Month: August 2009

  • Rebiya’s visit to Japan will spell trouble for China-Japan relations: Chinese ambassador

    Rebiya’s visit to Japan will spell trouble for China-Japan relations: Chinese ambassador

    TOKYO, July 28 (Xinhua) — The visit to Japan of Rebiya Kadeer, leader of the separatist World Uyghur Congress (WUC), may cause trouble for China-Japan relations, said Chinese Ambassador to Japan Cui Tiankai on Monday.

        Cui was speaking in a joint interview with Kyodo News and Japanese national broadcaster NHK on the July 5 Xinjiang riot and Kadeer.

        The deadly July 5 Xinjiang riot was neither an ethnic nor a religious issue, but was masterminded by the separatist WUC led by Rebiya, said Cui.

        “The July 5 riot in Urumqi was a serious, violent, criminal incident, which caused heavy casualties of innocent civilians,” he said.

        “Evidence showed the well-orchestrated riot was instigated and masterminded by the WUC led by Rebiya,” he said.

        The WUC called for massive bloodshed “at any cost” before the Sunday riot. And on July 5, the WUC sent out a flood of instructive messages via telephones and mobile phones to the rioters, and Rebiya herself also reminded her family of their safety in case anything should happen, Cui said.

        “The riot was not a religious issue, no Islamic clergy were involved, and nor was it an ethnic one as ethnic groups live in perfect harmony with each other in China,” Cui said.

        On Rebiya’s visit to Japan, the Chinese ambassador said China was firmly opposed to her visit to Japan and had made clear its stance to the Japanese side.

        “Her tour in Japan is aimed at distorting the facts and advocating her separatist stand,” said Cui. Rebiya’s separatist activities in Japan would spell trouble for China-Japan relations, he said.

        “China and Japan need to make a concerted effort to advance their strategic and mutually beneficial relations and jointly tackle the ongoing international financial crisis as well as regional issues,” Cui said.

        “China-Japan relations should not be undermined by the issue concerning Rebiya, nor should the two countries’ recognition for major common interests and their cooperation,” he said.

        On bilateral ties, Cui said promoting the sound, stable and long-term development of China-Japan relations was the consensus of mainstream Japanese society.

        “It is in the common interests of the two countries and embodies the common aspiration of both peoples (to build relations),” he said, adding he hoped the two sides would work together to achieve that goal.

    China View
  • Uyghur Diaspora Faces Government Pressure in Kyrgyzstan

    Uyghur Diaspora Faces Government Pressure in Kyrgyzstan

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 156
    August 13, 2009 12:25 PM Age: 1 days
    By: Erica Marat

     

    On August 10, Kyrgyz authorities detained Dilmurat Akbarov, the leader of the Ittipak Uyghur society, and his deputy Jamaldin Nasyrov. These leaders had organized demonstrations calling for an independent investigation into last month’s riots in Xinjiang. They featured images and posters accusing Beijing of implementing cruel policies against Uyghurs in Xinjiang. According to the Kyrgyz authorities, approximately 500 people participated in the event in Bishkek (www.akipress.kg, August 10).

    The exact reasons for the arrests on August 10 remain unknown, since the government has avoided making any official statements. Many experts in Bishkek believe that these arrests demonstrate the Kyrgyz government’s agreement with Beijing’s policies. The arrested leaders are likely to be released soon, but their future activity based on criticizing the Chinese government will be discouraged.

    Over 50,000 ethnic Uyghurs live in Kyrgyzstan, but unofficial records claim that the actual number is much higher. Demonstrations against Beijing’s policy in Xinjiang took place in Almaty and Bishkek in July, but received little attention from the local media.

    Ittipak strived to maintain constructive relations with the Kyrgyz regime. The organization is part of the Peoples’ Assembly of Kyrgyzstan, a government body uniting different ethnic minorities. Its former leader Nigmat Bazakov was killed in 2000, allegedly by his enemies who disagreed with his overly-loyal relations with the Kyrgyz regime. At this time China’s influence within Central Asia was becoming more noticeable, according to Rustam Mukhamedov, a New-York based expert. Since then, local reports on Uyghur separatist and terrorist organizations have saturated the local media, while the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) quickly turned into a regional guarantor of security. China and Russia, both facing separatist movements at home, are the SCO’s leading members.

    Bishkek has consistently complied with Beijing’s directives in relation to the Uyghur diaspora. Mukhamedov said that Ittipak is under the close scrutiny of the interior ministry. The August 10 demonstrations were not allowed before the recent presidential election. They were also sanctioned to take place in the outskirts of Bishkek. While only two hours were allocated for the demonstrations, the activists were arrested within the first hour, halting the entire event. Ittipak leaders’ harsh criticism of Beijing’s policies expressed at the August 10 demonstrations came as a surprise to the Kyrgyz authorities. As one Kyrgyz expert told Jamestown, the top ranks of the Peoples’ Assembly of Kyrgyzstan, in which Ittipak is a member, are likely to be sacked soon for allowing these anti-Chinese demonstrations to take place.

    As Chinese influence in Kyrgyzstan increased, Ittipak struggled to balance its image between supporting the Uyghur legacy and avoiding being labeled as an extremist organization. This prompted its leaders to publicly express their support for the regime. According to Akbarov, the diaspora supports Kyrgyzstan’s development by organizing charity work, helping veterans and the victims of earthquakes, and promoting the incumbent government (www.ittipak.biz). Most of Ittipak’s initiatives are funded through contributions by local Uyghur businessmen.

    Ittipak hopes to celebrate its twentieth anniversary this year. In 2004, the diaspora encountered difficulties in commemorating its fifteenth anniversary. Since then, Ittipak members have avoided mentioning their ideas in the mass media about the unity of the Uyghur peoples across Central Asia and Western China. Due to the August 10 demonstrations, this year’s celebrations are also likely to fail, further complicating the Kyrgyz regime’s relations with the Uyghur diaspora.

    Both former president Askar Akayev and the incumbent Kurmanbek Bakiyev have utilized the Peoples’ Assembly to promote support for the government among the country’s ethnic minorities. Local diasporas were allowed some freedom to stage cultural events and preserve their customs and traditions, but were equally expected to support the regime. In this way, Ittipak also supported Bakiyev in the July 23 election, convincing Uyghurs in Kyrgyzstan to vote for him (www.ittipak.biz, June 2). Likewise, the leaders of other ethnic minorities such as the Dungans and Koreans are forced to maintain friendly relations with the regime.

    As a member of the SCO, Kyrgyzstan is under strong geopolitical pressure from its larger neighbors. The diaspora was officially warned by the Kyrgyz government to avoid undermining Kyrgyzstan’s relations with China (www.akipress.kg, August 10). Ombudsman Tursunbek Akun promised to investigate the arrest of the Ittipak activists, but he suggested that the movement must terminate its demonstrations.

    Last month’s riots in Xinjiang revealed strong sentiments among Central Asian Uyghurs about their shared history and identity. Consequently, family ties were rediscovered between the Uyghurs in Kyrgyzstan and China. “The majority of Uyghurs have relatives back in East Turkistan. Therefore, people are worried about their relatives,” Mukhamedov told Jamestown.

    https://jamestown.org/program/uyghur-diaspora-faces-government-pressure-in-kyrgyzstan/

  • PKK Forces Await Orders from Imprisoned Leader Abdullah Ocalan

    PKK Forces Await Orders from Imprisoned Leader Abdullah Ocalan

    Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 25
    August 13, 2009 02:59 PM
    By: Wladimir van Wilgenburg

    Bozan Tekin, Vice President of the KCK

    Reports indicate that Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party (Parti Karkerani Kurdistan – PKK), will release a “roadmap” for resolving Turkey’s decades-old Kurdish insurgency on August 15 (see Terrorism Monitor, August 6). Branches of the PKK continue to operate in northern Iraq’s Kurdistan region both on the political and the military levels, despite Turkish military and diplomatic pressure. It seems that the political branch of the PKK is heavily restrained inside Iraq’s Kurdistan region, but military operations against the PKK are unlikely to resume in the near future.

    The PKK Waits for Ocalan’s Roadmap

    The Kurdistan Democratic Confederation (Koma Civaken Kurdistan – KCK), the umbrella organization bringing together Kurdish militant groups and political branches in Iran (Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistane – PJAK), Iraq (Partiya Careseri u Demokrasiya Kurdistan – PCDK), Syria (Partiya Yekiti ya Demokratîk – PYD), and Turkey (PKK), is waiting for new orders from Abdullah Ocalan. The KCK’s Executive Council operates in the Haftanin, Metina, Zap, Gara, Avasin, Hakurk, and Qandil camps. The PKK also maintains a strong presence in the Mahkmur camp, which is controlled by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR).

    According to PKK member Roj Welat, the PKK’s series of unilateral ceasefires is not a new strategy born out of weakness. [1] During this period the guerrillas have refrained from carrying out offensive operations. Welat says it is a strategy to solve the Kurdish issue peacefully, although the Turkish state believes the PKK’s five unilateral ceasefires are a sign of weakness.
     
    KCK vice-president and PKK general Bozan Tekin says they will support the roadmap to the end; “In fact we don’t know what this roadmap is, but Ocalan said he is working on preparing it.” Tekin says it might look like the Basque or Scottish democratic model. [2]

    Tekin said the PKK wants its own protection force, the release of the PKK leader and freedom of politics and identity. The PKK is ready to form a Kurdish PKK unit within the Turkish military if a solution is reached. But if Turkey doesn’t accept Ocalan’s roadmap, “we are ready to defend our country till our last drop of blood.” Although Ocalan says he will remain silent if the state doesn’t listen to his “last roadmap for peace,” PKK members emphasize that Ocalan will remain the leader of the PKK and that it’s not a dead-end for the PKK-leader if his proposals are not accepted.
     
    The PCDK Has More Problems with Iraq than the Kurdish Regional Government

    Besides the KCK leadership and military forces that operate in the near-inaccessible mountains, there is also a political branch of the PKK that operates in Iraq and the Kurdistan region. This organization is called the Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party (PCDK), which tried to participate in the Kurdistan regional elections of July 25 with its political slate “Hiwa” (Hope). The logo of the list was a combination of the flag of the PKK and the logo of the legal Kurdish opposition party in Turkey, the DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi – Democratic Society Party).

    The PCDK was banned by Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) in June and is considered an illegal party in the Kurdistan Region. Najiba Omar, the female president of the Hiwa list, said they were informed by the IHEC that the list could not operate because the PCDK is not considered a legal party. [3] The Hiwa list believes that the KRG pressured IHEC to ban them.
     
    The PCDK’s offices were also closed down in the provinces of Erbil and Sulaimaniya. According to Najiba Omar, “We cannot have offices in regions controlled by the KRG. We don’t have a problem with the Iraqi government, but with the Kurdish government.” While the PCDK is seeking support among Kurds, it cannot operate in KRG-administered regions; therefore the main headquarters of the PCDK is in Kirkuk.

    The PCDK has other offices in Baghdad and Mosul while members operate from their own homes in the Kurdistan region. The PCDK also has party meetings and offices in villages near the border regions controlled by the PKK. Members of the party are not usually arrested, but after protests against the Hiwa list ban in June, some members were arrested for a short time.

    The main aim of the PCDK is to change Kurdish society according to the principles of Abdullah Ocalan. The PCDK is suspicious of northern Iraq’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which have dominated the region since 1991. The PCDK is also wary of the new Kurdish “Change list,” a reform party that separated from the PUK and received a number of seats in the new parliament. The Change list will also participate in the Iraqi elections and Kurdistan local elections and could become stronger within the Kurdistan region. However, the PCDK suspects them of being supported by outside forces and thinks they won’t change the policies of the KRG.

    The Kurdistan Regional Government’s PKK Policy

    Minister Falah Mustafa Bakir, Head of the KRG’s Department of Foreign Relations, says that the KRG will make sure that their territories are not used as a launching pad by the PKK. “For us it’s important to have good relations with our neighbours. We don’t want our people to pay the price, we want a peaceful solution.” [4]

    The KRG says it has taken the following measures:

    • Cordoning off the mountain areas on the border with Turkey to cut PKK supply routes.

    • Stopping foreign and Kurdish journalists from visiting PKK camps near the border regions.

    • Closing down offices of the PKK’s political fronts in Erbil and Sulaymaniya.

    • Monitoring airports to ensure that no PKK personnel enter or leave the region.

    • Preventing PKK demonstrations in KRG territory and curtailing their activities.

    • Banning PKK-affiliated political parties.

    • Sharing intelligence with Turkey and the United States.  

    In February a tripartite U.S.-Turkish-KRG intelligence center was established in Erbil, Kurdistan’s political capital, to coordinate efforts and share intelligence in the fight against the PKK (Taraf, July 24). The KRG Foreign Minister says this does not mean that the KRG supports military action against the PKK but that the center only collects information on the PKK.

    The Kurdistan government also supports the PKK’s ceasefire; Bakir says the government hopes the ceasefire “will help the peace process and [ensure] stability and we hope this will be maintained.” The KRG is against solving the PKK issue with military actions. “We don’t believe there is a military solution towards the PKK issue; there is no more need for violence or weapons.”

    The PKK confirms that it is unlikely that the KRG will send forces to attack the PKK. “There is a red line among Kurds, that there won’t be another brother war [civil war] again. We don’t think this will happen. Kurds have learned from the past,” says KCK member Bozan Tekin. Tekin also denies claims that the PKK gets support from the KRG. “These are lies by Turkey to put pressure on the KRG.”
     
    Independent Kurdish journalist Kamal Chomani says that the Kurdish government fears the PKK as a strong alternative and therefore tries to stop them from operating. [5] However, despite KRG measures, foreign and Kurdish journalists can still visit the PKK through “secret” roads and bypass KRG checkpoints.

    The PKK also still manages to organize its own logistics, media campaigns, and support from surrounding villages, because the mountains are impossible to control without a massive deployment of Iraqi or Kurdish military forces. The PKK has checkpoints with PKK flags near the Qandil mountains.

    Kamal Chomani says that even during the time of Saddam a complete mountain cordon was impossible. Chomani emphasizes that the triangular area with four borders was never controlled by any force. “This is a haven for rebel forces.”

    Members of Peshmerga forces that fought against the PKK in the past confirmed that it would be very difficult to remove PKK forces from the mountains without many casualties. For the moment, the KRG seems more interested in controlling the regions it disputes with Baghdad than in the PKK camps in the border regions with Turkey and Iran.

    The Central Government’s PKK Policy

    Baghdad’s policy does not differ much from that of the KRG. Iraqi government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh told a Kurdish newspaper that Iraq is not in favor of military operations against the PKK, nor does it want to close down the Makhmur refugee camp (Rudaw, August 6).  “Iraq is against the PKK using its territory, but we don’t support Turkey in performing military operations against this party. We help the KRG to limit and decrease their presence inside Iraq and end their problem with Turkey.”

    Although no PKK military forces are located in the territory controlled by the Iraqi central government, the political branch of the movement, the PCDK, has more freedom there than in the region controlled by the KRG. The PCDK headquarters was moved from Erbil to Kirkuk after the closure of PCDK offices in northern Iraq. PCDK official Najiba Omar says this is because, legally speaking, the Iraqi government cannot ban PCDK offices or activities in Iraq.

    Assessing the PKK’s Future

    The PKK indicates that they will renew their insurgency if the Turkish government does not listen to Abdullah Ocalan. The PKK wants the government to accept a Kurdish identity and release the PKK leader, which is unlikely.

    The KRG has successfully curtailed PKK political activities in the Kurdistan region, but cannot eliminate the PKK’s border camps without starting military operations against the PKK, which does not serve their own interests. The KRG maintains the belief that the PKK is not a KRG problem, but an internal Turkish problem. It is unlikely, therefore, that the KRG will attack the PKK.

    The Iraqi government might close down PCDK offices in its territory if pressured by the United States and Turkey, which would effectively leave the PCDK dysfunctional and cripple their level of support. The Kurdish and Iraqi governments will continue to share intelligence with Turkey, but will not support military operations against the PKK. The Iraqi army is not trained for counterinsurgency campaigns in the mountains nor does it have a sufficient amount of troops near PKK camps.
     
    Therefore it is unlikely that the PKK will leave Qandil in the near future and will keep pressuring Turkey with attacks to solve the Kurdish issue. The PKK’s military forces and commanders will only leave the mountains if the PKK and Turkey reach a solution. Even the launch of Turkish military operations against the PKK inside Iraqi territory is unlikely to dislodge the PKK and will only result in more media attention for the PKK.

    Notes

    1. Author’s interview with PKK official Roj Welat in the Qandil mountains, August 5.
    2. Author’s interview with PKK vice-president Bozan Tekin in the Qandil mountains, August 5.
    3. Author’s interview with head of the Hiwa list, Najiba Omar, in Erbil province, Iraq, August 7.
    4. Author’s interview with Falah Mustafa Bakir in Erbil, August 6.
    5. Author’s correspondence with Kamal Chomani, a freelance journalist who writes for Livin magazine and the Kurdish newspaper Awena in northern Iraq, August 5.

    https://jamestown.org/program/pkk-forces-await-orders-from-imprisoned-leader-abdullah-ocalan/

  • Ancient Jewish temple found in Turkey

    Ancient Jewish temple found in Turkey

    menorahRemains of ancient temple found in Turkey

    Excavations have revealed the first evidence of a Jewish presence in the ancient port city of Andriake in Lycia, now located in southern Turkey, the Turkish daily Zaman reported Tuesday.

    The find was unexpected and has created a buzz in the archaeology community.

    “To encounter remnants of Jewish culture for the first time has caused great excitement,” said site chief Nevzat Çevik, an archaeology professor at Akdeniz University.  “We’re adding another layer to what we know of Lycian culture. Now that we know that there was a Jewish presence in Lycia as well, we can follow this path and better understand other finds.”

    Source: www.jta.org, August 13, 2009

    Jewish temple found in Turkey may date back to 3rd century AD

    Ankara (Turkey), August 13 (ANI): Archaeologists have uncovered a centuries-old Jewish temple in Antalya, Turkey, which may date back to the 3rd century AD.

    According to a report in Today’s Zaman, ongoing excavations at the ancient port city of Andriake in Lycia – located in Antalya’s Demre district – uncovered the centuries-old Jewish temple.

    Site chief Dr. Nevzat Cevik, an archaeology professor at Akdeniz University, told the Anatolia news agency that his team believes the temple is from around the third century.

    “Located on a choice spot facing the sea, the temple was likely built following a law instituted in 212 that allowed Jews the right to become Roman citizens,” Cevik said.

    The find is important, as it is the first archaeological trace of Jewish culture found in Lycia.

    “For the archaeological world, the world of science and particularly for Lycian archaeology and history, we’re facing an important find here. It’s the first remnant of Lycian Jewish culture we’ve found,” Cevik said, describing the find.

    “When we first discovered the temple, we weren’t sure what it was, but after continuing to dig, the archaeological findings and particularly the first-quality marble slabs that we found were evidence for us that they were part of a Jewish temple,” he added.

    “To encounter remnants of Jewish culture for the first time has caused great excitement. We’re adding another layer to what we know of Lycian culture – now that we know that there was a Jewish presence in Lycia as well, we can follow this path and better understand other finds,” he explained.

    As part of the temple find, the team located a menorah and pieces inscribed with traditional Jewish symbols and figures.

    Cevik also noted the importance that the find would eventually have for tourism in the region. (ANI)

    Source:  www.thaindian.com, August 13th, 2009

  • INTERVIEW – Israel shuts door on Turkish-mediated Syria talks

    INTERVIEW – Israel shuts door on Turkish-mediated Syria talks

    Wed Aug 12, 2009 5:32pm

    “If they (Syria) are really serious on peace, and not just a peace process which may serve them to extricate them from international isolation, if they are really serious, they will come and sit with us.”

    U.S. DIPLOMACY

    The overtures to Olmert helped Assad’s relations with the West, long frayed over Syrian involvement in neighbouring Lebanon and Iraq, alleged pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, and sponsorship of Palestinian militants.

    U.S. President Barack Obama, who is trying to advance Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking as well as stabilise Iraq, has sent envoys to coax Syria into the circle of diplomacy.

    Like Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, Ayalon is from the far-right Yisrael Beitenu party, junior partner to Netanyahu’s conservative Likud in the coalition government.

    Lieberman keeps a low media profile and has largely ceded public diplomacy to Ayalon, a former Israeli ambassador to Washington.

    https://www.reuters.com/?edition-redirect=in

  • Unanimous Ruling:  Krikorian Probably Made False Statements – Hearing on Sept. 3

    Unanimous Ruling: Krikorian Probably Made False Statements – Hearing on Sept. 3

    State hears Schmidt genocide case

    By Jon Craig • [email protected] • August 13, 2009

    COLUMBUS – U.S. Rep. Jean Schmidt’s Armenian-American opponent probably made false statements during the 2008 campaign about contributions she received from Turkish political action committees, a unanimous three-member panel of the Ohio Elections Commission ruled today.

    David Krikorian, an independent candidate now running as a Democrat, also claimed the Republican congresswoman denied the mass killings of Armenians during World War I constituted genocide. Schmidt’s attorney withdrew an elections complaint about that claim, as well as complaints about three other statements.

    The three-person panel Thursday found probable cause that Krikorian made false statements. Next, fhe full seven-member elections commission will hear evidence Sept. 3 to decide whether the statements were false. If they are, it could result in a written reprimand, a fine or, in rare cases, prosecution.

    Donald C. Brey, Schmidt’s Columbus attorney, argued, “It would be illegal, it would be a crime, for her to take money from a foreign government. . . It’s a false statement.”

    Brey denied Krikorian’s claim that Schmidt’s campaign received $30,000 in “blood money” from Turkish PACs and Turkish people.

    “We actually wanted them to find probable cause,” Krikorian said afterward, complaining he’s been unable to get Schmidt to discuss the Turkish contributions during the campaign. “Jean Schmidt brought these frivolous charges against me. She’s afraid of facing me in an election. She’s not used to people speaking the truth.”

    Christopher P. Finney, Krikorian’s Cincinnati attorney, told the election panel that the Turkish government has poured campaign money into the U.S. government so it does not recognize the Armenian genocide of the early 1900s. “We’re actually disappointed we won’t have a hearing on her being a genocide denier,” Finney said.

    The debate spilled out into the commission lobby after the hearing: Krikorian attempted to argue facts of the case with Brey. “You can’t bring charges and drop them,” Krikorian said.

    “Actually you can,” Brey replied, saying an honorable man, if he tells a lie, would ultimately apologize.

    “I don’t understand why he doesn’t say he misspoke,” Brey told the Enquirer.

    Eventually, Finney got pulled into the verbal fray: “I’m the one who convicted her of making a false statement,” Finney said of an earlier campaign complaint against Schmidt. The Ohio Elections Commission doesn’t convict people, Brey countered. Both attorneys dared the other to file new grievances.

    From: 

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