By Sefa Yürükel
The Changing Character of Global Power Struggle
The structural transformation of the international system signals the dissolution of the unipolar moment that has persisted since the end of the Cold War. The hierarchical order based on the military, economic and cultural supremacy of the United States in the 1990s is giving way in the second quarter of the twenty first century to a multicentric, multilayered and unpredictable distribution of power. This transformation is not confined to quantitative shifts in the distribution of capabilities among states but involves a fundamental paradigm shift in the very definition, measurement and exercise of power. The concept of power traditionally defined by military capacity and geographical spheres of influence is now being redefined through multidimensional components such as technological sovereignty, economic resilience, cyber capability, energy security and diplomatic diversification.
The distinguishing feature of this new international environment is the emergence of Eurasia centred alternative structures as concrete and competitive poles vis à vis the Atlantic centred institutional architecture. The expansion dynamics of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the steps taken by BRICS+ towards institutionalisation and the deepening efforts of the Eurasian Economic Union represent challenges to the normative and operational monopoly of Western international organisations. These alternative platforms not only offer participating states opportunities for economic cooperation but also open a discursive and practical space against the global governance norms shaped by the West. The international system is thus evolving away from the determinacy of a single hegemonic logic towards a structure in which multiple ordering principles operate simultaneously.
The standing of states in the international system is no longer evaluated solely through their military capabilities but also through their economic resilience, degree of technological autonomy and diplomatic diversification. The declining capacity of military power alone to yield strategic outcomes has driven states to build structures resistant to economic sanctions, reduce external dependency in critical technologies and cultivate multidirectional diplomatic relations. In this framework the measure of strategic success emerges not as unconditional allegiance to any one bloc but as the ability to preserve room for manoeuvre among different poles of power and to adapt national interests to shifting circumstances. Multidirectional diplomacy has become the predominant strategic approach shaping the foreign policy behaviour of states in this new era.
The shifting centre of gravity of the global economy from the Atlantic to the Asia Pacific is also transforming the geographical parameters of international power struggle. The rise of China constitutes a systemic challenge not only in terms of economic size but also by virtue of its central position in global supply chains, its growing influence over technology standards and its claim to offer an alternative development model. Infrastructure projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative have enabled Beijing to extend its economic reach deep into Eurasia, Africa and Latin America, thereby expanding the geographical scope of the rivalry between Washington and Beijing to a global scale. The competition between the two countries manifests across a broad spectrum from trade wars to technology embargoes, from military tensions in the South China Sea to the Taiwan question.
Russia’s position in the international system forms another significant component of this transformation. The full scale military campaign against Ukraine launched in 2022 stands as Moscow’s most comprehensive challenge to the Atlantic system. Russia’s avoidance of economic collapse despite the Western sanctions and military aid packages is assessed as a consequence of its resilience strategy based on energy exports and its Asia oriented diplomatic pivot. The strategic partnership Russia has developed with China, the energy trade it sustains with India and the military cooperation it has deepened with Iran have created alternative economic and diplomatic channels that limit the impact of Western sanctions. This points to the emergence of parallel structures within the global economic system that remain beyond Western control.
Technological competition has become one of the most critical dimensions of the transforming power struggle. Developments in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, 5G and 6G infrastructures, semiconductor manufacturing and cyber security directly affect not only the economic competitiveness of states but also their military capabilities and societal control mechanisms. The export controls imposed by the United States on Chinese technology companies and the multilateral technology restrictions incorporating allies demonstrate that technological superiority is being wielded as a strategic weapon. Conversely China’s investments in domestic chip production and the development of indigenous technology standards represent concrete manifestations of the quest for technological autonomy and the emergence of a bipolar structure in the global technology ecosystem.
The Middle Eastern Theatre and Asymmetric Strategies
Developments in the Middle East must be read as direct reverberations of the global power struggle extending beyond regional conflicts. The region remains an arena of great power competition due to the control of energy resources, the security of maritime transit routes and its geostrategic location. The comprehensive military strikes launched by the United States and Israel against Iran in 2025 and 2026 triggered existing fault lines in the region while setting new conflict dynamics in motion. These strikes targeted not only Iran’s nuclear programme and ballistic missile capability but also Iran linked resistance elements such as Hezbollah and the Houthis.
The failure of the United States and Israel’s operations against Iran to achieve their objectives has once again demonstrated that military superiority alone does not guarantee strategic success. Iran’s developed ballistic missile capability and its influence over proxy forces have reinforced assessments that conventional military interventions do not yield the predicted results. Despite decades of international sanctions the Tehran administration has built asymmetric warfare capabilities that provide an effective deterrent capacity against Israel which possesses the region’s most powerful conventional army and against the military presence of the United States in the region. This has laid bare the limitations of quantitative military technological superiority in the face of geographical depth, ideological motivation and asymmetric tactics.
The failure of the operations to deliver expected outcomes has drawn the Gulf states into a complex strategic equation. Regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates while perceiving Iran’s nuclear capability and regional influence as a threat have simultaneously begun to question the reliability of American security guarantees. The normalisation processes these countries had undertaken with Israel have been plunged into deep uncertainty in the aftermath of the military operations against Iran and regional alignments have been reopened for debate. The diplomatic and economic relations the Gulf states have developed with China and Russia are regarded as signs of a search for alternatives to the traditional Western centric security architecture.
Iran’s influence over proxy forces remains one of the most determining elements of the conflict environment in the Middle East. Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, the Hashd al Shaabi groups in Iraq and Iranian backed militias in Syria function as operational instruments of Tehran’s regional influence. These structures provide Iran with the means to force its rivals into costly engagements and gain strategic depth without entering direct interstate conflict. The capacity of the Houthis to threaten maritime trade in the Red Sea during the military operations of 2025 and 2026 has concretely demonstrated the power of asymmetric actors to affect the global economy.
Another significant consequence of the conflict environment is the erosion that has emerged with regard to international law and the normative order. The conduct of military operations without United Nations Security Council resolutions, the gradual expansion of exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force and the proliferation of attacks on civilian infrastructure have weakened the binding force of the international normative framework. This is assessed not as an exception peculiar to the Middle East but as a harbinger of an international environment in which the thresholds concerning the use of force are lowering on a global scale. The weakening of the normative framework both widens the operating space of middle powers and creates a riskier international environment.
The new balances that have taken shape in the region in the aftermath of the operations have paved the way for an increase in the diplomatic effectiveness of China and Russia. China’s mediation between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023 served as the most concrete indicator of Beijing’s growing role in regional diplomacy. Russia by virtue of its military presence in Syria and the strategic cooperation it has developed with Iran continues to maintain the position of an actor that cannot be neglected in the Middle Eastern equation. Both countries pursue a strategy of enhancing their diplomatic and economic influence by exploiting the gaps created by the military engagements of the United States in the region. This is noted as a development that reinforces the multipolar character of the power struggle in the Middle East.
Iran’s Strategic Resilience Model: Lessons for Turkey
Iran’s ability to withstand decades of international sanctions, military threats and covert operations while steadily expanding its regional influence represents a case of strategic resilience that holds instructive value for Turkey. The Iranian experience demonstrates that a state can offset conventional military inferiority through the systematic cultivation of asymmetric capabilities, ideological mobilisation and the construction of alternative economic and diplomatic networks beyond Western dominated channels. Turkey seeking to chart an autonomous path in a turbulent strategic environment would do well to study both the achievements and the shortcomings of the Iranian model.
The cornerstone of Iran’s strategic approach lies in its long term investment in indigenous defence industries and missile technology. Faced with arms embargoes and technology denial regimes Iran built a domestic military industrial complex capable of producing ballistic missiles with varying ranges, unmanned aerial vehicles and air defence systems. This drive for self sufficiency transformed a vulnerability into a source of strategic leverage. For Turkey the Iranian case reinforces the vital importance of the ongoing indigenous defence programmes such as the KAAN National Combat Aircraft, the HİSAR air defence family and the various unmanned platforms. True strategic autonomy requires the capacity to produce critical military technologies without external dependency.
Iran’s skilful use of proxy forces and asymmetric tactics offers another dimension for comparative analysis. Tehran has mastered the art of projecting power through non state actors while avoiding direct state to state confrontation that would expose its conventional weaknesses. This approach has allowed Iran to impose costs on technologically superior adversaries and to maintain strategic depth across multiple theatres. While Turkey’s strategic culture and alliance commitments differ substantially from Iran’s, the principle of developing flexible and cost effective instruments of influence beyond conventional military structures merits careful consideration. Turkey’s evolving defence doctrine already incorporates elements of asymmetric thinking as demonstrated by the effective deployment of unmanned systems in various operational environments.
Perhaps the most salient lesson from the Iranian experience concerns economic resilience under sanctions. Iran’s ability to sustain its economy through sanctions evasion strategies, barter trade mechanisms, cryptocurrency utilisation and the cultivation of alternative financial channels provides a template for reducing vulnerability to Western economic coercion. Turkey which has also faced economic pressure and sanctions threats from its NATO allies would benefit from studying these mechanisms. The development of trade corridors independent of Western financial infrastructure and the deepening of economic ties with Russia, China and the broader Eurasian space represent steps already being taken in this direction.
The Iranian case also carries cautionary lessons that Turkey should heed. Excessive reliance on ideological mobilisation and proxy warfare has entailed significant costs for Iran in terms of diplomatic isolation, brain drain and the erosion of soft power. The model of strategic resilience that Turkey should pursue must differ fundamentally in that it combines military and economic self sufficiency with democratic legitimacy, cultural attractiveness and diplomatic openness. Turkey’s comparative advantage lies precisely in its ability to synthesise strength and autonomy with the soft power generated by its historical and cultural connections, its democratic institutions and its economic dynamism.
In essence Iran’s asymmetric success teaches that a state can carve out substantial strategic space even under conditions of intense external pressure provided it adopts a long term perspective, invests in indigenous capabilities and diversifies its international partnerships. Turkey with its larger economy, stronger industrial base, deeper state tradition and more advantageous geopolitical position possesses the potential to implement a more successful and sustainable version of strategic autonomy. The key lies in drawing the right lessons from the Iranian experience while avoiding its pathologies.
Turkey’s Geopolitical Position and Strategic Horizon
The Republic of Turkey by virtue of its geographical location sits at a unique intersection among Europe, Asia, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, the Caucasus and the Middle East. This geopolitical reality affords the country significant strategic advantages while simultaneously bringing multidimensional risks and responsibilities. The control authority the Turkish Straits provide under the Montreux Convention, the maritime jurisdiction disputes generated by energy discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean and the attribute of serving as the transit route for energy corridors in the Caucasus constitute the principal elements forming Turkey’s geopolitical weight. The conversion of these advantages into strategic gain requires the enhancement of institutional capacity and the development of long term planning capability.
Turkey’s position within NATO which constituted the alliance’s southeastern flank during the Cold War period requires reassessment in today’s changing security environment. The security guarantees and military integration opportunities provided by the alliance have historically formed one of the fundamental pillars of Turkey’s defence policy. However the attitude displayed by NATO allies towards Turkey’s national security concerns particularly the support extended to the PKK/YPG terrorist organisation, the CAATSA sanctions and the restrictions on defence industry cooperation have deepened the crisis of confidence within the alliance. These developments have reinforced Turkey’s determination to reduce external dependency in defence procurement and accelerate the quest for strategic autonomy.
Progress achieved in the defence industry stands among the most concrete examples of success in Turkey’s strategic autonomy objective. The enhancement of indigenous production capacity in areas such as unmanned aerial vehicles, armoured land vehicles, naval platforms and air defence systems has elevated the operational effectiveness of the Turkish Armed Forces while also positioning Turkey as a competitive actor in the global defence market. The KAAN National Combat Aircraft project, the GÖKTÜRK satellite systems and the HİSAR air defence family form the strategic components of the technological autonomy vision. These achievements carry significance not only in terms of military capability but also with regard to the construction of national self confidence and technological spillover effects.
Energy security holds a central place in Turkey’s strategic calculations. The discovery of hydrocarbon resources in the Eastern Mediterranean, the commencement of production at the Sakarya gas field in the Black Sea and the operation of the TANAP and TAP natural gas corridor represent developments that give concrete form to Turkey’s objective of becoming an energy hub. The construction of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant and the new nuclear projects planned in Sinop and Thrace constitute elements of the strategy of diversifying energy sources. The reduction of external dependency in energy and the transition from the position of a transit country to that of an energy trading centre are factors that directly affect Turkey’s economic security and diplomatic bargaining power.
One of the fundamental strategic issues facing Turkey is the nature of the balance to be struck between maintaining relations with Atlantic institutions and deepening Eurasia centred cooperation. This dilemma stems from the differing interpretations of the concept of national interest across different political traditions. Approaches that advocate the preservation of the institutional guarantees provided by existing alliance structures draw attention to the risks that radical axis shifts could generate. An alternative approach argues that the structural transformation of the global balance of power has rendered traditional alliance models dysfunctional and has made new strategic orientations imperative. The opportunities and risks inherent in both approaches necessitate a comprehensive strategic assessment.
The conversion of geopolitical advantages into lasting power requires the enhancement of institutional capacity, the strengthening of the education system and the incentivisation of scientific production. It is not possible to rise to the upper ranks of global competition by relying solely on geographical location without effecting a transition to a high value added production structure. The extension of the successes Turkey has achieved in the defence industry to other sectors, the realisation of a similar breakthrough in the civilian technology domain and the increase of high technology exports will form the economic foundations of strategic autonomy. Investments in human capital constitute the most critical component of this transformation.
The proposal for a Turkey Russia China alliance voiced by Nationalist Movement Party Chairman Devlet Bahçeli in September 2025 stands as a striking intervention with regard to the reflections of Eurasia oriented strategic quests within the political establishment. Bahçeli’s characterisation of this proposal as the most suitable option against what he termed the evil coalition of the United States and Israel demonstrates that debates regarding alternatives to Western centric alliances are increasingly settling onto the agenda of mainstream politics in Turkish foreign policy. The feasibility of such proposals depends on the degree of domestic political consensus and the level of institutional preparedness alongside the international conjuncture. Historical experience indeed reveals that radical strategic transformations can only succeed on the basis of strong societal consensus and comprehensive planning.
National Unity, Institutional Renewal and the Home Front
The ability of states to succeed in international competition depends as much on preserving their internal cohesion as on the effectiveness of their foreign policy strategies. The reduction of societal polarisation, the strengthening of common objectives and the enhancement of the effectiveness of institutional structures are among the integral elements of strategic capacity. The understanding of national unity requires that different segments of society, ethnic groups and political inclinations can converge around a shared vision of the future. While political competition is accepted as part of the natural functioning of democracies, the establishment of a broad ground of consensus on fundamental state goals and national security matters is regarded as a precondition of societal resilience.
The founding philosophy of the Republic was built on the principles of independence, popular sovereignty, secularism, science and modernisation. These principles should be treated not merely as periodical political preferences but as the constitutive values of Turkish modernisation. The Six Arrows of the Republican People’s Party: republicanism, populism, nationalism, secularism, statism and reformism have taken their place in history as the programmatic expression of this founding philosophy. The party programme updated at the Thirty Ninth Ordinary Congress held by the party in 2025 offers a significant reference framework regarding how these principles should be interpreted under contemporary conditions. The continuity of the link between founding principles and current policies is a factor that determines the relationship between the historical missions of political parties and their societal legitimacy.
The alignment between the historical missions of political parties and their current policies is important for the healthy functioning of a democratic system. The ability of well established parties to strike a balance between their inherited ideological legacy and present day societal realities is necessary both for the continuity of their political identity and for the confidence of their social base. Calls for the Republican People’s Party to reorganise the state and the nation from where it left off in 1938 can be read as an expression of a demand for a return to the founding philosophy and historical mission of the party. The integration of these calls with the perspective of the Turkish National Democratic Revolution can be assessed in terms of establishing an organic link between historical legacy and contemporary needs.
The fortification of the home front does not signify the suppression or homogenisation of differing views. On the contrary the free expression and competition of differing views in a democratic political system is the source of societal dynamism and creativity. What is meant by the concept of the home front is the formation of a societal consensus around fundamental state goals such as national security, independence, territorial integrity and development. This consensus without eliminating competition among political parties should serve as a common denominator that ensures national interests are placed above partisan interests. Strong societies are those that can act around shared goals while preserving diversity.
Institutional renewal is not a matter confined to the political sphere. The transformation of the education system in line with the requirements of the age, the strengthening of the predictability and impartiality of the legal order and the enhancement of efficiency and accountability in public administration constitute the cornerstones of institutional renewal. The elevation of the scientific production capacity of universities, the increase of research and development expenditure and the cultivation of qualified human capital form the intellectual infrastructure of the strategic autonomy objective. Structural reforms to be implemented in these areas are among the factors that will directly affect Turkey’s international competitiveness.
The healthy functioning of Turkey’s internal dynamics is one of the determinants of the strategic direction to be pursued in foreign policy. The sustainability of domestic political stability, the enhancement of economic performance and the strengthening of societal consensus constitute the preconditions for the display of a more effective and independent posture in foreign policy. National power elements taking greater initiative and the enhancement of coordination among state institutions will elevate Turkey’s effectiveness in the international arena. The fortification of the home front must be regarded as an indispensable precondition of the goals of national independence and strategic autonomy.
The objective of Turkey rising to the position of a pivotal state that will serve as a backbone in the international system is directly related not only to foreign policy choices but also to the success of internal institutional transformation. The accumulation of a state tradition spanning five thousand years can be converted into a meaningful strategic advantage when combined with an institutional modernisation aligned with the imperatives of the age. The balanced synthesis to be established between historical depth and future vision will be the fundamental factor that will determine Turkey’s position in this critical period in which the international system is being reshaped. The concept of state reason points precisely to the institutional memory and analytical capacity that make such strategic syntheses possible.
The Eurasian Perspective, Development Model and Future Vision
Assessments that the centre of gravity of the world economy is gradually shifting towards Asia have moved beyond being merely an academic observation and have become a phenomenon that influences the strategic planning of states. The growth performances of Asian economies such as China, India, Indonesia and Vietnam are reshaping the global map of production and trade. Data from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank reveal that the share of Asia in global gross domestic product is steadily increasing while the relative weight of developed Western economies is declining. This structural transformation creates both strategic opportunities and new competitive dynamics to which countries located in the Eurasian geography such as Turkey must adapt.
The Eurasian perspective represents for Turkey a comprehensive strategic framework that goes beyond alignment with a single country or bloc and denotes the diversification of economic, diplomatic and cultural relations across a vast geography. This framework regards cooperation with the Russian Federation in the fields of energy and security, infrastructure investments and trade relations with the People’s Republic of China, cultural and economic integration with the Central Asian Turkic republics, regional security dialogue with Iran and technology partnerships with India as components of the same strategic horizon. This multidirectional and multilayered approach rejects unconditional dependence on any power centre and makes possible a flexible strategic posture centred on national interests.
The development experience of the People’s Republic of China constitutes an example that merits examination with regard to state led industrialisation, long term planning and the priority accorded to infrastructure investments. That said the necessity for each country to develop a development approach suited to its own historical and social conditions rather than directly copying the development models of other countries must be emphasised. Turkey’s distinctive social structure, democratic political tradition, geopolitical location and human capital profile form the parameters of an original development strategy. While lessons can be drawn from China’s infrastructure investments and industrial policies, a roadmap suited to Turkey’s own societal dynamics and historical accumulation must be constructed.
Platforms such as the Eurasian Economic Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS offer Turkey alternative channels for economic integration and diplomatic dialogue. An arrangement akin to a customs union with the Eurasian Economic Union could enable Turkey to diversify its trade strategy in the face of the customs union deadlock it experiences with the European Union. The expanding agenda of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation offers multilateral cooperation opportunities in areas extending from energy security to counterterrorism and from the fight against drug trafficking to cyber security. The question of whether the relationship Turkey will establish with these platforms will be complementary in nature to its existing ties with Atlantic institutions or will replace these ties forms the essence of strategic choices.
Breakthroughs to be achieved in science, technology and education will form the foundations of economic independence and strategic autonomy. It is not possible to rise to the upper ranks of global competition without effecting a transition to a high value added production structure. Turkey’s long term goal can be defined as becoming an influential pivot state in economic, cultural, scientific and diplomatic fields rather than remaining merely a regional actor. The realisation of this goal requires elevating the ratio of research and development expenditure to gross domestic product, increasing high technology exports, cultivating qualified human capital and strengthening an innovative entrepreneurship ecosystem.
Proposals for Turkey to leave NATO and renounce its European Union candidacy point to the instrumental dimension of the Eurasian perspective. Such radical strategic choices necessitate a comprehensive cost benefit analysis, a careful assessment of the international conjuncture and the construction of societal consensus. Questions of how to close the security gap that would be generated by renouncing the collective defence guarantees provided by NATO membership, how to manage the economic costs of terminating the customs union relationship with the EU and to what extent alternative alliance structures are reliable are the principal matters that strategic planning must answer.
Turkey’s most important strategic priority in the period ahead is to rise to the position of a pivotal state that will serve as a backbone in the international system by combining the accumulation of a five thousand year state tradition with the requirements of the age. This vision requires the simultaneous operation of strong institutions, societal consensus, a productive economy and strategic reason. Raising the Turkish Nation to an enviable level of prosperity and transforming the Republic of Turkey into one of the world’s foremost centres of attraction will only be possible through the fortification of the home front, the enhancement of institutional capacity and the courageous implementation of sound strategic choices. The shifting global power balances open new windows of opportunity for prepared and resolute states; what matters is the ability to realise the visionary leadership and institutional transformation that these windows demand.
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Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
Aarhus University, 1997
Independent Researcher
Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures.
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