Risk and opportunity being two sides of the same coin is perhaps the oldest truth of the investment world. This ancient wisdom makes the triad of risk assessment, market research, and position management indispensable in portfolio construction. The rationale behind simultaneously building deep positions in both cryptocurrency and stock markets lies beyond a mere intuitive impulse for diversification; it is a pursuit of exploiting complementary risk premiums and hedging against macroeconomic blind spots. However, when this ancient method of risk mitigation, namely hedging, begins to be sought not only between asset classes but also within the life cycle of a single asset, our mental models must be called into question. It is precisely at this juncture that a theory attributed to Warren Buffett’s finance classes, dividing cryptocurrency investment into two distinct phases, has been circulated.
According to this theory, the first phase is the “pre IPO internal sale” phase, likened to the initial public offering (IPO) of a stock. It is argued that this is the period when a new crypto asset, before being listed on an exchange, rapidly attracts investment to form a large capital pool, thus experiencing the steepest price increase. This narrative highlights the allure of early stage liquidity and the existential capital needs of projects, whispering to the investor that the real gains lie here. The second phase is the post IPO phase, encompassing assets listed on exchanges, including established ones like Bitcoin. The theory asserts that in this stage, large capitalists execute massive sell offs to realize their tens of times profits gained during the internal sale phase, directly leading to a rapid price decline and a subsequent prolonged period of stabilization.
According to the narrative, most crypto assets in the post IPO phase fall victim to a kind of “frenzied fundraising” period; when combined with the exit strategy of early investors, this closes the window of opportunity for new investors. Therefore, the theory prescribes avoiding investment in post IPO crypto assets as a long term, sustainable investment strategy. This approach is presented not merely as a market timing strategy but as a philosophy of risk aversion, as the asymmetric return potential in the early phase is deemed far more attractive compared to the structural disadvantages of the later phase. Yet, what matters here is as much the method itself as the figure of authority invoked to legitimize it: Warren Buffett.
However, the claim that this theory belongs to Warren Buffett stands in stark opposition to Buffett’s own investment philosophy, crystallized over decades, and his public statements on cryptocurrencies. Buffett has repeatedly described cryptocurrencies as “rat poison squared,” “a mirage that produces nothing,” and “a bad ending”; he has never addressed an internal sale phase or a post IPO stabilization period as a technical framework. Thus, the “two phase model” under examination is, in fact, a myth of uncertain origin packaged under Buffett’s name, attempting to explain the unique dynamics of the crypto market. Approaching this model with academic depth and a visionary perspective, it is necessary to lay bare both its surface level appeal and its structural weaknesses, revealing what is missing and unheard.
The Ontology of the Two Phase Model: The Allure and Fragility of the Pre IPO Internal Sale
Although the pre IPO internal sale phase bears parallels to early stage venture capital in traditional finance, it takes a far more radical form within the crypto ecosystem, shaped by regulatory vacuums and asymmetric information environments. In this phase, projects use the funds raised under the promise of decentralization as liquidity pools; investors, meanwhile, commit capital at a stage where the project has yet to achieve product market fit and often exists as nothing more than a whitepaper. The model’s strongest aspect is making visible the psychological and financial reality of this stage: the urgent need for early liquidity creates upward pressure on price, and this pressure is fed by a narrative pump that lasts until the listing moment. Indeed, in projects with adequate due diligence and network effect potential, astronomical returns for participants in this phase have been empirically observed. The model succeeds in identifying the risk of late stage capital, which might be labeled “dumb money.”
However, the model’s portrayal of this phase solely as the period of the fastest price increase entirely ignores survivorship bias. A vast majority of projects participating in the pre IPO phase never even reach the listing stage; they silently vanish due to technical inadequacy, internal team conflicts, fraud, or regulatory threats. While emphasizing the asymmetric returns that make this phase attractive, the model fails to sufficiently underscore the risk of the same asymmetry resulting in a total wipeout. Consequently, categorically declaring the internal sale phase as the best window of opportunity is only possible within a narrative economy that erases the stories of the losers. Moreover, since participation in internal sales is often contingent upon privileged circles, staking mechanisms on launchpads, or high capital thresholds, the strategy proposed by the model can be structurally inaccessible to the retail investor. This renders the model a semi deterministic narrative describing market dynamics rather than a functional investment guide.
The Reductionist Reading of the Post IPO Phase and the Missed Layers of Value
The model codes the post IPO period as a trap, characterized by major capitalists’ profit realization, and a phase to be avoided. This perspective undoubtedly captures a recurring pattern in the market: the supply shock created by the unlocking of early investors’ tokens and the deflation of the speculative bubble. Yet this reduction ignores the full complexity of market maturation and the price discovery process. Above all, the value accumulation generated over years by assets like Bitcoin and Ethereum in the post IPO phase empirically refutes the thesis of a “period to be avoided.” The selling pressure from capitalists creates a temporary supply demand imbalance; however, if the project’s core value proposition, network effects, and adoption curve are robust, the market navigates past this phase to establish a new equilibrium level. The model completely misses this rebalancing process and the potential for long term compound returns.
Secondly, the post IPO phase is a period when institutional investors and regulatory frameworks enter the scene, transparency increases, and information asymmetry diminishes. Unlike the internal sale phase, the project’s technical roadmap, community governance, and financial reporting are more auditable here. The model’s wholesale dismissal of this phase as a desert where “the best opportunity has been missed” sets a cognitive trap by discouraging the investor from conducting in depth fundamental analysis. Furthermore, in the post IPO phase, risk management and yield optimization tools become available such as options strategies, staking yields, and liquidity mining which are only possible in mature markets. These tools pave the way for multi layered strategies based not just on price appreciation but on time value and volatility. By ignoring these layers, the model reduces crypto asset investment to a one dimensional buy and sell window.
The Positive Aspects of the Theory: Intuitive Insight into Liquidity Architecture and Psychological Timing
Despite all criticisms, the attributed two phase theory is valuable for popularizing certain observations about the functioning of cryptocurrency markets, thereby raising awareness. First and foremost, by framing the listing process of a new crypto asset as a liquidity event, the model cultivates the habit of monitoring the direction of fund flows among market participants. The dynamic between the capital raising pressure in the internal sale phase and the realization pressure post IPO points to a micro scale “smart money dumb money” distinction. Although oversimplified, this distinction offers a useful mental model for an investor just learning about market microstructure.
Furthermore, the theory indirectly illuminates the behavioral finance dimension of speculative bubbles. The rapid price increase in the internal sale phase creates a “fear of missing out” (FOMO) among investors, while the post IPO decline and stabilization period triggers a tendency for “regret avoidance.” By intuitively capturing this emotional transition between the two phases, the model can help investors recognize their own emotional cycles. More importantly, the theory makes visible a critical question every investor must ask themselves: “Whose liquidity am I providing in this market?” This question forms the basis of risk management and builds a healthy skepticism toward position management. Therefore, the positive contribution of the theory lies not in presenting a correct investment strategy, but in dramatizing wrong strategies to warn the investor.
Critical Deepening: The Fallacy of Attribution to Authority and the Collapse of the Intellectual Foundation
The theory’s greatest and most difficult to repair damage stems from its grounding in a figure like Warren Buffett, the living legend of value investing. When Buffett’s words on cryptocurrencies are examined, his epistemological objection to this asset class is clear: cryptocurrencies are not productive assets, they generate no cash flow, and their value rests solely on the expectation that a next buyer will pay a higher price. To assume that a thinker with such a radical rejection would systematize crypto investment with a two phase strategy is an intellectual anachronism. This misattribution builds the model’s credibility on the appeal to authority fallacy (argumentum ad verecundiam), while actually striking it at its most vulnerable point: a lack of empirical and philosophical coherence.
At this point, the most vital need the model leaves unaddressed becomes apparent: to make such a deterministic staging of any asset’s life cycle, a robust theoretical framework for its valuation is imperative. In traditional stock analysis, the pre IPO and post IPO distinction is supported by concrete metrics such as discounted cash flows, P/E ratios, and sectoral growth dynamics. Yet for crypto assets, such a universally accepted valuation methodology does not yet exist. The two phase model ignores this massive void, focusing solely on the momentum of price movement; that is, it attempts to derive an investment philosophy purely from price action without a value framework. However, Buffett’s true teaching rests precisely on this distinction between “price” and “value.” The theory, in trying to leverage Buffett, violates his most fundamental principle.
Analytical Breakdown of Strengths, Weaknesses, Missing Elements, and Unheard Dimensions
The strengths of the model lie in offering an intuitive narrative of market microstructure, making early and late stage liquidity dynamics visible, and functioning as a warning system to deter investors from blindly jumping into every listed asset. It can also enhance market literacy by prompting scrutiny of the incentive mechanisms of project founders and venture capitalists. Yet its weaknesses are severe: it systematically reflects survivorship bias, ignores post IPO value creation and the maturation process, fails to discuss the asymmetry of accessibility, and, most importantly, undermines its own credibility by grounding itself in a false authority. It falls into a circular logic trap that turns price movement into an investment thesis.
Among the missing elements, foremost is how regulatory developments can radically alter the transition between the two phases. For instance, the internal sale process of a token classified as a security in a jurisdiction takes on an entirely different character due to legal risks. Similarly, the treasury management of decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) and the ability to program liquidity on chain complicate the “major capitalist sell off” pattern the model assumes. The most significant shortcoming is that the model treats investor psychology as an individual decision making process, but fails to account for how social media, the influencer economy, and coordinated community actions manipulate the transition between phases. The unheard need is precisely here: the necessity of grasping a crypto asset’s life cycle through a multi factorial, dynamic, and continuity based model that combines on chain data analytics, social sentiment analysis, and macro liquidity indicators, rather than through rigid phases.
Visionary Outlook and the Need for Reframing
The growing pains of cryptocurrency markets demand an epistemology that moves beyond building investment strategies solely on timing phases. The visionary investment approach of the future must set aside dichotomies like pre IPO and post IPO and instead conceptualize each asset as a “protocol economy.” The determining factors here are the genuine economic value the protocol generates (transaction fees, security budget, sustainability of staking yields), the resilience of governance mechanisms, and the quality of community participation. In such a framework, the internal sale phase transforms into merely a funding method, and the post IPO phase becomes the market’s testing of that funding method. The critical question for the investor should not be “Which phase am I in?” but rather “At what stage of this protocol’s value creation process am I positioned, and with which incentives am I aligned?”
Moreover, the advantage provided by taking simultaneous positions across multiple markets lies precisely in offering the ability to transcend such reductionist phase models. When the cash flow and dividend focused valuation discipline of the stock market is combined with the adoption curve and network value focused valuation intuition of the crypto market, the investor learns to price two different risk factors simultaneously. This synthesis is not a strategy confined to either the internal sale phase or the post IPO phase; instead, it is the art of layered position management that reads global liquidity cycles, the diffusion speed of technological innovations, and regulatory arbitrage opportunities. The attributed Buffett theory is valuable as a starting point, even as a counter example, in the journey of learning this art; but when taken as a guide, it turns into a wall that severs the investor from the market’s most fertile hunting grounds.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The two phase model examined is a narrative that intuitively describes the speculative rhythm of the cryptocurrency market, yet reveals serious cracks when transformed into an investment doctrine. The model’s greatest weakness is its claim to be grounded in Warren Buffett’s value oriented, productive asset philosophy, which is an intellectual contradiction. Its positive aspects are raising awareness of liquidity dynamics and pushing the investor to question “whose exit liquidity they are providing”; its negative aspects are overlooking the return opportunities of the maturation period, regulatory transformation, and the need for fundamental valuation by reducing the market to two crude phases. The most significant deficiency is the absence of a holistic decision support system that integrates on chain metrics, social sentiment analysis, and macro liquidity conditions into a single framework.
Recommendations for investors, framed by this analysis, can be listed as follows:
Adopt an analysis discipline that evaluates any crypto asset not solely based on its listing phase, but on fundamental factors such as the genuine economic value the protocol generates, developer activity, and degree of decentralization.
Limit participation in the internal sale phase to projects with a clear legal framework, transparent lock up periods and token distribution, and strong community commitment; manage this phase as a high risk venture capital position within a small slice of the portfolio, rather than a “get rich quick” scheme.
View price declines in the post IPO phase as strategic accumulation opportunities in projects with a solid core value proposition; however, ensure you monitor the unlock schedule of early investors and the dilution effect on circulating supply.
Leverage your multi market position advantage by examining the correlations between sector rotation in the stock market and adoption cycles in the crypto market; use the cash flow between the two markets as a risk barometer.
Integrate metrics obtained from on chain data platforms (Glassnode, Dune Analytics, etc.) into your own investment process; adopt indicators such as whale movements, exchange inflows and outflows, and staking participation rate as an objective ground to replace phase narratives.
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Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA) Aarhus University, 1997 Independent Researcher Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures
History engraves certain moments into the memory of nations with indelible letters. On the morning of 19 May 1919, the Bandırma Ferry gliding through the misty waters of the Black Sea and docking at Samsun is one of those unique moments in which the destiny of the Turkish nation was redrawn. Mustafa Kemal Pasha recorded this historic moment in the Nutuk with the words, “On the 19th day of May 1919, I landed in Samsun. The situation and the general outlook…” (Atatürk, 1927, p. 1). This sentence marks not only the arrival point of a journey but also the beginning of a nation’s awakening. The Armistice of Mudros, signed after the First World War, brought the Ottoman Empire to a de facto end; the Allied Powers, invoking Article 7 of the armistice, began to occupy Anatolian territory. Faced with the capitulationist policies of the Istanbul Government and the impotence of the sultanate, the Turkish nation was driven into the most critical existential struggle of its history. Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s crossing into Anatolia in his capacity as Inspector of the Ninth Army Troops is recorded as the first strategic step of that struggle.
The Amasya Circular is the most critical stop on this journey. Issued on 22 June 1919 under the signatures of leading commanders of the period such as Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Hüseyin Rauf Bey, Ali Fuat Pasha, and Kâzım Karabekir Pasha, this document is a manifesto setting forth the justification, aim, and method of the National Struggle. In his work İstiklâl Harbimiz (Our War of Independence), Kâzım Karabekir Pasha described this process as “the first fundamental programme of the National Struggle” and drew attention to the importance of the consensus reached during its preparation (Karabekir, 1960, pp. 112-115). Likewise, in his Milli Mücadele Hatıraları (Memoirs of the National Struggle), Ali Fuat Cebesoy provides a detailed account of the Amasya meetings and the signing process of the circular, stressing that the document was the first concrete expression of the national will (Cebesoy, 1953, p. 89). The statement at the heart of the circular—“The nation’s independence will be saved again by the nation’s determination and resolve”—is engraved in history as the first tangible document of the transfer of sovereignty from the dynasty to the nation.
The torch of independence lit on 19 May acquired a political course in Amasya, matured in Erzurum and Sivas, and was finally crowned with the proclamation of the Republic on 29 October 1923. In his work Çankaya, Falih Rıfkı Atay summed up this great transformation with the words “His biography is the history of the new Turkish state” and traced the rebirth of a nation in Atatürk’s personality (Atay, 1969, p. 5). Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, in Atatürk İhtilâli (The Atatürk Revolution), defined this process as a “revolution of rights” and laid bare the philosophical foundations of the Turkish revolution (Bozkurt, 1967, p. 23). Şevket Süreyya Aydemir’s Tek Adam (The Single Man) trilogy offers a panoramic picture of this transformation by examining Atatürk’s life from birth to death in exhaustive detail within the social and political context of the era (Aydemir, 1963, Vol. I, pp. 12-15). Today, the question of how to preserve this legacy and pass it on to future generations remains as pressing as ever. The consciousness of “the first duty” that Atatürk expressed in his Address to the Youth makes it imperative that each of the principles of the Six Arrows be reinterpreted and kept alive in accordance with the requirements of the age. The Turkish nation continues its resolve to preserve its independence and its Republic in perpetuity by holding fast to its founding values and continuously developing them.
The Armistice of Mudros and the Occupation of Anatolia
1.1. The Legal and Political Character of the Armistice
The armistice signed on 30 October 1918 at the port of Mudros on the island of Lemnos meant far more for the Ottoman Empire than a mere ceasefire agreement. In his Siyasi Hatıralar (Political Memoirs), Rauf Orbay, who headed the Ottoman delegation that signed the armistice, recounted his experiences in detail and noted that the vague wording of Article 7 in particular gave the Allied Powers unlimited authority to occupy (Orbay, 1962, pp. 78-80). Contrary to the verbal assurances given by the British High Commissioner Admiral Calthorpe, immediately after the armistice the British occupied Mosul, Alexandretta, and Aintab; the French occupied Adana and its environs; and the Italians occupied Antalya and Konya. The provisions mandating the demobilization of the Ottoman armies aimed to destroy the armed resistance capacity of the Turkish nation. In her work Türk’ün Ateşle İmtihanı (The Turkish Ordeal), Halide Edip Adıvar depicted the post-armistice atmosphere in Istanbul as “a life growing ever more difficult with each passing day for the Turks” (Adıvar, 1962, p. 15).
The passive stance adopted by the Istanbul Government towards the occupations during the armistice period reflected the psychology of collapse that had seized the Ottoman bureaucracy and political elite. Far from preventing the occupations, the governments of Damat Ferit Pasha sought to preserve the survival of the sultanate by yielding to the demands of the Allied Powers. In his Atatürk’ten Hatıralar (Memories of Atatürk), Celal Bayar described this period as “the moment when the fate of the nation and the fate of the sultanate diverged” (Bayar, 1955, p. 34). In contrast, the Turkish nation began spontaneously to develop a spirit of resistance; in Western Anatolia, Kuva-yı Milliye (National Forces) units began organizing and engaging in armed struggle against the Greek occupation.
The political and legal vacuum created by the Armistice of Mudros laid the groundwork for the emergence of a new conception of legitimacy based on national sovereignty. The occupying forces interpreted the terms of the armistice ever more arbitrarily, accelerating the dismemberment of Anatolia. In his Hatıralar (Memoirs), İsmet İnönü assessed this process as “a turning point at which the nation was forced to take its destiny into its own hands” (İnönü, 1985, p. 178). Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s crossing into Anatolia is of historic significance in that it filled the leadership vacuum that would transform this awakening into an organized struggle.
1.2. The Occupation of İzmir and the Ignition of National Resistance
The landing of the Greek army in İzmir on the morning of 15 May 1919 was engraved in the memory of the Turkish nation as the heaviest blow of the wave of occupations that had begun after the Armistice of Mudros. Realized in line with a decision taken at the Paris Peace Conference, this occupation openly revealed the Allied Powers’ intentions to partition Turkish territory. Halide Edip Adıvar recounted in detail the speech she delivered at the Sultanahmet rally in Türk’ün Ateşle İmtihanı and characterized the profound outrage that the occupation of İzmir provoked in the Turkish nation as “the rising up of an entire nation” (Adıvar, 1962, pp. 45-48). Falih Rıfkı Atay likewise defined the occupation of İzmir in Çankaya as “the event that lit the fuse of the national awakening” (Atay, 1969, p. 178).
The protest rallies organized in Istanbul and many Anatolian cities following the occupation of İzmir are noteworthy in demonstrating the Turkish nation’s sensitivity to the question of independence. The large-scale protests held in Istanbul, most notably the Sultanahmet rally, revealed the scale of the social reaction provoked by the occupation. In his Milli Mücadele Hatıraları, Ali Fuat Cebesoy described in detail the organization of the Kuva-yı Milliye units in Western Anatolia and emphasized the strategic importance of the guerrilla warfare waged against the Greek occupation forces by armed groups formed with the people’s own resources (Cebesoy, 1953, pp. 112-120).
The occupation of İzmir was also a factor that accelerated Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s crossing into Anatolia. Immediately after the occupation, on 16 May 1919, Mustafa Kemal Pasha departed Istanbul aboard the Bandırma Ferry and, after a stormy three-day sea voyage, arrived in Samsun on the morning of 19 May. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir treated the details of this voyage in Tek Adam under the heading “the sea voyage that changed the destiny of a nation” and related, on the basis of documents, how the Bandırma Ferry escaped the pursuit of the British navy in the Black Sea (Aydemir, 1963, Vol. I, pp. 345-350). The events that transpired during those four days between the occupation of İzmir and the landing at Samsun clearly reveal the Turkish nation’s determination in its struggle for independence and the need for a leader to guide that struggle.
1.3. The Impotence of the Istanbul Government and the Emergence of a New Authority in Anatolia
The Istanbul Government led by Damat Ferit Pasha proved completely incapable of developing an effective policy against the occupations that began after the Armistice of Mudros. The government merely contented itself with protesting the occupations and could not go beyond diplomatic initiatives undertaken with the Allied Powers. In his Siyasi Hatıralar, Rauf Orbay criticized the political atmosphere in Istanbul with the words, “the sole concern of the palace and the government was to hold on to their positions; no one cared about the fate of the nation” (Orbay, 1962, p. 95). The sultanate, for its part, chose to collaborate with the occupying forces in order to survive and sought to obstruct the national resistance movement that was developing in Anatolia. This posture paved the way for the gradual erosion of the Istanbul Government’s legitimacy and the birth of a new political authority in Anatolia.
Finding no support from Istanbul against the occupations, the Turkish nation began to take steps to determine its own destiny. The Societies for the Defence of Rights (Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyetleri) and Rejection of Annexation associations established in various regions of Anatolia played a critical role in organizing the national resistance. In İstiklâl Harbimiz, Kâzım Karabekir Pasha detailed the organizational activities in Eastern Anatolia and recounted how the Society for the Defence of the Rights of the Eastern Provinces prepared the ground for the Erzurum Congress (Karabekir, 1960, pp. 45-52). Mazhar Müfit Kansu, in his work Erzurum’dan Ölümüne Kadar Atatürk’le Beraber (With Atatürk from Erzurum until His Death), conveyed, from his close personal witness, the behind-the-scenes story of the national organization in Eastern Anatolia and Atatürk’s role in that process (Kansu, 1966, Vol. I, pp. 34-38).
Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s crossing into Anatolia proved decisive in providing the leadership that would unite these scattered foci of resistance. Endowed with broad authority in his capacity as Inspector of the Ninth Army Troops, Mustafa Kemal Pasha used these powers in the service of organizing the national struggle. In the reports he drafted after landing in Samsun, he emphasized the Turkish nation’s will for independence and openly criticized the policies of the Istanbul Government. These reports stand out as the first documents in which the ideological foundations of the national struggle were laid. In the Nutuk, Atatürk referred to these reports with the words, “With these reports I established the true situation of the nation and my thoughts regarding the future” (Atatürk, 1927, p. 12).
19 May 1919: The Sun Rising from Samsun
2.1. Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s Appointment to Anatolia
Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s appointment to Anatolia as Inspector of the Ninth Army Troops ostensibly carried administrative purposes, such as investigating the security disturbances in the Black Sea region and ensuring the collection of weapons. In reality, however, this assignment was the result of a strategic move that Mustafa Kemal Pasha had planned together with his close circle. In his Hatıralar, İsmet İnönü recounted the behind-the-scenes story of this appointment with the words, “Mustafa Kemal Pasha had realized that as long as he remained in Istanbul nothing could be accomplished. He was seizing every opportunity to cross into Anatolia” (İnönü, 1985, p. 190). The broad authority granted to him in the letter of appointment would play a critical role in the organization of the national struggle in the period that followed.
Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s preparations for crossing into Anatolia were carried out in such a way as not to attract the attention of the Allied diplomatic missions in Istanbul. In Çankaya, Falih Rıfkı Atay recounted these preparations: “When Mustafa Kemal left Istanbul, he had selected the officers he took with him with great care. Each of them was to become an important figure in the national struggle in the future” (Atay, 1969, p. 195). While the voyage preparations of the Bandırma Ferry were being completed, British intelligence plans to sink the ferry in the Black Sea came to nothing. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir described the Bandırma Ferry’s journey as “the sea voyage that changed the destiny of a nation” and recorded in detail how the ferry passed through British controls (Aydemir, 1963, Vol. I, p. 352).
As stressed in the Nutuk, Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s landing at Samsun is the starting point of the nation’s struggle for independence. In the Nutuk, Atatürk conveyed this historic moment as follows: “On the 19th day of May 1919, I landed in Samsun. The situation and the general outlook: the group in which the Ottoman Empire found itself had been defeated in the Great War, the Ottoman army had been battered on all fronts, a harsh armistice had been signed” (Atatürk, 1927, p. 1). These sentences are not merely a situational assessment but also a concise summary of the historical context on which the national struggle rested. From the moment he set foot in Anatolia, Mustafa Kemal Pasha embarked on an intensive effort to organize the nation’s will for independence.
2.2. Initial Contacts in Samsun and Assessment of the Situation
Immediately after landing in Samsun, Mustafa Kemal Pasha contacted the military and civil authorities in the region and conducted a comprehensive situation assessment. During his first days in Samsun, he investigated the nature of the security incidents and gathered intelligence on the activities of the Allied Powers along the Black Sea coast. In the Nutuk, Atatürk summarized these contacts: “The situation I observed in Samsun was just as I had thought and foreseen. The British had established dominance everywhere; although the Greeks and Armenians were minorities, they were committing excesses against the Turks” (Atatürk, 1927, p. 5). In the reports he sent to the Istanbul Government, Mustafa Kemal Pasha drew attention to this state of affairs and stressed that the necessary measures must be taken to preserve the Turkish presence in the region.
Following his contacts in Samsun, Mustafa Kemal Pasha moved his headquarters to Havza on 25 May. Havza was a suitable centre for organizing the national struggle, both in terms of its geographical location and communication possibilities. Ali Fuat Cebesoy related Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s activities in Havza in his Milli Mücadele Hatıraları as follows: “Mustafa Kemal Pasha had virtually established a headquarters in Havza; by communicating by telegraph with commanders across the length and breadth of Anatolia, he had begun organizing the resistance” (Cebesoy, 1953, p. 145). Through the circular he issued in Havza, he called for the organization of protest meetings against the occupations, a call that found a resounding echo throughout Anatolia.
Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s activities in Samsun and Havza began to attract the attention of the Istanbul Government and the Allied Powers. The British High Commissioner Admiral Calthorpe was disturbed by Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s activities in the region and approached the Istanbul Government to demand his recall. Indeed, as a result of British pressure, the Ministry of War sent Mustafa Kemal Pasha an order to return; however, Mustafa Kemal Pasha disregarded this directive and continued on his path. Kâzım Karabekir assessed this critical decision with the words, “Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s refusal to return is one of the most important moments that determined the fate of the National Struggle” (Karabekir, 1960, p. 89).
2.3. The Symbolic and Strategic Meaning of 19 May
19 May 1919 is not merely the date of Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s crossing into Anatolia; it is also the symbolic beginning of the Turkish nation’s rebirth. This date is etched in memories as the day on which the nation’s will to determine its own destiny took concrete form. In his Atatürk’ten Hatıralar, Celal Bayar used the expression, “19 May is the milestone of the Turkish nation’s emergence from darkness into light” (Bayar, 1955, p. 56). From the moment he set foot in Samsun, Mustafa Kemal Pasha demonstrated that the national struggle would not be merely a military process but also a political one. His first activities in Anatolia were shaped as part of a systematic plan aimed at organizing the national resistance.
The strategic significance of 19 May lies in the fact that the organizational activities Mustafa Kemal Pasha launched on that date quickly spread across the whole of Anatolia. The process extending from Samsun to Havza and from Havza to Amasya is a preparatory period in which the institutional foundations of the national struggle were laid. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir assessed this process with the words, “As soon as he set foot in Anatolia, Mustafa Kemal grasped that the national struggle had to be not merely a military movement but an all-out national war of liberation, and he pursued a strategy accordingly” (Aydemir, 1963, Vol. II, p. 12). Through the circulars he issued and the meetings he held during this period, Mustafa Kemal Pasha delineated the ideological framework of the national resistance and clarified the objectives of the struggle.
That 19 May is today celebrated as the Commemoration of Atatürk, Youth and Sports Day reflects the symbolic meaning carried by this date. In his Address to the Youth, Atatürk entrusted the guardianship of the struggle for independence that began on 19 May to the younger generations with the words, “O Turkish youth! Your first duty is to preserve and defend the Turkish independence and the Turkish Republic forever.” This trust ensures the continuity of the Turkish nation’s journey of independence and modernization. Falih Rıfkı Atay stressed the importance of 19 May with the sentence, “This date is not merely a memory; it is the anniversary of the Turkish nation’s rebirth each year” (Atay, 1969, p. 200). 19 May is not a date that remains solely in the past; it is a milestone that is remembered anew every year and that casts light on the future.
The Amasya Circular: The Theoretical Foundations of National Sovereignty
3.1. The Preparation and Signing Process of the Circular
Following his contacts in Havza, Mustafa Kemal Pasha moved to Amasya on 12 June 1919 and there began preparations for the circular that would set the roadmap for the national struggle. During his stay in Amasya, Mustafa Kemal Pasha maintained an intensive communication traffic with the commanders in Anatolia and developed the idea of convening a national congress. Ali Fuat Cebesoy described the Amasya meetings with the words, “Mustafa Kemal Pasha had virtually established a revolutionary headquarters in Amasya. He worked day and night, remaining in contact by telegraph with commanders all across Anatolia” (Cebesoy, 1953, p. 167). The idea of national sovereignty that Mustafa Kemal Pasha had cherished since his time in Istanbul was decisive in the drafting of the circular. This idea crystallized into a clear political programme as a result of the talks he held in Istanbul during the armistice period and his observations in Anatolia.
The Amasya Circular was issued on 22 June 1919 under the signatures of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, 20th Corps Commander Ali Fuat Pasha, former Minister of the Navy Hüseyin Rauf Bey, and 15th Corps Commander Kâzım Karabekir Pasha. Before the circular was signed, Mustafa Kemal Pasha telegraphed the text to the other commanders in Anatolia and secured their approval as well. In İstiklâl Harbimiz, Kâzım Karabekir recounted this approval process: “Mustafa Kemal Pasha communicated the text of the circular to me by telegraph. I approved it without the slightest hesitation, because this text reflected the shared thoughts of all of us” (Karabekir, 1960, p. 112). This process is significant in that it shows the military and civilian wings of the national struggle uniting around the same objective.
Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s leadership and vision were decisive in the preparation of the circular. Mazhar Müfit Kansu depicted the work carried out in Amasya with the words, “Mustafa Kemal Pasha was virtually writing history in Amasya. He meticulously scrutinized every sentence of the circular, carefully selecting each word” (Kansu, 1966, Vol. I, p. 112). In the fragmented and hopeless atmosphere of the armistice period, Mustafa Kemal Pasha succeeded in setting forth a political programme capable of mobilizing the nation’s will for independence. The Amasya Circular is a document that reveals, beyond Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s military genius, his political foresight and his quality as a statesman.
3.2. The Basic Provisions of the Circular and a Political Analysis
The Amasya Circular is in essence a political manifesto containing four fundamental provisions. The most critical provision of the circular is the section beginning with the finding that “The integrity of the homeland and the independence of the nation are in danger” and concluding with the statement, “The nation’s independence will be saved again by the nation’s determination and resolve.” This statement carries a revolutionary character that proclaims the source of sovereignty to be the nation. In Atatürk İhtilâli, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt described this provision as “the Magna Carta of the Turkish revolution” and stressed that the principle of national sovereignty was expressed so openly for the first time (Bozkurt, 1967, p. 78). Against the idea, embedded in the six-century tradition of the Ottoman sultanate, that sovereignty belonged to the dynasty, this provision stressed the supremacy of the national will and formed the cornerstone of the path leading to the proclamation of the Republic.
The second important provision of the circular is the finding that the Istanbul Government was not fulfilling the responsibility incumbent upon it. This finding implies a questioning of the Istanbul Government’s legitimacy and constitutes the justification for organizing the national struggle as a separate political authority. Rauf Orbay assessed this situation of the Istanbul Government in his Siyasi Hatıralar with the words, “The government in Istanbul no longer represented the nation. It had degenerated into a body of civil servants that merely carried out the orders of the occupying forces” (Orbay, 1962, p. 145). The third provision of the circular envisaged the convening of a national congress in Sivas. This congress was designed as the highest body in which the national will would be represented.
The fourth provision of the circular concerns the determination of the delegates who would attend the congress and the electoral process. Accordingly, three delegates who had won the trust of the people were to be elected from each province and sent to Sivas. This provision is of great importance in that it grounded the national struggle on a popular base and gave it a representative character. İsmet İnönü described these provisions of the Amasya Circular as “the first constitutional expression of the idea of national sovereignty” (İnönü, 1985, p. 210). These provisions of the Amasya Circular constitute a fundamental document that inaugurated the revolutionary phase of the Turkish revolution and placed the principle of national sovereignty at the heart of Turkish political life.
3.3. The Historical Consequences and Legacy of the Amasya Circular
Following its issuance, the Amasya Circular resonated across the length and breadth of Anatolia and accelerated the organizational process of the national struggle. Under the influence of the circular, the Societies for the Defence of Rights sprang into action and the election of delegates for the Sivas Congress began. Kâzım Karabekir expressed the circular’s impact in Eastern Anatolia with the words, “The Amasya Circular was received with great enthusiasm in Erzurum. The nation had at last found a leader and a programme to guide it” (Karabekir, 1960, p. 125). Disturbed by this impact, the Istanbul Government moved to have Mustafa Kemal Pasha dismissed from his post, yet these initiatives failed to block the path of the national struggle.
The most important historical consequence of the circular was that it laid the groundwork for the convening of the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses. The decisions taken at the Erzurum Congress gave concrete form to the objectives of national sovereignty and full independence expressed in the Amasya Circular. Mazhar Müfit Kansu, in Erzurum’dan Ölümüne Kadar Atatürk’le Beraber, recounted the preparations for the Erzurum Congress and Atatürk’s role in this process through the daily notes he kept (Kansu, 1966, Vol. I, pp. 145-180). The Sivas Congress, in turn, enabled the national struggle to evolve into a political organization encompassing the whole of Anatolia. This chain of congresses eventually paved the way for the proclamation of the National Pact (Misak-ı Millî) and the opening of the Turkish Grand National Assembly.
The legacy of the Amasya Circular today is the central position that the principle of national sovereignty occupies in Turkish political life. The provision expressed in the circular that “the nation’s independence will be saved again by the nation’s determination and resolve” constitutes the essence of the founding philosophy of the Republic of Turkey. This understanding has served as the bedrock of Turkish democracy from the proclamation of the Republic to the present day. Mahmut Esat Bozkurt assessed this legacy of the Amasya Circular with the words, “The Atatürk revolution laid its intellectual foundations with the Amasya Circular; the Republic that rose upon these foundations has become the eternal work of the Turkish nation” (Bozkurt, 1967, p. 95). Although more than a century has passed since the circular was issued, the principles it contains continue to retain their relevance and their guiding quality.
The Six Arrows: The Founding Philosophy of the Republic of Turkey
4.1. The Birth of the Six Arrows: The 1931 RPP Congress and the 1937 Constitutional Amendment
The Six Arrows acquired official status when they were incorporated into the party programme at the Third Grand Congress of the Republican People’s Party (CHF) held between 10 and 18 May 1931. To the four principles that had been set forth at the 1927 Congress—republicanism, populism, secularism, and nationalism—the principles of statism and revolutionism were added at the 1931 Congress, thereby achieving a synthesis of six fundamental principles. In his Atatürk’ten Hatıralar, Celal Bayar recounted this process with the words, “Atatürk had developed the six principles as a programme born of the Turkish nation’s needs. Each principle had been conceived to offer a solution to the nation’s problems of the day” (Bayar, 1955, p. 89). Mustafa Kemal Atatürk regarded these principles as the compass of the Turkish nation’s modernization journey and took care that each principle formed a harmonious whole with the others.
The Six Arrows acquired constitutional status through the amendment made to Article 2 of the 1924 Constitution on 5 February 1937. With this amendment, the provision that the Turkish State was “republican, nationalist, populist, statist, secular, and revolutionist” was added to the Constitution. Thus, the Six Arrows ceased to be merely elements of a party programme and became the fundamental characteristics of the state. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir assessed this constitutional amendment as “the completion of the legal framework of the Turkish revolution” and noted that the incorporation of the Six Arrows into the Constitution formally certified the ideological identity of the Republic of Turkey (Aydemir, 1965, Vol. III, p. 345). The entry of the Six Arrows into the Constitution also meant the recording, for the first time, of the principle of secularism as a constitutional provision.
The formation process of the Six Arrows should be assessed as the institutionalization phase of the great transformation that the Turkish nation experienced. The idea of national sovereignty, whose theoretical foundations were laid with the Amasya Circular during the National Struggle, was transformed into a form of government with the proclamation of the Republic; the Six Arrows, in turn, drew the ideological framework of that transformation. In Atatürk İhtilâli, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt defined the Six Arrows as “the constitution of the Turkish revolution” and analysed in detail the function of each principle in the modernization process of Turkish society (Bozkurt, 1967, pp. 112-130). Yusuf Akçura’s ideas on the construction of national identity set forth in his work Türkçülüğün Tarihi (The History of Turkism) contributed to the intellectual foundations of the Six Arrows as a significant source forming the theoretical background of Atatürk’s nationalism (Akçura, 1928, pp. 45-52). Atatürk regarded these principles not as dogmatic moulds but as dynamic precepts responsive to the needs of the Turkish nation.
4.2. The Holistic Structure of the Principles and Their Mutually Complementary Character
Republicanism, as the master principle of the Six Arrows, forms the basis of all the other principles. In Atatürk’s words, the republic is a form of government “based on the principle of national sovereignty” and represents all the gains of the Turkish revolution. In his Hatıralar, İsmet İnönü defined the principle of republicanism as “the most concrete expression of the Turkish nation’s will to govern itself after centuries of sultanic rule” (İnönü, 1985, p. 312). The principle of nationalism, intertwined with republicanism, constitutes the ideological underpinning of the Turkish nation’s continued existence as an independent state. Yusuf Akçura, in his work Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset (Three Types of Policy), comparatively analysed the currents of Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism, laying the theoretical foundations of Turkish nationalism (Akçura, 1904, pp. 12-18). Atatürk’s nationalism was built upon this theoretical framework drawn by Akçura and took shape as a unifying and integrative conception that rejected racism and was based on unity of language, culture, and ideal.
The principle of populism, as a natural extension of republicanism and nationalism, defines the social structure of Turkish society. This principle rests on a conception that rejects class conflict, is based on social solidarity, and envisions a society without privileges. Falih Rıfkı Atay explained the principle of populism with the words, “Atatürk’s greatest ideal was to create a classless, privilege-free, coalesced society” (Atay, 1969, p. 410). The principle of statism, as a complement to populism in the economic sphere, is based on the idea that the state should undertake those tasks that the individual cannot accomplish. Atatürk’s conception of statism was assessed not as a rigid ideology but as a pragmatic model that would ensure rapid development under Turkey’s conditions of the time. Celal Bayar elucidated the balance in the implementation of the principle of statism with the words, “Atatürk never regarded statism as a system that excluded private enterprise. The state would do what the private sector could not, but without obstructing its path” (Bayar, 1955, p. 102).
The principles of secularism and revolutionism are complementary elements that reflect the dynamic and progressive character of the Six Arrows. Secularism denotes the separation of religion and state affairs and the state’s neutrality towards all faiths. In Atatürk İhtilâli, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt described secularism as “the boldest step of the Turkish revolution” and emphasized the importance of the transition from a state order based on religious principles to an order founded on reason and science (Bozkurt, 1967, p. 156). Revolutionism, in turn, as a principle foreseeing the constant renewal and development of the Turkish nation on its path of modernization, ensures the continuity of the other five principles. Atatürk regarded the principle of revolutionism as a safeguard against stagnation and believed that the Turkish nation’s goal of rising above the level of contemporary civilization could be achieved only through this principle. Falih Rıfkı Atay interpreted this principle with the words, “Atatürk had placed the principle of revolutionism at the foundation of the Six Arrows so that the revolutions would not freeze. For him, revolution was a continuous process of renewal and development” (Atay, 1969, p. 520).
4.3. The Place and Importance of the Six Arrows in Turkish Political Life
From 1931 to the present day, the Six Arrows have remained one of the most important reference points of Turkish political life. Beyond constituting the founding philosophy of the Republic of Turkey, these principles have become the Turkish nation’s set of shared values. Although some of the principles of the Six Arrows were debated during the transition to multiparty political life, their constitutional status as the fundamental characteristics of the state has been preserved. Both the 1961 and the 1982 Constitutions likewise contain provisions that the Republic of Turkey is a state “loyal to Atatürk nationalism” and “secular.” İsmet İnönü defended the position of the Six Arrows after the transition to multiparty life with the words, “These principles are not merely those of a party; they are the shared values of the Turkish nation” (İnönü, 1985, p. 450).
The place of the Six Arrows in Turkish political life is not limited to constitutional provisions alone. These principles also reveal the capacity to offer solutions to the problems encountered by the Turkish nation in its modernization process. In the final volume of the Tek Adam trilogy, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir stressed that the Six Arrows were a programme that gave concrete form to Turkey’s Westernization and modernization goals (Aydemir, 1965, Vol. III, p. 420). The principle of secularism plays a critical role in the preservation of the democratic system as a safeguard preventing the exploitation of religious beliefs for political ends. The principle of nationalism forms the basis for the construction of a national identity that transcends ethnic and sectarian differences and rests on a consciousness of a shared homeland and a shared history. The cultural nationalism advocated by Yusuf Akçura in Türkçülüğün Tarihi was one of the principal sources that constituted the theoretical ground of Atatürk’s nationalism (Akçura, 1928, pp. 78-85).
The importance of the Six Arrows becomes even more pronounced in the context of the political, economic, and social challenges that Turkey faces today. At a time when the spheres of sovereignty of nation-states are shrinking in the process of globalization, the emphasis of the Six Arrows on full independence and national sovereignty retains its relevance. The ideal of “full independence” stressed by Mahmut Esat Bozkurt in Atatürk İhtilâli deserves to be reinterpreted today across a broad spectrum extending from economic independence to technological independence (Bozkurt, 1967, p. 200). The principle of republicanism reminds us of the necessity of strengthening democratic institutions and meticulously preserving the separation of powers. In this respect, the Six Arrows are not merely a legacy of the past but also a compass guiding the construction of the future.
Keeping the Six Arrows Alive Today: A Contemporary Interpretation of the Principles
5.1. Republicanism and Nationalism: The Guarantee of a Democratic Political Order
Keeping the principle of republicanism alive today requires, above all, the strengthening of a democratic order based on national sovereignty. The republic is not merely a form of government; it is also a regime of liberty in which citizens enjoy equal political rights. Mahmut Esat Bozkurt expressed the essence of republicanism with the words, “The republic is the self-government of the nation. Liberty, equality, and justice are fundamental in this form of government” (Bozkurt, 1967, p. 135). The sustainability of this regime depends on the meticulous preservation of the principle of separation of powers, the safeguarding of judicial independence, and the functioning of participatory democracy mechanisms. A contemporary interpretation of the principle of republicanism necessitates the institutionalization of pluralist democracy and the strengthening of civil society.
Keeping Atatürk’s nationalism alive today requires that the unifying and inclusive quality of this principle be brought to the fore. The conception of nationalism based on “unity of language, culture, and ideal” advocated by Yusuf Akçura in Türkçülüğün Tarihi constituted the theoretical foundations of Atatürk’s nationalism (Akçura, 1928, pp. 92-98). This understanding envisions a construction of national identity that regards ethnic and sectarian differences as a richness and unites around the common ideal of the homeland. The provision enshrined in Article 88 of the Constitution that “every person who is bound to the Turkish State through the bond of citizenship, without distinction of religion or race, is called a Turk” constitutes the essence of Atatürk’s nationalism. The most powerful antidote today against divisive currents and ethnic separatism is this unifying conception of nationalism put forward by Atatürk.
Keeping the principles of republicanism and nationalism alive together is the guarantee of the Turkish nation’s continued existence as an independent state. These two principles express the unbreakable bond between national sovereignty and national independence. In the Nutuk, Atatürk linked these two principles with the words, “The Turkish nation’s struggle for independence is at the same time its struggle for sovereignty. Independence and sovereignty are two inseparable goals” (Atatürk, 1927, p. 345). In the face of the internal and external threats confronting the Republic of Turkey, it is of vital importance that these two principles, resting on national sovereignty and national unity, be kept alive uncompromisingly. The Turkish nation demonstrates its will to preserve its democratic order and its national existence by holding fast to the principles of republicanism and nationalism.
5.2. Populism and Statism: The Guarantee of Social Justice and Development
Keeping the principle of populism alive today requires the strengthening of the social state concept and the elimination of social inequalities. Atatürk’s conception of populism is founded on the principle that everyone, without any discrimination among the individuals that constitute society, is equal before the law. Mahmut Esat Bozkurt defined populism as “the organization of the Turkish nation as a classless, privilege-free, coalesced mass” and stressed that this principle is the guarantee of social justice (Bozkurt, 1967, p. 145). A contemporary interpretation of this principle must be implemented through concrete policies such as ensuring income justice, establishing equality of opportunity, and expanding social safety nets. Celal Bayar explained the role of the state in implementing populism with the words, “The state is obliged to take every measure to increase the welfare of the people. This is a natural requirement of the principle of populism” (Bayar, 1955, p. 110).
Keeping the principle of statism alive today necessitates a redefinition of the state’s role in the economic sphere. In Atatürk’s period, statism meant that the state undertook economic development in areas where the private sector proved inadequate. Today, statism should be understood as the state assuming a regulatory role in strategic sectors in the public interest and remedying market failures. Sustaining the effectiveness of the state in strategic fields such as energy, the defence industry, transportation, and communications is important for the preservation of the economic dimension of national independence. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir stressed the flexible structure of statism with the words, “Atatürk’s statism was not a rigid doctrine but a pragmatic development model that could be adjusted according to circumstances” (Aydemir, 1965, Vol. III, p. 280).
Keeping the principles of populism and statism alive together ensures the establishment of a balance between social justice and economic development. While the state is obliged to increase social welfare by virtue of the principle of populism, it is also responsible for guiding economic development by virtue of the principle of statism. The harmonious implementation of these two principles contributes to Turkey’s construction of an inclusive and sustainable development model. Today, keeping these principles alive requires that the protective role of the social state be brought to the fore in the face of the inequalities generated by neoliberal policies. In Çankaya, Falih Rıfkı Atay summed up the importance Atatürk attached to these two principles with the sentence, “Atatürk believed that national independence could not be realized in its full sense without increasing the welfare of the people” (Atay, 1969, p. 480).
5.3. Secularism and Revolutionism: The Guarantee of Rationalism and Modernization
Keeping the principle of secularism alive today requires, beyond the separation of religion and state affairs, that the state remain equidistant from all faith groups and guarantee freedom of religion. Secularism is not merely a state policy; it is also the guarantee of social peace and a culture of coexistence. Mahmut Esat Bozkurt stressed the place of secularism in the Turkish revolution with the words, “Secularism is the cornerstone of the Turkish revolution. Without this principle, none of the other principles can be truly realized” (Bozkurt, 1967, p. 160). A contemporary interpretation of this principle encompasses the prevention of the exploitation of religious beliefs for political ends and the delivery of scientific education to all segments of society. Secularism is likewise an indispensable principle for ensuring gender equality and protecting individual freedoms. In Türk’ün Ateşle İmtihanı, Halide Edip Adıvar expressed the role of secularism in the participation of Turkish women in social life with the words, “The secular character of the Republic is the greatest guarantee of the emancipation of Turkish women” (Adıvar, 1962, p. 320).
Keeping the principle of revolutionism alive today is of vital importance for ensuring the continuity of the Turkish nation’s modernization journey. Atatürk regarded revolutionism as a guarantee against stagnation and reactionism and stressed that the Turkish nation’s goal of rising above the level of contemporary civilization could be achieved only through continuous renewal and development. Mahmut Esat Bozkurt defined revolutionism as “a principle of dynamism established so that the Turkish nation would not freeze but would constantly progress” (Bozkurt, 1967, p. 175). The principle of revolutionism foresees keeping abreast of developments in science and technology, renewing the education system in accordance with the requirements of the age, and continuously improving institutions. This principle also requires the encouragement of critical thinking and creativity.
Keeping the principles of secularism and revolutionism alive together is the guarantee of the Turkish nation’s continuous progress on the basis of rationalism and scientific thought. While secularism prevents religious dogmas from shaping political and social life, revolutionism enables society to adapt to developments in the contemporary world. These two principles reinforce the Republic of Turkey’s place in the modern world and contribute to the Turkish nation’s attainment of the goal of contemporary civilization. Today, keeping these principles alive is possible through concrete steps such as the dissemination of scientific education, the promotion of technological innovations, and the deepening of democratic culture. Addressing the youth in the Nutuk, Atatürk stressed that this ideal of continuous renewal and progress exists in the essence of the Turkish nation with the words, “The strength you need is present in the noble blood in your veins” (Atatürk, 1927, p. 543).
Conclusion
The National Struggle that began in Samsun on 19 May 1919 and whose political course was charted by the Amasya Circular is the greatest epic of existence of the Turkish nation on the stage of history. This epic not only resulted in a military victory but also opened the path to the construction of a new state based on national sovereignty and a modern society. This great transformation, which Mustafa Kemal Atatürk narrated over the course of six days in the Nutuk, became institutionalized through the set of principles embodied in the Six Arrows and turned into the fundamental characteristics of the Republic of Turkey. The principles of republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism, and revolutionism guide the Turkish nation’s modernization journey within a structure in which they complement and complete one another.
The principle proclaimed in the Amasya Circular that “the nation’s independence will be saved again by the nation’s determination and resolve” has survived to the present day as the unchanging reference point of Turkish political life. This process, recorded from different perspectives in Kâzım Karabekir’s İstiklâl Harbimiz, Ali Fuat Cebesoy’s Milli Mücadele Hatıraları, Rauf Orbay’s Siyasi Hatıralar, Halide Edip Adıvar’s Türk’ün Ateşle İmtihanı, and Falih Rıfkı Atay’s Çankaya, demonstrates that national sovereignty and full independence are the founding mortar of the Republic of Turkey. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir’s Tek Adam trilogy reveals the difficulties through which the Turkish nation passed to arrive at the present day by presenting in exhaustive detail the life story of Atatürk, the leader of this great transformation, within all the complexity of the era. Mahmut Esat Bozkurt’s Atatürk İhtilâli, meanwhile, lays out the legal and philosophical foundations of this transformation, delineating the ideological framework of the Six Arrows. Works such as Yusuf Akçura’s Türkçülüğün Tarihi and Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset provided the intellectual legacy that constitutes the theoretical background of Atatürk’s nationalism.
As long as the Turkish nation and the State of the Republic of Turkey continue to hold fast to the Six Arrows and keep these principles alive, they will preserve their independence and their goal of modernization. The principle of republicanism must be realized through the strengthening of the democratic order; the principle of nationalism through the construction of a unifying and inclusive national identity; the principle of populism through the establishment of social justice; the principle of statism through the realization of strategic development goals; the principle of secularism through the safeguarding of freedom of religion and conscience; and the principle of revolutionism through the will to continuous renewal and development. The consciousness of the “first duty” stressed in Atatürk’s Address to the Youth expresses the responsibility of Turkish youth and the Turkish nation to uphold these principles.
The torch of independence lit in Samsun on 19 May 1919 acquired a political course in Amasya, was transformed into a state form with the proclamation of the Republic, and gained its ideological framework with the Six Arrows. Today, every link of this chain remains alive in the memory of the Turkish nation and awaits transmission to future generations. As Celal Bayar stated in his Atatürk’ten Hatıralar, “Atatürk left to those who came after him not only a homeland but also a system of thought that would keep that homeland alive forever” (Bayar, 1955, p. 195). As long as the Turkish nation maintains its resolve to keep this great legacy alive, it will never compromise on its independence, its Republic, and its ideal of modernization. The six lights of the Six Arrows will continue to burn as beacons illuminating Turkey’s path in dark times; the Turkish nation will continue to advance on the road to contemporary civilization under their guidance.
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Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA) Aarhus University, 1997 Independent Researcher Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures
Decades-long drug wars in Mexico have predominantly been explained in academic literature through variables such as inter-cartel competition, deficiencies in state capacity, and drug demand from the United States. However, the extensive investigations of Mexican journalist-author Francisco Cruz add an extremely disturbing dimension to this picture: the allegation that transnational criminal networks, specifically the structure defined as the “Israeli mafia,” and former intelligence operatives have been integrated into the cartel ecosystem in Mexico, protected and managed by the state security bureaucracy itself. Cruz’s narrative indicates that organized crime may represent not only market competition but also a complex power projection with geopolitical and intelligence dimensions. This article aims to systematically address Cruz’s findings, the chronology of events, and the alleged connections, discussing within an academic framework what these claims could mean for the Mexican state and international security. The study acknowledges from the outset that the entirety of the allegations has not been definitively corroborated by independent judicial bodies or international commissions of inquiry, yet it interrogates their analytical value as a research hypothesis.
Conceptual Framework: The Israeli Mafia and Transnational Crime Networks
Francisco Cruz particularly emphasizes that the Israeli mafia is not an ordinary criminal organization. According to the author, this structure is “a planned criminal organization born almost with the establishment of the modern State of Israel, possessing a permanent organizational scheme.” This claim partially aligns with the limited but existing studies in the literature on the historical roots of Jewish crime groups. It is known that organized crime in Israel possesses a comprehensive network structure, with 16 crime families operating in a wide spectrum of activities including drug trafficking, money laundering, extortion, and arms trafficking.
Specifically, with the mass immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel in 1989, Russian organized crime elements began to view Israel as an ideal center for money laundering. Because the banking system of the era was designed to encourage aliyah and capital movements, combined with the absence of anti-money laundering legislation, it became an easy haven for “Russian” organized crime. In 2005, Israeli police estimated that Russian organized crime had laundered between 5 and 10 billion dollars in the fifteen years following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Likewise, the structure known as the “Israeli mafia,” founded in the 1980s in New York under the leadership of Johnny Attias and responsible for the largest gold heist in Manhattan’s jewelry district, confirms this transnational character. Cruz’s contribution is his claim that this structure, over time, symbiotically strengthened with the Russian “Red Mafia,” reaching the same operational level as the Japanese Yakuza, the Italian Cosa Nostra, and the Mexican cartels. According to him, not only professional bankers but also mafia elements immigrated to Israel during the waves of Jewish migration; these groups merged with criminal networks from the former Soviet geography, thereby gaining a global capacity.
Entry into Mexico: The 2000s and Initial Detections
According to Cruz’s chronology, the presence of the Israeli mafia in Mexico dates back to the early 2000s. Other investigations supporting this claim reveal that Mexican government security forces had detected connections between the Israeli mafia and organized crime groups starting in 2000, that intensive operations were recorded for a Mexican cartel solely between 2000 and 2010, and that the Israeli mafia supplied high-powered weapons to this cartel and laundered illegal proceeds. Similarly, it has been reported that the Mexican federal government detected the money laundering connections of Israelis with cartels and Mexican companies 21 years ago.
During this period, two Israeli citizens, Benjamín Yessuharan Zuchi (Ben Zuchi) and Yalon Azulay, who would later be killed in Ciudad de México in 2019, entered the radar of security units. According to the Mexican Attorney General’s Office (FGR) investigation files, Benjamín Yeshurun Sutchi wove a criminal network during his stay in Mexico between 2001 and 2005 by establishing relations with criminal organizations dedicated to drug trafficking, kidnapping, and casino operations. Sought by Interpol, Sutchi was captured in June 2005 and deported to Israel but later returned to Mexico to continue his casino operations. FGR files document that Sutchi established relations with members of the Beltrán Leyva Cartel, particularly with Édgar Valdés Villarreal, known as “La Barbie”; a photograph of the Israeli together with “La Barbie” was found during a search conducted by SEIDO.
Genaro García Luna: From Security Chief to Protector of Criminal Networks
The central figure of the article is undoubtedly former Secretary of Public Security Genaro García Luna. According to the official indictment of the U.S. Department of Justice, García Luna served as the head of Mexico’s Federal Investigation Agency (AFI) from 2001 to 2005 and, as Secretary of Public Security from 2006 to 2012, controlled the Federal Police Force. Arrested in Dallas, Texas in December 2019, he was found guilty by a jury in February 2023 after a four-week trial in Brooklyn federal court of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, international cocaine distribution conspiracy, and making false statements. In October 2024, he was sentenced to 460 months (over 38 years) in prison and a $2 million fine.
Judge Brian M. Cogan stated that García Luna exhibited “the same kind of thuggery” as El Chapo, only manifested differently. According to The New York Times, García Luna had so penetrated the country’s security apparatus that he was defined as Mexico’s J. Edgar Hoover, yet he led a double life, being on the Sinaloa Cartel’s payroll for almost his entire career. García Luna’s cooperation encompassed actions such as providing safe passage for the cartel’s drug shipments, supplying sensitive law enforcement information about investigations related to the cartel, and assisting in attacks against rival cartels. The indictment indicates that between 2002 and 2007, García Luna assisted in at least six shipments containing over 50,000 kilograms of cocaine in total, with bribery payments personally delivered to him in briefcases containing millions of dollars.
Kidnapping, Extortion, and “Manhunt” Operations
According to the allegations, the main sphere of activity of the Israeli mafia in Mexico consists of extortion and kidnapping-for-ransom operations targeting wealthy Jewish businessmen. To place this allegation in a broader context, kidnapping has long been a critical source of income for organized crime groups in Mexico. Reports show that cartels have deeply penetrated the mining sector, some companies have made protection agreements with cartels, and disobedience can result in kidnapping and murder. Informality is widespread, and large companies and foreign operators often do not report kidnapping cases.
Cruz claims that the Israeli mafia established “large private operational teams” for such operations and that former Mossad agents served in these teams. It has been documented that Mexican cartels have heavily recruited former military personnel and operatives with tactical experience from countries such as Israel, Russia, the Netherlands, Ukraine, Colombia, and Guatemala in recent years, with the aim of forming “more lethal, trained, and disciplined forces.” It has also been reported that cartels have modernized their arsenals with technologies, accessories, and sighting systems previously unique to military or highly trained police forces. Connections between the Israeli mafia and the cartels are alleged to facilitate the trafficking of people, money, and drugs. In fact, authorities have documented the money-laundering activities of the Israeli mafia and the participation of members of ETA and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) as well as Los Zetas in training camps.
The Florence Cassez and Israel Vallarta Case: The Visible Face and Deep Connections
In Cruz’s analysis, the Florence Cassez and Israel Vallarta case is a “scapegoat” operation covering up this multi-layered network of relationships. The case chronology is as follows: In December 2005, AFI agents raided the Las Chinitas ranch on the México-Cuernavaca highway; simultaneously, a Televisa crew entered the scene to be broadcast on Carlos Loret de Mola’s program. According to records, agents were seen beating Vallarta while presenting him to the camera, while French citizen Florence Cassez repeatedly stated she was unaware that three people were being held hostage at the location. Both were accused of being the leaders of the kidnapping gang “Los Zodiaco.”
After years of legal struggle, the Mexican Supreme Court ruled in 2013 for Cassez’s release; it was determined that the arrest was a staged fiction by the AFI and that this fiction had a “corrupting effect” on the criminal process. In contrast, Israel Vallarta remained in detention without a definitive verdict for approximately 20 years. Finally, in August 2025, the Third Criminal District Judge of the State of Mexico, Mariana Vieyra Valdés, acquitted Vallarta on the same legal grounds the Supreme Court applied for Cassez in 2013. The court invalidated the testimonies, identifications, and Vallarta’s statement, proven through three separate expert reports to have been taken under torture in 2005. According to Cruz, this case made the presence of the Israeli mafia in Mexico so visible as to provide a foothold for publicly stating, “Here is the Israeli mafia in Mexico,” but simultaneously prevented the larger structure under García Luna’s leadership from being seen.
The 2019 Murders and the Network Becoming Visible
All of this alleged structure remained largely in the dark until two murders committed in Ciudad de México in July 2019. On July 24, 2019, at a Chinese restaurant in the upscale Plaza Artz shopping center south of Mexico City, a woman shot and killed two Israeli citizens at close range. The victims were identified as Alon Azulay (41) and Benjamin Yeshurun Sutchi (44). Although the female suspect, initially identified as “Esperanza N.,” suggested the attack was a crime of passion, the Mexico City Attorney General’s Office confirmed that the double homicide was a “coordinated attack” and linked to an underground network of Israeli criminals. President Andrés Manuel López Obrador personally addressed the issue at his daily press conference, stating, “This is not a case of passion as previously reported. This is related to organized crime, and I close the matter here.” Mexican Security Minister Alfonso Durazo explained that the slain Israelis were linked to money laundering gangs in the country. The Israeli Embassy in Mexico issued a written statement noting that Sutchi and Azulay “had criminal records both in Israel and in Mexico.”
As the investigation into the murders deepened, former Mexico City Police Chief Gabriel Regino explained that Sutchi was captured in 2005 in an operation conducted by the Mexican intelligence agency Cisen at Interpol’s request; that he had escaped from prison twice in Israel; and that there was intelligence indicating he had been trained by Mossad. According to the BBC, Mexico City Attorney General’s Office Spokesperson Ulises Lara stated that “the passion motivation has been eliminated” and that “the event leads us to connect it to a settling of scores between criminal groups.” The investigation launched following the murders led Cruz and his team to discover that these individuals were not ordinary crime victims but members of the Israeli mafia who had long been conducting extortion and kidnapping activities in Mexico. In 2021, a woman was arrested in connection with these 2019 murders for links to the Jalisco Nueva Generación Cartel (CJNG), demonstrating that the mafia-cartel connection had become a judicial finding.
Mossad Connections: The Most Controversial Link in the Allegation
The most speculative and hardest-to-verify part of Cruz’s narrative concerns the role of former Mossad agents within these structures. The point to be underlined here is that no evidence is presented that Mossad, as a state institution, was directly involved in criminal activities; rather, it is claimed that “former” agents were involved in these networks on an individual level. However, this allegation must be evaluated in historical context: Mossad’s presence in Latin America dates back decades. The most famous example is the capture of Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann by Mossad agents in Buenos Aires in 1960. A more controversial example is the close relationship between former Mossad special operations commander Mike Harari and Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega. According to Ynet’s exclusive report, Noriega “assisted in countless top-secret Mossad operations,” and Harari, even after retiring from Mossad in 1980, was tasked by then-Prime Minister Menachem Begin with managing the secret connections in Panama. During the U.S. invasion of Panama, Harari was sought alongside Noriega; he was alleged to have been involved in drug and arms trafficking but managed to escape with the help of local collaborators. This historical example offers an indirect framework for Cruz’s claims by demonstrating that former Mossad personnel could, at times, take part in operations beyond legal boundaries in Latin America; however, independent judicial evidence is essential to reach a definitive judgment.
Operational Symbiosis Model and Theoretical Assessment
When we expand and analyze Cruz’s claims, the following operational symbiosis model emerges: The Israeli mafia targets the wealthy Jewish community in Mexico using technical expertise provided by former intelligence operatives (surveillance, target profiling, kidnapping, and negotiation); transfers a portion of the proceeds from these activities as bribes to García Luna and his network; and in return gains logistical protection and operational space through strategic partnerships established with the cartels (particularly Beltrán Leyva, Sinaloa, and Jalisco Nueva Generación). The exact overlap of García Luna’s tenure as AFI head (2001-2005) and Sutchi’s initial period of activity in Mexico (2001-2005) is chronologically significant. Moreover, reports that cartels recruit former soldiers and operatives from many countries, including Israel, suggest that the Israeli mafia’s integration into the cartel ecosystem may not be an isolated case but part of a broader transnational crime strategy. This model inverts the concept of “state capture,” frequently used in organized crime literature on Mexico, and effectively describes a model of the “instrumentalization of crime by the state.”
Conclusion
When the allegations put forward by Francisco Cruz are combined with the García Luna corruption proven in U.S. courts, the documented Israeli-Cartel connections, and the 2019 murders corroborated by official authorities, a picture emerges capable of shaking all paradigms regarding the security crisis in Mexico. The sentencing of García Luna to over 38 years in prison demonstrates that the state-crime alliance is not merely a theory but is supported by concrete judicial findings. The narrative in question reveals not only that cartels are actors that capture the state but also that the state bureaucracy can actively manage international criminal networks and instrumentalize them for its own benefit. However, allegations regarding the individual participation of Mossad-linked former agents in organized crime cannot be dismissed as entirely baseless when assessed in the context of historical examples such as the Harari-Noriega relationship; nonetheless, they must be approached with caution as long as they remain unconfirmed by official authorities. Behind the violence persisting in Latin America may lie not only drug markets but far more complex global power relations shaped in the dark rooms of states.
References
· Beittel, J. S. (2022). Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations. Congressional Research Service. · Cruz, F. (various publications). Investigative journalism files and interviews. · Serrano, M. (2012). “State-Crime Relations in Mexico.” Journal of Latin American Studies, 44(3), 543-568. · Viano, E. C. (Ed.) (2020). Transnational Organized Crime: Yesterday and Today. Routledge. · U.S. Department of Justice, Eastern District of New York. (2023, February 21). Ex-Mexican Secretary of Public Security Genaro Garcia Luna Convicted of Engaging in a Continuing Criminal Enterprise. · U.S. Department of Justice, Eastern District of New York. (2024, October 16). Ex-Mexican Secretary of Public Security Genaro Garcia Luna Sentenced to Over 38 Years’ Imprisonment. · U.S. Department of Justice, Eastern District of New York. (2020, July 30). Former Mexican Secretary of Public Security Genaro Garcia Luna Charged with Engaging in a Continuing Criminal Enterprise. · U.S. Department of Justice, Eastern District of New York. (2019, December 10). Former Mexican Secretary of Public Security Arrested for Drug-Trafficking Conspiracy and Making False Statements. · The New York Times. (2023, February 21). “Mexico’s Ex-Top Security Official Is Convicted of Cartel Bribery.” · The Guardian. (2024, October 16). “Mexican official who led war on drugs jailed for 38 years for accepting bribes.” · BBC News Mundo. (2019, July 25). “Plaza Artz: what is known about the two Israelis murdered in a ‘settling of scores’ in Mexico City.” · BBC News. (2019, July 26). “Israeli ‘underworld’ figures shot dead in Mexico City ‘hit’.” · CNN. (2019, July 26). “Woman shoots two Israelis dead in Chinese restaurant in Mexico City.” · Instituto Nacional de Migración (Mexico). (2019, July 25). “Israeli wove criminal network in Mexico.” · El Imparcial. (2025, August 2). “They apply to Israel Vallarta the same ruling that freed Florence Cassez.” · Infobae. (2025, August 2). “Israel Vallarta Case: how he entered and how he left prison nearly 20 years later.” · Los Reporteros MX. (2026, April 30). “Weapons, training and mafia: the relationship of Mexican cartels with Israel.” · Ynetnews. (2017, June 1). “Former Panama dictator’s secret ties to Israel.” · NCFGT. (2021, September 7). “Israeli mafia.” · S-RM Inform. (2026, March 30). “Qtr 1, 2026 | The cost of business: Organised crime in Mexico.” · Amos News. (2025, September 27). “Links of Mexican cartels with the Israeli mafia from the year 2000, revealed.” · Mexico Daily Post. (2025, September 4). “From Israel to Mexico: Galil rifles end up in the hands of cartels.”
Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA) Aarhus University, 1997 Independent Researcher Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures
I have publicly criticized Turkish Consul General Ahmet Yazal. / I am living proof that freedom of criticism is real and free of Turkish Officials.
Mr. Ben -Meir you are at it again with your smear campaign of Türkiye.
First and foremost, I must remind you, Mr. Alon Ben-Meir, that the official name of the country is Türkiye. Given how many times I have written to you regarding this matter, you should have gotten it right by now. Your disrespect begins with your failure to use the correct name of the nation.
The article presents itself as a defense of universal human rights, yet it is deeply selective, ideologically framed, historically incomplete, and strategically dismissive of the existential security threats confronting the Republic of Türkiye. It does not read as a balanced legal analysis; rather, it resembles a prosecutorial brief crafted to delegitimize the Turkish state while systematically omitting the geopolitical realities, terrorist threats, constitutional complexities, and democratic dynamics that have shaped modern Türkiye since the attempted coup of July 15, 2016.
Any intellectually honest assessment must begin with the undeniable fact that Türkiye faced a violent coup attempt in 2016 orchestrated by elements infiltrating the military, judiciary, police, and bureaucracy. The coup attempt resulted in the deaths of over 250 civilians and security personnel, with thousands wounded. Fighter jets bombed the Turkish Grand National Assembly, tanks rolled into civilian streets, and armed officers attempted to overthrow a democratically elected government. The article minimizes this unprecedented national trauma as merely a “pretext” for authoritarianism, thereby erasing the legitimate security concerns of a sovereign NATO member state confronting an armed insurrection.
The article further fails to acknowledge that many Western democracies adopted extraordinary emergency powers after terrorist attacks or national security crises. Following 9/11, the United States implemented the Patriot Act, Guantanamo Bay detentions, enhanced surveillance, extraordinary renditions, and broad counterterrorism authorities. France enacted emergency powers after the Paris attacks. The United Kingdom expanded anti-terror legislation for decades in response to IRA terrorism. Yet when Türkiye responds to a direct coup attempt and decades long PKK terrorism, its actions are uniquely characterized as irredeemable authoritarianism. This double standard is impossible to ignore.
The portrayal of Türkiye’s judiciary as entirely illegitimate is similarly reductionist. No serious observer claims every judicial process in Türkiye is flawless; however, to assert that all prosecutions involving terrorist Gulen-linked operatives, PKK affiliates, or extremist networks are fabricated is intellectually unserious. The FETO network was not merely a religious or educational movement. Turkish authorities and many independent observers documented systematic infiltration into state institutions over decades. Even critics of President Erdogan acknowledged the movement’s extensive penetration of the judiciary and police apparatus, o you must have missed that too. The article deliberately ignores this dimension because acknowledging it would complicate its simplistic moral narrative.
The claims regarding Kurdish repression also omit crucial context. Türkiye’s conflict has never been with Kurdish identity itself. Millions of Kurdish citizens serve in parliament, business, academia, the military, and civil society. Kurdish-language broadcasting, publications, and cultural initiatives expanded dramatically under AK Party governments compared to previous eras. The issue is not Kurdish ethnicity but the PKK, which is recognized as a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the United States, NATO, and the European Union. The article repeatedly conflates Kurdish political identity with organizations accused of operational or ideological proximity to PKK militancy. No democratic state permits elected officials to materially support armed insurgent structures while claiming complete immunity from legal scrutiny.
Moreover, the article’s discussion of southeastern operations omits the urban warfare environment created by PKK-affiliated militants who dug trenches, planted explosives in residential zones, and militarized municipalities. Civilian suffering in these clashes was tragic, but responsibility cannot be examined honestly while erasing the role of armed insurgency. To describe all counterterrorism operations as “collective punishment” is rhetoric designed to morally criminalize the Turkish state rather than analyze a complex security conflict.
The article’s accusations regarding media freedom are similarly one-sided. Türkiye possesses one of the most politically vibrant and confrontational media environments in the region. Opposition parties openly campaign nationwide. Anti-government media outlets continue to operate. Social media criticism of state officials remains widespread.
As a matter of fact, for the past year, almost bi-weekly, I have publicly called out and criticized the Turkish Consul General, Ahmet Yazal. Despite this, I have never been approached by Turkish intelligence, faced a lawsuit, or even been questioned when I travel to Türkiye. I am living proof that freedom of criticism is real, and that anyone can openly criticize Turkish officials without fear of retaliation. I am living proof.
Indeed, some of the harshest criticism directed at the Turkish government is published daily within Türkiye itself. The article selectively cites arrests and prosecutions while refusing to distinguish between journalism and alleged operational support for violent organizations, financial crimes, or coup-related activities. Democracies worldwide struggle with defining the boundary between protected speech and active collaboration with extremist entities.
Equally problematic is the article’s attempt to frame President Erdogan as transforming Türkiye into a theocratic state as a matter of fact President Erdogan when he traveled to Egypt – He stressed Secularism in Egyptian Parliament- Alon , you must have missed the speech .
This argument fundamentally misunderstands Turkish society and democratic pluralism. Türkiye remains constitutionally secular. The visibility of religious identity in public life does not automatically constitute authoritarian Islamization. In many Western democracies, politicians openly invoke Christian values especially here in America which you neglect to talk about , attend religious ceremonies, and shape policy discussions around faith informed ethics without triggering accusations of dismantling democracy. Yet when Turkish society reflects its overwhelmingly Muslim social character, commentators portray it as inherently threatening. This reveals an orientalist discomfort with Muslim majority democratic expression rather than a principled defense of secular governance.
The article’s treatment of refugees is especially disingenuous. Türkiye hosts one of the largest refugee populations on Earth, including millions fleeing the Syrian civil war. Turkiye has a time tested honor role in welcoming and protecting refugees. While European governments built walls, closed borders, or externalized migration enforcement, Türkiye absorbed immense economic and social pressures with comparatively limited international support. No refugee system managing millions of displaced persons is without challenges. However, to portray Türkiye solely as an abuser while ignoring the extraordinary humanitarian burden it has carried for over a decade is a profound distortion and is a planned to delegitimize our NATO allyTürkiye.
The calls for NATO exclusion, EU isolation, ICC referrals, and sanctions reveal the article’s true objective: strategic punishment of Türkiye rather than constructive engagement. Excluding Türkiye from NATO decision-making would weaken the alliance’s southern flank, destabilize Black Sea security architecture, undermine counterterrorism coordination, and strengthen Russian and Iranian geopolitical leverage. Calls to isolate Türkiye are not principled solutions; they are strategically reckless proposals that ignore Türkiye’s indispensable role in European security, energy transit, migration management, and regional diplomacy.
Furthermore, the article entirely ignores Türkiye’s democratic electoral legitimacy. President Erdoğan and the AK Party have repeatedly faced competitive elections over two decades. Opposition parties control major municipalities, including Istanbul and Ankara. Political transitions at local levels continue to occur through ballots, not military intervention. One may criticize aspects of governance while still acknowledging that Türkiye retains competitive political structures far more dynamic than many states in its broader region.
Most importantly, the article suffers from a profound civilizational bias frequently directed toward nonWestern powers. Western governments routinely engage in controversial counterterrorism practices, military interventions, surveillance programs, and emergency measures while still being treated as fundamentally legitimate democracies. Türkiye, however, is often judged through an absolutist framework in which every imperfection becomes evidence of authoritarian collapse. This asymmetrical moral scrutiny undermines the credibility of the critique itself.
A mature analysis of Türkiye requires intellectual honesty which you Mr. Alon never do: acknowledging legitimate concerns regarding judicial independence, civil liberties, and political polarization while simultaneously recognizing the severe national security threats Türkiye faces, the trauma of the 2016 coup attempt, the burden of regional instability, the PKK insurgency, the Syrian war, and the broader geopolitical pressures surrounding the Turkish Republic.
What weakens the article most is not that it raises criticisms every democracy should tolerate criticism but that it abandons balance entirely. It substitutes complexity with ideological absolutism, security realities with selective outrage, and nuanced legal analysis with geopolitical advocacy. In doing so, it ceases to be a credible human rights assessment and instead becomes a polemical instrument aimed at delegitimizing a sovereign nation whose policies the author opposes.
The Republic of Türkiye is not beyond criticism. No state is. But neither is it the caricature of unrestrained tyranny portrayed in this article. Türkiye remains a strategically essential, democratically contested, regionally influential nation navigating extraordinarily difficult internal and external pressures in one of the most unstable geopolitical environments in the world. Any serious discussion must begin with that reality not with slogans masquerading as analysis.
Letter to Editor : Turkey’s new missiles target India, presage a new Kashmir push” by Michael Rubin
Letter to Editor Sunday Guardian Ms Joyeeta Basu Sundayguardianlive India
Dear Ms Joyeeta Basu:
First, a matter of basic accuracy and respect. The official name of the country is Türkiye, not “Turkey.” The Government of the Republic of Türkiye formally requested that this name be used in international discourse and institutions. When individuals presenting themselves as analysts of Middle Eastern affairs cannot even employ the correct name of a NATO ally, it raises legitimate questions about the depth of their expertise.
The article in question “Turkey’s new missiles target India, presage a new Kashmir push” by Michael Rubin is not a serious strategic assessment. It is another example of the ongoing smear campaigns across the world against Türkiye, part of a broader global campaign of delegitimization directed against the Turkish state and nation. This issue has become another weapon in the international campaign to de-legitimize the Turkish state and the Turkish people.
To suggest that Türkiye’s missile development is somehow uniquely directed at India is speculative, inflammatory, and strategically unserious. Major regional and global powers continuously develop advanced missile systems as part of deterrence doctrine, technological modernization, and national defense planning. India itself maintains sophisticated missile and nuclear capabilities, as do numerous other states across Eurasia. Yet when Türkiye advances its own defense industry, it is immediately framed through paranoia and ideological hostility.
Türkiye has every sovereign right to strengthen its defense capabilities in an increasingly unstable geopolitical environment marked by war in Eastern Europe, instability in the Middle East, terrorism, maritime disputes, and evolving missile threats. Portraying Türkiye’s technological progress as evidence of an impending anti-India conspiracy reflects political bias rather than objective analysis.
The article further descends into ideological caricature by attempting to portray President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and modern Türkiye through reductive Islamist stereotypes divorced from geopolitical reality. Türkiye remains a constitutional republic, a member of NATO, a G20 economy, and a critical strategic actor balancing relations across Europe, Asia, the Caucasus, the Balkans, and the Middle East. It is, in fact, A NATO Ally Against Authoritarian Threats.
The accusations regarding Hamas, Syria, Kashmir, and so-called “neo-Ottomanism” are presented without balance, nuance, or acknowledgment of Türkiye’s actual security concerns. Türkiye has suffered enormously from terrorism, instability on its borders, refugee crises, and regional wars. It has fought ISIS directly, hosted millions of refugees, and acted as a mediator in multiple international conflicts. Yet critics selectively erase these realities because they do not fit the predetermined narrative.
The attempt to equate Türkiye’s diplomatic concern regarding Kashmiri Muslims with support for terrorism is especially irresponsible. Nations routinely express views on international disputes and humanitarian issues without endorsing violence. Türkiye’s statements on Kashmir, like those of many countries regarding global disputes, reflect diplomatic and humanitarian concerns, not calls for extremism.
More troubling is the broader pattern behind such rhetoric. Increasingly, certain commentators seek to frame every independent Turkish foreign policy decision as evidence of extremism simply because Türkiye refuses to act as a subordinate regional actor. Whether the issue is the Eastern Mediterranean, Libya, Syria, the Caucasus, Palestine, or defense modernization, the same narrative machinery activates: demonize Türkiye, question its legitimacy, and isolate it internationally.
This is not objective analysis. It is another smear campaign to delegitimize Türkiye a nation that has emerged as an independent regional power with strategic autonomy, advanced defense capabilities, and growing diplomatic influence across multiple continents.
Ibrahim Kurtulus Community Activist
Turkey’s new missiles target India, presage a new Kashmir push
Every year, the food produced contains enough calories to feed 10 billion people, yet one-eighth of the planet faces chronic hunger. In an age where soil grows deaf, water recedes, and the climate becomes unpredictable, the coexistence of abundance and famine at the same table is no accident but a designed outcome of the modern agricultural regime. While fertile land equivalent to 30 football pitches is lost every minute, one-third of all food produced rots in waste containers. This striking contradiction is not merely about the limits of agricultural technologies or arable land; it is about food being stripped of its status as a human right and transformed into a financial asset. The following sections trace the silent scream of the soil, the double face of technology, and the radical imprints of the demand for justice.
The global population’s projected approach to 10 billion by mid-century pushes debates on the sustainability of agricultural production systems and food security to an ever more critical juncture. Current production models deplete natural resources on one hand, while failing to eliminate hunger and malnutrition on the other, due to the inequitable distribution of the food produced. Data from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations indicate that the per capita food supply is theoretically sufficient on a global scale, yet structural ruptures in access are deepening. The decline in arable land, the yield pressures created by climate change, and the unequal sharing of resources place the planet’s food architecture on fragile ground.
The pressure on agricultural land arises not only from population growth but also from alternative land-use demands such as urbanization, industrial expansion, and biofuel production. Soil degradation and erosion reduce the capacity of fertile agricultural fields, threatening the amount of product obtained per unit area. Despite this, total production volumes continue to trend upwards thanks to technological innovations and precision agriculture practices, yet these gains are not reflected equally across the entire global population. The polarization within food systems manifests as overconsumption and obesity epidemics in developed regions, while presenting as chronic hunger and macronutrient deficiencies in underdeveloped geographies. The increasing frequency of extreme weather events linked to climate change, geopolitical ruptures in supply chains, and speculative price movements prove that logistical and economic access, rather than production quantity, constitutes the primary problem.
The modern agricultural paradigm is built on monoculture cropping, intensive chemical use, and fossil fuel dependency in the name of high yields. This industrial model may boost output in the short term, but it destroys the soil microbiome, depletes groundwater reserves, and annihilates agricultural biodiversity. The net decline in arable land accelerates phenomena such as salinization and desertification as an indirect consequence of these aggressive production practices. Meanwhile, the circulation of surplus production as a commercial commodity has eroded the food sovereignty of poor communities and dismantled the resilience of local markets against global price shocks. This neoliberal transformation in food regimes creates a structural ethical impasse by abandoning the goal of equitable distribution to the mercy of market dynamics.
Striking a balance between ecological limits and human needs necessitates a comprehensive and multi-layered analytical framework. At the core of the issue lies not only biophysical production capacity but also the political will to recognize food as a human right and the functionality of socioeconomic mechanisms. In Africa’s Sahel region, extensive arable land potential remains untapped due to infrastructure deficiencies and security problems, while in North America, land is deliberately left fallow to stabilize the market. This contradictory tableau of agricultural production reveals that productivity increases alone are no savior; distribution networks must be democratized. In a world where approximately one-third of food is wasted, the persistence of hunger is a manifestation of systemic failure.
Current Status and Limitations of Arable Lands
The global stock of arable land constitutes a limited portion of the Earth’s ice-free surface, and the capacity for expanding these lands has been largely exhausted. Approximately one-third of existing arable areas have lost their functionality over the last forty years due to erosion, chemical pollution, and salinization. Changes in land use lead to the clearing of new fields through deforestation, but these gains often come at the cost of destroying fragile ecosystems in the tropical belt. The conversion of rainforests, particularly in the Amazon and Congo basins and Southeast Asia, into agricultural land destroys carbon sinks, thereby undermining the long-term sustainability of food production.
The irreversible degradation of soil health exposes the inadequacy of focusing solely on the physical extent of arable lands. Agricultural activities carried out on soils with low organic matter content, compacted and lifeless, yield only marginal productivity increases despite excessive synthetic fertilizer use. Reports from the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification record that approximately 12 million hectares of productive land undergo degradation each year. Urbanization pressure, typically concentrated on the most fertile alluvial plains, results in losses that are difficult to compensate for global food supply, as these areas are opened to non-agricultural use through concreting.
The climate crisis is radically reshaping the geographical distribution of arable land and vegetation periods. While agricultural suitability boundaries shift northward in some high-latitude regions due to rising temperatures, extreme heat and drought periods are prolonging in traditional agricultural centers such as the Mediterranean basin, the Middle East, and South Asia. The unconscious use of freshwater resources for agricultural irrigation rapidly lowers the levels of underground aquifers, threatening vast agricultural basins with water scarcity. Declining soil moisture and erratic rainfall regimes are rendering rain-fed agricultural lands idle in regions lacking developed irrigation infrastructure, thereby triggering rural migration.
Inequalities in land ownership and usage rights stand as a socio-political barrier hindering the effective management of arable lands. Land grabbing by large-scale industrial farms and transnational corporations pushes smallholder farmers onto marginal lands while collapsing local food systems. The promotion of non-food agricultural activities, such as biofuel production, creates competition for the use of cereal and oilseed acreage intended for food purposes. While existing resources are technically sufficient to feed the entire planet, profit-driven choices in land use delineate the boundaries of the hunger map.
Agricultural Productivity and Technological Intervention
The concept of agricultural productivity, with modernity, has focused on obtaining maximum output per unit area, a process that reached its zenith with the Green Revolution’s triad of hybrid seeds, chemical inputs, and irrigation. The yield increases recorded in staple cereals like maize, wheat, and rice ensured the survival of billions of people in the second half of the twentieth century. However, this productivity explosion, being heavily dependent on fossil fuel-derived fertilizers and pesticides, has created a structure extremely sensitive to fluctuations in energy markets. The strategy of substituting soil fertility with synthetic inputs faces the law of diminishing returns; the crop yield obtained per unit of fertilizer is trending downward in many regions.
Precision agriculture technologies represent the next phase, promising radical optimization in resource use through satellite imagery, sensor networks, and artificial intelligence-assisted decision support systems. Variable rate fertilization and spot spraying carry the potential to reduce the environmental footprint while increasing economic efficiency. Gene-editing techniques and tools like CRISPR accelerate the development of crop varieties resistant to drought, salinity, and pests, enabling marginal lands to be brought into production. Controlled environment agriculture and vertical farming practices, meanwhile, redefine urban food supply by achieving exponentially higher yields with minimal water use compared to conventional field farming.
Nevertheless, the fruits of technological progress are distributed asymmetrically among the global farming population. High-cost robotic systems and digital infrastructure are accessible only to capital-intensive large enterprises, while subsistence farming families in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia cannot adequately benefit even from advances in seed breeding. Intellectual property regimes and the patenting of genetic material deepen dependency relationships by restricting farmers’ rights to save and exchange their own seeds. Perspectives based on technological determinism, viewing productivity solely as a biophysical output, fail to achieve the expected transformation by excluding the socioeconomic context and local knowledge systems.
Agroecological intensification strategies are attracting increasing attention for reconciling productivity increases with sustainability. This approach, which increases soil organic carbon, brings biodiversity back to the field, and activates natural pest control mechanisms, enhances the economic resilience of farmers by reducing the need for synthetic inputs. Practices such as polyculture, crop rotation, and agroforestry demonstrate a more stable long-term performance in total system productivity compared to monoculture. The concept of productivity awaits redefinition not merely in terms of grain tonnage but through multidimensional indicators such as nutrient density, water use efficiency, and carbon sequestration capacity.
Structural Barriers to Equitable Distribution
The global architecture of the food supply chain structurally reproduces the paradox of widespread scarcity amidst production abundance. Post-harvest losses reach up to forty percent in underdeveloped regions due to deficiencies in storage, cold chain, and rural transport infrastructure. Conversely, in developed consumer markets, food waste is concentrated at the retail and household levels, and the nutrients thrown away are more than enough to feed populations on the brink of starvation. This inefficiency in distribution networks reflects an economic rationality trapped between abandoning food to rot and destroying it to preserve market value.
The international agricultural trade regime creates a structural asymmetry between producer and consumer countries, undermining food sovereignty. Agricultural subsidies and protectionist walls implemented by high-income countries collapse the local markets of developing nations with low-cost export surpluses. Local producers, unable to compete with dumped imports, are condemned to rural poverty, and dependency on food imports deepens. Food speculation decouples basic commodity prices from production costs and supply-demand balances, rendering the food basket suddenly inaccessible for poor households.
The gender dimension of distributional injustice is shaped by the structural exclusion of women, who constitute roughly half of the agricultural workforce, from access to land, credit, and agricultural extension services. It has been calculated that in a scenario where women farmers have equal access to productive resources, total agricultural output could increase by up to 30 percent, significantly reducing hunger. Patriarchal norms in intra-household food allocation lead to chronic undernutrition among girls and women, creating an intergenerational transfer of lost physical and cognitive capacity. Even food aid mechanisms fall short in reaching the most vulnerable groups due to logistical constraints and political maneuvering, often turning into a tool for donor countries to offload surplus stocks.
Re-localizing regional food systems around short supply chains emerges as a central strategy for achieving distributional justice. Community-supported agriculture models, producer cooperatives, and urban gardening eliminate intermediaries, providing a fair price to the producer while offering accessible fresh food to the consumer. Food banking and rescue networks institutionalize social solidarity by preventing waste at the source. Supporting local production through public procurement and school feeding programs accelerates rural development by creating demand guarantees and confers the status of a public right upon healthy food.
Holistic Analysis and Policy Openings
The current crisis imposes a simultaneous transformation of interconnected ecological, economic, and social layers. Arable land protection strategies necessitate that public authorities responsible for zoning plans absolutely safeguard agricultural lands and prevent urban sprawl from encroaching upon fertile plains. Restorative agricultural practices that center on soil health must halt erosion while contributing to the fight against climate change by sequestering atmospheric carbon. To reduce pressure on freshwater resources, rainwater harvesting, the treatment and reuse of wastewater, and the dissemination of drought-resistant varieties must be addressed through integrated water governance.
Productivity policies must focus on resource-use efficiency and resilience rather than labor productivity. Enriching gene banks and supporting farmer seed networks provide the raw material for adapting to the uncertain environmental conditions of the future by preserving genetic diversity. Biological diversity serves as an insurance function, spontaneously suppressing pest outbreaks and disease epidemics. The democratization of agricultural extension services must adopt a hybrid approach combining smartphone-based applications with village-based demonstration plots to bridge the digital divide. Open-source hardware and software initiatives that reduce the cloud computing costs of precision agriculture hold the potential to enhance the competitiveness of small-scale farmers.
The goal of equitable distribution necessitates a radical revision of agricultural and trade policies. Multilateral regulatory frameworks must be urgently implemented within the World Trade Organization to counter export restrictions and speculative fund movements that threaten food security. Food stockpiling and buffer mechanisms can protect both producers and consumers by curbing excessive price volatility. Social protection floors, universal school meal programs, and conditional cash transfers are effective instruments for breaking the layer of poverty that blocks access to food. Binding commitments to reduce food loss and waste must be based on the hierarchy of recycling and reuse at every link of the supply chain.
The transformation of food systems on a sustainable basis necessitates multi-actor and participatory governance mechanisms that transcend nation-states. City administrations can redraw the nutritional map of metropolises by promoting local agriculture and peri-urban production through food policy councils. The private sector’s integration of environmental, social, and governance criteria into supply chains and adoption of fair trade standards must form part of responsible investment. Strengthening the monitoring and advocacy capacity of civil society will enhance accountability. Ultimately, a legal framework that removes food from the status of a financial asset class and defines it as a human right must constitute the backbone of all this transformation.
The global shift in dietary patterns offers a critical window of opportunity to alleviate pressure on agricultural lands. Diets based on excessive animal protein consumption lead to vast monoculture fields for feed crop production and intensive water use. A conscious transition towards plant-based nutrition will not only reduce greenhouse gas emissions but also allow existing arable lands to be allocated to producing food for direct human consumption. Energy efficiency in the agriculture and food sector, the increased use of renewable energy, and carbon-neutral production targets will ensure that long-term food security proceeds hand in hand with climate action.
The mission of providing sufficient and nutritious food for the global population can succeed through the reconceptualization of agriculture not as a mere production sector but as part of the planet’s life support systems. The quantitative shrinkage of arable lands can be balanced by increasing the output per unit area; however, the real issue is who benefits from this increase and how. The democratization of the food regime is possible through the broadening of access to the means of production and resistance against the commodification of knowledge. An agricultural paradigm in which technological optimism is balanced with ecological realism and social justice demands stands as the fundamental mortar in the construction of the future.
While the capacity to feed all the planet’s inhabitants remains embedded in natural resources, the translation of this potential into reality depends on political choices. Hunger is not a symptom of ultimate scarcity but of a systematic regime of deprivation. A food architecture that does not sacrifice agricultural lands to concrete and biofuels, that liberates the seed, that views water as a commons rather than a commodity, and that accepts waste as a design flaw must be urgently established. Climate justice cannot be conceived without food justice; therefore, both mitigation and adaptation strategies must center on nutritional security. Decisions taken across a wide spectrum, from individual consumer choices to global trade agreements, will determine the common destiny of humanity in the middle of the twenty-first century.
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Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA) Aarhus University, 1997 Independent Researcher Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures
