By Sefa Yürükel
In an age when global power competition is being reshaped on a technological axis, the nature of military alliances is also undergoing a fundamental transformation. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), built on the conventional deterrence logic of the Cold War, is now seeking strategic superiority in advanced technology fields such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, hypersonic weapons, autonomous systems and cyber capabilities. This paradigm shift leads to the emergence of new mechanisms within the alliance’s institutional structure while also making visible the hierarchical relations among member states. The news article titled “Türkiye’siz teknolojik NATO girişimi” (A technological NATO initiative without Turkey), brought to the agenda by the Aydınlık newspaper in 2024, points precisely to what kind of exclusionary dynamics this transformation produces for Turkey. When NATO’s new generation technology innovation ecosystem is examined, it becomes clear that Turkey’s exclusion from certain critical platforms is based on structural reasons that cannot be explained solely by political tensions, and that this will have consequences deeply affecting both Ankara’s defence industry strategy and the future of the alliance.
NATO’s Innovation Transformation and Institutional Restructuring
The origins of the alliance’s technological transformation efforts extend beyond the defence spending commitments that gained momentum from the 2014 Wales Summit onward. With the 2019 London Declaration, it was formally acknowledged that NATO needed to “adapt to new strategic threats,” and at the 2021 Brussels Summit, the foundations of a technology oriented transformation were laid within the framework of the “NATO 2030” vision. The most concrete outcome of this process has been the new Strategic Concept adopted at the 2022 Madrid Summit. The document identifies Russia as “the most significant and direct threat,” while also codifying China’s rise as a “systemic challenge.” This dual threat perception has forced NATO to adopt a proactive position not only in military deterrence but also in technological competition.
The institutional reflections of this strategic orientation have rapidly emerged. In 2022, two critical structures were established within NATO: the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) and the NATO Innovation Fund. DIANA has been designed as a transatlantic accelerator network intended to speed up the development of dual use (civil military) deep technologies. The NATO Innovation Fund, with an initial capital of 1 billion euros, has been structured as a fund of funds that invests in the venture capital funds of member countries. These two institutional mechanisms represent a radical break from NATO’s traditional defence planning processes; instead of state centric, cumbersome procurement models, they embrace a market based approach involving the start up ecosystem, risk capital and the transfer of civilian innovation to the military domain.
An important dimension of this transformation is also the relaxation of classified information sharing and technology transfer regimes. NATO’s “technological sovereignty” discourse encourages deepened cooperation especially among core countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy, while envisaging a more selective and conditional participation model for the alliance’s other members.
Participation Hierarchy in DIANA and the Innovation Fund
The establishment process of DIANA contains noteworthy patterns of exclusion with respect to Turkey. When the map of the first DIANA accelerator centres and test centres announced in 2023 is examined, it is seen that Turkey is not among the total of eleven accelerators and twenty three test centres deployed in countries such as the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, Estonia, Canada and the United States. This situation was largely preserved in the second wave of expansion as of 2024, with Turkey being allowed to host only a limited number of test centres. Yet, despite possessing one of the alliance’s most advanced technological capabilities in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned systems, Turkey is not represented in decision making and steering mechanisms.
The investment portfolio of the NATO Innovation Fund also reflects a similar differentiation. The amount of capital committed by Turkey, which is among the twenty four countries participating in the fund, does not constitute a decisive weight in the fund’s overall investment strategy. More importantly, the geographical distribution of ventures supported in the fund’s initial investment rounds feeds an innovation ecosystem predominantly centred on North America and Northern Europe. NATO’s first investment portfolio, announced in June 2024, concentrates on space technologies, quantum sensors, autonomous robotic systems and artificial intelligence supported cyber security, and almost all of these ventures consist of companies based in the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany.
Turkey’s Rise in Defence Technology and Intra Alliance Tensions
The defence industry breakthrough Turkey has achieved over the last twenty years has called the traditional division of labour within NATO into question. The domestic production rate, which stood at twenty percent in 2002, has exceeded eighty percent as of 2024. The effectiveness demonstrated by the Bayraktar TB 2 and ANKA S UAV systems on the battlefield has led to the emergence of a product range that creates demand in the global arms market. Platforms such as the TCG Anadolu Amphibious Assault Ship and the national combat aircraft KAAN project indicate that Turkey is positioning itself not merely as a technology consumer but also as an original system developer.
This rise, paradoxically, has become one of the factors triggering Turkey’s exclusion from NATO’s technology cooperation mechanisms. Because the systems developed by Turkey, particularly UAV technologies, are assessed by some circles within the alliance as “non standard” or “not fully compatible with interoperability.” It is clear that these criticisms stem from differences in geopolitical positioning rather than technical justifications. Turkey’s S 400 air defence system procurement process with Russia, the CAATSA sanctions imposed by the United States and Turkey’s removal from the F 35 programme have caused a deep crisis of confidence in the transatlantic technology transfer regime.
This confidence crisis has also been directly reflected in NATO’s new technology architecture. Some allies, chiefly the United States and Germany, are blocking Turkey from playing a more effective role in platforms such as DIANA and the Innovation Fund, on the grounds that sensitive technologies could be exposed to risks associated with the S 400 systems. This approach reveals that the concept of “technological security” within the alliance is being handled with an increasingly narrow and exclusionary interpretation.
Global Supply Chains and Transatlantic Asymmetry
The exclusionary tendency in NATO’s technology initiatives has ceased to be an issue specific to Turkey and has become part of a broader transatlantic asymmetry. Regulations such as the US CHIPS and Science Act and the European Union’s European Chips Act aim to restructure semiconductor and critical technology supply chains. In this process, NATO’s technology platforms are effectively functioning as tools to consolidate the position of the Western alliance in global competition.
Turkey’s position in this structure contains two fundamental dilemmas. First, Turkey’s relative backwardness in fields such as semiconductors, advanced materials and quantum technologies compared to Western Europe and North America creates a natural asymmetry. Second, and more decisively, the distance Turkey is trying to close in these areas is being hampered on political grounds. The competencies of organisations such as ASELSAN, HAVELSAN and TUBITAK BILGEM in the field of artificial intelligence and cyber security are perceived as a competitive element rather than being integrated into NATO projects.
One of the most striking examples of this asymmetry is occurring in the implementation processes of NATO’s “digital transformation” agenda. The alliance’s “Artificial Intelligence Strategy for Multi Domain Operations” document, announced in 2024, constructs an implicit security hierarchy while determining data sharing standards among member countries. According to the document, the status of a “trusted ally” is based on criteria such as the level of cyber security maturity and the history of intelligence sharing, which may restrict Turkey’s access to certain data pools.
Turkey’s Strategic Response and Alternative Cooperation Channels
Ankara is developing a two pronged strategy against the exclusionary tendencies it encounters in NATO’s technology initiatives. On the one hand, diplomatic initiatives aimed at transforming existing structures within NATO are being pursued; on the other hand, alternative cooperation axes are being built. In this context, Turkey’s “strategic autonomy” discourse encompasses not only diversifying defence industry supply chains but also restructuring global technology partnerships.
The bilateral defence technology partnerships Turkey is conducting with the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy are strengthening channels outside the NATO umbrella. Particularly within the framework of the “Defence Cooperation Agreement” signed with the United Kingdom, concrete projects are being carried out in the fields of unmanned aerial systems and artificial intelligence. Furthermore, Turkey is deepening its relations with technology powers in the Asia Pacific region; joint production projects carried out with South Korea and Indonesia are regarded as steps aimed at balancing Western oriented restrictions.
Within this framework, the export performance of the Turkish defence industry is also noteworthy. Defence and aerospace exports exceeding 7 billion dollars in 2024 demonstrate that Turkey has become a competitive actor even in non NATO markets. This situation provides Ankara with a manoeuvring space that could strengthen its bargaining position within NATO, but it also generates a dynamic that accelerates the orientation towards alternative axes rather than encouraging the deepening of intra alliance technology cooperation.
Structural Consequences of Technological Exclusion and Future Projections
The exclusionary model emerging in NATO’s technology initiatives will have layered consequences for both Turkey and the alliance. In the short term, Turkey’s capacity to develop systems compatible with NATO standards in areas such as artificial intelligence and data analytics is being limited, which weakens the technological cohesion on the alliance’s southern flank. In the medium term, the deepening of Turkey’s non NATO partnerships may lead to the emergence of dual structures in the alliance’s technology supply chain. In the long term, the risk of NATO turning into a “two tier technological” structure becomes evident; while core countries advance deep technology integration, other members will have to content themselves mostly with operational contributions.
This projection concerns not only Turkey but also other NATO members such as Spain, Portugal, Greece and Central European countries. The defence technology production capacities of these countries and their level of participation in decision making processes are candidates to become the subjects of a similar asymmetrical structure. Therefore, the governance model of NATO’s technology initiatives also needs to be questioned in terms of the alliance’s democratic legitimacy and the principle of collective security.
The steps Turkey needs to take in this process necessitate a multidimensional strategic planning. First, it is important that diplomatic initiatives vis à vis NATO be carried out in a way that demonstrates, with concrete data, that the exclusion is based on political rather than technical reasons. Second, Turkish defence industry companies should increase their project proposals and joint investment initiatives for the NATO Innovation Fund, thereby trying to gain a position from within the existing mechanisms. Third, investments in areas such as semiconductors and advanced materials within the scope of the national technology move should be accelerated, thus reducing asymmetric dependency. Fourth, the use of non NATO collaborations as a balancing factor should be maintained, but this axis shift should not be allowed to further weaken the structural positioning within the alliance.
As for NATO, it has become imperative for the alliance’s long term strategic integrity that it review its own technology architecture and adopt a more inclusive governance model. Structures such as DIANA and the Innovation Fund should be designed not only as instruments for seeking technological superiority but also as tools for intra alliance solidarity. Otherwise, the deepening polarisation in the technology field will turn into a new fault line that erodes NATO’s collective defence backbone.
Turkey’s positioning in this process necessitates the redefinition not only of its defence industry strategy but also of its role in the Euro Atlantic security architecture. The evolving balances create a field of strategic tension that compels Ankara both to be a more effective actor within NATO and to keep non NATO options alive. The manner in which this tension is managed will be one of the fundamental determinants of Turkey’s position in the international system in the coming decade.
References
NATO Public Diplomacy Division. (2019). London Declaration: Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London. NATO Official Documents, 4 December 2019.
NATO. (2020). NATO 2030: United for a New Era – Analysis and Recommendations of the Reflection Group Appointed by the NATO Secretary General. NATO Official Publication, Brussels, 25 November 2020.
NATO. (2022). Strategic Concept 2022: Adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Madrid. NATO Official Documents, 29 June 2022.
NATO. (2023). DIANA – Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic: Initial Governance and Site Selection. NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division, January 2023.
NATO Innovation Fund. (2023). NIF Investment Strategy and Initial Capital Deployment Plan. NATO Innovation Fund Board, Brussels, March 2023.
Fiott, D. (2023). “The European Defence Innovation Ecosystem: Between Transatlantic Ambitions and Strategic Autonomy.” European Security, 32(4), pp. 521 to 539.
Aydınlık. (2024). “Türkiye’siz teknolojik NATO girişimi.” Aydınlık Newspaper, 15 March 2024, https://www.aydinlik.com.tr/haber/turkiyesiz-teknolojik-nato-girisimi-581359.
NATO. (2024). Artificial Intelligence Strategy for Multi Domain Operations. NATO Allied Command Transformation, Norfolk, VA, April 2024.
Küçükyılmaz, M. & Özkan, G. (2024). “NATO’nun Dönüşümü ve Türkiye’nin Savunma Sanayii Stratejisi: DIANA ve İnovasyon Fonu Bağlamında Bir Değerlendirme.” Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi, 20(1), pp. 87 to 118.
Presidency of Defence Industries. (2024). 2024 Annual Report. Publications of the Presidency of Defence Industries of the Republic of Turkey, Ankara, December 2024.
Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
Aarhus University, 1997
Independent Researcher
Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures.
Bir yanıt yazın