Category: World

  • Central Asia Faces New Future: between Turkey, Iran, China and Russia

    Central Asia Faces New Future: between Turkey, Iran, China and Russia

    Central Asian leaders are known for their absolute power and life-long immunity from prosecution. The tradition that was started by the late Turkmen president Saparmurat Niyazov who held the title Turkmenbashi (The Leader of All Turkmen) until his death in 2006, later followed by his successor, Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, the Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, 77 and finally the Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, 64, has been well enjoyed by its followers for over 20 years by now.

    However, the leaders are getting old and the region just might be on the threshold of the new era. The recent death of the Uzbek President Islam Karimov has marked the beginning of inevitable changes and has made the issue a public debate. The Central Asia is of great interest of its strong neighbors: Turkey, Iran, Russia and, finally, China. Each of the country is eagerly waiting to gain its own geopolitical goals and ambitions there. It’s only a matter of time now. In the long-term scenario, as seen by political analysts, China will most likely strengthen its political and economic development, while Turkey will likely become more stable economically. Finally, Iran might recover its power due to its nuclear program agreement.

    The key factor might be played by migrant workers. Though China is the huge labor pool that offers low-cost migrant workers it still cannot compete with Russia when it comes to the Central Asia: most of the people’s income in this region is coming from Russia as there are more jobs to Central Asian migrant workers than in any other country. Nevertheless, the competition between Turkey and Iran will most likely continue to grow. Considering the fact that some Central Asian countries such as Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are highly vulnerable due to terrorism threats and geographic proximity with Afghanistan, Turkey, if it keeps its stable economic growth, has all chances to confront terrorism by taking the leading control in the region in the long run.

    Meanwhile, the current Central Asian leaders keeping in mind all the dangers coming to them struggle to extend their authoritarian leadership as longer as possible by empowering their children and by filling all the important government positions with their family members. One of the brightest examples of such practice may be found in Tajikistan. Earlier last year Emomali Rahmon’s daughter, Ozoda Rahmon has been appointed as his chief of staff while her husband, Jamoliddin Nuraliev, the First Deputy Chairman of the National Bank of Tajikistan is one of the strongest candidates for the President elections in 2020 along with the President’s son, Rustam Rahmon. But due to the recent scandal that put Jamoliddin Nuraliev in the spotlight as he has been regularly seen in public together with Takhmina Bagirova in Austria (where Bagirova lives) and other countries during the holiday season, Nuraliev might soon be off the game leaving Rustam Rahmon the only real candidate for the President.  But whether the current leaders’ successors be able to be as powerful as their fathers or their presidency will mark the end of the authoritarian power in the region the Central Asia’s new wave of development is inevitable. As the pro-Moscow leaders will go, the region this will most likely be the platform of disputes between Iran, Turkey and China.

  • RESEARCH DOCUMENT /// Chiquita Papers : Uncertainty Fueled Staff Concerns about Payments to Guerrillas and Paramilitaries

    RESEARCH DOCUMENT /// Chiquita Papers : Uncertainty Fueled Staff Concerns about Payments to Guerrillas and Paramilitaries

    Chiquita Papers : Uncertainty Fueled Staff Concerns about Payments to Guerrillas and Paramilitaries

    Colombia Payments a “Leap of Faith”

    “We are funding their activities, or we are protecting ourselves. It’s questionable.”

    CFO asks: “How can I audit that? I cannot ask them to sign a receipt.”

    Posted May 2, 2017
    National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 589
    Edited by Michael Evans
    For further information, contact: mevansTwitter: @colombiadocs

    Washington, D.C., May 2, 2017 – Chiquita’s Colombia-based staff questioned the company’s payments to illegal armed groups, and asked whether Chiquita had gone beyond extortion and was directly funding the activities of leftist guerrillas and right-wing paramilitary groups, even while top company executives became “comfortable” with the idea.

    This is the second in a series of stories jointly published by the National Security Archive and VerdadAbierta.com documenting how the world’s most famous banana company financed terrorist groups in Colombia.

    The New Chiquita Papers are the result of a seven-year legal battle waged by the National Security Archive against the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, and later Chiquita itself, for access to tens of thousands of records produced by the company during an investigation of illicit payments made in Colombia.

    The Archive has used these records to identify individual Chiquita executives who approved and oversaw years of payments to groups responsible for countless human rights violations in Colombia, but whose roles in the affair have been unknown or unclear until now.

    In this installment, we examine the roles of financial officers, security staff and hired intermediaries on the ground in Colombia who managed an unorthodox payments process one official described as a “leap of faith.”

    The following article was also published today in Spanish at VerdadAbierta.com.

    * * *

    Payments to Armed Groups Generated Internal Conflicts at Chiquita Brands

    The banana company invented an accounting system to hide payments to guerrilla groups in Colombia that they admitted were “impossible to audit.” Even while senior Chiquita officials became “comfortable” with the way the payments were made, officials based in Colombia had their reservations.

    By Tatiana Navarrete and Juan Diego Restrepo E.
    Edited by Michael Evans – This is the second in a series of articles published jointly by the National Security Archive and VerdadAbierta.com

    “[These] were payments that, you know, are questionable, payments to the guerrillas that at the end are payments that, you know, are questionable,” said Jorge Forton, chief financial officer for Banadex, Chiquita’s wholly-owned subsidiary in Colombia, in his April 27, 1999 statement to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). “We are funding their activities, or we are protecting ourselves. It’s questionable.”[1]

    The deposition of this Peruvian accountant, who worked for Chiquita from 1990-1998, turns out to be key evidence on a little-known chapter in the history of Colombia’s banana-growing zone: payments made by the multinational fruit company to anti-government guerrilla groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), and the funding of political organizations like the Current for Socialist Renovation (CRS), Hope, Peace and Liberty, and the Popular Commands.

    Forton began in 1990 at Chiquita headquarters in Cincinnati, Ohio, looking for opportunities to expand the company’s worldwide operations. In the middle of 1994, he was sent to Colombia to assess how the local economy was affecting the prices of banana production. Over the next few months, Forton returned to the country several times and proposed alternatives for reorganizing Colombian operations. At the end of the year, Forton accepted a new position as chief financial officer for Banadex in Medellín.

    Since his arrival in Colombia in early 1995, the accountant knew that Chiquita made “sensitive payments” to illegal armed groups to ensure, as he was told, that its workers were not killed or kidnapped and that its plantations were not burned to the ground. “My role was to see how we could standardize and have a good control of those payments,” he said to the SEC.

    At that time, there were two Chiquita offices in Colombia: Banadex, in Medellín, and Samarex, in Santa Marta; each with independent accounting systems and separate sets of books to record payments not only to guerrillas but to the Colombian Armed Forces, which also benefitted from the company’s secret security fund. Forton’s job was to unify the accounts so Cincinnati could better track the payments. The company asked him to prepare a report on all the “sensitive payments” realized since 1992, something that, according to Forton, was almost impossible given the “poor accounting records” that had existed up to that point.

    SEC Testimony of Jorge Forton, April 27, 1999, pp. 45-46.

    So Forton implemented a new procedure to better account for the payments. He introduced two basic rules: there would be no more cash payments, and none would be authorized without an invoice.

    Forton said he was “not comfortable” with the guerilla payments: “How do I feel those payments are really going to those groups? I mean, how can I audit that? I cannot ask them to sign a receipt.”

    The fact that Colombian guerrilla groups could not be counted on to provide receipts elevated the role of the Security Department and the intermediaries they relied on as go-betweens with the insurgent factions, military units, and paramilitary groups at the receiving end of those payments. These are the names and signatures that appear on the forms used to request payments to the various armed groups.

    The fewer people who knew about the “sensitive payments,” the better, so the payments only needed the authorization of the general manager, Charles Keiser, and the signature of Forton. Keiser was followed as general manager by Álvaro Acevedo, who later oversaw several years of payments to the paramilitary United Self-defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and today works for a fruit producer in Ecuador. VerdadAbierta.com tried to contact Acevedo, but did not receive a response.

    Forton instituted the “1016” form to register all of the payments and to camouflage them among the fruit multinational many other expenses. To do so, he created two new accounts: “Logistics,” for payments to government agencies; and “Operations” for payments to guerrilla groups.

    This rigorous accounting system coldly recorded the harsh reality of life in the violently-contested region of Urabá during the 1990s. Forton was aware of the impact that the payments had on public order and thought it indispensable to know whether the money found its way to the intended recipients. At the very least, the ultimate destination of the payments mattered more to Forton than to his superiors in Cincinnati, who had not witnessed Colombia’s war in person.

    In a vivid account to the SEC, Forton said the surge in paramilitary groups (or “anti-guerrilla groups,” as he called them)—who were also financed by the company—had intensified conflict in the region. He recalled a day when some 20 bus riders were killed, and a subsequent call from company staff in Urabá asking what to do. “I have a wife that carried the body of her husband into the office to ask for money to bury him,” he remembered.

    SEC Testimony of Jorge Forton, April 27, 1999, p. 57.

    “There were situations where, I mean, things that I hope not to live again. But after being exposed to those horrible stories, I understood better if the money was reaching the end or not,” he explained.

    Forton left Colombia in 1996 and was effectively fired from the company in 1998 for his role in authorizing bribes to Colombian port authorities in Turbo, Antioquia. Forton is now a high-ranking official at Dun & Bradstreet, according to his LinkedIn account. VerdadAbierta.com did not receive a response from a message sent to Forton through the social media network.

    Where did the money actually go?

    The names of the individuals from the Security Department who handled the “sensitive payments” to armed groups in Colombia during that time, Juan Manuel Alvarado and John Stabler, are found in a draft Chiquita legal memorandum dated January 5, 1994.

    One of the chief intermediaries used as a bridge between the company and the insurgent groups was René Alejandro Osorio J., an attorney from Antioquia who in 1992 signed a services contract with the Compañía Frutera de Sevilla, another of Chiquita’s Colombian subsidiaries.

    His role as a “Security Consultant” for Chiquita is revealed in an earlier draft of the same memo, dated January 4, 1994, which identifies Osorio as the company’s “contact with the various guerrilla groups in both Divisions.” The professional middleman was responsible for making “guerrilla extortion payments” for Chiquita. In many internal company records, he is referred to by the initials “R.O.”

    Another document obtained by the National Security Archive is a copy of a contract signed by Osorio indicating that he was paid five million Colombian Pesos (about five thousand U.S. dollars) every three months. Osorio assumed all risks involved with the assigned work, but Chiquita would provide legal assistance if it ever became necessary. VerdadAbierta.com contacted him in Medellin, where he apparently resides, to hear his version, but made clear that he "was not going to refer to that subject".

    The sort of informality that existed between Chiquita Brands and the intermediaries made it even more difficult to determine if the money was actually reaching the guerrillas and generated suspicions among some of the managers in Medellín.

    Even when the payments were made in cash, before the arrival of Forton as CFO, it was never really known whether they arrived in their totality to the guerrillas. John Ordman, based in Costa Rica, was a key link between Chiquita’s Colombian operations and top executives at the company’s headquarters in Cincinnati (as explained in the first article in this series). Ordman called these payments "a leap of faith."

    “Now does it get distributed to the people that it should be? Does it get distributed – you know, there’s a commission for this guy [name redacted]. Does he take half of it and put it in his pocket? How do you tell? There’s no way of determining that.”

    SEC Testimony of John Ordman, November 23, 1999, pp. 124-125.

    In spite of this, Ordman said he felt “comfortable that this was being handled in a responsible way.” The view of Robert F. Kistinger, head of Chiquita’s Banana Group, was much the same. He told the SEC he saw the guerrilla payments as an “ongoing cost” of company operations, like the purchase of fertilizers or agrichemicals.

    Forton told the SEC that he took the concerns about his inability to track the payments to a top executive in Cincinnati, asking, “How can I audit this?” And the response was: “If nobody is killed, it’s because the money is reaching the end. That’s the only way to say that the money is there.”

    SEC Testimony of Jorge Forton, April 27, 1999, p. 58.

    The person who provided that response may well have been Robert Kistinger, since SEC investigators asked him about this same episode during his interview, but denied ever having such a conversation with Forton.

    SEC Testimony of Robert Kistinger, January 6, 2000, pp. 66-67.

    Forton was not the only person who worried that the money could not be tracked. His replacement in Colombia, John Paul Olivo, who arrived in 1996, voiced similar concerns in his SEC testimony. Olivo’s name has been known to Colombian investigators since 2009 when the Attorney General opened an investigation against him and two other officials, Charles Keiser and Dorn Wenninger, for conspiracy to commit an aggravated felony—a process that has gone nowhere in eight years.

    In his December 1999 testimony to the SEC, Olivo said he did not feel comfortable with the way the company made the payments, since it was impossible to know whether Alvarado, Osorio and the others were actually delivering the money to the armed groups. “The only person that requests funds and payments for guerrillas is the head of security,” he said. “No one ever knows who – or negotiates with this groups, except for himself. And that’s been my . . . concern since day one.”

    SEC Testimony of John Paul Olivo, December 15, 1999, p. 64.

    More than extortion?

    In his declaration, Kistinger said the company made the payments because they were being extorted and wanted to protect the lives of their workers amid constant threats. For this reason, Chiquita also paid Colombian military and police forces, above all when they needed special security services.

    While the internal discussions of Chiquita employees mostly revolved around the technical aspects of the payments, Forton’s deposition is testament to the thin line between paying extortion and willingly funding the operations of a violent group.

    SEC Testimony of Jorge Forton, April 27, 1999, pp. 90-91.

    Other documents obtained by the National Security Archive indicate that Chiquita’s outlays to guerrillas were perhaps not as innocent as the company portrayed them in negotiations with Colombian and U.S. authorities. As the following draft legal memorandum demonstrates, at least some Chiquita officials believed the payments were illegal under Colombian law, while others wanted to eliminate evidence of such knowledge from the record.

    The same memo also suggests that not all of the payments were the result of extortion. If indeed the multinational made the payments to protect itself from guerrilla threats, it is equally clear that some of Chiquita’s farms were supplied with “security personnel” from “Guerrilla Groups.”

    Why did Chiquita Brands make payments to virtually every guerrilla group in Urabá? How much did the FARC, ELN, EPL and the other groups receive each year, according to company records? Were there any contracts or agreements with insurgent groups?

    The complex relationship between Chiquita Brands and Colombian guerrillas will be the subject of the next report in this series, to be published next Tuesday by the National Security Archive and VerdadAbierta.com.

    • The depositions of the seven Chiquita employees interviewed by the SEC were obtained by the National Security Archive after seven years of litigation. Although the names of those officials remained hidden, it was possible to identify them by comparing the transcripts to other official sources.

    READ THE DOCUMENTS

    Document 01

    1992-12-14

    [Bill for Services Rendered]

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

    Bill for services rendered to Compañia Frutera de Sevilla on letterhead of "Rene Alejandro Osorio J."

    Document 02

    1992-12-18

    ["Contract for Provision of Professional Services"] [Includes original attachment]

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

    Copy of a contract between a Chiquita subsidiary and Rene Osorio, identified by the initials "R.O." The attached forms indicate that the three million Peso payment was to a "security advisor" who "works as liaison with activist groups."

    Document 03

    1994-01-04

    "Reportable Payments in Colombia and Manager’s Expense Payments" [Draft; includes original annotations

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>Draft Chiquita legal memorandum on payments to guerrilla groups in Colombia identifies intermediary employed by Security Department to handle payments to guerrilla groups.

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>Document 04

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>1994-01-05

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>"Reportable Payments in Colombia and Manager’s Expense Payments" [Draft; includes original annotations

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>Draft Chiquita legal memorandum on payments to guerrilla groups in Colombia identifies members of the Security Department, John Stabler and Juan Manuel Alvarado.

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>Document 05

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>1999-04-27

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>[SEC Testimony of Jorge Forton], April 27, 1999, pp. 45-48.

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

    Forton describes the challenge of auditing payments to guerrillas since the groups do not provide any kind of receipt.

    Document 06

    1999-04-27

    [SEC Testimony of Jorge Forton], April 27, 1999, pp. 57-60.

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

    Forton recounts a call with company staff who told him about a massacre of some 20 bus travelers in Urabá.

    Document 07

    1999-04-27

    [SEC Testimony of Jorge Forton], April 27, 1999, pp. 89-92.

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

    Forton says it was “questionable” whether payments to guerrillas were for self-protection or for “funding their activities.”

    Document 08

    1999-10-23

    [SEC Testimony of John Ordman], November 23, 1999, pp. 121-128.

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

    Ordman says there is “no way of determining” whether money channeled through the Security Department and third-party intermediaries ever reached the intended recipients.

    Document 09

    1999-12-15

    [SEC Testimony of John Paul Olivo], December 15, 1999, pp. 61-64.

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

    Olivo says his “concern since day one” was that he could never be sure that money intended for guerrillas and other groups was not being stolen by a third-party intermediary.

    Document 10

    2000-01-06

    [SEC Testimony of Robert Kistinger], January 6, 2000, pp. 65-68.

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

    Kistinger does not recall telling “Jorge” the way to know whether company funds had reached illegal armed groups was “if there are no killings.”

    NOTE

    [1] While the name of the SEC witness identified here as Jorge Forton was redacted from the transcript, there is abundant evidence indicating that Forton is the Chiquita witness interviewed by the SEC on April 27, 1999.

    · A 1998 series in the Cincinnati Enquirer identified Forton as one of the officials central to the bribery case that triggered the SEC probe.

    · The witness describes the role he played overseeing Chiquita’s financial operations in Colombia from 1994-1998, while an account for “Jorge Forton” on the popular social media network LinkedIn indicates that he held various positions at Chiquita from 1990-1998, including “Country Controller.”

    · Throughout the testimony, the witness describes how he sent financial reports to his superiors about so-called “sensitive payments” that were made in Colombia, mainly to government officials and to guerrilla insurgent groups.

    · The witness describes a conversation he had about these payments with a superior at the company: “… I questioned the nature of the payment. And he said: [Redacted], don’t get involved in this. I’m handling this and I know this is correct.” And basically, that was an invitation to get out. I mean, I wasn’t—I shouldn’t worry about questioning those payments, because, as I said, if no killings are, meaning that the payments were correct, reached the end user.”

    · Another witness who has been separately identified as Robert Kistinger, is asked by the SEC about this same conversation during his later testimony: “[Redacted] also said that … that you had responded to him, “Jorge, if there are no killings, you know the money is getting to the guerrillas.”

    · Another witness separately identified as Orlando Dangond mentions “Jorge” as being present at a key meeting where the bribe was discussed: “[Redacted] and myself may have explained to Jorge what had been going on, and then I believe [Redacted] explained to him about the payment.”

    · While questioning a witness separately identified as John Ordman the SEC investigator mentions “Jorge Forton” during a discussion of how certain sensitive payments were recorded and reported to corporate headquarters: “… [T]his document related to Jorge Forton and this document contains disclosures…”

    · Information at beginning of interview reveals that the witness is from Arequipa (assumed to be Peru). The LinkedIn account for Jorge Forton (mentioned above) says that he is a graduate of Catholic University of Santa María, a university in Arequipa, Peru.

  • WikiLeaks find shows how the Clintons supported child stealer Laura Silsby

    WikiLeaks find shows how the Clintons supported child stealer Laura Silsby

    The individual in question is one Laura Silsby, former director of The New Life Children’s Refuge. She was caught trying to steal 33 children from the country, most of whom were not even orphans and had families.

    Hillary has a LONG history of interest in Ms. Silsby. Wikileak emails dating back till at least 2001 have been found in her archives discussing Laura’s NGO. Laura had claimed she planned to build an orphanage in the Dominican Republic, but authorities in the country said she never submitted an application for this purpose. They instead located to Haiti.

    Sources:

    Huma Abedin was constantly forwarding Hillary articles on this woman’s organization:

    One of the first things the Clintons did when they took over the scene in Haiti was to have Bill get Laura off the hook:

    And the attorney who represented Laura Silsby? A man who was himself convicted as a sex trafficker:

    Even more disturbing, we uncovered an email in Wikileaks where they are literally pricing how much it costs to transport children:

    Again, this was the same group that got busted by Haitian Authorities trying to Traffic kids.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Life_Children%27s_Refuge_case

    They’re in the Clinton Emails;

    Pitch for funding or some shit, super sketchy.

    This looks like Mills & co are drafting statements following extradition.

    Help me research!!! There are surely more emails to be found in Wikileaks on this! If we can connect the Clintons to a child abductor their campaign is DONE!!!

    EDIT: Wanted to add this email showing HRC contacting a lawyer regarding the 10 people who were arrested for their roles in this kidnapping case, thanks /u/Look_See_Think for bringing me this:

    EDIT 2: More info on this story:

    http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1249280/Haiti-earthquake-Missionaries-led-Laura-Silsby-accused-stealing-orphans.html

  • Bernard Lewis Questions The Armenian Genocide

    Bernard Lewis Questions The Armenian Genocide

    Bernard Lewis Questions The Armenian Genocide

    By Jonathan WilsonTue, 01/08/2008 – 23:13

    Dr. Bernard Lewis is a world renowned British-American historian on Islam, the Middle East, and the Ottoman Empire. He was a professor in Princeton University’s Near East Studies department. In this video, Dr. Bernard Lewis through decades of research states that the killings of Armenians during World War I cannot be classified as genocide. He has advised Western Governments on Middle Eastern policies.

    Dr. Bernard Lewis is described as the West’s leading historian on the Middle East.http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2007/0406/ed_distance.html

    In the Encyclopedia of Historians and Historical Writing, Martin Kramer considers that, over a 60-year career, Dr. Bernard Lewis has emerged as “the most influential postwar historian of Islam and the Middle East.”

    Dr. Bernard Lewis on Armenian Genocide – Youtube Video

    Bernard Lewis Armenian Genocide Youtube Video

    It is interesting to note that objective historians like Bernard Lewis are all over the world, but very few have the courage of Bernard Lewis to speak the truth when so many historians are bullied and intimidated by the infamous ANCA (Armenian National Committee of America) and the Armenian American Assembly lobbyists which use hate campaigns, propaganda, and invest a lot of money in scholars, organizations, and politicians to support their crusade of Anti-Turkism. They also organize hundreds of volunteers to protest and flood politician offices to pressure them into following their political agendas.

    Objective historians like Bernard Lewis are what will bring peace to the world and ethics to the field. If you’re a historian, do the research, analyze both sides, go to both Armenian perspective websites as well as Turkish perspective websites, watch all the documentaries from both sides, and I guarantee you the truth will show itself as clear as day that the Ottoman government did not plan out a mass extermination campaign, and only stopped the violence through a relocation order that may have saved hundreds of thousands of Armenian and Turkish lives during World War I.

    Ethnic conflicts are terrible, they cause thousands of deaths (as they did in 1915), and governments struggle in differentiating between who is a rebel and who is a civilian. During World War I, the best solution proposed was to relocate hostile populations; this of course, was not good for the innocent Armenians among the guilty Armenians, but it was a last resort after many amnesties for Armenian revolts and uprisings.

    There are many genocides in the world, but only one gets recognition without any solid proof, that is the Armenian Genocide, yet the subject is debated amongst academics and historians around the world. Through decades of propaganda it has started to settle into peoples minds who did not read books on the issue. This is the same kind of tactics the Islamofacists use to brainwash millions of Muslims to believe in their extreme revision of history and religion.

    Hatred should not be preached on anyone, and no one should preach hatred or oppress other peoples’ views even if they differ from your own.

    Dr. Bernard Lewis’s Books

    • The Origins of Islamism (1940)
    • A Handbook of Diplomatic and Political Arabic (1947)
    • The Arabs in History (1950)
    • The Emergence of Modern Turkey (1961)
    • Istanbul and the Civilizations of the Ottoman Empire (1963)
    • The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam (1967)
    • The Cambridge History of Islam (2 vols. 1970, revised 4 vols. 1978, editor with Peter Malcolm Holt and Ann K.S. Lambton)
    • Islam: From the Prophet Muhammad to the capture of Constantinople (1974, editor)
    • History — Remembered, Recovered, Invented (1975)
    • Race and Color in Islam (1979)
    • Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society (1982, editor with Benjamin Braude)
    • The Muslim Discovery of Europe (1982)
    • The Jews of Islam (1984)
    • Semites and Anti-Semites (1986)
    • Islam from the Prophet Muhammad to the Capture of Constantinople (1987)
    • The Political Language of Islam (1988)
    • Race and Slavery in the Middle East: an Historical Enquiry (1990)
    • Islam and the West (1993)
    • Islam in History (1993)
    • The Shaping of the Modern Middle East (1994)
    • Cultures in Conflict (1994)
    • The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years (1995)
    • The Future of the Middle East (1997)
    • The Multiple Identities of the Middle East (1998)
    • A Middle East Mosaic: Fragments of Life, Letters and History (2000)
    • Music of a Distant Drum: Classical Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and Hebrew Poems (2001)
    • The Muslim Discovery of Europe (2001)
    • What Went Wrong?: The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East (2002)
    • The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror (2003)
    • From Babel to Dragomans: Interpreting the Middle East (2004)
  • Poor Richard- Greece can be Saved

    Poor Richard- Greece can be Saved

    Poor Richards Report

    Greece can be saved and so can the rest of world.
    If we forgive the interest rates and just ask that they repay. Wouldn’t it be more beneficial to regain the principal of a loan rather than losing everything?
    The major banks would be the losers because they lose the benefit of compound interest or even simple interest. It is those interest payments that add up fast.
    Another plus is that it would rein in the major banks as well. The loss of income for them means that they will be more careful making loans in the future, because many bankers would face salary pay cuts rather than living off government guarantees of deposits as they do now.

  • Fethullah Gulen: Turkey’s Eroding Democracy

    Fethullah Gulen: Turkey’s Eroding Democracy

     

    SAYLORSBURG, Pa. — It is deeply disappointing to see what has become of Turkey in the last few years. Not long ago, it was the envy of Muslim-majority countries: a viable candidate for the European Union on its path to becoming a functioning democracy that upholds universal human rights, gender equality, the rule of law and the rights of Kurdish and non-Muslim citizens. This historic opportunity now appears to have been squandered as Turkey’s ruling party, known as the A.K.P., reverses that progress and clamps down on civil society, media, the judiciary and free enterprise.

    Turkey’s current leaders seem to claim an absolute mandate by virtue of winning elections. But victory doesn’t grant them permission to ignore the Constitution or suppress dissent, especially when election victories are built on crony capitalism and media subservience. The A.K.P.’s leaders now depict every democratic criticism of them as an attack on the state. By viewing every critical voice as an enemy — or worse, a traitor — they are leading the country toward totalitarianism.

    The latest victims of the clampdown are the staff, executives and editors of independent media organizations who were detained and are now facing charges made possible by recent changes to the laws and the court system. The director of one of the most popular TV channels, arrested in December, is still behind bars. Public officials investigating corruption charges have also been purged and jailed for simply doing their jobs. An independent judiciary, a functioning civil society and media are checks and balances against government transgressions. Such harassment sends the message that whoever stands in the way of the ruling party’s agenda will be targeted by slander, sanctions and even trumped-up charges.

    Turkey’s rulers have not only alienated the West, they are also now losing credibility in the Middle East. Turkey’s ability to assert positive influence in the region depends not only on its economy but also on the health of its own democracy.

    The core tenets of a functioning democracy — the rule of law, respect for individual freedoms — are also the most basic of Islamic values bestowed upon us by God. No political or religious leader has the authority to take them away. It is disheartening to see religious scholars provide theological justification for the ruling party’s oppression and corruption or simply stay silent. Those who use the language and symbols of religious observance but violate the core principles of their religion do not deserve such loyalty from religious scholars.

    Speaking against oppression is a democratic right, a civic duty and for believers, a religious obligation. The Quran makes clear that people should not remain silent in the face of injustice: “O you who believe! Be upholders and standard-bearers of justice, bearing witness to the truth for God’s sake, even though it be against your own selves, or parents or kindred.”

    For the past 50 years, I have been fortunate to take part in a civil society movement, sometimes referred to as Hizmet, whose participants and supporters include millions of Turkish citizens. These citizens have committed themselves to interfaith dialogue, community service, relief efforts and making life-changing education accessible. They have established more than 1,000 modern secular schools, tutoring centers, colleges, hospitals and relief organizations in over 150 countries. They are teachers, journalists, businessmen and ordinary citizens.

    The rhetoric used by the ruling party repeatedly to crack down on Hizmet participants is nothing but a pretext to justify their own authoritarianism. Hizmet participants have never formed a political party nor have they pursued political ambitions. Their participation in the movement is driven by intrinsic rewards, not extrinsic ones.

    I have spent over 50 years preaching and teaching the values of peace, mutual respect and altruism. I’ve advocated for education, community service and interfaith dialogue. I have always believed in seeking happiness in the happiness of others and the virtue of seeking God’s pleasure in helping His people. Whatever influence is attributed to me, I have used it as a means to promote educational and social projects that help nurture virtuous individuals. I have no interest in political power.

    Many Hizmet participants, including me, once supported the ruling party’s agenda, including the 2005 opening of accession negotiations with the European Union. Our support then was based on principle, as is our criticism today. It is our right and duty to speak out about government policies that have a deep impact on society. Unfortunately, our democratic expression against public corruption and authoritarianism has made us victims of a witch-hunt; both the Hizmet movement and I are being targeted with hate speech, media smear campaigns and legal harassment.

    Like all segments of Turkish society, Hizmet participants have a presence in government organizations and in the private sector. These citizens cannot be denied their constitutional rights or be subjected to discrimination for their sympathy to Hizmet’s ideals, as long as they abide by the laws of the country, the rules of their institutions and basic ethical principles. Profiling any segment of society and viewing them as a threat is a sign of intolerance.

    We are not the only victims of the A.K.P.’s crackdown. Peaceful environmental protesters, Kurds, Alevis, non-Muslim citizens and some Sunni Muslim groups not aligned with the ruling party have suffered, too. Without checks and balances, no individual or group is safe from the ruling party’s wrath. Regardless of their religious observance, citizens can and should unite around universal human rights and freedoms, and democratically oppose those who violate them.

    Turkey has now reached a point where democracy and human rights have almost been shelved. I hope and pray that those in power reverse their current domineering path. In the past the Turkish people have rejected elected leaders who strayed from a democratic path. I hope they will exercise their legal and democratic rights again to reclaim the future of their country.