Category: Ukraine

  • Brzezinski reviews US policy towards Russia

    Brzezinski reviews US policy towards Russia

    Zbigniew Brzezinski, former US National Security Adviser under Jimmy Carter, claims that bringing the Ukraine closer to the West is the key to assuring the democratization of Russia.

    In an interview for the French paper Le Figaro said that the West must work to reopen relations with Russia and that Georgia and the Ukraine must be part of that dialogue.

    Western nations, including Poland and the United States, must rework their relations with Russia in order to `slowly limit Russia’s nostalgia for imperialism and renew disarmament negotiations.`

    Brzezinski told the paper that initiating a new dialogue with Russia cannot happen at the cost of limiting the aspirations of those countries seeking NATO membership – such as the Ukraine and Georgia – especially because the Ukraine, as a NATO member opens up a transformative path to democratize Russia.

    Source:  The Georgian Times, 02.19.2009



  • The credit crunch according to Soros

    The credit crunch according to Soros

    The credit crunch according to Soros

    By Chrystia Freeland

    Published: January 30 2009 11:38 | Last updated: January 30 2009 11:38

    On Friday, August 17 2007, 21 of Wall Street’s most influential investors met for lunch at George Soros’s Southampton estate on the eastern end of Long Island. The first tremors of what would become the global credit crunch had rippled out a week or so earlier, when the French bank BNP Paribas froze withdrawals from three of its funds, and in response, central bankers made a huge injection of liquidity into the money markets in an effort to keep the world’s banks lending to one another.

    Although it was a sultry summer Friday, as the group dined on striped bass, fruit salad and cookies, the tone was serious and rather formal. Soros’s guests included Julian Robertson, founder of the Tiger Management hedge fund; Donald Marron, the former chief executive of PaineWebber and now boss of Lightyear Capital; James Chanos, president of Kynikos Associates, a hedge fund that specialised in shorting stocks; and Byron Wien, chief investment strategist at Pequot Capital and the convener of the annual gathering – known to its participants as the Benchmark Lunch.

    The discussion focused on a single question: was a recession looming? We all know the answer today, but the consensus that overcast afternoon was different. In a memo written after the lunch, Wien, a longtime friend of Soros’s, wrote: “The conclusion was that we were probably in an economic slowdown and a correction in the market, but we were not about to begin a recession or a bear market.” Only two men dissented. One of those was Soros, who finished the meal convinced that the global financial crisis he had been predicting – prematurely – for years had finally begun.

    His conclusion had immediate consequences. Six years earlier, following the departure of Stan Druckenmiller from Quantum Funds, Soros’s hedge fund, Soros converted the operation into a “less aggressively managed vehicle” and renamed it an “endowment fund”, which farmed most of its money out to external managers. Now Soros realised he had to get back into the game. “I did not want to see my accumulated wealth be severely impaired,” he said, during a two-hour conversation this winter in the conference room of his midtown Manhattan offices. “So I came back and set up a macro-account within which I counterbalanced what I thought was the exposure of the firm.”

    Soros complained that his years of less active involvement at Quantum meant he didn’t have the kind of “detailed knowledge of particular companies I used to have, so I’m not in a position to pick stocks”. Moreover, “even many of the macro instruments that have been recently invented were unfamiliar to me”. Even so, Quantum achieved a 32 per cent return in 2007, making the then 77-year-old the second-highest paid hedge fund manager in the world, according to Institutional Investor’s Alpha magazine. He ended 2008, a year that saw global destruction of wealth on the most colossal scale since the second world war, with two out of three hedge funds losing money, up almost 10 per cent.

    Soros’s main goal was to preserve his fortune. But, as has been the case throughout his career, his timing and financial acumen enhanced his credibility as a thinker, and never more so than in 2008. In May and June, after more than two decades of writing, he hit bestseller lists in the US and in the UK with his ninth book, The New Paradigm for Financial Markets. In October, he received an invitation to testify before Congress about the financial crisis. In November, Barack Obama, whom he had long backed for the presidency, defeated John McCain.

    “In the twilight of his life, he’s achieved the recognition he has always wanted,” Wien said. “Everything is going for him. He’s healthy, his candidate won, his business is on a solid footing.”

    . . .

    Many comparisons have been drawn between 2008 and earlier periods of turmoil, but the historical moment with most personal resonance for Soros is not one of the conventional choices. The parallel he sees is with 1944, when, as a 13-year-old Jewish boy in Nazi-occupied Budapest, he eluded the Holocaust.

    Soros credits his beloved father, Tivadar, with teaching him how to respond to “far from equilibrium situations”. Captured by the Russians in the first world war, Tivadar was imprisoned in Siberia. He engineered his own escape and return home through a Russia convulsed by the Bolshevik revolution. That sojourn stripped him of his youthful ambition and left him wanting “nothing more from life than to enjoy it”. Yet on March 19 1944, the day the Germans occupied Hungary, the 50-year-old sprang into action, rescuing his immediate family and many others by arranging false identities for them.

    Before the invasion, George was still enough of a child, his father thought, to need a bit of parental coddling. Yet the teenager who spent the war living apart from his parents under a false name found the danger exhilarating. “It was high adventure,” Soros wrote, “like living through Raiders of the Lost Ark.” And as the latest financial crisis gathered momentum, he admitted to the same thrill. “I think the same thing applies again. I feel the same kind of stimulation as I felt then,” he told me.

    Part of the stimulation is intellectual. Soros’s experiences in 1944 laid the groundwork for the conceptual framework he would spend the rest of his life elaborating and which, he believes, has found its validation in the events of 2008. His core idea is “reflexivity”, which he defines as a “two-way feedback loop, between the participants’ views and the actual state of affairs. People base their decisions not on the actual situation that confronts them, but on their perception or interpretation of the situation. Their decisions make an impact on the situation and changes in the situation are liable to change their perceptions.”

    It is, at its root, a case for frequent re-examination of one’s assumptions about the world and for a readiness to spot and exploit moments of cataclysmic change – those times when our perceptions of events and events themselves are likely to interact most fiercely. It is also at odds with the rational expectations economic school, which has been the prevailing orthodoxy in recent decades. That approach assumed that economic players – from people buying homes to bankers buying subprime mortgages for their portfolios – were rational actors making, in aggregate, the best choices for themselves and that free markets were effective mechanisms for balancing supply and demand, setting prices correctly and tending towards equilibrium.

    The rational expectations theory has taken a beating over the past 18 months: its intellectual nadir was probably October 23 2008, when Alan Greenspan, the former Federal Reserve chairman, admitted to Congress that there was “a flaw in the model”. Soros argues that the “market fundamentalism” of Greenspan and his ilk, especially their assumption that “financial markets are self-correcting”, was an important cause of the current crisis. It befuddled policy-makers and was the intellectual basis for the “various synthetic instruments and valuation models” which contributed mightily to the crash.

    By contrast, Soros sees the current crisis as a real-life illustration of reflexivity. Markets did not reflect an objective “truth”. Rather, the beliefs of market participants – that house prices would always rise, that an arcane financial instrument based on a subprime mortgage really could merit a triple-A rating – created a new reality. Ultimately, that “super-bubble” was unsustainable, hence the credit crunch of 2007 and the recession and financial crisis of 2008 and beyond.

    As an investor and as a thinker, Soros has always thrived in times of upheaval. But he has also remained something of an outsider. He recalls how he “discovered loneliness” when he arrived to study at the London School of Economics in 1947. Later on, as he worked his way up from being a journeyman arbitrage trader in London and then New York, to running one of the world’s most successful hedge funds, Soros remained, in the words of one private equity acquaintance, a bit of “an oddball”, both on Wall Street and in the academic world. He is frequently described as “charming”, yet few see the fit, tanned, twice-divorced billionaire as an emotional confidant. “If I had an idea about India-Pakistan, I would talk to him about it,” Wien said. “If I were having a problem in my marriage, I don’t think I would go and talk to George about it.”

    Strobe Talbott, now the president of the Brookings Institute and a former deputy secretary of state, said: “He likes to think of himself as an outsider who can come in from time to time, including to the Oval Office, where I took him on a couple of occasions. But simply hobnobbing with the powerful isn’t important.”

    That lack of clubbiness, and the associated trait of iconoclasm, may explain why, for all his worldly success, Soros has had a rather mixed public reputation. His speculative plays, which have often targeted currencies, have earned him the wrath of political leaders around the world. The ambitious, global reach of his richly funded Open Society foundation has prompted some critics to accuse him of suffering from a Messiah complex. He was so effectively demonised by the US right earlier this decade that he kept fairly quiet about his support of Obama, lest the association hurt his candidate. Probably most painfully, his forays into economics and philosophy often have met with considerable scepticism, especially from academia.

    The one time and place where he instantly became a highly regarded insider was in the former Soviet Union and its satellites, at the moment the Berlin Wall came down. More completely and more swiftly than any other foreigner, Soros grasped and embraced the systemic transformation that was unfolding, and was rewarded with influence and respect. The question for Soros today is whether, as the west undergoes its own once-in-a-century systemic shock, this arch-outsider will finally find himself in the mainstream in the society which has been his main home for more than half a century.

    . . .

    Soros’s most famous – or infamous – speculative play as an investor was his bet against sterling in 1992, a wager which won him more than $1bn and earned him the epithet from the British press of “the man who broke the Bank of England”. That bet also turns out to be a perfect illustration of the specific talent which his past and present fund managers agree has been central to his investing success.

    Soros’s best-known investment was not, in actual fact, his own idea. According to both Soros and Druckenmiller, who was managing Quantum at the time, it was Druckenmiller who came up with the plan to short the pound. But when Druckenmiller went through his rationale with Soros, in one of their twice- or thrice-daily conversations, Soros told his protégé to be bolder: “I said, ‘Go for the jugular!’.” Druckenmiller duly raised their stake – Quantum and several related funds wagered nearly $10bn, according to interviews Soros gave afterwards – and Soros earned both a fortune and an international reputation.

    Druckenmiller, who spent 12 years at Quantum, says that conversation exemplifies Soros’s singular financial gift: “He’s extremely good at using the balance sheet – probably the best ever. He is able to use leverage when he likes it, but he is also able to walk away. He has no emotional attachment to a position. I think that is an unusual characteristic in our industry.”

    Chanos agrees: “One thing that I’ve both wrestled with and admired, that [Soros] conquered many years ago, is the ability to go from long to short, the ability to turn on a dime when confronted with the evidence. Emotionally, that is really hard.”

    Soros denies any great degree of emotional self-control. “That’s not true, that’s not true,” he told me, shaking his head and smiling. “I am very emotional. I am as moody as the market, so I’m basically a manic depressive personality.” (His market-linked moodiness extends to psychosomatic ailments, especially backaches, which he treats as valuable investment tips.)

    Instead, Soros attributes his effectiveness as an investor to his philosophical views about the contingent nature of human knowledge: “I think that my conceptual framework, which basically emphasises the importance of misconceptions, makes me extremely critical of my own decisions … I know that I am bound to be wrong, and therefore am more likely to correct my own mistakes.”

    Soros’s radar for revolution is the second key to his investing style. He looks for “game-changing moments, not incremental ones”, according to Sebastian Mallaby, the Washington Post columnist and author who is writing a history of hedge funds. As examples, Mallaby cites Quantum’s shorting of the pound and Soros’s 1985 “Plaza Accord” bet that the dollar would fall against the yen – his two most famous currency trades – as well as a lesser-known 1973 bet that, as a consequence of the Arab-Israeli war, defence stocks would soar. “It’s not that reflexivity tells you what to do, but it tells you to be on the look-out for turn-around situations,” Mallaby said. “It’s an attitude of mind.”

    Some Soros-watchers intimate that his vast network of international contacts might be an important source of his market prescience. But it was in the one part of the world where Soros really did have an inside track – the former Soviet bloc – that he made his most disastrous deal. In Russia, as in much of the former Soviet Union, he was intensely engaged with the country’s political and economic transformation. In June 1997, as the Kremlin struggled to pay overdue wages, Soros extended a bridge loan to the Russian government, acting as a one-man International Monetary Fund.

    He came to believe in Russia’s commitment to reforms, and to see himself as an insider – two convictions that were his financial undoing. He invested $980m with a consortium of oligarchs who acquired a 25 per cent stake in Svyazinvest, the national telecoms company, deciding to participate because “I thought that this is the transition from robber capitalism to legitimate capitalism”. But instead, the Svyazinvest privatisation turned out to be the moment when the oligarchs redirected their energies from fleecing the state to fleecing one another. Soros, as an outsider, was an obvious casualty. “Never have I been screwed so much since Russia. For them, they get a satisfaction out of doing it.

    “It was the biggest mistake of my investment career. I was deceived by my own hope.” In his most recent book he dismisses Russia with a single sentence, further diminished by parenthesis: “(I don’t discuss Russia, because I don’t want to invest there.)”

    . . .

    On a chilly Monday night in December, Soros took the hour-long drive from Manhattan to the Bruce Museum in Greenwich, Connecticut. He was due to speak at a benefit for the Scholar Rescue Fund, a programme he has partly financed and which, since 2002, has provided safe havens for 266 persecuted academics from 40 countries. After his talk (on the global financial crisis, of course), Soros filed out of the auditorium chatting with Stanley Bergman, a founding partner of the law firm that had sponsored the evening.

    “You like the game?” Soros asked his host with a smile.

    “Yes,” the white-haired Bergman replied.

    Then, in a flash of the competitive spirit that makes Soros an avid skier and player of tennis and chess, Soros asked: “And how old are you?”

    “75.”

    “I’m 78,” Soros replied. “But what’s the use of good health if it doesn’t buy you money?” The vigorous septuagenarians flashed each other a complicit smile.

    According to Wien, Soros likes the game, too: “George loves to be able to show from time to time that he can do it.” But while he loves to play, he is disdainful of a life lived purely to accumulate more chips. His epiphany came in 1981, when he had to scramble to raise money to pay for an investment in bonds. “I thought I would have a heart attack,” he told me. “And then I realised that to die just for the sake of getting rich, I would be a loser.”

    For Soros, the solution was philanthropy. “To do something really that would make a significant difference to the world, that would be worth dying for,” he said. “The Foundation enabled me to get out of myself and to somehow be concerned with other people than myself.” Soros’s fortune has given his causes enormous firepower: according to Aryeh Neier, the human rights activist who has been running the Open Society Foundation since 1993, its budget was $550m in 2008 and will increase to $600m this year. By his own calculation, Soros has donated a total of more than $5bn to his causes, primarily directing his giving through his foundation.

    “No philanthropist in the second half of the 20th century has done better in deploying resources strategically to change the world,” Larry Summers, the newly appointed head of Barack Obama’s National Economic Council, told me in a conversation early last autumn. Talbott compares Soros’s impact to that of a sovereign nation. In the 1990s, says Talbott, “when I got word that George Soros wanted to talk, I would drop everything and treat him pretty much like a visiting head of state. He was literally putting more money into some of the former colonies of the former Soviet empire than the US government, so that merited treating him as someone with a very high impact.”

    Soros’s philanthropic lieutenants report an approach remarkably similar to the investing style observed by his fund managers: he knows how to make big, original bets, and he isn’t afraid to cut his losses when a project isn’t working out. Anders Aslund, an economist who has studied Russia and Ukraine and who has worked with Soros on various projects, believes his philanthropic style “is very much formed by the money markets, which are always changing. He assumes any idea he has now will be wrong in a few years. He is always asking himself, when he has a wonderful project going, ‘When should I stop this project?’.”

    Soros’s war chest, and his determination to deploy it beyond the usual blue-chip charities of hospitals, universities, museums or even poverty in Africa, had long made him an occasionally controversial figure outside the US. He was among the western culprits accused by the Kremlin of inciting Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution; his foundation’s offices have been raided in Russia and he was forced to close them down in authoritarian Uzbekistan.

    America, it turns out, can also be sensitive to plutocrats using their wealth to address socially contentious subjects. In recent years, his foundation became more active in the US, taking on issues including drug policy. His engagement became more intense during the George W. Bush presidency, when Soros decided that the open society he had worked to foster in repressive regimes abroad was imperilled in his adopted home.

    Some admired his chutzpah. The famously independent-minded Paul Volcker, who was appointed to lead the Fed by Jimmy Carter and reappointed by Ronald Reagan, said: “The drug thing is a perfect example that he doesn’t adopt a conventional view. I think drug policy needs a new look and he’s been one of the people who say that.”

    Soros’s money has been crucial in enabling him to voice maverick views: “That’s what led me to oppose Bush very publicly, because I was in a position that I could afford to do it,” he said. But he also believes his fortune and the automatic credibility it gives him in America has drawn the fire of conservative pundits such as Fox’s Bill O’Reilly and extremist pamphleteer Lyndon LaRouche. “Given the excessive esteem in which people who make money are held in America, I had to be demonised,” he said.

    Their attacks worked. So much so that last year, as the Obama bandwagon gained speed and American financiers, along with much of the rest of the country, clamoured to jump on, his earliest heavyweight Wall Street backer kept a low profile. “Obama seeks to be a unifier,” Soros said. “And I have been a divisive figure because I’ve been demonised by the right. I thought my vocal support for him would not necessarily benefit him.”

    . . .

    At around 1.00am on November 5 2008, Soros sat on a peach-coloured sofa in his elegant Fifth Avenue apartment, with Queen Noor of Jordan to his left and Steve Clemons, of the New America think-tank, perched on the edge of a chair to his right. Around them milled a crowd of eclectic and jubilant guests, many still teary-eyed from Obama’s Grant Park victory speech, which had been broadcast on four flat-screen television sets in the apartment. Like most Soros soirées, the gathering included more artists and statesmen than Masters of the Universe: Michèle Pierre-Louis, the prime minister of Haiti and former head of her country’s Soros foundation; former World Bank chief James Wolfensohn; Volcker; and twentysomething Kwasi Asare, a hip-hop music promoter, were among the visitors.

    Soros drank an espresso and, a few minutes later, a final champagne toast with the last of his guests. Alexander, his 23-year-old son, perched on the arm of his chair and ruffled his father’s hair in farewell. Everyone else took that as a signal to depart, too. Soros was in a mellow, triumphant mood that night – and with good reason. He had spotted Obama early on. His ubiquitous political consigliere, Michael Vachon, still has among his papers a rumpled itinerary from a trip he and Soros took to Chicago in February 2004. In the upper right-hand corner of the page, Vachon had scrawled, “Barack guy”. The Senate candidate had been keen to meet Soros and called the pair repeatedly during their visit. But it was a packed schedule and Soros could only offer a 7.30am breakfast slot at the Four Seasons.

    Soros left that meal “very impressed”, a view that was confirmed when he read Obama’s autobiography and deemed him “a real person of substance”. A few months later, on June 7, Soros hosted a packed fundraiser for Obama’s Senate campaign at his upper east side home. Soros and his family contributed roughly $80,000, then the legal maximum.

    Obama was impressing a lot of people at that time. But once it became clear that Hillary Clinton would be in the presidential race, nearly all of the established New York Democrats, particularly the older Wall Street crowd, lined up behind their local Senator and her machine, driven by a combination of loyalty and calculation. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, now the head of the IMF and then a possible French presidential candidate, said Soros told him in 2006 he was supporting “this young guy, Barack Obama. He was the first one to tell me this and he was right.” On January 16 2007, the day Obama formed a presidential exploratory committee, Soros contributed to his campaign and officially offered his backing. Before doing so, Soros called Hillary Clinton to let her know. “I look forward to your support in the general election,” she told him.

    His decision to back Obama was consistent with his life-long affinity for moments of radical change. “I felt that America had gone so far off base that there was a need for discontinuity,” he said. As in the markets, Soros’s political bet on systemic transformation – his support for Obama, but also his early opposition to the war in Iraq and the “war on terror” – has come good.

    For Soros, one happy consequence of now being in tune with the zeitgeist is that he is being taken seriously as a thinker on American public policy issues, particularly to do with the financial crisis. When he, along with the other four highest-earning hedge fund managers, testified before Congress in November, he was treated with respect and even deference – not the prevailing attitude towards billionaire financiers at the moment. Before Soros had even taken his coat off, he was greeted in the corridors by Democratic New York Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney. “Give him a nice office,” she told a staffer who was looking for a place where Soros could wait before his testimony. “He creates a lot of jobs in my district and supports a lot of good people.” After the hearing, a lawmaker and a staffer both approached Soros and asked him to autograph their copies of his book.

    . . .

    Being listened to on Capitol Hill, and by global policymakers more generally, is important to Soros. But what matters to him most of all – more than money, more than the political and social accomplishments of his foundation – is leaving an enduring intellectual legacy. He describes reflexivity as “my main interest”. Even as Soros met with increasing financial and public success through his fund and his foundation, he was deeply frustrated by his failure to be accepted as a serious thinker. He titled one chapter in his latest book “Autobiography of a Failed Philosopher”, and once delivered a lecture at the University of Vienna called “A Failed Philosopher Tries Again”. As a young man, he wanted to become an academic, but “my grades were not good enough”.

    He writes that his first book, The Alchemy of Finance, was “dismissed by many critics as the self-indulgence of a successful speculator”. That reaction still prevails in some circles. Paul Krugman, the Nobel prize-winning economist, devotes half a chapter to Soros in his latest book, characterising him as “perhaps the most famous speculator of all times”. He also raises an eyebrow at Soros’s intellectual “ambitions”, tartly observing that he “would like the world to take his philosophical pronouncements as seriously as it takes his financial acumen”.

    Another barrier to academic respectability is Soros’s self-confessed “phobia” of formal mathematics: “I understand mathematical concepts but I’m afraid of mathematical symbols, because you can easily get lost in them.” That fear proved no impediment to success in the quantitative world of finance, but it has hurt Soros’s street cred in economics departments. “Among academics, he suffers from the additional liability of not expressing it in the language of mathematics that has become fashionable,” Joe Stiglitz, another Nobel prize-winning economist, said. But Stiglitz believes his friend’s writing has become more current, partly thanks to the financial crisis: “By those economists interested in ideas, I think his work is taken seriously as an idea that informs their thinking.”

    In the view of Larry Summers: “Reflexivity as an idea is right and important and closely related to various streams of existing thought in the social sciences. But no one has deployed a philosophical concept as effectively as George has, first to make money and then to change the world.”

    Paul Volcker delivered a similar verdict: “I think he has a valid insight which is not always expressed as clearly by him as I might like.” Overall, he said, Soros is “an imaginative and provocative thinker … he’s got some brilliant ideas about how markets function or dysfunction.”

    This is as close to mainstream intellectual acceptance as Soros has come in his two decades of writing and more than five decades since he gave up on academia. It feels like a breakthrough. When I asked him if he would still describe himself as a failed philosopher, he said no: “I think that I am actually succeeding as a philosopher.” For him, that is “obviously” the most important human accomplishment.

    “I think it has to do with the human condition,” he said. “The fact that we are mortal and we would like to be immortal. The closest thing you can come to that is by creating something that lives beyond you. Wealth could be one of those things, but evidence shows that it doesn’t survive too many generations. However, if you can have an artistic or philosophical or scientific creation that withstands the test of time, then you have come as close to it as possible.”

    Chrystia Freeland is the FT’s US managing editor

    Click here to read an extract from George Soros’s e-book update to The New Paradigm for Financial Markets – The credit crisis of 2008 and what it means

  • Turkey Is Optimistic About Nabucco as Budapest Summit Approaches

    Turkey Is Optimistic About Nabucco as Budapest Summit Approaches

    Turkey Is Optimistic About Nabucco as Budapest Summit Approaches

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 10
    January 16, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    In the midst of the gas transit row between Russia and Ukraine and discussions on diversifying the continent’s energy supplies, Turkey is pleased to see an opportunity for itself.

    Turkey is seeking a mediating role in the diplomatic standoff between Russia and Ukraine. Following his visit to Moscow, Turkish Energy Minister Hilmi Guler told reporters that Turkey’s talks with the two parties were continuing and it was ready to mediate, if necessary by hosting a meeting in Turkey. Noting that some Balkan countries that were hit by the crisis, such as Bulgaria, were demanding gas from Turkey, he announced that Ankara was holding talks for building alternative supply routes to them. It will be similar to Turkey’s exports to Greece and might help these countries weather future energy interruptions. Guler also was content that the importance of the Nabucco project for diversifying Europe’s energy supplies was appreciated. He told reporters that Turkey was determined to realize this project, and concrete steps to make it operational would be taken soon (Anadolu Ajansi, January 15).

    Ahead of the Nabucco summit to be hosted by Hungary this month, it appears that Turkey’s hand has been strengthened. Despite calls for prioritizing energy security following a similar crisis in 2006, the EU has failed to reduce energy dependence, which has raised questions about the effectiveness of the EU’s energy policy (Hurriyet, January 15). The latest Russian-Ukrainian crisis prompted a debate on diversifying both sources and gas transportation routes through alternative pipelines. The EU and Russia now have incentives to support projects that bypass Ukraine. Gazprom’s Nord Stream and South Stream projects, under the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, respectively, are in progress. Since South Stream is a rival to the Nabucco project and European countries have differing preferences, it will be interesting to observe how pipeline politics develop.

    The Nabucco project, originally projected to open in 2013, will carry gas from the Caspian basin, the Middle East, and Egypt to Europe by routes stretching through Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary and terminating at the Baumgarten hub in Austria. The 3,300-km (1,980-mile) project is expected to cost approximately €7.9 billion ($10.5 billion) (www.nabucco-pipeline.com).

    Nabucco has gained increasing favor because of efforts to open European access to the resources of the Caspian (EDM, January 6). The Czech Republic, which currently holds the EU’s rotating presidency, is intent on speeding up the preparations for Nabucco. Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek proposed that the EU make the realization of the project a top priority (www.trt.net.tr, January 14). Nonetheless, other EU members such as Italy back South Stream (EDM, June 25, 2007).

    One major obstacle to the project has been whether the consortium can secure enough gas to make the project feasible. Turkey, hoping to project itself as a major player in gas markets through Nabucco, has worked hard to find sufficient gas resources. Its efforts to bring Turkmenistan on board did not produce any results in mid-2008 (www.asam.org.tr, May 2, 2008), because of Turkmenistan’s contracts with Russia, and concerns about transporting the gas across the Caspian Sea. A trilateral summit between the presidents of Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Turkey in late November 2008, however, was interpreted as “quiet support” for the Nabucco project (EDM, December 1). Since then, European leaders have also been encouraging Turkmenistan to join the project. Recently it was suggested that the prospects for realizing the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) had increased, particularly following the Russian-Ukrainian dispute. Although “the route and means for Turkmenistan’s gas to cross the Caspian Sea has not yet been decided,” it is claimed that the TCGP could be integrated into Nabucco (www.isn.ethz.ch, January 15). Nonetheless, Turkmenistan has yet to commit gas exports to Europe through Nabucco.

    Currently, the only supplier that is committed to Nabucco is Azerbaijan. Turkey has been pushing for including Iranian gas in the project, but the diplomatic standoff between Iran and the West over the Iranian nuclear issue raises questions about the likelihood of connecting Iranian Tabriz-Erzurum gas pipeline to Nabucco. Moreover, the reliability of Iran is also unclear, given the problems Turkey has encountered in its imports from Iran in the past. Turkey also hopes to connect gas from Iraq and Egypt to the Nabucco line.

    Turkey had even raised the possibility of Russia joining the Nabucco project. During his visit to Moscow in February 2008, Foreign Minister Ali Babacan invited his Russian counterpart to join the project (Turkish Daily News, February 21, 2008; EDM, February 28, 2008). Later, Guler argued that the South Stream and Nabucco projects could be combined (Today’s Zaman, March 21, 2008). Nonetheless, Russian officials continued to scorn Nabucco for being infeasible.

    Another concern is whether this ambitious project could be completed, given the global economic crisis. Reinhard Mitschek, Managing Director of Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH, maintained that “the actual situation of the markets is more or less a benefit for projects like Nabucco.” As positive developments, he referred to falling steel prices and the willingness of banks to support long-term infrastructure projects in times of crisis (www.nabucco-pipeline.com, January 9).

    Turkey’s demands from other shareholders (Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Germany, and Austria), particularly those relating to the pricing mechanism, have been considered another obstacle by experts (EDM, December 12). Speaking after a working meeting in Istanbul on January 13, Mitschek maintained that the parties were close to signing the intergovernmental agreement, emphasizing consensus among countries involved in the construction project about how to “share the benefits and risks of the project equally, each owning a 16.6 percent stake in the project.” Mitschek argued that its flexibility in receiving gas from many sources and being open to different partners and commercial models was what gave Nabucco a competitive advantage over its rivals. He also counted the many benefits of the project to Turkey but said that “we should not mix the two issues. Our consortium is about the transmission of the gas, not about the trading of gas” (Today’s Zaman, Hurriyet Daily News, Milliyet, January 14).

    Guler told reporters that Turkey had submitted its own draft of the intergovernmental agreement to its partners and was awaiting their response (Cihan Haber Ajansi, January 15). Nonetheless, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has not confirmed that he will take part in the Budapest summit. Disagreements over Turkey’s demands, as well intra-EU bargaining, are likely to continue until the leaders meet on January 27.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-is-optimistic-about-nabucco-as-budapest-summit-approaches/

  • “We Will Not Let Our People Go Cold,” Says Turkish Energy Minister

    “We Will Not Let Our People Go Cold,” Says Turkish Energy Minister

    “We Will Not Let Our People Go Cold,” Says Turkish Energy Minister

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 4
    January 8, 2009 04:20 PM
    By: Saban Kardas

    The dispute between Russia and Ukraine over natural gas prices continues to threaten the energy supply to Europe in the midst of plunging temperatures (EDM, January 5). The disruptions caused by the row between the Russian gas company Gazprom and Ukraine’s Naftohaz has already led to the halting of deliveries to many European countries that are dependent on Russian gas. Amid mutual accusations and contradictory claims by both parties, several European leaders and European Union officials have asked those involved to relax tensions (BBC News, January 7).

    As a country that depends heavily on natural gas for electricity production and household heating, Turkey is also discussing the implications of the crisis. Turkey’s gas imports from Russia amount to 65 percent of its total needs of 135 million cubic meters (MCM) per day. Turkey imports 40 MCM of gas from Russia a day via the West pipeline passing through Ukraine and Bulgaria and another 35 MCM through the Blue Stream pipeline underneath the Black Sea. Turkey also imports around 15 MCM of gas from Iran and 17 MCM from Azerbaijan per day. The state-owned Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS) has signed various contracts to secure the import of the following amounts annually: 16 billion cubic meters (BCM) via Blue Stream, 14 BCM through the West pipeline, 10 BCM from Iran, and 6.6 BCM from Azerbaijan. Moreover, BOTAS has also signed agreements with Nigeria and Algeria for 1.2 BCM and 4 BCM, respectively, of liquefied natural gas (LNG) (Cumhuriyet, January 7).

    The International Energy Agency (IEA) maintains that if the gas supply and winter conditions remain unchanged, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece may face problems (www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr, January7). Since Turkey already confronted a similar crisis in 2006, it has had greater experience in learning how to deal with these types of shortages.

    At the beginning of the crisis, representatives from BOTAS and the Energy Ministry announced that the Ukrainian crisis was not affecting Turkey and the gas flow from both West line and Blue Stream, as well as from Iran, was continuing. They also noted that Turkey did not expect a cutoff in the West line but that there were contingency plans in case this did happen. BOTAS officials noted that the underground tanks were full and Turkey could increase the capacity of Blue Stream up to 50 MCM by activating a compressor station in Corum (www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr, January 2).

    When the news about Russia’s decision to cut off gas to Ukraine arrived, Energy Minister Hilmi Guler told reporters that gas supplies from the West pipeline had been completely halted. Guler also noted that the gas supplies from Blue Stream would soon be increased to 48 MCM per day. He assured the Turkish public, “We will not let our people go cold” (Anadolu Ajansi, January 6).

    Guler announced that Turkey had already started to implement some precautions. First, the ministry asked the power stations producing electricity from natural gas to switch to secondary fuels. Although Reuters reported that in three stations electricity production had been halted (Hurriyet Daily News, January 8), energy officials have denied these claims, saying that production was continuing normally (Cihan Haber Ajansi, January 8).

    Moreover, if the supply shortages continue, the ministry plans to cut gas delivery to industrial facilities producing their own electricity from natural gas that is sold at subsidized prices. Since falling industrial production due to the global economic crisis has already reduced Turkey’s energy consumption, such reductions would probably not create major power supply problems. Nonetheless, experts note that using alternative sources such as fuel oil to produce electricity is likely to increase production costs by up to 20 percent (www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr, January 7).

    Furthermore, like other countries, Turkey has started tapping strategic reserves and using LNG. Guler noted that six ships were scheduled to bring additional LNG in January; and, if need arose, Turkey would seek additional deliveries. According to official sources, if deliveries arrive as scheduled, Turkey will be unlikely to experience major shortages. At the same time, Turkey is working to expand the daily supply capacity of its underground reserve depots.

    A source from the Iranian Embassy in Ankara said that Iran was ready to increase its gas exports to Turkey to offset the shortfall, as long as Iran’s domestic consumption did not prevent it (Today’s Zaman, January 7). Minister Guler said, however, that additional supplies from Blue Stream would be enough to maintain the supply balance and that Turkey would not take up the Iranian offer. Last winter, when Iran cut exports to Turkey due to its own domestic needs, Gazprom helped avoid shortages by increasing its supplies to Turkey. Given this experience, Turkey’s reluctance to rely on the Iranian option is understandable.

    Overall, the goal of these measures is to reduce the impact of the crisis on households. Since major metropolitan areas rely on natural gas for heating, the public has become increasingly worried about these developments. In response to this concern, the IGDAS gas distribution company in Istanbul issued a statement maintaining that the gas and LNG depots supplying the city had sufficient reserves and that there were no grounds for anxiety about shortages in Istanbul (www.nethaber.com, January 6). The precautions in place have already reduced Turkey’s daily consumption from 130 MCM to 107 MCM (www.cnnturk.com, January 7).

    Despite the optimistic statements from official sources, energy expert Necdet Pamir maintains that Turkey’s reserve capacity is too limited, which makes it vulnerable to such supply shocks. Moreover, Pamir notes that switching to secondary sources for electricity production by buying LNG on spot markets incurs additional costs (www.cnnturk.com, January 7). Some experts claim, however, that under the contract between Turkey and Russia, Gazprom will have to compensate Turkey for its losses (Cihan Haber Ajansi, January 6).

    Other experts refer to the positive implications of the crisis for Turkey. Bahadir Kaleagasi, the Turkish Industry and Business Association Representative to the EU, notes that the row once again demonstrates the vulnerability of Europe’s energy supplies. The EU will come under pressure to diversify transportation routes, which will strengthen Turkey’s position in negotiations over the Nabucco project for supplying Europe with gas by means of pipelines going through Turkey (ANKA, January 7).

    https://jamestown.org/program/we-will-not-let-our-people-go-cold-says-turkish-energy-minister/

  • Laying Claim to Asia

    Laying Claim to Asia

    by Dmitry Shlapentokh
    22 December 2008

    On the Dnieper and in Crimea, the notion is taking root that Eurasia’s true heart was never in Russia after all.

    For centuries, nationalistic Ukrainian intellectuals have seen Ukraine as a part of Europe and hostile to Asians. And it was Russians who were dubbed Asiatics, descendants of the Mongols, who had nothing to do with civilized European Ukraine. The popularity among some Russian intellectuals of “Eurasianism,” with its emphasis and praise of Russia’s Asiatic-Mongol roots, handed post-Soviet Ukrainian intellectuals an additional reason for locating Russia in Asia, with Asiatics as the Russians’ major allies.

    Nationalist-minded Ukrainian historians and politicians also began to witness a countermovement as, by the end of the Putin presidency, rising Russian nationalism increasingly disowned the notion, put forth by scores of Eurasianists from Lev Gumilev to Aleksandr Dugin, of the Mongols as engaged in a healthy “symbiosis” with Russians. In recent years Ukrainians also noted that in Crimea, which most Russians still regard as part of Russia, it was ethnic Tatars who were most loyal to Ukraine. This led to a dramatic reinterpretation of history. In the new version of Ukrainian idiosyncratic “Eurasianism,” Tatars, and indeed other Muslim peoples as well, became Ukraine’s “historical” friends who had fought alongside freedom-loving Ukrainians against their common primordial enemy, the Russian empire. The image of Tatars was recast in the Ukrainian mind from other perspectives as well. Tatar Asianness, essentially tainted by despotism and brutality, was displaced as a cultural and political phenomenon and became instead an integral part of civilized Europe.

    Detail of a painting depicting the Battle of Konotop. Source:
    Mузейний простір України.

    EURO-EURASIANISM

    The changing fortunes of the Crimean Tatars became a major driver of the growth of Ukrainian “Eurasianism.” Deported by Stalin during World War II and replaced by ethnic Russians and Russified Ukrainians, the Crimean Tatars were “rehabilitated” by Khrushchev and started to return to their ancestral lands by the late Soviet and, of course, post-Soviet era. Similar to the Chechens, the Crimean Tatars have never forgotten their misfortune and blame Russians – not just the regime but ethnic Russians – for this. This resentment is reinforced by the feeling that it was the Russians who took their property and land.

    For their part, the Russian-speakers who make up the large majority of the Crimean population regarded Crimea, with Sevastopol – still the home port for Russia’s Black Sea fleet – as an essentially Russian place. They demanded either broad autonomy or outright unification with Russia. Kyiv, alarmed that the Russian-speaking Crimeans might come to play a role not unlike that of the Sudeten Germans in interwar Czechoslovakia, began to appreciate the Crimean Tatars, who although much smaller in numbers had emerged as a natural counterbalance to the Russian speakers of the peninsula and, by the logic of events, even to Russified eastern Ukrainians, who are seen by westerners as less committed to independence. These elements – their gravitating, at least by political logic, toward western Ukrainian nationalists and their coming to appear more pro-European than eastern Ukrainians – lend the Eurasianism of the Ukrainian Tatars a specific flavor quite different from the Russian variety. Russian Eurasianism, while emphasizing peaceful coexistence and nurturing a “symbiosis” between Russians and Asians, sees in this the foundation of a grand empire. Asiatic elements in Russian culture are also seen as a way to juxtapose Russia-Eurasia against, if not the entire West, at least America, and what are regarded as her East European stooges. Nothing of this sort can be found in Ukrainian Eurasianism. It is true that both Ukrainians and Crimean Tatar nationalists boast of their respective peoples’ military prowess in dealing with enemies, Russia first of all. Yet this history of military valor serves to underscore the defense of liberty and has no imperialist implications.

    There are other differences. If for Russian Eurasianists the attachment to “Tatars” (not merely in the Crimea but the historical Muslim groups going back to the Mongol conquest) served to bind Russia closer to Asia, for the Ukrainians the same bond came to represent a European multiculturalism, the very fact that Europe, European civilization, includes not just white Christians but people of a variety of ethnic and cultural backgrounds.

    Representatives of both branches of Eurasianism have actively appealed to historical analogies to substantiate their essentially dissimilar claims.

    OUR FRIENDS, THE TATARS

    This new vision of Ukrainians’ relationship with the Tatars, as well as with other Asian peoples, took form soon after the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of Ukraine as an independent state – visibly, in the changing displays at the Kyiv State Historical Museum, the goal of which was to propagandize the new official version of the Ukrainian past. Drastic rearrangement of the Soviet-era expositions led to the disappearance of the Mongol invasion of the Kyivan state, the pivotal event in that state’s history and that of many peoples of Eurasia. The future Russian state’s struggle with the Mongols, and, later, what most historians regarded as the liberation from the Mongol yoke, had been marginalized. The centuries-long conflicts of Ukrainians, Poles, and Russians with the Crimean Tatar vassals of the Ottoman Empire had also vanished. And at the end of the exposition hall dedicated to the “Orange Revolution” of 2004, regarded by Ukraine’s present-day rulers as the true watershed in recent Ukrainian history, you could read that Ukraine was a place of various minorities. Russians were not mentioned. At the same time, there was now a place for Jews and Tatars.

    The Tatars’ old negative image in Ukraine is showing signs of reversing among historians and in the public mind as well, as opinions catch on that in some ways resemble those of such Russian Eurasianists as the scholar Lev Gumilev (1912-1992), who saw the dramatic events of the 13th century not so much as an overwhelming onslaught – the traditional view of pre-revolutionary and Soviet historiography – but rather as a “raid” that inflicted rather limited damage. This is also the view of some Ukrainian historians who downplay the devastation and argue that soon after the Mongol conquest of Kyiv, the capital of Kyivan Rus, foreign travelers found a vibrant trading community in the city, a sign of the limited extent of the destruction. Moreover, recent archeological work is cited as support for a hypothesis that the conquering impulses of the new rulers were subsiding and their energies increasingly channeled into city-building, trade, crafts, and similar exploits. These views of the Golden Horde fit well into the design of some leading intellectuals in Russia’s Tatarstan Republic. While regarding modern Tatars as the descendants of the Golden Horde, or at least not denying the Golden Horde as contributing to the formation of Tatar nationhood, one of these intellectuals, R.S. Khakimov, focuses not on the Golden Horde’s military prowess and associated brutality but on what he sees as the positive implications of Mongol statehood. In his view, its rulers were preoccupied not with bloodshed or conquest but with the development of crafts, trade, and culture.

    This stress on the cultural achievements and broad religious tolerance of Tatars and Muslims in general not only enrolls them within European civilization but can be taken so far as seeing in them forerunners of true European values in an era when most other Europeans were behaving in a most “unEuropean” and “Asiatic” way. And while Tatar military prowess may now be downplayed when Ukrainian pundits comment on the Muslim conquests, it can also be re-emphasized when the Tatars are seen as the Ukrainians’ ally in fighting what is now regarded as Ukrainians’ historical enemies: the Russians.

    PAST AND PRESENT

    As friction between Ukraine and Russia has risen, history has become increasingly involved in providing justification for the present. This year, Ukrainian press accounts, bolstered by an article in the nationalist Russian newspaper Zavtra, laid claim to celebrate the Battle of Konotop as a great feat of Ukrainian military power.

    In that encounter in 1659, a force of Ukrainians and their Crimean Tatar and Polish allies defeated with much slaughter a Russian army at Konotop in the north of today’s Ukraine. The triumph of Ukrainian leader Ivan Vyhovsky, successor to Bogdan Khmelnitsky, was not to last long; Vyhovsky soon faced rebellion in his own ranks and fled to Poland.

    The Battle of Konotop is one of the manifestations of the complexity of Russia’s 17th-century war with Ukraine, one event in the bloody years of strife among Ukrainians, Poles, and Russians that ended in major territorial gains for Moscow. The clash has been transformed by present-day Ukrainian historians into an epic battle in which the foe numbered almost 100,000.

    In these scholars’ thinking the victory at Konotop identifies Russia as the major enemy of the Ukrainians. More, it shows clearly that not only was the Ukrainian state already in existence in the 17th century but that it was a strong power, a worthy rival of Russia. According to one tale, upon receiving news of the defeat, the Russian czar trembled. The implication is that Russia was trembling not in fear of a potential Polish march on Moscow – the memory of the Time of Troubles when Polish troops occupied Moscow still fresh – but in fear of victorious Ukraine.

    This interpretation, of course, leaves unexplained how this mighty rival of weak Russia was in the end incorporated into the Russian state. At any rate, what most concerns us is the role of the Tatars in these events. Here, the Tatars have emerged as a valiant ally who helped the Ukrainians defeat the common enemy. In an article published in June on a site for Russian Muslims, Islam.ru, pagan Russians are juxtaposed against monotheist Muslim Tatars or Ottoman Turks; it was no accident, according to this interpretation of events, that the victors presented some of the most important Russian prisoners taken at Konotop to the Ottoman sultan. It is a view of history in which Ukraine has not been the historical enemy of Asians, at least those who live in Europe, but actually their good friend. The same could be said for Ukraine’s historical relations with the Poles. The story is quite different for Russia. From a brotherly Orthodox country, it has been transformed into the primordial enemy of Ukrainians.

    There is also a direct link between past and present. In the past, Ukrainians, Poles, and Muslims of various origin – civilized and freedom-loving people all – defended their liberties against the Russian imperial monster, the same as they do now, for Russia’s nature has not changed through time. In the eyes of some Ukrainian politicians, Russia continues to occupy part of historic Ukrainian land and subjugates the Chechens. Russia was and continues to be an imperial predator.

    The unfolding of dramatic geopolitical changes – Russia’s increasing alienation not just from the West but from Eastern Europe, as well as from a good segment of her own Muslims, and the corresponding rapprochement between Ukrainians and the historic Muslim community in the Crimea – has driven this startling reversal. By dint of this growing Ukrainian “Eurasianism” Russia is cast into an “Asia” that is not so much a place as a cultural and political sign for despotism and brutality. At the same time the Tatars are pulled into Europe, a Europe not in the geographic sense but a symbol of the “civilized” West.

     

    Dmitry Shlapentokh is an associate professor of history at Indiana University in South Bend.

  • Crimean Tatars Rally For Return Of Ancestral Land

    Crimean Tatars Rally For Return Of Ancestral Land

    SIMFEROPOL, Ukraine — Some 2,000 repatriated Crimean Tatars gathered in front of the Crimean Supreme Council in the Ukrainian city of Simferopol to demand the return of land they were forced to leave several decades ago.

    Daniyal Ametov, a leader of the protest, told RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service that the demonstration is against Crimean authorities for “their responsibility in creating the land problems for the Crimean Tatars.”

    The protesters ended the rally after negotiations with local legislators, but promised to gather again on December 15 if their demands are not met.

    Crimean Tatars are considered an indigenous nation of the Crimean Peninsula. Tens of thousands were deported by Soviet authorities to Central Asia in the 1940s.

    Deportees and their families began returning to Crimea in the 1990s, demanding that their lands and properties be returned to them.