Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs Vol. 28, No. 2, August 2008
ISSN 1360-2004 print/ISSN 1469-9591 online/08/020303-17#2008
Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs
DOI: 10.1080/13602000802303235
A SCRUTINY OF AKCAM’S VERSION OF HISTORY
REVIEW ESSAY: A SCRUTINY OF AKCAM’S VERSION OF HISTORY AND THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE
By ERMAN SAHIN
Book reviewed – A SHAMEFUL ACT: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility, TANER AKCAM, translated from Turkish by PAUL BESSEMER, 2006, New York: Metropolitan Books x þ 376 pp., notes to p. 464, index to p. 483, $30.00 (hardcover), ISBN: 0-8050-7932-7
ABSTRACT
The tragic fate of the Ottoman Armenians during World War I, the massacres that
accompanied their forced migration, and the role of the Committee of Union and
Progress—the ruling faction in the Ottoman government during World War I—
constitute one of the murkiest chapters in the modern history of the Middle East.
This article argues that those who have dealt with this complex subject have not
always respected the limits set by scholarly ethics and have failed to use their
sources scrupulously while engaging in distortions deliberate quoting out of context
and doctoring of data. At this point Taner Akcam’s book, translated and distributed
by the Zoryan Institute, deserves particular attention, and therefore it is essential to
examine this work with a closer scrutiny by checking and comparing the original
sources utilized by the author. The article will illustrate this point by a case study
presenting the discrepancies between the texts preserved in the original sources
and those presented by the author in his work.
INTRODUCTION
This book, dealing with the Armenian Question, is a substantially revised English version
of the author’s earlier book, Insan Hakları ve Ermeni Sorunu,1 published in 1999. The
book is welcomed by many authors including Erik Jan Zu rcher who, on its back cover,
wrote that Taner Akcam’s study is the “state of the art in this field”. Elsewhere
Stephen Feinstein described it as the “best book ever written on Armenian Genocide”.
Akcam, a sociologist often credited as the first Turkish scholar to acknowledge the
“Armenian Genocide”, contends that there is no doubt that the “scale of the operations
would have been impossible without planning at the political center” (p. 7). The readers
would have welcomed a bibliography (a surprising omission in a heavily referenced
work), tables and perhaps more than one map. However, despite revisions the trail of
errors and inconsistencies still mar the book. Moreover the influence of Vahakn
N. Dadrian’s earlier findings and arguments is also visible throughout Akcam’s study.
The book tells us little that is new, and suffers from inadequate understanding and
use of sources.
The book is divided into three parts:
part one discusses the Ottoman state and its non-Muslim subjects and covers the era of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and discusses Turkish nationalism;
part two deals with the events leading to the decision for executing genocide and its aftermath;
part three is devoted to investigation and prosecution of the crimes committed during the catastrophic events of 1915–1916.
Unfortunately the book lacks a comprehensive conclusion and suffers from poor organization
and repetition.
PRESENTING THE COURSE OF EVENTS
In discussing the massacres of the 1890s the author does not mention the provocations
carried out by the Armenian revolutionary groups that were also an important factor in
bringing about Muslim attacks on the Armenians. In the second chapter the author
quotes a single instance of this kind for a different occasion (p. 63). His argument,
however, is not a synthesis of the evidence presented. Instead of discussing how such
incidents shaped the course of events the author prefers to limit himself to pointing
out how the Turkish historiography makes use of them.
Akcam suggests that the Ottoman Special Organization (Teskilat-ı Mahsusa) (OSO)
has been instrumental “in implementing the Armenian genocide” (p. 59); however,
the documentary evidence does not support his claims.2
Moreover, in discussing the structure and the assignments of the OSO, Akcam incorrectly attributes a statement to Cemal Kutay (pp. 96–97) that was in fact made by Esref Kuscubasi.3
In his discussion of the impact of the Muslim refugees the author offers a simplistic
and inaccurate assessment of the situation; for instance, we read that “. . . between
1878–1904 some 850,000 refugees were settled in predominantly Armenian areas
alone” (p. 87). In fact, the research based on primary documents establishes that
the great bulk of these refugees were settled in the “provinces other than Eastern
Anatolia”.4
In addition, such western provinces as Aydın, Hudavendigar (Bursa) and
Edirne (Adrianople) where the refugees were settled in significant numbers can hardly
be described as being predominantly Armenian.
The author’s discussion of the Ottomans’ war aims and their entry into the war are also
problematic for these are presented in too oversimplified a framework to be accepted
without an immense amount of equivocation. He maintains that the “Unionists devoted
a great deal of effort toward entering the war” (p. 112). In fact, the Unionists devoted
their efforts towards securing an alliance with Germany, not entering the war. By means
of the alliance, they hoped to put an end to the Empire’s political isolation while at the
same trying to postpone the entry into the war as much as possible before they finally succumbed
to German pressure for armed action. As Mustafa Aksakal, the author of a scholarly
study on the Ottoman entry into the war noted, “The Ottoman leaders hoped either
to stay outside the war entirely or to enter it only in its final stages but they were equally
concerned to preserve the alliance they had formed with Germany”.5
Akcam also
asserts that by entering the war Unionists sought to pursue their “Pan-Turanist and
Pan-Islamist objectives”, and would also seek an opportunity to “regain lost territories
especially in the Balkans and seek revenge in the Christian communities” (p. 112). He
also lays considerable stress on the feelings of revenge, and concludes that “it was this
kind of feeling that was used to justify the killing of Armenians” (p. 117).
RECONCILING FACTS WITH ASSUMPTIONS
One wonders how an administration, which not only reconciled and established an alliance
with Bulgaria but even made territorial concessions to bring it into the war on its
own side or which conducted negotiations with Greece to form a Balkan alliance,6 was
able to dream about seeking revenge in the Christian communities or regaining the
lost territories in the Balkans.
While there is no doubt that the disastrous results of the
Balkan wars had left many people with bitter feelings and painful memories it is doubtful
that the Ottoman leadership was carried away by the simplistic and emotional ideals as
Akcamsuggests. As Feroz Ahmad pointed out, the Unionists started out “with the principal
aim of guaranteeing the territorial integrity and maintaining sovereignty” and
showed “little concern” toward such matters as Pan-Turanism, and “there was no question
of regaining Macedonia which had already proved to be an unduly expensive adventure”.
7
The author also discusses the role and the activity of convicts released in 1914; he
refers to sources that, according to him, mention that these prisoners were “actually
trained in Istanbul for the purpose of carrying out the Armenian genocide” (p. 136).
On the other hand, he claims it is very likely that the “key decisions concerning the massacre
were made within the CUP in Istanbul during March 1915” (p. 152, and also
p. 156). He provides no explanation, however, as to how the prisoners may be released
and trained in 1914 for the purpose of carrying out the genocide when there was no such
decision yet (to judge from Akcam’s own date). This is however, only one of the many
contradictions and inconsistencies that the book contains.
Akcam is also quite selective in his use of materials. He alleges for instance, that
“immediately after the [Sarıkamıs] defeat, Enver conveyed his thanks to the Armenian
Patriarchate for the sacrifice and heroism of the Armenian soldiers in the war” (p. 143)
on the basis of such a highly partisan account as that of Pastor Johannes Lepsius alone,
and tries to support this point by referring to German Consular reports concerning the
self-sacrifice shown by the Armenians (pp. 143–144). Yet when discussing a different
matter on page 197, we read that the German consuls “reported that during the
Caucasian campaign, the Armenian soldiers in the Ottoman Army turned their guns
on the Turks”. It is thus quite unlikely that Enver should have ever made such a statement
after a Caucasian campaign in which the Armenian soldiers did indeed turn their
guns on the Turks.
The author’s inadequate understanding of Ottoman history also undermines the
validity of his explanations. For instance, he claims there is “evidence that the [genocide]
decision was made at the end of March, during the critical days of the Gallipoli
Campaign” (p. 152), but the Gallipoli campaign began on 25 April 1915. Despite the
firm insistence on March 1915 as the date of decision for the genocide, the author
fails to provide any credible “evidence” substantiating this thesis. Enver’s remark
that the threat offered by the Armenians can be quelled by removing them “from the
places where they lived and sending them to other places” is according to Akcam, the
evidence that there was a decision for genocide in March 1915.
Akcam’s tendentious mode of writing and selective use of sources become even more
transparent when considering his use of trial proceedings. The proceedings that are
recorded in various newspapers and journals do not always conform, and at times
even contradict each other. For instance, the statement and the admission he attributes
to Colonel Sahabettin (p. 200), which was supposedly made by S ahabettin at the eighth
session of the Yozgat trial, is uncorroborated by two other newspaper versions8 while
contradicted by a third,9 all of which also gave the proceedings of the same session. In
the absence of original transcripts it is difficult to determine with any accuracy which
one of these reflects a truer picture. The more recent research, therefore, casts doubt
on Akcam’s finding as he failed to include the other relevant material.
INTERPRETING ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS
One may also feel uneasy with Akcam’s treatment of Ottoman archival documents since
whenever the Ottoman documents seem to support his contentions he considers them
genuine. On the other hand, when they contradict his views he consistently attempts
to dismiss them as part of a conspiracy, even if they are in fact the same documents.
The most striking example of this dualistic approach is given when Akcam relies on a
“general circular from the Ministry of the Interior” (p. 204), a document he earlier dismissed
as part of a “great deception” (p. 169) in relation to the exclusion of Protestants
from the relocation. Similarly, after having initially regarded the former Grand Vizier
Said Halim’s statement about his non-involvement in the process of the Armenians’
relocation as convincing (p. 156), the author subsequently expresses his doubts over
its sincerity (pp. 263–265).
Akcam’s discussion of the estimates regarding the Armenian deaths also stands on
shaky ground. He admits that the available “estimates are based on a political agenda”
(p. 183). One would not expect to see that an author who can claim this should rely
on a figure given by a government that has distinguished itself with its deep enmity
towards the CUP. He upholds the figure of 800,000 killed Armenians given by Interior
Minister Cemal Bey, as true. In order to increase its credibility, he also claims this figure
was the “result of the commission established” by Mustafa Arif Degmer but fails to
adduce anything in support of this assertion. The same minister, Cemal Bey, in the
same statement also declared that the CUP had annihilated four million Turks10 the
very same CUP that according to Akcam was carrying out a policy of Turkification.
Is it conceivable to maintain that these claims as well as figures were not based on a
political agenda?
The author’s other claims in support of his numbers are also unconvincing or inaccurate.
He relies on an ambiguous statement attributed toMustafa Kemal in a second-hand source
whilst ignoring a first-hand account in which Mustafa Kemal had rejected the figures
offered by Minister Cemal as a slander (iftira).11
While the book published by the
Turkish Army’s General Staff, Buyuk Harp’te Turk Harbi [Turkish War in the Great War],
was not on the “issue of the World War I losses”, its publication does not substantiate
Akcam’s claims either; after all, it was a translation of a book published in Paris in 1926
on the history of Ottoman participation in the World War by the French author Maurice
Larcher.12
Yusuf Hikmet Bayur has never stated that the figure “800,000” should be
considered accurate for the Armenian losses; indeed, in discussing the Armenian Question
in the preceding part of his study, Bayur described Commandant M. Larcher’s account of
events which used the figure of 500,000 for the Armenian losses as being quite exaggerated.
13
Furthermore, in another work, Bayur has criticized Minister Cemal’s statement,
characterizing it as the “ugliest indication” of the Damat Ferit government’s endless
efforts at appeasing victorious allies.14
The author does not provide adequate discussion on the course of relocations that differed
depending on local circumstances as well as the attitude of local officials and the
few examples provided by Akcam are all carefully selected. While Akcam acknowledges
Cemal Pasha’s efforts in favor of Armenians he sheds little light on it.
RELYING ON “KEY” SOURCES
The key source of Akcam’s allegations is the findings of 1919–1920 court-martials
(as well as the indictment of the main trial), which he upholds as true. But the legal
procedures of these courts suffered from serious shortcomings and the reliability of
their findings was questionable.15
The trials were conducted under the pressure of
the victorious Allies and by the post-war Ottoman governments eager to heap any
blame on the CUP in order to forestall the dismemberment of the Empire and to
receive more lenient treatment from the Allies.16
Commenting on this attitude of the
prosecution, the late Tarık Zafer Tunaya has remarked that the prosecutor was
blaming the CUP (for everything) by “beginning from the story of Eve and Adam”,17
while other scholars have also expressed their skepticism over their findings18—including
M. E. Yapp who noted that the “1919 courts martial . . . cannot be taken entirely at
face value because they were conducted by a government which was anxious to pin
any blame on the CUP leaders”.19
According to Akcam’s sources the CUP leader Cemal Pasha “had indeed tried . . . to
ease the situation for the Armenian deportees” (p. 186) and yet was actually sentenced to
death by these courts. Falih Rıfkı Atay, seemingly a valuable source for Akcam, relates
how Atay had to bribe the members of these courts with an amount less than 500 Lira
in order to save himself from execution, and how the decision for his execution was
made even before he was tried.20
Refik Halid Karay, a staunch opponent of both the
Unionists and the nationalist movement in Ankara, and one who had a meeting with
the judge and the members of the court over Atay’s case, confirms that the decision to
execute Atay was already arranged even before a trial.21
Akcamcannot bring himself to admit the injustices committed by these courts; he does
not even discuss the changes introduced by the Damat Ferit government, which even
banned the defendants from hiring a lawyer22—a process that constitutes the most
basic right of a defendant in any system. Likewise he mentions the “irregularities
involving Nusret’s death sentence” (p. 354) but does not elaborate on these irregularities.
The author does not refrain from relying on questionable sources either. For instance,
the alleged 1926 interview of Mustafa Kemal, on which he relies (pp. 345–346), was
proven to be false years ago.23
A LITANY OF ERRORS
For an author claiming to have mastered the subject, Akcam makes too many factual
errors which diminish the text’s reliability as a point of reference:
The Ottoman
Empire was not considered the “Sick Man of Europe” since the 1830s; the term was
coined by the Russian Tsar in 1844 (p. 27).
Sasun was not a Cilician village; it was in
Bitlis province (p. 41).
Yusuf Kemal Tengirsenk was not the second foreign minister
of the Turkish Republic but the second foreign minister of the Ankara Government
before the Republic was proclaimed (p. 46).
The last name of the Russian foreign minister
was not Sazanov but Sazonov (pp. 98–99, 213 and index).
Kurt Ziemke was not a
historian but a diplomat (p. 118).
Huseyin Cahit Yalcın was not the editor of Tanin
during the war; he left Tanin in January 1914 (p. 143).
Alma Johansson was not a
Swiss nurse but Swedish (p. 150).
Pozanti is not some 30–40 km from Adana but
about 70 km (p. 158).
Kayseri, Nigde and Eskisehir were not provinces but sanjaks
(subdivisions of provinces) (p. 177).
Interior Minister Cemal Bey’s statement was not
made on 18 March 1919; it first appeared in an interview with Cemal Bey in Le Moniteur
Oriental on 13 March 1919 (p. 183).
The book published by the Turkish Army’s General
Staff was not on the issue ofWorldWar I losses (p. 183).
Hovhannes Kachaznuni was not
the first president of Armenia but the first prime minister (p. 198).
The governor of Van
was not Cevdet Pasa but Cevdet Bey (p. 201).
The surname of the former Van deputy
was not Avras but Arvas (pp. 201, 326 and index).
The general circular from the
Ministry of the Interior was not sent to all Ottoman provinces (p. 204).
The Greeks
did not invade I zmir on 16 May 1919 but on 15 May 1919 (pp. 279, 294).
Friedrich
Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein was not a general but a colonel (p. 325).
Mustafa
Kemal’s statement was not made in a closed session of the parliament but in an open
session (pp. 346, 348).
Nusret Bey was not the prefect (kaymakam) of Urfa but the subgovernor
(mutasarrıf) (p. 351).
The above mistakes are not just aberrations but typify the
whole book.
LOST IN TRANSLATION
The translation errors represent another problem. The word “ekseriyet”, for instance,
does not mean minority but majority. Therefore, the last part of the quote presented
on page 97 should not read “[a]reas . . . in which non-Turkish races and nations
formed a minority” but should be “[a]reas . . . in which non-Turkish races and nations
formed a majority”.24
Basbakanlık does not mean Presidential but the Office of the
Prime Minister (p. 417, n. 65).
The translation problems are not confined to just minor ones; the book gives
fundamentally different versions of events than its original Turkish. For instance,
when discussing the role of Colonel Seyfi, the original Turkish version of the book
provides the following information:
Following the armistice, on 13 December 1918, the daily Sabah declared that
as the officer responsible for the political department in Ottoman Military
Headquarters in close coordination with Bahaettin Sakir, and in collaboration
with the Special Organization, Colonel Seyfi was one of those who had planned
the massacre of Armenians.25
As might be seen, according to the Turkish version of the book, it is the Sabah newspaper
that is making the assertion in question. However, in the present English book, this event
is suspiciously rendered as a confession by Colonel Seyfi rather than a declaration by
Sabah while no date is given for relevant issue of the daily Sabah:
After the 1918 armistice, the colonel [Seyfi] explained in the daily Sabah that,
as the officer responsible for the political department in Ottoman military
headquarters in collaboration with the Special Organization and in close
coordination with Unionist Bahaettin Sakir, he had been among those who
had devised the plan for the murder of the Armenians. (p. 125)
One cannot know whether this is an intentional manipulation or an innocent (but inexcusable)
translation error, or even who is to be blamed for it: the translator or Taner
Akcam who had revised the English text. At any rate, Akcam bears the responsibility
for having allowed such errors to enter the text, the existence of which further undermines
the reliability of his book.
Typographical errors and inconsistencies in spelling of names further mar the book. In
addition, the reader whose knowledge of the existing literature is derived from this book
is likely to think that Edward J. Erickson’s painstaking study “The Defeat in Detail: The
Ottoman Army in the Balkans 1912–1913” was released in 1972 (p. 392, n. 114)
instead of 2003, or the seventh volume of the Genocide and Holocaust Studies journal
was published in 1998 (p. 406, n. 78) instead of 1993.
SOURCES DISTORTED
Even if one is to ignore the subjectivist attitude of the author, there are more serious problems
with Akcam’s work. In preparing his book, Akcam appears to have altered and distorted
the contents of the sources he has utilized.26 Some examples discussed below may
reiterate this point.
On the Figures Given by Esref Kuscubasi and Celal Bayar
In discussing the deportation of Christians in Western Anatolia, Taner Akcam—by referring
to the autobiographical account of Esref Kuscubasi (a prominent agent of the
OSO)—writes that: “Kuscubasi Esref claims that during the first months of the war
alone the number of ‘Greek-Armenians . . . deported totaled 1,350,000’” (p. 106). In
the original source, however, the number given by Kuscubasi is 1,150,000 and not
1,350,000 as incorrectly given by Akcam. Moreover, Esref Kuscubasi does not say they
were “deported” but taken to the interior:
. . . [I]t was plainly visible that if the Greek-Armenian population in the Aegean
region, concentrated especially in the coastal areas amounting to 1,150,000,
had not been taken to the interior a short time before the outbreak of the
war and during the first months of the war, then even the defense in Canakkale
[Gallipoli] would not have been possible.27
In his note the author further claims that “Celal Bayar, who draws extensively from
Kuscubasi’smemoirs gives separate figures for specific cities. The total number of
these is the same as the figure above [i.e. 1,350,000]” (p. 403, n. 150). Yet the total of
these is not 1,350,000 as the reader is told but 760,000, which is in fact close to one half
of the figure above.28 It should be further noted that, in the case of the latter
figure, Kuscubasi does not speak of any relocation but rather gives the figures for the
population concentration in specific regions.
On the Memoirs of A. Mil (Arif Cemil (Denker))
In a section of his book dealing with the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Congress in
Erzurum, Taner Akcam falsely puts forward claims that have no basis in the original
account. He writes that:
In one document we read: “The necessary preparations have been made for
those individuals . . . who have left Erzurum . . . Instructions for those things
that are essential for our organization’s freedom of action should be given.”
The author of this document confirmed that Bahaettin Sakir had wanted
“those people [mentioned in the telegram] apprehended on the way and liquidated”
(p. 137).
However in the original account, Arif Cemil (Denker) quotes a letter from Hilmi Bey, the
CUP inspector for Erzurum, in which Hilmi Bey states that:
. . . The necessary preparations have been made for those individuals on whose
departures from Erzurum you have informed [us] with a cipher. I have made
delivery to the persons required to get them [i.e. the individuals who departed
from Erzurum] regardless of anything . . . I hope to inform you on this matter in
about two days. The command post should give the necessary instructions for
our organization’s freedom of action to the persons required.29
After quoting this Arif Cemil (Denker) makes some comments on Hilmi Bey’s letter by
stating that:
Two points in Hilmi Bey’s letter deserve attention. One of them is the apprehension,
more precisely the liquidation of the persons on their way, whose
departures from Erzurum have been notified by Bahaettin Sakir.30
The original account, as might be seen, makes no mention of Bahaettin Sakir’s alleged
demand for the liquidation of the persons in question and the only role attributed to
Bahaettin Sakir Bey is his notifying of the mentioned individuals’ departures. It is difficult
to understand how Akcam, based on the above source, concluded that “the author of
this document confirmed that Bahaettin Sakir had wanted those people [mentioned in
the telegram] . . . liquidated”. Of minor importance is Akcam’s misidentification of
“the author of this document”, since its author was Hilmi Bey while the one making
the so-called confirmation on which Akcam relied was Arif Cemil.
More on the Memoirs of Arif Cemil (Denker)
In attempting to describe the alleged genocide decision, which was supposedly made
during March 1915, Taner Akcam again deliberately distorts his evidence in order to
back up his contentions:
. . . In addition to the question of the army command, fundamental changes
in the Special Organization’s activities were also under discussion. “The
Armenians’ anti-Turkish attitude and the help they gave the Russian army convinced
[Bahaettin Sakir] that dealing with the enemy within was as necessary as
the enemy without.” Having assembled evidence of Armenian gang activity in
the region, Sakir now tried to persuade his friends in Istanbul that it was time to
get rid of this threat. It is very likely that the key decisions concerning the massacre were made
within the CUP in Istanbul during March 1915. “In these discussions a
decision was made that Bahaettin Sakir Bey would resign from his duties pertaining
to the country’s foreign enemies and concentrate solely on its internal
enemies.” Sakir was put in charge of dealing with “the Armenians inside . . .
These discussions concluded with the formulation of the Deportation Law.
When Bahaettin Sakir Bey returned to the Caucasian front a short time later
the new arrangements had been completely determined”. (pp. 151–152)
As his source for the sentences and phrases given within quotation marks in the above
quote, Akcam again cites the memoirs of Arif Cemil (Denker), who served with the
OSO during the War. However, this episode described by Akcam appears fundamentally
different in the original source—which reads as follows:
In Istanbul now, Dr. Bahaettin Sakir Bey has decided to concentrate on the
country’s internal enemies by abandoning the Special Organization’s affairs
related to foreign enemies.
This was because Dr. Bahaettin Sakir Bey has witnessed many facts during
the period of four-five months he has spent in Erzurum and at different
points of the Caucasian front. The attitude the Armenians have taken against
Turkey and the assistance they provided to the Russian army have convinced
him [Bahaettin Sakir] that it was necessary to fear the internal enemies as
much as the external ones. The Armenians inside through formation of bands
were threatening the rear of our army and were trying to cut our lines of
retreat.31
[. . .] In Istanbul Dr. Bahaettin Sakir Bey was busy with discussing the precautions
to be taken to save the army from a grave danger by placing these
[documents] to the attention of the CUP’s Central Committee. These discussions
finally resulted in the formulation of Relocation Law. When Dr. Bahaettin
Sakir Bey returned to the Caucasian front after a while, the new situation had
completely come into existence. But again we will pass on without touching
these matters. Because the issue of the Armenians’ relocation was completely
out of the O.S.O.’s scope.32 [Emphasis added]
There are several problems about the way in which the author has made use of the
passage given in the original account:
1. The phrase signifying that it was necessary to “fear internal enemies” is
altered into a different one that reads “dealing with the enemy within” by
Akcam.
2. Akcam quotes the source as saying “in these discussions a decision was made
that Bahaettin Sakir Bey would resign from his duties . . .”, whereas in the
original source it is Bahaettin Sakir himself deciding to focus on internal
enemies and there is no mention of a discussion where the alleged decision
for Bahaettin Sakir’s focusing on the internal enemies was taken. Thus the
phrase that reads “in these discussions a decision was made that Bahaettin
Sakir Bey would resign from his duties . . .” has no basis in the original
source and was evidently doctored in an effort to give the impression of
an official policy targeting the Armenians.
3. Similarly the statement that Bahaettin Sakir Bey was put in charge of dealing
with “the Armenians inside” has no basis in the original source and the text
is completely quoted out of context. The only reference to the “Armenians
inside” is made in connection with their formation of bands and the threat
they posed to the army. And there is simply no entry suggesting that
Dr. Bahaettin Sakir Bey was put in charge of (or instructed for) anything.
4. Although Akcam quotes the source as saying “new arrangements were completely
determined”, the original account contains nothing regarding “new
arrangements”; rather, it states that a new situation had emerged. This
manipulation, too, gives the impression of a policy targeting Armenians
for which “new arrangements” were determined even though such is not
the case in the original source. Moreover, it is of the utmost significance
that in Akcam’s version a revealing section of the very document on which
his case rests is missing. At the end was Arif Cemil’s statement that “the
issue of the Armenians’ relocation was completely out of the O.S.O.’s scope”.
On Esref Kuscubasi’s Statement
In discussing the implementation of the relocation and the massacres the author
contends that many members of the government were unaware of the genocidal policy
that was secretly carried out by the party under the veil of a deportation decree. Like
Dadrian,33 Akcam refers to the interviews made with Esref Kuscubasi to support
this point:
As Esref Kuscubasi put it, the government was never informed of the meetings
and plans related to the deportations and massacres. (pp. 156–157)
In the original account, after briefly talking about the activities of the OSO, Esref
Kuscubasi does indeed state that, “As these [activities] were seriously kept ‘secret’,
they were even unknown to the members of the cabinet”. However, there are several
problems with Akcam’s utilization and interpretation of the autobiographical account
of Esref Kuscubasi. First of all, in the original account there is no mention of any
meeting regarding the Armenian relocation or massacres nor is there any mention of
the Armenians. Second, and more importantly, following the above sentence
Kuscubasi relates that Talat Pasha too was among those cabinet members who were
not informed of the activities of the OSO and had even complained about this matter:
As these [activities] were seriously kept “secret”, they were even unknown to
the members of the cabinet. In fact, I remember very well that one day Talat
Pasha in a half serious and half joking manner had asked me: “Esref Beyefendi,
is there any news about the government’s organization that you could share
with us?” And he quietly whispered this in my ears lest others not hear. What
were these activities that were regarded as so secret even to cause a person
[Talat] who was then, the Minister of the Interior and considered as the
natural leader of the political party in power, to make it a matter of complaint
in such a manner?34
In view of this information, Akcam’s utilization and interpretation of Kuscubasi’s
statement and his efforts to establish a link between it and the massacres becomes
highly problematic. Indeed if one is to accept Akcam’s false paraphrasing, then
Akcam’s whole theory of “a genocidal policy under the supervision of Talat” collapses
since Talat Pasha, the person whom he credits with being the overall coordinator of massacres
and deportations is actually not informed on something that he allegedly supervises.
It is clear that the author Akcam deliberately ignores the context and misleads his
readers. The intention of such a manipulation is to lead readers into what is after all, a
pre-arranged conclusion, at the expense of historic truth.
On Ahmet Refik
In discussing the participation of gangs in perpetrating the massacres Taner Akcam
writes that:
Ahmet Refik testified that the perpetrators of the massacres at Pozanti, some
thirty to forty kilometers from Adana, were “reorganized by gangs sent to the
Caucasus”. (p. 158)
To begin with, it should be noted that Ahmet Refik did not testify, but wrote a book.
More importantly, in the book Ahmet Refik did not use the word massacre; rather,
there is a single sentence referring to the assaults carried out by gangs without indicating
whether they resulted in massacres or not:
The [place] which the Armenians were most particularly afraid of was Pozanti.
There [in Pozanti], the attack of gangs was making their hearts tremble
[in fear]. Which gangs were these? These were the gangs sent to the Caucasus in
the name of Turanian policy [and] the union of Islam by the Unionist
government.35
It seems that the author feels no discomfort in substituting such words as “attack” and
“massacre” and allowing his readers to make incorrect assumptions.
On Huseyin and Abidin Nesimi
According to Akcam, in some cases the government officials who resisted obeying orders
of annihilation were killed, and a kaymakam’s son had confirmed this point:
In several cases uncooperative officials were actually murdered. Huseyin
Nesimi, the prefect of Lice, refused to obey the verbal order and asked for a
written copy. He was fired, called to Diyarbakir, and murdered on the way.
Abidin Nesimi, the prefect’s son, wrote that the liquidation of government officials
was ordered by Mehmet Resit, the governor of Diyarbakir, among others.
The murdered include “Ferit, the governor-general of Basra, Bedri Nuri, the
lieutenant-governor of Muntefak, . . . Sabit, the deputy prefect of Besiri, Ismail
Mestan a journalist.” The reason for thesemurders was clear: “The administrative
cadre that opposed the massacre had to be liquidated . . .”. (pp. 166–167)
Unfortunately it is not Abidin Nesimi but Taner Akcam who wrote that the government
officials in question were liquidated on the orders of Mehmet Resit. What Abidin Nesimi
had said36 was that during Resit’s governorship some murders with unknown perpetrators
had taken place:
. . . When Dr. Resit was in Iraq and later during his governorship of Diyarbakir,
many murders with unknown perpetrators took place. Most important among
them, were those of Ferit, the governor of Basra, Bedri Nuri, the sub-governor
of Muntefak, my father Huseyin Nesimi, the prefect of Lice, and Sabit, the
deputy prefect of Besiri and the journalist Ismail Mestan . . . It was impossible
to carry out the relocation of Armenians with the gendarme units composed of
Circassians and the members of the tribes of Bedirhani, Milli, KarakeCili who
were the Kurdish militia. For this group was a cadre of pillage and plunder.
Therefore, this group could not carry out the relocation and turned it into a
massacre. [And] the liquidation of the [administrative] cadre which would
oppose the pillage and plunder was inevitable.37
As regards to the complicity of Mehmet Resit38 in relation to the murder of his father,
Abidin Nesimi wrote the following:
Did Dr. Resit give any orders for the murder of my father? Or did this event
occur without his knowledge? We can find the answers of these questions in
Resit’s memoirs. . .. In these [memoirs], Dr. Resit writes that he was extremely
respectful towards my father and that my father had possessed the quality of
rendering great services to the nation and that it was impossible for him to
give orders for the murder of my father. Quite naturally I cannot be expected
to have sympathies for Dr. Resit as my father was killed by a mobile gendarme
regiment that was recalled by this name. I have made researches on Dr. Resit.
I have inquired about Dr. Resit fromhis friends who had been in exile in Tripoli
where he was also in exile and from other persons especially from the governor
of Tripoli, Giritli Celal Bey. Both the deceased Cami Baykurt and Celal Bey
had given testimony in his favor. I am of the opinion that Dr. Resit was a
well-intentioned, yet narrow-minded person.39
There are two significant problems with the way in which this account has been utilized:
1. Akcam has altered the sentence that reads “the liquidation of the [administrative]
cadre which would oppose the ‘pillage and plunder’ was inevitable”
into a different sentence that states “the administrative cadre that opposed
the ‘massacre’ had to be liquidated . . .”, which is yet another example
demonstrating how freely the author is altering words and replacing them
with his own insertions. As was the case in the Ahmet Refik instance, the
author substituted the words “pillage and plunder” with his own word
“massacre”.
2. Abidin Nesimi nowhere writes that the liquidation of the mentioned individuals
and his father was done on the orders of Mehmet Resit. To the contrary,
Abidin Nesimi points to a source giving the answer to this question and the
source in question indicates something entirely contrary to Akcam’s
allegation. Once again, Akcam has attributed a false opinion to a source
that does not support his claims.
The Alleged Dual Mechanism
Akcam also makes some comments on the character of Talat Pasha, the Ottoman Interior
Minister (pp. 169–170), which are intended to establish his argument that Talat’s telegrams
ordering the protection of Armenians were merely written for silencing foreign
ambassadors and that these orders were subsequently cancelled by a coded cable, a
process he termed as a dual mechanism.40 While Akcam attempts to explain those
telegrams shown to the foreign ambassadors in the light of this argument, he is unable
to explain numerous confidential and ciphered telegrams not intended for public
consumption, which contain similar instructions. And in order to explain away such
inconveniences the author’s theory is constructed upon selective use of sources and
the manipulation of his sources.
According to Akcam, Falih Rıfkı Atay said that “sending an order only to cancel it
shortly afterward by coded cable was business as usual for Talat” (p. 170). In this case
the author displays another example of his going beyond the source he refers to, and
adding interpretations that are not contained in the original source. The original
account of this episode, related by Atay, while not suggesting in any way that this is a
“business as usual for Talat”, makes no reference either to an “order” sent earlier:
One day, he [Talat] again called out for me from the office. There was an applicant
[man] next to him. He said: “Write a letter to the Mutasarrıf [sub-governor]
of Izmit and recommend them to definitely do the work of this Gentleman”.
I wrote and brought [the letter].He signed it. The (poor)man took the letter and
left by giving his thanks. A little later, they had told me that the minister [Talat]
wanted to see me. I went [to see him]. He said: “write a ciphered telegram to
the Mutasarrıf of Izmit and inform him that the letter I sent has no importance”.41
This is not quite the sort of evidence to substantiate such bold claims and the readers
might want to see more convincing evidence in order to accept the high-profile claims
Akcam has advanced about Talat with respect to the relocation of Armenians. In his
enthusiasm to prove his theory of dual mechanism, Akcam further claims that:
On 18 September 1915 cables sent from Kayseri, Eskisehir, Nigde, Diyarbakır,
report that all the Armenians had been deported from these provinces and that
none remained. (p. 177)
However, this is not at all the case in the documents to which Akcam refers. The telegram
sent from Eskisehir states that “the number of Armenians who were required to be dispatched
amounted to 7000” and that all (7000) of these Armenians were dispatched,42
which does not mean that no Armenians remained and that all were deported from
Eskisehir.43 In the case of Kayseri, the telegram mentions the presence of 4911
Armenians consisting of the soldiers’ families and, to a lesser extent, of Catholics
and Protestants who were left within the sanjak of Kayseri.44 It is again difficult to
understand how any scrupulous author can claim that no Armenians were left in the
mentioned places.
In conclusion, Akcam misrepresents his sources and the documents that he relies on
do not substantiate his thesis. Thus the author’s case on the alleged dual mechanism
remains poorly documented and unconvincing.
Akcam also creates misleading impressions on the reader by juxtaposing disparate
events. For instance, he quotes from a report that mentions an official named Huseyin
Kazım Bey who is said to be a good person trying to help and feed the Armenians
but faces difficulties from authorities and he fears the extermination of Armenians.
Immediately after quoting this document, Akcam writes: “Huseyin Kazım . . . later
wrote in his memoirs that 200,000 people were sacrificed to the evil designs of
Government, in Lebanon alone” (p. 186). Yet Huseyin Kazım’s statement had
nothing to do with Ottoman Armenians. Still less it had anything to do with a central
government policy. Huseyin Kazım uses the statement above in describing the
corruption of the provincial authorities that was rampant during the war:
There was a disgrace of silk corruption that no one can describe properly. The
bales of silks each of which amounted to 600 Lira (gold) in Germany and
Switzerland, has been bought at 300 Lira from their owners by [exerting] all
kinds of threats pressures swearwords and insults . . . To benefit from the
misery of the people, to be full through the hunger of the poor, and to find
life through their death has become a custom in the country. And those who
first broke this ground had been the high officials of the Government. Then,
it was seen that thousands of innocent men, women and children died everywhere
in the most terrible manner. In the unfortunate Lebanon alone, the
number of those poor who fell victim to the evil designs of the government
reaches to 150–200 thousand.45
By combining two totally unrelated events out of sequence, Akcamchanges the meaning
of the original account, and misleads his readers. It is also important to note that the
number “150–200 thousand” in Huseyin Kazım’s account has become simply
“200,000” in Akcam’s text.
CONCLUSION
The examples displayed in this study cast doubt on Taner Akcam’s approach as being
impartial and scholarly. To the contrary, such manipulations point to an extremely
partisan attitude, dominated by preconceived ideas that in turn have led the author to
manipulate the sources he has utilized in service of his pre-arranged conclusions.
Akcam’s work suffers from a lack of honesty with which he has evidently approached
his subject, and the implications of his intentional manipulations shed considerable
light on the credibility that could be attached to his work. As Akcam himself stated
elsewhere, “suspicion within the academic community as to whether or not sources
have been honestly and accurately presented is something that can poison the entire
scientific milieu”.46 Within this framework, Taner Akcam’s dishonesty—which manifests
itself in the form of numerous deliberate alterations and distortions misleading
quotations and doctoring of data—casts doubt on the accuracy of his claims as well as
his conclusions. Accordingly, serious readers and researchers alike should approach
Akcam’s work and claims with a great caution. This tainted volume can neither be
considered “the state of the art in this field”, as Erik Jan Zu rcher has written, nor the
“best book ever written on Armenian Genocide”, as Stephen Feinstein claims but as
an example of poor editing, badly supported conclusions and, most importantly,
of unethical and partisan scholarship that calls for further, more balanced and
thorough research.
NOTES
1. Taner Akcam,Insan Hakları ve Ermeni Sorunu, Ittihat ve Terakki’den Kurtulus Savası’na [Human Rights and the Armenian Question, from the [Committe of] Union and Progress to Liberation War], Ankara: Imge Kitabevi, 1999.
2. Edward J. Erickson, “Re-examining History: Armenian Massacres: New Records Undercut Old
Blame”, Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3, Summer 2006, pp. 67–75; and Guenter Lewy, The
Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide, Salt Lake City, UT: The University of
Utah Press 2005, pp. 82–88.
3. Cemal Kutay, Birinci Dunya Harbinde Teskilat-ı Mahsusa Ve Hayber’de Turk Cengi [The [Ottoman]
Special Organization in the WWI and the Turkish Battle in Khayber], Istanbul: Tarih Yayınları, 1962,
pp. 17–18.
4. Nedim Ipek, Rumeli’den Anadolu’ya Turk Gocleri (1877–1890) [The Turkish Migrations from Balkans to
Anatolia (1877–1890)], Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1994, p. 207.
5. Mustafa Aksakal, “Defending the Nation, The German-Ottoman Alliance of 1914 and the Ottoman
Decision for War”, Unpublished PhD thesis Princeton University, NJ, 2003, p. 150.
6. Ibid, p. 139.
7. Feroz Ahmad, “Review of Germany and The Ottoman Empire 1914–1918, by Ulrich Trumpener”,
Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 6, No. 1, 1970, pp. 104–105. Also see Michael A. Reynolds “The
Ottoman–Russian Struggle for Eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus 1908–1918: Identity, Ideology
and the Geopolitics of World Order”, Unpublished PhD thesis Princeton University, NJ, 2003.
8. Nejdet Bilgi, Yozgat Ermeni Tehciri Davası [The Trial for the Yozgat Armenian Relocation], Istanbul:
Kitabevi Yayınları, 2006, pp. 205–208, “Vakit Versiyonu” [“The Daily Vakit Version”] and
pp. 208–211, “Yeni Gazete Versiyonu” [“The Daily Yeni Gazete Version”].
9. Ibid, pp. 202–205, “Memleket Versiyonu” [“The Daily Memleket Version”].
10. Sina Aksin, Istanbul Hukumetleri ve Milli Mucadele [The Istanbul Governments and the National
Struggle], Vol. 1, Istanbul: Is Bankası Yayınları, 2004, p. 204; and Ferudun Ata, IsgalIstanbul’unda
Tehcir Yargılamaları [The Relocation Trials in Occupied Istanbul], Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 2005,
pp. 141–142.
11. Irade-i Milliye, 2 October 1919, quoted in Hulki Cevizoglu,Isgal ve Direnis 1919 ve Bugun [The Occupation and Resistance, 1919 and Today], Istanbul: Ceviz Kabugu Yayınları, 2007, p. 25.
12. Maurice Larcher, La Guerre Turque dans la Guerre Mondiale [Turkish War in the Great War], Paris:
Etienne Chiron; Berger-Levrault, 1926, p. 602: “L’anatolie avait en outre perdu 500,000 mussulmans
des vilayets orientaux, victimes ou fugitifs de la guerre; 800,000 Armeniens et 200,000
Grecs victimes de deportations ou de´ce´de´s dans les battalions de travailleurs” [“Anatolia had also
lost 500,000 Muslims from the eastern provinces as victims or fugitives of the war; 800,00
Armenians and 200,000 Greeks as victims of the deportations or those who died in the labor
battalions”].
13. Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, TurkInkıla bı Tarihi [The History of the Turkish Revolution], Vol. 3, Part 3, Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1983, pp. 8–9.
14. Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Ataturk Hayatı ve Eseri [AtaTurk, His Life and Work], Vol. 1, Ankara: AKDTYK
Ataturk Arastırma Merkezi, 1990, p. 182.
15. Lewy, The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey, op. cit., pp. 73–82; Ata, Isgal Istanbul’unda Tehcir Yargılamaları [The Relocation Trials in Occupied Istanbul], op. cit.; Falih Rıfkı Atay, Cankaya: Ataturk’un Dogumundan Olumune Kadar [Cankaya, From Ataturk’s Birth Till His Death], Istanbul: Bates, 1998, pp. 218–230.
16. Husamettin ErTurk,Iki Devrin Perde Arkası [Behind the Curtain of Two Eras],Istanbul: Hilmi Kitapevi,
1957, pp. 370–373.
17. Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Turkiye’de Siyasi Partiler [Political Parties in Turkey], Vol. 3, Istanbul: Iletisim
Yayınları, 2000, p. 674.
18. Andrew Mango, “Minorities and Majorities”, Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 23, No. 4, 1987, p. 519.
19. M. E. Yapp, “Review of The History of the Armenian Genocide, by V.N. Dadrian”, Middle Eastern
Studies Vol. 32, No. 4, 1996, p. 397.
20. Atay, Cankaya [Cankaya], op. cit., pp. 219, 223–224.
21. Refik Halid Karay, Minelbab Ilelmihrab [From Gate to Mihrab], Istanbul: Inkılap-Aka Kitabevleri,
1964, pp. 195–196.
22. Ata, Isgal Istanbul’unda Tehcir Yargılamaları [The Relocation Trials in Occupied Istanbul], op. cit.,
pp. 258–259; Bayram Akca, “1915 Ermeni Tehciri ve Urfa Mutasarrıfı Nusret Bey’in I damı”
[“The 1915 Armenian Relocation and the Execution of Nusret Bey, the Sub-Governor of Urfa”],
Ermeni Arastırmaları 1. Turkiye Kongresi Bildirileri [Papers of the 1st Turkey Congress of Armenian
Studies], Vol. 2, Ankara: ASAM, 2003, p. 28; and Bayram AkCa, “Mondros Mu tarekesi’nden
Sonra Ermeni Tehciri Nedeniyle Kurulan Divan-ı Harp Mahkemelerinde (Nemrut) Mustafa
Pasa’nın Rolu” [“The Role of (Nemrut) Mustafa Pasha in the Court-martials Set Up for the
Armenian Relocation After the Armistice of Mudros)”], Ermeni Arastırmaları 2. Turkiye Kongresi
Bildirileri [Papers of the 2nd Turkey Congress of Armenian Studies], Vol. 1, Ankara: ASAM, 2007, p. 608.
23. Turkkaya Ataov, Another Falsification: Statement (1926) Wrongly Attributed to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Ankara: Sistem Ofset, 1988. For Mustafa Kemal’s views on the Armenian Question, see Ismet
Gorgulu , Ataturk’ten Ermeni Sorunu [The Armenian Question from Ataturk], Ankara: Bilgi, 2002.
24. Kutay, Birinci Dunya Harbinde Teskilat-ı Mahsusa [The [Ottoman] Special Organization in the WWI],
op. cit., p. 18: “Turklerden gayrı ırk ve milletlerin ekseriyeti teskil ettikleri yerlerde . . .”.
25. Akcam, Insan Hakları ve Ermeni Sorunu [Human Rights and the Armenian Question], op. cit., p. 213:
“Mu tareke sonrası, Sabah gazetesi 13 Aralık 1918’de Albay Seyfi’nin, Osmanlı Karargahındaki
Siyasi S ube’nin sorumlusu olarak, Bahaettin Sakir ile yakın isbirligi iCinde, Teskilat-ı Mahsusa
eliyle Ermenilerin katledilmesini planlayanlardan oldugunu acıkladı”.
26. Since the book under review is the English translation of another book, one might wonder whether it
is the translator who is to be blamed for the manipulations and the discrepancies with original
sources. However, the readers should be aware that the inaccuracies presented in this study are
also present in the original Turkish version of Taner Akcam’s study.
27. Kutay, Birinci Dunya Harbinde Teskilat-ı Mahsusa [The [Ottoman] Special Organization in the WWI],
op. cit., p. 60: “. . . Ege mıntıkasında ve bilhassa sahillerde yuvalanmıs ve kumelenmis olan
1.150.000 Rum-Ermeni nu fus daha harbin baslamasından kısa zaman evvel ve harbin ilk aylarında
iCeri alınmamıs olsa idi, C anakkale mu dafaasının bile mumkun olamıyacagı gun gibi asikar idi”.
28. The population figures given by Esref Kuscubasi are as follows: “120,000 in the region of Ayvalik
gulf; 90,000 in the C anakkale region (including the town itself); 190,000 in the capital of Izmir;
130,000 in the region from Urla peninsula and southeast Izmir to C esme; 80,000 in the environs
of Aydın; 150,000 in the environs of Akhisar, and Manisa, Alasehir, Usak and its environs”. Apart
from this Kuscubasialso gives figures for the Aegean islands of Mtylene, Chios and Samos.
However the Ottoman Empire had lost these islands in 1912–1913, therefore any Ottomancontrolled
population movement on these islands would be out of question. See Celal Bayar, Ben
de Yazdım: Milli Mucadeleye Giris [I Too Have Written: Joining the National Struggle], Vol. 5, Istanbul:
Baha Matbaası, 1967, p. 1576.
29. A. Mil, “Umumi Harpte Teskilatı Mahsusa” [“The [Ottoman] Special Organization in the Great
War”], Vakit, No. 13, November 15, 1933, p. 5: “Erzurumdan Cıktıklarını sifre ile bildirdiginiz
eshas iCin tertibatı lazıme alınmıstır. HerCibadabat onları elde edebilmek iCin icap edenlere teslimat
verdim . . . Bu husus hakkında bir iki gune kadar haber verecegimi umit ediyorum. Kumandanlık
teskilatımızın serbestii harekatı hakkında icap edenlere talimatı lazıme vermelidir”. Arif Cemil,
Birinci Dunya Savasında Teskilat-ı Mahsusa [The [Ottoman] Special Organization in WWI], Istanbul:
Arba Yayınları, 1997, pp. 45–46. A. Mil is the pseudonym for Arif Cemil (Denker). His memoirs
were first published pseudonymously in the Daily Vakit in 1933–1934. In 1997 these memoirs
were republished by Arba Yayınları in the form of a book under the real name of its author, Arif
Cemil (Denker). For readers’ convenience, both items are cited in this review.
30. Ibid, No. 14, November 16, 1933, p. 5: “Hilmi Bey’in mektubunda iki noktai nazarı dikkati celbeder.
Bunlardan birisi Erzurumdan hareketleri Bahaettin Sakir Bey tarafından bildirilen bazı eshasın yolda
yakalanmaları, daha dogrusu imha edilmeleri . . .” Arif Cemil, Teskilat-ı Mahsusa [The [Ottoman]
Special Organization], op. cit., p. 46.
31. Ibid, No. 98, February 10, 1934, p. 5: “Doktor Bahattin Sakir bey Istanbul’da artık teskilatı mahsusanın harici du smanlara taalluk eden islerinden sarfınazar ederek memleketin dahili dusmanlarıyla mesgul olmıya karar vermisti. C unku Doktor Bahaettin Sakir bey Erzurumda ve Kafkas cephesinin diger noktalarında gecirdigi dort bes ay zarfında pek Cok hakikatlere sahit olmustu. Ermenilerin Turkiye’ye karsı takındıkları tavır ve Rus ordusuna ettikleri yardım kendisinde harici dusman kadar dahili dusmandan da korkmak lazım geldig i kanaatını hasıl etmisti. Dahildeki Ermeniler cete teskiliyle ordumuzun arkasını tehdit ve hattı ric’atını kesmeye Calısıyorlardı”. Arif Cemil, Teskilat-ı Mahsusa [The [Ottoman] Special Organization], op. cit., p. 240.
32. Ibid, No. 100, February 12, 1934, p. 5: “. . . Doktor Bahaettin Sakir bey bunları Istanbul’da Ittihat ve
terakki merkezi umumisinin dikkati nazarına koyarak orduyu Buyukbir tehlikeden kurtarmak iCin
alınacak tedbirleri muzakere ile mesgul bulunuyordu. Bu mu zakereler nihayet tehcir kanunun nesri
ile neticelenmisti. Doktor Bahaettin Sakir bey bir muddet sonra Kafkas cephesine avdet ettigi
zaman yeni vaziyet tamamiyle taayyun etmis bulunuyordu. Fakat gene bu noktalara temas edemeden
geCeceg iz. C unku Ermenilerin tehciri meselesi teskilatı mahsusa mevzuunun busbu tun haricinde
kalmaktadır”. Arif Cemil, Teskilat-ı Mahsusa [The [Ottoman] Special Organization], op. cit.,
pp. 245–246.
33. Vahakn N. Dadrian, “Ottoman Archives and Denial of the Armenian Genocide”, in The Armenian
Genocide: History, Politics Ethics ed. Richard Hovannisian, London: MacMillan, 1992, pp. 300–301.
34. Kutay, Birinci Dunya Harbinde Teskilat-ı Mahsusa [The [Ottoman] Special Organization in the WWI],
op. cit., p. 18: “Bunlar gercekten gizli.. tutuldugu icin kabine azasının bile mechulu idiler.
Hatta cok iyi hatırlarım. Bir gun Talat Pasa, yarı saka yarı ciddi: ‘—Esref Beyefendi . . . Sizin
hukumet teskilatından bize anlatabileceginiz haberler yok mu?’ demisti. Bunu da, digerlerinin
duymaması icin yavasca kulagıma soylemisti. O tarihte Dahiliye Nazırı ve iktidarda olan siyasi
Fırka’nın tabii reisi sayılan bir zatın dahi, boylecesine sitem mevzuu yapacak kadar mahrem addedilen
Calısmaları nelerdi?”
35. Ahmet Refik, Iki Komite Iki Kıtal [Two Committees Two Massacres], Ankara: KebikeC Yayınları, 1994,
pp. 38–39: “Ermenilerin en ziyade korktukları Pozantı idi. Orada, Cetelerin hucumu kalblerini
titretiyordu. Bunlar hangi Cetelerdi? Ittihat hukumetinin Turan siyaseti, Islam ittihadı namına
Kafkasya’ya gonderdigi Cetelerdi”.
36. In his memoirs Abidin Nesimi also discusses the Armenian question—and his overall opinion is that
the central committee of CUP wanted an orderly relocation of Armenians and did not want to harm
the innocent Armenians but the Kurdish militia forces seized this moment as an opportunity for
plunder and massacre, and the CUP partly overlooked this situation but also attempted to punish
the guilty. Given the sharp difference of this interpretation to the narrative of Akcam, the omission
of these details also leaves the reader with quite an unbalanced opinion as regards the murder of
the officials mentioned as well as Abidin Nesimi’s opinion on this issue. See Abidin Nesimi, Yılların
Icinden [During the Years], Istanbul: Gozlem, 1977, pp. 41–45.
37. Ibid, pp. 39–40: “Dr. Resit Irakta bulundugu donemde ve daha sonra Diyarbakır valilig i sırasında
faili bulunamayan birCok cinayetler olmustur. Bunların iCinde en onemlileri Basra Valisi Ferit’in,
Mu ntefek mutasarrıfı Bedi Nuri’nin, Lice kaymakamı babam Hu seyin Nesimi’nin, Besiri kaymakam
vekili Sabit’in, gazeteci Ismail Mestan’ın vb. olduru lmeleridir . . . Bu cerkez jandarma ekibi ve milis
Kurtler olan Bedirhani, Milli ve Karakecili asiretleri mensuplarıyla Ermeni tehcirinin gerceklestirilmesi imkansızdı. Cunku bu kadro yagma ve talan kadrosudur. Bu yuzden bu kadro tehciri
yapamamıs ve onu katliama donusturmustu r. Yagma ve talanı gerceklestirmeye muhalefet edecek
kadronun da tasfiyesi kacınılmazdı”.
38. This article primarily aims to focus on the manner in which Akcam has utilized his sources. Therefore
the role and the responsibility of Dr. Resit is beyond the scope of this study. On this matter, see
Mithad Sukru Bleda, Imparatorlugun Cokusu [The Fall of the [Ottoman] Empire], Istanbul: Remzi
Kitabevi, 1979, pp. 56–59.
39. Abidin Nesimi, Yılların Icinden [During the Years], op. cit., pp. 45–46: “Babamın oldurulmesi olayında
Dr. Resit’in bir emri var mıdır? Yoksa bu olay onun bilgisi dısında mı olmustur? Bu soruların cevabını
Dr. Resit’in ‘Mudafaaname’ sinden ogrenebiliriz . . . Bu ‘Mudafaaname’ sinde Dr. Resit, babama karsı
son derece hurmetkar oldugunu, vucudunun millete Buyukfaydalar bırakacag ı nitelikte oldugunu,
onun oldurulmesine emir vermesinin imkansız oldugunu yazmıstır. Pek dogaldır ki, babamın bu
adla anılan seyyar jandarma mu frezesince olduruldugu icin Dr. Resit’e karsı sempatim olamaz.
Dr. Resit uzerine arastırmalar yaptım. Dr. Resit’i surgun bulundugu Trablusgarb’daki surgun arkadas
¸larından ve diger kisilerden, o zellikle Trablusgarb valisi Giritli Celal Bey den sorusturdum. Rahmetli
Cami Baykurt da, Celal Bey de onun lehinde sahadette bulunmuslardır. Dr. Resit’in iyi niyetli fakat
dar goru slu birisi oldugu kanısındayım”.
40. Guenter Lewy also characterizes the evidence presented by Taner Akcamfor his allegation of dual
mechanism as “slim”; see Lewy, The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey, op. cit., p. 112.
41. Falih Rıfkı Atay, Zeytindagı [The Olive Mountain], Istanbul: Bates, 1981, pp. 24–25: “Bir gun
yine kalemden Cagırtmıstı. Yanında bir mu racaatCı vardı: ‘Izmit mutasarrıfına bir mektup yazınız,
Beyfendinin isini mutlaka yapmasını tavsiye ediniz’, demisti. Yazıp goturdum. Imzaladı, adamcagız
mektubu aldı ve tesekku r ederek gitti. Biraz sonra nazırın yine beni istedigini soylediler. Gittim:
—Izmit mutasarrıfına bir sifre yaz. Gonderdig im mektubun bir ehemmiyeti yoktur, diye bildir, dedi”.
42. Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeniler (1915–1920) [Armenians in Ottoman Documents 1915–1920], Ankara: Devlet Arsivleri Genel Mudurlugu , 1995, p. 96, Document 111: “Liva dahilindeki Ermenilerden
ihracı ıˆcab edenler yedi bin raddesinde olup kaffesinin sevk edilmis oldugu arz olunur”.
43. The official Ottoman statistics cite the Armenian population of Eskisehir as 8807, while according
to the figures adopted by the British it was 10,000; for the comparative figures see Meir Zamir,
“Population statistics of the Ottoman empire in 1914 and 1919”, Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 17,
No. 1, 1981, pp. 100, 104.
44. Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeniler (1915–1920) [Armenians in Ottoman Documents 1915–1920], op. cit., p. 94, Document 109: “. . . dahil-i livada kalan do rt bin dokuz yu z on bir neferi asker a’ilesi ve
cu z’ıˆ mikdarı Protestan ve Katolik bakayası olmakla dahi yuzde bes nisbetinde koylere tevzıˆ’
kılınmakta oldugu ma’ruzdur”.
45. Hu seyin Kazım Kadri, Turkiye’nin C oku su [The Fall of Turkey], Istanbul: Hikmet 1992, pp. 204–205:
“Bir ipek yolsuzlugu rezaleti vardı ki bunu hakkıyla tasvire kimse muvaffak olamaz. Almanya’da ve
Isvicre’de altın para ile 600 yu z lira tutan her bir balya ipek sahiplerinin elinden bin bir tu rlu tehditler,
tazyikler, ku fu r ve hakaretler ile 300 kagıda alındı . . . Halkın sefaletinden yararlanmak, fukaranın
aClıgıyla doymak, o lumu yle hayat bulmak, memlekette alıskanlık halini aldı. Ve bu Cıg ırı aCan
hukumetin Buyukmemurları oldu. O zaman her tarafta binlerce gu nahsız adamların, kadınların ve
Cocukların en feci halde du sup oldu kleri goruldu . Yalnız su bedbaht Lubnan’da hukumetin suikastına
kurban giden zavallıların sayısı 150–200 bine Cıkar”.
46. Taner Akcam, “Anatomy of a Crime: The Turkish Historical Society’s Manipulation of Archival
Documents”, Journal of Genocide Research, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2005, p. 273.
