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  • In Turkey the right to free speech is being lost

    In Turkey the right to free speech is being lost

    Erdogan is using a series of alleged plots to justify a crackdown on dissent that threatens basic freedoms

    Mehdi Hasan
    guardian.co.uk,

    Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s prime minister, has been described as ‘Putinesque’ by critics. Photograph: Nikolay Doychinov/AFP/Getty Images

    Which country in the world currently imprisons more journalists than any other? The People’s Republic of China? Nope. Iran? Wrong again. The rather depressing answer is the Republic of Turkey, where nearly 100 journalists are behind bars, according to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Yes, that’s right: modern, secular, western-oriented Turkey, with its democratically elected government, has locked away more members of the press than China and Iran combined.

    But this isn’t just about the press – students, academics, artists and opposition MPs have all recently been targeted for daring to speak out against the government of prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his mildly Islamist Justice and Development Party, or AKP.

    There is a new climate of fear in Istanbul. When I visited the city last week to host a discussion show for al-Jazeera English, I found journalists speaking in hushed tones about the clampdown on free speech. Within 24 hours of our arrival, one of my al-Jazeera colleagues was detained by police officers, who went through his bag and rifled through one of my scripts. They loudly objected to a line referring to the country’s “increasingly authoritarian government”. Who says that Turks don’t do irony?

    The stock response from members of the AKP government is to blame the imprisonment and intimidation on Turkey’s supposedly “independent” judiciary. But this will not do. For a start, ministers haven’t been afraid of interfering in high-profile prosecutions. In a speech at – of all places – the Council of Europe in April 2011, a defiant Erdogan, commenting on the controversial detention of the investigative journalist Ahmet Sik, compared Sik’s then unpublished book to a bomb: “It is a crime to use a bomb, but it is also a crime to use materials from which a bomb is made.”

    Then there is the behind-the-scenes pressure that is exerted by the government on media organisations. “People are afraid of criticising Erdogan openly,” says Mehmet Karli, a lecturer at Galatasaray University in Istanbul and a campaigner for Kurdish rights. “They might not be arrested, but they will lose their jobs.”

    In February, for example, Nuray Mert, a columnist for the Milliyet newspaper, was sacked and her TV show cancelled after she was publicly singled out for criticism by the prime minister. Last month Ali Akel, a conservative columnist for the pro-government newspaper Yeni Safak, was fired for daring to write a rare, critical article about Erdogan’s handling of the Kurdish issue.

    But the restrictions on freedom of speech don’t stop with the media.

    Exhibit A: last week, two students were sentenced to eight years and five months in prison by a court in Istanbul for “membership of a terrorist organisation”, while a third student was sentenced to two years and two months behind bars for spreading terrorist propaganda. Yet the students, Berna Yilmaz, Ferhat Tüzer and Utku Aykar, had merely unfurled a banner reading “We want free education, we will get it,” at a public meeting attended by Erdogan in March 2010.

    Exhibit B: on 1 June Fazil Say, one of Turkey’s leading classical pianists, was charged with “publicly insulting religious values that are adopted by a part of the nation” after he retweeted a few lines from a poem by the 11th-century Persian poet, Omar Khayyam, that mocked the Islamic vision of heaven. Say’s trial is scheduled for October, and if convicted the pianist faces up to 18 months in prison. The irony is not lost on those Turks who remember how Erdogan himself was imprisoned in 1998, when he was mayor of Istanbul, for reading out a provocative poem.

    Erdogan, re-elected as prime minister for the second time last June and now considered the most powerful Turkish leader since Kemal Ataturk, has become intolerant of criticism and seems bent on crushing domestic opposition.

    “He is Putinesque,” says Karli, referring to reports that Erdogan plans to emulate the Russian leader’s switch from prime minister to president and thereby become the longest-serving leader in Turkish history. “Yes, he wins elections,” adds Karli, “but he does not respect the rights of those who do not vote or support him.”

    Let’s be clear: Turkey in the pre-Erdogan era was no liberal democratic nirvana. Since its creation in 1923, the republic has had to endure three military coups against elected governments: in 1960, 1971, and 1980. The AKP government is the first to succeed in neutering the military. And its paranoia is not wholly unjustified: Turkey’s constitutional court was just one vote from banning the AKP in 2008, and a series of alleged anti-government plots and conspiracies were exposed in 2010 and 2011.

    “I am concerned by the numbers [of imprisoned journalists] but they’re not all innocent,” the AKP MP Nursuna Memecan tells me. “Many of them were plotting against the government.” It’s a line echoed by her party leader. “It is hard for western countries to understand the problem because they do not have journalists who engage in coup attempts and who support and invite coups,” declared Erdogan in a speech in January.

    Perhaps. But the AKP’s crackdown on dissent, on basic freedoms of speech and expression, has gone beyond all civilised norms. “We do need to expand free speech in Turkey,” admits Memecan.

    Those of us who have long argued that elected Islamist parties should not be denied the opportunity to govern invested great hope in Erdogan and the AKP. But what I discovered in Istanbul is that there is still a long way to go. The truth is that Turkey cannot be the model, the template, for post-revolutionary, Muslim-majority countries like Tunisia and Egypt until it first gets its own house in order. To inspire freedom abroad, the Turkish government must first guarantee freedom at home.

  • Introducing Turkey’s Eurovision Breakout

    Introducing Turkey’s Eurovision Breakout

    Ah, to be 25, dressed like a Left Bank buccaneer and belting out irresistible Anatolian pop before a televised audience of 125 million kitsch-craving European fans. Such was Can Bonomo’s perch at the Eurovision Song Contest last month. The dashing young Turk, from a Sephardic Jewish family in Izmir, represented Turkey in Eurovision. Though he did not win — the prize went to Swedish-Moroccan singer Loreen — Bonomo was one of the more compelling singers to take the enormous and purpose-built stage in Baku, Azerbaijan. His song “Love Me Back” was performed as a jaunty set piece, variously channeling Pirates of the Caribbean (the ride), Show Boat and Ali Baba. A spicy summer mix, you might say. Bonomo stopped whirling for a moment to talk to us about “Istanbul music” and more.

    What was your craziest Eurovision experience?

    There’s not much that is not crazy when it comes to Eurovision. It’s very hyped all over Europe. I’ve had a lot of crazy experiences, from getting chased by cops for making music on European streets to broadcasting my birthday via press conference to all over the world.

    Is it correct that you wrote the words and music to “Love Me Back”? Did you translate the lyrics from Turkish, or was the song originally written in English?

    It was written completely from scratch in English. Eurovision is an international contest, so if the lyrics were in Turkish only the Turkish people would have understood it. This way it reached a wider audience. However the song would have also sounded quite good if it was in Turkish, since the Turkish language is very melodic and very suitable for songs.

    Do American pop artists influence your music or style?

    I don’t want to sound condescending, but as a personal preference I don’t listen to pop that much. I’ve heard Madonna is coming to Turkey for a show sometime soon; I don’t think I’ll be going. On the other hand I’m really excited for Red Hot Chili Peppers concert. I’ve always been a rock ‘n’ roll type of guy. Even when I was a kid I grew up with the Kinks, the Beatles and the Rolling Stones. My style is actually more influenced by poets than musicians. I’m a great admirer of American poetry and literature. I love Bukowski. I even have a tattoo from one of Gwendolyn Brooks’s poems.

    In both your Eurovision performance and on your Web site, you can be seen wearing some very interesting styles. Is it a Turkish designer who makes the clothes you wear for shows?

    The very first performance I did, I was wearing my own clothes straight from my closet. I only work with designers for official events like the Eurovision or song videos. I don’t have a designated designer. For Eurovision, though, Giray Sepin did the costumes for the dancers and Hatice Gokce did mine. My style is not that specific to a region or anything like that, but it does have slight ethnic touches.

    After Eurovision, what comes next? Can we expect more songs in English? Is performing in the United States something you would like to do in the future?

    I would absolutely be delighted to come to the U.S. to perform. But I want my lyrics to have a powerful emotional impact, and I don’t think I’m ready to deliver that punch in English yet. I had to postpone the recording of my second album because of Eurovision. Better late than never, and we are finally starting on that. I will also be publishing a poetry book in a few months. I’ve been getting a lot of praise from famous writers and poets here in Turkey. I’m super-thrilled about that.

    I watched Eurovision with a group of Israelis who said some of your music reminded them of klezmer. Was klezmer an influence on you musically growing up in Izmir?

    Turkish music shares a lot of instruments with klezmer music. However, I prefer to call the music I make “Istanbul” music. It’s a combination of sounds, instruments, bazaar salesmen yells, the whole nine yards. I want people to feel the chaotic energy of Istanbul in my albums.

    This post has been revised to reflect the following correction:

    Correction: June 11, 2012

    In an earlier version of the post, the singer’s name was misspelled in the headline. His name is Can Bonomo, not Cam Bonomo.

    via Introducing Turkey’s Eurovision Breakout – NYTimes.com.

  • Turkey will soon announce $4 billion missile defense decision

    Turkey will soon announce $4 billion missile defense decision

    From Umit Enginsoy and Burak Ege Bekdil, Defense News: The long-range air and missile defense system, worth more than $4 billion, has attracted companies from China, Europe, Russia and the U.S. . . .

    The presence of Russian and Chinese competitors for the missile system has drawn security concerns from some NATO allies.

    Turkey’s Defense Industry Executive Committee will meet in early July, probably July 4, on the selections and is expected to announce decisions or at least a shorter list.

    Competitors in the air and missile defense system include: U.S. partners Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, with their Patriot-based system; Eurosam with its SAMP/T Aster 30; Russia’s Rosoboronexport, marketing the country’s S-300 and S-400 systems; and China’s CPMIEC (China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corp.), offering its HQ-9.

    Eurosam’s shareholders include MBDA — jointly owned by British BAE Systems, Italian Finmeccanica and pan-European EADS — and France’s Thales. These companies will work with Turkish partners. . . .

    One Western expert countered: “If, say, the Chinese win the competition, their systems will be in interaction, directly or indirectly, with NATO’s intelligence systems, and this may lead to the leak of critical NATO information to the Chinese, albeit inadvertently. So this is dangerous. . . .”

    This marks the first time NATO has strongly urged Turkey against choosing the non-Western systems.

    “One explanation is that Turkey itself doesn’t plan to select the Chinese or Russian alternatives eventually but still is retaining them among their options to put pressure on the Americans and the Europeans to curb their prices,” the Western expert said.

    Turkey’s national air and missile defense program is independent from NATO’s own plans to design, develop and build a collective missile shield. (photo: French Ministry of Defense)

    via Turkey will soon announce $4 billion missile defense decision | Atlantic Council.

  • Turkey to sue Iran over natural gas price

     

    Energy and Natural Resources Minister Taner Yıldız (L), Iran’s Minister of Oil Rostam Qasemi (R)

     

    14 March 2012 / TODAY’S ZAMAN WITH WIRES, İSTANBUL

     

    In the absence of an agreement over the price Turkey pays for Iranian natural gas, Energy and Natural Resources Minister Taner Yıldız has said the government is getting ready to sue the Middle Eastern country’s administration in an international court of arbitration for a settlement that the two countries could not reach on their own.

     

    Speaking to reporters in Kuwait on Wednesday, Yıldız said he was not suspicious of the Iranians’ good intentions to resolve the matter bilaterally, yet Turkey remained with but one option after months-long discussions to that end proved futile. “The road to arbitration is being paved on March 16, and we will not wait for too long after that to file our complaint,” he was quoted as saying by the Anatolia news agency.

    Yıldız met with Iranian Petroleum Minister Rostam Qasemi on the sidelines of the 13th International Energy Forum (IEF) held in Kuwait City on Tuesday and that marked the latest of official discussions over the price Iran charges Turkey for its natural gas. The preparations for an arbitration application were already under way, and it became clear at the two ministers’ meeting that, in Yıldız’s words, “There was nothing left to discuss.”

    “They told us that they had a legal excuse [for not lowering the price] rather than talking about if the price was appropriate or not. Iran is our second biggest natural gas supplier after Russia, and there is a price difference [between the two suppliers],” Yıldız said.

    Of the natural gas that Turkey buys, Iran charges the most, and this is the main cause of rising tensions between the two countries. Turkey currently buys a cubic meter of Azerbaijani gas for $330 and pays Russia $400 for the same amount. However, Iran sells its gas to Turkey for $505 for each cubic meter, which increases Turkey’s natural gas bill by an extra $800 million annually. The price of a cubic meter of natural gas is sold for $400 in international markets.

    Although it has not been specified where Turkey is seeking arbitration, the International Chamber of Commerce in Switzerland, which awarded Turkey $800 million in compensation in 2009 in a previous dispute with Iran, is the most likely place where the arbitration will be held.

    At the end of last year Turkey experienced a similar problem with another major gas provider, Russia. The Russian government agreed to lower the price of natural gas it sells after Turkey agreed to a key natural gas pipeline that will carry Russian gas to European markets via Turkey’s territorial waters in the Black Sea.

    High gas prices aside, Turkey, a net energy importer, is also facing challenges due to a much discussed “take or pay” condition that requires the country to import predetermined amounts of natural gas in almost all of its natural gas import agreements. According to the natural gas purchase contract between Turkey and Iran, Turkey has to buy at least 6.8 billion cubic meters of natural gas from Iran annually. This means Turkey has to pay Iran a specified amount of money irrespective of whether it needs that amount of natural gas. A similar situation exists for the supply of natural gas from Russia. Although the payments can be used in lieu of natural gas acquired in the future, there is a five year limit after which the amount paid cannot be used to obtain natural gas. In a time of poor domestic natural gas consumption, the Turkish Pipeline Corporation (BOTAŞ) is wondering whether it will be able to consume the (unused) natural gas that it has paid for.

    When asked if the dispute over the price of natural gas is likely to also have a negative impact on the two neighbors’ relations at large, Yıldız said business and friendship are two different things that should not be confused. “It is like the continuation of trade between two enlightened nations as they are also carrying out the arbitration process. This is pretty normal. We are good with them. Our business relations, trade are going on. Both the buyer and the seller are happy, but there is one problem. We are now trying to solve it without damaging the very business between us,” he said, adding: “Here actually I believe the Iranians acknowledge that reality [that a price arrangement to Turkey’s benefit is necessary], but they are unable to do so because of certain limitations. That is, I cannot say they are ill-intentioned. This is why our relations are not affected. I believe they have good intentions, as they believe we do.”

    Turkey and Iran have a highly unbalanced trade. As of last year, the trade volume reached $16 billion, mostly from Iranian natural gas and oil proceeds. In addition to the one-third of natural gas it buys from overseas, Turkey imports some 30 percent of its oil needs from Iran, or 200,000 barrels per day, which represents over 7 percent of Iranian oil exports.

     

  • Obama’s friend in Turkey

    Obama’s friend in Turkey

    David Ignatius
    Opinion Writer

    Obama’s friend in Turkey


    ISTANBUL

    As President Obama was feeling his way in foreign policy during his first months in office, he decided to cultivate a friendship with Turkey’s headstrong prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Over the past year, this investment in Turkey has begun to pay some big dividends — anchoring U.S. policy in a region that sometimes seems adrift.

     

    Erdogan’s clout was on display this week as he hosted a meeting here of the World Economic Forum (WEF) that celebrated the stability of the “Turkish model” of Muslim democracy amid the turmoil of the Arab Spring. One panel had the enraptured title “Turkey as a Source of Inspiration.”

    In a speech Tuesday, Erdogan named Turkey’s achievements over the decade he has been in power: Its economy has grown an annual average of 5.3 percent since 2002, the fastest rate of any country in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; gross domestic product has more than tripled, as have its foreign reserves; investment from abroad has increased more than 16 times.

    For Erdogan, receiving a visit from the WEF was a kind of vindication. The Turkish leader walked angrily offstage at the group’s 2009 meeting in Davos, Switzerland, after a panel moderator (yours truly) didn’t allow him time to respond to Israeli President Shimon Peres’s remarks about the Gaza war. This week, that moment seemed well in the past.

    Turkey’s ascendancy in the region may seem obvious now, but it was less so in 2009, when Obama began working to build a special relationship. To an otherwise predictable European itinerary for his first overseas trip in April 2009, he added a stop in Ankara. What impressed the Turks wasn’t just that he spoke to their parliament but that earlier, in Strasbourg, he pushed for a greater role for Turkey in NATO, and in Prague he argued for Turkish membership in the European Union.

    Obama and Erdogan continued their courtship despite a sharp deterioration in Turkey’s relations with Israel after the Gaza war and despite U.S. worries in early 2010 that Ankara was becoming too friendly with Iran. Obama expressed his concerns in a blunt two-hour conversation at the June 2010 Group of 20 summit in Toronto. Since then, according to both sides, there has been growing mutual trust.

    “My prime minister sees a friend in President Obama,” says Egemen Bagis, the minister for European affairs and one of Erdogan’s closest political advisers. “The two can very candidly express their opinions. They might not always agree, but they feel confident enough to share positions.”

    An example of the Obama-Erdogan channel was their meeting in March at the Asian summit in Seoul. The top item was Obama’s request that Erdogan convey a message to Iran’s supreme leader about U.S. interest in a nuclear agreement. In Seoul, Erdogan also promised to reopen a Greek Orthodox seminary on the island of Halki, granting a request that Obama had made in 2009; Erdogan had earlier agreed to Obama’s request that Turkey permit services at an ancient Armenian church on Akdamar Island in Lake Van.

    Turks cite several other concessions made by the Turkish leader: Obama persuaded him to install a missile-defense radar system that became operational this year, upsetting Tehran. And at U.S. urging, Erdogan reversed his initial opposition to NATO intervention last year in Libya.

    In playing the Turkey card, Obama has upset some powerful political constituencies at home. Jewish groups protest that Obama’s warming to Ankara has come even as Israel’s relationship with Turkey has chilled almost to the freezing point. Armenian groups are upset that Obama has soft-pedaled his once-emphatic call for Turkey to recognize the genocide of 1915. And human-rights groups complain that the United States is tolerating Erdogan’s squeeze on Turkish journalists, judges and political foes.

    But as the Arab Spring has darkened, the administration has been glad for its alliance with this prosperous Muslim democracy — which it can celebrate as a beacon for the neighborhood. Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey’s ambitious foreign minister, argues that his country is a role model for Arabs because it shows that democracy brings dignity, not chaos or extremism.

    Bagis puts it this way: “There are many Muslim leaders who can go to Egypt and pray in a mosque. And there are many Western leaders who can go talk about democracy. Erdogan did both.” For Turkey these days, that’s something of a trump card. But there’s a mutual dependence. It seems fair to say that no world leader has a greater stake in Obama’s reelection than the Turkish prime minister.

    [email protected]

    Read more on this topic from Opinions:

    David Ignatius: Obama’s signal to Iran

    Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu: Opposition being silenced in Turkey

    Jackson Diehl: Turkey’s government is the new normal

     

     

  • All Three Branches of US government  Recognize the Armenian Genocide

    All Three Branches of US government Recognize the Armenian Genocide

     

     

    While readers are generally aware that the Executive and Legislative branches of the US government have recognized the Armenian Genocide, it is not as widely known that the US Judiciary has also reaffirmed the facts of the Armenian Genocide on several occasions. Indeed, all three branches of the US government have gone on record confirming that the Armenian Genocide was indeed a genocide.

     

    The first time that the Executive branch made reference to the Armenian Genocide was back in 1951 in a key document filed by the US government with the International Court of Justice (World Court). It stated: “The Genocide Convention resulted from the inhuman and barbarous practices which prevailed in certain countries prior to and during World War II, when entire religious, racial and national minority groups were threatened with and subjected to deliberate extermination. The practice of genocide has occurred throughout human history. The Roman persecution of the Christians, the Turkish massacres of Armenians, the extermination of millions of Jews and Poles by the Nazis are outstanding examples of the crime of genocide.”

     

    The second reference by the Executive branch to the Armenian Genocide was made by Pres. Ronald Reagan when he issued Presidential Proclamation 4838 on April 22, 1981, in which he stated: “Like the genocide of the Armenians before it, and the genocide of the Cambodians which followed it — and like too many other such persecutions of too many other peoples — the lessons of the Holocaust must never be forgotten.”

     

    The Legislative branch of the US government adopted two resolutions confirming the historical facts of the Armenian Genocide. The first resolution, approved by the US House of Representatives on April 8, 1975, designated April 24, 1975 “as a day of remembrance for all the victims of genocide, especially those of Armenian ancestry who succumbed to the genocide perpetrated in 1915.” A second resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on September 10, 1984, designating April 24, 1985 “as a day of remembrance for all the victims of genocide, especially the one and one-half million people of Armenian ancestry who were the victims of the genocide perpetrated in Turkey between 1915 and 1923.” In addition, the House adopted two amendments on the Armenian Genocide in the 1996 and 2004 Foreign Operations Appropriation Act.

     

    However, most people are unaware that the Judiciary, the third branch of the US government, has issued at least three federal court rulings concerning the Armenian Genocide:

     

    The first judicial reference to the Armenian Genocide was the unanimous ruling of a three-judge panel of the First Circuit Court of Appeals on August 11, 2010. In a decision written by former US Supreme Court Justice David Souter, the court rejected a claim by an American-Turkish group that a curricular guide issued by the Massachusetts Education Commissioner explicitly referring to the Armenian Genocide should have included “contra-genocide” references.

     

    The second court case involving the Armenian Genocide was the ruling of federal Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly on January 26, 2011, in the lawsuits regarding the Armenian Genocide Museum & Memorial in Washington, D.C. In the opening paragraph of her decision, Judge Kollar-Kotelly quoted the chilling words of Adolf Hitler: “Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians?” She explained that Hitler was referring to “the largely successful efforts by the Ottoman-Turkish government to eliminate the Armenian population living on its historical homeland during the World War I era, known today as the Armenian Genocide.” The Judge stated in a footnote that “the Court’s use of the term ‘genocide’ is not intended to express any opinion on the propriety of that label.”

     

    The third judicial reference to the Armenian Genocide was made on May 3, 2012, by a three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, denying the claim of the Turkish Coalition of America against the University of Minnesota. In a unanimous opinion, the judges referred unambiguously and without qualification to the Armenian Genocide, describing it as “the Turkish genocide of Armenians during World War I.”

     

    With all three independent branches of the US government going on record reaffirming the Armenian Genocide, the United States has gained its rightful place in the list of righteous nations that have recognized the Armenian Genocide. In fact, in many respects, the United States has compiled a more extensive record of acknowledging the Armenian Genocide than most other countries that have merely adopted a legislative resolution on this issue.