Category: East Asia & Pacific

  • From Orbit to the Underground: China’s Revolutionary SAR Satellite and the Discovery of the Planet’s Hidden Depths

    From Orbit to the Underground: China’s Revolutionary SAR Satellite and the Discovery of the Planet’s Hidden Depths

    A New View from the Sky

    Humanity has been observing our planet from space since the launch of Sputnik in 1957. Until now, however, this observation has been almost entirely limited to the Earth’s surface. The depths of the oceans, beneath the polar ice caps, terrain hidden by dense vegetation, and especially the earth’s crust beneath our feet have remained largely closed to the curious gaze from space.

    China’s latest move is radically changing this boundary. The newly launched next-generation satellite has made history as one of the first operational systems capable of imaging the inside of the earth’s crust from orbit by combining synthetic aperture radar (SAR) technology with low-frequency electromagnetic wave analysis. This satellite, reported to have been developed under the “Ludi Tanshi” (Land Exploration) program, can simultaneously use P-band and L-band frequencies to collect data at different depth and resolution levels.

    Technical Infrastructure and Working Principles

    The Evolution of Synthetic Aperture Radar

    Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) is an imaging technique that processes radar echoes collected by a moving antenna to achieve the resolution that a physically much larger antenna would provide. Traditional SAR systems generally operate in X-band (8-12 GHz), C-band (4-8 GHz) or S-band (2-4 GHz) frequencies and show extraordinary success in surface imaging. However, these high-frequency signals are extremely limited in their ability to penetrate soil and rock.

    China’s new satellite breaks through this frequency barrier by using a system that can operate in P-band (approximately 300 MHz to 1 GHz) and partially in VHF bands. Low-frequency electromagnetic waves, thanks to their longer wavelengths, can penetrate materials such as soil, sand, rock and even concrete. Although penetration depth varies depending on the conductivity and dielectric properties of the material, it can be between 100 and 500 meters under ideal conditions (in low-conductivity environments such as dry sand and limestone).

    Dual-Band Hybrid System

    One of the satellite’s most critical technical features is its ability to operate P-band and L-band (1-2 GHz) radars simultaneously. This dual-band architecture allows targets at different depths and of different scales to be detected at the same time. P-band radar provides deeper penetration (100-500m) but has relatively low resolution; it is used for detecting large-scale geological structures, deep bunkers and fault lines. L-band radar, on the other hand, offers shallower penetration (20-50m) but much higher resolution; it is effective in detailed mapping of near-surface tunnels, pipelines, archaeological remains and military fortifications. The interferometric combination of these two data streams (InSAR technique) enables the creation of three-dimensional models of underground structures.

    Phase Change Analysis and Dielectric Contrast

    The basic physical principle of underground imaging is the reflection of electromagnetic waves at the boundaries between media with different dielectric properties. The dielectric difference between the concrete wall of an underground bunker and the surrounding soil causes part of the radar signal to be reflected back. The Chinese satellite is equipped with receivers sensitive enough to detect these extremely weak reflections.

    One of the innovative aspects of the system is phase change analysis. A signal reflected from an underground cavity or a structure of different density shows a phase difference compared to signals coming from its surroundings. These phase differences are measured at the millisecond level to obtain information about the location, size and even shape of underground anomalies. Signal processing algorithms developed by the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC) combine this phase data with AI-supported analysis to minimize false positives and increase detection accuracy.

    Orbit and Satellite Constellation Architecture

    The satellite is deployed in a sun-synchronous orbit (SSO) at an altitude of approximately 500-600 km. This orbital choice provides the advantage of imaging the same region under similar illumination conditions on each pass and facilitates change detection. Furthermore, rather than a single satellite, a constellation architecture consisting of three or four satellites is planned. In this way, the revisit time for the same region will be reduced to under 24 hours, tomographic underground maps will be created through multi-angle imaging, and the total capacity and global coverage area of the system will be increased.

    Comparative Technical Superiority

    To understand China’s position in this field, a comparison with existing systems is necessary. China’s Ludi Tanshi system uses P/L-band frequencies to offer 100-500 meter penetration and 3-10 meter resolution and is currently operational. Argentina’s SAOCOM system uses L-band, providing 10-20 meter penetration and 10-30 meter resolution, and is operational. Japan’s ALOS-2 PALSAR system uses L-band to deliver 5-15 meter penetration and 10-30 meter resolution and is operational. The European Space Agency’s Biomass system aims for 50-100 meter penetration and 50-100 meter resolution using P-band and is planned for launch in 2025. The US-India partnership NISAR is planned for 2024, using L/S-band to offer 10-20 meter penetration and 3-10 meter resolution. As can be seen, China’s system demonstrates a clear superiority over all existing and planned competitors in terms of both penetration depth and resolution. In particular, the P-band and L-band combination largely eliminates the traditional trade-off between depth and resolution.

    Scientific and Civil Application Areas

    Geology and Earthquake Prediction

    One of the most important civil applications of the underground imaging satellite is the monitoring of active fault lines. While more than 90% of major earthquakes worldwide occur on known active fault lines, our knowledge of the deep geometry of these faults and the amount of accumulated stress is extremely limited. Current methods rely either on surface observations or on a limited number of deep boreholes and seismic measurement stations.

    The Chinese satellite can revolutionize earthquake hazard assessments by mapping the depth, inclination and lateral continuity of fault planes from orbit. In particular, critical regions such as the Longmenshan Fault Line (the source of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake), one of the world’s most active fault systems located on China’s own territory, and the eastern extensions of the North Anatolian Fault Line can be continuously monitored.

    The elastic deformation accumulating along fault lines changes the dielectric properties underground. The development of micro-cracks in rocks under stress, changes in water content and mineralogical transformations affect the reflection patterns of radar signals. Monitoring these changes over time may enable the detection of earthquake precursors. The China Earthquake Administration (CEA) aims to integrate data obtained from this satellite with existing seismic networks to develop medium-term prediction models, particularly for earthquakes above magnitude 6.

    Geothermal Energy and Natural Resource Exploration

    The thermal structure of the earth’s crust is critical in determining geothermal energy potential. Hot rock formations, magma chambers and hydrothermal systems exhibit dielectric properties different from the surrounding rocks. The satellite’s P-band radar can detect these thermal anomalies up to depths of 300-400 meters from the surface.

    Similarly, mineral deposits and underground water reservoirs can be discovered more quickly and at lower cost thanks to this technology. While traditional mineral exploration methods require intensive drilling and geophysical surveys, satellite-based underground imaging can reduce exploration costs by up to 60% by pre-identifying potential areas.

    It is planned to use this technology for mineral and water resource exploration in countries within the scope of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, particularly in Central Asia and Africa. This constitutes the technological pillar of China’s global resource security strategy.

    Urban Planning, Infrastructure Safety and Disaster Management

    Modern cities rise upon complex underground infrastructure networks: metro tunnels, sewage systems, drinking water networks, electricity and communication cables, natural gas pipelines. The mapping of this infrastructure is often incomplete or outdated, especially in historic cities or rapidly urbanizing areas.

    Satellite-based underground imaging enables the non-invasive detection of this infrastructure. In particular, cavities, weak ground zones and underground water flow paths along tunnel routes can be identified in advance during pre-construction ground surveys for metro construction. In monitoring infrastructure aging, leaks in old water pipes can be detected as they change the dielectric properties of the ground. Regarding sinkhole and subsidence risk, underground cavities in karstic terrains can be identified before collapse occurs.

    The underground cavity disaster that occurred in Shanghai in 2021, causing a shopping center to collapse, painfully demonstrated the importance of such technology. The new satellite can play a proactive role in preventing similar disasters.

    Archaeology: Discovering History Without Digging the Soil

    Archaeology is perhaps the field that will benefit most excitingly from underground imaging technology. Worldwide, especially in Mesopotamia, Egypt, China, India and Central America, thousands of yet undiscovered ancient settlements, temples, tombs and infrastructure remains lie buried beneath the soil.

    Traditional archaeological discovery relies either on chance finds or surface surveys. While geophysical methods (magnetometer, ground-penetrating radar) are effective, their application over large areas is impractical in terms of time and cost. The satellite-based system can scan hundreds of square kilometers in a single pass, marking potential archaeological sites.

    China’s own territory holds enormous potential in this regard. Buried caravanserais along the Silk Road route, Neolithic settlements in the Yellow River basin, submerged cities in the Yangtze delta and undiscovered tombs from the Qin Dynasty are among the targets of this technology. The National Cultural Heritage Administration (NCHA) plans to integrate data obtained from the satellite into national archaeological inventory studies.

    Climate Change and Permafrost Monitoring

    The thawing of permafrost (frozen ground) due to global warming is a critical issue for both infrastructure safety and greenhouse gas emissions. Permafrost areas in northeastern China and on the Tibetan Plateau have been rapidly degrading in recent years. The satellite’s radar penetration capability allows monitoring of the active layer thickness of permafrost, the distribution of ice lenses within it and thawing processes over wide areas.

    This data can be used to assess the safety of infrastructure built on permafrost, such as the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, and to improve climate models. The Tibetan Plateau Research Institute within the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) plans to calibrate regional climate change models by integrating permafrost data obtained from the satellite with existing field measurements.

    Military-Strategic Dimension and Global Balances

    Detection of Underground Military Facilities

    In military strategy, underground facilities are the primary method used to protect the most critical elements, from nuclear weapons to command centers, from missile launch ramps to ammunition depots. During the Cold War, the US and USSR built massive underground complexes carved into mountains; today, countries such as Iran, North Korea and China have moved a significant portion of their military infrastructure underground.

    China’s new satellite offers a game-changing capability in detecting these facilities. P-band radar can detect cavities carved into hard rocks such as granite or limestone thanks to the dielectric contrast with the surrounding rock. This is particularly critical for deep underground bunkers (DUGs), meaning command centers and shelters at depths of 100-500 meters; for buried missile silos, namely ballistic missile launch facilities hidden under concrete and soil; for underground tunnel networks, especially fortifications on the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait coast and South China Sea islands; and for secret underground production facilities in the context of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons production plants.

    Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Stability

    The ability to detect the locations and depths of underground military facilities has a direct impact on nuclear deterrence doctrines. The second-strike capability of nuclear weapons largely depends on protecting the weapons and the chain of command from being destroyed in a first strike. If one side knows the location and vulnerabilities of all the other side’s underground facilities, the possibility of completely destroying the second-strike capability with a first strike theoretically increases.

    This situation can negatively affect strategic stability. During the Cold War, stability was based on the inviolability of the parties’ second-strike capabilities. The increased transparency of underground facilities can weaken this perception of inviolability and increase the risk of escalation in times of crisis.

    However, there is an important nuance here: China, as the country developing this technology, possesses an asymmetric advantage. Whether its own facilities can be similarly detected by the opposing side depends on when rival states achieve similar technology. This temporary window of asymmetry is considered an important factor in China’s strategic planning.

    Integration with the Belt and Road Initiative

    China’s military-strategic objectives are intertwined with its economic expansion strategy. The ports, railways and energy transmission lines built under the Belt and Road Initiative are also part of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) logistics network. The underground imaging satellite can be used not only to provide ground surveys prior to the construction of this infrastructure but also to detect foreign military presence at strategic points.

    For example, this satellite can monitor whether there are secret underground facilities or tunnels of other states around Gwadar Port (Pakistan), Hambantota (Sri Lanka) or the Chinese military base in Djibouti. This is a factor that increases China’s global situational awareness.

    The Taiwan Strait and Regional Military Balances

    Taiwan is one of the actors investing most heavily in underground military facilities. On the island’s mountainous east coast, there are massive air bases carved into rock (for example, Jiashan and Chihhang underground air bases), submarine shelters and command centers. China’s new satellite can reveal the exact locations, dimensions and potential vulnerabilities of these facilities.

    This is a critical intelligence advantage that increases the PLA’s targeting precision and first-strike effectiveness in a potential conflict scenario. Similarly, verifying whether underground fortifications built on artificial islands in the South China Sea have been detected by the opposing side is also possible with this satellite.

    Space Surveillance and Counter-Space Capabilities

    Since the satellite itself is a space asset, it must be protected against the opposing side’s anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities. China has likely taken measures to protect this satellite, such as rapid orbit change maneuver capability, a frequency-hopping radar system against electronic jamming, a redundant satellite constellation architecture (even if one satellite is lost, the others continue the mission), and ground backup and rapid launch capability (quickly placing a replacement into orbit in case of loss).

    International Law, Ethics and Regulatory Issues

    Underground Surveillance within the Framework of Space Law

    Current international space law is primarily based on the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. This treaty envisages the use of space for peaceful purposes but does not explicitly prohibit military satellites and reconnaissance activities. The interpretation of the term “peaceful” has been controversial since the Cold War and is in practice accepted to cover non-aggressive military uses.

    In the context of the underground imaging satellite, the following legal questions arise: Within the framework of national sovereignty and underground privacy, a state’s airspace sovereignty is defined, but what about the underground? Since observation from space is not considered a violation of airspace, should underground surveillance be evaluated in the same category? In the context of detecting cross-border underground resources, how should the detection of underground resources within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) by another state be evaluated under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)? Regarding the detection of military facilities and espionage, is the systematic scanning of a state’s underground military facilities by another state lawful in peacetime? There are no clear answers to these questions yet, and the international community will need to develop new norms on this issue.

    The Ethical Dimension: The Right of the Invisible

    Throughout human history, the underground has been a shelter, a hiding place. Caves were the refuge of early humans; underground cities were the sanctuary of those fleeing persecution; deep bunkers were the last bastion of leaders under nuclear threat. The elimination of this “invisibility” characteristic of the underground by technology brings with it a philosophical and ethical problem: In a world where everything can be seen, will there remain a spatial dimension to privacy and security?

    Especially when it comes to archaeological sites, this technology also questions the balance between “discovery” and “respect.” Ancient tombs, sacred sites and the ancestral lands of indigenous peoples may not wish to be discovered. The ability of technology to detect these areas non-invasively is an advantage, but how this information will be used and who will control it is a critical ethical issue.

    Arms Race and Technological Proliferation

    This technological leap by China will inevitably trigger a response. The US, European Union, Russia and India are expected to accelerate their programs to develop similar or superior capabilities. The “Subterranean Challenge” and “Earth MRI” programs run by the US through DARPA, the ESA’s Biomass mission and Russia’s Kondor-FKA series are the first signals of this race.

    The cost of this new arms race is not only economic but also strategic. To the extent that the increased transparency of the underground shakes the fundamental assumptions of nuclear deterrence, states may turn to riskier strategies: greater investment in mobile launch platforms, increasing underwater nuclear capability or accelerating space-based weapon systems.

    Regulatory Proposals

    The following steps can be proposed for the international community to adapt to this new technology: Regarding the development of underground surveillance norms, rules of conduct concerning the use of underground surveillance technologies should be developed within the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). In the context of transparency and confidence-building measures, states should mutually notify the existence and capabilities of such satellites and conclude bilateral agreements limiting the targeting of military facilities. Within the framework of scientific cooperation, the sharing of data obtained from this technology in civilian fields such as geology, archaeology and disaster management should be encouraged. According to the ethical framework, the consent of the relevant country and local communities should be sought in the detection of archaeological and cultural sites; the commercialization and exploitation of data should be prevented.

    Future Perspective and Conclusion

    China’s new-generation underground imaging satellite represents a breaking point in the way we perceive the Earth. This technology, capable of penetrating beyond the surface into the earth’s crust, has the potential to revolutionize numerous fields, from scientific discovery to military intelligence, from urban planning to archaeology.

    However, this potential also brings with it serious responsibilities and risks. The risk of military espionage and strategic instability, gaps in international law and ethical dilemmas stand before us as the consequences of the uncontrolled proliferation of the technology.

    In the short term (1-3 years), the intelligence advantage China will gain from this satellite will affect military balances, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. In the medium term (3-7 years), as other major powers develop similar systems, underground transparency will become a global phenomenon and nuclear strategies will be reshaped. In the long term (7-15 years), this technology may become a standard tool in civil applications such as earthquake prediction, resource exploration and climate change monitoring, and may profoundly transform humanity’s relationship with its planet.

    Ultimately, China’s technological achievement is as much a product of human curiosity and the desire for exploration as it is a manifestation of great power competition. This dual nature is the fundamental dynamic that will determine how the technology is used and what it brings to humanity. What is promising is that the same satellite can both save thousands of lives by predicting an earthquake in advance and enrich our common human heritage by discovering a buried ancient city. Technology itself is neutral; whether we use it for the benefit or harm of humanity will be our common choice.

    References

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    Sefa Yürükel
    Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
    Aarhus University, 1997
    Independent Researcher
    Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures.

  • Storing Gravity: An Interdisciplinary Examination of the Role of China’s Daofu Pumped Storage Hydropower Station in Energy Systems Transformation

    Storing Gravity: An Interdisciplinary Examination of the Role of China’s Daofu Pumped Storage Hydropower Station in Energy Systems Transformation

    On the Threshold of the Energy Storage Era

    The energy paradigm of the twenty first century is characterized by a profound contradiction: humanity, for the first time in its history, possesses the technological capacity to produce enough energy for the vast majority of the planet; yet it faces serious structural limitations in consuming or storing this energy at the moment of its production. Solar panels operate at maximum capacity during midday hours but cannot meet the rising demand in the evening. Wind turbines produce excess energy on stormy nights but remain idle on calm summer days. This temporal mismatch constitutes one of the most fundamental technical and economic problems of the renewable energy revolution.

    The massive construction site rising in the Daofu region, located in the northwestern part of China’s Sichuan Province, represents one of the most striking responses to this problem. Situated at an elevation of approximately 3,500 meters above sea level on the eastern edge of the Tibetan Plateau, the Daofu Pumped Storage Hydropower Station is not merely an energy infrastructure project; it is also a paradigmatic intervention into the concept of energy storage. By transcending the limitations of chemical batteries, the project applies one of the oldest and most reliable forms of energy storage, gravitational potential energy, on an unprecedented scale.

    Technical Anatomy of the Daofu Project

    Geographic Location and Topographic Advantages

    The Daofu Pumped Storage Hydropower Station is located within the boundaries of the Garzê Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan Province, near Daofu County. The region lies in the complex topographic belt where the Tibetan Plateau descends eastward, transitioning into the Sichuan Basin. This location provides the project with two critical advantages: first, a steep topographic gradient that enables the creation of an extraordinary hydraulic head (pressure height) between the lower and upper reservoirs; second, the project’s proximity to the abundant water resources of the Tibetan Plateau and the region’s steadily growing renewable energy infrastructure.

    The most striking technical parameter of the project is the maximum hydraulic head of approximately 760.7 meters between the two reservoirs. This value is among the highest for pumped storage hydropower facilities on a global scale and constitutes the fundamental factor determining the project’s energy density. The relationship between hydraulic head and the potential energy that can be stored can be explained through basic physics principles:

    E_p equals m multiplied by g multiplied by h

    Where E_p represents potential energy (Joules), m represents water mass (kilograms), g represents gravitational acceleration (9.81 meters per second squared), and h represents hydraulic head (meters). A hydraulic head of 760.7 meters means approximately 2.5 times more energy storage capacity for the same amount of water compared to a facility with a head of 300 meters. This simple physical relationship explains why Daofu is being built specifically in this region: topography is the determining variable of energy storage efficiency.

    System Architecture and Technical Specifications

    The system architecture of the Daofu Pumped Storage Hydropower Station is based on classical pumped storage hydropower principles, yet it draws attention with its scale and technical parameters. The project’s installed power capacity has been set at 2.1 GW (2,100 MW). The designed annual electricity generation is approximately 2.994 billion kWh. The maximum hydraulic head between the two reservoirs reaches approximately 760.7 meters. The system’s daily energy storage capacity has been calculated at approximately 12.6 million kWh. This amount is considered equivalent to the daily electricity consumption of approximately 2 million households. Construction of the project, which began in January 2024, is taking place at an elevation of approximately 3,500 meters.

    These parameters offer striking reference points for grasping the scale of the project. An installed power capacity of 2.1 GW is roughly equivalent to half the planned total capacity of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant (4.8 GW), Turkey’s largest nuclear energy project. A daily storage capacity of 12.6 million kWh represents an amount of energy equivalent to approximately 630,000 electric vehicle batteries with a capacity of 20 kWh each.

    The system’s operating cycle is fundamentally a reversible process consisting of two stages:

    Pumping Phase (Energy Storage): During hours when electricity demand is low and renewable energy production is high (typically between midnight and early morning), the system uses excess electricity to operate high capacity pumps. These pumps transport water from the lower reservoir to the upper reservoir located more than 760 meters above. In this phase, electrical energy is converted into the gravitational potential energy of water.

    Turbining Phase (Energy Generation): During peak demand hours (typically evening hours), water from the upper reservoir is released in a controlled manner. Gaining kinetic energy throughout its descent of hundreds of meters, the water rotates the turbines at the lower reservoir level, enabling the generators to produce electricity. In this phase, the water’s potential energy is converted into kinetic energy and ultimately into electrical energy.

    This bidirectional energy conversion process forms the basis for conceptualizing the system as a “battery.” Energy stored through electrochemical reactions in a chemical battery is stored here in a physical medium: a body of water positioned at height.

    Efficiency and Thermodynamic Limits

    The round trip efficiency of pumped storage hydropower systems is defined as the ratio of the energy obtained during the turbining phase to the energy consumed during the pumping phase. In modern pumped storage hydropower facilities, this ratio typically ranges between 70 and 80 percent. The high hydraulic head of the Daofu Project may serve as a factor that increases turbine efficiency, since the hydrodynamic performance of turbine blades is generally higher in high pressure heads.

    However, the first law of thermodynamics firmly establishes that no energy storage system can achieve 100 percent efficiency. Energy losses occurring in electric motors during pumping, in frictional pipe flow, and in generators during turbining constitute the unavoidable efficiency limits of the system. Frictional losses in pipes can be modeled using the Darcy Weisbach equation:

    h_f equals f multiplied by (L divided by D) multiplied by (v squared divided by 2g)

    Where h_f represents friction induced head loss, f represents the friction factor, L represents pipe length, D represents pipe diameter, and v represents flow velocity. In large scale projects like Daofu, pipe diameters are optimized and friction is reduced through interior surface coatings to minimize these losses.

    Nevertheless, the round trip efficiency of pumped storage hydropower systems in the 70 to 80 percent range makes them one of the most efficient large scale energy storage technologies available today. Although lower compared to the 85 to 95 percent efficiency of lithium ion batteries, the much longer cycle life and far greater scalability advantages of pumped storage hydropower offset this efficiency difference.

    Comparative Analysis of Energy Storage Technologies

    Chemical Storage: The Battery Era

    Lithium ion batteries have spearheaded a revolutionary transformation in the field of energy storage over the past two decades. The decline in costs by approximately 90 percent since 2010 has enabled the commercialization of electric vehicles and accelerated the proliferation of grid scale battery systems. As of 2023, global lithium ion battery production capacity has exceeded the 1 TWh threshold.

    Nevertheless, lithium ion batteries face structural problems in large scale energy storage applications:

    Raw Material Constraints: The extraction of critical minerals such as lithium, cobalt, and nickel is geographically concentrated. Approximately 70 percent of cobalt production takes place in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which exposes supply chains to geopolitical risks. Lithium is primarily extracted in Australia, Chile, and China, with more than 60 percent of processing capacity concentrated in China.

    Cycle Life and Degradation: A typical lithium ion battery cell loses 20 percent of its capacity after 3,000 to 5,000 full charge discharge cycles. This poses a significant limitation for grid scale storage systems that may need to perform more than one cycle per day.

    Safety and Thermal Management: The risk of thermal runaway in large scale battery systems requires comprehensive cooling and monitoring systems. The fire at the Victoria Big Battery project in Australia in 2021 provided a concrete example of these risks.

    Scale Limitations: The largest lithium ion battery storage facility in operation today, the Moss Landing Project in California, has a storage capacity of 1.6 GWh. Daofu’s daily storage capacity of 12.6 GWh is approximately eight times this value.

    Mechanical Storage: Gravity and Pressure

    Mechanical energy storage systems are technologies that store energy in physical media, in the form of potential energy, kinetic energy, or pressure. Pumped storage hydropower is the most mature and most widespread technology in this category.

    Pumped Storage Hydropower: Accounting for more than 90 percent of global energy storage capacity, pumped storage hydropower stands out with operational lifetimes of 50 to 100 years. A pumped storage hydropower facility can operate for more than 50,000 cycles with minimal capacity loss. Its main disadvantages are high initial capital costs (typically 1,000 to 2,500 US dollars per kW) and the requirement for suitable geographical conditions.

    Compressed Air Energy Storage (CAES): This technology, which stores energy in the form of compressed air in underground caverns, offers scalability advantages similar to pumped storage hydropower. However, conventional CAES systems use natural gas to heat the air and are therefore not an entirely clean solution. Advanced adiabatic CAES systems aim to solve this problem.

    Gravity Batteries: These systems, developed by companies such as Energy Vault, store energy as gravitational potential energy using cranes and heavy blocks. However, the scale of these systems is still very limited compared to pumped storage hydropower (typically at the MWh level).

    Complementarity Rather Than Competition in Energy Storage

    The relationship between different energy storage technologies should be conceptualized as a complementary ecosystem rather than a zero sum competition. Each technology serves different niches along the dimensions of discharge duration, response speed, scalability, and cost. Lithium ion batteries are ideal for short duration storage and frequency regulation, ranging from milliseconds to a few hours. Pumped storage hydropower systems are optimized for long duration storage of 6 to 24 hours and daily load shifting. Chemical storage solutions such as green hydrogen offer seasonal storage potential (from summer sun to winter electricity).

    The Daofu Project targets the “long duration, large scale storage” niche within this ecosystem. The abundant hydropower and increasingly growing solar energy capacity in Sichuan cause excess energy to be generated during daytime hours. Daofu will be able to store this excess energy and make it available during evening peak demand, thereby optimizing the grid integration of renewable energy.

    China’s Energy Transformation Strategy and the Role of Pumped Storage Hydropower

    Carbon Neutrality Target and Storage Requirements

    The People’s Republic of China announced its target of achieving carbon neutrality by 2060 at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2020. This target requires a fundamental transformation in the energy system of the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter. In 2023, China installed 216 GW of new solar energy capacity, single handedly realizing more than half of global solar energy growth. However, this rapid growth creates serious problems in terms of grid stability.

    According to data from China’s National Energy Administration, the curtailment rate of solar and wind energy exceeds 10 percent in some regions of the country. This means that the clean energy produced cannot be integrated into the grid and goes to waste. Energy storage systems are seen as a critical infrastructure component to solve this curtailment problem.

    In 2021, the Chinese government published its “Guiding Opinions on the Development of New Energy Storage,” targeting 30 GW of new energy storage capacity by 2025. Pumped storage hydropower lies at the center of this target. According to the “Medium and Long Term Pumped Storage Hydropower Development Plan” published by the National Energy Administration in 2021, China’s pumped storage hydropower capacity is targeted to reach 62 GW in 2025 and 120 GW in 2030.

    Sichuan’s Strategic Position

    Sichuan Province holds a special position in China’s energy transformation. The province has long been referred to as “China’s battery” due to its rich hydropower resources. However, with rapidly increasing solar energy capacity in recent years, the province’s energy system has faced a new imbalance.

    The Daofu region has conditions favorable for photovoltaic energy production, with annual average sunshine duration of 2,000 to 2,500 hours. At the same time, the abundant water resources flowing from the Tibetan Plateau toward the Sichuan Basin are ideal for hydropower generation. However, the seasonal profiles of these two sources differ: hydropower generation peaks in summer months (during the rainy season), while solar energy generation is higher in winter months (due to clearer skies). The Daofu Pumped Storage Hydropower Station can serve as a buffer to balance these seasonal and daily fluctuations.

    Energy Security and Geopolitical Dimensions

    The selection of energy storage technologies is subject not only to technical and economic criteria but also to geopolitical considerations. The widespread use of lithium ion batteries makes China dependent on the import of certain critical minerals. Although China holds a large portion of lithium processing capacity, a significant portion of raw lithium is imported.

    Pumped storage hydropower, on the other hand, can largely source the materials required for its construction domestically (cement used in concrete, steel used in turbines). This makes pumped storage hydropower a more resilient option in terms of energy security. Furthermore, the operational lifetime of a pumped storage hydropower facility, ranging from 50 to 100 years, is far longer than battery systems that need replacement every 10 to 15 years.

    Environmental Impacts and Sustainability Debates

    Intervention in Mountain Ecology

    The fact that the Daofu Project is being built at an elevation of approximately 3,500 meters, in a region with the sensitive ecology of the Tibetan Plateau, raises significant environmental questions. Although pumped storage hydropower projects do not emit greenhouse gases during the operational phase, they deserve comprehensive environmental assessment in terms of the construction phase and the lasting impacts they leave on the ecosystem.

    The primary areas of environmental impact of the project are as follows:

    Land Use and Habitat Loss: The construction of the upper and lower reservoirs will cause thousands of hectares of mountain ecosystem to be submerged. These areas may provide habitat for endemic species unique to the Tibetan Plateau.

    Intervention in the Hydrological Cycle: The continuous movement of water between the lower and upper reservoirs may affect local groundwater levels and surface flow regimes.

    Construction Related Emissions: The production of cement and steel to be used during the project’s construction will lead to significant carbon emissions. This “embodied carbon” cost needs to be weighed against the emission savings the facility will provide over its operational lifetime.

    Seismic Risks: The region is located in a tectonically active belt. The movement of large scale water masses and the weight of the reservoirs carry the potential to trigger seismic activity.

    Comparative Environmental Assessment

    The environmental impacts of energy storage technologies should be evaluated not only from the operational phase but from a perspective encompassing the entire life cycle. From a Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) perspective, pumped storage hydropower systems show high environmental impact during the construction phase, but leave low impact per unit of stored energy over a 50 to 100 year lifetime and require minimal resource consumption, only water, during the operational phase. Lithium ion batteries cause water pollution and habitat destruction during the mining phase, have a lifespan of 10 to 15 years, and the recycling infrastructure is still in the development stage. Hydrogen storage is energy intensive during the production phase and requires special infrastructure for storage and transportation.

    This comparison demonstrates that no technology possesses a “perfect” environmental profile and that each involves its own specific trade offs. In the specific case of the Daofu Project, the efficiency advantage provided by the high hydraulic head can be considered a factor that reduces the environmental impact per unit of stored energy.

    Social Impacts and Displacement

    Perhaps the most controversial dimension of large scale hydropower projects is their social impacts on local communities. The Daofu region is an area predominantly inhabited by Tibetan communities, where cultural and spiritual values are closely tied to the geography. The construction of the project may cause agricultural lands and potentially residential areas to be submerged.

    Mandatory resettlement programs implemented in large infrastructure projects in China have been the subject of significant criticism in the past. The Three Gorges Dam project resulted in the displacement of approximately 1.3 million people. Although the scale of the Daofu Project is much smaller, the transparent assessment and management of social impacts on local communities is of critical importance for the project’s social legitimacy.

    Engineering Challenges and Innovation

    Challenges of High Altitude Construction

    Construction at an elevation of 3,500 meters presents a series of unique engineering challenges compared to construction at sea level:

    Reduced Oxygen Levels: At this altitude, atmospheric pressure drops to approximately 65 percent of sea level. This creates problems both for worker health and safety and for the performance of internal combustion engine equipment. Diesel engines can lose 30 to 40 percent of their power at this altitude.

    Freeze Thaw Cycles: The harsh climate of the Tibetan Plateau can be subject to more than 200 freeze thaw cycles per year. These cycles threaten the durability of concrete structures and require special concrete formulations and construction techniques.

    Transportation Logistics: Transporting massive turbine components and construction materials to mountainous terrain is a complex logistical operation. Transporting heavy components such as turbine rotors and stators may require special road improvements or modular design approaches.

    Technical Challenges Related to High Hydraulic Head

    A hydraulic head of 760.7 meters is unusually high for pumped storage hydropower systems and brings with it special engineering challenges:

    Pressure Management: The water column at this height creates approximately 76 bar (7.6 MPa) of pressure at the turbine level. This pressure requires penstocks and turbine components to be manufactured from high strength steel.

    Water Hammer Risk: In the event of sudden valve closures or turbine shutdowns, destructive pressure waves can form in the pipe system. This phenomenon, expressed by the Joukowski equation:

    ΔP equals ρ multiplied by c multiplied by Δv

    Where ΔP represents the pressure change, ρ represents the density of water, c represents the speed of the sound wave in water, and Δv represents the change in flow velocity. The risk of water hammer is greater in systems with high hydraulic head and requires comprehensive pressure relief systems.

    Turbine Technology: Pelton turbines optimized for high pressure heads or special variants of Francis turbines may be required. The manufacturing of these turbines requires high precision machining and special alloys.

    Innovative Solutions and Technology Transfer

    While the technical specifications of the Daofu Project demonstrate China’s competence in pumped storage hydropower technology, international technology transfer is still needed for some critical components. The experience of international companies such as Voith Hydro, GE Renewable Energy, and Andritz is particularly important in the design and manufacture of high pressure, large diameter turbines.

    Nevertheless, the progress China has made in pumped storage hydropower technology, especially in the last decade, is noteworthy. State owned engineering firms such as POWERCHINA now rank among the world leaders in the design, equipment manufacturing, and construction of pumped storage hydropower projects. The Daofu Project can be considered a reference project showcasing this competence at the highest level.

    Economic Analysis: Costs, Financing, and Market Dynamics

    Capital Costs and Financing Structure

    Although the total investment cost of the Daofu Project has not been publicly disclosed, it is possible to make estimates based on projects of similar scale. For a pumped storage hydropower project with a capacity of 2.1 GW, assuming a unit cost in the range of 1,500 to 2,500 US dollars per kW, the total investment cost can be expected to fall in the range of 3.15 to 5.25 billion US dollars.

    The typical financing structure for projects of this magnitude consists of 20 to 30 percent equity and 70 to 80 percent debt financing. In China, such strategic infrastructure projects are generally financed by state banks (China Development Bank, China Exim Bank) with favorable condition loans. Multilateral institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB) are also among potential financing sources.

    Levelized Cost of Storage (LCOS)

    The fundamental metric used for the economic comparison of energy storage technologies is the Levelized Cost of Storage (LCOS). LCOS expresses the total cost per unit of energy stored over the life cycle of the storage system and is calculated using the following formula:

    LCOS equals (Capital Cost plus the sum of Operating Cost at time t divided by (1 plus r) to the power of t) divided by (the sum of Stored Energy at time t divided by (1 plus r) to the power of t)

    According to Lazard’s 2023 analysis, the LCOS for pumped storage hydropower is in the range of 150 to 250 US dollars per MWh, while for lithium ion batteries this value is in the range of 200 to 350 US dollars per MWh. However, these values can vary significantly depending on regional conditions and specific project parameters.

    The high hydraulic head of the Daofu Project will serve as a factor that drives down the LCOS by enabling more energy to be stored per unit water volume. Furthermore, the operational lifetime of the facility, expected to exceed 50 years, will improve the LCOS by spreading the initial investment cost over a long time horizon.

    Revenue Models and Market Integration

    The revenue model of pumped storage hydropower facilities can consist of various components depending on the structure of the electricity market:

    Energy Arbitrage: The most basic source of revenue is storing energy by pumping during hours when electricity prices are low and selling this energy during hours when prices are high. The profitability of this “buy low, sell high” strategy depends on the spread between peak and off peak prices.

    Ancillary Services: Pumped storage hydropower facilities can earn additional revenue by providing grid ancillary services such as frequency regulation, voltage control, and spinning reserve. Thanks to their high ramp rates, pumped storage hydropower facilities can respond rapidly to sudden changes in grid frequency.

    Capacity Payments: In some market structures, storage facilities may receive capacity payments in return for their contribution to grid reliability.

    China’s electricity market is still in a reform process, and energy pricing is not entirely determined by free market conditions. This may create uncertainty for the revenue model of projects like Daofu. However, the fact that the Chinese government has designated pumped storage hydropower as a strategic priority indicates that appropriate market arrangements will be made for such projects.

    Current Status and Timeline of the Project

    Construction Phase

    Construction of the Daofu Pumped Storage Hydropower Station officially began as of January 2024. The project is still in the construction phase and is not a completed facility. The portrayal of the project as a completed “miracle battery” in social media and some news sources does not reflect reality. The construction of such mega projects is typically expected to take five to eight years.

    The construction process will proceed in several stages, as is typical for a pumped storage hydropower project. The first stage, the Preparation Phase (2024 to 2025), encompasses the construction of access roads, preparation of the construction site, and foundation excavations. The second stage, the Main Construction Phase (2025 to 2028), includes the excavation and concreting of reservoir areas, laying of penstocks, and installation of turbines and generators. The third stage, the Commissioning Phase (2028 to 2030), will encompass system testing, water filling, and gradual capacity increase. The fourth and final stage, Full Operation (2030 and beyond), represents the transition to full capacity commercial operation.

    This timeline represents an optimistic scenario given the complexity and scale of the project. The challenges posed by high altitude construction and potential supply chain disruptions could extend the schedule.

    Media Representation and Reality Check

    The framing of the Daofu Project in the media and on social media as a “giant water battery built inside a mountain” is a powerful narrative that emphasizes the innovative character of the project. This narrative transforms energy storage from an abstract technical concept into a concrete, comprehensible image. The “turning a mountain into a battery” metaphor, while effective in terms of science communication, can also lead to certain misunderstandings.

    First of all, the project is not an underground facility built by “hollowing out” a mountain. It is a surface facility consisting of two open air reservoirs and the pipe system connecting them. Secondly, the system is not a “battery” but an energy storage system; it stores energy physically, not chemically. This distinction is important from a technical standpoint.

    Implications for Global Energy Transformation

    The Global Revival of Pumped Storage Hydropower

    The Daofu Project is part of the renewed global interest in pumped storage hydropower. According to data from the International Hydropower Association (IHA), approximately 160 GW of pumped storage hydropower capacity is in operation worldwide as of 2023, and over 60 GW of capacity is under construction. Projects such as Eagle Mountain in the USA (1.3 GW), Snowy 2.0 in Australia (2 GW), and Nant de Drance in Switzerland (900 MW) demonstrate the strategic role of pumped storage hydropower in the global energy transformation.

    Several fundamental factors lie behind the revival of pumped storage hydropower. Growing solar and wind energy capacity is increasing the need for long duration storage. The scale and cost limitations of lithium ion batteries highlight the need for complementary storage solutions. Pumped storage hydropower is a proven technology with over 100 years of operational experience. Furthermore, operational lifetimes of 50 to 100 years make pumped storage hydropower attractive for long term energy planning.

    Can It Serve as a Model for Developing Countries?

    The large scale pumped storage hydropower model represented by the Daofu Project could serve as a potential reference for developing countries with similar geographical conditions. Countries with high mountainous regions such as Nepal, Bhutan, Ethiopia, Peru, and Turkey possess suitable topography for pumped storage hydropower projects.

    However, caution is required regarding the transferability of such mega projects. Pumped storage hydropower projects requiring billions of dollars in investment exceed the financial capacity of many developing countries; the favorable condition financing that China provides through its state banks may not be available in other countries. Pumped storage hydropower projects also require complex planning, regulatory, and management capacity; without strong institutional structures, the successful completion of such projects is difficult. Additionally, the economics of pumped storage hydropower depend on electricity markets where there is a sufficient spread between peak and off peak prices; arbitrage opportunities may be limited in smaller grids where demand is less variable.

    The Future of Energy Storage: Integrated Systems

    The future of energy storage is evolving toward hybrid systems in which different storage solutions are integrated, rather than the dominance of a single technology. While large scale pumped storage hydropower facilities like Daofu provide ideal infrastructure for daily load shifting and seasonal storage, lithium ion batteries can play a role in services requiring rapid response such as frequency regulation, and green hydrogen can play a role in long distance energy transportation.

    This integrated approach will increase the resilience of energy systems and play a critical role in overcoming the challenges arising from the intermittent nature of renewable energy sources. The Daofu Project can be read as a harbinger of this integrated future: beyond being a massive engineering achievement, it is a concrete expression of the will to build new ways of storing energy and spreading it across time.

    Conclusion

    China’s Daofu Pumped Storage Hydropower Station represents a turning point in the evolution of energy storage technologies. With its installed capacity of 2.1 GW and daily storage capacity of 12.6 million kWh, the project is pushing the boundaries of pumped storage hydropower technology and offering a large scale response to one of the greatest obstacles facing renewable energy integration: the intermittency problem.

    Nevertheless, the fact that the project’s construction, which began in January 2024, is still ongoing and that its completion will take years is an important reminder of the time horizon involved in such mega projects. Energy transformation is a process that requires not only technological innovations but also long term planning and patient investment.

    Daofu is the story of turning a mountain into a battery; but this story is also the story of humanity rediscovering one of its oldest energy sources, gravity, for its newest energy needs. When the sun does not shine and the wind does not blow, the potential energy of water lifted high can continue to keep the lights on. This simple physics principle may be one of the most elegant answers to our complex energy problems.

    The ultimate success or failure of the project will be measured not only by technical parameters but also by the extent to which environmental impacts can be managed, the extent to which local communities benefit, and how well the system can adapt to changing market conditions. In this context, Daofu is not only an energy infrastructure project but also a case study for examining the complex socio technical nature of energy transformation.

    References

    1. Global Times. “China builds giant ‘water battery’ in Sichuan mountain.” 2024.
    2. China.org.cn. “Daofu Pumped Storage Power Station Project Overview.” 2024.
    3. National Energy Administration of China. “Medium and Long Term Pumped Storage Development Plan (2021 to 2035).” 2021.
    4. International Hydropower Association. “2023 World Hydropower Outlook.” London: IHA, 2023.
    5. POWERCHINA Chengdu Engineering Corporation. “Daofu Pumped Storage Project Technical Specifications.” 2024.
    6. Lazard. “Levelized Cost of Storage Analysis, Version 8.0.” 2023.
    7. Blakers, A., Stocks, M., Lu, B., and Cheng, C. “A review of pumped hydro energy storage.” Progress in Energy, 3(2), 022003, 2021.
    8. Rehman, S., Al Hadhrami, L. M., and Alam, M. M. “Pumped hydro energy storage system: A technological review.” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 44, 586 to 598, 2015.
    9. IRENA. “Renewable Energy Statistics 2024.” Abu Dhabi: International Renewable Energy Agency, 2024.
    10. Zhang, Y., et al. “Environmental impacts of pumped storage hydropower: A review.” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 157, 112048, 2022.

    Sefa Yürükel
    Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
    Aarhus University, 1997
    Independent Researcher
    Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures.

  • Mocking Çanakkale

    Mocking Çanakkale

    Mocking Çanakkale ( Gallipoli ) Türkiye and Australia. By Portraying a Soccer Match as “Revenge for Gallipoli”

    Mocking Çanakkale ( Gallipoli )  for Sports Humor Dishonors the Fallen and Distorts History. 

    Not on my watch will I stay mute.

    The article by Clancy Overell is not clever satire it is a deeply offensive attempt to trivialize one of the most tragic chapters in the shared history of Türkiye and Australia. By portraying a soccer match as “revenge for Gallipoli,” the author reduces the sacrifice of thousands of young men on both sides to a cheap sporting joke and undermines a friendship that was forged through unimaginable loss and later transformed into one of mutual respect and brotherhood.

     Article link below:

    https://www.betootaadvocate.com/australia-finally-get-revenge-for-gallipoli-as-turks-ambushed-by-our-brave-socceroos

    Gallipoli was never about revenge. It became a symbol of reconciliation. The battlefield of Çanakkale produced not hatred, but a lasting bond between Australians, New Zealanders, and Turks. The men who fought there earned each other’s respect through courage and sacrifice.

    In 1915, while defending his homeland, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk told his soldiers: “I am not ordering you to attack, I am ordering you to die.” He later became the founder of the modern Republic of Türkiye and emerged as a statesman dedicated to peace and reconciliation.

    His immortal words to the mothers of the fallen ANZACs remain one of the greatest tributes to peace ever spoken:

    “There is no difference between the Johnnies and the Mehmets to us where they lie side by side in this country of ours… After having lost their lives on this land, they become our sons as well.”

    These words transformed former enemies into friends and created a relationship that has endured for more than a century. Türkiye, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and many other nations continue to honor that shared history together.

    To invoke Gallipoli as a vehicle for mocking Turks or celebrating “revenge” is irresponsible and disrespectful. It does nothing to strengthen understanding between peoples. More troubling, it contributes to a broader pattern of rhetoric that seeks to caricature and delegitimize the Turkish nation and its people.

    No article, no headline, and no misguided attempt at humor will damage the brotherhood forged at Çanakkale. The friendship between Türkiye and Australia is built on mutual respect, remembrance, and peace and it is far stronger than the divisive words of any commentator.

    Ibrahim Kurtulus 

    Community Activist 

    New York – Staten Island.

    cc:   Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations, New York

    All The Australian Consulate-General’s in United States 

  • China’s Economic Model: State, Market, and the Debate on Capitalism

    China’s Economic Model: State, Market, and the Debate on Capitalism

    China’s economic transformation over the past forty years has drawn attention not only for its high growth rates but also for a structure that challenges the boundaries of existing economic theories. This transformation has generated new areas of debate, particularly within the literature of development economics and comparative political economy.

    Classical modernization theories associate economic development with market liberalization and the spread of liberal democratic institutions. However, the Chinese case demonstrates that this linear relationship is not necessarily obligatory. This calls for a reassessment of existing theoretical frameworks.

    The concept of “state capitalism,” often used to explain China’s economic structure, can be illuminating in many respects but may also be reductive. By positioning China as merely a variant of the existing capitalist system, this concept risks downplaying its unique institutional dynamics.

    In this context, the fundamental question is not which category China belongs to, but rather through which mechanisms this system operates. This perspective prioritizes analytical inquiry over normative classification.

    Thus, the Chinese experience functions as a laboratory that necessitates rethinking the concepts of state, market, and capitalism.

    Comparative Analysis of the Concept of the State

    In Western political thought, the state is defined within a Weberian framework as a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and a rational-bureaucratic organization. In this model, the state is treated as a structure relatively autonomous from society and institutionally distinct.

    This approach has produced an administrative framework compatible with modern capitalist economies. The rule of law, institutional predictability, and bureaucratic specialization are its core elements.

    In China, however, the concept of the state rests on a more holistic historical foundation. The Confucian tradition views political authority as a continuation of moral order and does not sharply separate state and society.

    The concept of “Guojia” reflects this holistic understanding. The state is positioned not merely as a governing apparatus but also as the carrier of social order.

    Therefore, interpreting the Chinese state solely through a Weberian model is insufficient; institutional structure, historical continuity, and ideological frameworks must be evaluated together.

    The Distinction Between Market and Capitalism

    Although the market mechanism and the capitalist system are often used interchangeably, these two concepts are structurally distinct. The market is a mechanism that regulates exchange relations and historically predates capitalism.

    Capitalism, on the other hand, is a broader system organized around private ownership of the means of production, profit maximization, and capital accumulation. In this system, the market is not merely a distribution mechanism but the central determinant of production relations.

    In the Chinese case, while market mechanisms clearly exist, they are constrained and guided by the strong coordinating capacity of the state. Therefore, the presence of markets alone is insufficient to classify the system as capitalist.

    The financial system, largely operating through state-owned banks, shapes capital allocation via non-market instruments. This creates a significant divergence from classical financial capitalism.

    Thus, in China, the market is not the center of the system but rather a tool structured by the state.

    Historical Evolution of the Chinese Model

    The Chinese economy during the Mao era was built on a structure based on central planning and state ownership. Economic activities were largely conducted under state control.

    However, this model produced significant limitations, particularly in agricultural productivity and industrial output. Rigidity in resource allocation deepened economic imbalances.

    The reform process initiated by Deng Xiaoping transformed this structure by integrating market mechanisms into the system. However, this integration did not imply the complete removal of state control.

    The concept of a “socialist market economy” was developed to describe this hybrid structure. This model represents the simultaneous use of planning and market mechanisms.

    Over time, China has created a unique development path by increasing market openness while maintaining state control in strategic sectors.

    Institutional Structure and the Party-State System

    To understand the functioning of China’s economic system, the central role of the Chinese Communist Party must be taken into account. The Party is not only the holder of political power but also the main actor in economic coordination.

    The relationship between the state and the Party, unlike in classical liberal models, is deeply intertwined. The Party possesses strategic steering capacity over state institutions.

    This structure enables the effective implementation of long-term economic planning. Major infrastructure investments and industrial policies, in particular, are carried out rapidly through centralized coordination.

    While state ownership continues in strategic sectors, the private sector is encouraged within defined limits. This creates a controlled market environment.

    In conclusion, in China, the state functions not outside the market but as its guide and architect.

    Comparison with the Soviet Union

    The fundamental difference between the Soviet Union and China lies in the management of their reform processes. Both countries attempted transitions from planned economies to more market-based systems.

    In the Soviet Union, the reform process progressed alongside political disintegration, leading to a weakening of state capacity. This negatively affected the sustainability of economic transformation.

    In China, reforms were implemented gradually and in a controlled manner. Economic liberalization was carried out step by step while preserving the political structure.

    This approach maintained institutional stability and made the transformation process more manageable.

    Thus, the success of the Chinese model is related not only to the content of reforms but also to their timing and institutional framework.

    Theoretical Debates and the Position of the Model

    There are various theoretical approaches in the literature on the Chinese economy. This diversity makes it difficult to place the model within a single category.

    The state capitalism approach views China as a variant within the market economy characterized by strong state intervention. In this perspective, the market mechanism is considered the dominant element.

    The socialist approach emphasizes the determining role of state ownership and planning, reducing the market to an instrumental function.

    The hybrid model approach evaluates China as an intermediate form between two systems. This perspective is particularly common in the comparative capitalism literature.

    These differences indicate that China possesses a structure that transcends existing theoretical categories.

    Conclusion

    China’s economic model has a multilayered structure that goes beyond classical economic and political categorizations, making it difficult to define with a single label.

    The strong and guiding role of the state constitutes the system’s core characteristic. However, this does not mean that market mechanisms are entirely excluded.

    Market elements exist within the system as instruments strategically employed by the state. This complicates conventional definitions of capitalism.

    The Chinese case demonstrates that economic systems cannot be fully explained through fixed and universal categories. Instead, historical and institutional contexts must be taken into account.

    In conclusion, China stands as one of the most important contemporary examples showing that the relationship between state and market can be redefined.

    References

    Arrighi, Giovanni. Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century. London: Verso, 2007.

    Bremmer, Ian. The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations? New York: Portfolio, 2010.

    Deng, Xiaoping. Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, various volumes.

    Huang, Yasheng. Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

    Milanović, Branko. Capitalism, Alone: The Future of the System That Rules the World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019.

    Naughton, Barry. The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007.

    North, Douglass C. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

    Polanyi, Karl. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Boston: Beacon Press, 1944.

    Weber, Max. Economy and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.

    Zhang, Weiwei. The China Wave: Rise of a Civilizational State. Hackensack: World Scientific, 2012.

    Naughton, Barry. “The Chinese Economy: Adaptation and Growth.” (various articles and edited volumes).

    Oi, Jean C. “The Role of the Local State in China’s Transitional Economy.” China Quarterly, 1992.

    Walder, Andrew G. “Local Governments as Industrial Firms.” American Journal of Sociology, 1995.

    Pei, Minxin. China’s Trapped Transition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006.

    Sefa Yürükel

    Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
    Aarhus University, 1997
    Independent Researcher
    Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures

  • The TRIC Axis: Turkey, Russia, Iran, and China as a Geopolitical Proposition – Possibility, Limits, and Global Repercussions

    The TRIC Axis: Turkey, Russia, Iran, and China as a Geopolitical Proposition – Possibility, Limits, and Global Repercussions

    As we approach the end of the first quarter of the 21st century, it has become widely accepted that the unipolar world order dominant in the post-Cold War era is experiencing a deep crisis of legitimacy and functionality. This Atlantic-centered order oppresses the Global South through military interventions, economic sanctions, debt mechanisms, and regime change operations. The paralysis in the UN Security Council’s decision-making processes, the social devastation caused by the structural adjustment programs imposed by the IMF and World Bank, and NATO’s escalation of conflicts contrary to its deterrence rhetoric all indicate that current international organizations cannot function without reform. Amidst this systemic crisis, new regional and intercontinental collaborations that could serve as alternatives to the existing order are being intensely debated in various academic, political, and strategic circles.

    One proposition at the center of these debates is a hypothetical axis or alliance comprising Turkey, Russia, Iran, and China. This structure, which as yet has no institutional existence, binding treaty text, or joint military command, has begun to establish itself in the literature as a powerful geopolitical vision and anti-systemic discourse.

    The TRIC Axis as a Geopolitical Proposition: Hypothetical Ground and Definition

    For any political project or alliance proposal to be seriously evaluated, the historical and structural ground that makes it possible must first be laid out. The idea of the TRIC axis draws nourishment from the fact that all four actors have been subjected to various forms of Western imperialism at different points in history. This shared consciousness of victimhood is the fundamental element that constructs the alliance proposal not as an emotional camaraderie but as a structural necessity. The partition of the Middle East with artificial borders following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, China’s “Century of Humiliation” in the 19th and 20th centuries, Russia’s total security, economic, and demographic crisis after its collapse in the 1990s, and Iran’s international isolation since the 1953 coup against Mossadegh have all prepared the ground for these four countries to develop a common critique of the system.

    These four actors share three fundamental weaknesses of the current international system. The first is the lack of a say in the security architecture. Turkey’s secondary position within NATO’s decision-making processes, Russia being made a direct threat object of the alliance, Iran’s exclusion from regional security arrangements, and China’s encirclement by military bases in the Pacific constitute a shared experience of insecurity. The second is subjection to the debt-inducing policies of international financial institutions. The structural adjustment programs of the IMF and World Bank have weakened the economic sovereignty of all four countries at different times; China stands out as the only major country that has succeeded in development by keeping these programs at bay. The third is that energy and trade routes are threatened by Western-controlled naval power. The control of critical maritime chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, the Suez Canal, Gibraltar, and the Strait of Malacca by the US and allied navies directly threatens the supply chain security of all four countries.

    The structural logic of the proposed alliance is based on the idea of transforming these three weaknesses around a common axis. Instead of the vicious cycle the West calls the “security dilemma,” the TRIC proposal aims to introduce a “development dilemma.” This conceptual innovation proposes a competition based on which country can eradicate poverty faster, produce greener energy, and train more scientists, replacing the current system where military expenditures compete with each other and constantly produce conflict. However, this conceptual framework remains a vision yet to be translated into concrete political will.

    Asymmetric Contributions and Complementarity Potential of the Four Actors

    The success or failure of any alliance depends on the members’ ability to cover each other’s weaknesses and turn strengths into synergy. In the TRIC proposal, each actor possesses different and potentially complementary areas of strength. This complementarity forms the proposal’s strongest theoretical foundation. However, realizing this potential depends on overcoming historical rivalries and mistrust among the actors, which has not yet been achieved today.

    Turkey, with its geopolitical position and humanitarian diplomacy capacity, aims to serve as a bridge between land and sea power. Located at the intersection of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, with its coastline on the Black Sea, control over the Straits, and presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey is positioned as the alliance’s gateway to the West. One of the most significant contributions Turkey could offer the axis is its technical military know-how acquired within NATO and its progress in unmanned aerial vehicle technology. Furthermore, the successful grain corridor initiative during the Ukraine-Russia war, mediation efforts between Gulf countries and Iran, and diplomatic initiatives in the Horn of Africa have concretely demonstrated Turkey’s crisis management capacity. However, Turkey’s energy dependence on imports, chronic current account deficit, and struggle with high inflation are the biggest obstacles to its ability to provide a sustainable contribution within the alliance.

    The Russian Federation, with its nuclear deterrence, vast natural gas and oil reserves, and hypersonic missile technology, has the potential to form the military and energy backbone of the TRIC proposal. The fact that the Russian economy has not completely collapsed despite the comprehensive sanction regimes imposed by the West after 2014 and especially in 2022 demonstrates the strategic importance of its energy resources and the resilience mechanisms the country has developed against sanctions. Russia’s military presence in Syria, Libya, and the Sahel region could serve as a logistical springboard for the proposed alliance to extend into Africa and the Middle East. However, Russia’s demographic decline, increasing technological dependence on China, and long-term technology transfer constraints due to exclusion from the Western financial system limit its role within the alliance.

    Iran stands out with its control over the energy corridor between the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, and its economy of resistance model developed under sanctions. Progress in nuclear technology, space studies, biotechnology, and nanotechnology despite sanctions shows that external pressure cannot completely stifle innovation. Iran’s proxy structures in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen have the potential to deepen the proposed alliance’s sphere of influence in the Middle East. Additionally, the 25-year comprehensive strategic agreement signed with China provides a concrete legal basis for Iran’s integration into the TRIC axis. Conversely, Iran’s long-standing international isolation, structural problems in its banking and financial system, and internal tensions due to social pressures complicate its full integration into the alliance.

    The People’s Republic of China, as the world’s largest economy by purchasing power parity, is designed as the economic locomotive of the TRIC proposal, with the financing and infrastructure technologies offered within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. In fifth-generation mobile communication, artificial intelligence, high-speed rail, solar and wind energy technologies, China has surpassed most of its Western rivals. As the founder of non-Western financial institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank, China claims to offer a financing model based on non-debt-inducing win-win principles. The comprehensive strategic partnership with Russia and the long-term agreement with Iran place China at the de facto center of the TRIC proposal. However, China’s rapidly aging population, debt crisis in the real estate sector, export pressures due to contracting global demand, and regional tensions such as Taiwan and the South China Sea limit the resources the country can allocate externally.

    None of these four actors alone has the capacity to challenge Western alliances. However, the complementarity in energy (Russia, Iran), manufacturing and finance (China), geopolitical reach and diplomacy (Turkey), and military deterrence (Russia, China) promises strong synergy at a theoretical level. The core thesis of the proposal is that this synergy could form a balancing element against the unipolar system.

    Strengths of the Proposal and the Vision It Offers

    Before assessing the feasibility of the TRIC axis proposal, it is necessary to deeply understand its strengths and the vision it offers. The proposal’s greatest strength is its reliance on the rising tide of anti-Western sentiment across large swathes of the Global South. Many countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America complain about the injustices of the current order and look favorably upon the formation of an alternative pole. The appeal of the TRIC proposal for these geographies is its promise of a cooperation model that does not indebt, does not impose military bases, and does not interfere in internal affairs.

    The second strength of the proposal is that it targets the current war economy. Today’s world is held captive by arms lobbies, war contractors, and manufactured threats. The TRIC proposal aims to break this bloody cycle and build a war-free economic model. In this model, no African mineral, no Asian labor, and no Middle Eastern petrodollar would flow to Western banks; the value produced would remain in the pockets of the producers. Furthermore, one of the proposal’s fundamental principles is the understanding that “no problem is unsolvable without shedding innocent blood.” Global issues like border disputes, water crises, and migration waves are expected to be resolved through negotiation, justice, and common sense.

    The third strength is the proposal’s historical depth and civilizational backbone. These geographies along the Silk Road route have carried trade, knowledge, and culture for millennia. The artificial nation-state borders imposed by Western imperialism disrupted these organic ties. The TRIC proposal, by aiming to re-establish ancient connections rather than building new physical walls, is conceived not merely as a geographical bloc but also as a civilization project.

    Weaknesses of the Proposal and Concrete Obstacles

    Although the TRIC proposal offers a powerful vision, the concrete obstacles it faces are at least as serious as the vision itself. Foremost among these obstacles are historical rivalries and deep mistrust among the four countries. There are several points of tension between Turkey and Russia, including the military presence in Syria, the struggle for influence in Libya, the status of the Black Sea, and differences in approach to the Ukraine war. Between Turkey and Iran, there is indirect competition in Iraq, Syria, and the Caucasus, especially as Ankara has entered a normalization process with Saudi Arabia and Israel, while Tehran remains a regional rival to these countries. Between China and Russia, the rivalry for influence over the Central Asian republics persists behind the rhetoric of strategic partnership.

    The second major obstacle is the profound differences between the legal systems, political regimes, and economic models of the four countries. Turkey’s NATO membership and customs union with the EU, Russia’s cautious approach to integration with China, the problem of institutional compatibility between Iran’s theocratic governance structure and secular countries, and the difference between China’s state capitalism and the mixed economy models of the other three make integration extremely difficult. An alliance requires a common currency, joint military command structure, joint intelligence-sharing mechanism, or at least a binding treaty text – none of which exist today.

    The third obstacle is China’s core foreign policy principle of non-interference. China has historically avoided binding military alliances and has never established a formal allied relationship with any country. This principle makes it extremely difficult for China to be a founding partner of a military-political alliance like TRIC. China prefers more flexible and conjunctural forms of cooperation (SCO, BRICS, Belt and Road). Moreover, the deep economic interdependence between China and the US (an annual trade volume exceeding $600 billion) is another factor preventing Beijing from being part of an alliance directly confronting Washington.

    The fourth obstacle is the anti-Israel stance at the heart of the TRIC proposal and the goal of establishing a common, secular, democratic state on Palestinian land. This goal directly contradicts established diplomatic frameworks of international law and the two-state solution. Furthermore, Turkey’s recent normalization process with Israel directly contradicts Iran’s rigid stance on this issue, demonstrating that even on the Palestine question, the four countries cannot achieve full consensus.

    Global Repercussions and Regional Participation Scenarios

    The global repercussions of the TRIC proposal, should it materialize, and the potential forms of participation by other regions constitute another dimension requiring serious evaluation. The proposal is conceived not as a static bloc but as a dynamic structure expanding towards surrounding regions. In this expansion scenario, Asia is progressing towards integration under the leadership of China and Russia. India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Central Asian republics have the potential to be integrated into the TRIC axis under the umbrella of BRICS and the SCO. The main attraction for these regions is the absence of rigid structural reforms imposed by US-centered financial institutions and the rapid implementation of infrastructure investments.

    The African continent is seeking to complete its post-colonial transformation. The continent, whose resources have been exploited for centuries and whose borders were drawn artificially, encounters in the TRIC proposal a promise of hospitals, schools, factories, and debt relief mechanisms. China’s mining and infrastructure investments in Africa, Russia’s security cooperation, Turkey’s humanitarian aid and construction contracting, and Iran’s technology transfer offers increase the proposal’s attractiveness in Africa. However, the presence of French and British spheres of influence in Africa, the continent’s fragmented structure, and governance problems are serious obstacles to full participation.

    In Europe, the proposal envisions a partial participation scenario. Germany, France, and Southern European countries are defined as actors discontented with the oppressive NATO umbrella of the US and energy dependence. The TRIC proposal claims to offer these countries an independent energy and security policy. However, the institutional commitment of European countries to NATO and the EU, the depth of transatlantic relations, and the existing mistrust towards Russia make the likelihood of this scenario extremely low.

    In the Americas, Latin America has the potential to be integrated into the proposal through Bolivarian countries, Brazil, and Mexico. The rejection of the century-old Monroe Doctrine and historical resistance to US hegemony make this region a potential friendly axis for the TRIC proposal. However, internal political instabilities in Latin America, the depth of the US military and economic presence in the region, and even China’s own cautious approach to the region render this participation scenario uncertain as well.

    Conclusion: TRIC as a Vision and Notes for the Future

    As a geopolitical proposition, the TRIC axis is a significant intellectual contribution that draws attention to the deep crisis of the current order and emphasizes the necessity of transitioning to multipolarity. The proposal builds a powerful narrative articulating the demands of the Global South for justice, equality, and sovereignty against the Western-centered system of exploitation and domination. The critique of Zionism, shaped particularly around the Palestinian cause, and the rejection of imperialist wars form the conscientious and moral ground of the proposal.

    However, this proposition has not yet become a political reality. Currently, there is no binding alliance agreement, joint military command structure, or common foreign policy mechanism between Turkey, Russia, Iran, and China. Existing cooperation remains limited to the level of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, BRICS, and bilateral agreements, none of which constitute a military-political alliance. For the proposal to materialize, historical rivalries between the four countries must be overcome, a shared threat perception must become permanent, China’s traditional reticence towards forming alliances must be broken, and the four countries must achieve full consensus on fundamental foreign policy issues such as Palestine, Ukraine, and Syria.

    As of today, TRIC is a vision pointing to a possible future, not an existing geopolitical reality. Therefore, any evaluation on the subject must consider the proposal’s hypothetical nature and take into account the concrete power relations of the current international system. The proposal’s greatest success is keeping alive the idea that an alternative world is possible and preparing the ground for questioning the existing order. Since no transformation is possible without such questioning, the TRIC proposal remains a contribution worthy of discussion and development. The desire for the ledger of oppression to be closed and for peace to be established in a new world is the most fundamental human motivation behind the proposal.

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    Sefa Yürükel

    Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
    Aarhus University, 1997
    Independent Researcher
    Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures

  • Ji Hyun Kim / Korean War Veteran Organization of Media Representative

    Ji Hyun Kim / Korean War Veteran Organization of Media Representative

    Ji Hyun Kim – Wisdom
    Korean War Veteran Organization of Media Representative 
    Astoria – Queens – New York

    Dear Wisdom,

    Warm greetings to you.

    For more than 25 years, you have honored our community through your heartfelt representation of the heroic Turkish Korean War Veterans. Many of us in the Turkish-American community know this well, including numerous Turkish military officers who have served in New York throughout the last quarter century. In fact, past Turkish Military Advisors still ask about your health and remember your dedication with great appreciation.

    My dear friend, I write to you with a sincere and respectful request: that you kindly refrain from sending further correspondence to the current Consul General of Türkiye, Mr. M. Ahmet Yazal. Unlike his predecessors who valued your efforts, engaged with the community, and showed genuine respect Mr. Yazal has not demonstrated the qualities deserving of the honor you traditionally extend to the office of the Consul General Figures such as Volkan Bozkır, Yusuf Buluc, Fuat Tanlay, Mehmet Nuri Ezen, Ömer Önhon, Mehmet Samsar, Mustafa Levent Bilgen, Ertan Yalçın, Alper Aktaş, and Reyhan Özgür. 

    Most painfully, Mr. Yazal refused to attend the funeral of the highest-ranking and most decorated Turkish Korean War Veteran in the United States, who passed away in January 2025. This veteran was not only honored by the United States military for his heroism, but was the most decorated Turkish veteran recognized in America for his service during the Korean War. For our community, his funeral was a moment of profound respect and national pride. For Mr. Yazal, it was a moment ignored. We view this as an insult not only to the memory of a heroic Turkish soldier, but to the dignity of the Turkish nation itself.

    No Consul General in our community’s history has shown such disregard. For more than 40 years, we have not seen a Consul General perform so poorly in representing the Republic of Türkiye or in engaging the community that funds and supports the very institution he represents.

    A Consul General’s role is not merely ceremonial. It is a position funded by taxpayers, meant to maintain relationships, foster diplomacy, support citizens of the sending state, and actively engage with community, civic organizations, veterans, religious leaders, city officials, diplomats, and Americans of goodwill. When this engagement breaks, the mission of the Consulate suffers and the image of Türkiye is damaged.

    For these reasons, I am urging friends in our American community including diplomats, veterans’ organizations, civic leaders, and city officials to suspend engagement with Mr. Yazal. He has not earned the respect nor the honor you have so generously extended to previous Consul Generals who valued your contributions and the contributions of our veterans.

    You have always stood with those who served this nation and the Republic of Türkiye. Your moral clarity has never gone unnoticed, and it continues to inspire those of us who believe that respect must be earned, not assumed.

    With my highest regards and respect,

    Ibrahim Kurtulus

    Honorary South Korean Citizen 
    Honorary Korean War Veteran