Washington And The World
What a Turkey!
Has the Turkish leader lost his head?
If Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan were an American politician, he would be an excellent candidate for one of Chris Cillizza’s “Worst Week in Washington” features. First, on Friday, July 19, a day after the State Department spokesperson criticized him for his frequent invocation of the Nazis to describe Israel’s behavior, Erdogan asked, “What do Americans know about Hitler?” Given that almost 200,000 young Americans died fighting in Europe during WWII, quite a lot, actually. Second, in an open and embarrassing display of just how far the cult of Erdogan’s personality has gone, the 60-year-old prime minister appeared in a friendly soccer match—wearing a bright orange uniform—and miraculously scored three goals in 15 minutes to the collective delirium of announcers, fans and opposing players from the Istanbul Basaksehir club. (It was a bit of a disappointment that he did not pull off his jersey in triumph after the hat trick; it would have given the growing Tayyip Erdogan-Vladimir Putin comparisons an additional element of absurdity.) Third, the American Jewish Congress demanded that Erdogan return the “Profiles in Courage” award the organization bestowed upon him in 2004 for his commitment to protect Turkish Jewry, combat terrorism and forge peaceful coexistence in the Middle East. The prime minister—who is also a recipient of the Muammar al-Qaddafi prize for human rights—was, in the words of Turkey’s ambassador in Washington, “glad” to return the honor. Finally, Cillizza’s colleague at the Washington Post, Richard Cohen, penned a column about Erdogan’s “Hitler fetish,” wondering whether the Turkish prime minister had lost his marbles.
So, is Erdogan crazy? No self-respecting psychiatrist, psychologist or clinical social worker would offer an assessment from afar. Putting world leaders on the couch is passé except at the CIA—and whatever the analysts at Langley conclude does not much matter in the places where policy is made, especially when it comes to Erdogan. The White House and the State Department would prefer not to rock the boat with the Turkish leader—a man President Obama once included among the world leaders with whom he had a “bond of trust” —for fear of what he might do to put American and Turkish interests at risk. That said, and without any scientific precision, it is hard to come to the conclusion that Erdogan is nuts. He may say or do things from time to time that make one wonder whether he got the self-awareness gene. Who wouldn’t, when the toadies of the Erdogan-adoring Turkish press consistently refer to the prime minister as the “Buyuk Usta,” or “Great Master”?
It is hard to blame Erdogan for this one, though. Having an over-inflated sense of self comes with being a world leader, and he’s has been in the bubble for almost 12 years. And for all of Erdogan’s seeming public decomposition, there is actually a perfectly rational and sane politician astutely advancing his agenda, which at the moment is focused on becoming Turkey’s next president.
In Turkey, all of those things that would have landed Erdogan in a “Worst Week” actually accrue to the prime minister’s political benefit as the leading candidate in Turkey’s first-ever direct election of its head of state. Given the prevailing and deeply held anti-Americanism among large numbers of Turks, Jen Psaki’s criticism of Erdogan from the podium at the State Department—she called his rhetoric “offensive and wrong” while chiding the prime minister for “distract[ing] from urgent efforts to bring about a ceasefire”—provided the Turkish leader with the opportunity to stand up to Washington and reinforce the idea that he is a truth-teller on the Middle East, especially in contrast to the United States that enables Israel’s ability to make war on the Gaza Strip. This plays extremely well even beyond Erdogan’s core constituency of middle class and pious Turks. As for the soccer match, which was the subject of considerable derision and sniggering among Turkey watchers everywhere, it was sheer political genius. In soccer-crazed Turkey, where Erdogan played at a fairly high amateur level in his younger days, the prime minister proved that he still has good game even if the 21 other sycophants on the pitch were letting him have his way. The implausible hat trick in 15 minutes? That only reinforced the Erdogan mystique. It seems that the man can do anything, face down the coup-prone Turkish military, denounce the international interest rate lobby (with more than a whiff of anti-Semitism), hold his own and more among world leaders—and still lace up the cleats for a friendly match. The event, ridiculous as it was, also put to rest any lingering questions about the prime minister’s health after a mysterious stomach ailment in 2011
When it comes to anti-Semitism, Erdogan is guilty as charged, but sadly so are large numbers of Turks. It is true that Jews found refuge in Turkey during the Inquisition and have lived and prospered there ever since, but that does not mean that anti-Semitism is alien to Turkish culture. Recent events in which blood curdling hatred of Jews appeared in the pro-Erdogan press (is there any other kind these days?) and among Turkish users of social media in response to Israel’s attack on the Gaza Strip demonstrate that it is decidedly not, particularly among Erdogan’s core constituency. Yet even beyond the particular strand of Turkish Islamism from which Erdogan’s worldview comes, anti-Semitism is widespread in Turkey. For Turks, Erdogan is not even necessarily an anti-Semite; more important, by calling out the Israelis for killing Palestinian innocents on a large scale, he is acting as the conscience of the Muslim world.
It would be unfair to a political talent like Erdogan, however, to suggest that he has been successful because of Turks’ dislike of the United States, Israel and Jews, let alone his ability to move around a soccer field relatively well. Erdogan’s repeated electoral victories are attributable to his many achievements. Since he became prime minister in March 2003, Turkey has made important strides in health care, redeveloped significant portions of its transportation infrastructure, put money in the pockets of the middle class, and become a regional power. Throughout Erdogan’s tenure the Turkish economy has been among the fastest growing in the world, surging by 9.2 percent in 2010 and almost doing that well the following year before slowing considerably in 2012. Before Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party came to power, Turkey was never regarded as an influential actor in the Middle East. Now, with the aid of his energetic foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, and the investment Ankara has made in relationships with the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas as well the country’s regional economic might, Turkey very much is a player. Washington’s romance with Turkey as a “model” for the Middle East world has diminished considerably since the halcyon days of the Arab uprisings and President Obama’s relationship with Erdogan has certainly cooled, but American officials still believe they need the Turkish leader. With the exception of Psaki’s atypical criticism, the Obama administration continues to treat Erdogan with kid gloves, much to the dismay of its other Middle Eastern allies. Even though there were many Egyptians, Saudis, Emiratis, Palestinians and Israelis who were angry that Davutoglu was involved in Gaza ceasefire talks, whether they like it or not, Ankara is an important channel of communication with Hamas. For many Turks, only Erdogan—the strong, unapologetic, tough guy—could have transformed Turkey in the way the prime minister has, even if from the perspective of outside observers these achievements have come at the cost of what was once promising political reform. Erdogan’s rule has become fundamentally illiberal, which seems just fine with his constituents.
The real question is not whether Erdogan has lost it, but why he is bothering to go to the lengths that he has to secure the Turkish presidency. He is running against two opponents: one guy running as a joint opposition candidate whom no one in either of the two nominating parties seems to like, and another guy who has rather narrow appeal.
Public opinion polls show that about half or slightly more than half of Turks approve of Erdogan, meaning that he can likely prevail without all the fury, anger and cult of personality that makes people wonder whether the Turkish prime minister is “all there.” But for Erdogan, there is no mercy rule in politics—especially for someone who has reason to be paranoid. This is a politician who, in the 1990s, was jailed for reciting a nationalist poem that the secular elites who were dominant at the time alleged was a call to religious incitement. After he became prime minister, his party barely escaped closure for being a “center of anti-secular activity.” Even as he has mastered the political arena, Erdogan has been worried when the next coup d’etat may come, given the Turkish military’s history of undermining governments that it did not like. So Erdogan will leave nothing to chance.
This is not to excuse Erdogan’s recent Jew-baiting or an entire previous year of intimidating his opponents, cowing the press, restricting access to the Internet, purging the bureaucracy and banning (unsuccessfully) social media. These are the tactics of a tin-pot dictator, not a major NATO ally, but Erdogan does not care. Behind the bluster and thuggish politics is an effort to secure the domestic political arena. To the extent that this approach plays well among voters in Kayseri, Trabzon and Erzurum, Erdogan will reap the benefits.
From afar, Erdogan certainly seems crazy, but he is more likely crazy like a fox.