Digital currencies, especially crypto assets, are instruments that push the boundaries of modern finance and redefine the concepts of sovereignty and trust. The decentralized, distributed ledger technology (DLT) architecture of blockchain theoretically promises a value transfer that is resistant to state intervention, censorship, and geographical borders, operating as an apolitical medium. However, this structure frequently masks the vulnerabilities in the physical and digital layers upon which its very existence deeply depends. In extreme scenarios such as atomic disasters or space based satellite warfare, which are no longer merely theoretical the question of the preservation of digital currencies transcends a simple data security problem and transforms into a philosophical crisis that questions the nature of abstract value in the face of the collapse of civilization’s technological backbone.
Technological Perspective: The Revenge of the Physical Layer
The security of blockchain rests on cryptographic verification and distributed consensus mechanisms. Yet, this digital superstructure owes its existence to three fundamental physical layers: energy infrastructure, telecommunication networks (particularly fiber optic cables and satellite constellations), and data storage/server units.
One of the first targets in space based conflicts will be the Global Positioning System (GPS) and low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite networks such as Starlink. The accuracy of timestamps and network synchronization, which are vital for cryptocurrency transactions, depend with absolute precision on GPS signals. The crippling of a satellite network by kinetic or non kinetic (laser, high power microwave) weapons not only severs internet access; by disrupting the temporal ordering of blocks, it can lead to chain forks, double spending attacks, and the collapse of the consensus mechanism (especially in Proof of Stake).
The High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) generated by nuclear explosions magnifies this threat exponentially. A HEMP has the capacity to permanently destroy continental scale electrical grids and all unprotected semiconductor circuits. In this scenario, the distributed nature of the blockchain ceases to be an advantage; the simultaneous physical destruction of all nodes in a geographical region does not merely mean the erasure of the chain’s record in that area (even though copies theoretically exist on other continents). The real danger is global network fragmentation. When the backbone of the Internet collapses, surviving isolated node groups can continue to process transactions internally, but when connectivity is restored, deciding which of these isolated chains will be accepted as the “valid” one will lead to an unsolvable consensus crisis and immense value destruction. Cold wallets and offline backups rely on the assumption that a functioning computer can be found after a nuclear EMP a scenario highly unlikely in a technological dark age that would last for years in affected regions.
Economic and Psychological Risks: The Hyper Insecurity Cycle
In an extreme crisis, the value of digital assets becomes subject not to their underlying technology but to instantaneous fluctuations in psychological trust. The simultaneous halt of exchange operations (CEXs) alongside infrastructure collapse means the sudden evaporation of liquidity. This creates a “digital asset run” far more lethal than a classic bank run.
The psychological dynamic here is more complex than simple panic. Holders of digital assets confront the heavy burden of the “be your own bank” philosophy. Since the system has no central authority, there is no mechanism to appeal to, no fund to provide compensation, and no institution to hold accountable. This state of ontological insecurity can push users to two extremes: on one hand, those desperately and insecurely trying to get online to salvage their assets; on the other, those who experience a profound existential shock upon realizing that their digital assets have become meaningless in the face of physical destruction. The fear of missing out (FOMO) is replaced by the immediacy and certainty of absolute loss (Fear of Certain Loss). This situation demonstrates how money, as the digital manifestation of the social contract, can revert to nothingness when the underlying social consensus vanishes.
Social, Cultural, and Legal Perspectives: Fragmented Sovereignty
An atomic conflict destroys the physical infrastructure of the Westphalian sovereignty system while simultaneously exposing how fragile the “stateless” sovereignty promised by cryptocurrencies truly is. Culturally, Bitcoin and similar assets are powerful symbols of freedom and technological progress. However, when these symbols become physically inaccessible due to an electromagnetic pulse and their value approaches zero at the same time, a cultural trauma ensues.
At this point, a legal vacuum emerges. International law is almost entirely silent on the protection of digital private property in a state of war. Since “your cryptocurrency” is nothing more than a private key, there is no authority from which to claim compensation or rights if that key is directly targeted or destroyed as collateral damage in an armed conflict. As social structures destabilize, the real value for surviving communities becomes not the numbers in a digital wallet, but immediate physical resources such as canned food, clean water, and medicine. This lays bare the truth that money is a social consensus in its most naked form: when there is no society left to provide consensus, money itself ceases to exist.
Ethical and Philosophical Perspectives: The Tragedy of the Trust Machine
Blockchain was designed at its core as a “trust machine”; it takes trust away from humans and institutions and delegates it to code and mathematics. Atomic and space based conflicts reveal the tragic limits of this abstraction. The code may be perfect, but the silicon, fiber optic cables, and power lines upon which the code runs are not; on the contrary, they are extremely fragile.
Philosophically, this situation is a reflection of the mind body dualism that has persisted since Descartes, now projected onto the digital economy. Digital currency, as pure information (mind), can exist everywhere in the world, but it cannot manifest without a physical infrastructure (body). When the body dies, the existence of the mind becomes meaningless. Ethical responsibility enters at this point: those who build and use these systems bear the irresponsibility of ignoring the system’s absolute dependence on physical reality. True resilience lies not only in cryptographic security, but also in socio technical planning for how to rebuild infrastructure locally and redundantly. In the event of a catastrophe, what must be protected may not be individual wealth, but rather the community based communication and energy micro grids that will make transactions possible again.
Conclusion: The Trial of Abstract Value Against Physical Reality
Digital currencies offer robust protection against peacetime threats through cold wallets, multi signature systems, and geographically distributed backup strategies. However, a planetary scale electromagnetic pulse or the collapse of satellite communication reduces the preservability of these assets from a mere technical malfunction to the question of whether they hold any meaning at all alongside civilization’s technological backbone.
The risk cannot be entirely eliminated, but it can be managed with a layered and holistic approach. This approach relies not only on encrypting data, but also on resilient energy sources (for instance, full nodes stored in EMP shielded Faraday cages ready for operation), alternative communication protocols (such as block transmission over shortwave radio), and most importantly, the existence of trained communities who know how to manage these assets during a crisis.
In conclusion, digital currencies promise humanity an unprecedented financial autonomy. Yet this autonomy ultimately remains a slave to the physical infrastructure of the civilization humanity has built. In an extreme disaster scenario, what is truly tested is not the strength of cryptography, but the resilience of the human capacity to construct meaning, value, and community. The protection of digital assets, in this larger picture, cannot be considered separately from the responsibility of keeping the planet habitable and maintaining the fundamental communication networks of civilization.
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Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA) Aarhus University, 1997 Independent Researcher Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Socio
The revocation of Istanbul Bilgi University’s operating license by a Presidential decree published in the Official Gazette on May 22, 2026, constitutes one of the darkest thresholds in the despotic campaign waged by political power in Turkey against universities, scientific autonomy, and academic freedom. This decision did not merely terminate the legal existence of an educational institution; it ruthlessly destroyed a quarter-century of intellectual accumulation, the labor of over a thousand academics and tens of thousands of students, international scientific networks, and Turkey’s already fragile foundation of scientific autonomy. This measure, enacted by the political power while hiding behind the shield of “legal process,” is the most concrete declaration of a systematic hostility towards the institution of the university and an intolerance of science and free thought.
The Historical-Theoretical Foundations of University Autonomy and Academic Freedom
Since its inception, the university has been shaped around two indispensable principles: scientific autonomy and academic freedom. As early as 1978, Anıl Çeçen emphasized that university autonomy means “the university being governed by its own organs, and the limitation of state intervention,” and that it is a prerequisite for scientific production (Çeçen, 1978). The landmark 1992 decision of the Constitutional Court ruled that universities are “public legal entities possessing autonomy” and that the state’s supervisory power cannot turn into an intervention that eliminates this autonomy (Constitutional Court, E. 1991/21, K. 1992/42). Yet in Turkey, this principle has been systematically dismantled step by step by the ruling power over the last two decades.
Tokay Gedikoğlu’s comprehensive examination reveals the structural obstacles to academic freedom in Turkey and the stifling effect of the centralist character of the Council of Higher Education (YÖK) on scientific production (Gedikoğlu, 2009). Bülent Bingöl, meanwhile, has determined that post-1980 legal regulations, particularly the Higher Education Law No. 2547, gradually transformed universities into extensions of the state bureaucracy, making them vulnerable to political intervention (Bingöl, 2012). This structural weakness prepared the legal ground that allows a President to close a university with a single signature today. Saniye Gül Dedeoğlu, after recalling the universal standards of academic freedom, systematically analyzed the mechanisms through which scientists are suppressed in Turkey, emphasizing that without freedom, universities are reduced to vocational schools, losing their function of research and critical thought (Dedeoğlu, 2014).
The Roots of Systematic Despotism Against Universities in Turkey
The closure of Bilgi University is not an isolated incident but the final act of a systematic despotism with much deeper roots. The mass academic dismissals during the State of Emergency (OHAL) declared after 2016 constituted the first major wave of this despotism. İlknur Özlem Taştan’s study documents, in all its nakedness, how universities were turned into an apparatus of purge during the OHAL period and how academic freedoms were trampled (Taştan, 2021). During this period, thousands of academics were dismissed on grounds with no legal basis, plunging universities into a climate of fear.
The judicial and administrative pressures faced by academics who signed the “Peace Petition” have demonstrated the ruling power’s intolerance of critical thought in the clearest way. The comprehensive legal analysis by Rıdvan Ergün and Berke Özenç reveals how concepts like freedom of expression, academic freedom, and “loyalty to the state” were distorted in this process, and how even the Constitutional Court proved inadequate in protecting academic freedoms (Ergün and Özenç, 2019). While another Constitutional Court decision in 2023 confirmed the constitutional guarantees of academic freedom in principle, it proved a serious lack of will in implementing these guarantees in practice (Constitutional Court, E. 2018/117, K. 2023/212). The ruling power used this vacuum to further deepen its despotic control over universities.
Hostility to Science Waged Through Trustees: The Process of Closing Bilgi University
The paving stones on the path to the closure of Istanbul Bilgi University began to be laid in September 2025 with the appointment of a trustee to the university under the pretext of an investigation into Can Holding. However, one of the most fundamental requirements of the rule of law, the principle of “individuality of responsibility,” clearly dictates that allegations against holding executives cannot be used to punish an entire university. As Burcu Kükner emphasizes in her discussion of “academic freedom as a right,” academic freedom is both an individual right and an institutional guarantee; an intervention against a university violates the rights not only of the individuals in that institution but of the entire scientific community (Kükner, 2019). Indeed, the unjustified dismissal of research assistants, arbitrary administrative appointments, and interventions in academic programs during the trustee process have been recorded as concrete examples of this mass rights violation. The closure decision on May 22, 2026, is the extreme endpoint of this chain of violations.
This process is the product of a “management strategy” that summarizes the ruling power’s view of science and autonomy. As Ahmet Sinan Bilgili shows in his conceptual analysis, scientific autonomy and academic freedom are two complementary principles; any attack on one directly wounds the other (Bilgili, 2022). What has been experienced in Turkey over the last twenty years consists precisely of this dual erosion process. Fatma Buğday has analyzed the historical and structural roots of this erosion in two separate studies. In her first study, Buğday (2023) addresses the course of the weakening of university autonomy in Turkey; in the second, she places the crisis of the university idea in a theoretical framework by associating it with neoliberal transformation, arguing that as universities are managed like market actors, their spheres of autonomy shrink, and academic freedom remains merely nominal (Buğday, 2026). Esra Eren supports this analysis by examining how the Bologna Process was turned into a tool of bureaucratic control in Turkey and how universities were homogenized (Eren, 2023).
Brain Drain: The Scientific Cost of Despotism
The heaviest bill for the ruling power’s hostility to science and autonomy has been the loss of the country’s trained human capital. In her study titled “Brain Drain or Brain Power?”, Füsun Tanrısevdi has demonstrated that the academic mobility from Turkey to abroad has reached dramatic dimensions, with the leading push factors being the restriction of academic freedom, non-meritocratic appointments, and political pressures (Tanrısevdi, 2019). Filiz Tufan Emini and Hatice Gürsoy, examining five-year development plans, also determined that Turkey is inadequate in addressing brain drain as a structural problem and that the outflow has gained a permanent character (Tufan Emini and Gürsoy, 2021).
The comprehensive diaspora report prepared by Ufuk Akçiğit for the Turkish Academy of Sciences, revealing the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of brain drain with striking data, has called for an urgent policy change (Akçiğit, 2024). Yet a despotic mindset that sees closing a university with a Presidential signature as a “solution” is, on the contrary, the primary actor exacerbating brain drain. The closure of Bilgi University will deepen this structural problem further, making Turkey an unlivable country for scientists.
The Collapse of International Academic Reputation and the Proliferation of a Culture of Fear
The international repercussions of the closure decision have also been devastating for Turkey’s scientific reputation. The 2025 report jointly published by the European University Association (EUA) and Scholars at Risk counts Turkey among the countries where academic freedom violations are most intense (EUA, 2025). Two independent reports published by Scholars at Risk in the same year depict the oppressive environment in Turkey using “dark” terms (Scholars at Risk, October 2025; Scholars at Risk, November 2025).
Current assessments within the country also confirm this picture. The academic freedom reports published by the Science Academy in 2023 and 2025 reveal with data that political pressure on universities is intensifying, that scientists are forced to self-censor, and that institutional autonomy has effectively disappeared (Science Academy, 2023; Science Academy, 2025). The 2026 mid-term report of the Education and Science Workers’ Union (Eğitim Sen) emphasizes that more than 251 cases of rights violations reflected in the press were identified in 2025 alone, and that universities have turned from “havens of science” into “empires of fear” (Eğitim Sen, 2026). The report of the University and Academics Association (ÜNİVDER) for the same period documents the prevalence of arbitrary dismissals, mobbing, investigation threats, and precarious working conditions (ÜNİVDER, 2026).
This climate of fear also deeply affects students. Olga Selin Hünler’s recent research shows how the absence of academic freedom and self-censorship destroys students’ critical thinking skills, democratic participation habits, and intellectual identities (Hünler, 2025). As underlined in the interview with Yeşim M. Atamer, students are being raised with learned helplessness and a culture of fear, which poses a serious threat to the future of democracy (Atamer, 2024). The principles document prepared based on the Boğaziçi University experience, in fact, demonstrates how universal norms of autonomy and freedom, applicable to all Turkish universities, are being disregarded (Adaman, 2021).
Conclusion
What was closed on May 22, 2026, was not only the signboard of Istanbul Bilgi University but Turkey’s scientific accumulation, intellectual diversity, and democratic future. This administrative measure, disguised in a legal cloak, is in reality a political blow dealt to the institution of the university, to free thought, and to the common scientific heritage of humanity. This despotic campaign waged by the ruling power against universities tramples the constitution, laws, and international conventions, dragging Turkey into a darkness devoid of science, autonomy, and critical reason. Halting this course necessitates a fundamental change in mentality, legal reforms that will restore university autonomy, and the reconstruction of a democratic atmosphere where scientists can work freely. Otherwise, the political mindset that closed Bilgi today will continue to darken Turkey’s scientific and democratic future entirely tomorrow.
References
Çeçen, Anıl. “Üniversite Özerkliği” [University Autonomy]. Eğitim ve Bilim 3, no. 14 (1978): 3-12.
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey. Decision E. 1991/21, K. 1992/42, June 29, 1992. Official Gazette Date: November 30, 1992.
Gedikoğlu, Tokay. “Yükseköğretimde Akademik Özgürlük” [Academic Freedom in Higher Education]. Kuram ve Uygulamada Eğitim Yönetimi 15, no. 57 (2009): 5-34.
Bingöl, Bülent. “Üniversite Özerkliğinin Değişen Tanımı ve Üniversitelerin Yeniden Yapılandırılması” [The Changing Definition of University Autonomy and the Restructuring of Universities]. Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi 67, no. 1 (2012): 39-76.
Dedeoğlu, Saniye Gül. “Akademik Özgürlük ve Üniversite Özerkliği” [Academic Freedom and University Autonomy]. Yaşar Üniversitesi E-Dergisi 9, no. 34 (2014): 5887-5906.
Ergün, Rıdvan, and Berke Özenç. “Anayasa Mahkemesi’nin Barış Bildirisi Kararı: İfade Özgürlüğü, Akademik Özgürlük ve Devlete Sadakat Kavramı Çerçevesinde Bir İnceleme” [The Constitutional Court’s Peace Petition Decision: An Analysis within the Framework of Freedom of Expression, Academic Freedom, and Loyalty to the State]. Anayasa Hukuku Dergisi 8, no. 16 (2019): 289-332.
Kükner, Burcu. “Bir Hak Olarak Akademik Özgürlük: Sınırlar ve Tartışmalar” [Academic Freedom as a Right: Limits and Discussions]. İnönü Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi 10, no. 1 (2019): 177-192.
Tanrısevdi, Füsun. “Beyin Göçü mü, Beyin Gücü mü?” [Brain Drain or Brain Power?]. Adnan Menderes Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi 6, no. 2 (2019): 43-58.
Adaman, Fikret. “Akademik Özgürlük ve Üniversite Özerkliği İlkeleri: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Deneyimi” [Principles of Academic Freedom and University Autonomy: The Boğaziçi University Experience]. Boğaziçi Üniversitesi ÜYYK Yayınları, 2021.
Taştan, İlknur Özlem. “OHAL Döneminde Türkiye‘de Akademik Özgürlükler” [Academic Freedoms in Turkey during the State of Emergency Period]. İnsan Hakları Okulu Yayınları, 2021.
Tufan Emini, Filiz, and Hatice Gürsoy. “Türkiye‘de Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planlarında Beyin Göçü Olgusu” [The Brain Drain Phenomenon in Turkey’s Five-Year Development Plans]. Journal of Social and Humanities Sciences Research 8, no. 73 (2021): 2045-2056.
Bilgili, Ahmet Sinan. “Üniversitelerde Bilimsel/Akademik Özerklik ve Özgürlük: Kavramsal Bir Analiz” [Scientific/Academic Autonomy and Freedom in Universities: A Conceptual Analysis]. Yükseköğretim ve Bilim Dergisi 12, no. 1 (2022): 1-15.
Bilim Akademisi [Science Academy]. Akademik Özgürlükler Raporu 2021-2022 [Academic Freedoms Report 2021-2022]. İstanbul: Bilim Akademisi Yayınları, January 2023.
Buğday, Fatma. “Üniversite Özerkliği Üzerine Tarihsel Bir İnceleme” [A Historical Review on University Autonomy]. Uluslararası Yönetim Akademisi Dergisi 6, no. 4 (2023): 1015-1032.
Eren, Esra. “Üniversitelerin Neoliberal Dönüşümü: Bologna Süreci ve Akademik Özgürlük” [The Neoliberal Transformation of Universities: The Bologna Process and Academic Freedom]. Eleştirel Pedagoji Dergisi, no. 67 (2023).
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey. Decision E. 2018/117, K. 2023/212, December 7, 2023. Official Gazette Date: March 10, 2024.
Akçiğit, Ufuk. Türkiye Akademik Diaspora Raporu: Beyin Göçünden Beyin Gücüne [Turkey Academic Diaspora Report: From Brain Drain to Brain Power]. İstanbul: TÜBA Yayınları, 2024.
Atamer, Yeşim M. Interview. “Türkiye‘de Akademik Özgürlüklerin Hâl-i Pür Melali” [The Lamentable State of Academic Freedoms in Turkey]. Reflektif Journal of Social Sciences 5, no. 3 (2024): 487-508.
Bilim Akademisi [Science Academy]. Akademik Özgürlükler Raporu 2024-2025 [Academic Freedoms Report 2024-2025]. İstanbul: Bilim Akademisi Yayınları, February 2025.
European University Association (EUA). Free to Think 2025: Report of the Scholars at Risk Academic Freedom Monitoring Project. Brussels: EUA Publications, October 2025.
Hünler, Olga Selin. “Academic Freedom and Patterns of Self-Censorship in Turkey.” Philosophy & Social Criticism 51, no. 8 (2025): 1123-1145.
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Eğitim Sen [Education and Science Workers’ Union]. 2025-2026 Yükseköğretim Ara Dönem Raporu [2025-2026 Higher Education Mid-Term Report]. Ankara: Eğitim Sen Yayınları, February 2026.
ÜNİVDER (Üniversite ve Akademisyenler Derneği) [University and Academics Association]. Üniversitelerde Hak İhlalleri Raporu 2025 [Report on Rights Violations in Universities 2025]. İstanbul: ÜNİVDER Yayınları, 2026.
Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA) Aarhus University, 1997 Independent Researcher Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures.
On the night of Thursday, May 22, 2026, a few lines of text published in the Official Gazette by presidential decree opened one of the darkest pages in Turkey’s academic history. The operating license of Istanbul Bilgi University—whose founding foundation had been under trustee administration since September 2025—was completely revoked, citing Article 11 of the Higher Education Law No. 2547 as justification. This decision meant the effective destruction of an institution that represented over a quarter-century of accumulated knowledge: founded in 1996 as Turkey’s fourth foundation university, with more than 20,000 students, over a thousand academics, nearly 50,000 graduates, 7 faculties, 3 institutes, and more than 150 programs.
A university in Turkey does not consist merely of classrooms, campuses, and diplomas. The university is the most fundamental institution where free thought is produced, science develops, and the future of society is shaped. Ever since Wilhelm von Humboldt built the modern university idea in Berlin at the beginning of the 19th century, universities have been recognized as structures where knowledge is not only transmitted but also produced, where research and teaching are inseparable, and where scientific autonomy forms the institutional backbone. According to Humboldt, the university must be independent of political power despite being funded by the state; academics should have complete freedom over the content, methods, and publications of their courses; the university should exist not merely as an institution that confers professions, but as an autonomous sphere where scientific thought flourishes. The experiences of every developed country today—from Europe to America, from Japan to Australia—demonstrate that the strength of universities is directly proportional to their capacity to remain outside the sphere of political power’s intervention.
The closure decision concerning Istanbul Bilgi University is the most striking example of how this universal principle has been trampled upon in Turkey. Although official statements claim that the decision is based on legal and administrative processes, it is clear that this step has triggered a much broader political and structural debate in the public sphere. This decision, taken by hiding behind the rhetoric of the rule of law, is one of the heaviest blows struck against academia by a political mentality incapable of tolerating dissident and critical thought in Turkey.
The Meaning of the University and Istanbul Bilgi University’s Place in Turkey
Although the concept of the university has taken different forms in different civilizations throughout history, it has always been shaped around the same ideal at its core: an institutional structure where knowledge is freely produced, discussed, and disseminated. The earliest universities that emerged in Medieval Europe (Bologna, Paris, Oxford) possessed partial institutional autonomy; the transition to the modern university occurred in the 19th century with the Humboldtian model, where knowledge production and academic freedom gained central importance. While American research universities carried this legacy further in the 20th century, universities became fundamental pillars of democratic societies with the massification of higher education after the Second World War.
Istanbul Bilgi University was founded in 1996 as one of the most successful carriers of this universal heritage in Turkey. With its educational model that encouraged critical thought, its emphasis on social sciences, and its international academic connections, it created a distinctive university culture in Turkey. Through its legal clinics, human rights center, migration studies, gender studies, cultural studies, and interdisciplinary programs, Bilgi was not merely an institution that trained students; it also became a structure that generated ideas, opened spaces for debate, and contributed to social transformation. Having transformed industrial heritage into a space of cultural production with its Santralistanbul campus, the university had also registered its international academic success by ranking among the top five foundation universities from Turkey in the 2024 QS rankings.
The most important characteristic that distinguished Bilgi University from its peers was its insistence on preserving the space of academic freedom despite Turkey’s authoritarian tendencies. Its defense of the peace academics, its willingness to take a stand in debates on freedom of expression, and its institutionalization of the critical social sciences tradition were the primary factors that placed it in the crosshairs of political power. The process that began with its sale to Can Holding in 2019 evolved into a new phase with the appointment of a trustee to the university following an investigation launched in September 2025 against the holding on charges of “forming a criminal organization,” “smuggling,” “fraud,” and “money laundering,” and ultimately culminated in the closure decision.
The Justifications for the Closure Decision and Debates in Terms of the Rule of Law
The technical justification given for the closure decision is the appointment of a trustee to the university’s founding foundation and the provision in Article 11 of Law No. 2547 stipulating the revocation of the operating license in such a case. However, the real issue behind this veil of “technical justification” is how the principles of individualizing responsibility and protecting the institutional structure have been brazenly violated in a state governed by the rule of law.
Why do the results of investigations carried out against a company or holding directly affect students, academics, and the entire academic institution? What causal link can be established between the alleged crimes of holding executives and the existence of a university? These questions have no answers compatible with the principle of the rule of law. Indeed, even Professor Dr. İzzet Özgenç, a criminal law scholar who once served as President Erdoğan’s legal advisor, described the closure decision as “unconstitutional” and stated, “The legal existence of a university established by law can only be terminated by law; the legal existence of a university cannot be terminated by a presidential decree.”
The fundamental approach of the rule of law principle is the individualization of responsibility and the protection of the institutional structure to the greatest extent possible. In no developed democracy in the world is a university within a holding closed by citing an investigation against that holding as justification; instead, the management structure is reorganized and the institution is enabled to continue its activities. In Turkey, however, the ruling power has chosen to use law as an instrument of instrumentalization, opting to destroy one of the bastions of critical thought on the pretext of an investigation. This demonstrates that the process that began with the trustee appointment in September 2025 was actually a series of steps leading to closure, and that the “legal process” rhetoric was nothing more than a camouflage.
The Debate on Academic Freedom and University Autonomy
This decision starkly reveals the point that the long-standing debates on academic freedom in Turkey have reached. As the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey stated in a ruling in 1975, “universities are public legal entities endowed with autonomy; they are administered by organs elected by themselves under the supervision and control of the state.” According to the same ruling, “The state’s power of supervision and control does not justify interference in the administrative actions and affairs of an institution possessing administrative autonomy.” Yet in the Turkey of 2026, not the slightest trace of these principles remains.
Over the last twenty years, the AKP government has consciously and systematically placed universities under the domination of political authority. According to reports by the Science Academy, 131 universities have been opened in Turkey in the last twenty years; however, this quantitative growth has gone hand in hand with a qualitative collapse. Rectors appointed directly by the President have become accountable solely to political power, rather than to university constituents and academic autonomy. The mass academic purges following July 15 led to the institutionalization of unmeritocratic practices and political staffing. The Education and Science Workers’ Union’s (Eğitim Sen) 2025-2026 Higher Education Midterm Report emphasizes that “the trampling of academic freedom as a result of political-ideological attacks is one of the fundamental causes of the problems experienced by universities.” The fact that at least 251 cases of rights violations were documented just from those reflected in the press in 2025 reveals the gravity of the situation.
The closure of Bilgi University is one of the pinnacles of this systematic policy of destruction. While the ruling power has for years attempted to standardize universities under the rhetoric of “national and indigenous,” it has sequentially targeted institutions that resisted this rhetoric and defended critical thought and scientific autonomy. First, a trustee rector was appointed to Boğaziçi University, then a trustee was sent to Bilgi University, and now the same university has been entirely shut down. This chronology is not a coincidence; it is the step-by-step implementation of the political power’s strategy of seizing universities and destroying dissident scientific institutions.
The process that began with TÜBA’s autonomy being stripped away by a Decree-Law in 2011 has culminated today in the closure of a university by presidential decree. The fifteen-year period between these two events is a documentary record of how academic freedom and university autonomy have been systematically dismantled in Turkey.
Consequences for Students and Academics: A Lost World
The most direct and devastating impact of the closure decision is on students and the academic staff. According to the Council of Higher Education’s (YÖK) announcement, students will be transferred to Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University (MSGSÜ), which holds the status of guarantor university. YÖK announced that “necessary measures have been taken immediately regarding ensuring that students and administrative and academic staff do not experience any grievances, and that educational activities continue without interruption.”
However, this rhetoric falls short of concealing the trauma created by the closure. Following the trustee appointment in September 2025, students had said, “We are worried that our school’s reputation and the value of our diploma will decline, and that our space of freedom will be restricted.” Today, the accuracy of these concerns has been painfully confirmed. A university is not merely a diploma-granting institution; it is a living space that shapes students’ intellectual development, social environment, academic belonging, and future plans. The overnight destruction of this space is such a profound devastation that it cannot be compensated for merely by a technical “transfer” process.
The situation is even graver for academics. Having already witnessed the groundless dismissal of research assistants, arbitrary appointments, and precarious working conditions during the trustee process, Bilgi University academics today face a completely uncertain future. Research projects, academic networks, international collaborations, and institutional memory built over many years have been nullified by a single presidential signature. Some of these academics will be forced to go abroad, while others will try to hold on in Turkey’s increasingly shrinking space of academic freedom. In either case, the loser will be Turkey’s scientific and intellectual accumulation.
International Academic Reputation and Brain Drain: Global Consequences
Universities are not only national but also part of the international world of science. The fact that Humboldt University has produced 29 Nobel laureate scientists strikingly demonstrates the role of universities in the global scientific ecosystem. The world’s leading universities—such as Berlin’s Humboldt, Harvard, Oxford, Cambridge, and the University of Tokyo—are recognized as institutions that contribute to the scientific capital not only of their own countries but of all humanity.
The closure of a university in Turkey by presidential decree constitutes a heavy blow to the country’s academic credibility and predictability. International academic circles will read this decision as an indicator of how much the rule of law, academic freedom, and scientific autonomy have weakened in Turkey. Erasmus programs, research partnerships, joint degree projects, and academic exchange programs will be directly affected by this erosion of trust.
Data from the Academic Freedom Index reveal a strong relationship between the decline in academic freedom and the drop in democracy levels. In recent years, Turkey has continuously regressed in this index, becoming categorized alongside authoritarian regimes. The closure of Bilgi University is a new and far more visible stage of this regression.
More importantly, this decision will further trigger Turkey’s already accelerated brain drain. Trained academics, researchers, and the brightest students will not want to stay in a country where scientific freedom is absent and universities can be shut down overnight. Every departing scientist represents not only an individual loss but also the loss of the students they would have trained, the research they would have conducted, the laboratories they would have established, and the knowledge they would have produced. With this decision, Turkey faces the risk of losing not merely one university, but a significant portion of its future scientific potential.
The University in the World: Models, Principles, and a Comparative Perspective
Historically, the concept of the university has been shaped around three main models: the Humboldtian German model, the American research university model, and the British collegiate model. The common denominator of all three models is the indispensability of academic freedom and institutional autonomy.
The Humboldtian model defines the university as a scientific institution independent of the state. Founded in Berlin in 1810, Humboldt University made the principle of “the unity of research and teaching” the founding philosophy of the university. German universities were able to preserve their institutional autonomy to a great extent even during the dark period of the Second World War; if Germany today possesses one of the world’s most powerful scientific research infrastructures, it owes this largely to the Humboldtian tradition.
American research universities, on the other hand, carried the Humboldtian model into a more competitive and entrepreneurial framework. Institutions such as Harvard, Stanford, MIT, and Berkeley have seen academic freedom and institutional autonomy not merely as principles but as necessary conditions for scientific success. It is no coincidence that the world’s most important scientific discoveries throughout the 20th century emerged from these universities. No American president can revoke a university’s operating license with a single signature; such a power does not even exist in the American legal system.
In the British model as well, universities like Oxford and Cambridge, with their centuries-old traditions, have preserved their autonomy in the face of political power. Founded in 1209, Cambridge University has maintained its existence for eight centuries as an academic structure independent of the British monarchy, parliament, and governments.
Turkey, meanwhile, adopted the Humboldtian model with the 1933 University Reform; however, it has never been able to fully implement the autonomy required by this model. The establishment of YÖK following the 1980 coup placed universities under centralized bureaucratic control; during the AKP government, this centralizing tendency reached its peak, transforming universities into apparatuses of political power. The elimination of TÜBA’s autonomy in 2011, the post-2016 dismissals, the appointment of a trustee rector to Boğaziçi, and now the closure of Bilgi University are all different manifestations of the same political will.
Today, in developed countries, the closure of a university is an extraordinary and almost unprecedented occurrence. In Japan, South Korea, Canada, Australia, Sweden, and the Netherlands, political powers do not have the authority to close universities they disapprove of because the constitutions and laws of these countries safeguard university autonomy. In Turkey, however, the President can terminate the existence of a university where 20,000 students are receiving education with a single signature. This situation is one of the most striking indicators of the gulf between the official rhetoric about how advanced a democracy Turkey is and the reality.
Conclusion
The closure of Istanbul Bilgi University will go down in history not merely as an administrative act but as a critical rupture that reopens the discussion on the relationship between the university, freedom, and science in Turkey.
Responsibility for this decision lies primarily and essentially with the current political power. Over their more than twenty years in office, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the AKP government have institutionalized a mentality that sees universities as “service institutions,” cannot tolerate critical thought, and attempts to substitute scientific autonomy with political loyalty. At the point reached today, universities in Turkey have ceased to be universities in the sense described by Humboldt, Einstein, Russell, and Gramsci; they have become obedient bureaucratic structures integrated into the chain of command of the political power.
The closure of Bilgi University is the most dangerous stage this process has reached. Because this time, the issue is not merely the appointment of a trustee to a university, the removal of a rector, or the dismissal of academics; the issue is the complete destruction of an entire academic institution. This demonstrates that the ruling power has reached the point of “I will close the university I dislike.” There is no guarantee that another university will not suffer the same fate tomorrow on some other pretext.
Universities are the institutions that build the intellectual future of societies. The elimination or incapacitation of these institutions irreversibly damages not only the present but also the country’s scientific and cultural capacity in the long term. Turkey will feel the consequences of this decision for decades to come: the acceleration of brain drain, the weakening of international academic collaborations, the decline in scientific production, and, most importantly, the shrinking of the institutional foundation of free thought.
At the center of the debate is not merely one institution, but fundamental questions such as what the university is, how it should be protected, and the place of science within society. The answers given to these questions will determine not only Turkey’s academic future but also its democratic future.
Today, the political will that closed Istanbul Bilgi University has, in fact, closed Turkey’s future. The issue is not the existence or non-existence of a university; it is whether science, free thought, and the common intellectual heritage of humanity will survive on this soil. The closure of Bilgi is a dark answer given to this question. However, history has shown that no darkness lasts forever; sooner or later, the light of science and free thought pierces through even the thickest walls.
Recommendations
In the face of the closure of Istanbul Bilgi University, the responsibilities incumbent upon the academic community, civil society, and the democratic public are as follows:
Initiating a legal struggle: The closure decision is clearly contrary to the constitution and universal legal principles. Legal processes should be initiated before national and international judicial bodies, and all legal avenues—including application to the European Court of Human Rights—should be used effectively.
Mobilizing international academic solidarity: International organizations such as Scholars at Risk, the European University Association, and the Magna Charta Observatory should be involved in the process; it should be emphasized that the closure of Bilgi University is a threat to global academic freedom.
Establishing independent monitoring mechanisms to protect the rights of students and academics: YÖK’s rhetoric of “there will be no grievances” should be audited by independent observers; the problems experienced by students and academics should be systematically documented.
Strengthening legal guarantees for academic freedom and university autonomy: The higher education legislation, particularly the existing Higher Education Law No. 2547, should be reformed to protect university autonomy and academic freedom; Article 11, which grants the President the authority to close universities, should be repealed.
Developing policies against brain drain: In order to halt the academic brain drain that will accelerate with the closure of Bilgi University, academics should be provided with free and secure working conditions; mechanisms should be created that allow scientists forced to go abroad to maintain their ties with Turkey.
Supporting alternative academic structures: In order to keep the intellectual heritage of the closed Bilgi University alive, independent research institutes, open academy programs, and alternative education platforms should be established.
Raising social awareness: It should be communicated that the closure of a university is not only a problem for the academic community but a democracy problem that concerns the entire society; the public should be made aware of the social value of science, free thought, and the university.
The closure of Istanbul Bilgi University by presidential decree is the latest link in the systematic dismantling of academic freedom and university autonomy in Turkey. This decision has turned the lives of 20,000 students and over a thousand academics upside down overnight; it has nullified a quarter-century of scientific accumulation, international academic networks, and a tradition of critical thought.
The principles of individualizing responsibility and protecting the institutional structure, which are fundamental requirements of the rule of law, have been explicitly violated; an investigation targeting a holding has been turned into a pretext to punish an entire university. This is the most concrete manifestation of the political power’s intolerance of critical thought and its project of standardizing universities.
The closure of Bilgi University has dealt a heavy blow to Turkey’s international academic reputation; it has created a rupture that will further trigger the already accelerated brain drain. What is actually closed is not so much a university as Turkey’s scientific and intellectual future. However, history shows that the light of science and free thought never succumbs to any darkness.
References
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Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA) Aarhus University, 1997 Independent Researcher Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures.
The Structural Dependencies of the Global Economy and the Anatomy of Systemic Risk
The global economy has reached an unprecedented level of integration over the last fifty years, constructing a complex and multi-layered architecture of production, energy, and logistics networks that transcend nation-state borders. This hyper-integrated architecture, while pioneering efficiency based on the principle of comparative advantage, has exposed the system to the kind of fragilities predicted by the theory of “complex adaptive systems.” In such systems, non-linear interactions mean that a small perturbation can paralyze the entire network through cascading and unpredictable chain reactions.
At the heart of this fragility lies the concentration of energy and logistics infrastructure in specific bottlenecks. More than 60% of global oil trade and a third of liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade are transported by sea, with the lion’s share of this flow passing through geopolitically sensitive “chokepoints” such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, and the Bab el-Mandeb. A disruption at these points not only impacts physical supply but also instantaneously distorts pricing behavior in futures markets, creating a financial contagion effect.
The same fragility applies to the real production sector. The “just-in-time” supply model, dominant since the 1990s, radically reduced inventory holding costs, creating an efficiency revolution on corporate balance sheets, but simultaneously reduced the system’s buffer to zero. Today, inventory-to-production ratios in strategic sectors like automotive and electronics are at historically low levels. This has caused unexpected shocks, such as the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 or the grounding of the Ever Given in the Suez Canal in 2021, to turn into global production stoppages and price shocks within weeks. The global economy now walks a tightly stretched tightrope, anchored at one end by energy supply security and at the other by consumer demand.
The Strategic Depth of Energy and Maritime Trade Corridors: A Fragility Matrix
Energy and maritime trade can be thought of as the circulatory system of the global system. The functioning of this system is threatened by a three-layered fragility matrix: physical chokepoints, commercial-financial chokepoints, and geopolitical risk premiums.
Physical Chokepoints and Cascading Effects: The Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20 million barrels of oil and derivatives pass daily, is the world’s most critical energy artery. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has modeled that in a scenario where this strait is closed, oil prices could quickly exceed $150/barrel. However, the impact does not stop there. The disruption of energy and raw material shipments to China and Japan via the Strait of Malacca would paralyze Asia’s function as a production base, throttling the supply of finished goods to European and North American markets. Disruption in logistics not only increases transport costs but also leads to equipment imbalances, with containers piling up in the wrong geographies, thereby prolonging the duration of the shock.
Commercial and Financial Chokepoints: The forced lengthening of routes does more than just raise freight rates. The security crisis in the Suez Canal during the 2020-2024 period caused ships diverting via the Cape of Good Hope to extend their voyage times by 10-14 days, effectively reducing the global container fleet’s capacity by approximately 8-10%. This leads to a 5-10 fold increase in insurance premiums, especially for war risk and blacklisting clauses, which is exponentially reflected in product prices. Through the London and Lloyd’s market, where the maritime sector is concentrated, this shock is transmitted to global financial markets, distorting the pricing of instruments like credit default swaps (CDS) and dramatically increasing companies’ working capital needs.
The Anatomy of Geopolitical Risk Premiums: In addition to the tangible factors above, the “expectations economy” comes into play. Any escalating tension in the Red Sea or the Persian Gulf is instantly reflected in oil and LNG futures markets as a “fear premium.” This premium negatively impacts consumer prices, producer costs, and central banks’ ability to fight inflation, even before any physical supply disruption occurs. This mechanism demonstrates that the modern economy is deeply dependent not only on physical flows but also on the perceptions and narratives concerning the future of these flows.
Asia and Europe: The Political Economy of Asymmetric Dependence
Energy and logistics shocks affect the global economy asymmetrically, producing different crisis dynamics based on the structural characteristics of different regions.
Asia’s Production Paradox: Asian economies such as China, Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN countries are positioned as the “workshop of the world.” The functioning of this model implies an absolute dependence on an uninterrupted and low-cost flow of energy and raw materials. An energy supply disruption directly halts industrial production in these countries. For instance, semiconductor production in South Korea and Taiwan takes place in extremely sensitive facilities where the slightest power interruption can result in billions of dollars in losses. These countries’ dependence on the Strait of Hormuz for energy imports, often exceeding 80%, makes this strait not just an economic issue but a matter of national security. The slowdown in production, beyond the drop in export revenues, blocks the supply of critical components in Global Value Chains (GVCs), bringing an automobile factory in Brazil or a machinery manufacturer in Germany to a standstill.
Europe’s Cost-Inflation Spiral: While Europe presents a similar picture to Asia in its dependence on energy imports, the nature of its fragility is different. As concretely demonstrated by the 2022 energy crisis, the primary risk for Europe is not a complete supply cut-off but prices skyrocketing to astronomical levels. The 5-10 fold increases in natural gas prices (TTF) rendered energy-intensive industries (steel, fertilizer, aluminum, glass) uncompetitive and led to permanent production losses (demand destruction). This created a cost-push inflation in Europe, eroding household purchasing power while pushing the European Central Bank (ECB) into a deep dilemma: raising interest rates to control inflation would push an economy already facing stagflation into recession. This is an entirely different, supply-driven stagflation dynamic compared to traditional demand-side shocks.
Cascading Failure: The halt of production in Asia and the explosion of costs in Europe create a mutually reinforcing cycle. When Asian factories stop producing, Europe’s machinery, automotive, and medical device sectors are left without inputs. Conversely, when the cost crisis in Europe dampens demand, Asia’s export orders are cut. During the 2022-2024 period, the quadrupling of freight rates from Asia to Europe due to the Suez route disruption weakened the link between these two massive economic blocs, demonstrating how this decoupling drags down global growth. The fundamental risk of the modern economy is that such a cascade effect could obliterate what Keynes termed “animal spirits”—investor confidence—leading to a global “stop-go” crisis.
The Gulf Region, Energy Rents, and the Reconfiguration of the Financial System
For the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, the security of energy corridors is the foundation not just of foreign trade, but of the state’s fiscal structure and the social contract. The region has developed a sophisticated mechanism to manage this dependence by converting energy rents into financial power, but this structure harbors new fragilities of its own.
Fiscal Fragility and Pro-Cyclicality: The vast majority of GCC countries require an oil price ranging from $65-$80/barrel to balance their budgets. When a crisis in energy corridors pushes oil prices above $100, massive budget surpluses occur in the short term. However, this petrodollar flow also works in reverse: if geopolitical risks cause the market to view the region as risky as a whole, capital flight can be triggered despite high oil prices. Regional stock markets and government bonds are highly sensitive to the perception of security in energy corridors. A region-specific CDS premium (country risk premium) has become a key indicator for global investors.
The Role of Sovereign Wealth Funds and Systemic Risk: The Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar, managing trillions of dollars, have become “too big to fail” actors in the global financial system. These funds invest heavily in developed country bonds, real estate, and private equity funds. In the event of a Gulf crisis, a fire sale of assets by these funds to cover budget deficits or meet liquidity needs could send shockwaves through asset prices from New York to London, and from Tokyo to Frankfurt. This is an ironic consequence of the Gulf’s energy rent accumulation: the colossal funds established to stabilize the region now constitute a potential channel for international financial contagion.
The Dilemma of the Gulf as a Logistics Hub: The massive logistics investments of Dubai (Jebel Ali Port) and Qatar (Hamad Port) have turned these locations into critical transshipment hubs for global trade. However, this amplifies the impact of any security threat directed at the region. A conflict in the Persian Gulf would disrupt not only regional trade but also the global container traffic flowing to Africa, South Asia, and Europe via these hubs. Thus, the Gulf represents the global economy’s most sensitive point of “double lock-in,” serving as both an energy supply source and a logistics distribution network.
Strategic Recommendations: A Resilience-Focused System Architecture
Since the current fragility is ingrained in the system’s foundation, solutions must be structural and multidimensional. A “system architecture” must be built that enhances resilience without compromising efficiency.
Multi-Layered Diversification in Energy Supply: Investing solely in renewable energy is insufficient. The resilience of the energy system depends on increasing “grid flexibility.” This requires integrating diverse sources (nuclear, hydro, solar, wind) with smart grids and large-scale energy storage systems. While Europe’s REPowerEU plan or China’s massive renewable energy capacity expansion are steps in the right direction, they carry the risk of creating new bottlenecks for critical minerals (lithium, cobalt, rare earth elements). Therefore, energy diversification must simultaneously encompass the diversification of raw material supply chains and an increase in recycling capacity.
Redundancy and Flexibility in Logistics: The “Just-in-Time” model must be hybridized with a “Just-in-Case” model. This does not mean excessively increasing stocks, but rather intelligent inventory management.
· Nearshoring/Friendshoring in Production: Bringing the production of critical components closer to consumer markets (such as the Mexico-US or Eastern Europe-Western Europe corridors) reduces dependency on long-distance maritime logistics. · Strategic Development of Alternative Corridors: Mega-projects like the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor), which bypasses Russia, and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), connecting India to the Middle East and Europe, are vital for reducing dependency on single chokepoints. These projects must be supported not only by physical infrastructure but also by the digitalization and harmonization of cross-border customs procedures.
Globalizing Financial Risk Governance: Systemic risk is beyond the level that firms can manage alone. Public-private sector cooperation is essential.
· Financialization of Strategic Stocks: The coordinated release mechanisms of strategic petroleum stocks by International Energy Agency (IEA) member countries should also be established for LNG and renewable energy components. · Next-Generation Stress Tests: Multinational companies and financial institutions should standardize dynamic and holistic scenario analyses (using models like Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium – DSGE) that model not just individual shocks, but “perfect storm” scenarios (simultaneous cyber-attack + geographic chokepoint closure + financial panic). · Supply Chain Finance Regulation: Making the complex financial instruments that fund global supply chains more transparent and subject to regulation will reduce the risk of financial contagion.
Conclusion: From the Geopolitics of Fragility to the Political Economy of Resilience
The overall analysis demonstrates that the current architecture of the global economy inherently generates instability. This architecture, while optimizing parameters like efficiency and profit maximization, has externalized vital values such as security, resilience, and sovereignty. The result is an “efficient but fragile” system.
Managing this fragility is not merely a technical issue but requires a profound political-economic transformation. The future global economic order will no longer be shaped solely around comparative advantages and the dogma of free trade, but around the concepts of “supply chain security,” “energy sovereignty,” and “systemic resilience.” In this new paradigm, the fundamental competitive advantage for states and companies will not be producing at the cheapest cost, but the ability to ensure operational continuity even amidst major shocks.
Ultimately, the sustainability of the global system depends on re-establishing the delicate balance between the fragility of hyper-efficiency and the cost of flexibility. Societies and economies that can look beyond the allure of cheapness and speed and agree to pay a premium for reliability and robustness will survive the turbulent period ahead. This is not merely a choice, but a survival strategy necessitated by history.
References
· BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2024 (and subsequent Energy Institute reports). · International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 2024, Oil Market Report monthly reports, The Future of Resilience in Energy Systems. · World Bank, Global Economic Prospects, Container Port Performance Index 2023. · UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport 2024, Global Trade Update. · IMF, Global Financial Stability Report: The Last Mile – Financial Vulnerabilities and Risks (October 2024). · OECD, Economic Outlook, Structural Resilience in Global Value Chains. · Lloyd’s List Intelligence, Chokepoints: The Threats to Global Trade. · RUSI (Royal United Services Institute), The Geopolitics of Chokepoints and Global Trade Corridors. · Bruegel Institute, The European Union’s Energy Security Architecture. · Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Geoeconomics and Supply Chain Resilience.
Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA) Aarhus University, 1997 Independent Researcher Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures
Within modern state structures, secret intelligence services are positioned as one of the invisible yet most critical elements of the security architecture. These bodies are not merely institutions that monitor military threats but also multi-layered organizations that influence information flow, perception processes, and strategic decision-making mechanisms. With globalization, the acceleration of information production has rendered the role of intelligence services more complex. These institutions are no longer seen solely as data collectors; they are now regarded as entities that also produce meaning and shape that meaning in line with strategic objectives. The concept of cultural hegemony comes into play precisely at this point: intelligence services, by targeting societies’ values, beliefs, and identity structures, can achieve long-term strategic gains through the manufacture of consent without resorting to direct military or economic coercion. Within this framework, cultural activities that appear innocent must in fact be read as reflections of a profound power struggle.
The Strategic Transformation of the Cultural Sphere
Historically, culture has been a fundamental sphere that determines the shared values and identity structures of societies. However, in the modern era, culture has simultaneously transformed into a domain of power. In this context, intelligence services can generate long-term strategic effects by interacting with the cultural sphere through means that are not immediately visible. The flow of information occurring through the media, academia, and digital platforms has become a significant instrument in shaping societal perception. It is here that Antonio Gramsci’s concept of “cultural hegemony” regains its meaning: it explains how ruling classes or states mobilize cultural institutions to establish domination based not only on coercion but also on consent. Intelligence organizations, as the covert architects of this hegemonic process, operate across a broad spectrum, from art funds and publishing houses to film studios and think tanks. Numerous examples throughout and after the Cold War reveal the extent of intelligence activities conducted under the veil of cultural innocence.
Information, Perception, and Strategic Steering
Intelligence activities are not limited to the process of gathering information; how this information is interpreted and presented is also of strategic importance. Today, information is treated not as a neutral reality but as a component of power relations. For this reason, perception management has become one of the most important tools of modern intelligence structures. How societies perceive events can directly affect the feasibility of international policies. Intelligence services can reconstruct reality itself through agents infiltrating news agencies, funding mechanisms targeting opinion leaders, and social media disinformation campaigns. The aim here is to ensure that the target audience adopts a particular event or policy “of its own will,” thus achieving the manufacture of consent without visible imposition. The functioning of cultural hegemony materializes precisely here, in the shaping of information by power.
Soft Power and Invisible Spheres of Influence
Competition among states is no longer conducted solely in military and economic spheres but also through elements of soft power. In this process, intelligence services can contribute to state policies without being directly visible, through indirect influence mechanisms. Cultural production, information sharing, and strategic communication processes constitute the fundamental instruments of this invisible influence. This situation points to a more complex structure that transcends the classical definition of power. Joseph Nye’s conceptualization of “soft power” describes the capacity to shape the preferences of others through cultural attraction and values. Intelligence services, through covert operations that often overlap with official soft power instruments or are concealed behind them, steer the intellectual climate, artistic tendencies, and academic agendas of target countries to serve their own strategic interests. This overlap blurs the boundaries between the “visible hand” and the “invisible hand” of states.
The Global System and the Security Paradox
The increasingly interconnected nature of the global system has transformed the concept of security into a more complex structure. A crisis occurring in one region can generate not only local but global effects. In this context, the role of intelligence services is not limited to national security but also possesses an indirect sphere of influence in preserving global stability. Yet, this situation simultaneously brings new debates in terms of transparency, legitimacy, and democratic oversight. The global dimension of cultural hegemony has led intelligence activities to assume a multilateral and multi-actor character. An intelligence service now targets not only the military secrets of rival states but also the mental maps of global public opinion. This expansion strains traditional understandings of sovereignty, creating a deep chasm between international law and intelligence practices.
Five Examples of Cultural Hegemony Practices by Intelligence Services
Below, five distinct cases are presented that concretize the methods by which secret intelligence services establish cultural hegemony, selected from different geographies and periods. The analysis focuses on the practices of Western and other regional actors.
The first example is the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) operation conducted by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during the Cold War. Operating between 1950 and 1967, the CCF was secretly financed by the CIA and organized art exhibitions, literary journals, music festivals, and intellectual conferences across the globe. The aim was to position Western modernist art and liberal thought as a “center of cultural attraction” against communist ideology. Prestigious publications such as Encounter, Preuves, and Der Monat were sustained by CIA funds, while the majority of writers and readers were unaware of this connection. This operation has gone down in history as one of the most striking examples of culture being transformed into a direct battlefield and of the manufacture of consent.
The second example is the activities carried out by the United Kingdom’s Secret Intelligence Service MI6 throughout the Cold War via the Information Research Department (IRD). The IRD, established within the Foreign Office but operating largely under intelligence direction, produced anti-communist propaganda texts, collaborated with journalists and academics, and funded cultural events. Successfully penetrating intellectual circles in Africa and Asia, particularly during the post-colonial period, the IRD used the global dominance of the English language as a cultural lever, shaping the intellectual climate of target countries through educational scholarships and book translation programs. Thus, London was able to sustain its cultural hegemony in former colonies without direct military intervention.
The third example involves covert cultural operations that go beyond the hasbara (public diplomacy) activities carried out by the Israeli intelligence service Mossad and the non-governmental organizations coordinated with it. Mossad has used front organizations, particularly on university campuses and within art circles and media institutions in Europe and North America, to strengthen Israel’s strategic narrative. The funding of certain film festivals, the support of alternative intellectual networks to counter academic boycott initiatives against Israel, and the encouragement of art projects that culturally marginalize the Palestinian issue can be evaluated within this scope. These activities demonstrate how military and political conflict is transferred to the cultural sphere to reconstruct the ground of international legitimacy.
The fourth example is the organic link forged by France’s external intelligence agency, the DGSE (Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure), with Francophonie institutions and cultural diplomacy networks. While France uses language, education, and culture as strategic instruments to preserve its influence in its former colonies in Africa, the DGSE has been the behind-the-scenes director of many civil organizations in this field. Through French Cultural Centers, scholarship programs, and co-produced cinema projects, attempts have been made to align the mental world of African political elites and opinion leaders with French values. In this way, even during periods when it reduced its military presence, Paris was able to maintain its economic and political privileges through cultural hegemony. The DGSE’s role in these operations, though officially denied, has been documented by numerous investigative journalists and historians.
The fifth example is the program known as Operation Mockingbird – the CIA’s media infiltration operation in the United States – and the practices that succeeded it. Beginning in the 1950s, this operation saw the CIA place agents in or put journalists on the payroll of hundreds of media organizations, including major newspapers, television channels, and news agencies. Through this network, the tone, content, and framing of news served to the American public and to the world at large could be directly determined in line with intelligence objectives. Mockingbird was not limited to Cold War propaganda; it also shaped cultural narratives in Third World countries. These interventions, ranging from script consultancy for Hollywood productions to the arrangement of stands at book fairs, demonstrate that the entire culture industry can be transformed into an apparatus of hegemony.
Conclusion
The position of secret intelligence services in the modern world has moved far beyond the classical understanding of security. These institutions are no longer merely structures that detect threats in advance; they are now regarded as strategic actors that influence the order of information, the architecture of perception, and cultural orientations. When considered within the framework of cultural hegemony, it becomes evident that this influence operates not only through coercive elements of power but also through the manufacture of consent and the construction of meaning. The five examples enumerated above – the CIA’s Congress for Cultural Freedom, the British Information Research Department, Mossad’s cultural network operations, the French DGSE’s instrumentalization of Francophonie, and the CIA’s media infiltration program Mockingbird – clearly illustrate this picture.
In this context, while representing the invisible hand of states, intelligence activities also play a critical role in the functioning of the global system. However, this role simultaneously raises significant ethical and political questions. The manipulation of information, the shaping of perception, and the use of the cultural sphere for strategic purposes exist in constant tension with the principles of transparency and accountability in democratic societies. The intelligence dimension of cultural hegemony keeps alive the possibility that many decisions citizens believe they have made of their “own free will” may actually be the product of systematic manipulation. This is a problem that deepens the internal contradictions of liberal democracies: states that champion transparency can simultaneously conduct the largest anti-transparency operations.
This structure is expected to become even more complex in the future. With the advancement of digitalization, artificial intelligence, and big data analytics, the scope of intelligence activities will expand further. The manipulation of social media algorithms, the use of deepfake technologies, and the possibilities of personalized propaganda will both lower the cost and increase the radius of cultural hegemony’s impact. This will enhance the security capacities of states while profoundly affecting the ways individuals access information. Moreover, the increasing blurring of boundaries between the private sector and intelligence services, the thorough commercialization of the cultural sphere, and the convergence of platform capitalism with new surveillance architectures point to a future where hegemony is constructed not only by states but in collaboration with multinational technology corporations.
In conclusion, the cultural and strategic influence of secret intelligence services will remain one of the most critical areas of debate in 21st-century international relations. For this debate to be conducted in a healthy manner, it is only possible through the emergence of more archival documents concerning states’ covert operations, the strengthening of independent investigative journalism, and the preservation of academic freedom. Understanding the intelligence dimension of cultural hegemony is the shared responsibility not only of international security studies but also of critical media literacy, political philosophy, and the sociology of communication.
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Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the Prison Notebooks. New York: International Publishers.
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Pells, R. (1997). Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II. New York: Basic Books.
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Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA) Aarhus University, 1997 Independent Researcher Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures
Risk and opportunity being two sides of the same coin is perhaps the oldest truth of the investment world. This ancient wisdom makes the triad of risk assessment, market research, and position management indispensable in portfolio construction. The rationale behind simultaneously building deep positions in both cryptocurrency and stock markets lies beyond a mere intuitive impulse for diversification; it is a pursuit of exploiting complementary risk premiums and hedging against macroeconomic blind spots. However, when this ancient method of risk mitigation, namely hedging, begins to be sought not only between asset classes but also within the life cycle of a single asset, our mental models must be called into question. It is precisely at this juncture that a theory attributed to Warren Buffett’s finance classes, dividing cryptocurrency investment into two distinct phases, has been circulated.
According to this theory, the first phase is the “pre IPO internal sale” phase, likened to the initial public offering (IPO) of a stock. It is argued that this is the period when a new crypto asset, before being listed on an exchange, rapidly attracts investment to form a large capital pool, thus experiencing the steepest price increase. This narrative highlights the allure of early stage liquidity and the existential capital needs of projects, whispering to the investor that the real gains lie here. The second phase is the post IPO phase, encompassing assets listed on exchanges, including established ones like Bitcoin. The theory asserts that in this stage, large capitalists execute massive sell offs to realize their tens of times profits gained during the internal sale phase, directly leading to a rapid price decline and a subsequent prolonged period of stabilization.
According to the narrative, most crypto assets in the post IPO phase fall victim to a kind of “frenzied fundraising” period; when combined with the exit strategy of early investors, this closes the window of opportunity for new investors. Therefore, the theory prescribes avoiding investment in post IPO crypto assets as a long term, sustainable investment strategy. This approach is presented not merely as a market timing strategy but as a philosophy of risk aversion, as the asymmetric return potential in the early phase is deemed far more attractive compared to the structural disadvantages of the later phase. Yet, what matters here is as much the method itself as the figure of authority invoked to legitimize it: Warren Buffett.
However, the claim that this theory belongs to Warren Buffett stands in stark opposition to Buffett’s own investment philosophy, crystallized over decades, and his public statements on cryptocurrencies. Buffett has repeatedly described cryptocurrencies as “rat poison squared,” “a mirage that produces nothing,” and “a bad ending”; he has never addressed an internal sale phase or a post IPO stabilization period as a technical framework. Thus, the “two phase model” under examination is, in fact, a myth of uncertain origin packaged under Buffett’s name, attempting to explain the unique dynamics of the crypto market. Approaching this model with academic depth and a visionary perspective, it is necessary to lay bare both its surface level appeal and its structural weaknesses, revealing what is missing and unheard.
The Ontology of the Two Phase Model: The Allure and Fragility of the Pre IPO Internal Sale
Although the pre IPO internal sale phase bears parallels to early stage venture capital in traditional finance, it takes a far more radical form within the crypto ecosystem, shaped by regulatory vacuums and asymmetric information environments. In this phase, projects use the funds raised under the promise of decentralization as liquidity pools; investors, meanwhile, commit capital at a stage where the project has yet to achieve product market fit and often exists as nothing more than a whitepaper. The model’s strongest aspect is making visible the psychological and financial reality of this stage: the urgent need for early liquidity creates upward pressure on price, and this pressure is fed by a narrative pump that lasts until the listing moment. Indeed, in projects with adequate due diligence and network effect potential, astronomical returns for participants in this phase have been empirically observed. The model succeeds in identifying the risk of late stage capital, which might be labeled “dumb money.”
However, the model’s portrayal of this phase solely as the period of the fastest price increase entirely ignores survivorship bias. A vast majority of projects participating in the pre IPO phase never even reach the listing stage; they silently vanish due to technical inadequacy, internal team conflicts, fraud, or regulatory threats. While emphasizing the asymmetric returns that make this phase attractive, the model fails to sufficiently underscore the risk of the same asymmetry resulting in a total wipeout. Consequently, categorically declaring the internal sale phase as the best window of opportunity is only possible within a narrative economy that erases the stories of the losers. Moreover, since participation in internal sales is often contingent upon privileged circles, staking mechanisms on launchpads, or high capital thresholds, the strategy proposed by the model can be structurally inaccessible to the retail investor. This renders the model a semi deterministic narrative describing market dynamics rather than a functional investment guide.
The Reductionist Reading of the Post IPO Phase and the Missed Layers of Value
The model codes the post IPO period as a trap, characterized by major capitalists’ profit realization, and a phase to be avoided. This perspective undoubtedly captures a recurring pattern in the market: the supply shock created by the unlocking of early investors’ tokens and the deflation of the speculative bubble. Yet this reduction ignores the full complexity of market maturation and the price discovery process. Above all, the value accumulation generated over years by assets like Bitcoin and Ethereum in the post IPO phase empirically refutes the thesis of a “period to be avoided.” The selling pressure from capitalists creates a temporary supply demand imbalance; however, if the project’s core value proposition, network effects, and adoption curve are robust, the market navigates past this phase to establish a new equilibrium level. The model completely misses this rebalancing process and the potential for long term compound returns.
Secondly, the post IPO phase is a period when institutional investors and regulatory frameworks enter the scene, transparency increases, and information asymmetry diminishes. Unlike the internal sale phase, the project’s technical roadmap, community governance, and financial reporting are more auditable here. The model’s wholesale dismissal of this phase as a desert where “the best opportunity has been missed” sets a cognitive trap by discouraging the investor from conducting in depth fundamental analysis. Furthermore, in the post IPO phase, risk management and yield optimization tools become available such as options strategies, staking yields, and liquidity mining which are only possible in mature markets. These tools pave the way for multi layered strategies based not just on price appreciation but on time value and volatility. By ignoring these layers, the model reduces crypto asset investment to a one dimensional buy and sell window.
The Positive Aspects of the Theory: Intuitive Insight into Liquidity Architecture and Psychological Timing
Despite all criticisms, the attributed two phase theory is valuable for popularizing certain observations about the functioning of cryptocurrency markets, thereby raising awareness. First and foremost, by framing the listing process of a new crypto asset as a liquidity event, the model cultivates the habit of monitoring the direction of fund flows among market participants. The dynamic between the capital raising pressure in the internal sale phase and the realization pressure post IPO points to a micro scale “smart money dumb money” distinction. Although oversimplified, this distinction offers a useful mental model for an investor just learning about market microstructure.
Furthermore, the theory indirectly illuminates the behavioral finance dimension of speculative bubbles. The rapid price increase in the internal sale phase creates a “fear of missing out” (FOMO) among investors, while the post IPO decline and stabilization period triggers a tendency for “regret avoidance.” By intuitively capturing this emotional transition between the two phases, the model can help investors recognize their own emotional cycles. More importantly, the theory makes visible a critical question every investor must ask themselves: “Whose liquidity am I providing in this market?” This question forms the basis of risk management and builds a healthy skepticism toward position management. Therefore, the positive contribution of the theory lies not in presenting a correct investment strategy, but in dramatizing wrong strategies to warn the investor.
Critical Deepening: The Fallacy of Attribution to Authority and the Collapse of the Intellectual Foundation
The theory’s greatest and most difficult to repair damage stems from its grounding in a figure like Warren Buffett, the living legend of value investing. When Buffett’s words on cryptocurrencies are examined, his epistemological objection to this asset class is clear: cryptocurrencies are not productive assets, they generate no cash flow, and their value rests solely on the expectation that a next buyer will pay a higher price. To assume that a thinker with such a radical rejection would systematize crypto investment with a two phase strategy is an intellectual anachronism. This misattribution builds the model’s credibility on the appeal to authority fallacy (argumentum ad verecundiam), while actually striking it at its most vulnerable point: a lack of empirical and philosophical coherence.
At this point, the most vital need the model leaves unaddressed becomes apparent: to make such a deterministic staging of any asset’s life cycle, a robust theoretical framework for its valuation is imperative. In traditional stock analysis, the pre IPO and post IPO distinction is supported by concrete metrics such as discounted cash flows, P/E ratios, and sectoral growth dynamics. Yet for crypto assets, such a universally accepted valuation methodology does not yet exist. The two phase model ignores this massive void, focusing solely on the momentum of price movement; that is, it attempts to derive an investment philosophy purely from price action without a value framework. However, Buffett’s true teaching rests precisely on this distinction between “price” and “value.” The theory, in trying to leverage Buffett, violates his most fundamental principle.
Analytical Breakdown of Strengths, Weaknesses, Missing Elements, and Unheard Dimensions
The strengths of the model lie in offering an intuitive narrative of market microstructure, making early and late stage liquidity dynamics visible, and functioning as a warning system to deter investors from blindly jumping into every listed asset. It can also enhance market literacy by prompting scrutiny of the incentive mechanisms of project founders and venture capitalists. Yet its weaknesses are severe: it systematically reflects survivorship bias, ignores post IPO value creation and the maturation process, fails to discuss the asymmetry of accessibility, and, most importantly, undermines its own credibility by grounding itself in a false authority. It falls into a circular logic trap that turns price movement into an investment thesis.
Among the missing elements, foremost is how regulatory developments can radically alter the transition between the two phases. For instance, the internal sale process of a token classified as a security in a jurisdiction takes on an entirely different character due to legal risks. Similarly, the treasury management of decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) and the ability to program liquidity on chain complicate the “major capitalist sell off” pattern the model assumes. The most significant shortcoming is that the model treats investor psychology as an individual decision making process, but fails to account for how social media, the influencer economy, and coordinated community actions manipulate the transition between phases. The unheard need is precisely here: the necessity of grasping a crypto asset’s life cycle through a multi factorial, dynamic, and continuity based model that combines on chain data analytics, social sentiment analysis, and macro liquidity indicators, rather than through rigid phases.
Visionary Outlook and the Need for Reframing
The growing pains of cryptocurrency markets demand an epistemology that moves beyond building investment strategies solely on timing phases. The visionary investment approach of the future must set aside dichotomies like pre IPO and post IPO and instead conceptualize each asset as a “protocol economy.” The determining factors here are the genuine economic value the protocol generates (transaction fees, security budget, sustainability of staking yields), the resilience of governance mechanisms, and the quality of community participation. In such a framework, the internal sale phase transforms into merely a funding method, and the post IPO phase becomes the market’s testing of that funding method. The critical question for the investor should not be “Which phase am I in?” but rather “At what stage of this protocol’s value creation process am I positioned, and with which incentives am I aligned?”
Moreover, the advantage provided by taking simultaneous positions across multiple markets lies precisely in offering the ability to transcend such reductionist phase models. When the cash flow and dividend focused valuation discipline of the stock market is combined with the adoption curve and network value focused valuation intuition of the crypto market, the investor learns to price two different risk factors simultaneously. This synthesis is not a strategy confined to either the internal sale phase or the post IPO phase; instead, it is the art of layered position management that reads global liquidity cycles, the diffusion speed of technological innovations, and regulatory arbitrage opportunities. The attributed Buffett theory is valuable as a starting point, even as a counter example, in the journey of learning this art; but when taken as a guide, it turns into a wall that severs the investor from the market’s most fertile hunting grounds.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The two phase model examined is a narrative that intuitively describes the speculative rhythm of the cryptocurrency market, yet reveals serious cracks when transformed into an investment doctrine. The model’s greatest weakness is its claim to be grounded in Warren Buffett’s value oriented, productive asset philosophy, which is an intellectual contradiction. Its positive aspects are raising awareness of liquidity dynamics and pushing the investor to question “whose exit liquidity they are providing”; its negative aspects are overlooking the return opportunities of the maturation period, regulatory transformation, and the need for fundamental valuation by reducing the market to two crude phases. The most significant deficiency is the absence of a holistic decision support system that integrates on chain metrics, social sentiment analysis, and macro liquidity conditions into a single framework.
Recommendations for investors, framed by this analysis, can be listed as follows:
Adopt an analysis discipline that evaluates any crypto asset not solely based on its listing phase, but on fundamental factors such as the genuine economic value the protocol generates, developer activity, and degree of decentralization.
Limit participation in the internal sale phase to projects with a clear legal framework, transparent lock up periods and token distribution, and strong community commitment; manage this phase as a high risk venture capital position within a small slice of the portfolio, rather than a “get rich quick” scheme.
View price declines in the post IPO phase as strategic accumulation opportunities in projects with a solid core value proposition; however, ensure you monitor the unlock schedule of early investors and the dilution effect on circulating supply.
Leverage your multi market position advantage by examining the correlations between sector rotation in the stock market and adoption cycles in the crypto market; use the cash flow between the two markets as a risk barometer.
Integrate metrics obtained from on chain data platforms (Glassnode, Dune Analytics, etc.) into your own investment process; adopt indicators such as whale movements, exchange inflows and outflows, and staking participation rate as an objective ground to replace phase narratives.
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Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA) Aarhus University, 1997 Independent Researcher Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures
