Tag: Caucasus

Now is the time to act with due speed and determination

Peace under normal circumstances have no losers, but if it is utilized wisely will benefit all involved and beyond. Now that the crucial step has been taken, both Azerbaijan and Armenia and all the relevant partners should use this momentum and lay the needed foundations for a lasting peace, cooperation and prosperity in the Caucasus and our region. Sitting on the signed memorandum(s) and accords or becoming complacent, can undermine and squander the created good conditions and opportunities for constructive actions. This in turn, can encourage the opponents and the ill-wishers to move in again and infest the region again for many more decades.

Now is the time to act with due speed and determination.

Ekin Altunbay,

August 12, 2025
Azerbaijan in the context of Caucasus policy of the Russia empire: from Peter to Pavel Part II

Under Catherine II, Russia’s struggle for the Caucasus was carried out purposefully. By signing the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774), Russia has strengthened its positions in the Crimea and the Azov coast, and thereby expanded its sphere of influence in the mega region – Caucasus. Catherine II, in order to establish its political domination in this choronym, had been conducting an active resettlement policy. In so doing, just like her forefather, she has not refused to play the “Armeniancard”. The Highest Charter of March 9, 1779, by the Russian Empress gave rise to the Armeniancolonization of the Don coast. Nakhichevan city was established on the outskirts of the St. Demetrius of Rostov Fortress and Russia resettled 20 thousand Armenians from Crimea, including the newly formed city of Novorossiysk province. Active efforts of representatives of the wealthier segments of Armenians contributed to this colonization. In the XVIII century, rich Armenian merchants, natives of New Julfa, who left the Safavid state during its fall, appear in Russia. Sparing no expense, they set the Armenian tandem in motion. The Sarafovs and Lazarevs made a special effort in this direction. Ivan Lazarev was especially distinguished. By turning into a major industrialist and landowner in theRussian Empire as a result of successful commercial and financial deals, he invested huge subsidies in imposing intelligible dreams of the Armenians among the highest circles of Russian society. Stressing the primary role of the Armenian Gregorian Church, the carrier of mythical idea of “Great Armenia”, this Armenian wealthy man, in the last quarter of the XVIII century, built Armenian churches in the capital cities of the Russian Empire. Ivan Lazarev became one of the key “players”, who integrated the “Armenian question” into the policy of Catherine’s Russia. By entering into negotiations with the famous favorite of Catherine II Prince G. Potemkin, this wealthy Armenian, in unison with the head of the Armenian Church in Russia Archbishop Joseph Argutinsky, tried to convince the Russiannobleman in feasibility of the formation of the Armenian statehood with the center in Irevan, while not recalling the historical homeland of the Armenians, located on the banks of the Euphrates, and which has no relation to the Caucasus, and thus, to Irevan. The duo of Lazarev- Argutinsky, in the presented draft, insisted on capturing of this ancient Azerbaijani city by the Russian army. Short memory of the Armenian tandem during the creation of this project has “failed” and it “forgot” about the pre-Caucasus homeland of Armenians – Eastern Anatolia.

In the second half of the XVIII century, the Armenian statehood projects have been also developed by rich Armenians of Indian colonies. The authors of projects – Joseph Emin, Sh. Shaamiryan tried to draw the attention of Catherine’s Russia to the centuries-old dream of Armenians. These designers of “Great Armenia”, as well as their predecessors, considered it appropriate to act in union with the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti. Presenting projects identical in content, the representatives of the Indian colonies, in order to achieve their intelligible dream, just like their fellow-designers of Russiancolonies, “forgot” the original oecumene, Asia Minor, which served as the matrix in the process of formation of the Armenian statehood and, by creating virtual geographic framework of their centuries-old dream, set their sights on foreign soil, on the ancestral lands of Azerbaijan.

Hajar Verdiyeva Doctor of Historical Science

Azerbaijan in the context of Caucasus policy of the Russia empire: from Peter to Pavel (PART I)

Part I is here

Source // “International Academic Herald” 2014 »5 (5) // .pp. 4-11

September 5, 2016
Azerbaijan in the context of Caucasus policy of the Russia empire: from Peter to Pavel (PART I)

Russia’s interest in the Caucasus was built during the reign of Ivan the Terrible. But the unfolding socio-political processes in Russia at the end of XVI and the beginning of XVII centuries did not allow the upstream development of Caucasus policy of Romanov Russia. XVII century was a turning point in the East-West confrontation. Post-Karlovitsk rubicon changed the foundations of the international system of the continent. The Emperor-reformer – Peter I, abandoning the stagnation positions of the Old Rus, joined Europe in order to strengthen Russia’s position in the international system, launching a policy of conquest.

Russia, by defeating Charles XII during the Great Northern War (1700-1721), took possession of the Baltic Sea and has become a maritime power. But European countries have become a barrier to the further advancement of Russia to the west, and Peter I activated Russian policy in the Caucasus, in the area of the coastal strip of the Caspian Sea. The interest of the Russian Emperor in the coastal strip of the Caspian Sea was due to rich natural resources, which could give new impetus to the development of the Russian economy. At the same time, Peter I also tried to form an ethno-confessional basis, for the establishment of Russia’s political position in the region, decided to bet on the “Armenian issue”, the idea of “Great Armenia” invented by Mkhitarists and featured by Armenianfalsifiers. Here, the Armenian-Gregorian church acted as the “first violin”. Already at the beginning of the Northern War, the representative of the Armenian Gregorian Church I.Ori met with Peter I and drew the attention of the Russian tsar to “Armenian issue”, developing a fictitious map of Armeniaaccording to the algorithm of the Armenian Gregorian Church, directs him to Azerbaijani Irevan fortress, at the same time convinces the emperor about advisability of Asia Minor route, that opens the way to Istanbul, where the Christian population of this choronim would be social support for theRussian troops. After receiving this information, Peter I, during the Northern War, developed the contours of Caucasian policy and made plans for the upcoming military operations with states that dominate in the region. When designing grandiose plans for the Caspian lands, as strategically important for Russia, Tsar considered it expedient to form ethno-social basis for his political power in this confessional Muslim area. And for this purpose, Peter I planned the formation of a “united under the scepter of Russia the Georgian-Armenian alliance led by the Georgian king (ruler of Kartli-Kakheti kingdom-ed.) Vakhtang VI, with the intention of turning it into an outpost in the South Caucasus.

In the policy of the Christianization of the conquered lands, the emperor included not only the formation of units of the Armenian-Georgian Christian Union. During the Caspian campaign, Peter I, not concealing his plans of Christianization, planned an “ethnic cleansing” of the cities of the coast of the Caspian Sea, evicting the autochthonous population of Azerbaijan – Azerbaijanis – from these lands, in order to prevent the influence of the Ottoman factor in the region, which intensified after the Shamakhi events in 1721.

The international situation and the domestic political situation in the Empire did not allow Peter I to realize his targeted plans of integral Caucasus policy, the Christian colonization of the Caspian coast strip. As a result of the Caspian campaign of Peter I, the Istanbul agreement was signed in 1724, establishing the Russian conquest of the lands on the Caspian coast. However, after the death of Peter I, the “bironovshchina”, established in Russia during the reign of Anna Ivanovna, was not interested in the issue of the Caucasus, and Russia, by signing Rasht (1732) and Ganja (1735) agreements, easily abandoned Peter’s policies in the Caucasus.

Source // “International Academic Herald” 2014 »5 (5) // .pp. 4-11

Hajar Verdiyeva Doctor of Historical Science.

August 30, 2016
Russia, Iran, Turkey, And The Caucasus

March 22, 2013 – 1:44pm, by Joshua Kucera

The history of the Caucasus has long been dominated by three surrounding powers: Turkey,Russia, and Iran. And while Europe and the U.S. have become part of the equation in recent years, the region is still likely to be subject to the influences of its big neighbors to the west, north, and south. And so a big project by the Washington think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies on “The Turkey, Russia, Iran Nexus” is particularly interesting for observers of the Caucasus. CSIS has just released a report (pdf) examining how the various bilateral relationships (i.e. Turkey-Russia, Russia-Iran, Turkey-Iran) interact in political, economic and other ways. The report notes that Russia is not as worried about Iranian influence in the Caucasus as it is about Turkey:

Moscow is not enthusiastic about any state increasing its influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus, be it Turkey, Iran, China, the United States, or whomever. As then-President Dmitri Medvedev stated in September 2008 just after the five-day Georgia War, Russia regards the post-Soviet states as its “zone of privileged interests.” Having noted that, Iran’s presence and activities in Central Asia have been viewed as very much aligned with those of Moscow while Turkey’s as neither significant nor malign enough to draw too much attention.

The picture in the South Caucasus, however, is quite different. First, this region is viewed much more strategically important for Moscow than Central Asia because of its proximity to the North Caucasus, and its dual role as an energy-producing and key transit region to Europe and the Middle East. Second, other international players, including Iran and Turkey but especially the United States and Europe, have been far more active. Third, the region has been much more prone to conflict since the Soviet collapse, including for the first time since the Afghan campaign in the 1980s the deployment of Russian troops abroad in the 2008 Georgia War. For now, Turkish policies in the South Caucasus are probably a bigger concern for Moscow than those of Iran. Many Russian analysts talk of a North/South axis of Russia, Armenia, and Iran that is opposed to an East-West axis of Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.

Although Turkey has its hands more than full at the moment with the Arab Spring and a number of setbacks in its supposed “zero problems” foreign policy, the Russians expect that sooner or later Ankara will return to the Caucasus and ultimately Turkish influence will grow. Virtually all of the national and ethnic groups in the Caucasus have large diaspora populations in Turkey. The most natural partner for Turkey is secular and Islamic Azerbaijan. Already Turkey and Georgia and Azerbaijan are linked through energy pipeline and transit infrastructure, and at some point, it seems inevitable that Turkey and Armenia will reengage more successfully, open their borders, and extend trade and transit ties. All of these developments come to some degree at the expense of traditional Russian domination. Still, for now at least, Turkey is reluctant to provoke the ire of Moscow in the Caucasus, especially as it is highly dependent on imports of Russian gas (58 percent of gas imports in 2012) and oil (which dropped from 40 to 12 percent of imports between 2009 and 2011). This situation of extreme dependence could shift as the regional gas market is experiencing great change, and Turkey seeks to diversify its energy imports…

Some Russian officials… assess that Turkey is becoming more Islamist under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, and that the Turkish General Staff is no longer an effective defender of secularism or check on Prime Minister Erdoğan’s power. Some Russians also fear that Turkish cultural, religious, and educational activities in the Caucasus, Crimea, and Central Asia with Circassian and other Muslim communities could, over time, foster radical Islamist movements in Russia and neighboring states.

Iran mistrusts Russian influence in the Caucasus, but is unwilling to confront Moscow over it, considering the region to be of lesser importance to other issues in their relationship:

The Soviet legacy still shapes the strategic landscape and Russia retains a dominant role. Ankara seeks to promote interdependence among the three South Caucasus states in order to strengthen their sovereignty and to expand commercial and energy links to Turkey, though following the rejection of its 2009 effort to normalize relations and open the Turkish-Armenian border, Turkey has moved more firmly behind Baku. Iran’s engagement in the region includes deepened ties to Armenia, efforts to intimidate Azerbaijan, but caution with respect to Nagorno-Karabakh. Iran does not want Russia heavily involved in the South Caucasus, but has avoided confronting Moscow, and has benefited from a mistrust of Turkey in the region. Washington’s interests of stability, enhanced sovereignty, democratization, and diversification of commercial relations are closely aligned with Turkey’s.

In the aftermath of the 2008 Georgia War, Iran did become more active diplomatically in the Caucasus to offset Russian influence and protect its own interests in developing economic ties and energy routes there. While tensions with Azerbaijan have deepened, Tehran made a conscious decision to avoid causing problems for Moscow in the Caucasus. In part, this restraint seeks to induce Moscow to oppose further sanctions on Iran. The insurgents and foreign fighters operating in the North Caucasus are Sunni Salafists not aligned with or supported by Iran.

Russian and Turkish interests clash on the Caspian, in terms of the proposed Trans-Caspian pipeline:

[O]ne of Russia’s most important foreign policy goals linking the Caucasus and Central Asia… is to prevent any agreement between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan that would lead to a Trans-Caspian pipeline that would bring Turkmen gas West. Russia adamantly opposes this development and will go to great lengths to prevent it since large quantities of Turkmen gas going West could further erode Gazprom’s hegemonic position in Europe, still Russia’s most important gas- consuming market. Turkey’s interests clearly do not coincide with Russian interests, and Ankara has tried to mediate the dispute between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, to no avail so far. At this point the Russian position is quietly supported by Azerbaijan, which wants to ensure that all of its gas sup- plies find reliable and lucrative markets before allowing for such a large competitor as Turkmenistan to enter Western markets.

The report is apparently just the first part of a larger project; the next installment will address how this triangle of relationships affect U.S. policies.

March 23, 2013
Russia and Turkey open Samsun-Caucasus train ferry – exclusive interview

Binala Yildirim

Photo: EPA

The opening ceremony of the Samsun-Caucasus train ferry, which links the North of the country to the South of Russia, will be held on February 19 in the Turkish city of Samsun. This project will give a new dimension to the two country’s bilateral relations, Turkey’s Minister of Transport Binala Yildirim stated in an exclusive interview with the Voice of Russia.

The Samsun-Caucasus will be the shortest transport corridor between the countries.

Its connection to the internal areas of the country will be established in the Russian territory.

Northern and Southern corridors in the territory of Turkey will also be connected to provide a combined and fully integrated transportation network.

Meanwhile, Russia will be able to establish transport links with the Mediterranean region and the Middle East; and Turkey – with Turkic states (former Soviet republics) and Siberia.

The Minister pointed out that there was road, air, railway and sea communication between Russia and Turkey.

As for relations between the two countries as a whole, they continue to develop in a friendly vein, in the framework of mutual respect, Binala Yildirim is sure.

He expressed hope that in 5-10 years bilateral trade would increase three times and would amount to 100 billion dollars.

via Russia and Turkey open Samsun-Caucasus train ferry – exclusive interview: Voice of Russia.

February 20, 2013
Young Women’s Chaos in Istanbul

I and my colleague Katarina Härröd have had the opportunity to take part in the meeting of Young Women’s Network of South Caucasus in Istanbul the last three days. From time to time it has been chaotic; strong feelings, problems, “aha” points in discovering similarities and differences, a mixture of languages and new friendships all mixed with a spirit of young activism and a sense that everything is possible.

Tomorrow we leave Istanbul to continue with a smaller group of young people to take part in an Integrated Security Workshop; the weather forecast says it will be cloudy, rainy and cold but we hope for a warm and cosy atmosphere within the group which will keep us warm and motivated for the rest of the week.

via Young Women’s Chaos in Istanbul | Vi på Kvinna till Kvinna.

November 8, 2012