Bridge or Barrier in the EU Process?
Dr. M. Murat Erdoğan,
Hacettepe University, Ankara,
Dept. of Political Science and Public Administration.
He is Vice Director of the Hacettepe University
European Union Research Center (HUAB) and
of the Strategical Research Centre (HÜSAM).t Erdoğan
Centuries have gone by since the retreat of
Turks, who once controlled the entire Southeast
of Europe and who had once expanded their territory
up to Vienna. “Europe” and “Turkey”, once
“mutual enemies”, then saw themselves rallying
on the same side during the Cold War, deleting
the negative marks of the past to a large extent.
At the same time, the ideological-political
orientation of Turkey toward Europe was more
and more institutionalized and a strong human
dimension was eventually added as well. Participating
as far as possible in Western European
institutions had a strong Europeanising effect,
making Turkey a part of Europe. Turkey’s European
commitment never seemed to perish
despite the considerable challenges on the way
to full participation in European institutions. Increasing
“Europeanness” was not only limited
to the state, it also established itself as one of
the most important aspects of modern Turkish
identity. “Europeanness” is a deliberate political
choice of Turks and the efforts spent to reach
this goal continue with great commitment.
The human factor, a dimension hardly taken
into account at the beginning, became an ever
more important issue with the start of substantial
“workforce immigration”, particularly to Germany,
at the beginning of the 1960s. The agreement
with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1961
was soon followed by other European countries.
The process and its implications, which have
been characterised by the famous phrase of Max
Frisch (“We wanted workers, but we got people”),
started almost half a century ago. Even though
the conditions of the Cold War are no longer
present, the process continues to carry on. The
immigrants and their families, identifying themselves
as European Turks, increasingly hold signifi
cant positions in the economic, cultural and
political life of the countries they live in – especially
after it had become apparent that most of
them are not living in Europe on a “temporary”
basis. More than 5 million Turkish migrants, with
half of the population already being European
citizens, are living example of this fundamental
and qualitative change in European societies.
The former “Gastarbeiter” identity, which meant
“sitting on the baggage as if returning tomorrow”,
has practically been surpassed for the majority
of Turks living in Europe. The economic, cultural
and intellectual capacity of Turkish immigrants,
having evolved into a “European Turkish middle
class” as active participants in European societies,
constitutes part of Europe’s reality.
Although impacting fi rst and foremost the countries
with substantial Turkish immigration over
the past fi fty years, the process has always been
linked to European integration as well. Mass
immigration of Turks to Europe and relations
between Turkey and the EEC developed hand
in hand, although there is no organic bond between
the two. However, the lack of workforce in
revitalised post war Europe played an important
role in the association of Turkey to the European
Economic Community. However, the charm of
cheap labour seemed to decrease for the EC in
the 1980s. Ironically, one of the most contested
issues between Turkey and the EC became the
questions related to the free movement of persons
and European efforts to stop admissions
or even to send back, if possible, people already
living in Europe. Accordingly, Turks were eventually
not granted the right of free movement, although
this had been foreseen before.
For Turkey, the migration of workforce meant a
contribution to European growth, helping foreign
countries to solve their notorious lack of labour.
The revenue sent back to Turkey initially constituted
an important source of income but gradually
lost its importance because of the economic
developments in Turkey and the decision of
many migrants to eventually rather invest money
in the country they live in. Whereas in 1995
transfers still amounted to 5 billion USD, they
dropped to an estimated 1 billion USD in 2009.
Accordingly, after the 1990s, for Turkey the signifi
cance of Turks living in Europe shifted from
the economic to politics. The main change in
migrant Turks’ attitudes in this context was illustrated
by a considerable number of them turning
from Turkish migrants into citizens of European
countries. Turkish citizens in Europe were more
and more perceived as a politically relevant entity,
not only by Turkey but also by EU politicians,
especially after 1993: The discussions on the
new EU architecture and the establishment of
a Customs Union between the EU and Turkey
created an important atmosphere for European
Turks to become part of the European equation.
Accordingly, the group that had been cause for
concern due to the problems attached to the
free movement of persons became – anew –
an important factor for Turkey. Now European
Turks were more and more considered “Turkish
Diaspora”, expected to help Turkey to reach
its goals in foreign and domestic politics, going
well beyond the signifi cance formerly attached
to workers’ transfers of money. In 1997, Turkish
Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz even demanded of
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to “defi ne his
attitude” towards Turkey and its EU ambitions
ahead of the 1998 general elections.
Many discussions and debates have accompanied
the process ever since the workforce
agreement with Germany in 1961. Despite all
problems, half a century of common history
has demonstrated that Turks in general have
integrated well into the norms of Europe.
ZEI EVENTS
The task of the European Commission in
ongoing accession negotiations consists
not only in the technical conduct of negotiations,
but to an increasing degree in the
mediation between different expectations
and demands attached to enlargement policy.
This mediation is an important factor in
adequately responding to European as well
as to partner’s interests. During his visit to
the Center for European Integration Studies
(ZEI) on 24 June 2009, Commissioner Olli
Rehn particularly acknowledged the moderating
function of ZEI’s EU-Turkey-Monitor,
accompanying accession negotiations between
the EU and Turkey ever since their
launch in late 2005. The reinforcement of
mutual understanding and recognition in
this as well as in other policy fi elds with particular
external implications plays a major
role in any successful European policy.
hard time fi tting into European culture and
lifestyle, never became a source of massive
disruption in the countries where – initially –
they were outsiders. On the contrary, they were
the kind of group who contributed to the development
of these countries by their labour and
taxes, respecting the laws and integrating into
the societies they live in. On the occasion of an
international symposium, commemorating and
discussing “Turks Abroad: Immigration and Integration
in 50 Years” in Ankara in May 2009, Minister
of State Faruk Çelik, in charge of migrant
Turks, opposed the popular view that “Turks will
create imbalance due to their cultural differences.”
To the contrary, he stressed that “the existence
of our citizens on European land and their
contributions to Europe are the most meaningful
response to those opposing the membership of
Turkey in the EU”. An environment of symbiosis
creates new dynamics, but the positive potential
of this situation outweighs the negative ones and
could be seen as an asset for Turkey on its way
to the EU. At the same event, Egemen Bağış,
Minister of State for EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator,
clearly highlighted the important role of
the Turkish “Diaspora” in this context: “We are,
thanks to you, already in the EU and I see each
one of you as our ambassador in our EU efforts”.
These words clearly illustrate Turkey’s new policy
towards “its European citizens”. According to
recent declarations by Turkish politicians “integration
that does not turn into assimilation” shall
generate a win-win-situation for both, Europe
and Turkey – only if Turkish migrants are taken
seriously and are having economic, cultural and
political relevance, they can play this role. Turkish
migrants causing problems in the countries
they live in, however, also create problems for
Turkey – or, at least, are far from adding value.
Therefore it could be argued that Turkey has no
choice but to be truly sincere about integration,
because only then all parties can benefi t. The
question however remains, in how far the EU
is equally sincere about it. If one considers the
persistent obstacles to free movement, which is
still one of the central issues in EU-Turkey relations,
it appears that Turkish migrants as well as
Turkish citizens suffer: Visa-free travel is still an
illusion and it seems unlikely that the decisions
of the Court of Justice in individual cases, which
are only putting the fi nger on Europe’s negative
attitude on free movement, will lead to a general
improvement; one could therefore conclude that
Turkish people are effectively being prevented
from exercising some of the rights European
legislation gives them.2 On the other hand, the
European concern of potential mass immigration
of Turks to Europe must also be addressed
and taken into account in order to formulate a
win-win-solution to this central obstacle to true
integration.3
Within the EU, the obstacles to free movement
are complemented by limitations on political
rights. The European demand to renounce Turkish
citizenship for a working, tax-paying, lawabiding
Turkish migrant, who has lived 30 or even
40 years in Europe, reduces the eagerness to
really become an EU citizen. It also raises emotional
reactions for Turks to be subjected to different
regulations in the process of admission to
citizenship. The EU will have made a major contribution
to integration by changing its attitude in
this regard by, for example, giving migrants who
have lived in Europe for a certain time the right to
vote regardless of citizenship. Already today, the
importance of Turkish migrants, accounting for
an approximate 2.5 million qualifi ed voters, has
come to an unprecedented degree. Political parties
will increasingly be affected by this growing
potential. The conservative notion that the emotional
bond between Turkish migrants and Turkey
is an obstacle for integration and therefore
a reason for marginalising them from national
political life requires re-examination. Turkey can
be a part of the solution just as it can also be a
part of the problem: As long as Turkish EU membership
is used – or rather misused – for cheap
propaganda, the topic as an election issue emotionally
disturbs Turkish migrants. Arguments for
an anti-enlargement course along the lines of
“cultural-religious” differences, used for justifying
why the “homeland” of many migrants (i.e. Turkey)
should not be admitted, create the ground
for dangerous reasoning: Turkish migrants,
in the eyes of many Europeans displaying the
characteristics of the country that shall not be
admitted, are concerned whether those saying
“An EU without Turkey” may someday say “An
EU without Turks”. Accordingly, they perceive
the “no to Turkey in the EU” campaign as a campaign
against them, especially in the post 9/11
environment with its growing Islamophobia and
discriminatory policy approaches.4 This is not to
argue that Turkish migrants shall be manipulated
in the favour of Turkish policy goals since this
would mean intervention in the internal affairs of
the countries concerned. However, it should be
acknowledged and taken into consideration that
the integration (or non-integration) of Turkish
migrants into different EU societies is partly but
strongly linked with the question of Turkey joining
the EU or not. To ignore this fact would mean
to be ignorant to central links and connexions in
this complex puzzle.
From the presented point of view, it seems that
Turkey is more successful than some EU member
states if it comes to integration. Turkey is already
playing a major “European” role in terms
of culture (Eurovision, European Capital of Culture),
economy (Customs Union, commerce
with the EU), politics (Council of Europe), and
security (NATO, OSCE, European Security and
Defence Policy). The only – central – European
arena whose decision making mechanisms
Turkey does not participate in is the EU. It is
an undeniable fact that Turks are an important
component of European life. Through immigration,
European countries have already tested
whether it is possible to live with Turks. At this
point, it can already be concluded that Turkish
migrants constitute an undeniable “social-political
capital” to Europe that should not and must
not be wasted by building up barriers instead
of establishing a climate of mutual understanding,
respect and cooperation. Only by really accepting
and understanding Turkish migrants as
“capital”, the countries they live in can fully benefi
t from the potential of its migrant population.
Turkish migrants are a “soft power” that cannot
only contribute to the admission of Turkey to the
EU but also to the general interests of European
countries – particularly in times of crisis as they
are experienced today in the fi nancial and economic
sphere.
1
Turks, who were expected to have a rather
ZEI EU-Turkey-Monitor Vol. 5 No. 2 August 2009 7
Dr. Olli Rehn, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, meets with ZEI Director Prof. Dr.
Ludger Kühnhardt and Dr. Andreas Marchetti, Editor of the ZEI EU-Turkey-Monitor.
1) Cf. also Eleni Mavrogeorgis: A Clash of Perceptions,
Not of Civilizations.: Revealing Muslim & Non-Muslim
Perceptions of National Loyalty and Integrated Living
(Rutgers DGA Policy Brief, 1), Newark 2009.
2) R. Gutman during the mentioned symposium.
3) Former MEP V. Öger at the same event.
4) U. Erdener, Rector of Hacettepe University, at the
mentioned symposium.
