Author: Aylin D. Miller

  • PKK Says Kidnapped Tourists Well, Urges Germany to Back Kurds

    PKK Says Kidnapped Tourists Well, Urges Germany to Back Kurds

    By Ben Holland

    July 14 (Bloomberg) — The Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, said the three German tourists it kidnapped last week are well, and urged Germany to end a crackdown on Kurdish groups.

    The three men, seized on July 8 while they were climbing Mount Ararat in eastern Turkey, “have no problem with their health,” the PKK said in a statement to the Kurdish Firat news agency yesterday.

    To ensure their safe return, Germany should press Turkey to stop military operations against the PKK in southeast Turkey, the group said. Germany’s “anti-Kurdish policies” make it likely that incidents such as the kidnapping will occur again, it said.

    The PKK has been fighting for autonomy in largely Kurdish southeast Turkey since 1984 in a conflict that has caused about 40,000 deaths. The group has been banned in Germany since 1993.

    To contact the reporter on this story: Ben Holland in Istanbul at [email protected].

    Last Updated: July 14, 2008 03:36 EDT

  • Beyond the veil….”The Economist”‘ten ilginc bir yorum.

    Beyond the veil….”The Economist”‘ten ilginc bir yorum.

    “The Economist”‘ten ilginc bir yorum.
    Timur Sumer
    Beyond the veil
    Jun 12th 2008 | ANKARA
    From The Economist print edition

    The secular and the pious march towards a new collision, with unforeseeable consequences for democracy and Turkey’s chances in Europe

    Get article background

    WHEN Adnan Menderes, a right-wing politician who spoke up for pious Anatolians, swept to power as prime minister after Turkey’s first free parliamentary election 58 years ago, a group of officers began plotting a military coup within weeks. Ten years later, with the support of the secular intelligentsia and politicians, they overthrew the government, by then in its third term. A year later, in September 1961, Menderes was hanged.

    Yildiray Ogur, a young activist, sees worrying parallels between the 1960 coup and today’s campaign, spearheaded by Turkey’s generals and judges, to overthrow Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the prime minister, and his Justice and Development Party (AKP). Turkey has been in upheaval ever since the constitutional court began considering a case brought by the chief prosecutor to ban the AKP and to bar 71 named individuals, including Mr Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul, from politics, on thinly documented charges that they are seeking to impose sharia law.

    The stakes were raised on June 5th, when the court overturned a law passed by a big majority in parliament to let young women wear the Islamic-style headscarf at universities. By voting 9-2 to quash the law the court sent a clear signal that it would vote to shut down the AKP. A verdict is expected by the autumn.

    To many the case is like a judicial coup: a last-ditch attempt to cling to power by an elite that refuses to share wealth and social space with a rising class of pious Turks, symbolised by the AKP. It may also further discredit the constitutional court. Above all, says Mr Ogur, the case reveals “an army that believes it should have the final say, not elected politicians.”

    A defiant Mr Erdogan vows to fight back. In a fiery speech in parliament this week, he declared that the court had exceeded its jurisdiction and would “need to explain itself to the people.” There is talk of changing the rules for appointing judges and limiting their ability to ban political parties. Some AKP officials dream of unleashing millions of supporters on to the streets. But they know that doing so would risk provoking a real military coup. “We are like lambs being taken to slaughter, we are resigned to our fate,” sighs one AKP deputy.

    A few hardy souls pin their hopes on Western support. The European Union has hinted that it would suspend membership talks if the AKP were banned. But thanks to the growing opposition to Turkish accession in countries such as France and Austria, few Turks believe they will ever get in anyway. “With no carrots left to offer, the EU has no stick to wield,” opines Cengiz Aktar, who follows EU affairs.

    The biggest deterrent to overthrowing the AKP may be Turkey’s wobbly economy. After six years of steady growth the economy is slowing down, inflation has crept back to double digits and this year’s current-account deficit is expected to rise to 7% of GDP. Faik Oztrak, a former treasury under-secretary and opposition parliamentarian, reckons that Turkey will need at least $135 billion in foreign inflows to plug the gap. As he asks pointedly, “where will it come from?”

    Investor confidence has been rattled by the government’s indecision over extending an IMF deal that expired in May. “With financial markets remaining jittery, Turkey is walking on a tightrope, making policy errors potentially costly. In particular, new initiatives that jeopardise the achievement of the announced fiscal targets, such as the planned reform of municipal finances, could tilt the balance of policies and should be avoided,” Lorenzo Giorgianni, the IMF’s mission chief for Turkey, says. He is referring to the government’s plans to boost local spending.

    Yet in Istanbul many financiers seem unfazed. They see no reason for alarm, even if the AKP is banned. A chastened, wiser AKP would simply regroup under a different name and it will be business as usual, the argument goes. Certainly, when a party is banned (they tend to be either pro-Kurdish or pro-Islamic) its members usually come together under a new banner. But Islamic parties often come back even stronger. The AKP itself is an offshoot of Virtue, a party that was banned in 2001. It romped to power in 2002 and won a second term last year with a bigger share of the vote.

    Even if it were disbanded, the AKP’s surviving parliamentarians would remain as independents in sufficient numbers to be able to force another snap election. Indeed, the million-dollar question, as one European diplomat puts it, is “whether those who are perpetrating this strategy against the AKP will let them come back even stronger. They are stuck between a coup and a hard place.”

    Not everyone thinks that the AKP will emerge unscathed. Even his allies agree that Mr Erdogan made a strategic blunder by passing the headscarf law instead of blending it into a package of broader reforms embodied in a new constitution. Instead of appeasing secular fears, some AKP members crowed that the headscarf would soon be allowed in government offices as well. Many say the void left by Mr Gul, who moved up from foreign minister to become president last August, is partly to blame for Mr Erdogan’s mistakes. As number two in the AKP, Mr Gul had often curbed Mr Erdogan’s rasher instincts.

    Meanwhile, support in the Kurdish south-east, where the AKP made big gains last year, has been waning ever since Mr Erdogan yielded to army pressure and authorised cross-border attacks on PKK terrorists in northern Iraq. He also snubbed members of the pro-Kurdish Democratic People’s Party (DTP) in parliament. Police brutality and mass arrests during a May 1st demonstration in Istanbul have not helped his image.

    Yet, for all his and the party’s failings, recent opinion polls suggest that the AKP retains a big lead over its rivals. “You may criticise us for going slow on reforms, but the truth is that we made more changes than Turkey was able to absorb,” says Abdurrahman Kurt, an AKP member from Diyarbakir. By giving pious Turks a political voice, the AKP has also bolstered their faith in democracy.

    By overturning the headscarf law, says Mazhar Bagli, a sociologist at Diyarbakir’s Dicle university, the court is running the risk that “radical groups will now seek their rights through illegal means.” In other words, the threat of radical Islam in Turkey may have increased thanks to the secularists’ attack on the AKP.

     

    YORUM

    From: サバ SAMATYA [[email protected]]

     

    The Economist’ten EKONOMIK VERILERIMIZ

     


    14.07.2008

     
        THE Economist, dünyaca ünlü ve yaygın bir ekonomi politik
    dergidir. Ama son birkaç yıldır Türkiye’nin AKP tarafından ne kadar da
    “harika” yöneltildiğini, Atatürk ve Cumhuriyet ilkelerinin ne kadar da
    “demode” olduğunu yazmaktan hiç bıkmadı. Hele, hele AKP kapatma
    davasına Talabani, Rumlar ve AB komiserlerinden bile çok üzüldü ve
    karşı çıktı.
    Ama The Economist’te yayınlanan toplu ekonomik veriler AKP iktidarının
    Türkiye’yi nasıl da kırılgan ve sıkıntılı bir noktaya sürüklediğini
    ayan-beyan gösteriyor.
    Gelin, The Economist’in siyasi makalelerde yücelttiği AKP iktidarının
    Türkiye’yi ekonomik verilerde dünyada kendi kategorisindeki ülkeler
    arasında getirdiği yerini birlikte görelim ve karşılaştıralım.
    Veriler 5 Temmuz 2008 tarihli 388 sayılı son The Economist’ten;

    işsizlik oranı:
    Türkiye %11.6
    Polonya %10
    Brezilya %7.9
    Hindistan %7.2
    Rusya %6.4
    İsrail %6.3
    Pakistan %6.2
    G.Afrika %3.2

    Dış Tic.Açığı(12 ay-milyar dolar)
    -85 Hindistan
    -69.7 Türkiye
    -22.2 Mısır
    -21.3 Avustralya
    -19.8 Pakistan
    -17.1 Polonya
    -13.2 İsrail

    Cari Açık(nisan 2008-12 ay-milyar dolar)

    -42 Türkiye
    -22.G.Afrika
    -17.5 Hindistan
    -15.2 Brezilya
    -10.5 Pakistan
    -5.0 Kolombiya
    -4.8 Meksika
    -0.1 Mısır

    Yukarıdaki tablolarda Türkiye’nin maalesef en negatif göstergelere
    sahip olduğu görülüyor.
    Tabi dünya borsaları arasında da 2007 yılsonu itibarı ile
    karşılaştırıldığında en çok kaybeden ve düşüş gösteren borsanın Çin
    ile beraber İMKB olduğunu da belirtmek gerekiyor.
    İngilizler, Rumlar, AB komiserleri ve Talabani’nin AKP’nin
    kapatılmasına neden böyle canla başla karşı çıktıklarını da yukarıdaki
    karşılaştırılmalı ekonomik veriler yeterince anlatıyor sanırım.
    The Economist’in sürekli övüp desteklediği AKP’nin, Türk ekonomisini
    nasıl dünyanın en kırılgan ekonomisi haline getirdiğini, yine aynı
    dergi son sayısının arka sayfalarında ilan etmek zorunda kalıyor.
    Ne diyelim Allah akıl, fikir versin.
     
     
    UFUK SÖYLEMEZ
    -TERCUMAN-

  • Iran vs. the West

    Iran vs. the West

    Iran vs. the West

    Source: Aljazeera.net
  • The Not-So-Historic Talabani-Barak Handshake

    The Not-So-Historic Talabani-Barak Handshake

    Sunday, 13 July 2008, 2:54 pm

    Column: Ramzy Baroud

    A Kodak Moment:

    The Not-So-Historic Talabani-Barak Handshake (Photo: AFP)

    By Ramzy Baroud

    Most people would not have even realised that the 23rd congress of the Socialist International was being held near Athens were it not for the moment when Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak shook the hand of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani.

    An Associated Press report, published in the Israeli daily Haaretz, dubbed the handshake “historic”. History was supposedly made in Athens on 1 July 2008. Centred in a photo, featuring a widely grinning Barak and Talabani, is Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, who was credited for introducing the two.

    The three individuals involved are members of political establishments that are largely funded and sustained by the US government. Both Abbas and Talabani are at the helm of puppet political structures that lack sovereignty or political will of their own, and are entirely reliant on scripts drafted in full or in part by the Bush administration.

    As for Israel, which enjoys a more equitable relationship with the United States, normalisation with the Arabs is something it covets and tirelessly promotes, granted that such normalisation doesn’t involve ending its occupation of the Palestinian territories, or any other concessions.

    One might suggest the happenstance handshake and very brief meeting was not accidental at all. This is what Haaretz wrote, rewording Barak’s comments on the handshake. He “said that Israel wished to extend its indirect peace talks with Syria to cover Iraq as well.” That was a major political declaration by Israel — one surely aimed at further isolating Iran, as Israel’s newest moves regarding Syria, Lebanon and Gaza clearly suggest. But the fact is Israel’s ever-careful leaders could make no such major political announcement without intense deliberation and consensus in the Israeli government prior to the “accidental” handshake.

    Talabani owes Barak more than a reciprocal handshake; a heartfelt thank you is in order for his newly found fortunes as Iraq’s sixth president starting in 2005. Indeed, over time, pointing the finger at Israel’s leading role in the Iraq war — as it’s now being replayed in efforts to strike Iran — has morphed from being a recurring discussion of writers and analysts outside the mainstream media, to US government and army officials.

    In a recent commentary, US writer Paul J Balles brings to the fore some of these major declarations, including those of Senator Ernest Hollings (May 2004) who “acknowledged that the US invaded Iraq ‘to secure Israel’, and ‘everybody knows it.’Retired four-star US army general and former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Wesley Clark is another: “Those who favour this attack (against Iraq) now will tell you candidly, and privately, that it is probably true that Saddam Hussein is no threat to the United States. But they are afraid at some point he might decide if he had a nuclear weapon to use it against Israel,” he was quoted in The Independent as saying.

    In his recent review of Michael Scheuer‘s Marching Toward Hell: America and Islam after Iraq, Jim Miles wrote, “It is not so much the Israeli lobby itself that he [Scheuer] criticises, but the ‘Israeli-firsters’, those of the elite who whole-heartedly adopt the cause of Israel as the cause of America. He describes them as ‘dangerous men… seeking to place de facto limitations on the First Amendment to protect the nation of their primary attachment [Israel].

    Scheuer, an ex-CIA agent who primarily worked on gathering information on Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, wrote in his book, “to believe that relationship is not only a burden but a cancer on America’s ability to protect its genuine national interests… equates to either anti- Semitism or a lack of American patriotism.”

    Not only is Israel directly and indirectly responsible for a large share of the war efforts (needless to say media propaganda and hyped “intelligence” on Iraq’s non-existing nuclear programme), but it also had much to say and do following the fall of the Iraqi government in March 2003.

    In a comprehensive study entitled “The US War on Iraq: Yet Another Battle To Protect Israeli Interests?” published in the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs in October 2003, Delinda C Hanley discussed Israel’s involvement following the invasion of Iraq. The article poses an important question, among others: did Bush’s Israel-first advisers invade Iraq in order to assure that Israel would have easy access to oil? — a question that is not predicated on a hunch, but rather statements made by top Israeli officials, including the country’s national infrastructure minister at the time Joseph Paritzky, who “suggested that after Saddam Hussein’s departure, Iraqi oil could flow to the Jewish state, to be consumed or marketed from there.” A 31 March 2003 article in Haaretz reported on plans to “reopen a long-unused pipeline from Iraq’s Kirkuk oil fields to the Israeli port of Haifa.”

    Israel’s interest in Kirkuk’s oil, and thus Iraqi Kurds, didn’t merely manifest itself in economic profits, but extended far beyond. Seymour M Hersh wrote in The New Yorker, 21 June 2004: “Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s government decided… to minimise the damage that the war was causing to Israel’s strategic position by expanding its long-standing relationship with Iraq’s Kurds and establishing a significant presence on the ground in the semi- autonomous region of Kurdistan…
    Israeli intelligence and military operatives are now quietly at work in Kurdistan, providing training for Kurdish commando units
    and, most important in Israel’s view, running covert operations inside Kurdish areas of Iran and Syria.”

    Perhaps Talabani is the president of Iraq, but he is also the founder and secretary-general of the major Kurdish political party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). His advocacy for Kurdish political sovereignty spans a period of five decades. Thus, it is also difficult to believe that the influential leader didn’t know of Israel’s presence and involvement in northern Iraq. Ought one to understand the Athens handshake as a public acknowledgment and approval of that role?

    To suggest that the Barak-Talabani handshake was “historic” is completely unfounded, if not ignorant. What deserves scrutiny is why the governments of Tel Aviv and the Green Zone decided to upgrade their gestures of “good will” starting in 2003 to a public handshake. Is it a test balloon or is there a more “historic” and public agreement to follow?

    *************

    -Ramzy Baroud (www.ramzybaroud.net) is an author and editor of PalestineChronicle.com. His work has been published in many newspapers and journals worldwide. His latest book is The Second Palestinian Intifada: A Chronicle of a People’s Struggle (Pluto Press, London).

    Source: PalestineChronicle.com,

  • The Plot Against Turkey

    The Plot Against Turkey

    The Ergenekon case is the latest salvo in the battle between the ruling AKP and the nationalist old guard.

    By Mustafa Akyol | NEWSWEEK
    Jul 21, 2008 Issue

    Things are getting very hot this summer in Turkey—and it’s not just the weather. A long-simmering constitutional crisis is boiling over, and the country is experiencing one of its most turbulent periods in decades. Over the past several weeks, Turkish authorities have arrested two dozen members of a covert ultranationalist group named Ergenekon for allegedly plotting to provoke a military coup by staging political assassinations and whipping up social turmoil. Among the plotters: two retired top generals, the leader of a paramilitary group, and Kemal Kerincsiz, a lawyer who has sued dozens of liberal intellectuals in the past for violating Turkey’s law against “insulting Turkishness.”

    The Ergenekon case is only the latest salvo in a political war between the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Turkey’s nationalist and staunchly secularist old guard. The charges, if proved, point to a brazen conspiracy to undo the liberal reforms implemented by the AKP in recent years as part of its effort to move Turkey toward entry into the European Union. The plot seems to have grown out of fears that have been growing among Turkey’s nationalists since 2004, when the nation’s accession process began, and nationalists realized that as well as offering some economic advantages, the process could require Turkey to grant concessions on Cyprus, give greater freedoms to minorities and develop a more democratic political system.

    This battle is sometimes defined in the Western media as a tension between “Islamists” and “secularists,” but both terms are misleading. While AKP leaders, including Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, share an Islamist past, they abandoned that years ago and redefined themselves as “conservative democrats” who champion free markets, traditional (including religious) values and pro-EU reforms. Since it came to power in November 2002, the AKP has proved highly successful, winning a solid electoral victory in July 2007. Socially, the AKP represents Turkey’s economically minded masses, religious conservatives—including the rising “Islamic bourgeoisie” —and even most Kurds. As for those labeled secularists, they are not what one might think. Turkey’s definition of secularism is based not on the separation of mosque and state, but the dominance of the latter over the former—all mosques are simply run by the government. Secularist ideologues argue that the state also needs to safeguard society from religion. The Constitutional Court, one of the enforcers of this ideology, ruled in 1989 that “society should be kept away from thoughts and judgments that are not based on science and reason.” The result is a complete banishment of religion from the public square, including a ban on religious symbols such as headscarves.

     This illiberal secularism goes back to the formative years of the Turkish republic, born from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire in 1923 under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. He and his followers were deeply influenced by the French Enlightenment, and were convinced that the influence of religion must be swept away from society. Ethnic and cultural diversity were seen as threats—hence the decision to “Turkify” the Kurds. The Kemalists’ project was in fact a cultural revolution and a government they defined as “for the people, in spite of the people.”

    Though the Kemalists succeeded in building a strong state, most of the undesired social groups—such as pious Muslims and the Kurds—persisted in their demands for freedom and democracy. Yet Turkey’s establishment, represented by the military and the high courts and supported by urban elites, remains attached to Kemalism, which has turned into a rigid ideology perpetuated by an official cult of personality. The reverence shown to Ataturk, evident in his omnipresent image and oft-repeated mantras, approaches the level of leader worship you see in places like North Korea. The Ergenekon gang seems to have been an attempt by the most radical extreme secularists to preserve the old regime, which has given the old elite unchecked power and privilege. Cengiz Aktar, a liberal EU advocate, likens the plot to the coup attempted by Lt. Col. Antonio Tejero in Spain in 1981, when he stormed Parliament to halt the EU accession process and restore the Francoist regime.

    Like Tejero, the alleged Ergenekon conspiracy has failed. But the ideology behind it persists. One clear sign is the shocking case launched by Turkey’s chief prosecutor, Abdurrahman Yalcinkaya, against the AKP four months ago. Defining the party “as an anti-secular threat to the regime,” he asked the Constitutional Court to close the party and ban from politics 71 of its members, including Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul, a former AKP member. Their crimes, according to Yalcinkaya, include passing a constitutional amendment to allow headscarves in universities, and comments by Erdogan such as “Turkey needs a more liberal secularism like the American one.” The notoriously illiberal Constitutional Court is expected to give its verdict on AKP’s fate sometime in August. If the AKP prevails, it will likely continue on the path to the EU. But should the court rule against the party, it will also in the process strike a major blow to Turkish democracy and the country’s EU dreams. There will no longer be any need for gangs like Ergenekon; the coup will have been realized by legal means.

    Akyol is the deputy editor of the Turkish Daily News.

  • Turkey and Germany positive for a Union for the Mediterranean

    Turkey and Germany positive for a Union for the Mediterranean

    Turkey’s foreign minister said Ankara would play an active role in the new grouping despite initial fears that Sarkozy devised it as an alternative to Turkish EU membership, which he has long opposed.

    “Regarding the initiative of a Union for the Mediterranean, we think it will promote peace, stability and development in the region, and Turkey supports this initiative,” Foreign Minister Ali Babacan told a news conference.

    Babacan said Ankara’s role would be the same as in the existing Euro-Mediterranean partnership, known as the Barcelona process, which France says needs revitalising.

    Read the full story…