The 14 point memorandum of understanding signed between the United States and Iran, the full text of which has been made public, is a comprehensive arrangement stretching from the nuclear file to the regional security architecture.
The long running US Iran negotiations conducted behind closed doors have entered a new phase with the signing of a 14 point memorandum of understanding. Assessments of the text reveal that the memorandum is not merely a technical arrangement aimed at resolving the nuclear crisis but envisages an architecture of normalization spanning the entire Middle East. Statements such as “Iran’s acceptance that it will not possess nuclear weapons,” “the immediate opening of negotiations on the destruction process of nuclear stockpiles,” and “the release of 300 billion dollars in frozen funds” indicate how Washington frames the negotiation process. However, a detailed examination of the text reveals that Tehran left the table having preserved its strategic red lines on each of these headings and fortified its regional influence.
The Permanent Cessation of Military Operations: The End of War, The Survival of the Proxy Network
The first article stipulates that the parties immediately and permanently cease military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon, refrain from using force against one another henceforth, and guarantee Lebanon’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. At first glance, this provision appears to be a general framework for ending regional conflicts. Yet the article’s real strategic meaning lies as much in what it does not mention as in what it does. The text contains no expression concerning the disarmament, dissolution, or restriction of Iran’s ally Hezbollah in Lebanon. On the contrary, guaranteeing Lebanon’s sovereignty can be read as an implicit recognition of the existing political military structure of which Hezbollah is a part. The absence of any restrictions on proxy forces in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, meanwhile, proves that Tehran has preserved its regional depth in its entirety. While gaining international legitimacy through the commitment to halt military operations, Iran has obtained a legal ground that carries its proxy network into the future.
The second article, regulating the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, rises on the same strategic line. Through this article, Tehran acquires the ability to label external pressure on its nuclear program, missile development activities, and regional engagements as interventions contrary to the spirit of the memorandum.
The Lifting of the Naval Blockade and the Opening of the Strait of Hormuz: Tehran’s Control of the Geopolitical Choke Point
The fourth and fifth articles constitute the most critical geopolitical headings of the memorandum. The United States undertakes to completely end the naval blockade within 30 days and to withdraw its forces near Iran’s borders within 30 days following the signing of the final agreement. In return, Iran undertakes to make arrangements within 60 days, including mine clearance and the removal of technical obstacles, to ensure the free and safe passage of commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz.
Tehran’s advantage in these articles becomes apparent on multiple layers. First, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz was one of Iran’s most powerful asymmetric levers; using this lever, Tehran has both secured the lifting of the blockade and inscribed into the text the right to determine the future administration of the strait within the framework of the “sovereign rights of littoral states.” The authorization granted to Iran in the fifth article to determine the administration and navigational services in the strait through consultations with the Sultanate of Oman and other Persian Gulf coastal states means that Tehran has registered the Strait of Hormuz not as an international transit route but rather as an area where its sovereign rights are recognized. Second, the US commitment to withdraw its forces from the region is the diplomatic crowning of the strategy Iran has pursued for years to reduce military pressure in the Persian Gulf. Third, the provision that commercial shipping traffic will resume “proportionate to the pre-war traffic volume” gives Tehran the flexibility to adjust the pace of the transition process according to its own calendar.
The 300 Billion Dollar Reconstruction and the Release of Frozen Assets: The Collapse of the Economic Siege
The sixth, tenth, and eleventh articles constitute Iran’s most tangible gain at the negotiating table. The United States undertakes, together with its regional partners, to prepare a plan of at least 300 billion dollars for Iran’s reconstruction and economic development. In addition, immediately upon the signing of the memorandum, Treasury Department waivers will be issued for the export of Iranian crude oil, petroleum products, and derivatives, as well as for banking, insurance, and shipping services; Iran’s frozen funds and assets will be made fully available for use.
The statement that “the process regarding the release of 300 billion dollars in frozen funds will be opened for immediate negotiation” confirms that this economic package lies at the heart of the memorandum. What is critical for Tehran is the guarantee that payments from these funds can be made to the final beneficiary determined by the Central Bank of Iran. The explicit provision of the eleventh article in this direction demonstrates that Washington recognizes Iran’s authority to control the flow of funds. The waiver granted for oil exports, meanwhile, returns Iran to international energy markets, collapsing the central pillar of the “maximum pressure” policy.
The Nuclear Regime: Reject the Weapon, Preserve the Infrastructure
The eighth article reaffirms that Iran will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons. The assessment that “Iran has accepted that it will not possess nuclear weapons” shows how Washington reads this commitment. Yet the continuation of the article reveals Tehran’s strategic flexibility. The destruction of enriched material stockpiles will be carried out “through on site dilution under IAEA supervision” and with “minimal method.” This phrasing guarantees that the uranium stockpile will not be removed from Iranian territory and that the dilution process will be carried out under Tehran’s control. Moreover, the fact that the enrichment issue and Iran’s nuclear needs will be discussed within the framework of “mutually agreed subjects” in the final agreement gives Tehran the opportunity to shape the future of the program at the negotiating table.
The ninth article, meanwhile, foresees the preservation of the status quo until the final agreement is signed. Iran will maintain the current state of its nuclear program, while the United States will not impose new sanctions or deploy additional troops to the region. This freezing of the status quo guarantees that Iran’s existing nuclear capacity is fixed for a temporary period, but that this capacity will not be dismantled. Tehran has successfully preserved the position of “full nuclear infrastructure” while giving the commitment of “no nuclear weapons.”
Legal Bindingness and the Implementation Timetable: The Transition Process Under Tehran’s Control
The thirteenth article grants Iran a decisive advantage in the sequencing of the memorandum’s implementation. Negotiations on the final agreement will commence on the condition that paragraphs one, four, five, ten, and eleven have begun to be implemented and that these measures continue. In other words, Washington’s lifting of the naval blockade, granting of petroleum and banking waivers, and release of frozen assets have been made the precondition for Tehran to sit at the final agreement table. Iran will not negotiate the remaining articles before securing its concrete economic and military gains.
The stipulation in the fourteenth article that the final agreement will be approved by a binding UN Security Council resolution is a reflection of the lesson Iran drew from the 2015 JCPOA experience. To prevent a unilateral American withdrawal from bringing sanctions back, the memorandum is anchored in international law, providing Tehran an additional layer of assurance. The implementation mechanism foreseen in the twelfth article, meanwhile, institutionalizes the joint monitoring of implementation by the parties, strengthening Tehran’s hand against any future unilateral steps by Washington.
Strategic Reckoning
When the 14 point memorandum of understanding and the accompanying assessments are read together, it emerges that Iran has exited the negotiation process with strategic superiority across all military, economic, and legal headings. Tehran gave its commitment to end the war on all fronts, including Lebanon, while preserving its proxy network; reaffirmed that it would not develop nuclear weapons while making no concessions on its enrichment infrastructure; undertook the obligation to open the Strait of Hormuz within the framework of littoral sovereignty; shattered its economic isolation with a 300 billion dollar reconstruction package and the release of frozen assets; and succeeded in keeping control of the transition process by making the commencement of final agreement negotiations conditional on the concrete lifting of American sanctions. This memorandum, which Washington frames with the rhetoric that “Iran will not possess nuclear weapons,” in practice gives Tehran the opportunity to register its regional power through a diplomatic text.
Bibliography
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Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). (2015). Vienna: European External Action Service.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231. (2015). S/RES/2231.
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Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
Aarhus University, 1997
Independent Researcher
Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures.
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