Category: Sefa Yürükel

Black Cube: The Rise of Private Intelligence Firms and Their Impact on Democratic Processes – The Israeli Mossad Connection
Black Cube is a private intelligence company founded in 2010 by former members of Israel’s elite intelligence units. This article comprehensively analyzes the company’s structure, methodologies, and documented operations. It examines Black Cube’s election interventions in Nigeria, Romania, Hungary, Slovenia, and Cyprus, its role in the Harvey Weinstein scandal, its ban by Meta (Facebook), and its organ trafficking operation in Turkey. The article argues that Black Cube represents a new category of “private intelligence actor” that poses systemic risks to democratic institutions and national sovereignty. The findings highlight the need for enhanced regulatory frameworks at both national and international levels.

The Privatization of Intelligence

The post-Cold War era has witnessed the proliferation of private military and security companies operating in areas traditionally reserved for state actors. Private intelligence firms represent a particularly consequential subset of this phenomenon, offering services that blur the boundaries between legitimate corporate investigation, state-sponsored espionage, and political manipulation.

Black Cube, established in 2010 by Dan Zorella and Avi Yanus, both veterans of the Israeli Defense Forces’ special operations units, has emerged as a prominent player in this sector. The company’s growth trajectory reflects broader trends in the globalization of intelligence services. Operating from headquarters in Tel Aviv’s Discount Tower, with branches in London and Madrid, Black Cube currently employs approximately 200 personnel.

According to the company’s self-reported figures, it has operated in more than 75 countries, handled over 540 cases, recovered 5.3 billion dollars in assets, and helped clients obtain 14.7 billion dollars in judgments or settlements. This scale of operations positions Black Cube as a significant non-state actor capable of influencing global economic and political outcomes.

Organizational Structure and Methodology

Founders and Advisory Board

Black Cube was founded by Dan Zorella (CEO), who served in the IDF’s special operations units, and Avi Yanus, who holds a Ph.D. in organizational behavior from the Technion and served as an IDF strategic planning officer. The company’s International Advisory Board includes figures of considerable stature in Israeli intelligence and international security:

Meir Dagan, former Mossad Director, served as chairman until his death in 2016. Efraim Halevy, former Mossad Director, is a current board member. Giora Eiland, retired Major General, is a former head of Israel’s National Security Council. Yohanan Danino is a former Israeli Police Commissioner. Adrian Leppard is a former London Police Commissioner.

This advisory structure demonstrates the deep integration between Black Cube and Israel’s national security establishment.

Operational Methodology

Black Cube’s operational methodology follows a consistent pattern across documented cases:

Fictitious Corporate Fronts: The company establishes seemingly legitimate companies with registered offices, functioning websites, LinkedIn profiles, and email addresses, maintained for months before operational deployment.

False Identity Deployment: Operatives assume false identities, posing as filmmakers, journalists, talent scouts, investors, or activists, to approach targets and conduct surreptitious meetings.

Covert Recording: Meetings are secretly recorded, and operatives gather intelligence through conversation and observation.

Disappearance: Once objectives are achieved, all associated websites are deleted and communication channels are terminated.

Strategic Release: Manipulated content is released at pre-planned times, typically immediately preceding elections or critical legal proceedings.

The “Success Fee” Model

At least some Black Cube contracts, most notably the Weinstein agreement, stipulated that final payment was contingent on operational success. This performance-based compensation model creates incentives for aggressive and potentially unlawful conduct.

Documented Operations: A Pattern of Democratic Interference

Nigeria (2015): Election Interference

According to testimony from Cambridge Analytica whistleblower Christopher Wylie before UK Parliament, Black Cube was hired to hack into medical records of Muhammadu Buhari, the challenger to then-incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan. Jonathan lost the election. Black Cube denied the allegations.

Romania (2016): Criminal Conviction

Black Cube operatives were hired to gather compromising material on Laura Codruța Kövesi, Romania’s chief anti-corruption prosecutor. Operatives David Geclowicz and Ron Weiner traveled to Bucharest to hack her email accounts but were arrested before completing the operation. In a subsequent 2022 court proceeding, Black Cube co-founders Dan Zorella, Avi Yanus, and Executive Director Gal Farchi accepted suspended sentences of two years and eleven months in a Bucharest court after entering a plea agreement on charges of establishing an “organized crime group.” Romania remains the only country to have secured criminal convictions against Black Cube or its leadership. Kövesi now serves as Chief Prosecutor of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO).

Harvey Weinstein (2016-2017): Press Suppression

This case represents the most extensively documented Black Cube operation. Film producer Harvey Weinstein, through attorneys at Boies Schiller Flexner, contracted Black Cube when reporters from The New York Times and The New Yorker were investigating sexual assault allegations against him.

The contract explicitly required Black Cube to prevent publication of news articles and exposés. Operatives assumed false identities to target actress Rose McGowan, secretly recording at least four meetings; Ronan Farrow, The New Yorker journalist whose reporting won a Pulitzer Prize; Jodi Kantor, The New York Times reporter; and Annabella Sciorra, an alleged victim.

Subcontractors Roman Khaykin and Igor Ostrovskiy were assigned to surveil journalists. Ostrovskiy eventually became a whistleblower and one of Farrow’s primary sources, documented in Farrow’s 2019 book “Catch and Kill.”

The case generated significant ethical concerns because David Boies, Weinstein’s attorney, simultaneously represented The New York Times while signing the Black Cube contract to suppress the Times’ investigation. The Times labeled this “intolerable conduct, a grave betrayal of trust, and a breach of the basic professional standards that all lawyers are required to observe.”

Canada (2017): Judicial Harassment

Ahead of a significant Ontario Court of Appeal hearing between private equity firms Catalyst Capital and West Face Capital, a Black Cube operative targeted retired Judge Frank Newbould, the original trial judge. Using the false name “Hugo Gabriel Saavedra Rodriguez,” the operative met with Newbould in his office and at a restaurant, secretly recording both meetings in an apparent attempt to provoke anti-Semitic statements that could discredit him. The attempt failed.

Iran Nuclear Deal (2017-2018): Targeting Former Officials

Black Cube agents contacted families of former Obama administration officials Ben Rhodes and Colin Kahl, architects of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and pretended to be documentary filmmakers. Black Cube compiled detailed dossiers on both officials, including home addresses, family details, and vehicle information. The identity of the client was never established.

Hungary (2018 and 2022): Election Campaigns

Black Cube has twice operated in Hungary ahead of parliamentary elections. In 2018, operatives posed as progressive NGO supporters and approached civil society representatives linked to George Soros to obtain damaging information. A Hungarian magazine subsequently published a list of over 200 people it claimed were part of a Soros conspiracy against the government.

In 2022, the operation repeated with a network of fake LinkedIn profiles and job offers that lured at least 12 journalists and activists critical of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán into video calls. The recordings appeared in pro-Orbán media ahead of elections. In November 2022, LinkedIn confirmed Black Cube’s responsibility and removed all associated fake profiles and the company’s corporate page.

Slovenia (2025-2026): Direct Hybrid Threat

This is the most current and extensively documented case. The Slovenian Intelligence and Security Agency (SISA) confirmed that Black Cube representatives visited Slovenia four times in six months leading up to the 2026 parliamentary elections.

On December 22, 2025, Black Cube CEO Dan Zorella and board member Giora Eiland met with SDS President Janez Janša in Ljubljana. Flight data confirmed that three representatives, Zorella, Eiland, and Liron Tzur, departed from Slovenia on December 25, 2025, after an extended stop at a specific location in Ljubljana.

SISA director presented operational findings confirming Black Cube’s activities followed the company’s established methodologies: recruiting through LinkedIn fake profiles, using operatives with false identities and altered appearances, organizing in-person meetings abroad, and publishing manipulated content at pre-planned times.

Slovenian Prime Minister Robert Golob wrote to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, describing the situation as “a grave instance of foreign information manipulation and interference” and “a clear hybrid threat against the European Union.” The Slovenian government formally requested EU investigation.

Cyprus (2026): The “Emily Thompson” Video

In January 2026, a video was posted online by a purported activist named “Emily Thompson,” showing associates of Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides discussing investment projects and political access. The video triggered multiple resignations and was released days after Cyprus assumed the EU’s rotating presidency.

Black Cube confirmed its involvement in an official statement, declaring it was “proud” to have uncovered “corruption” and helped facilitate a “cleaner business environment” on the island. The company stated it obtained legal advice in every jurisdiction to ensure legality and offered to provide the 30 hours of recorded material to authorities. However, the client who paid for the operation was not disclosed. The Cypriot opposition party AKEL noted that the company’s admission “collapsed the government’s narrative of ‘hybrid wars’ and ‘Russian involvement.’”

Turkey (Date Not Specified): Illegal Organ Trafficking Operation

Black Cube is known to have conducted a direct operation in Turkey. According to a case study published on the company’s own website, it carried out an operation to expose an illegal organ trafficking network run through a Turkey-based company.

The details of this operation are as follows:

Subject: The alleged illegal activities of a Turkish organ transplantation company in cooperation with a network in Israel. The network was alleged to procure organs from impoverished individuals and sell them to wealthy patients at high prices.

Method: Black Cube conducted a comprehensive investigation to uncover the network’s structure, operational methods, and financial sources. The company’s standard methodologies were employed, including false identities, covert recordings, and strategic intelligence gathering techniques.

Result: The findings led to police investigations in the relevant countries, the issuance of Interpol red notices, and the cessation of the network’s activities. Black Cube characterized this operation as a “public interest” effort and stated it was conducted pro bono (free of charge).

This operation demonstrates that Black Cube operates not only in political and commercial spheres but also in areas such as human trafficking and organized crime. This Turkish operation is part of the company’s network of activities across more than 75 countries and is one of the rare examples publicly disclosed.

Digital Operations and Platform Responses

Meta’s (Facebook) Ban

In December 2021, Meta (Facebook’s parent company) announced it had banned seven “cyber-mercenary” groups from its platforms, including Black Cube. The company had launched a seven-month investigation that uncovered approximately 1,500 fake accounts across Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp; approximately 300 accounts linked specifically to Black Cube; and approximately 50,000 targets across more than 100 countries.

Meta’s investigation concluded that Black Cube’s targeting was “indiscriminate” and included “journalists, dissidents, critics of authoritarian governments, families of opposition leaders, and human rights activists.” Nathaniel Gleicher, head of security policy at Meta, stated: “The surveillance-for-hire industry looks like indiscriminate targeting on behalf of the highest bidder.”

This ban represents one of the few instances of corporate countermeasures against private intelligence firms.

European Response and Policy Implications

A Pattern of “Hybrid Threats”

Black Cube’s documented operations in Romania, Hungary, Slovenia, and Cyprus demonstrate a consistent pattern of interference in European democratic processes. The company has targeted the head of Romania’s anti-corruption agency, now the EU’s chief prosecutor; journalists and activists in Hungary; the Slovenian Prime Minister’s associates; and the Cypriot President’s inner circle.

These operations frequently coincide with electoral timing, leading Slovenian Prime Minister Golob to characterize Black Cube’s activities as “a clear hybrid threat against the European Union and its Member States” with potential to “negatively impact or potentially threaten our common values, procedures and political processes.”

Institutional Silence

Despite the documented pattern, the European Commission has not publicly acknowledged receiving Slovenia’s formal complaint. This silence has drawn criticism from analysts who note the EU has consistently responded to alleged Russian interference through the “Rapid Response System” and “European Democracy Shield” initiatives, while remaining unresponsive to proven Israeli private intelligence operations.

State-Intelligence Nexus

The relationship between Black Cube and the Israeli state complicates any regulatory response. Israel’s Defense Ministry classifies spyware as weapons, retaining final authority over export licenses. The same officials who oversee these classifications are often alumni of the same intelligence units that populate Black Cube’s leadership.

Conclusion: A Challenge to Democratic Sovereignty

Black Cube represents a new category of actor in international relations: the private intelligence firm with the capacity to influence electoral outcomes, judicial proceedings, and public discourse across multiple sovereign states. With offices in Tel Aviv, London, and Madrid, a staff of approximately 200, and a reported reach across 75 countries, the company’s operational scale rivals that of many national intelligence agencies.

Several patterns emerge from the documented cases:

First, Black Cube’s operations consistently target democratic processes, particularly elections and anti-corruption mechanisms. The company has intervened in elections in Nigeria (2015), Hungary (2018, 2022), and Slovenia (2026), and targeted anti-corruption prosecutors in Romania and Cyprus. In Turkey, it conducted operations in the areas of organized crime and human trafficking.

Second, the company demonstrates sophisticated operational security, establishing corporate fronts, deploying false identities, and erasing digital footprints immediately after operations conclude.

Third, the state-private intelligence nexus raises fundamental questions about sovereignty. Black Cube’s leadership includes two former Mossad directors, a former head of Israel’s National Security Council, and other senior Israeli intelligence figures, suggesting operational or tacit support from the Israeli state.

Fourth, the European Union’s failure to respond to documented Israeli private intelligence interference while vigorously addressing alleged Russian interference suggests selective application of democratic resilience principles.

The European Democracy Shield, launched in February 2026, and the European Centre for Democratic Resilience represent institutional frameworks for addressing foreign interference. As Slovenian Prime Minister Golob noted, the Slovenia case “provides a critical test of its mandate to protect Member States against foreign interference.” However, without an effective regulatory response to private intelligence actors like Black Cube, these institutions risk legitimizing a double standard in which threats from certain sources are addressed while comparable threats from others are ignored.

Future research should examine the regulatory gaps that enable private intelligence firms to operate across borders with impunity, the mechanisms by which state-linked private actors maintain plausible deniability while serving state interests, and the potential for international legal frameworks to address the unique challenges posed by this emerging category of transnational actor.

References
1. Prime Minister Robert Golob. (2026, March 18). Prime Minister Robert Golob informs the President of the European Commission of foreign interference in Slovenia’s elections in a letter. GOV.SI. https://www.gov.si/en/news/2026-03-19-prime-minister-robert-golob-informs-the-president-of-the-european-commission-of-foreign-interference-in-slovenias-elections-in-a-letter/
2. The New York Times. (2017, November 15). Deception and Ruses Fill the Toolkit of Investigators Used by Weinstein. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/15/business/deception-and-ruses-fill-the-toolkit-of-investigators-used-by-weinstein.html
3. Al Jazeera. (2021, December 17). Meta bans ‘cyber-mercenaries’ that targeted 50,000 people. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/17/meta-bans-cyber-mercenaries-spying-on-journalists-activists
4. Cyprus Radio Broadcasting Corporation. (2026, April 10). Intelligence company behind the “Emily Thompson” video. https://tr.news.rik.cy/tr/article/2026/4/10/emily-thompson-videosunun-yapiminin-arkasindaki-istihbarat-sirketi/
5. Mladina.si. (2026, March 16). Investigation Report: How Israelis Met with Janez Janša. https://www.mladina.si/247422/investigation-report/blackcube.com/committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/7803/committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/7803/html
6. Marks Gray. (2017, December 20). Attorney David Boies’s Career-Killing Ethical Breach for Weinstein. https://marksgray.com/media-law/attorney-david-boiess-career-killing-media-stories-weinstein/
7. China Press. (2021, December 16). 7 companies banned for using Facebook to monitor 10,000 people. https://www.chinapress.com.my/?p=2787960
8. Black Cube. (n.d.). Uncovering a Criminal Organ Trafficking Network. https://www.blackcube.com/case-study/pro-bono-organ-trafficking
9. GOV.SI. (2026, March 18). Press release following the meeting of the National Security Council Secretariat. https://www.gov.si/en/news/2026-03-18-press-release-following-the-meeting-of-the-national-security-council-secretariat/
10. eKathimerini.com. (2026, April 10). Israeli firm Black Cube confirms Cyprus sting to ‘expose corruption’. https://www.ekathimerini.com/politics/foreign-policy/1300775/israeli-firm-black-cube-confirms-cyprus-sting-to-expose-corruption/
11. Law.com. (2020, January 30). Boies Schiller Lawyer Testifies Firm Helped Hire Ex-Spies to Aid Harvey Weinstein. https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/01/30/boies-schiller-lawyers-says-firm-helped-hire-ex-spies-to-aid-harvey-weinstein/
12. NEWSru.co.il. (2021, December 17). Meta announces it has blocked access to the Facebook platform for four Israeli cyber-espionage companies. https://www.newsru.co.il/finance/17dec2021/facebook302.html
13. AKEL. (2026, April 14). Five days after the Black Cube company’s statement on Videogate, the Christodoulides government still maintains its deafening silence. https://akel.org.cy/black-cube/?lang=tr
14. RT International. (2026, April 27). Wired for War: Why is the EU ignoring the Israeli cyber threat?. https://rtnewsru.com/news/639159-israel-spies-eu-pegasus/
15. The Jerusalem Post. (2026, May 19). Black Cube doubles office space in Tel Aviv. http://members.jpost.com/business-and-innovation/article-896834
16. ⁠Black Cube. (n.d.). Uncovering a Criminal Organ Trafficking Network. https://www.blackcube.com/case-study/pro-bono-organ-trafficking
Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
Aarhus University, 1997
Independent Researcher
Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures.

Black Cube: Özel İstihbarat Firmalarının Yükselişi ve Demokratik Süreçlere Etkileri – İsrail-Mossad Bağlantısı
July 21, 2026
Strategic Shift on Geopolitical Fault Lines: Military Doctrine, Regional Spillover, and Global Economic-Political Consequences of Infrastructure Warfare in the U.S.-Iran Conflict

The Strategic Logic and Risks of Tactical Target Expansion

In international security studies, one of the most critical elements determining the course of a conflict is the qualitative shifts that occur in the rules of engagement and target selection. Military history demonstrates that an innovation at the tactical level or an expansion of the target set often triggers an escalation dynamic that surpasses political objectives and produces uncontrollable strategic consequences. In the U.S. military operation against Iran, the expansion of firepower beyond exclusively military facilities and nuclear infrastructure to systematically target the critical transportation and logistics backbone that sustains the country’s economic and societal resilience represents precisely this kind of turning point. This new phase, crystallized by the July 16 strikes, has ceased to be a classical instrument of coercive diplomacy and has evolved into a strategy of “systemic attrition” aimed at systematically collapsing the adversary’s war-making capacity and its ability to recover.

The simultaneous targeting of bridges and railway connections, port surveillance infrastructure, and naval bases around the Bandar Abbas and Chabahar ports reveals that this operation is not merely a show of force but possesses a calculated architecture aimed at paralyzing the geo-economic nerve endings of the Iranian state. This strategy aims to leave Iran with two fundamental choices: either to accept the political conditions imposed by the U.S. and come to the negotiating table, or to be dragged into a spiral of increasing economic collapse and internal instability. However, empirical developments on the ground demonstrate that Tehran has not consented to either of these options, preferring instead a “third way” suited to its strategic culture and asymmetric capacity, one that radically alters the parameters of the conflict: horizontal escalation. This article subjects the multidimensional consequences of this strategic shift to an in-depth analysis through the lenses of military doctrine, regional security architecture, the fragility of global supply chains, and the U.S. decision-making processes caught between domestic politics and foreign strategy.

The Transformation of Target Selection: The Strategic Shift from Military Facilities to the Logistics Backbone

Classical air power theory assumes that the enemy’s command and control centers, air defense networks, and combatant elements are the priority targets. The initial waves of U.S. strikes on Iran largely adhered to this framework, prioritizing air defense batteries, coastal defense missile systems, patrol boats, and naval bases. However, with the July 16 wave, the inclusion of transportation infrastructure in the target set is a leap that elevates the level of war from tactical engagement to the operational and even strategic plane. The aim of these strikes is not solely to sever the supply lines of the Iranian navy but also to undermine strategic projects such as Chabahar, which serves as Iran’s gateway to the East and facilitates its integration into international trade.

This shift in targeting has had two primary effects on Iran’s strategic calculus. First, unlike purely military facilities, the striking of this dual-use civilian-military infrastructure has provided the Iranian regime with powerful propaganda material within the framework of international law and war crimes, strengthening the narrative of “encirclement” within domestic public opinion. Second, and more importantly, these strikes have provided Iran with a legitimacy ground for asymmetric retaliation. For the Iranian regime, aware that it cannot offer a conventional response, spreading the cost and pain of the attack to U.S. regional allies and interests has become the main pillar of its survival strategy. At this point, Iran’s “front expansion” strategy should be read not as an admission of weakness but as a deliberate form of power projection.

Tehran’s Multi-Front Retaliation Architecture: The Simultaneity of Proxy Forces and Direct Engagement

Iran’s horizontal escalation strategy consists of a complex combination of asymmetric attacks conducted through its network of proxy forces and direct engagements by the Quds Force elements affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The most critical feature of this strategy is its capacity to create simultaneous engagements across multiple geographic fronts at varying intensities. Examining the fundamental elements that constitute this multi-layered architecture separately is essential to grasp the holistic picture of the strategy.

The Gulf Arab States hold a special place in Iran’s horizontal escalation strategy. Countries like Bahrain and Kuwait have become a front where critical infrastructure and U.S. bases are targeted through direct missile and unmanned aerial vehicle attacks or via local cells. The strategic aim here is to deter U.S. allies in the Gulf, force them to distance themselves from Washington’s strategy, and restrict the operational freedom of the Fifth Fleet, particularly its headquarters in Bahrain. These attacks, directly threatening the economic and political stability of the Gulf states, aim to shake the foundations of the U.S. regional alliance system.

The Yemen and Red Sea Front constitutes one of Iran’s most potent asymmetric levers. The intensification of attacks on commercial and military vessels in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait through the Houthis creates enormous global economic pressure on the U.S. and its allies to end the conflict by threatening one of the most critical chokepoints of global trade. Perhaps the most strategic aspect of this move is that it renders the routes seen as alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz equally insecure. Thus, without assuming the colossal risks of closing Hormuz itself, Iran can manipulate the flow of global energy and trade.

The Levant and Mesopotamia geography is a complex chessboard where Iran simultaneously employs both direct and indirect means of engagement. While direct attacks are carried out against U.S. elements in Syria, such as the presence around the Al-Tanf base, continuous and low-intensity pressure is sustained against the U.S. military presence and diplomatic facilities in Iraq through Shia militia groups. The ultimate goal here is to completely expel the U.S. from its strategic presence in the Levant and to wear down Washington by making the political and military cost in Iraq perpetual. The simultaneous activation of these three fronts demonstrates that Iran is pursuing a proactive strategy aimed at setting the agenda and geography of the conflict, rather than merely passive retaliation.

Pressure on the Global Energy and Logistics Architecture: From Graduated Threat to Systemic Crisis

The most devastating potential of the U.S.-Iran conflict lies in its capacity to paralyze the fragile network of maritime trade and energy logistics upon which the global economy is built. The threat is not limited to the disruption of oil and liquefied natural gas shipments passing through the Strait of Hormuz. The problem now is the proliferation of threat vectors and the progressive securitization of alternative routes as well.

Even before the strikes began, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates had invested billions of dollars in strategic pipelines and alternative ports to reduce their dependency on Hormuz. However, Iran’s horizontal escalation strategy places these alternatives directly in the crosshairs. Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline was built as a vital artery to bypass Hormuz by connecting the rich oil fields in the country’s east to the Yanbu terminal on the Red Sea coast. Yet, the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea make exports from this terminal equally risky. A tanker departing from Yanbu now means it must overcome the Bab el-Mandeb obstacle, a situation that largely nullifies the strategic value of this route developed as an alternative to Hormuz.

A similar vulnerability applies to the Port of Fujairah, the United Arab Emirates’ largest alternative export gateway. Strategically located just outside the Strait of Hormuz on the coast of the Arabian Sea, this port is within Iran’s direct military range and can be easily threatened in the event of a conflict. Disruptions in exports originating from Fujairah would directly hit the UAE’s economic resilience and cause a severe contraction in the volume of oil supplied to global markets. At the intersection of all these scenarios, the picture awaiting global markets is not merely one of a simple price increase. The world economy could face a multi-headed cost inflation triggered by a spike in energy costs, an astronomical rise in maritime shipping insurance premiums, extended voyage durations due to ships being rerouted around Africa, and an explosion in container freight rates. This shock striking the global food and fertilizer supply chains, which were already trying to recover from the post-COVID era and have not yet overcome the effects of the Russo-Ukrainian war, could lead to serious food security crises and political instability, particularly in the Global South.

Washington’s Strategic Schizophrenia: The Gap Between Indo-Pacific Rhetoric and Middle Eastern Reality

While this multi-front and attritional escalation continues on the ground, the strategic rhetoric emanating from Washington displays a striking dissonance. President Trump positioning China and communism as major strategic threats in his national address, and Secretary of State Rubio strongly echoing this discourse, confirms that the fundamental priority of the U.S. national security bureaucracy is now indisputably Great Power Competition and the Indo-Pacific geography. This orientation is in full alignment with all strategic documents published by the U.S. in recent years. The simultaneous rekindling of election security debates further strengthens the impression that the administration is trying to manage its legitimacy crises in domestic politics through the perception of external threat.

However, the deep contradiction between this rhetoric and the intensity of the military engagement in the Middle East constitutes the very essence of the strategic dilemma facing the administration. Washington is trying to solve an impossible equation: on the one hand, aiming to “re-establish deterrence” by pressuring Iran militarily, while on the other hand, attempting to keep this conflict limited and controllable in order to mobilize its scarce resources against China, which it defines as the primary rival. Yet, a conflict that deepens and spreads to new fronts with each passing day renders this very strategic prioritization unimplementable. The U.S. Navy, while having to shift some of its critical combatant elements to the Pacific, is trying to simultaneously maintain a credible deterrent posture against Iran in the Strait of Hormuz, protect freedom of navigation under the Houthi threat in the Red Sea, and balance Russia’s presence in the Eastern Mediterranean with the limited number of warships it has left in the Middle East. This evokes classical cases of “imperial overstretch” in history. This situation gradually transforms the U.S. presence in the region from a product of long-term strategic planning into a spiral of instantaneous and increasingly costly tactical reactions given to day to day crises. The fact that an administration grappling with election security debates domestically and trying to build a narrative of national unity over the China threat is compelled to deal with a regional conflagration abroad that it has itself created and is increasingly unable to control reveals the deep rationality problem in its decision-making processes.

Conclusion and Prospective Assessment: The Geopolitical and Economic Cost of Uncontrolled Escalation

The strategic decision to target critical logistics infrastructure in the U.S. operation against Iran, while yielding certain short-term tactical gains, has ignited a highly costly and unpredictable escalation spiral at the strategic level. Tehran’s response to this move, namely escalating the conflict horizontally by simultaneously activating proxy forces and direct engagement tools across a vast geography stretching from the Gulf to the Red Sea, and from Syria to Iraq, has pushed the U.S. precisely to the point it sought to avoid: the brink of a multi-front, attritional regional war with no end in sight.

The massive dissonance between Washington’s Indo-Pacific focused strategic rhetoric and its ever-deepening military engagement in the Middle East should be read as a signal of “overstretch” that seriously questions the U.S.’s global power projection capability. The price of this strategic dilemma is likely to be paid not only by the regional countries directly party to the conflict but by the entire world economy, through a chain reaction ranging from spikes in energy prices to food security, from the collapse of maritime insurance to global inflation. In the final analysis, this prolonged war, projecting an image of failed crisis management, directly and concretely threatens the economic welfare of American citizens above all. As history has repeatedly shown, such foreign policy failures that hit the voters’ pockets will inevitably have a consequence at the ballot box. This situation represents the most urgent and vital strategic matter for U.S. decision makers; for the instantaneous shows of force undertaken today for the sake of short-term tactical gains are producing strategic consequences that will irreversibly shape not only the present but the geopolitical and political economic architecture of the coming decades.

References

Freedman, Lawrence. Strategy: A History. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. New York: Random House, 1987.

Pape, Robert A. Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996.

Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.

The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC, October 2022.

U.S. Department of Defense. Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge. Washington, DC, 2018.

U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). “The Strait of Hormuz is the world’s most important oil transit chokepoint.” June 21, 2022.

Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
Aarhus University, 1997
Independent Researcher
Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures.

Jeopolitik Kırılma Hatlarında Stratejik Kayma: ABD-İran Çatışmasında Altyapı Savaşının Askerî Doktrin, Bölgesel Yayılma ve Küresel Ekonomi-Politik Sonuçları

July 19, 2026
From Orbit to the Underground: China’s Revolutionary SAR Satellite and the Discovery of the Planet’s Hidden Depths

A New View from the Sky

Humanity has been observing our planet from space since the launch of Sputnik in 1957. Until now, however, this observation has been almost entirely limited to the Earth’s surface. The depths of the oceans, beneath the polar ice caps, terrain hidden by dense vegetation, and especially the earth’s crust beneath our feet have remained largely closed to the curious gaze from space.

China’s latest move is radically changing this boundary. The newly launched next-generation satellite has made history as one of the first operational systems capable of imaging the inside of the earth’s crust from orbit by combining synthetic aperture radar (SAR) technology with low-frequency electromagnetic wave analysis. This satellite, reported to have been developed under the “Ludi Tanshi” (Land Exploration) program, can simultaneously use P-band and L-band frequencies to collect data at different depth and resolution levels.

Technical Infrastructure and Working Principles

The Evolution of Synthetic Aperture Radar

Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) is an imaging technique that processes radar echoes collected by a moving antenna to achieve the resolution that a physically much larger antenna would provide. Traditional SAR systems generally operate in X-band (8-12 GHz), C-band (4-8 GHz) or S-band (2-4 GHz) frequencies and show extraordinary success in surface imaging. However, these high-frequency signals are extremely limited in their ability to penetrate soil and rock.

China’s new satellite breaks through this frequency barrier by using a system that can operate in P-band (approximately 300 MHz to 1 GHz) and partially in VHF bands. Low-frequency electromagnetic waves, thanks to their longer wavelengths, can penetrate materials such as soil, sand, rock and even concrete. Although penetration depth varies depending on the conductivity and dielectric properties of the material, it can be between 100 and 500 meters under ideal conditions (in low-conductivity environments such as dry sand and limestone).

Dual-Band Hybrid System

One of the satellite’s most critical technical features is its ability to operate P-band and L-band (1-2 GHz) radars simultaneously. This dual-band architecture allows targets at different depths and of different scales to be detected at the same time. P-band radar provides deeper penetration (100-500m) but has relatively low resolution; it is used for detecting large-scale geological structures, deep bunkers and fault lines. L-band radar, on the other hand, offers shallower penetration (20-50m) but much higher resolution; it is effective in detailed mapping of near-surface tunnels, pipelines, archaeological remains and military fortifications. The interferometric combination of these two data streams (InSAR technique) enables the creation of three-dimensional models of underground structures.

Phase Change Analysis and Dielectric Contrast

The basic physical principle of underground imaging is the reflection of electromagnetic waves at the boundaries between media with different dielectric properties. The dielectric difference between the concrete wall of an underground bunker and the surrounding soil causes part of the radar signal to be reflected back. The Chinese satellite is equipped with receivers sensitive enough to detect these extremely weak reflections.

One of the innovative aspects of the system is phase change analysis. A signal reflected from an underground cavity or a structure of different density shows a phase difference compared to signals coming from its surroundings. These phase differences are measured at the millisecond level to obtain information about the location, size and even shape of underground anomalies. Signal processing algorithms developed by the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC) combine this phase data with AI-supported analysis to minimize false positives and increase detection accuracy.

Orbit and Satellite Constellation Architecture

The satellite is deployed in a sun-synchronous orbit (SSO) at an altitude of approximately 500-600 km. This orbital choice provides the advantage of imaging the same region under similar illumination conditions on each pass and facilitates change detection. Furthermore, rather than a single satellite, a constellation architecture consisting of three or four satellites is planned. In this way, the revisit time for the same region will be reduced to under 24 hours, tomographic underground maps will be created through multi-angle imaging, and the total capacity and global coverage area of the system will be increased.

Comparative Technical Superiority

To understand China’s position in this field, a comparison with existing systems is necessary. China’s Ludi Tanshi system uses P/L-band frequencies to offer 100-500 meter penetration and 3-10 meter resolution and is currently operational. Argentina’s SAOCOM system uses L-band, providing 10-20 meter penetration and 10-30 meter resolution, and is operational. Japan’s ALOS-2 PALSAR system uses L-band to deliver 5-15 meter penetration and 10-30 meter resolution and is operational. The European Space Agency’s Biomass system aims for 50-100 meter penetration and 50-100 meter resolution using P-band and is planned for launch in 2025. The US-India partnership NISAR is planned for 2024, using L/S-band to offer 10-20 meter penetration and 3-10 meter resolution. As can be seen, China’s system demonstrates a clear superiority over all existing and planned competitors in terms of both penetration depth and resolution. In particular, the P-band and L-band combination largely eliminates the traditional trade-off between depth and resolution.

Scientific and Civil Application Areas

Geology and Earthquake Prediction

One of the most important civil applications of the underground imaging satellite is the monitoring of active fault lines. While more than 90% of major earthquakes worldwide occur on known active fault lines, our knowledge of the deep geometry of these faults and the amount of accumulated stress is extremely limited. Current methods rely either on surface observations or on a limited number of deep boreholes and seismic measurement stations.

The Chinese satellite can revolutionize earthquake hazard assessments by mapping the depth, inclination and lateral continuity of fault planes from orbit. In particular, critical regions such as the Longmenshan Fault Line (the source of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake), one of the world’s most active fault systems located on China’s own territory, and the eastern extensions of the North Anatolian Fault Line can be continuously monitored.

The elastic deformation accumulating along fault lines changes the dielectric properties underground. The development of micro-cracks in rocks under stress, changes in water content and mineralogical transformations affect the reflection patterns of radar signals. Monitoring these changes over time may enable the detection of earthquake precursors. The China Earthquake Administration (CEA) aims to integrate data obtained from this satellite with existing seismic networks to develop medium-term prediction models, particularly for earthquakes above magnitude 6.

Geothermal Energy and Natural Resource Exploration

The thermal structure of the earth’s crust is critical in determining geothermal energy potential. Hot rock formations, magma chambers and hydrothermal systems exhibit dielectric properties different from the surrounding rocks. The satellite’s P-band radar can detect these thermal anomalies up to depths of 300-400 meters from the surface.

Similarly, mineral deposits and underground water reservoirs can be discovered more quickly and at lower cost thanks to this technology. While traditional mineral exploration methods require intensive drilling and geophysical surveys, satellite-based underground imaging can reduce exploration costs by up to 60% by pre-identifying potential areas.

It is planned to use this technology for mineral and water resource exploration in countries within the scope of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, particularly in Central Asia and Africa. This constitutes the technological pillar of China’s global resource security strategy.

Urban Planning, Infrastructure Safety and Disaster Management

Modern cities rise upon complex underground infrastructure networks: metro tunnels, sewage systems, drinking water networks, electricity and communication cables, natural gas pipelines. The mapping of this infrastructure is often incomplete or outdated, especially in historic cities or rapidly urbanizing areas.

Satellite-based underground imaging enables the non-invasive detection of this infrastructure. In particular, cavities, weak ground zones and underground water flow paths along tunnel routes can be identified in advance during pre-construction ground surveys for metro construction. In monitoring infrastructure aging, leaks in old water pipes can be detected as they change the dielectric properties of the ground. Regarding sinkhole and subsidence risk, underground cavities in karstic terrains can be identified before collapse occurs.

The underground cavity disaster that occurred in Shanghai in 2021, causing a shopping center to collapse, painfully demonstrated the importance of such technology. The new satellite can play a proactive role in preventing similar disasters.

Archaeology: Discovering History Without Digging the Soil

Archaeology is perhaps the field that will benefit most excitingly from underground imaging technology. Worldwide, especially in Mesopotamia, Egypt, China, India and Central America, thousands of yet undiscovered ancient settlements, temples, tombs and infrastructure remains lie buried beneath the soil.

Traditional archaeological discovery relies either on chance finds or surface surveys. While geophysical methods (magnetometer, ground-penetrating radar) are effective, their application over large areas is impractical in terms of time and cost. The satellite-based system can scan hundreds of square kilometers in a single pass, marking potential archaeological sites.

China’s own territory holds enormous potential in this regard. Buried caravanserais along the Silk Road route, Neolithic settlements in the Yellow River basin, submerged cities in the Yangtze delta and undiscovered tombs from the Qin Dynasty are among the targets of this technology. The National Cultural Heritage Administration (NCHA) plans to integrate data obtained from the satellite into national archaeological inventory studies.

Climate Change and Permafrost Monitoring

The thawing of permafrost (frozen ground) due to global warming is a critical issue for both infrastructure safety and greenhouse gas emissions. Permafrost areas in northeastern China and on the Tibetan Plateau have been rapidly degrading in recent years. The satellite’s radar penetration capability allows monitoring of the active layer thickness of permafrost, the distribution of ice lenses within it and thawing processes over wide areas.

This data can be used to assess the safety of infrastructure built on permafrost, such as the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, and to improve climate models. The Tibetan Plateau Research Institute within the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) plans to calibrate regional climate change models by integrating permafrost data obtained from the satellite with existing field measurements.

Military-Strategic Dimension and Global Balances

Detection of Underground Military Facilities

In military strategy, underground facilities are the primary method used to protect the most critical elements, from nuclear weapons to command centers, from missile launch ramps to ammunition depots. During the Cold War, the US and USSR built massive underground complexes carved into mountains; today, countries such as Iran, North Korea and China have moved a significant portion of their military infrastructure underground.

China’s new satellite offers a game-changing capability in detecting these facilities. P-band radar can detect cavities carved into hard rocks such as granite or limestone thanks to the dielectric contrast with the surrounding rock. This is particularly critical for deep underground bunkers (DUGs), meaning command centers and shelters at depths of 100-500 meters; for buried missile silos, namely ballistic missile launch facilities hidden under concrete and soil; for underground tunnel networks, especially fortifications on the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait coast and South China Sea islands; and for secret underground production facilities in the context of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons production plants.

Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Stability

The ability to detect the locations and depths of underground military facilities has a direct impact on nuclear deterrence doctrines. The second-strike capability of nuclear weapons largely depends on protecting the weapons and the chain of command from being destroyed in a first strike. If one side knows the location and vulnerabilities of all the other side’s underground facilities, the possibility of completely destroying the second-strike capability with a first strike theoretically increases.

This situation can negatively affect strategic stability. During the Cold War, stability was based on the inviolability of the parties’ second-strike capabilities. The increased transparency of underground facilities can weaken this perception of inviolability and increase the risk of escalation in times of crisis.

However, there is an important nuance here: China, as the country developing this technology, possesses an asymmetric advantage. Whether its own facilities can be similarly detected by the opposing side depends on when rival states achieve similar technology. This temporary window of asymmetry is considered an important factor in China’s strategic planning.

Integration with the Belt and Road Initiative

China’s military-strategic objectives are intertwined with its economic expansion strategy. The ports, railways and energy transmission lines built under the Belt and Road Initiative are also part of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) logistics network. The underground imaging satellite can be used not only to provide ground surveys prior to the construction of this infrastructure but also to detect foreign military presence at strategic points.

For example, this satellite can monitor whether there are secret underground facilities or tunnels of other states around Gwadar Port (Pakistan), Hambantota (Sri Lanka) or the Chinese military base in Djibouti. This is a factor that increases China’s global situational awareness.

The Taiwan Strait and Regional Military Balances

Taiwan is one of the actors investing most heavily in underground military facilities. On the island’s mountainous east coast, there are massive air bases carved into rock (for example, Jiashan and Chihhang underground air bases), submarine shelters and command centers. China’s new satellite can reveal the exact locations, dimensions and potential vulnerabilities of these facilities.

This is a critical intelligence advantage that increases the PLA’s targeting precision and first-strike effectiveness in a potential conflict scenario. Similarly, verifying whether underground fortifications built on artificial islands in the South China Sea have been detected by the opposing side is also possible with this satellite.

Space Surveillance and Counter-Space Capabilities

Since the satellite itself is a space asset, it must be protected against the opposing side’s anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities. China has likely taken measures to protect this satellite, such as rapid orbit change maneuver capability, a frequency-hopping radar system against electronic jamming, a redundant satellite constellation architecture (even if one satellite is lost, the others continue the mission), and ground backup and rapid launch capability (quickly placing a replacement into orbit in case of loss).

International Law, Ethics and Regulatory Issues

Underground Surveillance within the Framework of Space Law

Current international space law is primarily based on the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. This treaty envisages the use of space for peaceful purposes but does not explicitly prohibit military satellites and reconnaissance activities. The interpretation of the term “peaceful” has been controversial since the Cold War and is in practice accepted to cover non-aggressive military uses.

In the context of the underground imaging satellite, the following legal questions arise: Within the framework of national sovereignty and underground privacy, a state’s airspace sovereignty is defined, but what about the underground? Since observation from space is not considered a violation of airspace, should underground surveillance be evaluated in the same category? In the context of detecting cross-border underground resources, how should the detection of underground resources within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) by another state be evaluated under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)? Regarding the detection of military facilities and espionage, is the systematic scanning of a state’s underground military facilities by another state lawful in peacetime? There are no clear answers to these questions yet, and the international community will need to develop new norms on this issue.

The Ethical Dimension: The Right of the Invisible

Throughout human history, the underground has been a shelter, a hiding place. Caves were the refuge of early humans; underground cities were the sanctuary of those fleeing persecution; deep bunkers were the last bastion of leaders under nuclear threat. The elimination of this “invisibility” characteristic of the underground by technology brings with it a philosophical and ethical problem: In a world where everything can be seen, will there remain a spatial dimension to privacy and security?

Especially when it comes to archaeological sites, this technology also questions the balance between “discovery” and “respect.” Ancient tombs, sacred sites and the ancestral lands of indigenous peoples may not wish to be discovered. The ability of technology to detect these areas non-invasively is an advantage, but how this information will be used and who will control it is a critical ethical issue.

Arms Race and Technological Proliferation

This technological leap by China will inevitably trigger a response. The US, European Union, Russia and India are expected to accelerate their programs to develop similar or superior capabilities. The “Subterranean Challenge” and “Earth MRI” programs run by the US through DARPA, the ESA’s Biomass mission and Russia’s Kondor-FKA series are the first signals of this race.

The cost of this new arms race is not only economic but also strategic. To the extent that the increased transparency of the underground shakes the fundamental assumptions of nuclear deterrence, states may turn to riskier strategies: greater investment in mobile launch platforms, increasing underwater nuclear capability or accelerating space-based weapon systems.

Regulatory Proposals

The following steps can be proposed for the international community to adapt to this new technology: Regarding the development of underground surveillance norms, rules of conduct concerning the use of underground surveillance technologies should be developed within the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). In the context of transparency and confidence-building measures, states should mutually notify the existence and capabilities of such satellites and conclude bilateral agreements limiting the targeting of military facilities. Within the framework of scientific cooperation, the sharing of data obtained from this technology in civilian fields such as geology, archaeology and disaster management should be encouraged. According to the ethical framework, the consent of the relevant country and local communities should be sought in the detection of archaeological and cultural sites; the commercialization and exploitation of data should be prevented.

Future Perspective and Conclusion

China’s new-generation underground imaging satellite represents a breaking point in the way we perceive the Earth. This technology, capable of penetrating beyond the surface into the earth’s crust, has the potential to revolutionize numerous fields, from scientific discovery to military intelligence, from urban planning to archaeology.

However, this potential also brings with it serious responsibilities and risks. The risk of military espionage and strategic instability, gaps in international law and ethical dilemmas stand before us as the consequences of the uncontrolled proliferation of the technology.

In the short term (1-3 years), the intelligence advantage China will gain from this satellite will affect military balances, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. In the medium term (3-7 years), as other major powers develop similar systems, underground transparency will become a global phenomenon and nuclear strategies will be reshaped. In the long term (7-15 years), this technology may become a standard tool in civil applications such as earthquake prediction, resource exploration and climate change monitoring, and may profoundly transform humanity’s relationship with its planet.

Ultimately, China’s technological achievement is as much a product of human curiosity and the desire for exploration as it is a manifestation of great power competition. This dual nature is the fundamental dynamic that will determine how the technology is used and what it brings to humanity. What is promising is that the same satellite can both save thousands of lives by predicting an earthquake in advance and enrich our common human heritage by discovering a buried ancient city. Technology itself is neutral; whether we use it for the benefit or harm of humanity will be our common choice.

References

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Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
Aarhus University, 1997
Independent Researcher
Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures.

Yörüngeden Yeraltına: Çin’in Devrimci SAR Uydusu ve Gezegenin Gizli Derinliklerinin Keşfi

July 18, 2026
Storing Gravity: An Interdisciplinary Examination of the Role of China’s Daofu Pumped Storage Hydropower Station in Energy Systems Transformation
On the Threshold of the Energy Storage Era

The energy paradigm of the twenty first century is characterized by a profound contradiction: humanity, for the first time in its history, possesses the technological capacity to produce enough energy for the vast majority of the planet; yet it faces serious structural limitations in consuming or storing this energy at the moment of its production. Solar panels operate at maximum capacity during midday hours but cannot meet the rising demand in the evening. Wind turbines produce excess energy on stormy nights but remain idle on calm summer days. This temporal mismatch constitutes one of the most fundamental technical and economic problems of the renewable energy revolution.

The massive construction site rising in the Daofu region, located in the northwestern part of China’s Sichuan Province, represents one of the most striking responses to this problem. Situated at an elevation of approximately 3,500 meters above sea level on the eastern edge of the Tibetan Plateau, the Daofu Pumped Storage Hydropower Station is not merely an energy infrastructure project; it is also a paradigmatic intervention into the concept of energy storage. By transcending the limitations of chemical batteries, the project applies one of the oldest and most reliable forms of energy storage, gravitational potential energy, on an unprecedented scale.

Technical Anatomy of the Daofu Project

Geographic Location and Topographic Advantages

The Daofu Pumped Storage Hydropower Station is located within the boundaries of the Garzê Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan Province, near Daofu County. The region lies in the complex topographic belt where the Tibetan Plateau descends eastward, transitioning into the Sichuan Basin. This location provides the project with two critical advantages: first, a steep topographic gradient that enables the creation of an extraordinary hydraulic head (pressure height) between the lower and upper reservoirs; second, the project’s proximity to the abundant water resources of the Tibetan Plateau and the region’s steadily growing renewable energy infrastructure.

The most striking technical parameter of the project is the maximum hydraulic head of approximately 760.7 meters between the two reservoirs. This value is among the highest for pumped storage hydropower facilities on a global scale and constitutes the fundamental factor determining the project’s energy density. The relationship between hydraulic head and the potential energy that can be stored can be explained through basic physics principles:

E_p equals m multiplied by g multiplied by h

Where E_p represents potential energy (Joules), m represents water mass (kilograms), g represents gravitational acceleration (9.81 meters per second squared), and h represents hydraulic head (meters). A hydraulic head of 760.7 meters means approximately 2.5 times more energy storage capacity for the same amount of water compared to a facility with a head of 300 meters. This simple physical relationship explains why Daofu is being built specifically in this region: topography is the determining variable of energy storage efficiency.

System Architecture and Technical Specifications

The system architecture of the Daofu Pumped Storage Hydropower Station is based on classical pumped storage hydropower principles, yet it draws attention with its scale and technical parameters. The project’s installed power capacity has been set at 2.1 GW (2,100 MW). The designed annual electricity generation is approximately 2.994 billion kWh. The maximum hydraulic head between the two reservoirs reaches approximately 760.7 meters. The system’s daily energy storage capacity has been calculated at approximately 12.6 million kWh. This amount is considered equivalent to the daily electricity consumption of approximately 2 million households. Construction of the project, which began in January 2024, is taking place at an elevation of approximately 3,500 meters.

These parameters offer striking reference points for grasping the scale of the project. An installed power capacity of 2.1 GW is roughly equivalent to half the planned total capacity of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant (4.8 GW), Turkey’s largest nuclear energy project. A daily storage capacity of 12.6 million kWh represents an amount of energy equivalent to approximately 630,000 electric vehicle batteries with a capacity of 20 kWh each.

The system’s operating cycle is fundamentally a reversible process consisting of two stages:

Pumping Phase (Energy Storage): During hours when electricity demand is low and renewable energy production is high (typically between midnight and early morning), the system uses excess electricity to operate high capacity pumps. These pumps transport water from the lower reservoir to the upper reservoir located more than 760 meters above. In this phase, electrical energy is converted into the gravitational potential energy of water.

Turbining Phase (Energy Generation): During peak demand hours (typically evening hours), water from the upper reservoir is released in a controlled manner. Gaining kinetic energy throughout its descent of hundreds of meters, the water rotates the turbines at the lower reservoir level, enabling the generators to produce electricity. In this phase, the water’s potential energy is converted into kinetic energy and ultimately into electrical energy.

This bidirectional energy conversion process forms the basis for conceptualizing the system as a “battery.” Energy stored through electrochemical reactions in a chemical battery is stored here in a physical medium: a body of water positioned at height.

Efficiency and Thermodynamic Limits

The round trip efficiency of pumped storage hydropower systems is defined as the ratio of the energy obtained during the turbining phase to the energy consumed during the pumping phase. In modern pumped storage hydropower facilities, this ratio typically ranges between 70 and 80 percent. The high hydraulic head of the Daofu Project may serve as a factor that increases turbine efficiency, since the hydrodynamic performance of turbine blades is generally higher in high pressure heads.

However, the first law of thermodynamics firmly establishes that no energy storage system can achieve 100 percent efficiency. Energy losses occurring in electric motors during pumping, in frictional pipe flow, and in generators during turbining constitute the unavoidable efficiency limits of the system. Frictional losses in pipes can be modeled using the Darcy Weisbach equation:

h_f equals f multiplied by (L divided by D) multiplied by (v squared divided by 2g)

Where h_f represents friction induced head loss, f represents the friction factor, L represents pipe length, D represents pipe diameter, and v represents flow velocity. In large scale projects like Daofu, pipe diameters are optimized and friction is reduced through interior surface coatings to minimize these losses.

Nevertheless, the round trip efficiency of pumped storage hydropower systems in the 70 to 80 percent range makes them one of the most efficient large scale energy storage technologies available today. Although lower compared to the 85 to 95 percent efficiency of lithium ion batteries, the much longer cycle life and far greater scalability advantages of pumped storage hydropower offset this efficiency difference.

Comparative Analysis of Energy Storage Technologies

Chemical Storage: The Battery Era

Lithium ion batteries have spearheaded a revolutionary transformation in the field of energy storage over the past two decades. The decline in costs by approximately 90 percent since 2010 has enabled the commercialization of electric vehicles and accelerated the proliferation of grid scale battery systems. As of 2023, global lithium ion battery production capacity has exceeded the 1 TWh threshold.

Nevertheless, lithium ion batteries face structural problems in large scale energy storage applications:

Raw Material Constraints: The extraction of critical minerals such as lithium, cobalt, and nickel is geographically concentrated. Approximately 70 percent of cobalt production takes place in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which exposes supply chains to geopolitical risks. Lithium is primarily extracted in Australia, Chile, and China, with more than 60 percent of processing capacity concentrated in China.

Cycle Life and Degradation: A typical lithium ion battery cell loses 20 percent of its capacity after 3,000 to 5,000 full charge discharge cycles. This poses a significant limitation for grid scale storage systems that may need to perform more than one cycle per day.

Safety and Thermal Management: The risk of thermal runaway in large scale battery systems requires comprehensive cooling and monitoring systems. The fire at the Victoria Big Battery project in Australia in 2021 provided a concrete example of these risks.

Scale Limitations: The largest lithium ion battery storage facility in operation today, the Moss Landing Project in California, has a storage capacity of 1.6 GWh. Daofu’s daily storage capacity of 12.6 GWh is approximately eight times this value.

Mechanical Storage: Gravity and Pressure

Mechanical energy storage systems are technologies that store energy in physical media, in the form of potential energy, kinetic energy, or pressure. Pumped storage hydropower is the most mature and most widespread technology in this category.

Pumped Storage Hydropower: Accounting for more than 90 percent of global energy storage capacity, pumped storage hydropower stands out with operational lifetimes of 50 to 100 years. A pumped storage hydropower facility can operate for more than 50,000 cycles with minimal capacity loss. Its main disadvantages are high initial capital costs (typically 1,000 to 2,500 US dollars per kW) and the requirement for suitable geographical conditions.

Compressed Air Energy Storage (CAES): This technology, which stores energy in the form of compressed air in underground caverns, offers scalability advantages similar to pumped storage hydropower. However, conventional CAES systems use natural gas to heat the air and are therefore not an entirely clean solution. Advanced adiabatic CAES systems aim to solve this problem.

Gravity Batteries: These systems, developed by companies such as Energy Vault, store energy as gravitational potential energy using cranes and heavy blocks. However, the scale of these systems is still very limited compared to pumped storage hydropower (typically at the MWh level).

Complementarity Rather Than Competition in Energy Storage

The relationship between different energy storage technologies should be conceptualized as a complementary ecosystem rather than a zero sum competition. Each technology serves different niches along the dimensions of discharge duration, response speed, scalability, and cost. Lithium ion batteries are ideal for short duration storage and frequency regulation, ranging from milliseconds to a few hours. Pumped storage hydropower systems are optimized for long duration storage of 6 to 24 hours and daily load shifting. Chemical storage solutions such as green hydrogen offer seasonal storage potential (from summer sun to winter electricity).

The Daofu Project targets the “long duration, large scale storage” niche within this ecosystem. The abundant hydropower and increasingly growing solar energy capacity in Sichuan cause excess energy to be generated during daytime hours. Daofu will be able to store this excess energy and make it available during evening peak demand, thereby optimizing the grid integration of renewable energy.

China’s Energy Transformation Strategy and the Role of Pumped Storage Hydropower

Carbon Neutrality Target and Storage Requirements

The People’s Republic of China announced its target of achieving carbon neutrality by 2060 at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2020. This target requires a fundamental transformation in the energy system of the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter. In 2023, China installed 216 GW of new solar energy capacity, single handedly realizing more than half of global solar energy growth. However, this rapid growth creates serious problems in terms of grid stability.

According to data from China’s National Energy Administration, the curtailment rate of solar and wind energy exceeds 10 percent in some regions of the country. This means that the clean energy produced cannot be integrated into the grid and goes to waste. Energy storage systems are seen as a critical infrastructure component to solve this curtailment problem.

In 2021, the Chinese government published its “Guiding Opinions on the Development of New Energy Storage,” targeting 30 GW of new energy storage capacity by 2025. Pumped storage hydropower lies at the center of this target. According to the “Medium and Long Term Pumped Storage Hydropower Development Plan” published by the National Energy Administration in 2021, China’s pumped storage hydropower capacity is targeted to reach 62 GW in 2025 and 120 GW in 2030.

Sichuan’s Strategic Position

Sichuan Province holds a special position in China’s energy transformation. The province has long been referred to as “China’s battery” due to its rich hydropower resources. However, with rapidly increasing solar energy capacity in recent years, the province’s energy system has faced a new imbalance.

The Daofu region has conditions favorable for photovoltaic energy production, with annual average sunshine duration of 2,000 to 2,500 hours. At the same time, the abundant water resources flowing from the Tibetan Plateau toward the Sichuan Basin are ideal for hydropower generation. However, the seasonal profiles of these two sources differ: hydropower generation peaks in summer months (during the rainy season), while solar energy generation is higher in winter months (due to clearer skies). The Daofu Pumped Storage Hydropower Station can serve as a buffer to balance these seasonal and daily fluctuations.

Energy Security and Geopolitical Dimensions

The selection of energy storage technologies is subject not only to technical and economic criteria but also to geopolitical considerations. The widespread use of lithium ion batteries makes China dependent on the import of certain critical minerals. Although China holds a large portion of lithium processing capacity, a significant portion of raw lithium is imported.

Pumped storage hydropower, on the other hand, can largely source the materials required for its construction domestically (cement used in concrete, steel used in turbines). This makes pumped storage hydropower a more resilient option in terms of energy security. Furthermore, the operational lifetime of a pumped storage hydropower facility, ranging from 50 to 100 years, is far longer than battery systems that need replacement every 10 to 15 years.

Environmental Impacts and Sustainability Debates

Intervention in Mountain Ecology

The fact that the Daofu Project is being built at an elevation of approximately 3,500 meters, in a region with the sensitive ecology of the Tibetan Plateau, raises significant environmental questions. Although pumped storage hydropower projects do not emit greenhouse gases during the operational phase, they deserve comprehensive environmental assessment in terms of the construction phase and the lasting impacts they leave on the ecosystem.

The primary areas of environmental impact of the project are as follows:

Land Use and Habitat Loss: The construction of the upper and lower reservoirs will cause thousands of hectares of mountain ecosystem to be submerged. These areas may provide habitat for endemic species unique to the Tibetan Plateau.

Intervention in the Hydrological Cycle: The continuous movement of water between the lower and upper reservoirs may affect local groundwater levels and surface flow regimes.

Construction Related Emissions: The production of cement and steel to be used during the project’s construction will lead to significant carbon emissions. This “embodied carbon” cost needs to be weighed against the emission savings the facility will provide over its operational lifetime.

Seismic Risks: The region is located in a tectonically active belt. The movement of large scale water masses and the weight of the reservoirs carry the potential to trigger seismic activity.

Comparative Environmental Assessment

The environmental impacts of energy storage technologies should be evaluated not only from the operational phase but from a perspective encompassing the entire life cycle. From a Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) perspective, pumped storage hydropower systems show high environmental impact during the construction phase, but leave low impact per unit of stored energy over a 50 to 100 year lifetime and require minimal resource consumption, only water, during the operational phase. Lithium ion batteries cause water pollution and habitat destruction during the mining phase, have a lifespan of 10 to 15 years, and the recycling infrastructure is still in the development stage. Hydrogen storage is energy intensive during the production phase and requires special infrastructure for storage and transportation.

This comparison demonstrates that no technology possesses a “perfect” environmental profile and that each involves its own specific trade offs. In the specific case of the Daofu Project, the efficiency advantage provided by the high hydraulic head can be considered a factor that reduces the environmental impact per unit of stored energy.

Social Impacts and Displacement

Perhaps the most controversial dimension of large scale hydropower projects is their social impacts on local communities. The Daofu region is an area predominantly inhabited by Tibetan communities, where cultural and spiritual values are closely tied to the geography. The construction of the project may cause agricultural lands and potentially residential areas to be submerged.

Mandatory resettlement programs implemented in large infrastructure projects in China have been the subject of significant criticism in the past. The Three Gorges Dam project resulted in the displacement of approximately 1.3 million people. Although the scale of the Daofu Project is much smaller, the transparent assessment and management of social impacts on local communities is of critical importance for the project’s social legitimacy.

Engineering Challenges and Innovation

Challenges of High Altitude Construction

Construction at an elevation of 3,500 meters presents a series of unique engineering challenges compared to construction at sea level:

Reduced Oxygen Levels: At this altitude, atmospheric pressure drops to approximately 65 percent of sea level. This creates problems both for worker health and safety and for the performance of internal combustion engine equipment. Diesel engines can lose 30 to 40 percent of their power at this altitude.

Freeze Thaw Cycles: The harsh climate of the Tibetan Plateau can be subject to more than 200 freeze thaw cycles per year. These cycles threaten the durability of concrete structures and require special concrete formulations and construction techniques.

Transportation Logistics: Transporting massive turbine components and construction materials to mountainous terrain is a complex logistical operation. Transporting heavy components such as turbine rotors and stators may require special road improvements or modular design approaches.

Technical Challenges Related to High Hydraulic Head

A hydraulic head of 760.7 meters is unusually high for pumped storage hydropower systems and brings with it special engineering challenges:

Pressure Management: The water column at this height creates approximately 76 bar (7.6 MPa) of pressure at the turbine level. This pressure requires penstocks and turbine components to be manufactured from high strength steel.

Water Hammer Risk: In the event of sudden valve closures or turbine shutdowns, destructive pressure waves can form in the pipe system. This phenomenon, expressed by the Joukowski equation:

ΔP equals ρ multiplied by c multiplied by Δv

Where ΔP represents the pressure change, ρ represents the density of water, c represents the speed of the sound wave in water, and Δv represents the change in flow velocity. The risk of water hammer is greater in systems with high hydraulic head and requires comprehensive pressure relief systems.

Turbine Technology: Pelton turbines optimized for high pressure heads or special variants of Francis turbines may be required. The manufacturing of these turbines requires high precision machining and special alloys.

Innovative Solutions and Technology Transfer

While the technical specifications of the Daofu Project demonstrate China’s competence in pumped storage hydropower technology, international technology transfer is still needed for some critical components. The experience of international companies such as Voith Hydro, GE Renewable Energy, and Andritz is particularly important in the design and manufacture of high pressure, large diameter turbines.

Nevertheless, the progress China has made in pumped storage hydropower technology, especially in the last decade, is noteworthy. State owned engineering firms such as POWERCHINA now rank among the world leaders in the design, equipment manufacturing, and construction of pumped storage hydropower projects. The Daofu Project can be considered a reference project showcasing this competence at the highest level.

Economic Analysis: Costs, Financing, and Market Dynamics

Capital Costs and Financing Structure

Although the total investment cost of the Daofu Project has not been publicly disclosed, it is possible to make estimates based on projects of similar scale. For a pumped storage hydropower project with a capacity of 2.1 GW, assuming a unit cost in the range of 1,500 to 2,500 US dollars per kW, the total investment cost can be expected to fall in the range of 3.15 to 5.25 billion US dollars.

The typical financing structure for projects of this magnitude consists of 20 to 30 percent equity and 70 to 80 percent debt financing. In China, such strategic infrastructure projects are generally financed by state banks (China Development Bank, China Exim Bank) with favorable condition loans. Multilateral institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB) are also among potential financing sources.

Levelized Cost of Storage (LCOS)

The fundamental metric used for the economic comparison of energy storage technologies is the Levelized Cost of Storage (LCOS). LCOS expresses the total cost per unit of energy stored over the life cycle of the storage system and is calculated using the following formula:

LCOS equals (Capital Cost plus the sum of Operating Cost at time t divided by (1 plus r) to the power of t) divided by (the sum of Stored Energy at time t divided by (1 plus r) to the power of t)

According to Lazard’s 2023 analysis, the LCOS for pumped storage hydropower is in the range of 150 to 250 US dollars per MWh, while for lithium ion batteries this value is in the range of 200 to 350 US dollars per MWh. However, these values can vary significantly depending on regional conditions and specific project parameters.

The high hydraulic head of the Daofu Project will serve as a factor that drives down the LCOS by enabling more energy to be stored per unit water volume. Furthermore, the operational lifetime of the facility, expected to exceed 50 years, will improve the LCOS by spreading the initial investment cost over a long time horizon.

Revenue Models and Market Integration

The revenue model of pumped storage hydropower facilities can consist of various components depending on the structure of the electricity market:

Energy Arbitrage: The most basic source of revenue is storing energy by pumping during hours when electricity prices are low and selling this energy during hours when prices are high. The profitability of this “buy low, sell high” strategy depends on the spread between peak and off peak prices.

Ancillary Services: Pumped storage hydropower facilities can earn additional revenue by providing grid ancillary services such as frequency regulation, voltage control, and spinning reserve. Thanks to their high ramp rates, pumped storage hydropower facilities can respond rapidly to sudden changes in grid frequency.

Capacity Payments: In some market structures, storage facilities may receive capacity payments in return for their contribution to grid reliability.

China’s electricity market is still in a reform process, and energy pricing is not entirely determined by free market conditions. This may create uncertainty for the revenue model of projects like Daofu. However, the fact that the Chinese government has designated pumped storage hydropower as a strategic priority indicates that appropriate market arrangements will be made for such projects.

Current Status and Timeline of the Project

Construction Phase

Construction of the Daofu Pumped Storage Hydropower Station officially began as of January 2024. The project is still in the construction phase and is not a completed facility. The portrayal of the project as a completed “miracle battery” in social media and some news sources does not reflect reality. The construction of such mega projects is typically expected to take five to eight years.

The construction process will proceed in several stages, as is typical for a pumped storage hydropower project. The first stage, the Preparation Phase (2024 to 2025), encompasses the construction of access roads, preparation of the construction site, and foundation excavations. The second stage, the Main Construction Phase (2025 to 2028), includes the excavation and concreting of reservoir areas, laying of penstocks, and installation of turbines and generators. The third stage, the Commissioning Phase (2028 to 2030), will encompass system testing, water filling, and gradual capacity increase. The fourth and final stage, Full Operation (2030 and beyond), represents the transition to full capacity commercial operation.

This timeline represents an optimistic scenario given the complexity and scale of the project. The challenges posed by high altitude construction and potential supply chain disruptions could extend the schedule.

Media Representation and Reality Check

The framing of the Daofu Project in the media and on social media as a “giant water battery built inside a mountain” is a powerful narrative that emphasizes the innovative character of the project. This narrative transforms energy storage from an abstract technical concept into a concrete, comprehensible image. The “turning a mountain into a battery” metaphor, while effective in terms of science communication, can also lead to certain misunderstandings.

First of all, the project is not an underground facility built by “hollowing out” a mountain. It is a surface facility consisting of two open air reservoirs and the pipe system connecting them. Secondly, the system is not a “battery” but an energy storage system; it stores energy physically, not chemically. This distinction is important from a technical standpoint.

Implications for Global Energy Transformation

The Global Revival of Pumped Storage Hydropower

The Daofu Project is part of the renewed global interest in pumped storage hydropower. According to data from the International Hydropower Association (IHA), approximately 160 GW of pumped storage hydropower capacity is in operation worldwide as of 2023, and over 60 GW of capacity is under construction. Projects such as Eagle Mountain in the USA (1.3 GW), Snowy 2.0 in Australia (2 GW), and Nant de Drance in Switzerland (900 MW) demonstrate the strategic role of pumped storage hydropower in the global energy transformation.

Several fundamental factors lie behind the revival of pumped storage hydropower. Growing solar and wind energy capacity is increasing the need for long duration storage. The scale and cost limitations of lithium ion batteries highlight the need for complementary storage solutions. Pumped storage hydropower is a proven technology with over 100 years of operational experience. Furthermore, operational lifetimes of 50 to 100 years make pumped storage hydropower attractive for long term energy planning.

Can It Serve as a Model for Developing Countries?

The large scale pumped storage hydropower model represented by the Daofu Project could serve as a potential reference for developing countries with similar geographical conditions. Countries with high mountainous regions such as Nepal, Bhutan, Ethiopia, Peru, and Turkey possess suitable topography for pumped storage hydropower projects.

However, caution is required regarding the transferability of such mega projects. Pumped storage hydropower projects requiring billions of dollars in investment exceed the financial capacity of many developing countries; the favorable condition financing that China provides through its state banks may not be available in other countries. Pumped storage hydropower projects also require complex planning, regulatory, and management capacity; without strong institutional structures, the successful completion of such projects is difficult. Additionally, the economics of pumped storage hydropower depend on electricity markets where there is a sufficient spread between peak and off peak prices; arbitrage opportunities may be limited in smaller grids where demand is less variable.

The Future of Energy Storage: Integrated Systems

The future of energy storage is evolving toward hybrid systems in which different storage solutions are integrated, rather than the dominance of a single technology. While large scale pumped storage hydropower facilities like Daofu provide ideal infrastructure for daily load shifting and seasonal storage, lithium ion batteries can play a role in services requiring rapid response such as frequency regulation, and green hydrogen can play a role in long distance energy transportation.

This integrated approach will increase the resilience of energy systems and play a critical role in overcoming the challenges arising from the intermittent nature of renewable energy sources. The Daofu Project can be read as a harbinger of this integrated future: beyond being a massive engineering achievement, it is a concrete expression of the will to build new ways of storing energy and spreading it across time.

Conclusion

China’s Daofu Pumped Storage Hydropower Station represents a turning point in the evolution of energy storage technologies. With its installed capacity of 2.1 GW and daily storage capacity of 12.6 million kWh, the project is pushing the boundaries of pumped storage hydropower technology and offering a large scale response to one of the greatest obstacles facing renewable energy integration: the intermittency problem.

Nevertheless, the fact that the project’s construction, which began in January 2024, is still ongoing and that its completion will take years is an important reminder of the time horizon involved in such mega projects. Energy transformation is a process that requires not only technological innovations but also long term planning and patient investment.

Daofu is the story of turning a mountain into a battery; but this story is also the story of humanity rediscovering one of its oldest energy sources, gravity, for its newest energy needs. When the sun does not shine and the wind does not blow, the potential energy of water lifted high can continue to keep the lights on. This simple physics principle may be one of the most elegant answers to our complex energy problems.

The ultimate success or failure of the project will be measured not only by technical parameters but also by the extent to which environmental impacts can be managed, the extent to which local communities benefit, and how well the system can adapt to changing market conditions. In this context, Daofu is not only an energy infrastructure project but also a case study for examining the complex socio technical nature of energy transformation.

References
1. Global Times. “China builds giant ‘water battery’ in Sichuan mountain.” 2024.
2. China.org.cn. “Daofu Pumped Storage Power Station Project Overview.” 2024.
3. National Energy Administration of China. “Medium and Long Term Pumped Storage Development Plan (2021 to 2035).” 2021.
4. International Hydropower Association. “2023 World Hydropower Outlook.” London: IHA, 2023.
5. POWERCHINA Chengdu Engineering Corporation. “Daofu Pumped Storage Project Technical Specifications.” 2024.
6. Lazard. “Levelized Cost of Storage Analysis, Version 8.0.” 2023.
7. Blakers, A., Stocks, M., Lu, B., and Cheng, C. “A review of pumped hydro energy storage.” Progress in Energy, 3(2), 022003, 2021.
8. Rehman, S., Al Hadhrami, L. M., and Alam, M. M. “Pumped hydro energy storage system: A technological review.” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 44, 586 to 598, 2015.
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10. Zhang, Y., et al. “Environmental impacts of pumped storage hydropower: A review.” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 157, 112048, 2022.
Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
Aarhus University, 1997
Independent Researcher
Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures.

Yerçekimini Depolamak: Çin’in Daofu Pompalı Depolamalı Hidroelektrik Santrali’nin Enerji Sistemleri Dönüşümündeki Rolü Üzerine Disiplinlerarası Bir İnceleme
July 18, 2026
The Shadow Game of the World Cup: Referee Decisions, the Shadow of Politics, and FIFA’s Crisis of Trust
A Comprehensive Analysis of the Controversies Shaking the 2026 Tournament and the Future of Football

Is Football Just Football?

The World Cup is an arena that locks billions of people to their screens every four years, where national pride is weighed on the scales. However, the 2026 tournament is being written into football history as a controversial page, beyond the on field battles, due to referee decisions, FIFA management’s relations with political actors, and the erosion of trust in technology. This article does not view these events merely as “referee errors” but analyzes how they have transformed into a systematic perception crisis, through the eyes of commentators from all around the world.

Trump and Infantino: The Political Wind That Began at the White House

FIFA President Gianni Infantino’s appearance alongside then US President Donald Trump at the White House sparked the first spark regarding how much football’s “neutral” line can be preserved. The direct involvement of the Trump administration in the official task force established within the scope of the 2026 organization’s preparations alarmed circles sensitive to sports independence.

English football commentator and former referee Mark Halsey evaluates this situation as follows:

“A FIFA president establishing such close contact with any government, especially before such a massive organization, seriously damages the perception of neutrality. Politicians being in the stands is normal, but being at the management table shakes the foundation of fair play.”

German sports journalist and football authority Raphael Honigstein places the issue in a broader perspective:

“FIFA has always been criticized for being under the influence of major economic powers. But this open embrace during the Trump era has carried the question ‘Can sport be a tool of politics?’ from football dugouts to parliamentary corridors. Can the political weight of host countries affect FIFA’s scales, especially on sensitive issues such as Middle Eastern policies and the Israel lobby? That is the most asked question today.”

Argentina and Messi: The “Protected Star” Perception

One of the most talked about controversies of the tournament revolves around the allegations of “privileged treatment” concerning Lionel Messi and the Argentina national team. Particularly, Messi’s strong objections to the referee in the Switzerland match going unpunished caused great reverberation among former players and commentators.

Brazilian legendary footballer and commentator Rivaldo expressed the following criticism on his Twitter account on the matter:

“In my time, a player who objected this harshly would have left the pitch within a minute. Messi is the best in the world, but that does not mean the rules should be bent for him. If referees apply different standards to big stars, the idea of justice in football will disappear.”

Former Premier League referee from England Keith Hackett places this situation in a more institutional framework:

“FIFA’s instructions stipulate that disrespect to the referee must absolutely be punished with a yellow card, and serious insults with a red card. When the images are examined, it is clear that Messi’s body language was quite aggressive. The absence of a card means these debates will not end unless VAR is used not only for offside and penalties but also for disciplinary violations.”

Argentine sports commentator Juan Pablo Varsky offers a defense against these criticisms:

“Big players have always been accused of being advantaged. Maradona was too, Ronaldo was too. But Messi is a player who has known how to avoid such cards throughout his career. The card not given is the referee’s assessment at that moment. Interpreting this as FIFA protecting Argentina is nothing more than serving a grand conspiracy theory.”

Egypt’s Elimination and the Double Standard in VAR

Following Egypt’s elimination from the tournament, the rising voices in Arab football circles claiming “referees targeted us” once again questioned the objectivity of the VAR system. Whether VAR intervenes in critical positions or not has exposed the gap between FIFA’s claim of “technological justice” and its implementation.

Former Egyptian national player and commentator Ahmed Hassan used the following statements on a television program:

“Look, we are not rebelling because we lost, but because different decisions were given for the same positions. No one knows what criteria those sitting in the VAR room are acting upon. Were these criteria changed only for our match? Of course not. But when this becomes systematic, people start questioning intentions, not just errors.”

Spanish sports journalist Alfredo Relaño summarizes where VAR has arrived with these words:

“VAR was invented to make football fairer, but it has now become football’s biggest source of debate. Because technology is only as fair as the person making the decision. And unfortunately, FIFA prefers to make vague statements rather than standing behind these decisions.”

Norway and the Camera Cable Crisis: Doubt Touching Technology

The allegation that the ball touched the camera cable on the sideline during the match between Norway and England was one of the most concrete examples of how fragile trust in technology is. The game not being stopped and England scoring following this action made headlines in the Norwegian press as a “camera scandal.”

Former Norwegian footballer and TV commentator Jan Åge Fjørtoft directed very harsh criticism in his statement after the match:

“This is a disgrace. Millions of people saw on their screens that the ball hit the cable. FIFA’s claim that the data showed no contact is not convincing. Because if we know the path the ball followed, this is an obvious error. Why wasn’t the game stopped? Because there is a system that works in favor of the big teams. This inevitably makes one think that way.”

English commentator Gary Lineker approaches this debate more calmly, drawing attention to the flaws of technology:

“I love technology in football, but no system is one hundred percent flawless. FIFA’s reliance on ball sensor data is normal. But this incident reminded us once again that technology also requires human interpretation. The problem is not technology making errors, but how those errors are managed.”

Red Cards and “International Privilege” in FIFA Discipline

The overturning of the red card penalty given to US player Folarin Balogun by FIFA rekindled the question of whether disciplinary rules are applied equally to everyone. This decision became a new argument for circles discussing the influence of pro Israel and pro US policies on FIFA.

Former Irish referee and commentator Alan Kelly explains the perception created by such decisions as follows:

“The overturning of penalties is normal if the evidence clearly shows an error. But it is observed that such interventions are frequently made for major federations. This inevitably raises the question ‘Is there a privilege here?’ FIFA has to explain every decision much more transparently to break this perception.”

Turkish sports commentator and former footballer Rıdvan Dilmen addresses the issue with its political dimension:

“There is politics in football, we cannot deny that. But if you think there is a mechanism that works so openly in favor of some countries and against others, then it is not just football that enters this equation, but also capital and international balances. The overturning of Balogun’s penalty is a controversial example in itself.”

Harsh Political Criticisms from Famous Footballers

Throughout the tournament, not only commentators but also legendary footballers expressed their criticisms towards FIFA and referee decisions. These names did not reduce the problem to on field errors but drew attention to institutional corruption and political intervention.

French legend Thierry Henry used the following statements in an interview:

“The soul of football is the belief that everyone plays by the same rules. But today this belief has been shaken. Referee decisions, VAR applications, even FIFA’s relationship with politics… These cause a child watching football to ask ‘Is this fair?’ This is very dangerous.”

Former Italian referee and now commentator Pierluigi Collina, as a former chairman of the FIFA Referees Committee, evaluates the process:

“Referees are human, they make mistakes. But today, it is not just errors that are being discussed, but the systematic patterns behind them. If similar errors are consistently made in favor of one country, that is either coincidence or a distortion in the system. FIFA needs to fight this perception.”

Dutch legend Marco van Basten takes it further with one of the harshest criticisms:

“This World Cup is dirty and tainted. We see not just referee errors, but a mechanism working in favor of countries like the US and Israel. Politics has entered football and unfortunately FIFA has remained a spectator. In some cases, it has even actively supported it. This could be the beginning of the end for football.”

“Match Fixing” or “Perception Crisis”?

At the center of all these debates, despite the absence of concrete evidence of match fixing, there is a strong erosion of trust in public opinion. The 2015 FIFA corruption scandals, the political controversies of Qatar 2022, and now these decisions in 2026 have buried fans’ unquestioning trust in the institution in history.

American sports journalist Grant Wahl had summarized this situation in his final articles written before the tournament:

“FIFA is a giant institution managing billions of dollars. With so much money and power, expecting it to be completely neutral would be naive. But the problem is pretending that this neutrality is being maintained. Fans want to believe in the idea of fair play. But every controversial decision erodes this belief a little more.”

English commentator and former player Alan Shearer removes the issue from individual errors and places it in an institutional framework:

“There is no concrete evidence of match fixing. But even without evidence, the suspicion formed in people’s minds has now become a reality. FIFA has to take these suspicions seriously. Otherwise, future World Cups will be remembered not just for their champions, but for their controversies and protests.”

The Lost Faith Beyond the Scoreboard

The 2026 World Cup has become a mirror of a much deeper crisis, beyond the goals and victories on the pitch. This crisis is the shaking of the belief in justice that lies at the foundation of football, beyond referee errors.

Even though FIFA delivers messages of transparency and independence in response to these criticisms, the political perception shaped around the US and Israel axis weakens the credibility of these messages.

German football sociologist and author Christoph Bausenwein comments on this process as follows:

“Football is the largest secular religion of the modern world. And like every religion, it stands on the faith of its believers. If referee decisions, VAR controversies, and political relationships erode this faith, football becomes just an industry. And an industry can never be as strong as a belief system.”

As a result, the legacy of this tournament watched by billions of people will perhaps remain in the shadow of controversies rather than the name of the winning team. If FIFA cannot rebuild trust in its institution, future World Cups will be played not only in stadiums but also in arenas shaped by courts and public pressure.

What Should Be Done? Concrete Recommendations for the Future of Football

The problems identified above have deeply shaken the belief in justice at the foundation of football. This situation is too comprehensive to be explained merely by referee errors or controversial decisions. To protect the spirit of football, rebuild trust in FIFA, and prevent such perception crises from recurring, the following concrete and comprehensive steps must be taken.

FIFA’s Structural Reforms and Transparency Commitments

Although FIFA made some reforms following the 2015 corruption scandals, today’s debates show that these reforms are insufficient. A new move towards independence and transparency is imperative.
1. An Independent Referee Observation Board Should Be Established: An international board composed of former referees, lawyers, and technical directors, completely independent from FIFA, should be established to oversee referee decisions. This board should independently review and report on all controversial decisions throughout the tournament.
2. VAR Protocols Should Be Shared with the Public: The criteria used in the VAR room, which positions were reviewed, and the review processes should be published in detail after each match. The current perception of a “secret VAR room” is the biggest factor feeding distrust.
3. Transparency in Disciplinary Decisions: Decisions such as the overturning of red card penalties or the reduction of player sanctions should not be made without publicly sharing the justifications. These decisions should be published transparently on FIFA’s disciplinary committee official website.
4. Equal Application for Star Players: The dialogues and objections of big stars with referees should be evaluated by the same standards as other players. Special training should be provided to referees on this matter, and the perception of “star privilege” should be broken.
5. Relations Between the FIFA President and Political Leaders Should Be Restricted: The FIFA president’s contacts with host country leaders should be limited to the technical and logistical dimensions of the organization and should not turn into political or strategic collaborations. A special ethics committee should be assigned for the transparency of these relations.
Reforms in Referee Education and Technology Management

Reducing referee errors and using technology more effectively play a critical role in rebuilding trust.
1. Psychological and Emotional Intelligence Training for Referees: Referees should not only receive physical and rule based training; they should also undergo psychological support and emotional intelligence training to withstand the pressure of big matches and manage fan and player pressure.
2. Independent Auditing of Technology Systems: The accuracy of technological systems such as camera to ball contact data should be audited by independent third parties before and after matches. FIFA’s reliance on its own data has lost its credibility among fans.
3. Publication of VAR Room Audio Recordings: The conversations in the VAR room during controversial positions should be broadcast during or after the match, as is done in rugby and cricket. This will increase the transparency of the decision making process and make referees’ decisions defensible.
4. Geographic and Political Balance in Referee Assignments: In referee assignments, balance should be maintained in selecting referees from regions close to or far from the teams’ home countries, and potential conflicts of interest or biases should be minimized.
5. A Fully Integrated Ball Technology System: To prevent a recurrence of the Norway incident, a fully integrated technology system should be developed that instantly records every surface the ball touches on the pitch and sends signals to the referee.
The Role of Football Public Opinion, Fans, and Media

Rebuilding trust is the responsibility of all stakeholders, not just FIFA.
1. Independent Sports Media and Civil Society Monitoring Platforms: During tournaments, “FIFA Justice Monitoring Reports” should be prepared by independent media outlets and civil society organizations and shared with the public.
2. Inclusion of Fan Representatives in the Process: Representatives from fan associations should be included in decision making processes, and consultation meetings should be organized with these representatives, especially after controversial decisions.
3. Combating Disinformation on Social Media: FIFA should establish a digital communication unit that provides rapid and accurate responses to misinformation and conspiracy theories spreading on social media.
4. Collaboration with Football Historians and Academics: FIFA should work with independent academic commissions that will analyze the historical context and systematic errors of tournament decisions.
Sports Diplomacy and the Separation of Politics

Limiting political intervention in football is vital for preserving neutrality.
1. Increasing the Powers of the FIFA Ethics Committee: The FIFA ethics committee should have broader authority and an independent budget to oversee the relations of the president and board members with political actors.
2. Establishing Political Criteria in Host Country Selection: In host country selection, criteria such as human rights, press freedom, and the rule of law should become binding conditions, not just recommendations.
3. Restricting Political Leaders in Stadium Protocol: Political leaders should not be included in protocols that could affect on field decisions, except for tournament opening and closing ceremonies.
4. Stronger Cooperation with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS): Controversial disciplinary decisions should be able to be brought to CAS before or simultaneously with FIFA internal mechanisms, and an independent judicial process should be operated.
5. Transparency Obligation for National Federations: All national federations affiliated with FIFA should be obliged to inform their own publics about referee assignments and disciplinary decisions in international tournaments.
6. Public Disclosure of FIFA Lobbying Activities: All meetings and correspondence between FIFA and international institutions, governments, and lobby groups should be archived after a certain period and made accessible to the public.
Final Word: A Common Mobilization for the Soul of Football

Football is a universal language that unites billions of people. But the power of this language is fed by the belief of players, administrators, and spectators that they are watching a fair game. The 2026 World Cup has shown how fragile this belief is and how quickly it can be lost.

The recommendations listed above are not merely technical or institutional corrections, but also a manifesto for returning to the essence of football. Unless these recommendations are implemented, future tournaments will be remembered not only for their champions but also for their controversies, protests, and lost trust.

FIFA can emerge stronger from this crisis. But to do so, it must first set aside its institutional arrogance and accept accountability to the fans, the true owners of football, and to justice. This is the shared responsibility of the entire football family, not just one institution.

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Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist

Dünya Kupası’nın Gölge Oyunu: Hakem Kararları, Siyasetin Gölgesi ve FIFA’ya Güven Krizi
July 17, 2026
The Three Great Debaters: The Declaration of Truth’s BankruptcyErdoğan, Netanyahu and Trump, the Utter Lie Machines

There are three flagship vessels of world politics that steer not by compass but by the direction of the wind. One swings his red tie like a club, another mistakes his staff for a magic trick behind the curtain, and the third wears his black robe like a shroud. Their shared talent is to use words like landmines; the moment you step on them, they explode, leaving behind not truth but only smoke and a few scorched sentences.

When the Iranian minister said, “Trump has lied 35 thousand times,” he was not so much giving a statistic as certifying a record. Yet no one objects to this record, because the opposing teams have their own scorecards as well. Trump’s language is that of a used car salesman: each sentence is a new model with zero mileage, but the engine is always made of the same scrap parts. When he says, “No one has ever told the truth like I do,” he does not realize that he is effectively erasing the statistics of his own lies, because in his world, statistics are merely a club to beat rivals with. He practices lying as a sport; his training is on Twitter, and his matches are on the podium.

As for Erdoğan… He is more than an acrobat in political discourse; he is an engineer of time. He can transform the sentence “I said that yesterday, but today conditions have changed” into a philosophical depth in a single breath. According to his opponents, there is no such entry as “consistency” in his dictionary; to his supporters, however, this is “the art of adapting to a changing world.” But behind the curtain, what becomes visible is this: every speech is the demolition of the previous one; every demolition promises a new construction; and when that construction is completed, you are faced with a wall made of the torn pages of the previous speech. His politics is not chess but backgammon: he rolls his own dice, and his pieces always land on his own square. And most importantly, when he loses, he has the audacity to flip the table and say, “Actually, I won.”

Netanyahu, on the other hand, is the dark magician of this trio. His discourse is like an archaeological excavation; at every layer you find a different fossil of “truth.” At times he relies on biblical kingdoms, at other times he weighs modern intelligence documents on a scale. But his real skill is to process threat like a kneading machine: the larger the threat, the broader his license to justify himself. It is known that while saying “Iran could build a bomb within three months,” he disregards his own intelligence reports; but for him this is not a contradiction, it is a prescription. He has turned lies into a reason for existence, because without threat, the shield would have no meaning.

When you place these three names side by side, what emerges is nothing but a tragicomedy. Each one is a tightrope walker who has received a certificate of mastery from the workshop of rhetoric. Trump has turned lying into a performance art; Erdoğan has turned lying into a governing technique; and Netanyahu has turned lying into a theology. One pounds the microphone and says, “This is not a lie, it is an alternative truth”; another whispers, “My nation believes in me, the rest is detail”; the third takes refuge in the defense that “The world is already against us, so every word is legitimate.” All three converge on the same point: truth, the moment it leaves their mouths, becomes a balloon that changes shape; the more they inflate it, the farther it flies, but in the end it either bursts or deflates. Know this: these three cannot fall asleep on any given day without having lied multiple times. Lies are the name of the sleeping pill that rests them and gives them pleasure. Without lies, Erdoğan, Netanyahu and Trump remain identityless and makeshift. They cannot exist without lies, nor can lies exist without them. Because lies belong to them, and they are the registered property of lies.

And the audience? Ah, that audience… Millions are both victims and accomplices of this game. Everyone cheers for their own acrobat, because the fall of the other acrobat means their own acrobat stays in the air longer. Yet when viewed from the bottom of the tower, all are performing on the same rope; no one looks at the rope itself, everyone just watches the hands. Truth fell into the safety net beneath the rope right from the start, left there forgotten and rotting. The audience applauds, because if they do not applaud, they pay from their own pockets. This is how politics works: lies are presented like a mathematical problem; no one checks the solution, everyone likes their own equation.

Perhaps the most painful part is not the lies of these men, but the gravity of the need for those lies. As societies feed on lies, they lose their immunity to truth. All three leaders compete to collapse this immune system. Trump lies openly; Erdoğan delegates his lies to national interest; Netanyahu bases his lies on divine command. And all of them, amid an avalanche of applause, keep raising the tower they have built. Yet the higher the tower rises, the louder the fall will be. But they love noise, because noise is safer than the reckoning that silence brings.

The outcome? From the top of the tower, these three sages see the same view: the world is round, but they have drawn a flat map. On that map, every country takes shape according to the words that leave their mouths. Yet the map does not show reality, only a navigational tool. And whenever one of them loses his compass, all three cling to their own drawn map and shout, “This is where the truth is!” But the truth lies in the warning written at the edge of the map: “This map is for explorers, not for those who are not ready to get lost.”

So the next time a leader steps up to the podium and says, “I will tell you the whole truth,” know that the curtain is opening once again, but the script is always the same. Truth is not behind the curtain; it is hidden where the curtain is torn. And seeing that tear, unfortunately, falls only to the brave among the audience. Those who are not brave keep applauding, until the tower collapses.

Note: This translation preserves the satirical, sharp tone of the original without adding or removing any substantive content. The text aims to provoke critical thinking through irony and exaggeration, not to offend individual personalities.

Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
Aarhus University, 1997
Independent Researcher
Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology,

Üç Büyük Münazır: Hakikatin İflas BeyannamesiErdoğan, Netanyahu ve Trump Adlı Katıksız Yalan Makinaları

July 17, 2026