Sefa Yürükel
In international security literature, alliances are most often conceptualised around mutual benefit and symmetrical dependency. Yet the anatomy of the relationship between Turkey and NATO exhibits a structure that falls far from this classical definition, one that is asymmetrical and based on exploitation. This engagement, shaped within the threat hierarchy of the Cold War period, has over time ceased to be a mechanism that responds to Turkey’s security needs and has instead turned into a dependency order that mortgages Turkey’s strategic autonomy and sacrifices its national interests to the global calculations of the alliance. At the stage now reached, the deterrence and security contribution that the NATO alliance is claimed to provide to Turkey is in reality overshadowed by the advantages Turkey secures through its own military capacity, geographical depth and diplomatic manoeuvring ability. NATO is not a security umbrella for Turkey; it is a growing geopolitical burden, a bureaucratic shackle that clogs sovereign decision making processes, and a structural obstacle before national independence. In return, Turkey is the principal military power bearing the alliance’s southeastern flank, its critical geographical hinge and the fundamental actor of regional stability. NATO’s need for Turkey is many times greater than Turkey’s need for NATO. With this truth evident, casting off this burden on its back and entering the route of strategic independence that Iran has successfully executed for decades is emerging as a historical imperative for Turkey.
The Strategic Picture of Asymmetrical Dependency
The fundamental phenomenon that structurally defines the Turkey NATO relationship is asymmetrical dependency. This dependency manifests itself across a wide spectrum ranging from defence planning to threat perception, from weapons procurement to diplomatic engagements. Far from ensuring Turkey’s security, NATO has for decades remained indifferent to the most pressing threats the country has faced. The US arms embargo imposed after the Cyprus Peace Operation is the first major rupture that revealed the true nature of NATO alliance membership. Similarly, in the struggle against PKK terrorism, the expected cooperation and solidarity from European allies did not materialise, and the terrorist organisation’s networks of finance, propaganda and recruitment in Europe were tolerated. In return, Turkey allocates the second largest army in NATO, opens strategic bases such as İncirlik and Kürecik to the alliance’s use, and shoulders risk on behalf of the alliance in all crisis zones stretching from the Black Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean, from the Balkans to the Middle East. This asymmetry demonstrates with utter clarity that NATO’s contribution to Turkey is marginal, while Turkey’s contribution to NATO is strategic. Without Turkey, NATO is not an actor that can be a deterrent in the Black Sea, position itself in the Eastern Mediterranean or engage in the Middle East. In contrast, Turkey has proven that, without NATO, it possesses the military capacity and political will to establish its own security in the Syrian theatre, in Libya, in Karabakh and in the fight against terrorism.
The Structural Burdens That NATO Imposes on Turkey
NATO membership imposes multilayered strategic burdens on Turkey, rather than a security contribution. The first of these burdens is the shackle placed on military planning autonomy. NATO joint defence planning subordinates Turkey’s unique threat geography to the alliance’s Russia centred strategic priorities and pushes the asymmetrical and proxy wars on Turkey’s southern borders to a secondary level. The second burden is defence industry dependency. For decades, under the name of NATO standards and common supply chains, Turkey was delayed in building its own unique defence industry and was confined within a procurement cycle dependent on outsiders. The third and most critical burden is the limitation of diplomatic engagement. Under the NATO umbrella, Turkey’s independent relations with alternative security platforms, Asia centred economic formations and regional powers have been continuously subjected to the alliance’s loyalty tests. The CAATSA sanctions imposed after the S-400 procurement and the incident of being removed from the F-35 programme are the most concrete examples of how this expectation of loyalty has been converted into a mechanism for punishing Turkey’s sovereign choices. When all these burdens are assessed collectively, reaching the verdict that NATO is not a security asset but a multifaceted strategic liability for Turkey becomes inevitable.
Lessons to Be Drawn from Iran’s Model of Strategic Independence
Since the 1979 revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran has existed as one of the most resilient and effective states in the Middle East without being subject to any military alliance. The fundamental factor behind this success is the institutionalisation of strategic independence as a state policy. Iran has built its defence doctrine on a structure not dependent on imported weapons systems, based on indigenous missile and unmanned aerial vehicle technologies and focused on asymmetrical deterrence. The network of influence established through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its regional extensions has granted Iran a depth of strategic space that traditional alliances could not provide. Moreover, by becoming a full member of platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, which offer alternatives to Western centred financial and trade systems, Iran has succeeded in overcoming economic and diplomatic isolation. This model demonstrates to the entire world that not being a NATO member does not mean geopolitical isolation and that, on the contrary, a multidimensional and flexible foreign policy is possible when managed correctly. Turkey, by virtue of its historical depth, military capacity, economic size and institutional experience, is at a much more advantageous starting point than Iran. What needs to be done to make use of this advantage is to adopt a strategic direction similar to the route of independence that Iran has been implementing for a quarter of a century and to throw off the NATO burden from its back.
The Rising Architecture of Eurasia and Turkey’s Independent Position
At this historical moment when the global centre of gravity is shifting from the Atlantic to Asia, remaining fixed on the NATO line would mean geopolitical suicide for Turkey. The Eurasian geography is today not only the locomotive of world economic growth but also a space where alternative institutional architectures are rising. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, BRICS, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Belt and Road initiative offer serious alternatives to the Western centred Bretton Woods system and the Atlantic security umbrella. Turkey’s full participation in these platforms as an independent actor after leaving NATO will turn it into an essential power shaping the geopolitical architecture of Eurasia. As long as its NATO membership continues, Turkey is condemned to establish a distant, secondary and cautious relationship with these formations. An independent Turkey, however, will play a dominant role in the Eastern Mediterranean energy equation, in integration with the Central Asian Turkic republics, in the establishment of stability in the Caucasus and in the construction of a new security architecture in the Middle East; it will not be a bridge but the very centre between the economic corridors and security arrangements of Eurasia.
Conclusion
Turkey’s NATO membership was historically not a choice but a necessity imposed by Cold War conditions. However, the threat hierarchy of that period has disappeared, the strategic rationality of the alliance has eroded, and Turkey has reached a military, economic and diplomatic capacity that enables it to stand on its own feet. Today, NATO is not a source of security for Turkey but a burden that restricts its sovereignty, erodes its national interests and narrows its future strategic horizon. In return, NATO’s need for Turkey remains vital for the alliance’s regional presence and global claims. Aware of this asymmetry, Turkey should seize the opportunity that history presents to it; it should cast off the NATO burden from its back, chart a route of strategic independence similar to that of Iran, and take its place as an independent and sovereign power within the rising architecture of Eurasia. Postponing the decision will only serve to make the burden heavier and to compound the opportunity cost. An independent Turkey has reached the maturity to secure its own security with its own mind, its own weapons and its own strategic vision.
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Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
Aarhus University, 1997
Independent Researcher
Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures.
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