The revocation of Istanbul Bilgi University’s operating license by a Presidential decree published in the Official Gazette on May 22, 2026, constitutes one of the darkest thresholds in the despotic campaign waged by political power in Turkey against universities, scientific autonomy, and academic freedom. This decision did not merely terminate the legal existence of an educational institution; it ruthlessly destroyed a quarter-century of intellectual accumulation, the labor of over a thousand academics and tens of thousands of students, international scientific networks, and Turkey’s already fragile foundation of scientific autonomy. This measure, enacted by the political power while hiding behind the shield of “legal process,” is the most concrete declaration of a systematic hostility towards the institution of the university and an intolerance of science and free thought.
The Historical-Theoretical Foundations of University Autonomy and Academic Freedom
Since its inception, the university has been shaped around two indispensable principles: scientific autonomy and academic freedom. As early as 1978, Anıl Çeçen emphasized that university autonomy means “the university being governed by its own organs, and the limitation of state intervention,” and that it is a prerequisite for scientific production (Çeçen, 1978). The landmark 1992 decision of the Constitutional Court ruled that universities are “public legal entities possessing autonomy” and that the state’s supervisory power cannot turn into an intervention that eliminates this autonomy (Constitutional Court, E. 1991/21, K. 1992/42). Yet in Turkey, this principle has been systematically dismantled step by step by the ruling power over the last two decades.
Tokay Gedikoğlu’s comprehensive examination reveals the structural obstacles to academic freedom in Turkey and the stifling effect of the centralist character of the Council of Higher Education (YÖK) on scientific production (Gedikoğlu, 2009). Bülent Bingöl, meanwhile, has determined that post-1980 legal regulations, particularly the Higher Education Law No. 2547, gradually transformed universities into extensions of the state bureaucracy, making them vulnerable to political intervention (Bingöl, 2012). This structural weakness prepared the legal ground that allows a President to close a university with a single signature today. Saniye Gül Dedeoğlu, after recalling the universal standards of academic freedom, systematically analyzed the mechanisms through which scientists are suppressed in Turkey, emphasizing that without freedom, universities are reduced to vocational schools, losing their function of research and critical thought (Dedeoğlu, 2014).
The Roots of Systematic Despotism Against Universities in Turkey
The closure of Bilgi University is not an isolated incident but the final act of a systematic despotism with much deeper roots. The mass academic dismissals during the State of Emergency (OHAL) declared after 2016 constituted the first major wave of this despotism. İlknur Özlem Taştan’s study documents, in all its nakedness, how universities were turned into an apparatus of purge during the OHAL period and how academic freedoms were trampled (Taştan, 2021). During this period, thousands of academics were dismissed on grounds with no legal basis, plunging universities into a climate of fear.
The judicial and administrative pressures faced by academics who signed the “Peace Petition” have demonstrated the ruling power’s intolerance of critical thought in the clearest way. The comprehensive legal analysis by Rıdvan Ergün and Berke Özenç reveals how concepts like freedom of expression, academic freedom, and “loyalty to the state” were distorted in this process, and how even the Constitutional Court proved inadequate in protecting academic freedoms (Ergün and Özenç, 2019). While another Constitutional Court decision in 2023 confirmed the constitutional guarantees of academic freedom in principle, it proved a serious lack of will in implementing these guarantees in practice (Constitutional Court, E. 2018/117, K. 2023/212). The ruling power used this vacuum to further deepen its despotic control over universities.
Hostility to Science Waged Through Trustees: The Process of Closing Bilgi University
The paving stones on the path to the closure of Istanbul Bilgi University began to be laid in September 2025 with the appointment of a trustee to the university under the pretext of an investigation into Can Holding. However, one of the most fundamental requirements of the rule of law, the principle of “individuality of responsibility,” clearly dictates that allegations against holding executives cannot be used to punish an entire university. As Burcu Kükner emphasizes in her discussion of “academic freedom as a right,” academic freedom is both an individual right and an institutional guarantee; an intervention against a university violates the rights not only of the individuals in that institution but of the entire scientific community (Kükner, 2019). Indeed, the unjustified dismissal of research assistants, arbitrary administrative appointments, and interventions in academic programs during the trustee process have been recorded as concrete examples of this mass rights violation. The closure decision on May 22, 2026, is the extreme endpoint of this chain of violations.
This process is the product of a “management strategy” that summarizes the ruling power’s view of science and autonomy. As Ahmet Sinan Bilgili shows in his conceptual analysis, scientific autonomy and academic freedom are two complementary principles; any attack on one directly wounds the other (Bilgili, 2022). What has been experienced in Turkey over the last twenty years consists precisely of this dual erosion process. Fatma Buğday has analyzed the historical and structural roots of this erosion in two separate studies. In her first study, Buğday (2023) addresses the course of the weakening of university autonomy in Turkey; in the second, she places the crisis of the university idea in a theoretical framework by associating it with neoliberal transformation, arguing that as universities are managed like market actors, their spheres of autonomy shrink, and academic freedom remains merely nominal (Buğday, 2026). Esra Eren supports this analysis by examining how the Bologna Process was turned into a tool of bureaucratic control in Turkey and how universities were homogenized (Eren, 2023).
Brain Drain: The Scientific Cost of Despotism
The heaviest bill for the ruling power’s hostility to science and autonomy has been the loss of the country’s trained human capital. In her study titled “Brain Drain or Brain Power?”, Füsun Tanrısevdi has demonstrated that the academic mobility from Turkey to abroad has reached dramatic dimensions, with the leading push factors being the restriction of academic freedom, non-meritocratic appointments, and political pressures (Tanrısevdi, 2019). Filiz Tufan Emini and Hatice Gürsoy, examining five-year development plans, also determined that Turkey is inadequate in addressing brain drain as a structural problem and that the outflow has gained a permanent character (Tufan Emini and Gürsoy, 2021).
The comprehensive diaspora report prepared by Ufuk Akçiğit for the Turkish Academy of Sciences, revealing the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of brain drain with striking data, has called for an urgent policy change (Akçiğit, 2024). Yet a despotic mindset that sees closing a university with a Presidential signature as a “solution” is, on the contrary, the primary actor exacerbating brain drain. The closure of Bilgi University will deepen this structural problem further, making Turkey an unlivable country for scientists.
The Collapse of International Academic Reputation and the Proliferation of a Culture of Fear
The international repercussions of the closure decision have also been devastating for Turkey’s scientific reputation. The 2025 report jointly published by the European University Association (EUA) and Scholars at Risk counts Turkey among the countries where academic freedom violations are most intense (EUA, 2025). Two independent reports published by Scholars at Risk in the same year depict the oppressive environment in Turkey using “dark” terms (Scholars at Risk, October 2025; Scholars at Risk, November 2025).
Current assessments within the country also confirm this picture. The academic freedom reports published by the Science Academy in 2023 and 2025 reveal with data that political pressure on universities is intensifying, that scientists are forced to self-censor, and that institutional autonomy has effectively disappeared (Science Academy, 2023; Science Academy, 2025). The 2026 mid-term report of the Education and Science Workers’ Union (Eğitim Sen) emphasizes that more than 251 cases of rights violations reflected in the press were identified in 2025 alone, and that universities have turned from “havens of science” into “empires of fear” (Eğitim Sen, 2026). The report of the University and Academics Association (ÜNİVDER) for the same period documents the prevalence of arbitrary dismissals, mobbing, investigation threats, and precarious working conditions (ÜNİVDER, 2026).
This climate of fear also deeply affects students. Olga Selin Hünler’s recent research shows how the absence of academic freedom and self-censorship destroys students’ critical thinking skills, democratic participation habits, and intellectual identities (Hünler, 2025). As underlined in the interview with Yeşim M. Atamer, students are being raised with learned helplessness and a culture of fear, which poses a serious threat to the future of democracy (Atamer, 2024). The principles document prepared based on the Boğaziçi University experience, in fact, demonstrates how universal norms of autonomy and freedom, applicable to all Turkish universities, are being disregarded (Adaman, 2021).
Conclusion
What was closed on May 22, 2026, was not only the signboard of Istanbul Bilgi University but Turkey’s scientific accumulation, intellectual diversity, and democratic future. This administrative measure, disguised in a legal cloak, is in reality a political blow dealt to the institution of the university, to free thought, and to the common scientific heritage of humanity. This despotic campaign waged by the ruling power against universities tramples the constitution, laws, and international conventions, dragging Turkey into a darkness devoid of science, autonomy, and critical reason. Halting this course necessitates a fundamental change in mentality, legal reforms that will restore university autonomy, and the reconstruction of a democratic atmosphere where scientists can work freely. Otherwise, the political mindset that closed Bilgi today will continue to darken Turkey’s scientific and democratic future entirely tomorrow.
References
Çeçen, Anıl. “Üniversite Özerkliği” [University Autonomy]. Eğitim ve Bilim 3, no. 14 (1978): 3-12.
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey. Decision E. 1991/21, K. 1992/42, June 29, 1992. Official Gazette Date: November 30, 1992.
Gedikoğlu, Tokay. “Yükseköğretimde Akademik Özgürlük” [Academic Freedom in Higher Education]. Kuram ve Uygulamada Eğitim Yönetimi 15, no. 57 (2009): 5-34.
Bingöl, Bülent. “Üniversite Özerkliğinin Değişen Tanımı ve Üniversitelerin Yeniden Yapılandırılması” [The Changing Definition of University Autonomy and the Restructuring of Universities]. Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi 67, no. 1 (2012): 39-76.
Dedeoğlu, Saniye Gül. “Akademik Özgürlük ve Üniversite Özerkliği” [Academic Freedom and University Autonomy]. Yaşar Üniversitesi E-Dergisi 9, no. 34 (2014): 5887-5906.
Ergün, Rıdvan, and Berke Özenç. “Anayasa Mahkemesi’nin Barış Bildirisi Kararı: İfade Özgürlüğü, Akademik Özgürlük ve Devlete Sadakat Kavramı Çerçevesinde Bir İnceleme” [The Constitutional Court’s Peace Petition Decision: An Analysis within the Framework of Freedom of Expression, Academic Freedom, and Loyalty to the State]. Anayasa Hukuku Dergisi 8, no. 16 (2019): 289-332.
Kükner, Burcu. “Bir Hak Olarak Akademik Özgürlük: Sınırlar ve Tartışmalar” [Academic Freedom as a Right: Limits and Discussions]. İnönü Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi 10, no. 1 (2019): 177-192.
Tanrısevdi, Füsun. “Beyin Göçü mü, Beyin Gücü mü?” [Brain Drain or Brain Power?]. Adnan Menderes Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi 6, no. 2 (2019): 43-58.
Adaman, Fikret. “Akademik Özgürlük ve Üniversite Özerkliği İlkeleri: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Deneyimi” [Principles of Academic Freedom and University Autonomy: The Boğaziçi University Experience]. Boğaziçi Üniversitesi ÜYYK Yayınları, 2021.
Taştan, İlknur Özlem. “OHAL Döneminde Türkiye‘de Akademik Özgürlükler” [Academic Freedoms in Turkey during the State of Emergency Period]. İnsan Hakları Okulu Yayınları, 2021.
Tufan Emini, Filiz, and Hatice Gürsoy. “Türkiye‘de Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planlarında Beyin Göçü Olgusu” [The Brain Drain Phenomenon in Turkey’s Five-Year Development Plans]. Journal of Social and Humanities Sciences Research 8, no. 73 (2021): 2045-2056.
Bilgili, Ahmet Sinan. “Üniversitelerde Bilimsel/Akademik Özerklik ve Özgürlük: Kavramsal Bir Analiz” [Scientific/Academic Autonomy and Freedom in Universities: A Conceptual Analysis]. Yükseköğretim ve Bilim Dergisi 12, no. 1 (2022): 1-15.
Bilim Akademisi [Science Academy]. Akademik Özgürlükler Raporu 2021-2022 [Academic Freedoms Report 2021-2022]. İstanbul: Bilim Akademisi Yayınları, January 2023.
Buğday, Fatma. “Üniversite Özerkliği Üzerine Tarihsel Bir İnceleme” [A Historical Review on University Autonomy]. Uluslararası Yönetim Akademisi Dergisi 6, no. 4 (2023): 1015-1032.
Eren, Esra. “Üniversitelerin Neoliberal Dönüşümü: Bologna Süreci ve Akademik Özgürlük” [The Neoliberal Transformation of Universities: The Bologna Process and Academic Freedom]. Eleştirel Pedagoji Dergisi, no. 67 (2023).
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey. Decision E. 2018/117, K. 2023/212, December 7, 2023. Official Gazette Date: March 10, 2024.
Akçiğit, Ufuk. Türkiye Akademik Diaspora Raporu: Beyin Göçünden Beyin Gücüne [Turkey Academic Diaspora Report: From Brain Drain to Brain Power]. İstanbul: TÜBA Yayınları, 2024.
Atamer, Yeşim M. Interview. “Türkiye‘de Akademik Özgürlüklerin Hâl-i Pür Melali” [The Lamentable State of Academic Freedoms in Turkey]. Reflektif Journal of Social Sciences 5, no. 3 (2024): 487-508.
Bilim Akademisi [Science Academy]. Akademik Özgürlükler Raporu 2024-2025 [Academic Freedoms Report 2024-2025]. İstanbul: Bilim Akademisi Yayınları, February 2025.
European University Association (EUA). Free to Think 2025: Report of the Scholars at Risk Academic Freedom Monitoring Project. Brussels: EUA Publications, October 2025.
Hünler, Olga Selin. “Academic Freedom and Patterns of Self-Censorship in Turkey.” Philosophy & Social Criticism 51, no. 8 (2025): 1123-1145.
Scholars at Risk. Free to Think 2025: Annual Report on Attacks on Higher Education. New York: SAR Publications, October 2025.
Scholars at Risk. SAR 2025 Annual Report. New York: SAR Publications, November 2025.
Buğday, Fatma. “Üniversite İdeasının Krizi ve Özerkliğin Aşınması: Tarihsel Kökenlerden Neoliberal Dönüşüme Kavramsal Bir Analiz” [The Crisis of the University Idea and the Erosion of Autonomy: A Conceptual Analysis from Historical Origins to Neoliberal Transformation]. Eleştirel Pedagoji Dergisi, no. 79 (March 2026).
Eğitim Sen [Education and Science Workers’ Union]. 2025-2026 Yükseköğretim Ara Dönem Raporu [2025-2026 Higher Education Mid-Term Report]. Ankara: Eğitim Sen Yayınları, February 2026.
ÜNİVDER (Üniversite ve Akademisyenler Derneği) [University and Academics Association]. Üniversitelerde Hak İhlalleri Raporu 2025 [Report on Rights Violations in Universities 2025]. İstanbul: ÜNİVDER Yayınları, 2026.
Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA) Aarhus University, 1997 Independent Researcher Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures.
On the night of Thursday, May 22, 2026, a few lines of text published in the Official Gazette by presidential decree opened one of the darkest pages in Turkey’s academic history. The operating license of Istanbul Bilgi University—whose founding foundation had been under trustee administration since September 2025—was completely revoked, citing Article 11 of the Higher Education Law No. 2547 as justification. This decision meant the effective destruction of an institution that represented over a quarter-century of accumulated knowledge: founded in 1996 as Turkey’s fourth foundation university, with more than 20,000 students, over a thousand academics, nearly 50,000 graduates, 7 faculties, 3 institutes, and more than 150 programs.
A university in Turkey does not consist merely of classrooms, campuses, and diplomas. The university is the most fundamental institution where free thought is produced, science develops, and the future of society is shaped. Ever since Wilhelm von Humboldt built the modern university idea in Berlin at the beginning of the 19th century, universities have been recognized as structures where knowledge is not only transmitted but also produced, where research and teaching are inseparable, and where scientific autonomy forms the institutional backbone. According to Humboldt, the university must be independent of political power despite being funded by the state; academics should have complete freedom over the content, methods, and publications of their courses; the university should exist not merely as an institution that confers professions, but as an autonomous sphere where scientific thought flourishes. The experiences of every developed country today—from Europe to America, from Japan to Australia—demonstrate that the strength of universities is directly proportional to their capacity to remain outside the sphere of political power’s intervention.
The closure decision concerning Istanbul Bilgi University is the most striking example of how this universal principle has been trampled upon in Turkey. Although official statements claim that the decision is based on legal and administrative processes, it is clear that this step has triggered a much broader political and structural debate in the public sphere. This decision, taken by hiding behind the rhetoric of the rule of law, is one of the heaviest blows struck against academia by a political mentality incapable of tolerating dissident and critical thought in Turkey.
The Meaning of the University and Istanbul Bilgi University’s Place in Turkey
Although the concept of the university has taken different forms in different civilizations throughout history, it has always been shaped around the same ideal at its core: an institutional structure where knowledge is freely produced, discussed, and disseminated. The earliest universities that emerged in Medieval Europe (Bologna, Paris, Oxford) possessed partial institutional autonomy; the transition to the modern university occurred in the 19th century with the Humboldtian model, where knowledge production and academic freedom gained central importance. While American research universities carried this legacy further in the 20th century, universities became fundamental pillars of democratic societies with the massification of higher education after the Second World War.
Istanbul Bilgi University was founded in 1996 as one of the most successful carriers of this universal heritage in Turkey. With its educational model that encouraged critical thought, its emphasis on social sciences, and its international academic connections, it created a distinctive university culture in Turkey. Through its legal clinics, human rights center, migration studies, gender studies, cultural studies, and interdisciplinary programs, Bilgi was not merely an institution that trained students; it also became a structure that generated ideas, opened spaces for debate, and contributed to social transformation. Having transformed industrial heritage into a space of cultural production with its Santralistanbul campus, the university had also registered its international academic success by ranking among the top five foundation universities from Turkey in the 2024 QS rankings.
The most important characteristic that distinguished Bilgi University from its peers was its insistence on preserving the space of academic freedom despite Turkey’s authoritarian tendencies. Its defense of the peace academics, its willingness to take a stand in debates on freedom of expression, and its institutionalization of the critical social sciences tradition were the primary factors that placed it in the crosshairs of political power. The process that began with its sale to Can Holding in 2019 evolved into a new phase with the appointment of a trustee to the university following an investigation launched in September 2025 against the holding on charges of “forming a criminal organization,” “smuggling,” “fraud,” and “money laundering,” and ultimately culminated in the closure decision.
The Justifications for the Closure Decision and Debates in Terms of the Rule of Law
The technical justification given for the closure decision is the appointment of a trustee to the university’s founding foundation and the provision in Article 11 of Law No. 2547 stipulating the revocation of the operating license in such a case. However, the real issue behind this veil of “technical justification” is how the principles of individualizing responsibility and protecting the institutional structure have been brazenly violated in a state governed by the rule of law.
Why do the results of investigations carried out against a company or holding directly affect students, academics, and the entire academic institution? What causal link can be established between the alleged crimes of holding executives and the existence of a university? These questions have no answers compatible with the principle of the rule of law. Indeed, even Professor Dr. İzzet Özgenç, a criminal law scholar who once served as President Erdoğan’s legal advisor, described the closure decision as “unconstitutional” and stated, “The legal existence of a university established by law can only be terminated by law; the legal existence of a university cannot be terminated by a presidential decree.”
The fundamental approach of the rule of law principle is the individualization of responsibility and the protection of the institutional structure to the greatest extent possible. In no developed democracy in the world is a university within a holding closed by citing an investigation against that holding as justification; instead, the management structure is reorganized and the institution is enabled to continue its activities. In Turkey, however, the ruling power has chosen to use law as an instrument of instrumentalization, opting to destroy one of the bastions of critical thought on the pretext of an investigation. This demonstrates that the process that began with the trustee appointment in September 2025 was actually a series of steps leading to closure, and that the “legal process” rhetoric was nothing more than a camouflage.
The Debate on Academic Freedom and University Autonomy
This decision starkly reveals the point that the long-standing debates on academic freedom in Turkey have reached. As the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey stated in a ruling in 1975, “universities are public legal entities endowed with autonomy; they are administered by organs elected by themselves under the supervision and control of the state.” According to the same ruling, “The state’s power of supervision and control does not justify interference in the administrative actions and affairs of an institution possessing administrative autonomy.” Yet in the Turkey of 2026, not the slightest trace of these principles remains.
Over the last twenty years, the AKP government has consciously and systematically placed universities under the domination of political authority. According to reports by the Science Academy, 131 universities have been opened in Turkey in the last twenty years; however, this quantitative growth has gone hand in hand with a qualitative collapse. Rectors appointed directly by the President have become accountable solely to political power, rather than to university constituents and academic autonomy. The mass academic purges following July 15 led to the institutionalization of unmeritocratic practices and political staffing. The Education and Science Workers’ Union’s (Eğitim Sen) 2025-2026 Higher Education Midterm Report emphasizes that “the trampling of academic freedom as a result of political-ideological attacks is one of the fundamental causes of the problems experienced by universities.” The fact that at least 251 cases of rights violations were documented just from those reflected in the press in 2025 reveals the gravity of the situation.
The closure of Bilgi University is one of the pinnacles of this systematic policy of destruction. While the ruling power has for years attempted to standardize universities under the rhetoric of “national and indigenous,” it has sequentially targeted institutions that resisted this rhetoric and defended critical thought and scientific autonomy. First, a trustee rector was appointed to Boğaziçi University, then a trustee was sent to Bilgi University, and now the same university has been entirely shut down. This chronology is not a coincidence; it is the step-by-step implementation of the political power’s strategy of seizing universities and destroying dissident scientific institutions.
The process that began with TÜBA’s autonomy being stripped away by a Decree-Law in 2011 has culminated today in the closure of a university by presidential decree. The fifteen-year period between these two events is a documentary record of how academic freedom and university autonomy have been systematically dismantled in Turkey.
Consequences for Students and Academics: A Lost World
The most direct and devastating impact of the closure decision is on students and the academic staff. According to the Council of Higher Education’s (YÖK) announcement, students will be transferred to Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University (MSGSÜ), which holds the status of guarantor university. YÖK announced that “necessary measures have been taken immediately regarding ensuring that students and administrative and academic staff do not experience any grievances, and that educational activities continue without interruption.”
However, this rhetoric falls short of concealing the trauma created by the closure. Following the trustee appointment in September 2025, students had said, “We are worried that our school’s reputation and the value of our diploma will decline, and that our space of freedom will be restricted.” Today, the accuracy of these concerns has been painfully confirmed. A university is not merely a diploma-granting institution; it is a living space that shapes students’ intellectual development, social environment, academic belonging, and future plans. The overnight destruction of this space is such a profound devastation that it cannot be compensated for merely by a technical “transfer” process.
The situation is even graver for academics. Having already witnessed the groundless dismissal of research assistants, arbitrary appointments, and precarious working conditions during the trustee process, Bilgi University academics today face a completely uncertain future. Research projects, academic networks, international collaborations, and institutional memory built over many years have been nullified by a single presidential signature. Some of these academics will be forced to go abroad, while others will try to hold on in Turkey’s increasingly shrinking space of academic freedom. In either case, the loser will be Turkey’s scientific and intellectual accumulation.
International Academic Reputation and Brain Drain: Global Consequences
Universities are not only national but also part of the international world of science. The fact that Humboldt University has produced 29 Nobel laureate scientists strikingly demonstrates the role of universities in the global scientific ecosystem. The world’s leading universities—such as Berlin’s Humboldt, Harvard, Oxford, Cambridge, and the University of Tokyo—are recognized as institutions that contribute to the scientific capital not only of their own countries but of all humanity.
The closure of a university in Turkey by presidential decree constitutes a heavy blow to the country’s academic credibility and predictability. International academic circles will read this decision as an indicator of how much the rule of law, academic freedom, and scientific autonomy have weakened in Turkey. Erasmus programs, research partnerships, joint degree projects, and academic exchange programs will be directly affected by this erosion of trust.
Data from the Academic Freedom Index reveal a strong relationship between the decline in academic freedom and the drop in democracy levels. In recent years, Turkey has continuously regressed in this index, becoming categorized alongside authoritarian regimes. The closure of Bilgi University is a new and far more visible stage of this regression.
More importantly, this decision will further trigger Turkey’s already accelerated brain drain. Trained academics, researchers, and the brightest students will not want to stay in a country where scientific freedom is absent and universities can be shut down overnight. Every departing scientist represents not only an individual loss but also the loss of the students they would have trained, the research they would have conducted, the laboratories they would have established, and the knowledge they would have produced. With this decision, Turkey faces the risk of losing not merely one university, but a significant portion of its future scientific potential.
The University in the World: Models, Principles, and a Comparative Perspective
Historically, the concept of the university has been shaped around three main models: the Humboldtian German model, the American research university model, and the British collegiate model. The common denominator of all three models is the indispensability of academic freedom and institutional autonomy.
The Humboldtian model defines the university as a scientific institution independent of the state. Founded in Berlin in 1810, Humboldt University made the principle of “the unity of research and teaching” the founding philosophy of the university. German universities were able to preserve their institutional autonomy to a great extent even during the dark period of the Second World War; if Germany today possesses one of the world’s most powerful scientific research infrastructures, it owes this largely to the Humboldtian tradition.
American research universities, on the other hand, carried the Humboldtian model into a more competitive and entrepreneurial framework. Institutions such as Harvard, Stanford, MIT, and Berkeley have seen academic freedom and institutional autonomy not merely as principles but as necessary conditions for scientific success. It is no coincidence that the world’s most important scientific discoveries throughout the 20th century emerged from these universities. No American president can revoke a university’s operating license with a single signature; such a power does not even exist in the American legal system.
In the British model as well, universities like Oxford and Cambridge, with their centuries-old traditions, have preserved their autonomy in the face of political power. Founded in 1209, Cambridge University has maintained its existence for eight centuries as an academic structure independent of the British monarchy, parliament, and governments.
Turkey, meanwhile, adopted the Humboldtian model with the 1933 University Reform; however, it has never been able to fully implement the autonomy required by this model. The establishment of YÖK following the 1980 coup placed universities under centralized bureaucratic control; during the AKP government, this centralizing tendency reached its peak, transforming universities into apparatuses of political power. The elimination of TÜBA’s autonomy in 2011, the post-2016 dismissals, the appointment of a trustee rector to Boğaziçi, and now the closure of Bilgi University are all different manifestations of the same political will.
Today, in developed countries, the closure of a university is an extraordinary and almost unprecedented occurrence. In Japan, South Korea, Canada, Australia, Sweden, and the Netherlands, political powers do not have the authority to close universities they disapprove of because the constitutions and laws of these countries safeguard university autonomy. In Turkey, however, the President can terminate the existence of a university where 20,000 students are receiving education with a single signature. This situation is one of the most striking indicators of the gulf between the official rhetoric about how advanced a democracy Turkey is and the reality.
Conclusion
The closure of Istanbul Bilgi University will go down in history not merely as an administrative act but as a critical rupture that reopens the discussion on the relationship between the university, freedom, and science in Turkey.
Responsibility for this decision lies primarily and essentially with the current political power. Over their more than twenty years in office, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the AKP government have institutionalized a mentality that sees universities as “service institutions,” cannot tolerate critical thought, and attempts to substitute scientific autonomy with political loyalty. At the point reached today, universities in Turkey have ceased to be universities in the sense described by Humboldt, Einstein, Russell, and Gramsci; they have become obedient bureaucratic structures integrated into the chain of command of the political power.
The closure of Bilgi University is the most dangerous stage this process has reached. Because this time, the issue is not merely the appointment of a trustee to a university, the removal of a rector, or the dismissal of academics; the issue is the complete destruction of an entire academic institution. This demonstrates that the ruling power has reached the point of “I will close the university I dislike.” There is no guarantee that another university will not suffer the same fate tomorrow on some other pretext.
Universities are the institutions that build the intellectual future of societies. The elimination or incapacitation of these institutions irreversibly damages not only the present but also the country’s scientific and cultural capacity in the long term. Turkey will feel the consequences of this decision for decades to come: the acceleration of brain drain, the weakening of international academic collaborations, the decline in scientific production, and, most importantly, the shrinking of the institutional foundation of free thought.
At the center of the debate is not merely one institution, but fundamental questions such as what the university is, how it should be protected, and the place of science within society. The answers given to these questions will determine not only Turkey’s academic future but also its democratic future.
Today, the political will that closed Istanbul Bilgi University has, in fact, closed Turkey’s future. The issue is not the existence or non-existence of a university; it is whether science, free thought, and the common intellectual heritage of humanity will survive on this soil. The closure of Bilgi is a dark answer given to this question. However, history has shown that no darkness lasts forever; sooner or later, the light of science and free thought pierces through even the thickest walls.
Recommendations
In the face of the closure of Istanbul Bilgi University, the responsibilities incumbent upon the academic community, civil society, and the democratic public are as follows:
Initiating a legal struggle: The closure decision is clearly contrary to the constitution and universal legal principles. Legal processes should be initiated before national and international judicial bodies, and all legal avenues—including application to the European Court of Human Rights—should be used effectively.
Mobilizing international academic solidarity: International organizations such as Scholars at Risk, the European University Association, and the Magna Charta Observatory should be involved in the process; it should be emphasized that the closure of Bilgi University is a threat to global academic freedom.
Establishing independent monitoring mechanisms to protect the rights of students and academics: YÖK’s rhetoric of “there will be no grievances” should be audited by independent observers; the problems experienced by students and academics should be systematically documented.
Strengthening legal guarantees for academic freedom and university autonomy: The higher education legislation, particularly the existing Higher Education Law No. 2547, should be reformed to protect university autonomy and academic freedom; Article 11, which grants the President the authority to close universities, should be repealed.
Developing policies against brain drain: In order to halt the academic brain drain that will accelerate with the closure of Bilgi University, academics should be provided with free and secure working conditions; mechanisms should be created that allow scientists forced to go abroad to maintain their ties with Turkey.
Supporting alternative academic structures: In order to keep the intellectual heritage of the closed Bilgi University alive, independent research institutes, open academy programs, and alternative education platforms should be established.
Raising social awareness: It should be communicated that the closure of a university is not only a problem for the academic community but a democracy problem that concerns the entire society; the public should be made aware of the social value of science, free thought, and the university.
The closure of Istanbul Bilgi University by presidential decree is the latest link in the systematic dismantling of academic freedom and university autonomy in Turkey. This decision has turned the lives of 20,000 students and over a thousand academics upside down overnight; it has nullified a quarter-century of scientific accumulation, international academic networks, and a tradition of critical thought.
The principles of individualizing responsibility and protecting the institutional structure, which are fundamental requirements of the rule of law, have been explicitly violated; an investigation targeting a holding has been turned into a pretext to punish an entire university. This is the most concrete manifestation of the political power’s intolerance of critical thought and its project of standardizing universities.
The closure of Bilgi University has dealt a heavy blow to Turkey’s international academic reputation; it has created a rupture that will further trigger the already accelerated brain drain. What is actually closed is not so much a university as Turkey’s scientific and intellectual future. However, history shows that the light of science and free thought never succumbs to any darkness.
References
Çeçen, Anıl. “Üniversite Özerkliği” [University Autonomy]. Eğitim ve Bilim 3, no. 14 (1978): 3-12.
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey. Decision E. 1991/21, K. 1992/42, June 29, 1992. Official Gazette Date: November 30, 1992.
Gedikoğlu, Tokay. “Yükseköğretimde Akademik Özgürlük” [Academic Freedom in Higher Education]. Kuram ve Uygulamada Eğitim Yönetimi 15, no. 57 (2009): 5-34.
Bingöl, Bülent. “Üniversite Özerkliğinin Değişen Tanımı ve Üniversitelerin Yeniden Yapılandırılması” [The Changing Definition of University Autonomy and the Restructuring of Universities]. Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi 67, no. 1 (2012): 39-76.
Dedeoğlu, Saniye Gül. “Akademik Özgürlük ve Üniversite Özerkliği” [Academic Freedom and University Autonomy]. Yaşar Üniversitesi E-Dergisi 9, no. 34 (2014): 5887-5906.
Ergün, Rıdvan, and Berke Özenç. “Anayasa Mahkemesi’nin Barış Bildirisi Kararı: İfade Özgürlüğü, Akademik Özgürlük ve Devlete Sadakat Kavramı Çerçevesinde Bir İnceleme” [The Constitutional Court’s Peace Petition Decision: An Analysis within the Framework of Freedom of Expression, Academic Freedom, and Loyalty to the State]. Anayasa Hukuku Dergisi 8, no. 16 (2019): 289-332.
Kükner, Burcu. “Bir Hak Olarak Akademik Özgürlük: Sınırlar ve Tartışmalar” [Academic Freedom as a Right: Limits and Discussions]. İnönü Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi 10, no. 1 (2019): 177-192.
Tanrısevdi, Füsun. “Beyin Göçü mü, Beyin Gücü mü?” [Brain Drain or Brain Power?]. Adnan Menderes Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi 6, no. 2 (2019): 43-58.
Adaman, Fikret. “Akademik Özgürlük ve Üniversite Özerkliği İlkeleri: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Deneyimi” [Principles of Academic Freedom and University Autonomy: The Boğaziçi University Experience]. Boğaziçi Üniversitesi ÜYYK Yayınları, 2021.
Taştan, İlknur Özlem. “OHAL Döneminde Türkiye‘de Akademik Özgürlükler” [Academic Freedoms in Turkey during the State of Emergency Period]. İnsan Hakları Okulu Yayınları, 2021.
Tufan Emini, Filiz, and Hatice Gürsoy. “Türkiye‘de Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planlarında Beyin Göçü Olgusu” [The Brain Drain Phenomenon in Turkey’s Five-Year Development Plans]. Journal of Social and Humanities Sciences Research 8, no. 73 (2021): 2045-2056.
Bilgili, Ahmet Sinan. “Üniversitelerde Bilimsel/Akademik Özerklik ve Özgürlük: Kavramsal Bir Analiz” [Scientific/Academic Autonomy and Freedom in Universities: A Conceptual Analysis]. Yükseköğretim ve Bilim Dergisi 12, no. 1 (2022): 1-15.
Bilim Akademisi [Science Academy]. Akademik Özgürlükler Raporu 2021-2022 [Academic Freedoms Report 2021-2022]. İstanbul: Bilim Akademisi Yayınları, January 2023.
Buğday, Fatma. “Üniversite Özerkliği Üzerine Tarihsel Bir İnceleme” [A Historical Review on University Autonomy]. Uluslararası Yönetim Akademisi Dergisi 6, no. 4 (2023): 1015-1032.
Eren, Esra. “Üniversitelerin Neoliberal Dönüşümü: Bologna Süreci ve Akademik Özgürlük” [The Neoliberal Transformation of Universities: The Bologna Process and Academic Freedom]. Eleştirel Pedagoji Dergisi, no. 67 (2023).
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey. Decision E. 2018/117, K. 2023/212, December 7, 2023. Official Gazette Date: March 10, 2024.
Akçiğit, Ufuk. Türkiye Akademik Diaspora Raporu: Beyin Göçünden Beyin Gücüne [Turkey Academic Diaspora Report: From Brain Drain to Brain Power]. İstanbul: TÜBA Yayınları, 2024.
Atamer, Yeşim M. Interview. “Türkiye‘de Akademik Özgürlüklerin Hâl-i Pür Melali” [The Lamentable State of Academic Freedoms in Turkey]. Reflektif Journal of Social Sciences 5, no. 3 (2024): 487-508.
Bilim Akademisi [Science Academy]. Akademik Özgürlükler Raporu 2024-2025 [Academic Freedoms Report 2024-2025]. İstanbul: Bilim Akademisi Yayınları, February 2025.
European University Association (EUA). Free to Think 2025: Report of the Scholars at Risk Academic Freedom Monitoring Project. Brussels: EUA Publications, October 2025.
Hünler, Olga Selin. “Academic Freedom and Patterns of Self-Censorship in Turkey.” Philosophy & Social Criticism 51, no. 8 (2025): 1123-1145.
Scholars at Risk. Free to Think 2025: Annual Report on Attacks on Higher Education. New York: SAR Publications, October 2025.
Scholars at Risk. SAR 2025 Annual Report. New York: SAR Publications, November 2025.
Buğday, Fatma. “Üniversite İdeasının Krizi ve Özerkliğin Aşınması: Tarihsel Kökenlerden Neoliberal Dönüşüme Kavramsal Bir Analiz” [The Crisis of the University Idea and the Erosion of Autonomy: A Conceptual Analysis from Historical Origins to Neoliberal Transformation]. Eleştirel Pedagoji Dergisi, no. 79 (March 2026).
Eğitim Sen [Education and Science Workers’ Union]. 2025-2026 Yükseköğretim Ara Dönem Raporu [2025-2026 Higher Education Midterm Report]. Ankara: Eğitim Sen Yayınları, February 2026.
ÜNİVDER (Üniversite ve Akademisyenler Derneği) [University and Academics Association]. Üniversitelerde Hak İhlalleri Raporu 2025 [Report on Rights Violations in Universities 2025]. İstanbul: ÜNİVDER Yayınları, 2026.
Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA) Aarhus University, 1997 Independent Researcher Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures.
The Structural Dependencies of the Global Economy and the Anatomy of Systemic Risk
The global economy has reached an unprecedented level of integration over the last fifty years, constructing a complex and multi-layered architecture of production, energy, and logistics networks that transcend nation-state borders. This hyper-integrated architecture, while pioneering efficiency based on the principle of comparative advantage, has exposed the system to the kind of fragilities predicted by the theory of “complex adaptive systems.” In such systems, non-linear interactions mean that a small perturbation can paralyze the entire network through cascading and unpredictable chain reactions.
At the heart of this fragility lies the concentration of energy and logistics infrastructure in specific bottlenecks. More than 60% of global oil trade and a third of liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade are transported by sea, with the lion’s share of this flow passing through geopolitically sensitive “chokepoints” such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, and the Bab el-Mandeb. A disruption at these points not only impacts physical supply but also instantaneously distorts pricing behavior in futures markets, creating a financial contagion effect.
The same fragility applies to the real production sector. The “just-in-time” supply model, dominant since the 1990s, radically reduced inventory holding costs, creating an efficiency revolution on corporate balance sheets, but simultaneously reduced the system’s buffer to zero. Today, inventory-to-production ratios in strategic sectors like automotive and electronics are at historically low levels. This has caused unexpected shocks, such as the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 or the grounding of the Ever Given in the Suez Canal in 2021, to turn into global production stoppages and price shocks within weeks. The global economy now walks a tightly stretched tightrope, anchored at one end by energy supply security and at the other by consumer demand.
The Strategic Depth of Energy and Maritime Trade Corridors: A Fragility Matrix
Energy and maritime trade can be thought of as the circulatory system of the global system. The functioning of this system is threatened by a three-layered fragility matrix: physical chokepoints, commercial-financial chokepoints, and geopolitical risk premiums.
Physical Chokepoints and Cascading Effects: The Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20 million barrels of oil and derivatives pass daily, is the world’s most critical energy artery. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has modeled that in a scenario where this strait is closed, oil prices could quickly exceed $150/barrel. However, the impact does not stop there. The disruption of energy and raw material shipments to China and Japan via the Strait of Malacca would paralyze Asia’s function as a production base, throttling the supply of finished goods to European and North American markets. Disruption in logistics not only increases transport costs but also leads to equipment imbalances, with containers piling up in the wrong geographies, thereby prolonging the duration of the shock.
Commercial and Financial Chokepoints: The forced lengthening of routes does more than just raise freight rates. The security crisis in the Suez Canal during the 2020-2024 period caused ships diverting via the Cape of Good Hope to extend their voyage times by 10-14 days, effectively reducing the global container fleet’s capacity by approximately 8-10%. This leads to a 5-10 fold increase in insurance premiums, especially for war risk and blacklisting clauses, which is exponentially reflected in product prices. Through the London and Lloyd’s market, where the maritime sector is concentrated, this shock is transmitted to global financial markets, distorting the pricing of instruments like credit default swaps (CDS) and dramatically increasing companies’ working capital needs.
The Anatomy of Geopolitical Risk Premiums: In addition to the tangible factors above, the “expectations economy” comes into play. Any escalating tension in the Red Sea or the Persian Gulf is instantly reflected in oil and LNG futures markets as a “fear premium.” This premium negatively impacts consumer prices, producer costs, and central banks’ ability to fight inflation, even before any physical supply disruption occurs. This mechanism demonstrates that the modern economy is deeply dependent not only on physical flows but also on the perceptions and narratives concerning the future of these flows.
Asia and Europe: The Political Economy of Asymmetric Dependence
Energy and logistics shocks affect the global economy asymmetrically, producing different crisis dynamics based on the structural characteristics of different regions.
Asia’s Production Paradox: Asian economies such as China, Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN countries are positioned as the “workshop of the world.” The functioning of this model implies an absolute dependence on an uninterrupted and low-cost flow of energy and raw materials. An energy supply disruption directly halts industrial production in these countries. For instance, semiconductor production in South Korea and Taiwan takes place in extremely sensitive facilities where the slightest power interruption can result in billions of dollars in losses. These countries’ dependence on the Strait of Hormuz for energy imports, often exceeding 80%, makes this strait not just an economic issue but a matter of national security. The slowdown in production, beyond the drop in export revenues, blocks the supply of critical components in Global Value Chains (GVCs), bringing an automobile factory in Brazil or a machinery manufacturer in Germany to a standstill.
Europe’s Cost-Inflation Spiral: While Europe presents a similar picture to Asia in its dependence on energy imports, the nature of its fragility is different. As concretely demonstrated by the 2022 energy crisis, the primary risk for Europe is not a complete supply cut-off but prices skyrocketing to astronomical levels. The 5-10 fold increases in natural gas prices (TTF) rendered energy-intensive industries (steel, fertilizer, aluminum, glass) uncompetitive and led to permanent production losses (demand destruction). This created a cost-push inflation in Europe, eroding household purchasing power while pushing the European Central Bank (ECB) into a deep dilemma: raising interest rates to control inflation would push an economy already facing stagflation into recession. This is an entirely different, supply-driven stagflation dynamic compared to traditional demand-side shocks.
Cascading Failure: The halt of production in Asia and the explosion of costs in Europe create a mutually reinforcing cycle. When Asian factories stop producing, Europe’s machinery, automotive, and medical device sectors are left without inputs. Conversely, when the cost crisis in Europe dampens demand, Asia’s export orders are cut. During the 2022-2024 period, the quadrupling of freight rates from Asia to Europe due to the Suez route disruption weakened the link between these two massive economic blocs, demonstrating how this decoupling drags down global growth. The fundamental risk of the modern economy is that such a cascade effect could obliterate what Keynes termed “animal spirits”—investor confidence—leading to a global “stop-go” crisis.
The Gulf Region, Energy Rents, and the Reconfiguration of the Financial System
For the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, the security of energy corridors is the foundation not just of foreign trade, but of the state’s fiscal structure and the social contract. The region has developed a sophisticated mechanism to manage this dependence by converting energy rents into financial power, but this structure harbors new fragilities of its own.
Fiscal Fragility and Pro-Cyclicality: The vast majority of GCC countries require an oil price ranging from $65-$80/barrel to balance their budgets. When a crisis in energy corridors pushes oil prices above $100, massive budget surpluses occur in the short term. However, this petrodollar flow also works in reverse: if geopolitical risks cause the market to view the region as risky as a whole, capital flight can be triggered despite high oil prices. Regional stock markets and government bonds are highly sensitive to the perception of security in energy corridors. A region-specific CDS premium (country risk premium) has become a key indicator for global investors.
The Role of Sovereign Wealth Funds and Systemic Risk: The Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar, managing trillions of dollars, have become “too big to fail” actors in the global financial system. These funds invest heavily in developed country bonds, real estate, and private equity funds. In the event of a Gulf crisis, a fire sale of assets by these funds to cover budget deficits or meet liquidity needs could send shockwaves through asset prices from New York to London, and from Tokyo to Frankfurt. This is an ironic consequence of the Gulf’s energy rent accumulation: the colossal funds established to stabilize the region now constitute a potential channel for international financial contagion.
The Dilemma of the Gulf as a Logistics Hub: The massive logistics investments of Dubai (Jebel Ali Port) and Qatar (Hamad Port) have turned these locations into critical transshipment hubs for global trade. However, this amplifies the impact of any security threat directed at the region. A conflict in the Persian Gulf would disrupt not only regional trade but also the global container traffic flowing to Africa, South Asia, and Europe via these hubs. Thus, the Gulf represents the global economy’s most sensitive point of “double lock-in,” serving as both an energy supply source and a logistics distribution network.
Strategic Recommendations: A Resilience-Focused System Architecture
Since the current fragility is ingrained in the system’s foundation, solutions must be structural and multidimensional. A “system architecture” must be built that enhances resilience without compromising efficiency.
Multi-Layered Diversification in Energy Supply: Investing solely in renewable energy is insufficient. The resilience of the energy system depends on increasing “grid flexibility.” This requires integrating diverse sources (nuclear, hydro, solar, wind) with smart grids and large-scale energy storage systems. While Europe’s REPowerEU plan or China’s massive renewable energy capacity expansion are steps in the right direction, they carry the risk of creating new bottlenecks for critical minerals (lithium, cobalt, rare earth elements). Therefore, energy diversification must simultaneously encompass the diversification of raw material supply chains and an increase in recycling capacity.
Redundancy and Flexibility in Logistics: The “Just-in-Time” model must be hybridized with a “Just-in-Case” model. This does not mean excessively increasing stocks, but rather intelligent inventory management.
· Nearshoring/Friendshoring in Production: Bringing the production of critical components closer to consumer markets (such as the Mexico-US or Eastern Europe-Western Europe corridors) reduces dependency on long-distance maritime logistics. · Strategic Development of Alternative Corridors: Mega-projects like the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor), which bypasses Russia, and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), connecting India to the Middle East and Europe, are vital for reducing dependency on single chokepoints. These projects must be supported not only by physical infrastructure but also by the digitalization and harmonization of cross-border customs procedures.
Globalizing Financial Risk Governance: Systemic risk is beyond the level that firms can manage alone. Public-private sector cooperation is essential.
· Financialization of Strategic Stocks: The coordinated release mechanisms of strategic petroleum stocks by International Energy Agency (IEA) member countries should also be established for LNG and renewable energy components. · Next-Generation Stress Tests: Multinational companies and financial institutions should standardize dynamic and holistic scenario analyses (using models like Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium – DSGE) that model not just individual shocks, but “perfect storm” scenarios (simultaneous cyber-attack + geographic chokepoint closure + financial panic). · Supply Chain Finance Regulation: Making the complex financial instruments that fund global supply chains more transparent and subject to regulation will reduce the risk of financial contagion.
Conclusion: From the Geopolitics of Fragility to the Political Economy of Resilience
The overall analysis demonstrates that the current architecture of the global economy inherently generates instability. This architecture, while optimizing parameters like efficiency and profit maximization, has externalized vital values such as security, resilience, and sovereignty. The result is an “efficient but fragile” system.
Managing this fragility is not merely a technical issue but requires a profound political-economic transformation. The future global economic order will no longer be shaped solely around comparative advantages and the dogma of free trade, but around the concepts of “supply chain security,” “energy sovereignty,” and “systemic resilience.” In this new paradigm, the fundamental competitive advantage for states and companies will not be producing at the cheapest cost, but the ability to ensure operational continuity even amidst major shocks.
Ultimately, the sustainability of the global system depends on re-establishing the delicate balance between the fragility of hyper-efficiency and the cost of flexibility. Societies and economies that can look beyond the allure of cheapness and speed and agree to pay a premium for reliability and robustness will survive the turbulent period ahead. This is not merely a choice, but a survival strategy necessitated by history.
References
· BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2024 (and subsequent Energy Institute reports). · International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 2024, Oil Market Report monthly reports, The Future of Resilience in Energy Systems. · World Bank, Global Economic Prospects, Container Port Performance Index 2023. · UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport 2024, Global Trade Update. · IMF, Global Financial Stability Report: The Last Mile – Financial Vulnerabilities and Risks (October 2024). · OECD, Economic Outlook, Structural Resilience in Global Value Chains. · Lloyd’s List Intelligence, Chokepoints: The Threats to Global Trade. · RUSI (Royal United Services Institute), The Geopolitics of Chokepoints and Global Trade Corridors. · Bruegel Institute, The European Union’s Energy Security Architecture. · Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Geoeconomics and Supply Chain Resilience.
Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA) Aarhus University, 1997 Independent Researcher Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures
Within modern state structures, secret intelligence services are positioned as one of the invisible yet most critical elements of the security architecture. These bodies are not merely institutions that monitor military threats but also multi-layered organizations that influence information flow, perception processes, and strategic decision-making mechanisms. With globalization, the acceleration of information production has rendered the role of intelligence services more complex. These institutions are no longer seen solely as data collectors; they are now regarded as entities that also produce meaning and shape that meaning in line with strategic objectives. The concept of cultural hegemony comes into play precisely at this point: intelligence services, by targeting societies’ values, beliefs, and identity structures, can achieve long-term strategic gains through the manufacture of consent without resorting to direct military or economic coercion. Within this framework, cultural activities that appear innocent must in fact be read as reflections of a profound power struggle.
The Strategic Transformation of the Cultural Sphere
Historically, culture has been a fundamental sphere that determines the shared values and identity structures of societies. However, in the modern era, culture has simultaneously transformed into a domain of power. In this context, intelligence services can generate long-term strategic effects by interacting with the cultural sphere through means that are not immediately visible. The flow of information occurring through the media, academia, and digital platforms has become a significant instrument in shaping societal perception. It is here that Antonio Gramsci’s concept of “cultural hegemony” regains its meaning: it explains how ruling classes or states mobilize cultural institutions to establish domination based not only on coercion but also on consent. Intelligence organizations, as the covert architects of this hegemonic process, operate across a broad spectrum, from art funds and publishing houses to film studios and think tanks. Numerous examples throughout and after the Cold War reveal the extent of intelligence activities conducted under the veil of cultural innocence.
Information, Perception, and Strategic Steering
Intelligence activities are not limited to the process of gathering information; how this information is interpreted and presented is also of strategic importance. Today, information is treated not as a neutral reality but as a component of power relations. For this reason, perception management has become one of the most important tools of modern intelligence structures. How societies perceive events can directly affect the feasibility of international policies. Intelligence services can reconstruct reality itself through agents infiltrating news agencies, funding mechanisms targeting opinion leaders, and social media disinformation campaigns. The aim here is to ensure that the target audience adopts a particular event or policy “of its own will,” thus achieving the manufacture of consent without visible imposition. The functioning of cultural hegemony materializes precisely here, in the shaping of information by power.
Soft Power and Invisible Spheres of Influence
Competition among states is no longer conducted solely in military and economic spheres but also through elements of soft power. In this process, intelligence services can contribute to state policies without being directly visible, through indirect influence mechanisms. Cultural production, information sharing, and strategic communication processes constitute the fundamental instruments of this invisible influence. This situation points to a more complex structure that transcends the classical definition of power. Joseph Nye’s conceptualization of “soft power” describes the capacity to shape the preferences of others through cultural attraction and values. Intelligence services, through covert operations that often overlap with official soft power instruments or are concealed behind them, steer the intellectual climate, artistic tendencies, and academic agendas of target countries to serve their own strategic interests. This overlap blurs the boundaries between the “visible hand” and the “invisible hand” of states.
The Global System and the Security Paradox
The increasingly interconnected nature of the global system has transformed the concept of security into a more complex structure. A crisis occurring in one region can generate not only local but global effects. In this context, the role of intelligence services is not limited to national security but also possesses an indirect sphere of influence in preserving global stability. Yet, this situation simultaneously brings new debates in terms of transparency, legitimacy, and democratic oversight. The global dimension of cultural hegemony has led intelligence activities to assume a multilateral and multi-actor character. An intelligence service now targets not only the military secrets of rival states but also the mental maps of global public opinion. This expansion strains traditional understandings of sovereignty, creating a deep chasm between international law and intelligence practices.
Five Examples of Cultural Hegemony Practices by Intelligence Services
Below, five distinct cases are presented that concretize the methods by which secret intelligence services establish cultural hegemony, selected from different geographies and periods. The analysis focuses on the practices of Western and other regional actors.
The first example is the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) operation conducted by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during the Cold War. Operating between 1950 and 1967, the CCF was secretly financed by the CIA and organized art exhibitions, literary journals, music festivals, and intellectual conferences across the globe. The aim was to position Western modernist art and liberal thought as a “center of cultural attraction” against communist ideology. Prestigious publications such as Encounter, Preuves, and Der Monat were sustained by CIA funds, while the majority of writers and readers were unaware of this connection. This operation has gone down in history as one of the most striking examples of culture being transformed into a direct battlefield and of the manufacture of consent.
The second example is the activities carried out by the United Kingdom’s Secret Intelligence Service MI6 throughout the Cold War via the Information Research Department (IRD). The IRD, established within the Foreign Office but operating largely under intelligence direction, produced anti-communist propaganda texts, collaborated with journalists and academics, and funded cultural events. Successfully penetrating intellectual circles in Africa and Asia, particularly during the post-colonial period, the IRD used the global dominance of the English language as a cultural lever, shaping the intellectual climate of target countries through educational scholarships and book translation programs. Thus, London was able to sustain its cultural hegemony in former colonies without direct military intervention.
The third example involves covert cultural operations that go beyond the hasbara (public diplomacy) activities carried out by the Israeli intelligence service Mossad and the non-governmental organizations coordinated with it. Mossad has used front organizations, particularly on university campuses and within art circles and media institutions in Europe and North America, to strengthen Israel’s strategic narrative. The funding of certain film festivals, the support of alternative intellectual networks to counter academic boycott initiatives against Israel, and the encouragement of art projects that culturally marginalize the Palestinian issue can be evaluated within this scope. These activities demonstrate how military and political conflict is transferred to the cultural sphere to reconstruct the ground of international legitimacy.
The fourth example is the organic link forged by France’s external intelligence agency, the DGSE (Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure), with Francophonie institutions and cultural diplomacy networks. While France uses language, education, and culture as strategic instruments to preserve its influence in its former colonies in Africa, the DGSE has been the behind-the-scenes director of many civil organizations in this field. Through French Cultural Centers, scholarship programs, and co-produced cinema projects, attempts have been made to align the mental world of African political elites and opinion leaders with French values. In this way, even during periods when it reduced its military presence, Paris was able to maintain its economic and political privileges through cultural hegemony. The DGSE’s role in these operations, though officially denied, has been documented by numerous investigative journalists and historians.
The fifth example is the program known as Operation Mockingbird – the CIA’s media infiltration operation in the United States – and the practices that succeeded it. Beginning in the 1950s, this operation saw the CIA place agents in or put journalists on the payroll of hundreds of media organizations, including major newspapers, television channels, and news agencies. Through this network, the tone, content, and framing of news served to the American public and to the world at large could be directly determined in line with intelligence objectives. Mockingbird was not limited to Cold War propaganda; it also shaped cultural narratives in Third World countries. These interventions, ranging from script consultancy for Hollywood productions to the arrangement of stands at book fairs, demonstrate that the entire culture industry can be transformed into an apparatus of hegemony.
Conclusion
The position of secret intelligence services in the modern world has moved far beyond the classical understanding of security. These institutions are no longer merely structures that detect threats in advance; they are now regarded as strategic actors that influence the order of information, the architecture of perception, and cultural orientations. When considered within the framework of cultural hegemony, it becomes evident that this influence operates not only through coercive elements of power but also through the manufacture of consent and the construction of meaning. The five examples enumerated above – the CIA’s Congress for Cultural Freedom, the British Information Research Department, Mossad’s cultural network operations, the French DGSE’s instrumentalization of Francophonie, and the CIA’s media infiltration program Mockingbird – clearly illustrate this picture.
In this context, while representing the invisible hand of states, intelligence activities also play a critical role in the functioning of the global system. However, this role simultaneously raises significant ethical and political questions. The manipulation of information, the shaping of perception, and the use of the cultural sphere for strategic purposes exist in constant tension with the principles of transparency and accountability in democratic societies. The intelligence dimension of cultural hegemony keeps alive the possibility that many decisions citizens believe they have made of their “own free will” may actually be the product of systematic manipulation. This is a problem that deepens the internal contradictions of liberal democracies: states that champion transparency can simultaneously conduct the largest anti-transparency operations.
This structure is expected to become even more complex in the future. With the advancement of digitalization, artificial intelligence, and big data analytics, the scope of intelligence activities will expand further. The manipulation of social media algorithms, the use of deepfake technologies, and the possibilities of personalized propaganda will both lower the cost and increase the radius of cultural hegemony’s impact. This will enhance the security capacities of states while profoundly affecting the ways individuals access information. Moreover, the increasing blurring of boundaries between the private sector and intelligence services, the thorough commercialization of the cultural sphere, and the convergence of platform capitalism with new surveillance architectures point to a future where hegemony is constructed not only by states but in collaboration with multinational technology corporations.
In conclusion, the cultural and strategic influence of secret intelligence services will remain one of the most critical areas of debate in 21st-century international relations. For this debate to be conducted in a healthy manner, it is only possible through the emergence of more archival documents concerning states’ covert operations, the strengthening of independent investigative journalism, and the preservation of academic freedom. Understanding the intelligence dimension of cultural hegemony is the shared responsibility not only of international security studies but also of critical media literacy, political philosophy, and the sociology of communication.
Bibliography
Aydın, M. (2017). İstihbarat, Propaganda ve Kültür: Soğuk Savaş’tan Günümüze Algı Yönetimi. İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi.
Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the Prison Notebooks. New York: International Publishers.
Nye, J. S. (2004). Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: PublicAffairs.
Pells, R. (1997). Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II. New York: Basic Books.
Saunders, F. S. (1999). The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters. New York: The New Press.
Scott-Smith, G. (2008). The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Political Economy of American Hegemony 1945-1955. London: Routledge.
Shaw, T. (2006). British Propaganda and the Cold War: The Information Research Department, 1947-1977. London: I.B. Tauris.
Shpiro, S. (2006). “The Media Strategies of Intelligence Services”. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 19(3), 485-502.
Thomas, M. (2008). Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Wilford, H. (2008). The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA) Aarhus University, 1997 Independent Researcher Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures
Risk and opportunity being two sides of the same coin is perhaps the oldest truth of the investment world. This ancient wisdom makes the triad of risk assessment, market research, and position management indispensable in portfolio construction. The rationale behind simultaneously building deep positions in both cryptocurrency and stock markets lies beyond a mere intuitive impulse for diversification; it is a pursuit of exploiting complementary risk premiums and hedging against macroeconomic blind spots. However, when this ancient method of risk mitigation, namely hedging, begins to be sought not only between asset classes but also within the life cycle of a single asset, our mental models must be called into question. It is precisely at this juncture that a theory attributed to Warren Buffett’s finance classes, dividing cryptocurrency investment into two distinct phases, has been circulated.
According to this theory, the first phase is the “pre IPO internal sale” phase, likened to the initial public offering (IPO) of a stock. It is argued that this is the period when a new crypto asset, before being listed on an exchange, rapidly attracts investment to form a large capital pool, thus experiencing the steepest price increase. This narrative highlights the allure of early stage liquidity and the existential capital needs of projects, whispering to the investor that the real gains lie here. The second phase is the post IPO phase, encompassing assets listed on exchanges, including established ones like Bitcoin. The theory asserts that in this stage, large capitalists execute massive sell offs to realize their tens of times profits gained during the internal sale phase, directly leading to a rapid price decline and a subsequent prolonged period of stabilization.
According to the narrative, most crypto assets in the post IPO phase fall victim to a kind of “frenzied fundraising” period; when combined with the exit strategy of early investors, this closes the window of opportunity for new investors. Therefore, the theory prescribes avoiding investment in post IPO crypto assets as a long term, sustainable investment strategy. This approach is presented not merely as a market timing strategy but as a philosophy of risk aversion, as the asymmetric return potential in the early phase is deemed far more attractive compared to the structural disadvantages of the later phase. Yet, what matters here is as much the method itself as the figure of authority invoked to legitimize it: Warren Buffett.
However, the claim that this theory belongs to Warren Buffett stands in stark opposition to Buffett’s own investment philosophy, crystallized over decades, and his public statements on cryptocurrencies. Buffett has repeatedly described cryptocurrencies as “rat poison squared,” “a mirage that produces nothing,” and “a bad ending”; he has never addressed an internal sale phase or a post IPO stabilization period as a technical framework. Thus, the “two phase model” under examination is, in fact, a myth of uncertain origin packaged under Buffett’s name, attempting to explain the unique dynamics of the crypto market. Approaching this model with academic depth and a visionary perspective, it is necessary to lay bare both its surface level appeal and its structural weaknesses, revealing what is missing and unheard.
The Ontology of the Two Phase Model: The Allure and Fragility of the Pre IPO Internal Sale
Although the pre IPO internal sale phase bears parallels to early stage venture capital in traditional finance, it takes a far more radical form within the crypto ecosystem, shaped by regulatory vacuums and asymmetric information environments. In this phase, projects use the funds raised under the promise of decentralization as liquidity pools; investors, meanwhile, commit capital at a stage where the project has yet to achieve product market fit and often exists as nothing more than a whitepaper. The model’s strongest aspect is making visible the psychological and financial reality of this stage: the urgent need for early liquidity creates upward pressure on price, and this pressure is fed by a narrative pump that lasts until the listing moment. Indeed, in projects with adequate due diligence and network effect potential, astronomical returns for participants in this phase have been empirically observed. The model succeeds in identifying the risk of late stage capital, which might be labeled “dumb money.”
However, the model’s portrayal of this phase solely as the period of the fastest price increase entirely ignores survivorship bias. A vast majority of projects participating in the pre IPO phase never even reach the listing stage; they silently vanish due to technical inadequacy, internal team conflicts, fraud, or regulatory threats. While emphasizing the asymmetric returns that make this phase attractive, the model fails to sufficiently underscore the risk of the same asymmetry resulting in a total wipeout. Consequently, categorically declaring the internal sale phase as the best window of opportunity is only possible within a narrative economy that erases the stories of the losers. Moreover, since participation in internal sales is often contingent upon privileged circles, staking mechanisms on launchpads, or high capital thresholds, the strategy proposed by the model can be structurally inaccessible to the retail investor. This renders the model a semi deterministic narrative describing market dynamics rather than a functional investment guide.
The Reductionist Reading of the Post IPO Phase and the Missed Layers of Value
The model codes the post IPO period as a trap, characterized by major capitalists’ profit realization, and a phase to be avoided. This perspective undoubtedly captures a recurring pattern in the market: the supply shock created by the unlocking of early investors’ tokens and the deflation of the speculative bubble. Yet this reduction ignores the full complexity of market maturation and the price discovery process. Above all, the value accumulation generated over years by assets like Bitcoin and Ethereum in the post IPO phase empirically refutes the thesis of a “period to be avoided.” The selling pressure from capitalists creates a temporary supply demand imbalance; however, if the project’s core value proposition, network effects, and adoption curve are robust, the market navigates past this phase to establish a new equilibrium level. The model completely misses this rebalancing process and the potential for long term compound returns.
Secondly, the post IPO phase is a period when institutional investors and regulatory frameworks enter the scene, transparency increases, and information asymmetry diminishes. Unlike the internal sale phase, the project’s technical roadmap, community governance, and financial reporting are more auditable here. The model’s wholesale dismissal of this phase as a desert where “the best opportunity has been missed” sets a cognitive trap by discouraging the investor from conducting in depth fundamental analysis. Furthermore, in the post IPO phase, risk management and yield optimization tools become available such as options strategies, staking yields, and liquidity mining which are only possible in mature markets. These tools pave the way for multi layered strategies based not just on price appreciation but on time value and volatility. By ignoring these layers, the model reduces crypto asset investment to a one dimensional buy and sell window.
The Positive Aspects of the Theory: Intuitive Insight into Liquidity Architecture and Psychological Timing
Despite all criticisms, the attributed two phase theory is valuable for popularizing certain observations about the functioning of cryptocurrency markets, thereby raising awareness. First and foremost, by framing the listing process of a new crypto asset as a liquidity event, the model cultivates the habit of monitoring the direction of fund flows among market participants. The dynamic between the capital raising pressure in the internal sale phase and the realization pressure post IPO points to a micro scale “smart money dumb money” distinction. Although oversimplified, this distinction offers a useful mental model for an investor just learning about market microstructure.
Furthermore, the theory indirectly illuminates the behavioral finance dimension of speculative bubbles. The rapid price increase in the internal sale phase creates a “fear of missing out” (FOMO) among investors, while the post IPO decline and stabilization period triggers a tendency for “regret avoidance.” By intuitively capturing this emotional transition between the two phases, the model can help investors recognize their own emotional cycles. More importantly, the theory makes visible a critical question every investor must ask themselves: “Whose liquidity am I providing in this market?” This question forms the basis of risk management and builds a healthy skepticism toward position management. Therefore, the positive contribution of the theory lies not in presenting a correct investment strategy, but in dramatizing wrong strategies to warn the investor.
Critical Deepening: The Fallacy of Attribution to Authority and the Collapse of the Intellectual Foundation
The theory’s greatest and most difficult to repair damage stems from its grounding in a figure like Warren Buffett, the living legend of value investing. When Buffett’s words on cryptocurrencies are examined, his epistemological objection to this asset class is clear: cryptocurrencies are not productive assets, they generate no cash flow, and their value rests solely on the expectation that a next buyer will pay a higher price. To assume that a thinker with such a radical rejection would systematize crypto investment with a two phase strategy is an intellectual anachronism. This misattribution builds the model’s credibility on the appeal to authority fallacy (argumentum ad verecundiam), while actually striking it at its most vulnerable point: a lack of empirical and philosophical coherence.
At this point, the most vital need the model leaves unaddressed becomes apparent: to make such a deterministic staging of any asset’s life cycle, a robust theoretical framework for its valuation is imperative. In traditional stock analysis, the pre IPO and post IPO distinction is supported by concrete metrics such as discounted cash flows, P/E ratios, and sectoral growth dynamics. Yet for crypto assets, such a universally accepted valuation methodology does not yet exist. The two phase model ignores this massive void, focusing solely on the momentum of price movement; that is, it attempts to derive an investment philosophy purely from price action without a value framework. However, Buffett’s true teaching rests precisely on this distinction between “price” and “value.” The theory, in trying to leverage Buffett, violates his most fundamental principle.
Analytical Breakdown of Strengths, Weaknesses, Missing Elements, and Unheard Dimensions
The strengths of the model lie in offering an intuitive narrative of market microstructure, making early and late stage liquidity dynamics visible, and functioning as a warning system to deter investors from blindly jumping into every listed asset. It can also enhance market literacy by prompting scrutiny of the incentive mechanisms of project founders and venture capitalists. Yet its weaknesses are severe: it systematically reflects survivorship bias, ignores post IPO value creation and the maturation process, fails to discuss the asymmetry of accessibility, and, most importantly, undermines its own credibility by grounding itself in a false authority. It falls into a circular logic trap that turns price movement into an investment thesis.
Among the missing elements, foremost is how regulatory developments can radically alter the transition between the two phases. For instance, the internal sale process of a token classified as a security in a jurisdiction takes on an entirely different character due to legal risks. Similarly, the treasury management of decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) and the ability to program liquidity on chain complicate the “major capitalist sell off” pattern the model assumes. The most significant shortcoming is that the model treats investor psychology as an individual decision making process, but fails to account for how social media, the influencer economy, and coordinated community actions manipulate the transition between phases. The unheard need is precisely here: the necessity of grasping a crypto asset’s life cycle through a multi factorial, dynamic, and continuity based model that combines on chain data analytics, social sentiment analysis, and macro liquidity indicators, rather than through rigid phases.
Visionary Outlook and the Need for Reframing
The growing pains of cryptocurrency markets demand an epistemology that moves beyond building investment strategies solely on timing phases. The visionary investment approach of the future must set aside dichotomies like pre IPO and post IPO and instead conceptualize each asset as a “protocol economy.” The determining factors here are the genuine economic value the protocol generates (transaction fees, security budget, sustainability of staking yields), the resilience of governance mechanisms, and the quality of community participation. In such a framework, the internal sale phase transforms into merely a funding method, and the post IPO phase becomes the market’s testing of that funding method. The critical question for the investor should not be “Which phase am I in?” but rather “At what stage of this protocol’s value creation process am I positioned, and with which incentives am I aligned?”
Moreover, the advantage provided by taking simultaneous positions across multiple markets lies precisely in offering the ability to transcend such reductionist phase models. When the cash flow and dividend focused valuation discipline of the stock market is combined with the adoption curve and network value focused valuation intuition of the crypto market, the investor learns to price two different risk factors simultaneously. This synthesis is not a strategy confined to either the internal sale phase or the post IPO phase; instead, it is the art of layered position management that reads global liquidity cycles, the diffusion speed of technological innovations, and regulatory arbitrage opportunities. The attributed Buffett theory is valuable as a starting point, even as a counter example, in the journey of learning this art; but when taken as a guide, it turns into a wall that severs the investor from the market’s most fertile hunting grounds.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The two phase model examined is a narrative that intuitively describes the speculative rhythm of the cryptocurrency market, yet reveals serious cracks when transformed into an investment doctrine. The model’s greatest weakness is its claim to be grounded in Warren Buffett’s value oriented, productive asset philosophy, which is an intellectual contradiction. Its positive aspects are raising awareness of liquidity dynamics and pushing the investor to question “whose exit liquidity they are providing”; its negative aspects are overlooking the return opportunities of the maturation period, regulatory transformation, and the need for fundamental valuation by reducing the market to two crude phases. The most significant deficiency is the absence of a holistic decision support system that integrates on chain metrics, social sentiment analysis, and macro liquidity conditions into a single framework.
Recommendations for investors, framed by this analysis, can be listed as follows:
Adopt an analysis discipline that evaluates any crypto asset not solely based on its listing phase, but on fundamental factors such as the genuine economic value the protocol generates, developer activity, and degree of decentralization.
Limit participation in the internal sale phase to projects with a clear legal framework, transparent lock up periods and token distribution, and strong community commitment; manage this phase as a high risk venture capital position within a small slice of the portfolio, rather than a “get rich quick” scheme.
View price declines in the post IPO phase as strategic accumulation opportunities in projects with a solid core value proposition; however, ensure you monitor the unlock schedule of early investors and the dilution effect on circulating supply.
Leverage your multi market position advantage by examining the correlations between sector rotation in the stock market and adoption cycles in the crypto market; use the cash flow between the two markets as a risk barometer.
Integrate metrics obtained from on chain data platforms (Glassnode, Dune Analytics, etc.) into your own investment process; adopt indicators such as whale movements, exchange inflows and outflows, and staking participation rate as an objective ground to replace phase narratives.
Bibliography
Buffett, W. E. (2018). Berkshire Hathaway 2017 Annual Shareholder Letter. Berkshire Hathaway Inc.
Buffett, W. E. (2022). Transcript of the 2022 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Shareholders Meeting. CNBC Archives.
Catalini, C., & Gans, J. S. (2018). “Initial Coin Offerings and the Value of Crypto Tokens”. MIT Sloan Research Paper, No. 5347-18.
Fisch, C. (2019). “Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) to Finance New Ventures”. Journal of Business Venturing, 34(1), 1-22.
Graham, B., & Dodd, D. L. (2008). Security Analysis (6th Edition). McGraw-Hill.
Howell, S. T., Niessner, M., & Yermack, D. (2020). “Initial Coin Offerings: Financing Growth with Cryptocurrency Token Sales”. The Review of Financial Studies, 33(9), 3925-3974.
Malkiel, B. G. (2019). A Random Walk Down Wall Street (12th Edition). W. W. Norton & Company.
Nakamoto, S. (2008). “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System”. Bitcoin.org.
Shiller, R. J. (2015). Irrational Exuberance (3rd Edition). Princeton University Press.
Taleb, N. N. (2018). Skin in the Game: Hidden Asymmetries in Daily Life. Random House.
Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA) Aarhus University, 1997 Independent Researcher Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures
History engraves certain moments into the memory of nations with indelible letters. On the morning of 19 May 1919, the Bandırma Ferry gliding through the misty waters of the Black Sea and docking at Samsun is one of those unique moments in which the destiny of the Turkish nation was redrawn. Mustafa Kemal Pasha recorded this historic moment in the Nutuk with the words, “On the 19th day of May 1919, I landed in Samsun. The situation and the general outlook…” (Atatürk, 1927, p. 1). This sentence marks not only the arrival point of a journey but also the beginning of a nation’s awakening. The Armistice of Mudros, signed after the First World War, brought the Ottoman Empire to a de facto end; the Allied Powers, invoking Article 7 of the armistice, began to occupy Anatolian territory. Faced with the capitulationist policies of the Istanbul Government and the impotence of the sultanate, the Turkish nation was driven into the most critical existential struggle of its history. Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s crossing into Anatolia in his capacity as Inspector of the Ninth Army Troops is recorded as the first strategic step of that struggle.
The Amasya Circular is the most critical stop on this journey. Issued on 22 June 1919 under the signatures of leading commanders of the period such as Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Hüseyin Rauf Bey, Ali Fuat Pasha, and Kâzım Karabekir Pasha, this document is a manifesto setting forth the justification, aim, and method of the National Struggle. In his work İstiklâl Harbimiz (Our War of Independence), Kâzım Karabekir Pasha described this process as “the first fundamental programme of the National Struggle” and drew attention to the importance of the consensus reached during its preparation (Karabekir, 1960, pp. 112-115). Likewise, in his Milli Mücadele Hatıraları (Memoirs of the National Struggle), Ali Fuat Cebesoy provides a detailed account of the Amasya meetings and the signing process of the circular, stressing that the document was the first concrete expression of the national will (Cebesoy, 1953, p. 89). The statement at the heart of the circular—“The nation’s independence will be saved again by the nation’s determination and resolve”—is engraved in history as the first tangible document of the transfer of sovereignty from the dynasty to the nation.
The torch of independence lit on 19 May acquired a political course in Amasya, matured in Erzurum and Sivas, and was finally crowned with the proclamation of the Republic on 29 October 1923. In his work Çankaya, Falih Rıfkı Atay summed up this great transformation with the words “His biography is the history of the new Turkish state” and traced the rebirth of a nation in Atatürk’s personality (Atay, 1969, p. 5). Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, in Atatürk İhtilâli (The Atatürk Revolution), defined this process as a “revolution of rights” and laid bare the philosophical foundations of the Turkish revolution (Bozkurt, 1967, p. 23). Şevket Süreyya Aydemir’s Tek Adam (The Single Man) trilogy offers a panoramic picture of this transformation by examining Atatürk’s life from birth to death in exhaustive detail within the social and political context of the era (Aydemir, 1963, Vol. I, pp. 12-15). Today, the question of how to preserve this legacy and pass it on to future generations remains as pressing as ever. The consciousness of “the first duty” that Atatürk expressed in his Address to the Youth makes it imperative that each of the principles of the Six Arrows be reinterpreted and kept alive in accordance with the requirements of the age. The Turkish nation continues its resolve to preserve its independence and its Republic in perpetuity by holding fast to its founding values and continuously developing them.
The Armistice of Mudros and the Occupation of Anatolia
1.1. The Legal and Political Character of the Armistice
The armistice signed on 30 October 1918 at the port of Mudros on the island of Lemnos meant far more for the Ottoman Empire than a mere ceasefire agreement. In his Siyasi Hatıralar (Political Memoirs), Rauf Orbay, who headed the Ottoman delegation that signed the armistice, recounted his experiences in detail and noted that the vague wording of Article 7 in particular gave the Allied Powers unlimited authority to occupy (Orbay, 1962, pp. 78-80). Contrary to the verbal assurances given by the British High Commissioner Admiral Calthorpe, immediately after the armistice the British occupied Mosul, Alexandretta, and Aintab; the French occupied Adana and its environs; and the Italians occupied Antalya and Konya. The provisions mandating the demobilization of the Ottoman armies aimed to destroy the armed resistance capacity of the Turkish nation. In her work Türk’ün Ateşle İmtihanı (The Turkish Ordeal), Halide Edip Adıvar depicted the post-armistice atmosphere in Istanbul as “a life growing ever more difficult with each passing day for the Turks” (Adıvar, 1962, p. 15).
The passive stance adopted by the Istanbul Government towards the occupations during the armistice period reflected the psychology of collapse that had seized the Ottoman bureaucracy and political elite. Far from preventing the occupations, the governments of Damat Ferit Pasha sought to preserve the survival of the sultanate by yielding to the demands of the Allied Powers. In his Atatürk’ten Hatıralar (Memories of Atatürk), Celal Bayar described this period as “the moment when the fate of the nation and the fate of the sultanate diverged” (Bayar, 1955, p. 34). In contrast, the Turkish nation began spontaneously to develop a spirit of resistance; in Western Anatolia, Kuva-yı Milliye (National Forces) units began organizing and engaging in armed struggle against the Greek occupation.
The political and legal vacuum created by the Armistice of Mudros laid the groundwork for the emergence of a new conception of legitimacy based on national sovereignty. The occupying forces interpreted the terms of the armistice ever more arbitrarily, accelerating the dismemberment of Anatolia. In his Hatıralar (Memoirs), İsmet İnönü assessed this process as “a turning point at which the nation was forced to take its destiny into its own hands” (İnönü, 1985, p. 178). Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s crossing into Anatolia is of historic significance in that it filled the leadership vacuum that would transform this awakening into an organized struggle.
1.2. The Occupation of İzmir and the Ignition of National Resistance
The landing of the Greek army in İzmir on the morning of 15 May 1919 was engraved in the memory of the Turkish nation as the heaviest blow of the wave of occupations that had begun after the Armistice of Mudros. Realized in line with a decision taken at the Paris Peace Conference, this occupation openly revealed the Allied Powers’ intentions to partition Turkish territory. Halide Edip Adıvar recounted in detail the speech she delivered at the Sultanahmet rally in Türk’ün Ateşle İmtihanı and characterized the profound outrage that the occupation of İzmir provoked in the Turkish nation as “the rising up of an entire nation” (Adıvar, 1962, pp. 45-48). Falih Rıfkı Atay likewise defined the occupation of İzmir in Çankaya as “the event that lit the fuse of the national awakening” (Atay, 1969, p. 178).
The protest rallies organized in Istanbul and many Anatolian cities following the occupation of İzmir are noteworthy in demonstrating the Turkish nation’s sensitivity to the question of independence. The large-scale protests held in Istanbul, most notably the Sultanahmet rally, revealed the scale of the social reaction provoked by the occupation. In his Milli Mücadele Hatıraları, Ali Fuat Cebesoy described in detail the organization of the Kuva-yı Milliye units in Western Anatolia and emphasized the strategic importance of the guerrilla warfare waged against the Greek occupation forces by armed groups formed with the people’s own resources (Cebesoy, 1953, pp. 112-120).
The occupation of İzmir was also a factor that accelerated Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s crossing into Anatolia. Immediately after the occupation, on 16 May 1919, Mustafa Kemal Pasha departed Istanbul aboard the Bandırma Ferry and, after a stormy three-day sea voyage, arrived in Samsun on the morning of 19 May. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir treated the details of this voyage in Tek Adam under the heading “the sea voyage that changed the destiny of a nation” and related, on the basis of documents, how the Bandırma Ferry escaped the pursuit of the British navy in the Black Sea (Aydemir, 1963, Vol. I, pp. 345-350). The events that transpired during those four days between the occupation of İzmir and the landing at Samsun clearly reveal the Turkish nation’s determination in its struggle for independence and the need for a leader to guide that struggle.
1.3. The Impotence of the Istanbul Government and the Emergence of a New Authority in Anatolia
The Istanbul Government led by Damat Ferit Pasha proved completely incapable of developing an effective policy against the occupations that began after the Armistice of Mudros. The government merely contented itself with protesting the occupations and could not go beyond diplomatic initiatives undertaken with the Allied Powers. In his Siyasi Hatıralar, Rauf Orbay criticized the political atmosphere in Istanbul with the words, “the sole concern of the palace and the government was to hold on to their positions; no one cared about the fate of the nation” (Orbay, 1962, p. 95). The sultanate, for its part, chose to collaborate with the occupying forces in order to survive and sought to obstruct the national resistance movement that was developing in Anatolia. This posture paved the way for the gradual erosion of the Istanbul Government’s legitimacy and the birth of a new political authority in Anatolia.
Finding no support from Istanbul against the occupations, the Turkish nation began to take steps to determine its own destiny. The Societies for the Defence of Rights (Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyetleri) and Rejection of Annexation associations established in various regions of Anatolia played a critical role in organizing the national resistance. In İstiklâl Harbimiz, Kâzım Karabekir Pasha detailed the organizational activities in Eastern Anatolia and recounted how the Society for the Defence of the Rights of the Eastern Provinces prepared the ground for the Erzurum Congress (Karabekir, 1960, pp. 45-52). Mazhar Müfit Kansu, in his work Erzurum’dan Ölümüne Kadar Atatürk’le Beraber (With Atatürk from Erzurum until His Death), conveyed, from his close personal witness, the behind-the-scenes story of the national organization in Eastern Anatolia and Atatürk’s role in that process (Kansu, 1966, Vol. I, pp. 34-38).
Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s crossing into Anatolia proved decisive in providing the leadership that would unite these scattered foci of resistance. Endowed with broad authority in his capacity as Inspector of the Ninth Army Troops, Mustafa Kemal Pasha used these powers in the service of organizing the national struggle. In the reports he drafted after landing in Samsun, he emphasized the Turkish nation’s will for independence and openly criticized the policies of the Istanbul Government. These reports stand out as the first documents in which the ideological foundations of the national struggle were laid. In the Nutuk, Atatürk referred to these reports with the words, “With these reports I established the true situation of the nation and my thoughts regarding the future” (Atatürk, 1927, p. 12).
19 May 1919: The Sun Rising from Samsun
2.1. Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s Appointment to Anatolia
Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s appointment to Anatolia as Inspector of the Ninth Army Troops ostensibly carried administrative purposes, such as investigating the security disturbances in the Black Sea region and ensuring the collection of weapons. In reality, however, this assignment was the result of a strategic move that Mustafa Kemal Pasha had planned together with his close circle. In his Hatıralar, İsmet İnönü recounted the behind-the-scenes story of this appointment with the words, “Mustafa Kemal Pasha had realized that as long as he remained in Istanbul nothing could be accomplished. He was seizing every opportunity to cross into Anatolia” (İnönü, 1985, p. 190). The broad authority granted to him in the letter of appointment would play a critical role in the organization of the national struggle in the period that followed.
Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s preparations for crossing into Anatolia were carried out in such a way as not to attract the attention of the Allied diplomatic missions in Istanbul. In Çankaya, Falih Rıfkı Atay recounted these preparations: “When Mustafa Kemal left Istanbul, he had selected the officers he took with him with great care. Each of them was to become an important figure in the national struggle in the future” (Atay, 1969, p. 195). While the voyage preparations of the Bandırma Ferry were being completed, British intelligence plans to sink the ferry in the Black Sea came to nothing. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir described the Bandırma Ferry’s journey as “the sea voyage that changed the destiny of a nation” and recorded in detail how the ferry passed through British controls (Aydemir, 1963, Vol. I, p. 352).
As stressed in the Nutuk, Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s landing at Samsun is the starting point of the nation’s struggle for independence. In the Nutuk, Atatürk conveyed this historic moment as follows: “On the 19th day of May 1919, I landed in Samsun. The situation and the general outlook: the group in which the Ottoman Empire found itself had been defeated in the Great War, the Ottoman army had been battered on all fronts, a harsh armistice had been signed” (Atatürk, 1927, p. 1). These sentences are not merely a situational assessment but also a concise summary of the historical context on which the national struggle rested. From the moment he set foot in Anatolia, Mustafa Kemal Pasha embarked on an intensive effort to organize the nation’s will for independence.
2.2. Initial Contacts in Samsun and Assessment of the Situation
Immediately after landing in Samsun, Mustafa Kemal Pasha contacted the military and civil authorities in the region and conducted a comprehensive situation assessment. During his first days in Samsun, he investigated the nature of the security incidents and gathered intelligence on the activities of the Allied Powers along the Black Sea coast. In the Nutuk, Atatürk summarized these contacts: “The situation I observed in Samsun was just as I had thought and foreseen. The British had established dominance everywhere; although the Greeks and Armenians were minorities, they were committing excesses against the Turks” (Atatürk, 1927, p. 5). In the reports he sent to the Istanbul Government, Mustafa Kemal Pasha drew attention to this state of affairs and stressed that the necessary measures must be taken to preserve the Turkish presence in the region.
Following his contacts in Samsun, Mustafa Kemal Pasha moved his headquarters to Havza on 25 May. Havza was a suitable centre for organizing the national struggle, both in terms of its geographical location and communication possibilities. Ali Fuat Cebesoy related Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s activities in Havza in his Milli Mücadele Hatıraları as follows: “Mustafa Kemal Pasha had virtually established a headquarters in Havza; by communicating by telegraph with commanders across the length and breadth of Anatolia, he had begun organizing the resistance” (Cebesoy, 1953, p. 145). Through the circular he issued in Havza, he called for the organization of protest meetings against the occupations, a call that found a resounding echo throughout Anatolia.
Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s activities in Samsun and Havza began to attract the attention of the Istanbul Government and the Allied Powers. The British High Commissioner Admiral Calthorpe was disturbed by Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s activities in the region and approached the Istanbul Government to demand his recall. Indeed, as a result of British pressure, the Ministry of War sent Mustafa Kemal Pasha an order to return; however, Mustafa Kemal Pasha disregarded this directive and continued on his path. Kâzım Karabekir assessed this critical decision with the words, “Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s refusal to return is one of the most important moments that determined the fate of the National Struggle” (Karabekir, 1960, p. 89).
2.3. The Symbolic and Strategic Meaning of 19 May
19 May 1919 is not merely the date of Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s crossing into Anatolia; it is also the symbolic beginning of the Turkish nation’s rebirth. This date is etched in memories as the day on which the nation’s will to determine its own destiny took concrete form. In his Atatürk’ten Hatıralar, Celal Bayar used the expression, “19 May is the milestone of the Turkish nation’s emergence from darkness into light” (Bayar, 1955, p. 56). From the moment he set foot in Samsun, Mustafa Kemal Pasha demonstrated that the national struggle would not be merely a military process but also a political one. His first activities in Anatolia were shaped as part of a systematic plan aimed at organizing the national resistance.
The strategic significance of 19 May lies in the fact that the organizational activities Mustafa Kemal Pasha launched on that date quickly spread across the whole of Anatolia. The process extending from Samsun to Havza and from Havza to Amasya is a preparatory period in which the institutional foundations of the national struggle were laid. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir assessed this process with the words, “As soon as he set foot in Anatolia, Mustafa Kemal grasped that the national struggle had to be not merely a military movement but an all-out national war of liberation, and he pursued a strategy accordingly” (Aydemir, 1963, Vol. II, p. 12). Through the circulars he issued and the meetings he held during this period, Mustafa Kemal Pasha delineated the ideological framework of the national resistance and clarified the objectives of the struggle.
That 19 May is today celebrated as the Commemoration of Atatürk, Youth and Sports Day reflects the symbolic meaning carried by this date. In his Address to the Youth, Atatürk entrusted the guardianship of the struggle for independence that began on 19 May to the younger generations with the words, “O Turkish youth! Your first duty is to preserve and defend the Turkish independence and the Turkish Republic forever.” This trust ensures the continuity of the Turkish nation’s journey of independence and modernization. Falih Rıfkı Atay stressed the importance of 19 May with the sentence, “This date is not merely a memory; it is the anniversary of the Turkish nation’s rebirth each year” (Atay, 1969, p. 200). 19 May is not a date that remains solely in the past; it is a milestone that is remembered anew every year and that casts light on the future.
The Amasya Circular: The Theoretical Foundations of National Sovereignty
3.1. The Preparation and Signing Process of the Circular
Following his contacts in Havza, Mustafa Kemal Pasha moved to Amasya on 12 June 1919 and there began preparations for the circular that would set the roadmap for the national struggle. During his stay in Amasya, Mustafa Kemal Pasha maintained an intensive communication traffic with the commanders in Anatolia and developed the idea of convening a national congress. Ali Fuat Cebesoy described the Amasya meetings with the words, “Mustafa Kemal Pasha had virtually established a revolutionary headquarters in Amasya. He worked day and night, remaining in contact by telegraph with commanders all across Anatolia” (Cebesoy, 1953, p. 167). The idea of national sovereignty that Mustafa Kemal Pasha had cherished since his time in Istanbul was decisive in the drafting of the circular. This idea crystallized into a clear political programme as a result of the talks he held in Istanbul during the armistice period and his observations in Anatolia.
The Amasya Circular was issued on 22 June 1919 under the signatures of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, 20th Corps Commander Ali Fuat Pasha, former Minister of the Navy Hüseyin Rauf Bey, and 15th Corps Commander Kâzım Karabekir Pasha. Before the circular was signed, Mustafa Kemal Pasha telegraphed the text to the other commanders in Anatolia and secured their approval as well. In İstiklâl Harbimiz, Kâzım Karabekir recounted this approval process: “Mustafa Kemal Pasha communicated the text of the circular to me by telegraph. I approved it without the slightest hesitation, because this text reflected the shared thoughts of all of us” (Karabekir, 1960, p. 112). This process is significant in that it shows the military and civilian wings of the national struggle uniting around the same objective.
Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s leadership and vision were decisive in the preparation of the circular. Mazhar Müfit Kansu depicted the work carried out in Amasya with the words, “Mustafa Kemal Pasha was virtually writing history in Amasya. He meticulously scrutinized every sentence of the circular, carefully selecting each word” (Kansu, 1966, Vol. I, p. 112). In the fragmented and hopeless atmosphere of the armistice period, Mustafa Kemal Pasha succeeded in setting forth a political programme capable of mobilizing the nation’s will for independence. The Amasya Circular is a document that reveals, beyond Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s military genius, his political foresight and his quality as a statesman.
3.2. The Basic Provisions of the Circular and a Political Analysis
The Amasya Circular is in essence a political manifesto containing four fundamental provisions. The most critical provision of the circular is the section beginning with the finding that “The integrity of the homeland and the independence of the nation are in danger” and concluding with the statement, “The nation’s independence will be saved again by the nation’s determination and resolve.” This statement carries a revolutionary character that proclaims the source of sovereignty to be the nation. In Atatürk İhtilâli, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt described this provision as “the Magna Carta of the Turkish revolution” and stressed that the principle of national sovereignty was expressed so openly for the first time (Bozkurt, 1967, p. 78). Against the idea, embedded in the six-century tradition of the Ottoman sultanate, that sovereignty belonged to the dynasty, this provision stressed the supremacy of the national will and formed the cornerstone of the path leading to the proclamation of the Republic.
The second important provision of the circular is the finding that the Istanbul Government was not fulfilling the responsibility incumbent upon it. This finding implies a questioning of the Istanbul Government’s legitimacy and constitutes the justification for organizing the national struggle as a separate political authority. Rauf Orbay assessed this situation of the Istanbul Government in his Siyasi Hatıralar with the words, “The government in Istanbul no longer represented the nation. It had degenerated into a body of civil servants that merely carried out the orders of the occupying forces” (Orbay, 1962, p. 145). The third provision of the circular envisaged the convening of a national congress in Sivas. This congress was designed as the highest body in which the national will would be represented.
The fourth provision of the circular concerns the determination of the delegates who would attend the congress and the electoral process. Accordingly, three delegates who had won the trust of the people were to be elected from each province and sent to Sivas. This provision is of great importance in that it grounded the national struggle on a popular base and gave it a representative character. İsmet İnönü described these provisions of the Amasya Circular as “the first constitutional expression of the idea of national sovereignty” (İnönü, 1985, p. 210). These provisions of the Amasya Circular constitute a fundamental document that inaugurated the revolutionary phase of the Turkish revolution and placed the principle of national sovereignty at the heart of Turkish political life.
3.3. The Historical Consequences and Legacy of the Amasya Circular
Following its issuance, the Amasya Circular resonated across the length and breadth of Anatolia and accelerated the organizational process of the national struggle. Under the influence of the circular, the Societies for the Defence of Rights sprang into action and the election of delegates for the Sivas Congress began. Kâzım Karabekir expressed the circular’s impact in Eastern Anatolia with the words, “The Amasya Circular was received with great enthusiasm in Erzurum. The nation had at last found a leader and a programme to guide it” (Karabekir, 1960, p. 125). Disturbed by this impact, the Istanbul Government moved to have Mustafa Kemal Pasha dismissed from his post, yet these initiatives failed to block the path of the national struggle.
The most important historical consequence of the circular was that it laid the groundwork for the convening of the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses. The decisions taken at the Erzurum Congress gave concrete form to the objectives of national sovereignty and full independence expressed in the Amasya Circular. Mazhar Müfit Kansu, in Erzurum’dan Ölümüne Kadar Atatürk’le Beraber, recounted the preparations for the Erzurum Congress and Atatürk’s role in this process through the daily notes he kept (Kansu, 1966, Vol. I, pp. 145-180). The Sivas Congress, in turn, enabled the national struggle to evolve into a political organization encompassing the whole of Anatolia. This chain of congresses eventually paved the way for the proclamation of the National Pact (Misak-ı Millî) and the opening of the Turkish Grand National Assembly.
The legacy of the Amasya Circular today is the central position that the principle of national sovereignty occupies in Turkish political life. The provision expressed in the circular that “the nation’s independence will be saved again by the nation’s determination and resolve” constitutes the essence of the founding philosophy of the Republic of Turkey. This understanding has served as the bedrock of Turkish democracy from the proclamation of the Republic to the present day. Mahmut Esat Bozkurt assessed this legacy of the Amasya Circular with the words, “The Atatürk revolution laid its intellectual foundations with the Amasya Circular; the Republic that rose upon these foundations has become the eternal work of the Turkish nation” (Bozkurt, 1967, p. 95). Although more than a century has passed since the circular was issued, the principles it contains continue to retain their relevance and their guiding quality.
The Six Arrows: The Founding Philosophy of the Republic of Turkey
4.1. The Birth of the Six Arrows: The 1931 RPP Congress and the 1937 Constitutional Amendment
The Six Arrows acquired official status when they were incorporated into the party programme at the Third Grand Congress of the Republican People’s Party (CHF) held between 10 and 18 May 1931. To the four principles that had been set forth at the 1927 Congress—republicanism, populism, secularism, and nationalism—the principles of statism and revolutionism were added at the 1931 Congress, thereby achieving a synthesis of six fundamental principles. In his Atatürk’ten Hatıralar, Celal Bayar recounted this process with the words, “Atatürk had developed the six principles as a programme born of the Turkish nation’s needs. Each principle had been conceived to offer a solution to the nation’s problems of the day” (Bayar, 1955, p. 89). Mustafa Kemal Atatürk regarded these principles as the compass of the Turkish nation’s modernization journey and took care that each principle formed a harmonious whole with the others.
The Six Arrows acquired constitutional status through the amendment made to Article 2 of the 1924 Constitution on 5 February 1937. With this amendment, the provision that the Turkish State was “republican, nationalist, populist, statist, secular, and revolutionist” was added to the Constitution. Thus, the Six Arrows ceased to be merely elements of a party programme and became the fundamental characteristics of the state. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir assessed this constitutional amendment as “the completion of the legal framework of the Turkish revolution” and noted that the incorporation of the Six Arrows into the Constitution formally certified the ideological identity of the Republic of Turkey (Aydemir, 1965, Vol. III, p. 345). The entry of the Six Arrows into the Constitution also meant the recording, for the first time, of the principle of secularism as a constitutional provision.
The formation process of the Six Arrows should be assessed as the institutionalization phase of the great transformation that the Turkish nation experienced. The idea of national sovereignty, whose theoretical foundations were laid with the Amasya Circular during the National Struggle, was transformed into a form of government with the proclamation of the Republic; the Six Arrows, in turn, drew the ideological framework of that transformation. In Atatürk İhtilâli, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt defined the Six Arrows as “the constitution of the Turkish revolution” and analysed in detail the function of each principle in the modernization process of Turkish society (Bozkurt, 1967, pp. 112-130). Yusuf Akçura’s ideas on the construction of national identity set forth in his work Türkçülüğün Tarihi (The History of Turkism) contributed to the intellectual foundations of the Six Arrows as a significant source forming the theoretical background of Atatürk’s nationalism (Akçura, 1928, pp. 45-52). Atatürk regarded these principles not as dogmatic moulds but as dynamic precepts responsive to the needs of the Turkish nation.
4.2. The Holistic Structure of the Principles and Their Mutually Complementary Character
Republicanism, as the master principle of the Six Arrows, forms the basis of all the other principles. In Atatürk’s words, the republic is a form of government “based on the principle of national sovereignty” and represents all the gains of the Turkish revolution. In his Hatıralar, İsmet İnönü defined the principle of republicanism as “the most concrete expression of the Turkish nation’s will to govern itself after centuries of sultanic rule” (İnönü, 1985, p. 312). The principle of nationalism, intertwined with republicanism, constitutes the ideological underpinning of the Turkish nation’s continued existence as an independent state. Yusuf Akçura, in his work Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset (Three Types of Policy), comparatively analysed the currents of Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism, laying the theoretical foundations of Turkish nationalism (Akçura, 1904, pp. 12-18). Atatürk’s nationalism was built upon this theoretical framework drawn by Akçura and took shape as a unifying and integrative conception that rejected racism and was based on unity of language, culture, and ideal.
The principle of populism, as a natural extension of republicanism and nationalism, defines the social structure of Turkish society. This principle rests on a conception that rejects class conflict, is based on social solidarity, and envisions a society without privileges. Falih Rıfkı Atay explained the principle of populism with the words, “Atatürk’s greatest ideal was to create a classless, privilege-free, coalesced society” (Atay, 1969, p. 410). The principle of statism, as a complement to populism in the economic sphere, is based on the idea that the state should undertake those tasks that the individual cannot accomplish. Atatürk’s conception of statism was assessed not as a rigid ideology but as a pragmatic model that would ensure rapid development under Turkey’s conditions of the time. Celal Bayar elucidated the balance in the implementation of the principle of statism with the words, “Atatürk never regarded statism as a system that excluded private enterprise. The state would do what the private sector could not, but without obstructing its path” (Bayar, 1955, p. 102).
The principles of secularism and revolutionism are complementary elements that reflect the dynamic and progressive character of the Six Arrows. Secularism denotes the separation of religion and state affairs and the state’s neutrality towards all faiths. In Atatürk İhtilâli, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt described secularism as “the boldest step of the Turkish revolution” and emphasized the importance of the transition from a state order based on religious principles to an order founded on reason and science (Bozkurt, 1967, p. 156). Revolutionism, in turn, as a principle foreseeing the constant renewal and development of the Turkish nation on its path of modernization, ensures the continuity of the other five principles. Atatürk regarded the principle of revolutionism as a safeguard against stagnation and believed that the Turkish nation’s goal of rising above the level of contemporary civilization could be achieved only through this principle. Falih Rıfkı Atay interpreted this principle with the words, “Atatürk had placed the principle of revolutionism at the foundation of the Six Arrows so that the revolutions would not freeze. For him, revolution was a continuous process of renewal and development” (Atay, 1969, p. 520).
4.3. The Place and Importance of the Six Arrows in Turkish Political Life
From 1931 to the present day, the Six Arrows have remained one of the most important reference points of Turkish political life. Beyond constituting the founding philosophy of the Republic of Turkey, these principles have become the Turkish nation’s set of shared values. Although some of the principles of the Six Arrows were debated during the transition to multiparty political life, their constitutional status as the fundamental characteristics of the state has been preserved. Both the 1961 and the 1982 Constitutions likewise contain provisions that the Republic of Turkey is a state “loyal to Atatürk nationalism” and “secular.” İsmet İnönü defended the position of the Six Arrows after the transition to multiparty life with the words, “These principles are not merely those of a party; they are the shared values of the Turkish nation” (İnönü, 1985, p. 450).
The place of the Six Arrows in Turkish political life is not limited to constitutional provisions alone. These principles also reveal the capacity to offer solutions to the problems encountered by the Turkish nation in its modernization process. In the final volume of the Tek Adam trilogy, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir stressed that the Six Arrows were a programme that gave concrete form to Turkey’s Westernization and modernization goals (Aydemir, 1965, Vol. III, p. 420). The principle of secularism plays a critical role in the preservation of the democratic system as a safeguard preventing the exploitation of religious beliefs for political ends. The principle of nationalism forms the basis for the construction of a national identity that transcends ethnic and sectarian differences and rests on a consciousness of a shared homeland and a shared history. The cultural nationalism advocated by Yusuf Akçura in Türkçülüğün Tarihi was one of the principal sources that constituted the theoretical ground of Atatürk’s nationalism (Akçura, 1928, pp. 78-85).
The importance of the Six Arrows becomes even more pronounced in the context of the political, economic, and social challenges that Turkey faces today. At a time when the spheres of sovereignty of nation-states are shrinking in the process of globalization, the emphasis of the Six Arrows on full independence and national sovereignty retains its relevance. The ideal of “full independence” stressed by Mahmut Esat Bozkurt in Atatürk İhtilâli deserves to be reinterpreted today across a broad spectrum extending from economic independence to technological independence (Bozkurt, 1967, p. 200). The principle of republicanism reminds us of the necessity of strengthening democratic institutions and meticulously preserving the separation of powers. In this respect, the Six Arrows are not merely a legacy of the past but also a compass guiding the construction of the future.
Keeping the Six Arrows Alive Today: A Contemporary Interpretation of the Principles
5.1. Republicanism and Nationalism: The Guarantee of a Democratic Political Order
Keeping the principle of republicanism alive today requires, above all, the strengthening of a democratic order based on national sovereignty. The republic is not merely a form of government; it is also a regime of liberty in which citizens enjoy equal political rights. Mahmut Esat Bozkurt expressed the essence of republicanism with the words, “The republic is the self-government of the nation. Liberty, equality, and justice are fundamental in this form of government” (Bozkurt, 1967, p. 135). The sustainability of this regime depends on the meticulous preservation of the principle of separation of powers, the safeguarding of judicial independence, and the functioning of participatory democracy mechanisms. A contemporary interpretation of the principle of republicanism necessitates the institutionalization of pluralist democracy and the strengthening of civil society.
Keeping Atatürk’s nationalism alive today requires that the unifying and inclusive quality of this principle be brought to the fore. The conception of nationalism based on “unity of language, culture, and ideal” advocated by Yusuf Akçura in Türkçülüğün Tarihi constituted the theoretical foundations of Atatürk’s nationalism (Akçura, 1928, pp. 92-98). This understanding envisions a construction of national identity that regards ethnic and sectarian differences as a richness and unites around the common ideal of the homeland. The provision enshrined in Article 88 of the Constitution that “every person who is bound to the Turkish State through the bond of citizenship, without distinction of religion or race, is called a Turk” constitutes the essence of Atatürk’s nationalism. The most powerful antidote today against divisive currents and ethnic separatism is this unifying conception of nationalism put forward by Atatürk.
Keeping the principles of republicanism and nationalism alive together is the guarantee of the Turkish nation’s continued existence as an independent state. These two principles express the unbreakable bond between national sovereignty and national independence. In the Nutuk, Atatürk linked these two principles with the words, “The Turkish nation’s struggle for independence is at the same time its struggle for sovereignty. Independence and sovereignty are two inseparable goals” (Atatürk, 1927, p. 345). In the face of the internal and external threats confronting the Republic of Turkey, it is of vital importance that these two principles, resting on national sovereignty and national unity, be kept alive uncompromisingly. The Turkish nation demonstrates its will to preserve its democratic order and its national existence by holding fast to the principles of republicanism and nationalism.
5.2. Populism and Statism: The Guarantee of Social Justice and Development
Keeping the principle of populism alive today requires the strengthening of the social state concept and the elimination of social inequalities. Atatürk’s conception of populism is founded on the principle that everyone, without any discrimination among the individuals that constitute society, is equal before the law. Mahmut Esat Bozkurt defined populism as “the organization of the Turkish nation as a classless, privilege-free, coalesced mass” and stressed that this principle is the guarantee of social justice (Bozkurt, 1967, p. 145). A contemporary interpretation of this principle must be implemented through concrete policies such as ensuring income justice, establishing equality of opportunity, and expanding social safety nets. Celal Bayar explained the role of the state in implementing populism with the words, “The state is obliged to take every measure to increase the welfare of the people. This is a natural requirement of the principle of populism” (Bayar, 1955, p. 110).
Keeping the principle of statism alive today necessitates a redefinition of the state’s role in the economic sphere. In Atatürk’s period, statism meant that the state undertook economic development in areas where the private sector proved inadequate. Today, statism should be understood as the state assuming a regulatory role in strategic sectors in the public interest and remedying market failures. Sustaining the effectiveness of the state in strategic fields such as energy, the defence industry, transportation, and communications is important for the preservation of the economic dimension of national independence. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir stressed the flexible structure of statism with the words, “Atatürk’s statism was not a rigid doctrine but a pragmatic development model that could be adjusted according to circumstances” (Aydemir, 1965, Vol. III, p. 280).
Keeping the principles of populism and statism alive together ensures the establishment of a balance between social justice and economic development. While the state is obliged to increase social welfare by virtue of the principle of populism, it is also responsible for guiding economic development by virtue of the principle of statism. The harmonious implementation of these two principles contributes to Turkey’s construction of an inclusive and sustainable development model. Today, keeping these principles alive requires that the protective role of the social state be brought to the fore in the face of the inequalities generated by neoliberal policies. In Çankaya, Falih Rıfkı Atay summed up the importance Atatürk attached to these two principles with the sentence, “Atatürk believed that national independence could not be realized in its full sense without increasing the welfare of the people” (Atay, 1969, p. 480).
5.3. Secularism and Revolutionism: The Guarantee of Rationalism and Modernization
Keeping the principle of secularism alive today requires, beyond the separation of religion and state affairs, that the state remain equidistant from all faith groups and guarantee freedom of religion. Secularism is not merely a state policy; it is also the guarantee of social peace and a culture of coexistence. Mahmut Esat Bozkurt stressed the place of secularism in the Turkish revolution with the words, “Secularism is the cornerstone of the Turkish revolution. Without this principle, none of the other principles can be truly realized” (Bozkurt, 1967, p. 160). A contemporary interpretation of this principle encompasses the prevention of the exploitation of religious beliefs for political ends and the delivery of scientific education to all segments of society. Secularism is likewise an indispensable principle for ensuring gender equality and protecting individual freedoms. In Türk’ün Ateşle İmtihanı, Halide Edip Adıvar expressed the role of secularism in the participation of Turkish women in social life with the words, “The secular character of the Republic is the greatest guarantee of the emancipation of Turkish women” (Adıvar, 1962, p. 320).
Keeping the principle of revolutionism alive today is of vital importance for ensuring the continuity of the Turkish nation’s modernization journey. Atatürk regarded revolutionism as a guarantee against stagnation and reactionism and stressed that the Turkish nation’s goal of rising above the level of contemporary civilization could be achieved only through continuous renewal and development. Mahmut Esat Bozkurt defined revolutionism as “a principle of dynamism established so that the Turkish nation would not freeze but would constantly progress” (Bozkurt, 1967, p. 175). The principle of revolutionism foresees keeping abreast of developments in science and technology, renewing the education system in accordance with the requirements of the age, and continuously improving institutions. This principle also requires the encouragement of critical thinking and creativity.
Keeping the principles of secularism and revolutionism alive together is the guarantee of the Turkish nation’s continuous progress on the basis of rationalism and scientific thought. While secularism prevents religious dogmas from shaping political and social life, revolutionism enables society to adapt to developments in the contemporary world. These two principles reinforce the Republic of Turkey’s place in the modern world and contribute to the Turkish nation’s attainment of the goal of contemporary civilization. Today, keeping these principles alive is possible through concrete steps such as the dissemination of scientific education, the promotion of technological innovations, and the deepening of democratic culture. Addressing the youth in the Nutuk, Atatürk stressed that this ideal of continuous renewal and progress exists in the essence of the Turkish nation with the words, “The strength you need is present in the noble blood in your veins” (Atatürk, 1927, p. 543).
Conclusion
The National Struggle that began in Samsun on 19 May 1919 and whose political course was charted by the Amasya Circular is the greatest epic of existence of the Turkish nation on the stage of history. This epic not only resulted in a military victory but also opened the path to the construction of a new state based on national sovereignty and a modern society. This great transformation, which Mustafa Kemal Atatürk narrated over the course of six days in the Nutuk, became institutionalized through the set of principles embodied in the Six Arrows and turned into the fundamental characteristics of the Republic of Turkey. The principles of republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism, and revolutionism guide the Turkish nation’s modernization journey within a structure in which they complement and complete one another.
The principle proclaimed in the Amasya Circular that “the nation’s independence will be saved again by the nation’s determination and resolve” has survived to the present day as the unchanging reference point of Turkish political life. This process, recorded from different perspectives in Kâzım Karabekir’s İstiklâl Harbimiz, Ali Fuat Cebesoy’s Milli Mücadele Hatıraları, Rauf Orbay’s Siyasi Hatıralar, Halide Edip Adıvar’s Türk’ün Ateşle İmtihanı, and Falih Rıfkı Atay’s Çankaya, demonstrates that national sovereignty and full independence are the founding mortar of the Republic of Turkey. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir’s Tek Adam trilogy reveals the difficulties through which the Turkish nation passed to arrive at the present day by presenting in exhaustive detail the life story of Atatürk, the leader of this great transformation, within all the complexity of the era. Mahmut Esat Bozkurt’s Atatürk İhtilâli, meanwhile, lays out the legal and philosophical foundations of this transformation, delineating the ideological framework of the Six Arrows. Works such as Yusuf Akçura’s Türkçülüğün Tarihi and Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset provided the intellectual legacy that constitutes the theoretical background of Atatürk’s nationalism.
As long as the Turkish nation and the State of the Republic of Turkey continue to hold fast to the Six Arrows and keep these principles alive, they will preserve their independence and their goal of modernization. The principle of republicanism must be realized through the strengthening of the democratic order; the principle of nationalism through the construction of a unifying and inclusive national identity; the principle of populism through the establishment of social justice; the principle of statism through the realization of strategic development goals; the principle of secularism through the safeguarding of freedom of religion and conscience; and the principle of revolutionism through the will to continuous renewal and development. The consciousness of the “first duty” stressed in Atatürk’s Address to the Youth expresses the responsibility of Turkish youth and the Turkish nation to uphold these principles.
The torch of independence lit in Samsun on 19 May 1919 acquired a political course in Amasya, was transformed into a state form with the proclamation of the Republic, and gained its ideological framework with the Six Arrows. Today, every link of this chain remains alive in the memory of the Turkish nation and awaits transmission to future generations. As Celal Bayar stated in his Atatürk’ten Hatıralar, “Atatürk left to those who came after him not only a homeland but also a system of thought that would keep that homeland alive forever” (Bayar, 1955, p. 195). As long as the Turkish nation maintains its resolve to keep this great legacy alive, it will never compromise on its independence, its Republic, and its ideal of modernization. The six lights of the Six Arrows will continue to burn as beacons illuminating Turkey’s path in dark times; the Turkish nation will continue to advance on the road to contemporary civilization under their guidance.
References
Adıvar, H. E. (1962). Türk’ün Ateşle İmtihanı: İstiklâl Savaşı Hatıraları [The Turkish Ordeal: Memoirs of the War of Independence] (Vols. 1-2). İstanbul: Atlas Kitabevi. (Original publication: 1928, in English; first Turkish edition: 1959).
Akçura, Y. (1904). Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset [Three Types of Policy]. Cairo: Türk Gazetesi. (Reprint: Akçağ Yayınları, Ankara, 2005).
Akçura, Y. (1928). Türkçülüğün Tarihi [The History of Turkism]. İstanbul: Türk Kültür Yayını. (Reprint: Ötüken Neşriyat, İstanbul, 2016).
Atatürk, M. K. (1927). Nutuk [The Speech]. Ankara: Türk Tayyare Cemiyeti. (Modern Turkish adaptation: Z. Korkmaz, Atatürk Research Centre, Ankara, 2020).
Atay, F. R. (1969). Çankaya: Atatürk’ün Doğumundan Ölümüne Kadar [Çankaya: Atatürk from Birth to Death]. İstanbul: Doğan Kardeş Yayınları. (Reprint: Pozitif Yayınları, İstanbul, 2012).
Aydemir, Ş. S. (1963). Tek Adam: Mustafa Kemal [The Single Man: Mustafa Kemal] (Vol. I: 1881-1919). İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi.
Aydemir, Ş. S. (1965). Tek Adam: Mustafa Kemal (Vol. III: 1922-1938). İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi.
Bayar, C. (1955). Atatürk’ten Hatıralar [Memories of Atatürk]. İstanbul: Sel Yayınları. (Reprint: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2008).
Bozkurt, M. E. (1967). Atatürk İhtilâli [The Atatürk Revolution]. İstanbul: Altın Kitaplar Yayınevi. (Original publication: İstanbul University Press, 1940; 3rd ed.: Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, 2024).
Cebesoy, A. F. (1953). Milli Mücadele Hatıraları [Memoirs of the National Struggle]. İstanbul: Vatan Neşriyatı. (Reprint: Temel Yayınları, İstanbul, 2000).
İnönü, İ. (1985). Hatıralar [Memoirs]. (Ed. S. Selek). Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi. (Reprint: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2014).
Kansu, M. M. (1966). Erzurum’dan Ölümüne Kadar Atatürk’le Beraber [With Atatürk from Erzurum until His Death] (Vols. 1-2). Ankara: Turkish Historical Society. (6th ed.: 2019).
Karabekir, K. (1960). İstiklâl Harbimiz [Our War of Independence] (Vols. 1-2). İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi. (Reprint: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2024).
Orbay, R. (1962). Siyasi Hatıralar [Political Memoirs]. Yakın Tarihimiz Journal (serialised). (Reprint: Rauf Orbay’ın Hatıraları (1914-1945) [Memoirs of Rauf Orbay (1914-1945)], Ed. F. Kandemir, Yeni Zamanlar Yayınları, İstanbul, 1995).
Bilir, A. G. F. (n.d.). Cumhuriyet dönemi anayasalarında milliyetçilik anlayışı [The conception of nationalism in republican-era constitutions]. DergiPark. https://dergipark.org.tr/…
Çaykıran, G. (n.d.). Samsun’dan İzmir’e Mustafa Kemal Paşa’nın Millî Mücadele’deki rolü [Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s role in the National Struggle from Samsun to İzmir]. DergiPark. https://dergipark.org.tr/…
Hazır, H. (n.d.). İnkılapçılık ve Atatürk’ün inkılap anlayışı [Revolutionism and Atatürk’s understanding of revolution]. DergiPark. https://dergipark.org.tr/…
Kaya, H. (2014). Milli Mücadele ve Refet (Bele) Paşa [The National Struggle and Refet (Bele) Pasha]. Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi, 30(89), 131-162. https://dergipark.org.tr/…
Morin, A. (2010). Constitutive discourse of Turkish nationalism: Atatürk’s Nutuk and the rhetorical construction of the “Turkish people.” Communication Studies, 61(5), 523-540. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/…
Özbudun, E. (n.d.). Atatürk ve lâiklik [Atatürk and secularism]. DergiPark. https://dergipark.org.tr/…
Özkul, F. (n.d.). Anayasalarımızda laiklik ilkesi [The principle of secularism in our constitutions]. DergiPark. https://dergipark.org.tr/…
Sabır, H. (n.d.). Atatürk’ün ekonomi anlayışı [Atatürk’s understanding of economics]. DergiPark. https://dergipark.org.tr/…
Şirin, T. (n.d.). Cumhuriyetçilik, laiklik, milliyetçilik, halkçılık, devletçilik ve inkılâpçılık ilkeleri [The principles of republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, statism, and revolutionism]. DergiPark. https://dergipark.org.tr/…
Tünay, M. (n.d.). Atatürk’ün halkçılık ilkesi ve çalışma hayatı [Atatürk’s principle of populism and working life]. DergiPark. https://dergipark.org.tr/…
Türkman, S. (n.d.). Yusuf Akçura’nın hayatı ve fikirleri [The life and ideas of Yusuf Akçura]. DergiPark. https://dergipark.org.tr/…
Uca, A. (n.d.). Atatürk ilkeleri Türk milletine neler kazandırdı? [What did Atatürk’s principles bring to the Turkish nation?]. DergiPark. https://dergipark.org.tr/…
Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA) Aarhus University, 1997 Independent Researcher Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures
