Turkish Forum

Month: March 2015

  • Natural Gas and the Cyprus Question

    Natural Gas and the Cyprus Question

    Turkeyresearch: “Natural Gas and the Cyprus Question”

    Author: Assistant Professor Tolga Demiryol, İstanbul Kemerburgaz University Date: Mar 19, 2015

    Abstract

    Can the natural gas reserves off the coast of Cyprus be a panacea to finally bring the enduring conflict on the island to a peaceful conclusion? Or will energy be yet another factor further widening the rift between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities? Evidence indicates that energy resources have so far aggravated rather than placated the tensions in Cyprus. The discovery of natural gas in the Aphrodite field, and the ongoing drilling efforts in adjacent blocks, have not only re-animated existing disputes like the demarcation of maritime borders but also spawned new issues including the distribution of future gas revenues between the two communities. The Turkish and Greek communities are currently caught in a deadlock, where neither party has sufficient incentives to coordinate. This article describes two scenarios in which the gas-powered conflict in Cyprus can unfold: 1) a grand consensusscenario, under which the disputing parties would insist on the resolution of all political disputes as a precondition for energy cooperation, 2) alimited bargaining scenario, where actors would choose to prioritise resource development over the settlement of political conflicts, with the expectation that the resulting energy interdependence would generate robust incentives for political settlement. While the latter scenario is achievable in principle, it would nonetheless face serious constraints in practice, including the domestic political costs of energy cooperation, volatile market conditions (discovery of additional gas reserves and the declining global energy prices), the availability of alternative markets and suppliers, as well as  potentially disruptive regional geopolitical dynamics .

    Introduction

    When significant gas reserves were finally confirmed in the Eastern Mediterranean, some analysts spotted in them a glimmer of hope for peace and prosperity in the region, particularly in Cyprus (Bryza, 2013; Grigoriadis, 2014; Gürel and Le Cornu, 2014; International Crisis Group, 2012; Khadduri, 2012; Pericleous, 2012; Van Rompuy, 2012; Wilson, 2014). The assumption underlying the proposition that energy could be a facilitator of peace in Cyprus is straightforward: the discovery of natural gas and the prospect of additional riches raise the opportunity costs of the present stalemate between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot administrations, providing “dollars-and-cents reasons for easing the estrangement or bringing it to an end” (Wilson, 2014: 105). Assuming that actors sufficiently value the absolute gains to be obtained from the monetization of natural resources, they would thus be extra-incentivised to resolve any outstanding political conflicts that stand in the way of profits.

    Natural resources, however, could be a ‘curse’ as well as a blessing, as history has revealed repeatedly. Contrary to the widespread expectations that potential energy wealth would facilitate cooperation, the prospect of natural gas bounty so far deepened and complicated the disagreements in Cyprus.

    The gradual escalation of energy-fueled tensions between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities over the past few years reached a critical juncture on October 7, 2014 when President Anastasiades unilaterally suspended UN-mediated peace talks. The official reason for the suspension was Turkey’s plans to search for oil and gas in waters where the Greek Cypriot-administered Republic of Cyprus (RoC) had declared its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), a decision that has been disputed by both Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Following the collapse of talks, the National Council of Cyprus announced a series of measures against Turkey, including blocking Turkey’s bid for EU membership. The RoC took the matter to the European Council meeting on October 23-24, upon which the Council officially urged Turkey “to respect Cyprus’ sovereignty over its territorial sea and Cyprus’ sovereign rights in its EEZ” (European Council, 2014). Ankara did not budge from its firm stance. In the National Security Council meeting on October 30, Turkey re-affirmed that it would take any measures necessary to defend TRNC and its sovereign rights. On November 9, Bülent Bostanoğlu, the Commander of Turkish Naval Forces, announced that Turkey continued to monitor the activities of Cypriot and Israeli elements and, if needed, the Turkish Navy would act in accordance with the rules of engagement.

    As of February 2015, there is no indication of when, if ever, the reunification talks would resume.

    How We Arrived at the Current Deadlock

    The energy landscape of the Eastern Mediterranean changed dramatically over the past five years. Following the major gas discoveries offshore Israel (Tamar field in 2009 and Leviathan field in 2010), in December 2011 another deep water reserve was confirmed off the coast of Cyprus. The so-called Aphrodite field was initially appraised to contain more than 200 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas, while later studies revised it down to 140 bcm. Despite the smaller than expected size of the reserves, Cyprus will have almost all of its gas available for exportation, given its limited domestic energy consumption.

    Besides the neighborhood countries like Egypt and Jordan, the two most important export destinations for the Eastern Mediterranean gas are Turkey and the European Union (EU), both of which are seeking to diversify their energy imports. Several alternative methods for gas exports are on the table, although parties are yet to agree on a solution that is both commercially and politically feasible. One option would be to construct an undersea pipeline from Israel and Cyprus to Greece. The so-called Eastern Mediterranean Gas Pipeline, however, presents a number of technical difficulties due to its length and construction depth, raising its costs considerably.[1] The other alternative that is particularly favored by the RoC is to construct a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) plant in Vasilikos in Southern Cyprus. The cost of the Vasilikos plant is estimated at US$10 billion but the Aphrodite gas alone will not be enough to make the plant financially viable. Unless additional reserves are discovered over the next two years, the only option for Cyprus would be to supply gas from Israel.[2] Given the high costs of Eastern Mediterranean Gas Pipeline and the Vasilikos plant, most industry experts agree that the best option to export Leviathan and Aphrodite gas would be a pipeline from Israel via Cyprus to Turkey. This route would be considerably cheaper, at approximately US$ 2.5 billion (Bryza, 2013: 39). The pipeline to Turkey would also provide Israel and Cyprus direct access to both Turkish and European markets. Once the gas reaches the port of Ceyhan in Southern Turkey, it would directly enter Turkey’s extensive pipeline system for domestic consumption as well as re-export via the planned the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) across Turkey and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) to Europe.

    Given the export options on the table, there is some validity in the proposition that the Cypriot gas offers mutual benefits to all parties involved, including the TRNC, the RoC and Turkey. The RoC and TRNC could share the revenue to be generated by the monetization of Cyprus’ gas. Turkey would not only diversify its natural gas imports but also can potentially be a part of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Corridor to Europe, which would in turn strengthen Ankara’s claim to be a critical asset for the EU’s energy security. Despite the considerable expected benefits from cooperation, however, energy resources have only further divided the parties.

    One major source of the divide between Turkey/TRNC and the RoC is the demarcation of maritime borders and the EEZs. In preparation for oil and gas exploration, the RoC has signed the EEZ delimitation agreements with Egypt (2003) and Lebanon (2007) and then passed a law in February 2007, defining 13 offshore drilling areas. Turkey and the TRNC protested fervently, claiming that the demarcation of maritime jurisdiction areas should be managed through arrangements among all concerned parties (Eissler and Arasıl, 2014; Stocker, 2012). After the RoC signed a critical EEZ agreement with Israel in 2010, Turkey reciprocated this by completing a maritime delimitation agreement with the TRNC in September 2011. In response to what was perceived as the RoC’s unilateralism, the TRNC issued a license to Turkish state-owned Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı (Turkish Petroleum Corporation) TPAO for drilling in several offshore blocks, some overlapping with those of the RoC. Turkey also threatened to blacklist energy companies that are partaking in RoC’s drilling tenders but this tactic failed to stop Italy’s Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (Integrated Energy Company) (ENI) and South Korea’s Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS) from obtaining new licenses for adjacent blocks in 2013.

    Turkey/TRNC and the RoC not only disagree on who can explore gas and where but also how the future revenues from gas exports will be shared by the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Being in charge of the internationally recognised RoC, the Greek Cypriots claim that they have the sole sovereign right to develop the natural resources of the island. The RoC does not necessarily dispute that the island’s natural resources belong to both communities but maintains that revenues will be shared with the Turkish Cypriots only within the federal framework of a unified Cyprus. In contrast, Turkey and the TRNC object that the Greek Cypriots alone cannot represent the island, which they claim is against the 1960 Cyprus Accords and Constitution (Gürel and Le Cornu, 2014: 18). Turkey and the TRNC hold that the Greek Cypriots should not exploit resources before reaching a comprehensive political settlement.

    From Grand Consensus to Limited Bargaining

    The situation in Cyprus is thus currently deadlocked primarily because both Turkey/TRNC and the RoC insist on the settlement of all political and legal disputes before either party can legitimately explore for and export any natural gas. Part of the problem here stems from the fact both parties expect that the other side will make some political concessions. The underlying rationale most likely is that “each side assumes that the other has a greater need for the resolution of tensions than they do” (Gürel and Mullen, 2014). Turkey/TRNC assume that given the state of the RoC’s economy, the Greek Cypriots are in dire need of the revenue that natural gas exports would bring in. The assumption underlying Turkey’s position is that since the most feasible export routes necessitate Turkey’s cooperation, the RoC will have little choice but to eventually give in. Similarly, Greek Cypriots likely calculate that their Turkish counterparts will be inclined to compromise, if they want to receive any share of the energy bounty at all. The RoC is also aware that there are limits to Turkey’s aggressive posture. Despite all the military muscle flexing by Ankara, an open military confrontation between Turkey and the RoC would indeed be all but inconceivable, assuming Turkey prefers to retain its bid for EU membership. This strategic predicament reinforces the current deadlock by reducing the incentives for either side to assume a more cooperative stance.

    Is there a way to break the deadlock? The short answer is a qualified ‘yes.’ A pathway out of this situation can be drawn if the disputing parties manage to provisionally delink the settlement of political issues from the prospect of energy cooperation.

    Theoretically speaking, there are two alternative approaches to developing natural resources under conditions of political conflict: grand consensus and limited bargaining.[3] The grand consensus scenario postulates that parties must settle all political conflicts before they can move onto the development of natural resources (O’Sullivan, 2012). This scenario is based on the premise that political stability is a requirement for economic cooperation. In the absence of political stability it would be difficult to attract sufficient investment into the major energy projects or guarantee the security of critical energy infrastructure. Grand consensus thus requires that the actors settle their legal and political disputes before they can realistically consider an energy partnership.

    This is indeed the very scenario that has so far been played out in Cyprus, albeit with no success. The RoC insists that gas revenues are to be shared by the two communities only within the framework of a federal government, i.e. after a grand political consensus is achieved. The position of Turkey and the TRNC, while it differs from that of the RoC, also requires a political settlement before the resources can be developed. In the absence of an initial political consensus in Cyprus, this scenario has collapsed into a tug-of-war between Turkish and Greek Cypriot administrations. The RoC pushes for unilateral resource development while arguing the revenue sharing will be contingent on a final political settlement, whereas Turkey/TRNC keeps the tensions high through diplomatic pressure and military muscle flexing in order to force the RoC’s hand to accept more amenable terms of resolution.

    An alternative scenario would involve striking a limited bargain where disputing parties jointly undertake resource development instead of requiring that complex legal and political disputes be settled first. As O’Sullivan puts it, actors would “agree to disagree” (O’Sullivan, 2012) in this scenario.  This does not mean that they renounce any of their legal claims or completely drop their political agenda. Rather, they temporarily set aside or freeze any outstanding issues and set up a basic regulatory framework for limited, targeted cooperation. Such a framework would contain the necessary guidelines and guarantees under which resource exploration, development and monetization as well as revenue sharing would take place. Under the limited bargaining scenario, the final resolution of political issues remains pending until economic cooperation generates stronger incentives for the disputing parties to switch to more cooperative political strategies.

    The argument that the disputing parties should prioritise resource development over the settlement of political issues may appear infeasible at first glance. There are, however, some historical precedents where parties with outstanding political conflicts managed to cooperate. In 1979, Thailand and Malaysia struck an agreement to exploit the natural resources of the Gulf of Thailand by postponing the settlement of their outstanding disputes over the delimitation of maritime borders (O’Sullivan, 2012; Thao, 1999).  In the 1970s, Germany and the Soviet Union decided to set aside their various disputes including unresolved border issues, to establish a long-lasting gas partnership (Stern, 2005). Even in Cyprus, there have been elementary forms of ad hoc energy cooperation. Following the major explosion in the Vasilikos power station in 2011, which supplied electricity to half of the Greek Cypriot population, the Turkish Cypriot administration decided to supply electricity to the south, even in the absence of recognition (Çalık, 2014).

    Domestic Politics, Global Markets and Regional Geopolitics

    The limited bargaining scenario is eminently more preferable than the grand consensus model but one must nonetheless carefully consider the obstacles to implementing a limited bargaining strategy in Cyprus. First, the limited bargaining scenario will require a minimum level of mutual trust. In the aftermath of the collapse of the peace talks in October 2014, the basic requirements of a productive dialogue are lacking in Cyprus. Both sides will need to undertake significant confidence-building measures, if they are to start working on the terms of a limited cooperation scheme. Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s visit to Greece in early December 2014 amidst the gas-dispute could be construed as an encouraging step in this direction but the lack of progress since then indicates that resetting the dialogue will require substantial political capital. In this regard, one obstacle to peace would be the political actors in both camps who may be risk-averse, unwilling to shoulder the political risks that a strategy of setting aside –even if temporarily– the deep-seated political divides could bring about. For instance, given the upcoming elections in Turkey, decision-makers will likely be risk averse and unwilling to appear as if they are making concessions on the Cyprus issue. Similarly, to some Greek Cypriot politicians the expected economic benefits from an energy partnership may be dwarfed by the potential political costs of cooperation with Turkey.

    Second, discovery of any new gas reserves in Cyprus –exploration continues in blocks adjacent to Aphrodite– would possibly impact the strategic calculations in both camps, albeit in complex ways. If Cyprus had more gas to sell to Turkey than it is currently estimated, this would likely incentivise Turkish policy makers to place a higher premium on absolute economic gains from cooperation, which would in turn reinforce the feasibility of the limited bargaining scenario. However, larger gas reserves would also strengthen the RoC’s hand. In this case the RoC would find it easier to finance costlier export options that do not require Turkey’s cooperation, which would in turn allow Nicosia to insist more strongly on political preconditions.

    Third, the availability of alternative markets and suppliers will shape the decision making of both Turkey and Cyprus. Ankara recently struck and agreement with Moscow to build the so-called ‘Turkish Stream,’ which will carry up to 63 bcm of Russian gas, 13 bcm of which will be retained for Turkey for domestic consumption. As part of the deal to build the Turkish Stream, Ankara is renegotiating gas prices with Moscow. The availability of larger Russian gas at a lower cost will likely dampen Turkey’s interest in Eastern Mediterranean gas for domestic consumption –even though Turkey will likely remain interested in transit opportunities. RoC, too, seems to be in search for regional alternatives to divert its gas to. On February 16th 2015 RoC signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Egypt. Egypt not only has a growing demand for natural gas but also the necessary LNG infrastructure that the RoC can use to export its gas.

    Fourth, the structural and cyclical changes in global energy markets will have critical regional repercussions. If oil prices continue to fall, then the feasibility of expensive energy projects like the East Mediterranean Gas Pipeline and the Vasilikos LNG plant will likely decline, incentivising the RoC to reconsider the pipeline to Turkey option. On the other hand, as oil remains relatively cheap, the attractiveness of the Eastern Mediterranean gas reserves could decline for investors as well as customers.

    Lastly, the geopolitical dynamics of the Eastern Mediterranean region will directly shape how the Cyprus conflict will unfold. On the one hand, new regional alliances are in the making, including the much-debated rapprochement among the RoC, Greece and Israel, where energy provides a bonding agent. How Turkey perceives of and responds to the realignment of regional interests will shape Ankara’s regional energy strategy. On the other hand, the preferences and strategies of major outside powers will be decisive for the Cyprus issue. The growing military and economic presence of Russia in the Eastern Mediterranean,[4] and the Kremlin’s unwavering support for the RoC’s right to develop the island’s natural resources, is a critical factor. The US, which is already involved in both regional energy projects and the Cyprus peace talks, can shape the strategic thinking of both Turkey/TRNC and the RoC by offering selective benefits for cooperation. The EU, which has so far been the least effective actor in the Eastern Mediterranean even though it has the largest stakes in the region, appears unlikely to play a larger role as a mediator.

    Conclusion

    After decades of constant conflict, punctuated by a few failed attempts at reconciliation, the peoples of Cyprus certainly deserve peace and prosperity. Following a mostly stagnant peace process since the failure of the Annan Plan in 2004, the discovery of natural resources had revitalised the hopes for peace in Cyprus. Indeed, the Aphrodite field, and the prospect for more energy wealth to be harvested from the region, could have very well been the push that the Cyprus peace process needed. The past few years, however, have shown that it is not a foregone conclusion that the prospect of energy wealth would inevitably incentivise the feuding parties to transcend their long-standing political quarrels in search for profits. Even the most optimistic observers would agree that energy has so far brought more conflict to Cyprus, not less.

    Yet all is not lost. While insisting on a grand political consensus as a precondition for energy cooperation has contributed to the collapse of the peace talks in Cyprus, a less ambitious but more practicable strategy of limited bargaining could help reset the peace process. If the Turkish and Greek communities find a way to provisionally and conditionally set aside their political and legal disputes for the sake of establishing a targeted, limited cooperation to develop the natural resources of the island, then it might be conceivable for the resulting economic interdependence to produce positive political externalities.

    The success of the limited bargaining strategy however depends on a number of factors, including the establishment of a minimum level of mutual trust and the political will on both parties to assume any domestic political costs associated with a more accommodating policy towards the other.  In addition, market conditions like the discovery of additional reserves in the region, the fluctuation of global energy prices as well as the availability of new regional markets and suppliers will change the costs and benefits of alternative export options. Lastly, geopolitical factors like the new regional alliances and the involvement of major extra-regional powers are among the key factors that will determine how the Cyprus peace process will unfold.

    Assistant Professor Tolga Demiryol, İstanbul Kemerburgaz University

  • Theresa May: I will change the law if police do not halt the ‘excessive and inappropriate’ use of them

    Theresa May: I will change the law if police do not halt the ‘excessive and inappropriate’ use of them

    Theresa_mayPolice condemned for using stop and search powers on 300 children aged under five

    • Nearly 300 children under the age of five stopped and searched across UK
    • Metropolitan Police stopped and frisked 184 under-fives in last five years
    • Scotland Yard said several children often stopped for being used by adults
    • Adults known to stash drugs, weapons or stolen goods on child or in pram 

    policeNearly 300 children under the age of five have been stopped and searched by police over the last five years, it has emerged.

    According to Emma Glanfield on Daily Online, Officers across the UK have been condemned for using their powers to stop and search toddlers on suspicion of a host of offences including drug or knife crime, possession of weapons and terrorism.

    Police said that in nearly all cases, officers had carried out the searches after believing the child had been an innocent party who had been used by adults to conceal drugs, weapons or stolen goods.

    Police can stop and search children under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which states that there is no requirement for an adult to be present during the search of under-10s.

    Officers from Metropolitan Police, the largest force in Britain, exercised their powers against under-fives the most – but Scotland Yard said it was because children are ‘among the most vulnerable in society’ and needed ‘safeguarding’.

    One former Met Police officer, who worked at border control at Heathrow Airport, said he believed stop and search powers on children were used only in exceptional circumstances.

    He said that on one occasion his team had firm intelligence that a couple with a baby were trying to transport drugs into the UK. However, when nothing was found on the two adults, officers decided not to search the child for fear of being condemned.

    He told The Sunday Times: ‘Can you imagine the headlines if we had searched the baby’s nappy and found nothing?’

    In total, Met Police officers in London have stopped and searched a total of 184 children under the age of five over the last five years.

    Greater Manchester Police was found to be the next prolific at stopping and searching children, with 45 toddlers frisked.

    While nearly 300 children aged under five have been stopped and searched across the UK during the last five years, a total of 612 children under the age of 10 – below the age of criminal responsibility – have also been searched.

    Last month, Home Secretary Theresa May announced plans to change the law regarding stop and search powers if police do not halt the ‘excessive and inappropriate’ use of them.

    Home Secretary Theresa May (pictured) announced plans last month to change the law regarding stop and search powers if police do not halt using them in an ‘excessive and inappropriate’ manner

    Ms May warned officers that she wanted to see a dramatic improvement in figures, which recently revealed that only one in every 10 of the searches ends in arrest.

    Stop and search has been frequently blamed for inflaming tensions between the public and the police.

    A recent report by the police watchdog found that more than a quarter of police stop and searches were ‘unlawful’ and risked promoting ‘major disorder’.

    Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary said that, in 27 per cent of cases, police failed to show they had reasonable grounds to carry out the search.

    Enver Solomon, director of evidence and impact at the National Children’s Bureau, told The Sunday Times: ‘The police should review how they deal with children and ensure they are always treated as having district separate needs from adults.’

    Releasing the figures for London, Scotland Yard said the majority of searches on children were to dectect and defer adults using youngsters to conceal weapons or drugs.

    A spokesman said: ‘The stop and search of individuals under 10-years-old represented only 0.02 per cent of total MPS stop and search activity in both 2011/2012 and 2012/2013.

    ‘Children are amongst the most vulnerable members of society. It is therefore vital that the MPS considers how best to safeguard them and promote their welfare in everything we do. ‘There are occasions when young children are concerned in crime and anti-social behaviour, and it is necessary for officers to undertake searches to allay or confirm suspicions without exercising their powers of arrest.

    ‘Any young child or baby being searched will be as a result of it being suspected that they are in some way the unsuspecting and innocent assistant in a criminal act.

  • Americana Shopping Center Bans Sale of Genocide T-Shirts

    Americana Shopping Center Bans Sale of Genocide T-Shirts

    Three young Armenian entrepreneurs rented a cart last month at the Americana — a large shopping-restaurant-theater complex in Glendale — to sell T-shirts, hats, and other clothing items advertised on their shop1915.com website.

    After Americana’s leasing staff approved their merchandise, Tina Chuldzhyan, Alex Kodagolian, and Armin Hariri (a rapper known as ‘R-Mean’) began selling their merchandise.

    On February 12, the opening day of their business, the three Armenians were unexpectedly told by Americana’s management to keep their cart family-friendly and remove all pictures of protests. Even though there were no pictures of any protests on the cart — just posters of people wearing the T-shirts on sale — Chuldzhyan told The California Courier that she immediately took down the posters to avoid any conflict with Americana.

    On Feb. 25, Americana issued an ultimatum telling Tina and her two partners that within 24 hours they had to change the kind of merchandise they were selling, claiming that there had been public complaints about the ‘genocide’ clothing. Otherwise, they would have three days to vacate the premises.

    Fearing that they were on the verge of eviction, the three entrepreneurs agreed not to display the Armenian T-shirts, and sell them only if requested by a customer. Later that afternoon, an Americana official reiterated that all clothing items with the ‘genocide’ theme had to be completely removed from the cart.

    This was a clear interference in the three Armenians’ business. Americana had no right to ban the sale of ‘genocide’ T-shirts — a violation of the owners’ freedom of expression. Furthermore, the T-shirts I saw while visiting the cart last week did not carry the word genocide, but had the following inscription: “WE ARE STILL HERE – 2015.” There were other T-shirts for sale displaying just the letter P for Pentagon Records, the name of the Armenian entrepreneurs’ company.

    It is not certain if anyone had actually complained to Americana’s management about the Armenian T-shirts. No one had ever said anything critical to the owners of the business. Moreover, even if someone had complained, does it follow that Armenian clothing, with or without the word genocide, should not be sold at Americana? This is a slippery slope! Should anyone complain about Holocaust and Genocide books being sold by Barnes & Noble bookstore at Americana, would the shopping center’s management ban the sale of such books? How about the movie theaters at Americana showing films that may be offensive to some shoppers?

    Realizing that Americana was violating her civil rights, Tina consulted an attorney to see what legal steps she could take to defend her business interests. She informed the lawyer that her contract with Americana did not prohibit the sale of genocide themed clothing. The contract simply restricted the sale of pornographic material, drug paraphernalia, and second hand merchandise. The attorney told Tina that even though Americana’s actions were clearly illegal, she had no choice but to comply, since she was up against a major corporation with a powerful legal team.

    While disappointed that she was unable to defend her legal rights, Tina decided to follow her attorney’s advice, and reluctantly complied with Americana’s illegal and draconian orders, not to lose her fledgling business. “I felt as if I was back in the prohibition days, selling bootlegged merchandise,” Tina told The California Courier.

    Last week, Tina continued to receive warnings from Americana not to display any genocide related clothing, even after she had taken down all other Armenian T-shirts, except the one that said, “WE ARE STILL HERE – 2015.”

    This controversy goes far beyond the personal interests of three young Armenians. Americana’s actions affect the civil rights of all tenants and the entire Armenian community, particularly on the eve of the Armenian Genocide Centennial. Glendale Armenians and city officials, who had granted Americana generous tax exemptions, should immediately intervene in this matter, by defending the rights of these three small business owners.

    Americana is owned by Rick Caruso who has enjoyed friendly relations with Glendale’s large Armenian community. Hopefully, Mr. Caruso will take the necessary corrective steps when he learns about his staff’s inappropriate and illegal actions.

    No one from Americana’s office responded to my phone call, after I left a message requesting an explanation for the ban on the sale of Armenian clothing.

  • CYPRUS MAIL: The spirit of Makarios in Anastasiades

    CYPRUS MAIL: The spirit of Makarios in Anastasiades

    Ioannis Kasoulides, a surprising emulation of Makarios

    By Loucas Charalambous

    I MUST admit I quite enjoy the foolish arguments used by our politicians and journalists when they attack the English, the Americans, the EU and officials of the UN. Given half an opportunity, they lash out against them, on the pretext that the above refuse to support our side, which is always in the right, and sit Turkey, which is always in the wrong, in the dock.

    They are accused of following a hypocritical policy of double standards. The nonsensical comments made by President Anastasiades on his Moscow trip combined with the US and British reaction gave this bunch the excuse to bombard us with their anti-American and anti-West sloganeering.

    This attitude explains how and why we are in the current mess. It is a sick mentality that is based on our political mythology of the last 50-plus years which maintains that for everything that has happened to this country the Turks and the West are to blame. We are completely blameless, the only ones without sin, but we are the envy of the whole world which has been constantly conspiring to destroy us.

    While we are listening to all this rubbish from the AKEL, DIKO and EDEK leaderships as well as from the rest of our political scoundrels who remain stuck in the Makarios political culture, we accept it. But when we hear this coming from the mouths of Anastasiades and Foreign Minister Ioannis Kasoulides, two men from DISY, the party set up some 40 years ago with the aim of fighting this sick political culture, destroying the myths, speaking honestly to people, modernising our primitive political attitudes, we can only despair.

    Both told us that the behaviour of the Western countries was hypocritical and Pharisaic because they did not condemn Turkey for its ‘invasion’ of the Cypriot EEZ whereas they wanted to crush President Putin over the Ukraine. Both are outraged when they are told that the two cases are very different. But they are.

    Our politicians, including Anastasiades and Kasoulides, pretend they do not know the Cyprus problem. Turkey does not recognise the Republic and that is the problem. Turkey’s position – much as we do not like it – is generally accepted by foreign countries and is along the following lines: The Greek Cypriots destroyed the partnership state of 1960, Turkish Cypriots have not been participating in it since 1964, they have set up on their own and therefore the Greek Cypriots represent only half of Cyprus; Greek Cypriots were not committed to a settlement that would lead to the establishment of a new partnership state, in contrast to the Turkish Cypriot who proved they were. For as long as this situation continues we will look after the rights of the Turkish Cypriots and will not allow the Greek Cypriots to usurp them.

    This is the argument Turkey uses to justify its incursions into the Cypriot EEZ from which we want the Americans and the British to kick her out. It is also the reason we are told that the two cases are not the same. It is understandable that Turkey’s actions infuriate the Greek Cypriots who have been inculcated with the mythology about the “Turkish Cypriot rebellion”, the evil US, back-stabbing Britain, nasty NATO, the hypocritical EU and virtuous, principled Russia by our political demagogues.

    Anastasiades and Kasoulides, after all these years, are emulating Makarios who thought he could play games in the ring in which the two world superpowers were sparring, with result that they crushed us. After all these years and with the benefit of hindsight, we have learnt nothing from these criminal mistakes.

    Neither Anastasiades nor Kasoulides – not to mention the other political dwarfs – have understood what our problem is. They continue the demagoguery and the frivolous political games instead of concentrating on finding a solution to the problem and explaining to people why it is necessary and the risks of leaving it unsolved.

    Küfi Seydali

    Comment by John Mavro:

    ‘Neither Anastasiades nor Kasoulides – not to mention the other political dwarfs – have understood what our problem is.”

    We cannot agree with the above conclusion of another otherwise very good and accurate commentary by Loucas Charalambous.

    The fact is that the entire ”system” of these, as Loucas accurately describes them, ”political dwarfs” ALWAYS have understood what our problem is. And what the (lucrative for them) consequences of such ”problem” for these thieves and embezzlers are.

    The truth of the matter is that ever since that fateful time that the foolish Makarios and his peasant thugs that made up ”government” of the day decided that the carefully designed 1960 constitution of this forsaken ”country” was ”unworkable” and required ”improvisation” by putting forward the infamous, catastrophic ”13 points” to change it, the writing was on the wall. For the eventual partition of the island.

    Which totally suited these thieves.

    By removing the TCs from the equation and effectively tearing up the ”constitution”, all the carefully thought out checks, balances and controls, not just between the two communities, but the effective functioning of the state, were eliminated.

    Clearing the way for these mafiosos to do as they please. To steal, plunder, accommodate their friends and family, protect their fellow embezzlers and ensure they did so without the prospect of being caught, never mind brought to court and punished.

    Thus the ”president”, ”ministers”, CBC governor, Attorney General, Auditor General etc could do as they pleased. Since their TC deputies had been forced out and simply were not in position to exercise checks and controls, as the constitution provided, over these criminals.

    Whose DNA and ”values” were always aligned to their self enrichment by whatever means available. And nothing was easier than the plundering of state resources with impunity. Since the way for such unhindered criminal activity had been opened up the elimination of the TCs from ”government”.

    Given this lucrative state of affairs, as well as the fact that most of these imbeciles have built up their ”political careers” on the perpetuation of the never ending Cyprus ”problem”, to expect them to want a settlement is the same as turkeys voting for Christmas. It would be fatal for them.

    It is clearly obvious all these backward looking, unintelligent, self serving peasant thugs know EXACTLY what the problem is. Including our alleged ”president” and his disappointing foreign minister.

    Unfortunately for the rest of the thinking sensible individuals, the obvious way forward of a win-win solution is in direct conflict of the ”interests” of these mafiosos. Who do not want a solution – under any circumstances.

    So expect more of the same: no ”asphyxiating” time deadlines, no arbitration, ”Cypriot led” ”talks” and process, no international conference by the guarantor powers, unanimity of the ”national (circus) council”, new strategy, removal of Mr Eide as he is, as the other 30 or so UN Secretary General special representatives before him were (which must be the most amazing convergence of probability theory of all time) pro Turkey and Turkish interests, no to a new Ban plan and just about every other mindless and mind numbing thing their (very small) minds can think of.

    Just like realistically we cannot expect the Sicilian mafia to make a conscious decision to self destruct by changing its ways, we can be as certain that Anastasiades will see out his five years with the Cyprus ”problem” very much alive and intact.

    Though he will be the last ”president” of the banana republic to achieve this.

    Because by the time little Nicholas, with the support of the AKEL Marxists is voted in as ”president”, the de jure partition of the island will have become a certain reality.

    And all’s well that ends well.

    For the well known ”ruling elite” scum whose criminal priorities, self enrichment and thieving, love of money, limitless greed, lack of vision and xenophobia always took precedence over the interests of their own motherland.

    In a civilized country these thugs would have been convicted of treason and just about every crime imaginable, branded traitors and shot.

    In this dysfunctional mafia state they will continue to be elected into ”government” so that they may continue with this destruction.

    We are our own worst enemies, who never learn from our mistakes.

    And have the ”leaders” we deserve to prove this

  • Turkey slams Greek minister for ‘stirring tension in Aegean’

    Turkey slams Greek minister for ‘stirring tension in Aegean’

    DHA Photo

    DHA Photo

    The recent actions and statements of the Greek defense minister are “unacceptable and are raising the tensions in the Aegean,” Turkey has said amid escalating tension between neighbors.

    “We invite the Greek government to display common sense and to take these irresponsible actions under control as soon as possible,” the Turkish Foreign Ministry said in a press release published March 7.

    The Aegean region has witnessed increasing tension between its neighbors, which particularly escalated after the election of the new Syriza government in Greece in January.

    Immediately after assuming the post, new Greek Defense Minister Panos Kammenos visited the disputed Aegean islets of Imia/Kardak with a military helicopter on Jan. 30.

    In another move that infuriated Ankara, Kammenos said in February that the Cyprus problem remains a subject of “invasion and occupation” for the Greek government.

    He criticized the presence of the Turkish seismic vessel Barbaros in the Exclusive Economic Zone in the eastern Mediterranean, calling it a “provocation.”

    Kammenos also said Greece planned to conduct a joint drill with the Greek Cypriot administration, Israel and possibly Egypt in the coming months.

    “It is clear that the continuation of these irresponsible actions will not serve any purpose other than increasing tensions in Turkish and Greek relations and in the Aegean,” the Turkish statement said. “It is also obvious that this attitude will harm the efforts toward the improvement of bilateral relations between the two countries and the settlement of disputes in the Aegean.”

    Turkey is determined to protect its rights and interests in the Aegean “by taking measures within the framework of international law,” the ministry added.

    The countries’ relations recently saw more tension over an aviation notice issued by Turkey for a 10-month military drill in the Aegean Sea.

    The Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) issued by Turkey sparked reaction from the Greekgovernment, which reportedly complained about the move to international organizations over a “violation of Greek integrity and flight safety.”

    Ankara then withdrew the warning, saying it had “mistakenly” declared inaccurate coordinates for long-distance dangerous areas.

    March/08/2015

      Küfi Seydali