Turkey’s foreign policy orientations. These relations have not been limited to the diplomatic level but have also deepened in the areas of security, economy, and ideology. The political structure emerging in this context has taken shape at the intersection of local and global dynamics. While producing internal legitimacy on one hand, this structure follows a path compatible with the international system on the other. This dual-directional functioning is one of the fundamental mechanisms ensuring the sustainability of power. Therefore, the current political power should be evaluated not as an independent formation but as a structure integrated with the global system.

    Discourse, Identity, and Ontological Bond

    The discourse of “co-presidency” serves beyond being a mere expression in terms of political analysis, functioning as a tool for identity construction. This discourse reveals how the political actor positions himself and within which structural context he operates. These expressions belonging to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan should be treated not as a temporary political preference but as an indicator of a deeper structural relationship. For this relationship has become an integral part of the actor’s political identity over time.

    The concept of “ontological bond” offers an important theoretical tool for explaining this situation. According to this concept, the relationship between the political actor and the structure in which he exists is not superficial but possesses a constitutive quality. Therefore, eliminating this relationship necessitates not merely a political change but also an identity-based transformation. Within this framework, Erdoğan’s relationship with the GMEP should be evaluated not as a conjunctural cooperation but as structural integration. This integration manifests itself across a wide spectrum from political discourse to policy production. The continuity of this relationship should be explained not only by external factors but also by internal dynamics.

    Conclusion

    A sound analysis of the political structure in Turkey requires a multi-layered and interdisciplinary approach. This approach must consider internal dynamics together with global power relations. Otherwise, analyses will remain incomplete and reductionist. In this context, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s political role should be evaluated not only at the national level but also through his position within the global system.

    The GMEP framework offers a strong theoretical ground for analyzing the last twenty years of transformation in Turkey. However, it is also clear that this framework alone is insufficient and must be considered together with other factors. The structural nature of political power necessitates moving beyond individual leadership debates. Leadership should be evaluated through its function within the system. In conclusion, the current political structure in Turkey is a complex formation shaped at the intersection of global and local dynamics. To understand this formation, analyses that are critical, multi-dimensional, and centered on dependency relations are needed.

    Bibliography

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    Sefa Yürükel

    Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
    Aarhus University, 1997
    Independent Researcher
    Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures

    Türkiye’de İktidarın Küresel Bağımlılık İlişkileri İçinde İnşası (BOP Eş Başkanlığı) : Jeopolitik Bir Çözümleme
  • Silence in the Shadow of Karbala: A Religious Reading of Geopolitical Interests and the Reversal of Conscience, The Pope’s Husseini Stance

    Silence in the Shadow of Karbala: A Religious Reading of Geopolitical Interests and the Reversal of Conscience, The Pope’s Husseini Stance

    As the World Turns Upside Down

    Throughout the flow of history, the alliances, hostilities, and loyalties we have grown accustomed to seem to have collapsed in recent days. In a region once referred to as the “heart of the Muslim world,” the expected outcry against Israel’s attacks on the peoples of Palestine, Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, and Iran, the anticipated cries of “God is the Greatest” did not rise from where it was expected. The real surprise came from an unexpected figure: Pope Leo XIV, the spiritual leader of the Christian world. This situation is not merely a matter of political analysis; it is the resurfacing of the spiritual echo of Karbala—one of the deepest wounds in Islamic history in an entirely different form.

    The Anatomy of Silence – The “Muslim” Gulf and the Israel Axis

    The wealthy monarchies of the Persian Gulf have, in recent years, acted with a pragmatism stripped of ideology. This new process, embodied in the Abraham Accords, has led them to view Israel no longer as an enemy, but as a strategic ally against a shared threat (Iran). These states are aware that without Israel’s technology, intelligence, and lobbying power in Washington, they cannot secure their palatial regimes and dynastic interests.
    • Economic and military reality: The normalization steps taken by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia with Israel have overshadowed the Palestinian cause. Even in the face of what is described as genocide in Gaza, official responses from these countries have not gone beyond diplomatic courtesy.
    • Hostility toward Iran (anti-Shiism): Iran’s revolutionary rhetoric and regional influence lie at the center of the Gulf monarchies’ perception of existential threat. This perception pushes them to ignore the shared tragedy experienced by the peoples of Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iran.

    At this point, no clear “no” is heard from these countries against the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” policy toward Iran or a possible military intervention. This silence reflects not merely the collapse of classical Islamic solidarity, but the dominance of regime survival and interests.

    The Pope’s Unusual Stance : A Christian Hand Reaching Toward Karbala

    Pope Leo XIV’s stance resonates as a powerful call for justice amid this modern hypocrisy. By declaring, “I am not afraid of you!” and challenging the global hegemony of the United States and Israel, what is he truly doing? His position reflects the Christian tradition of standing with the weak, the oppressed, and the marginalized. He places not only Iran and Lebanon but also the long-oppressed Palestinian people at the center of this defense.

    There is also an internal Islamic dimension that makes the Pope’s stance even more striking: consciously or not, he evokes the spirit of Karbala. In the year 61 AH (680 CE), Imam Hussein, left thirsty and alone against Yazid’s forces, became the symbol of standing upright against tyranny. Today, the suffering of the peoples of Palestine, Iran, and Lebanon is, according to some interpretations, seen as a form of uprising “for the sake of God.”

    This means:
    • standing against injustice,
    • defending justice,
    • refusing to submit to oppression,
    • upholding truth despite its cost.

    The Pope’s alignment with these peoples recalls narratives of a Christian monk offering a drop of water to Hussein in the desert of Karbala.

    Yazidism and the Army of Hussein: A Contemporary Reading

    Here, “Yazidism” represents not a historical figure, but a mindset: one that instrumentalizes religion for power, ignores the suffering of the oppressed, and collaborates with oppression for self-interest.
    • Today’s Yazids: Those who remain silent about or legitimize, the suffering of the peoples of Palestine, Lebanon, and Iran in order to preserve their palaces, petrodollar revenues, and political power are associated with this mindset.
    • Today’s Hussein (in spirit): The peoples struggling to survive under war and oppression are seen by many as symbols of resilience and patience.

    The Meaning of the Pope Standing “With Hussein”

    When the Pope, as one of the world’s most influential religious figures, stands with the oppressed, this is interpreted by some as a powerful critique of the silence within the Muslim world.

    According to these interpretations, the resulting picture raises serious questions about moral courage. Regardless of sect Sunni or Shia the inability or unwillingness of powerful actors to speak out due to strategic interests leads to a profound crisis of conscience.

    Conclusion and Call: The Importance of Moral Stance

    What we are witnessing today points to a world shaped not by religions, but by interests, fears, and power dynamics. Alliances in the Middle East have shifted, giving way to pragmatic relationships.

    In this context, Pope Leo XIV’s words: “I am not afraid of you!” carry strong symbolic meaning. They can be read not only as a political statement, but as a call for moral integrity.

    Ultimately, one principle remains unchanged:
    To stand with the oppressed and against the oppressor.

    Today, this principle may be voiced by unexpected actors. Yet this reality calls for deep self-reflection and moral reckoning across all societies.

    Note: This article has been written to interpret current geopolitical developments through a religious and historical lens. Its aim is not provocation, but to invite reflection and conscience.

    Sefa Yürükel

    Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
    Aarhus University, 1997
    Independent Researcher
    Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures

    Kerbela’nın Gölgesinde Kalan Sessizlik: Jeopolitik Çıkar ve Vicdanın Tersine Dönmesini Dinsel Anlamda Okumak, Papa’nın Hüseyni Duruşu.
  • China’s Economic Model: State, Market, and the Debate on Capitalism

    China’s Economic Model: State, Market, and the Debate on Capitalism

    China’s economic transformation over the past forty years has drawn attention not only for its high growth rates but also for a structure that challenges the boundaries of existing economic theories. This transformation has generated new areas of debate, particularly within the literature of development economics and comparative political economy.

    Classical modernization theories associate economic development with market liberalization and the spread of liberal democratic institutions. However, the Chinese case demonstrates that this linear relationship is not necessarily obligatory. This calls for a reassessment of existing theoretical frameworks.

    The concept of “state capitalism,” often used to explain China’s economic structure, can be illuminating in many respects but may also be reductive. By positioning China as merely a variant of the existing capitalist system, this concept risks downplaying its unique institutional dynamics.

    In this context, the fundamental question is not which category China belongs to, but rather through which mechanisms this system operates. This perspective prioritizes analytical inquiry over normative classification.

    Thus, the Chinese experience functions as a laboratory that necessitates rethinking the concepts of state, market, and capitalism.

    Comparative Analysis of the Concept of the State

    In Western political thought, the state is defined within a Weberian framework as a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and a rational-bureaucratic organization. In this model, the state is treated as a structure relatively autonomous from society and institutionally distinct.

    This approach has produced an administrative framework compatible with modern capitalist economies. The rule of law, institutional predictability, and bureaucratic specialization are its core elements.

    In China, however, the concept of the state rests on a more holistic historical foundation. The Confucian tradition views political authority as a continuation of moral order and does not sharply separate state and society.

    The concept of “Guojia” reflects this holistic understanding. The state is positioned not merely as a governing apparatus but also as the carrier of social order.

    Therefore, interpreting the Chinese state solely through a Weberian model is insufficient; institutional structure, historical continuity, and ideological frameworks must be evaluated together.

    The Distinction Between Market and Capitalism

    Although the market mechanism and the capitalist system are often used interchangeably, these two concepts are structurally distinct. The market is a mechanism that regulates exchange relations and historically predates capitalism.

    Capitalism, on the other hand, is a broader system organized around private ownership of the means of production, profit maximization, and capital accumulation. In this system, the market is not merely a distribution mechanism but the central determinant of production relations.

    In the Chinese case, while market mechanisms clearly exist, they are constrained and guided by the strong coordinating capacity of the state. Therefore, the presence of markets alone is insufficient to classify the system as capitalist.

    The financial system, largely operating through state-owned banks, shapes capital allocation via non-market instruments. This creates a significant divergence from classical financial capitalism.

    Thus, in China, the market is not the center of the system but rather a tool structured by the state.

    Historical Evolution of the Chinese Model

    The Chinese economy during the Mao era was built on a structure based on central planning and state ownership. Economic activities were largely conducted under state control.

    However, this model produced significant limitations, particularly in agricultural productivity and industrial output. Rigidity in resource allocation deepened economic imbalances.

    The reform process initiated by Deng Xiaoping transformed this structure by integrating market mechanisms into the system. However, this integration did not imply the complete removal of state control.

    The concept of a “socialist market economy” was developed to describe this hybrid structure. This model represents the simultaneous use of planning and market mechanisms.

    Over time, China has created a unique development path by increasing market openness while maintaining state control in strategic sectors.

    Institutional Structure and the Party-State System

    To understand the functioning of China’s economic system, the central role of the Chinese Communist Party must be taken into account. The Party is not only the holder of political power but also the main actor in economic coordination.

    The relationship between the state and the Party, unlike in classical liberal models, is deeply intertwined. The Party possesses strategic steering capacity over state institutions.

    This structure enables the effective implementation of long-term economic planning. Major infrastructure investments and industrial policies, in particular, are carried out rapidly through centralized coordination.

    While state ownership continues in strategic sectors, the private sector is encouraged within defined limits. This creates a controlled market environment.

    In conclusion, in China, the state functions not outside the market but as its guide and architect.

    Comparison with the Soviet Union

    The fundamental difference between the Soviet Union and China lies in the management of their reform processes. Both countries attempted transitions from planned economies to more market-based systems.

    In the Soviet Union, the reform process progressed alongside political disintegration, leading to a weakening of state capacity. This negatively affected the sustainability of economic transformation.

    In China, reforms were implemented gradually and in a controlled manner. Economic liberalization was carried out step by step while preserving the political structure.

    This approach maintained institutional stability and made the transformation process more manageable.

    Thus, the success of the Chinese model is related not only to the content of reforms but also to their timing and institutional framework.

    Theoretical Debates and the Position of the Model

    There are various theoretical approaches in the literature on the Chinese economy. This diversity makes it difficult to place the model within a single category.

    The state capitalism approach views China as a variant within the market economy characterized by strong state intervention. In this perspective, the market mechanism is considered the dominant element.

    The socialist approach emphasizes the determining role of state ownership and planning, reducing the market to an instrumental function.

    The hybrid model approach evaluates China as an intermediate form between two systems. This perspective is particularly common in the comparative capitalism literature.

    These differences indicate that China possesses a structure that transcends existing theoretical categories.

    Conclusion

    China’s economic model has a multilayered structure that goes beyond classical economic and political categorizations, making it difficult to define with a single label.

    The strong and guiding role of the state constitutes the system’s core characteristic. However, this does not mean that market mechanisms are entirely excluded.

    Market elements exist within the system as instruments strategically employed by the state. This complicates conventional definitions of capitalism.

    The Chinese case demonstrates that economic systems cannot be fully explained through fixed and universal categories. Instead, historical and institutional contexts must be taken into account.

    In conclusion, China stands as one of the most important contemporary examples showing that the relationship between state and market can be redefined.

    References

    Arrighi, Giovanni. Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century. London: Verso, 2007.

    Bremmer, Ian. The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations? New York: Portfolio, 2010.

    Deng, Xiaoping. Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, various volumes.

    Huang, Yasheng. Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

    Milanović, Branko. Capitalism, Alone: The Future of the System That Rules the World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019.

    Naughton, Barry. The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007.

    North, Douglass C. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

    Polanyi, Karl. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Boston: Beacon Press, 1944.

    Weber, Max. Economy and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.

    Zhang, Weiwei. The China Wave: Rise of a Civilizational State. Hackensack: World Scientific, 2012.

    Naughton, Barry. “The Chinese Economy: Adaptation and Growth.” (various articles and edited volumes).

    Oi, Jean C. “The Role of the Local State in China’s Transitional Economy.” China Quarterly, 1992.

    Walder, Andrew G. “Local Governments as Industrial Firms.” American Journal of Sociology, 1995.

    Pei, Minxin. China’s Trapped Transition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006.

    Sefa Yürükel

    Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
    Aarhus University, 1997
    Independent Researcher
    Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures

    Çin’in Ekonomik Modeli: Devlet, Piyasa ve Kapitalizm Tartışması
  • Between Ideological Consistency and Pragmatic Contradiction: Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” Legitimacy and Turkey’s Crisis of Reputation

    Between Ideological Consistency and Pragmatic Contradiction: Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” Legitimacy and Turkey’s Crisis of Reputation

    Iran’s “axis of resistance” discourse and practices, analyzed within international relations literature through the frameworks of “asymmetric resistance” and “ideological foreign policy,” present a rare example of consistency in the global system. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has succeeded in positioning itself as the center of an uncompromising, honorable resistance front, particularly against the United States and Israel. In contrast, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey claims to pursue a “pragmatic” and “multi-dimensional balancing” foreign policy, but this approach has in practice resulted in unprincipled behavior, inconsistency, and a severe erosion of reputation.

    1. Theoretical Framework: Reputation and Consistency in Light of Realism and Constructivism

    1.1. The Realist Perspective: Balance of Power and Survival

    Realist theory argues that power and interest are the primary determinants of international relations. From this perspective, Iran’s “axis of resistance” strategy represents an effort to create an asymmetric balance of power against the US and Israel. The network of proxy actors Iran has built—Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and Hamas in Palestine—has created a deterrence capacity that transcends Iran’s conventional limitations.

    However, the realist perspective alone is insufficient. Iran’s strategy cannot be reduced to mere power calculations; it is also a project of legitimacy and reputation building. Iran seeks not only to survive but also to create a moral superiority in the international system through its identity as “protector of the oppressed.”

    1.2. The Constructivist Perspective: Identity, Discourse, and Legitimacy

    Constructivist theory teaches that states exist not only through their material capacities but also through their identities, discourses, and the social capital these create. As Alexander Wendt famously argued, “anarchy is what states make of it.” From this perspective, Iran presents an extraordinary success story. Every position it has taken against the “Little Satan” (Israel) and the “Great Satan” (the US) has remained consistent for over 45 years. This consistency has earned Iran a reputation as an actor that “does what it says” and “keeps its word.” Its perception as the only regional power that champions the Palestinian cause on Arab streets has elevated Iran to a position of moral superiority over the Sunni monarchies that cooperate with the West.

    Turkey, from this perspective, represents a complete failure. Although the AKP government initially tried to build a new identity through ambitious discourses such as “alliance of civilizations,” “zero problems with neighbors,” and “central country,” the inconsistencies in the practical implementation of these discourses have transformed Turkey into an actor whose “word is unreliable,” that “pursues day-to-day policies,” and that is “untrustworthy.”

    1. Iran: A Reputable Actor Forged Through Ideological Consistency

    2.1. Historical and Ideological Origins of the “Axis of Resistance”

    The “axis of resistance” (Mihver-i Mukavemet) draws directly from the ideological codes of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Ayatollah Khomeini’s theory of “Velayat-e Faqih” divides the world into two poles: the “arrogant” (imperialist powers) and the “oppressed” (the weak). Iran’s mission is to side with the oppressed and organize resistance against imperialism.

    This strategy, which materialized with the founding of Hezbollah in 1982, has over the years evolved into a network of proxy actors extending across Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Palestine. Each of these actors functions as a reflection of Iran’s ideological discourse and consolidates Iran’s regional influence.

    2.2. Uncompromising Resistance at the Discourse Level: Anti-US and Anti-Israel Stance

    The central pillar of Iran’s foreign policy discourse is opposition to the US and Israel. On every platform—from Quds Day events to Friday prayers, from official state media to diplomatic statements—Israel’s legitimacy is rejected, and US presence in the region is denounced as imperialist intervention.

    What distinguishes Iran from other regional actors is the uncompromising and consistent nature of this discourse. Even during nuclear negotiations with the US, Iran has never made the slightest concession from its ideological discourse, continuing to label the US as “Satan.” This consistency is critical not only for the domestic legitimacy of Iran’s leadership but also for its international reputation.

    2.3. Action Supporting Discourse in Practice: Asymmetric Resistance

    Iran backs its discourse with action. Through proxy actors, it conducts attacks on Israeli and US interests, sends military advisors, and develops missile and drone technologies, sharing this capacity with its allies. Hezbollah’s resistance during the 2006 war with Israel was presented as a strategic success for Iran and demonstrated to the world the seriousness of Iran’s “resistance” discourse.

    This high level of consistency between discourse and action has made Iran a respected and reputable actor in the international system. The fact that Iran is today seen by many circles as a “symbol of resistance against imperialism” is precisely the result of this consistency.

    2.4. Iran’s Legitimacy and Its Costs

    This strategy certainly has its costs. Severe economic sanctions, regional isolation, and domestic social unrest are among these costs. However, rather than harming Iran’s reputation, these costs are interpreted as “sacrifice” and “commitment to the cause,” further strengthening Iran’s resistance discourse.

    Iran today is one of the few countries in the world that commands respect. Its ability to establish strategic partnerships with global powers such as China and Russia, and its membership in platforms like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, are concrete indicators of this reputation. Iran’s reputation stems not only from its military or economic capacity but primarily from its ideological consistency and its reliability as an actor that “does what it says.”

    1. Turkey: Reputation Loss in the Grip of Pragmatism

    3.1. The Evolution of AKP Foreign Policy: From Discourse to Contradiction

    With the AKP’s rise to power in 2002, Turkish foreign policy gained a new discourse through Ahmet Davutoğlu’s “strategic depth” doctrine. Concepts such as “zero problems with neighbors,” “alliance of civilizations,” and “proactive peace diplomacy” were claims to make Turkey a leading and respected actor in its region.

    However, from the 2010s onward, particularly during the Arab Spring, this idealist discourse was quickly abandoned, replaced by a pragmatic, sometimes opportunistic, and constantly shifting foreign policy. From its position on Assad in Syria, to the S-400 crisis with Russia and subsequent normalization, to tensions with Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean and military intervention in Libya, Turkey has failed to provide consistent explanations for its policies.

    3.2. Between the Western Alliance and Regional Engagements: A State of Belonging Nowhere

    One of the most serious aspects of Turkey’s foreign policy is its attempt to engage simultaneously with directly conflicting alliances. Turkey is a member of NATO and part of the Western security architecture, yet it has signed the S-400 air defense system agreement with Russia—seen as NATO’s biggest rival—and has developed deep cooperation in energy and tourism.

    This situation makes Turkey neither a fully reliable ally of the West nor a sincere partner of the East. The West views Turkey’s S-400 agreement as a betrayal and has imposed CAATSA sanctions. Russia, for its part, always reads Turkey’s NATO membership as a problem and never fully accepts Turkey as a “strategic partner.”

    3.3. The Hypocritical Stance on the Israel-Palestine Issue: The Gulf Between Discourse and Practice

    The issue that most damages Turkey’s reputation is its hypocritical stance on the Israel-Palestine issue. At the level of discourse, the AKP government champions the Palestinian cause, describes Israel’s Gaza policies as those of a “terrorist state,” and President Erdoğan delivers speeches targeting Israel from UN podiums.

    But the practice is entirely different. Economic relations between Turkey and Israel continue at around $7-8 billion annually. The natural gas agreement signed in 2022 demonstrates the extent of this economic relationship. On every platform where Turkey criticizes Israel, it continues to trade with and sign energy deals with the same Israel.

    This is an open discourse-action mismatch. Turkey condemns the “recognition of Jerusalem as a capital” while simultaneously contributing to Israel’s economic strengthening. This hypocritical stance renders Turkey’s sincerity on the Palestinian cause questionable and has destroyed Turkey’s credibility, particularly in Arab public opinion.

    3.4. Indirect Engagement with Israel Through Azerbaijan: A Concrete Example of Reputation Erosion

    The most concrete example of Turkey’s hypocritical stance is its indirect engagement with Israel through Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is one of Israel’s most important strategic partners. Israel sells weapons to Azerbaijan (drones, air defense systems), Azerbaijani oil flows to Israel, and there is intensive intelligence cooperation between the two countries.

    Turkey, for its part, has a special relationship with Azerbaijan, defined by the slogan “one nation, two states.” Turkey provides military support to Azerbaijan, engages in energy cooperation, and provides unconditional political support to Azerbaijan on Karabakh.

    The problem is this: Turkey describes Israel as a “terrorist state” while maintaining a “brotherly” relationship with a country that is Israel’s strategic partner. Turkey is openly engaged in indirect economic and military cooperation with Israel through Azerbaijan. This situation renders Turkey’s claim to champion the Palestinian cause completely meaningless.

    3.5. The “Unprincipled” Critique and Reputation Erosion

    Criticisms of Turkey’s foreign policy can be grouped under three headings:

    First, discourse-action inconsistency. Turkey criticizes Israel while trading with it. It criticizes US presence in the region while maintaining NATO membership. This is an open example of “hypocrisy.”

    Second, day-to-day policymaking. Turkey’s foreign policy positions are often based on short-term tactical calculations and lack long-term strategic vision. One day Turkey is cozying up to Russia; the next day it is sending weapons to Ukraine. This makes it impossible to predict Turkey’s next move.

    Third, reputation erosion. Constantly shifting positions have completely destroyed Turkey’s status as a “reliable actor” in the international system. Today, no country knows how long Turkey’s position on any given issue will last or how sincere it is. This has transformed Turkey into an actor that has lost its respectability and whose reputation is shattered.

    1. Comparative Analysis: Iran’s Reputation vs. Turkey’s Reputation Loss

    4.1. Fundamental Comparison

    The fundamental difference between Iran and Turkey emerges at the level of discourse-action consistency. Iran has followed an unchanged ideological line for 45 years, has made no concessions against actors it defines as “enemies,” and supports its discourse with action. Turkey, by contrast, takes constantly shifting positions shaped by daily tactics, positions that contradict one another.

    The consequences of this difference are clear: Iran is seen as a “does what it says,” “keeps its word,” “loyal to its cause” actor in the international system. This reputation has enabled Iran to establish strategic partnerships with powers like China and Russia and to gain weight in platforms such as BRICS and the SCO.

    Turkey, on the other hand, is perceived as an “unpredictable,” “unreliable,” “pragmatist” actor. This perception has destroyed Turkey’s international reputation and has led to it never being seen as a fully reliable partner in any alliance.

    4.2. Sources of Iran’s Reputation

    Iran’s reputation draws from four main sources:

    First, ideological consistency. Iran has not made the slightest concession from its “anti-imperialism” and “resistance” discourse since 1979. This consistency makes Iran a predictable actor.

    Second, discourse-action alignment. Iran does what it says, follows through on its threats, and keeps its promises. This makes Iran a reliable actor.

    Third, capacity for sacrifice. Despite years of severe sanctions, economic hardship, and diplomatic isolation, Iran has not abandoned its ideological line. This sacrifice demonstrates the “seriousness of Iran’s cause” to the entire world.

    Fourth, symbolic capital. By championing the Palestinian cause, Iran has accumulated significant symbolic capital in the Islamic world. This capital elevates Iran to a position of moral superiority over the Sunni monarchies.

    4.3. Causes of Turkey’s Reputation Loss

    The causes of Turkey’s reputation loss are precisely the opposite:

    First, ideological vacuum. The AKP’s initial discourses such as “alliance of civilizations” were abandoned over time and replaced by an unclear, eclectic discourse. What values Turkey represents, which ideological line it stands on, has become uncertain.

    Second, discourse-action mismatch. Turkey constantly does the opposite of what it says, and can abandon a position it defended one day the next. The hypocritical stance on Israel is the most striking example.

    Third, unreliability. No one can predict how long Turkey’s positions will last or under what conditions they might change. This makes Turkey a “risky” actor in international relations.

    Fourth, loss of symbolic capital. Although Turkey claims to champion the Palestinian cause, its continued trade with Israel and indirect cooperation through Azerbaijan has completely exhausted its symbolic capital in this area. Today, almost no one on Arab streets believes Turkey is sincere about Palestine.

    1. Case Study: The Azerbaijan-Israel-Turkey Triangle and Reputation Erosion

    5.1. Azerbaijan-Israel Relations

    The strategic cooperation between Azerbaijan and Israel has deepened in energy, military, and intelligence fields. Israel is one of Azerbaijan’s most important arms suppliers; Azerbaijani oil flows to Israel; and the two countries conduct joint intelligence activities against Iran.

    This relationship is a direct threat to Iran. Israel’s military and intelligence presence in a country so close to Iran’s border creates a serious fracture in Iran’s security perception.

    5.2. Turkey’s Contradictory Position

    Turkey has a special relationship with Azerbaijan, defined by the slogan “one nation, two states.” Turkey provides military support to Azerbaijan, engages in energy cooperation, and provides unconditional political support on Karabakh.

    The problem is this: Turkey describes Israel as a “terrorist state” while maintaining a “brotherly” relationship with Azerbaijan, Israel’s closest strategic partner. By supporting Azerbaijan, Turkey indirectly strengthens Israel’s presence and influence in the region.

    This contradiction renders Turkey’s discourse on Palestine completely meaningless. Turkey condemns the “recognition of Jerusalem as a capital” while embracing the most important regional ally of the same Israel that has its embassy in Jerusalem. This is open hypocrisy.

    5.3. Impact of This Triangle on Turkey’s Reputation

    The Azerbaijan-Israel-Turkey triangle has irreparably damaged Turkey’s reputation. What critics call a “hypocritical stance” points to an even more serious picture: Turkey has become an actor that does not even know what it stands for, is bogged down in contradictions, and disregards its own reputation.

    Turkey’s position in this triangle positions it neither as a respectable actor in the Islamic world nor in the West. The Islamic world doubts Turkey’s sincerity on Palestine. The West questions Turkey’s reliability within NATO. Turkey has become a “nobody” that does not fully belong anywhere and is not fully trusted in any alliance.

    1. Conclusion: Iran’s Reputation and Turkey’s Reputation Loss

    Iran’s ideologically grounded and hardline foreign policy approach has made it a reputable actor in the international system. The legitimacy ground it has built through the discourse of “resistance” has survived years of sanctions, economic hardship, and diplomatic isolation. Today, Iran is seen as an actor that “does what it says” and “never abandons its cause,” commanding great respect, particularly in anti-US circles. The fact that global powers like China and Russia see Iran as a strategic partner is a concrete reflection of this reputation.

    Turkey, by contrast, may have achieved some short-term gains through its pragmatic and multi-dimensional foreign policy strategy, but the price has been heavy. Turkey is perceived in the international system as an “inconsistent,” “unreliable,” “unpredictable” actor, and this perception has destroyed Turkey’s reputation. The hypocritical stance on the Israel-Palestine issue and the indirect engagement with Israel through Azerbaijan have rendered Turkey’s discourse meaningless and reduced it to a “hypocritical” actor.

    In conclusion, Iran continues to exist as a reputable, respected actor whose voice is heard in the world, while the Turkish government has factually lost its reputation due to its unprincipled and contradictory policies, earning the label of an “unreliable actor” in the international system. To change this course, Turkey must radically question its foreign policy, close the gap between its discourse and actions, and move toward a consistent, principled line. Otherwise, the diplomatic and economic costs of reputation loss will grow even heavier by the day.

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    Sefa Yürükel

    Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
    Aarhus University, 1997
    Independent Researcher
    Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures

    İdeolojik Tutarlılık ve Pragmatik Çelişki Arasında: İran’ın “Direniş Ekseni”nin Meşruiyeti ve Türkiye’nin İtibar Krizi