Former ICC Prosecutor Accuses Mossad of Intimidating Her at Her Home to Protect Israel
Former Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Fatou Bensouda, has denounced an intense campaign of pressure and intimidation by Israel aimed at forcing her to close the investigation into alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Palestine (Middle East Eye, 2026).
Bensouda, who led the Office of the Prosecutor between 2012 and 2021, opened a preliminary examination in 2015 into violations committed in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem, primarily attributed to Israeli forces and also to Palestinian armed groups (Al Jazeera, 2026).
Shortly after launching that inquiry, two men appeared directly at her home in The Hague and handed her an envelope containing $500, supposedly as a “thank you” gesture. Bensouda interpreted the act as a clear threat: “They came directly to my house. I understood the message they were sending,” she recalled (Middle East Eye, 2026).
She immediately reported the incident to the Dutch police and ICC security. The investigation revealed that the men’s phone numbers were linked to Israel and that the vehicle in which they arrived had been rented at the airport, confirming the connections to Israel (Middle East Eye, 2026).
Subsequently, then-Mossad chief Yossi Cohen met with her in Munich and New York to explicitly ask her to abandon the investigation. “What was clear is that he did not want the Palestine investigation to continue,” Bensouda stated (TRT World, 2026).
The former Gambian prosecutor felt abandoned by the ICC’s member states. “I felt alone. I felt unsupported,” she lamented despite having reported the threats (Al Jazeera, 2026).
These revelations have reignited the debate over political interference in international justice. Israel categorically denies the allegations.
References
Al Jazeera. (2026). Talk to Al Jazeera: Fatou Bensouda on Israeli threats against her and the ICC.
Middle East Eye. (2026). Former ICC prosecutor says Mossad chief pressured her to stop investigating Israel war crimes.
TRT World. (2026). Former ICC chief says Mossad pressured her to stop investigating Israel.
Washington does not lose wars, Washington achieves strategic objectives.
Washington successfully degrades enemy capabilities.
Washington transitions to a ceasefire framework, but Congress has receipts.
Just revealed something that no Pentagon press briefing would ever say out loud.
42 American military aircraft shot out of the sky.
By a country that Washington had already declared defeated.
Welcome to the story behind the story.
Before we count what America lost, let us count what America said it would achieve.
The Trump administration entered Operation Epic Fury with four publicly stated objectives.
Destroy Iran’s nuclear program completely.
Degraied Iran’s ballistic missile capability.
Cut-off Iran’s support for regional proxy groups.
Force Iran’s leadership to permanently renounce nuclear weapons.
Four objectives.
29 billion dollars.
Keep those four in your mind.
We will return to them.
On February 28th, 2026, the United States and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury.
Washington was triumphant.
Supreme Leader Kamine was dead.
Nuclear sites were hit.
The state of Hormuz Defense Secretary Pete Heggseth told Congress,”
We have achieved our strategic objectives.
Now fast-forward to May the Congressional Research Service.”
The non-partisan research arm of the United States Congress.
Quietly published a report.
No press conference.
No headlines on American prime time.
No ticker on CNN. A very uncomfortable document.
42 United States military aircraft lost or severely damaged.
In a war that America won.
Let us now do what Washington refused to do.
Aircraft by aircraft.
The F-35A, lightning the second.
The most expensive weapons program in human history.
At 1.7 trillion dollars.
Shot down or severely damaged over Iran on March 19th.
Cost of one aircraft between 80 and 110 million dollars.
Iran’s foreign minister, Iraq chi, Iran’s armed forces were the first in the world to shoot down an F-35.
Washington has not denied it.
Four F-15E strike-eagles, $100 million each, $400 million total.
Three destroyed by friendly fire over Kuwait.
America paid to shoot down its own jets.
The fourth destroyed in combat over Iran.
One eight-end thunderbolt the second, $20 million.
Destroyed inside Iran.
Seven KC–135 strattotankers.
The aircraft that keep combat jets flying.
$30 million each, $350 million total.
Five of them were not airborne.
They were parked on the tarmac at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia when Iranian missiles found them.
One E3-century A-wax, $270 million.
The flying command center.
The brain of the entire operation.
Destroyed on the ground in Saudi Arabia by an Iranian missile.
Two MC–130J commandow the second special operations aircraft.
$100 million each, $200 million total.
American commandows flew them into Iran on a rescue mission.
They got stuck in soft sand inside Iranian territory.
American forces blew up their own aircraft on Iranian soil because they could not fly them out.
One H-H-60W Jolly Green the second helicopter.
$40 million, damaged by small arms fire during the same rescue mission.
24 M-Q-9 Reaper drones between $30 and $56 million each, $720 million total.
And the M-Q-9 production line was already shut down in 2025.
America cannot replace them quickly.
Iran destroyed 24 of a product no longer being manufactured.
One M-Q-4C Triton surveillance drone.
$250 million, a quarter billion dollar aircraft.
Total hardware destroyed in 40 days.
Approximately $3.5 to $4 billion.
And that is just the aircraft.
The Pentagon told Congress the full cost of Operation Epic Fury is now $29 billion.
That number jumped 4 billion in just two weeks.
83 cents of every dollar spent.
$24 billion out of $29 billion.
Went toward fixing and replacing destroyed military hardware.
And the $29 billion does not include a single dollar of base repair costs.
Those assessments are still ongoing.
Congressional sources say the final bill could reach 200 billion oracles.
$200 billion for a 40-day war that America won.
And Iran was not just hitting aircraft.
Iran hit American military bases across seven countries simultaneously.
In the first two weeks alone, confirmed base damage reached $800 million.
The U. S. Navy Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain was hit.
Repair cost for that one building $200 million.
In Qatar, Iran struck an early warning radar system valued at $1.1 billion.
$1 billion.
In Kuwait, a 50-year-old Iranian F5 jet penetrated the patriot air defense shield and bombed a U. S. compound, a half-century old aircraft.
Inside a base protected by the most advanced missile defense system in the world.
And none of this base damage is included in the $29 billion figure.
It’s still counting.
Democratic Senator Mark Kelly sat before Congress and used one word to describe America’s weapons inventory after this war.
His exact words, “I think it is fair to say it is shocking how deep we have gone into these magazines.
The American people are less safe, whether it is a conflict with China or somewhere else in the world.
We are talking about years to rebuild.
America spent $29 billion and weakened itself against every future enemy at the same time.
Now the scoreboard.
Destroy Iran’s nuclear program.
Iran still holds over 450 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium.
Enough for 9 to 11 nuclear weapons.
Fordale survived.
Buried under 80 meters of granite.
Iran’s Parliament voted to end all IAA cooperation after the ceasefire.
Iran is now less transparent than before the war.
Netanyahu himself admitted on CBS. There is still nuclear material.
There are still enrichment sites that have to be dismantled.
The man who launched the war admitted the war did not finish the job.
Iran’s ballistic missiles.
Iranian missiles were still hitting American warships in the straight of Hormuz in May 2026.
A full month into the ceasefire.
Cut off Iran’s proxy support.
Hezbollah operational.
Health is active.
My RGC network intact, force Iran to announce nuclear weapons.
No deal, no signed agreement, no verification framework.
Trump called Iran’s latest proposal a piece of garbage.
The nuclear talks are still ongoing.
The same talks that diplomacy could have produced before a single bomb was dropped.
Zero out of four objectives achieved.
Here is what the data tells us.
The United States launched Operation Epic Fury with the most advanced air force in the world.
It flew nearly 13,000 soughties.
It hit over 5,500 targets.
It killed the Supreme Leader of Iran.
And it lost 42 aircraft worth $4 billion.
It spent $29 billion.
Got its bases hit in seven countries.
Pleated its missiles for years, achieved zero out of four stated objectives, agreed to a ceasefire with a country it claimed to have defeated.
And then spent two months hiding the losses from its own Congress, American style.
The story behind the story is not about what Iran lost.
The story behind the story is about what Washington could not afford to lose next.
Because if the war had restarted with Iran’s flight patent data with its proven F-35 kill, with its confirmed drone hunting capability, with American munitions already at shocking levels, the next set of losses would not be 42 aircraft.
And someone in Washington did the math.
That is the story behind the story.
I am your host.
If you believe the world deserves the full picture, share this video right now.
Decades-long drug wars in Mexico have predominantly been explained in academic literature through variables such as inter-cartel competition, deficiencies in state capacity, and drug demand from the United States. However, the extensive investigations of Mexican journalist-author Francisco Cruz add an extremely disturbing dimension to this picture: the allegation that transnational criminal networks, specifically the structure defined as the “Israeli mafia,” and former intelligence operatives have been integrated into the cartel ecosystem in Mexico, protected and managed by the state security bureaucracy itself. Cruz’s narrative indicates that organized crime may represent not only market competition but also a complex power projection with geopolitical and intelligence dimensions. This article aims to systematically address Cruz’s findings, the chronology of events, and the alleged connections, discussing within an academic framework what these claims could mean for the Mexican state and international security. The study acknowledges from the outset that the entirety of the allegations has not been definitively corroborated by independent judicial bodies or international commissions of inquiry, yet it interrogates their analytical value as a research hypothesis.
Conceptual Framework: The Israeli Mafia and Transnational Crime Networks
Francisco Cruz particularly emphasizes that the Israeli mafia is not an ordinary criminal organization. According to the author, this structure is “a planned criminal organization born almost with the establishment of the modern State of Israel, possessing a permanent organizational scheme.” This claim partially aligns with the limited but existing studies in the literature on the historical roots of Jewish crime groups. It is known that organized crime in Israel possesses a comprehensive network structure, with 16 crime families operating in a wide spectrum of activities including drug trafficking, money laundering, extortion, and arms trafficking.
Specifically, with the mass immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel in 1989, Russian organized crime elements began to view Israel as an ideal center for money laundering. Because the banking system of the era was designed to encourage aliyah and capital movements, combined with the absence of anti-money laundering legislation, it became an easy haven for “Russian” organized crime. In 2005, Israeli police estimated that Russian organized crime had laundered between 5 and 10 billion dollars in the fifteen years following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Likewise, the structure known as the “Israeli mafia,” founded in the 1980s in New York under the leadership of Johnny Attias and responsible for the largest gold heist in Manhattan’s jewelry district, confirms this transnational character. Cruz’s contribution is his claim that this structure, over time, symbiotically strengthened with the Russian “Red Mafia,” reaching the same operational level as the Japanese Yakuza, the Italian Cosa Nostra, and the Mexican cartels. According to him, not only professional bankers but also mafia elements immigrated to Israel during the waves of Jewish migration; these groups merged with criminal networks from the former Soviet geography, thereby gaining a global capacity.
Entry into Mexico: The 2000s and Initial Detections
According to Cruz’s chronology, the presence of the Israeli mafia in Mexico dates back to the early 2000s. Other investigations supporting this claim reveal that Mexican government security forces had detected connections between the Israeli mafia and organized crime groups starting in 2000, that intensive operations were recorded for a Mexican cartel solely between 2000 and 2010, and that the Israeli mafia supplied high-powered weapons to this cartel and laundered illegal proceeds. Similarly, it has been reported that the Mexican federal government detected the money laundering connections of Israelis with cartels and Mexican companies 21 years ago.
During this period, two Israeli citizens, Benjamín Yessuharan Zuchi (Ben Zuchi) and Yalon Azulay, who would later be killed in Ciudad de México in 2019, entered the radar of security units. According to the Mexican Attorney General’s Office (FGR) investigation files, Benjamín Yeshurun Sutchi wove a criminal network during his stay in Mexico between 2001 and 2005 by establishing relations with criminal organizations dedicated to drug trafficking, kidnapping, and casino operations. Sought by Interpol, Sutchi was captured in June 2005 and deported to Israel but later returned to Mexico to continue his casino operations. FGR files document that Sutchi established relations with members of the Beltrán Leyva Cartel, particularly with Édgar Valdés Villarreal, known as “La Barbie”; a photograph of the Israeli together with “La Barbie” was found during a search conducted by SEIDO.
Genaro García Luna: From Security Chief to Protector of Criminal Networks
The central figure of the article is undoubtedly former Secretary of Public Security Genaro García Luna. According to the official indictment of the U.S. Department of Justice, García Luna served as the head of Mexico’s Federal Investigation Agency (AFI) from 2001 to 2005 and, as Secretary of Public Security from 2006 to 2012, controlled the Federal Police Force. Arrested in Dallas, Texas in December 2019, he was found guilty by a jury in February 2023 after a four-week trial in Brooklyn federal court of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, international cocaine distribution conspiracy, and making false statements. In October 2024, he was sentenced to 460 months (over 38 years) in prison and a $2 million fine.
Judge Brian M. Cogan stated that García Luna exhibited “the same kind of thuggery” as El Chapo, only manifested differently. According to The New York Times, García Luna had so penetrated the country’s security apparatus that he was defined as Mexico’s J. Edgar Hoover, yet he led a double life, being on the Sinaloa Cartel’s payroll for almost his entire career. García Luna’s cooperation encompassed actions such as providing safe passage for the cartel’s drug shipments, supplying sensitive law enforcement information about investigations related to the cartel, and assisting in attacks against rival cartels. The indictment indicates that between 2002 and 2007, García Luna assisted in at least six shipments containing over 50,000 kilograms of cocaine in total, with bribery payments personally delivered to him in briefcases containing millions of dollars.
Kidnapping, Extortion, and “Manhunt” Operations
According to the allegations, the main sphere of activity of the Israeli mafia in Mexico consists of extortion and kidnapping-for-ransom operations targeting wealthy Jewish businessmen. To place this allegation in a broader context, kidnapping has long been a critical source of income for organized crime groups in Mexico. Reports show that cartels have deeply penetrated the mining sector, some companies have made protection agreements with cartels, and disobedience can result in kidnapping and murder. Informality is widespread, and large companies and foreign operators often do not report kidnapping cases.
Cruz claims that the Israeli mafia established “large private operational teams” for such operations and that former Mossad agents served in these teams. It has been documented that Mexican cartels have heavily recruited former military personnel and operatives with tactical experience from countries such as Israel, Russia, the Netherlands, Ukraine, Colombia, and Guatemala in recent years, with the aim of forming “more lethal, trained, and disciplined forces.” It has also been reported that cartels have modernized their arsenals with technologies, accessories, and sighting systems previously unique to military or highly trained police forces. Connections between the Israeli mafia and the cartels are alleged to facilitate the trafficking of people, money, and drugs. In fact, authorities have documented the money-laundering activities of the Israeli mafia and the participation of members of ETA and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) as well as Los Zetas in training camps.
The Florence Cassez and Israel Vallarta Case: The Visible Face and Deep Connections
In Cruz’s analysis, the Florence Cassez and Israel Vallarta case is a “scapegoat” operation covering up this multi-layered network of relationships. The case chronology is as follows: In December 2005, AFI agents raided the Las Chinitas ranch on the México-Cuernavaca highway; simultaneously, a Televisa crew entered the scene to be broadcast on Carlos Loret de Mola’s program. According to records, agents were seen beating Vallarta while presenting him to the camera, while French citizen Florence Cassez repeatedly stated she was unaware that three people were being held hostage at the location. Both were accused of being the leaders of the kidnapping gang “Los Zodiaco.”
After years of legal struggle, the Mexican Supreme Court ruled in 2013 for Cassez’s release; it was determined that the arrest was a staged fiction by the AFI and that this fiction had a “corrupting effect” on the criminal process. In contrast, Israel Vallarta remained in detention without a definitive verdict for approximately 20 years. Finally, in August 2025, the Third Criminal District Judge of the State of Mexico, Mariana Vieyra Valdés, acquitted Vallarta on the same legal grounds the Supreme Court applied for Cassez in 2013. The court invalidated the testimonies, identifications, and Vallarta’s statement, proven through three separate expert reports to have been taken under torture in 2005. According to Cruz, this case made the presence of the Israeli mafia in Mexico so visible as to provide a foothold for publicly stating, “Here is the Israeli mafia in Mexico,” but simultaneously prevented the larger structure under García Luna’s leadership from being seen.
The 2019 Murders and the Network Becoming Visible
All of this alleged structure remained largely in the dark until two murders committed in Ciudad de México in July 2019. On July 24, 2019, at a Chinese restaurant in the upscale Plaza Artz shopping center south of Mexico City, a woman shot and killed two Israeli citizens at close range. The victims were identified as Alon Azulay (41) and Benjamin Yeshurun Sutchi (44). Although the female suspect, initially identified as “Esperanza N.,” suggested the attack was a crime of passion, the Mexico City Attorney General’s Office confirmed that the double homicide was a “coordinated attack” and linked to an underground network of Israeli criminals. President Andrés Manuel López Obrador personally addressed the issue at his daily press conference, stating, “This is not a case of passion as previously reported. This is related to organized crime, and I close the matter here.” Mexican Security Minister Alfonso Durazo explained that the slain Israelis were linked to money laundering gangs in the country. The Israeli Embassy in Mexico issued a written statement noting that Sutchi and Azulay “had criminal records both in Israel and in Mexico.”
As the investigation into the murders deepened, former Mexico City Police Chief Gabriel Regino explained that Sutchi was captured in 2005 in an operation conducted by the Mexican intelligence agency Cisen at Interpol’s request; that he had escaped from prison twice in Israel; and that there was intelligence indicating he had been trained by Mossad. According to the BBC, Mexico City Attorney General’s Office Spokesperson Ulises Lara stated that “the passion motivation has been eliminated” and that “the event leads us to connect it to a settling of scores between criminal groups.” The investigation launched following the murders led Cruz and his team to discover that these individuals were not ordinary crime victims but members of the Israeli mafia who had long been conducting extortion and kidnapping activities in Mexico. In 2021, a woman was arrested in connection with these 2019 murders for links to the Jalisco Nueva Generación Cartel (CJNG), demonstrating that the mafia-cartel connection had become a judicial finding.
Mossad Connections: The Most Controversial Link in the Allegation
The most speculative and hardest-to-verify part of Cruz’s narrative concerns the role of former Mossad agents within these structures. The point to be underlined here is that no evidence is presented that Mossad, as a state institution, was directly involved in criminal activities; rather, it is claimed that “former” agents were involved in these networks on an individual level. However, this allegation must be evaluated in historical context: Mossad’s presence in Latin America dates back decades. The most famous example is the capture of Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann by Mossad agents in Buenos Aires in 1960. A more controversial example is the close relationship between former Mossad special operations commander Mike Harari and Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega. According to Ynet’s exclusive report, Noriega “assisted in countless top-secret Mossad operations,” and Harari, even after retiring from Mossad in 1980, was tasked by then-Prime Minister Menachem Begin with managing the secret connections in Panama. During the U.S. invasion of Panama, Harari was sought alongside Noriega; he was alleged to have been involved in drug and arms trafficking but managed to escape with the help of local collaborators. This historical example offers an indirect framework for Cruz’s claims by demonstrating that former Mossad personnel could, at times, take part in operations beyond legal boundaries in Latin America; however, independent judicial evidence is essential to reach a definitive judgment.
Operational Symbiosis Model and Theoretical Assessment
When we expand and analyze Cruz’s claims, the following operational symbiosis model emerges: The Israeli mafia targets the wealthy Jewish community in Mexico using technical expertise provided by former intelligence operatives (surveillance, target profiling, kidnapping, and negotiation); transfers a portion of the proceeds from these activities as bribes to García Luna and his network; and in return gains logistical protection and operational space through strategic partnerships established with the cartels (particularly Beltrán Leyva, Sinaloa, and Jalisco Nueva Generación). The exact overlap of García Luna’s tenure as AFI head (2001-2005) and Sutchi’s initial period of activity in Mexico (2001-2005) is chronologically significant. Moreover, reports that cartels recruit former soldiers and operatives from many countries, including Israel, suggest that the Israeli mafia’s integration into the cartel ecosystem may not be an isolated case but part of a broader transnational crime strategy. This model inverts the concept of “state capture,” frequently used in organized crime literature on Mexico, and effectively describes a model of the “instrumentalization of crime by the state.”
Conclusion
When the allegations put forward by Francisco Cruz are combined with the García Luna corruption proven in U.S. courts, the documented Israeli-Cartel connections, and the 2019 murders corroborated by official authorities, a picture emerges capable of shaking all paradigms regarding the security crisis in Mexico. The sentencing of García Luna to over 38 years in prison demonstrates that the state-crime alliance is not merely a theory but is supported by concrete judicial findings. The narrative in question reveals not only that cartels are actors that capture the state but also that the state bureaucracy can actively manage international criminal networks and instrumentalize them for its own benefit. However, allegations regarding the individual participation of Mossad-linked former agents in organized crime cannot be dismissed as entirely baseless when assessed in the context of historical examples such as the Harari-Noriega relationship; nonetheless, they must be approached with caution as long as they remain unconfirmed by official authorities. Behind the violence persisting in Latin America may lie not only drug markets but far more complex global power relations shaped in the dark rooms of states.
References
· Beittel, J. S. (2022). Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations. Congressional Research Service. · Cruz, F. (various publications). Investigative journalism files and interviews. · Serrano, M. (2012). “State-Crime Relations in Mexico.” Journal of Latin American Studies, 44(3), 543-568. · Viano, E. C. (Ed.) (2020). Transnational Organized Crime: Yesterday and Today. Routledge. · U.S. Department of Justice, Eastern District of New York. (2023, February 21). Ex-Mexican Secretary of Public Security Genaro Garcia Luna Convicted of Engaging in a Continuing Criminal Enterprise. · U.S. Department of Justice, Eastern District of New York. (2024, October 16). Ex-Mexican Secretary of Public Security Genaro Garcia Luna Sentenced to Over 38 Years’ Imprisonment. · U.S. Department of Justice, Eastern District of New York. (2020, July 30). Former Mexican Secretary of Public Security Genaro Garcia Luna Charged with Engaging in a Continuing Criminal Enterprise. · U.S. Department of Justice, Eastern District of New York. (2019, December 10). Former Mexican Secretary of Public Security Arrested for Drug-Trafficking Conspiracy and Making False Statements. · The New York Times. (2023, February 21). “Mexico’s Ex-Top Security Official Is Convicted of Cartel Bribery.” · The Guardian. (2024, October 16). “Mexican official who led war on drugs jailed for 38 years for accepting bribes.” · BBC News Mundo. (2019, July 25). “Plaza Artz: what is known about the two Israelis murdered in a ‘settling of scores’ in Mexico City.” · BBC News. (2019, July 26). “Israeli ‘underworld’ figures shot dead in Mexico City ‘hit’.” · CNN. (2019, July 26). “Woman shoots two Israelis dead in Chinese restaurant in Mexico City.” · Instituto Nacional de Migración (Mexico). (2019, July 25). “Israeli wove criminal network in Mexico.” · El Imparcial. (2025, August 2). “They apply to Israel Vallarta the same ruling that freed Florence Cassez.” · Infobae. (2025, August 2). “Israel Vallarta Case: how he entered and how he left prison nearly 20 years later.” · Los Reporteros MX. (2026, April 30). “Weapons, training and mafia: the relationship of Mexican cartels with Israel.” · Ynetnews. (2017, June 1). “Former Panama dictator’s secret ties to Israel.” · NCFGT. (2021, September 7). “Israeli mafia.” · S-RM Inform. (2026, March 30). “Qtr 1, 2026 | The cost of business: Organised crime in Mexico.” · Amos News. (2025, September 27). “Links of Mexican cartels with the Israeli mafia from the year 2000, revealed.” · Mexico Daily Post. (2025, September 4). “From Israel to Mexico: Galil rifles end up in the hands of cartels.”
Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA) Aarhus University, 1997 Independent Researcher Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures
The recent opinion piece in the New York Post titled “Beware Turkey’s ambitions in the post Iran power vacuum,” written by Jonathan Schanzer and published March 4, 2026, reflects again a troubling pattern in which speculation is presented as strategic analysis with a paper that always has an axe to grind with Turkiye . Opinion pages are meant to provoke debate, but serious commentary on international affairs must begin with accuracy, fact of evidence and context both of which appear noticeably absent with the New York Post .
First, a matter of basic accuracy and respect. The official name of the country is Türkiye, not “Turkey.” The Government of the Republic of Türkiye formally requested that this name be used in international discourse and institutions. When individuals presenting themselves as analysts of Middle Eastern affairs cannot even employ the correct name of a NATO ally, it raises legitimate questions about the depth of their expertise. It is remarkable that some commentators seated comfortably in editorial offices have suddenly become self declared specialists on Türkiye and the Middle East while failing to get even the most fundamental facts correct.
More importantly, the article advances a narrative portraying Türkiye as a destabilizing force poised to exploit a hypothetical Iranian collapse. This framing ignores a strategic reality: Türkiye is a longstanding member of NATO and possesses the alliance’s second largest military. For decades it has contributed to the collective defense of Europe and the transatlantic community while serving as a frontline state bordering some of the most volatile regions in the world.
For more than forty years, Türkiye has confronted terrorism at enormous cost. Over 45,000 innocent people women, children, teachers, doctors, and security personnel have lost their lives to terrorist violence. To casually assert that “Ankara has been cultivating terrorist proxies” without credible evidence is not analysis; it is an outright falsehood that disregards the painful reality of Türkiye’s long struggle against terrorism.
In fact, Türkiye has been one of the only countries in the region with boots on the ground fighting multiple terrorist threats simultaneously, including ISIS, the PKK, and Iranian backed militant networks seeking to expand Tehran’s influence. Turkish operations in northern Syria and Iraq were not exercises in imperial ambition but efforts to prevent terrorism from spilling across its borders and to block the very instability critics now claim to fear.
Equally misleading is the assertion that “Ankara has blanketed the region” to fill some imagined geopolitical vacuum. In reality, the areas where Türkiye has operated militarily were entered largely in response to direct security threats or through coordination with local authorities. In many of these areas, Turkish presence has helped establish relative security, humanitarian access, and basic stability for local populations who had previously been subjected to extremist control or civil war conditions.
The broader narrative advanced by the article reflects a long standing editorial tendency within the New York Post to frame Türkiye through a lens of suspicion rather than strategic reality. Such portrayals may resonate with readers who don’t even know where District of Columbia is in USA (D.C.) and unfamiliar with the complexities of the region, but they do little to inform the American public or contribute to constructive policy debate.
What makes this situation particularly unfortunate is the continued silence of Ahmet Yazal, the New York Consul General of the Republic of Türkiye in New York in rebutting Turkish movements official position. At a time when misleading narratives about Türkiye appear regularly in major American tabloids, one would expect stronger public engagement in defending the country’s reputation. Diplomacy requires more than ceremonial presence and walking two dogs; it requires active communication when misinformation circulates widely. Not Opinion , but official government policy.
Ultimately, the article does not expose Türkiye. Instead, it highlights the risks of substituting ideology for strategy and speculation for evidence. Türkiye remains a NATO ally, a regional superpower, and a country that understands the cost of war and terrorism more than most.
Foreign policy demands seriousness, not slogans. Unfortunately, this commentary offers little of the former. At a time when Western unity is essential, dismissive narratives about allies do not strengthen the alliance they weaken it. With NATO ally Türkiye at the table, the transatlantic community is stronger, not threatened.
An Open Letter of Appreciation to The Honorable Marjorie Taylor Greene Türkiye , Israel , Iran
The Honorable Marjorie Taylor Greene P.O. Box 829 Dalton, GA 30722 United States
Dear Congresswoman Greene,
I write to express my sincere appreciation for your clear and principled response to the recent remarks made by former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett. When you stated plainly, “Hello. Turkey is a NATO member country. Everyone wake up,” you did more than post a comment you reminded the world of a strategic reality too important to ignore.
Türkiye is not “the new Iran.” Such rhetoric is not analysis; it is provocation. It disregards decades of alliance, sacrifice, and shared security commitments. Since the Korean War, where Turkish brigades fought shoulder to shoulder with American forces, Türkiye has upheld a timetested and honorable role within the Western alliance. From Kosovo War to stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and operations in Libya, Türkiye has consistently stood on the froont lines of NATO’s most complex missions.
As the second-largest military force in NATO and the indispensable guardian of Europe’s southern flank, Türkiye protects not only its own sovereignty but the broader security architecture of the transatlantic world. It faces direct and indirect pressure from Iranbacked networks across Syria and Iraq. To equate Türkiye with Iran is not merely inaccurate it is intellectually unserious.
In fact, Türkiye’s strategic interventions have disrupted Iranian and Russian ambitions in Syria and Libya. Even James Jeffrey, who served as U.S. Ambassador to Türkiye and later as Special Representative for Syria, acknowledged that Turkish actions “stymied” Russian and Iranian designs and that this “is not a bad thing.” One may debate Ankara’s style or President Erdogan’s assertiveness; serious policymakers do so regularly. But caricature and smear campaigns are not substitutes for strategic thought.
Former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett’s remarks read less like statesmanship and more like political theater a careless attempt to delegitimize a NATO ally for shortterm applause. Demonizing Türkiye will not strengthen Israel’s security, nor will it serve American interests. It only erodes the cohesion of the alliance structure that has preserved stability for generations.
Türkiye is an independent regional major power, a complex democracy, and a pivotal state bridging Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia. It is not Iran, nor is it on a path to become Iran. Reducing it to such a slogan is a disservice to history and to facts.
Türkiye is not Lebanon, nor Iraq, Jordan, nor Syria, nor Iran and it is certainly not a nation to be intimidated or coerced by reckless rhetoric or military theatrics.
Those who believe otherwise misunderstand its history and resolve. At Gallipoli Campaign World War, I, 7 Powerful at time , Allied powers came to the Shores of Turkiye. Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, invading forces learned a hard lesson Ataturk said “the way they came, they left.”. Türkiye remains a sovereign power of strategic depth and institutional strength, fully capable of defending its national interests.
Your willingness to state the obvious that Türkiye is a NATO ally reflects clarity at a moment when clarity is needed. For that, many Americans who value strategic honesty are grateful.
A delegation from the Turkish Grand National Assembly, led by Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Fuat Oktay, is in Washington this week holding a series of meetings aimed at strengthening diplomatic ties at the legislative level. The visit underscores Ankara’s recognition that while executivelevel relations between Türkiye and the United States remain “extremely positive,” as Oktay noted, engagement with the U.S. Congress has proven far more difficult.
Oktay’s remarks deserve close attention. His observation that the U.S. Congress is challenging to engage because of its focus on domestic affairs is not merely a tactical complaint it is an admission of a structural reality of American democracy. In the United States, foreign policy is deeply shaped by grassroots engagement, local constituencies, and sustained relationships between elected officials and the communities they represent. This is not a flaw in the system; it is the system.
For years, A hand full of activist , like my self and policymakers have acknowledgedat least rhetorically that U.S. domestic politics is driven from the bottom up. Yet in practice, Ankara has largely relied on expensive lobbying firms in Washington, spending millions of dollars with little concrete, longterm impact. Access was purchased with millions of dollars given to lobbying firms, meetings were arranged, but influence remained shallow and often temporary. Lobbying without grassroots power is transactional, not transformational in building relationships.
The real weakness lies closer to home, within the ecosystem of Turkish-American organizations. Many so-called NGOs claiming to represent Americans of Turkish descent lack meaningful grassroots engagement in the halls of U.S. power. Groups such as Federation of Turkish Americans Associations often run by individuals with limited credibility, lack of proper English language or outreach or its members incardinated by the Federal Government , present themselves as national representatives while failing to build real relationships with members of Congress, state legislators, or even local officials. Representation without legitimacy is not advocacy; it is theater and picture taking.
Too many Turkish American organizations and its members appear more interested in hosting visiting Turkish political figures than in holding U.S. elected officials accountable or educating their own communities about civic engagement. Activism is reduced to symbolic welcoming outside the Turkish House or what I have refer to as the “Diplomatic House” rather than sustained engagement with congressional offices, district staff, school boards, or city councils.
The consequences are visible. Many Turkish Americans can name foreign ministers or ambassadors, yet cannot identify their own congressman, senator, assembly member, or even better yet , their children’s school principal. This is the State of the Turkish American Communities lobbying efforts. This civic disconnect undermines any serious claim to political influence in the halls of power. In the American system, power flows upward from informed, organized communities not downward from embassies or visiting delegations who for 40 years have come to the New York or Washington to congregate Turkish Americans by spoon feeding their version of relations then take group pictures for about one hour and then run to Apple store and Clothing Outlets to buy luggage full of Designer clothes.
Oktay’s statement that Congress is difficult because it is domestically focused is, unintentionally, an indictment of this failure. It highlights how Turkish-American NGOs have not done the essential work of embedding Turkish-American concerns into the fabric of U.S. domestic politics accept for community activist like Ergun Kirlikovali, Murat Guzel, Erol Akyurek and Melih Bektas. If Congress seems distant, it is because the bridge has not been built.
Leadership matters in this process, and it starts with consulates. In New York, for example, the role of the Consul General Yazal should be to empower communities, encourage civic participation, and foster credible relationships with elected officials. Instead, the current period has been marked by missed opportunities and weak engagement, widely regarded by community leaders as among the poorest in decades.
Strengthening U.S.Türkiye relations will not come from delegations alone, nor from checkbooks written to lobbying firms. It will come from disciplined grassroots organizing, accountable community leadership, and a serious commitment to engaging American democracy on its own terms. Only then will Congress listen not because it is asked to, but because it must.
