Month: May 2009

  • An expanded Europe will benefit Britain

    An expanded Europe will benefit Britain

    Maintaining the momentum of EU accession, particularly in the western Balkans and Turkey, will strengthen the UK economycaroline flint LABOUR PARTY CONFERENCE 2008

    Five years ago the European Union expanded overnight, extending its boundaries to include 12 new members and 104 million more citizens. But not everyone was rejoicing. Euro-sceptics claimed that the EU’s influence would be too great – or maybe too small. Some panicked that millions of new EU citizens would swamp our labour market. Others feared that weaker economies would suck the funding away from the richer EU members. Many doubted that with so many voices around the table, anything would ever get done.

    Five years on, it’s clear that those sceptics were wrong. The EU is stronger for being broader: an expanded EU has vastly increased trading opportunities for British business, has increased security at home and in our neighbourhood and has weakened the case for creating a European super state.

    But making the case for further enlargement and more free movement is undoubtedly more difficult in a recession, when unemployment is rising and pressure on public services intense.

    We need to recognise that people’s perceptions of enlargement are not clear-cut. People have genuine fears over crime, job losses and over-crowded communities. But it’s important to separate myth from fact, to recognise what has gone right and to put forward the case for maintaining the momentum of EU accession, particularly in the western Balkans, but also in Turkey – a view echoed by the US president Barack Obama during his recent visit there.

    The case for further enlargement rests on more than the figures charting increased growth and trade flows, important though these are to the British economy. We need to be clear too about the benefits to regional stability and security, particularly at a time when crime increasingly knows no borders.

    Enlargement has transformed the countries of eastern Europe after decades of communism: anchoring democracy and market based economic systems; and promoting social progress and human rights.

    We should continue to take forward Turkey’s accession negotiations, too. Turkey is a country of huge economic potential and its position at the crossroads of Europe makes it a logical transit route for energy from both the Middle East and Central Asia, and a key force for stability and prosperity in the region. It’s in our interests to see the EU’s shared values and common standards grow beyond our current boundaries and extend, for the first time, to a majority Muslim country.

    Enlargement brings risks and it hasn’t always been easy. Joining the EU is not, nor should it be, a walk in the park. Back in the 1970s, the UK’s application for membership was rejected twice. Not so long ago, people railed when Spain and Greece applied to join.

    But we have shown in the past and we’ll show again in the future that we can manage the risks by setting rigorous standards: on fighting crime and corruption; on respect for human rights; by ensuring that countries that join the EU have the political and economic structures to cope and are in a position to contribute to the strength of the union.

    The future of Europe is yet to be written but it’s clear to me that the UK’s interests lie in seeing a union that moves forwards and outwards: one that delivers growth in the UK and a powerful platform for negotiating with other countries on issues that matter to British people. An expanded Europe will help deliver both these aims.

    guardian.co.uk, Friday 1 May 2009

  • COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION A KEY ELEMENT OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH TURKEY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

    COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION A KEY ELEMENT OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH TURKEY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

    WASHINGTON, D.C. (A.A) – 01.05.2009 – Counterterrorism cooperation is a key element of the USA’s strategic partnership with Turkey, a report by the U.S. Department of State said on Thursday.

    U.S. Department of State released Country Reports on Terrorism for 2008 and said in the part on Turkey that “domestic and transnational terrorist groups have targeted Turkish nationals and foreigners in Turkey, including, on occasion, USG personnel, for more than 40 years. Terrorist groups that operated in Turkey have included Kurdish nationalists, al-Qa’ida (AQ), Marxist-Leninist, and pro-Chechen groups.”

    “Turkish terrorism law defines terrorism as attacks against Turkish citizens and the Turkish state; this definition may hamper Turkey’s ability to interdict, arrest, and prosecute those who plan and facilitate terrorist acts to be committed outside of Turkey,” the report said.

    It said, “Turkish National Police and the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) conducted a successful series of raids against suspected AQ-affiliated terrorists.”

    The report said most prominent among terrorist groups in Turkey was PKK and it operated from bases in northern Iraq and directed its forces to target mainly Turkish security forces. “In 2006, 2007, and 2008, PKK violence claimed hundreds of Turkish lives,” it said.

    The report said, “the Turkish government has proposed a number of reforms to its counterterrorism and intelligence structure including increasing civilian control of counterterrorism operations and improving civil-military cooperation in CT efforts. The reform proposals predated 2008, but were given a sharper focus following the October 4 Aktutun attack.”

    “Turkey has consistently supported Coalition efforts in Afghanistan. Turkey has over 800 troops as well as a military training team in Kabul, a civilian Provincial Reconstruction Team in Wardak Province, and has undertaken training of Afghan police officials, politicians, and bureaucrats in Turkey,” it said. (EÖ)

    Source:  haber.turk.net01/05/2009

  • Turkish-Syrian Security Cooperation Testing Turkish Foreign Policy

    Turkish-Syrian Security Cooperation Testing Turkish Foreign Policy

    Turkish-Syrian Security Cooperation Testing Turkish Foreign Policy

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 84
    May 1, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    On April 27, Turkey and Syria launched their first joint military exercise on their border. The three-day long land exercises between border forces involved an exchange of units to enhance joint training and interoperability, and are expected to be followed by similar exercises in the future. On the same day, during the 9th International Defense Industry Fair in Istanbul, both countries signed a bilateral security cooperation agreement to deepen collaboration between their defense industries (www.tsk.tr, April 26, Hurriyet, April 28). These developments once again strained Turkish-Israeli ties, re-opening the debate on Turkey’s commitment to its Western orientation.

    Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, called the exercises disturbing, though noting that Turkish-Israeli strategic relations will survive this challenge (www.ynetnews.com, April 27). Israel’s Ambassador to Turkey, Gabby Levy, told reporters that Tel Aviv was following the drill closely to understand its goal and content (Cihan Haber Ajansi, April 28). DEBKAfile reported that, to protest against this development Israel was preparing to “slash its military exchanges with Turkey to prevent the leakage of military secrets to an avowed Arab enemy” and it would “discontinue sales of its … drones and sharply reduce its military ties with Turkey” (DEBKAfile, April 27).

    Moreover, an Israeli strategic analyst Efraim Inbar, referring to unnamed Turkish military officers, maintained that the joint exercise not only raised questions over Turkey’s relationship to Israel, the United States and NATO, but also “the Turkish military is not happy about this. It does not like Syria, and views it as a problematic state” (Jerusalem Post, April 27).

    During his second press briefing within the past fortnight, Turkish Chief of Staff General Ilker Basbug was asked to comment on Israel’s reaction to the Turkish-Syrian exercise. Basbug criticized the remarks of the Israeli sources by saying “Shall we ask for Israel’s approval? Israel’s reaction does not concern us. This is between Turkey and Syria” (www.cnnturk.com, April 29). Other Turkish military officers talking to the press reportedly held similar views (Star, April 30).

    In addition, though noting that it was only a small-scale exercise, Basbug described it as important because it was held for the first time. A Turkish military analyst Nihat Ali Ozcan, added that “Turkey has similar deals with more than 60 countries. Besides, the exercise involved at most a total of 60 men from both sides. If it is held only at platoon level as reported, then really it holds only a symbolic value aimed against smugglers and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, operating along the border” (Hurriyet Daily News, April 29).

    Although the exercise might be inconsequential militarily, it has enormous political significance, which partly explains Israel’s reaction. Turkey and Syria came to the brink of war ten years ago over the latter’s harboring of PKK militants, their new security cooperation heralds a significant transformation in Turkish foreign policy. More importantly, it highlights the changing alignments of Turkey within the region.

    One explanation for the flourishing of the so-called Turkish-Israeli alliance throughout the 1990’s, which led to the establishment of closer military cooperation, was the common threat perceptions concerning Syria. Turkey was so frustrated by Damascus supporting the PKK that in 1998 it had to amass its army along the border and threaten to use force unless Damascus ceased its support. Following the expulsion of the PKK from Syria in the late 1990’s diplomatic relations improved, reflecting Turkey’s new policy of normalizing relations with the Middle East. The real push came with the accession to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002. Fostering closer ties with Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors became one of the cornerstones of the AKP’s new multi-dimensional foreign policy -which is attributed to Ahmet Davutoglu, chief foreign policy advisor to the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (EDM, March 25).

    Under the AKP, Ankara and Damascus have overcome their differences and promoted the growth of economic, social and cultural ties between the two countries, as expressed symbolically in the close personal ties between Erdogan and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Turkey resisted attempts to isolate Syria diplomatically, and has served as the conduit for opening Damascus to the outside world. Most significantly, it has acted as a mediator between Israel and Syria by arranging indirect talks between the two countries.

    Diplomatic analysts had once discussed a Turkish-Israeli axis against Syria, while clearly the interests of Turkey and Syria are now converging, which permits the development of military cooperation. These alternating roles have naturally raised questions as to whether Turkey might be trading its strategic ties with Israel for a new partnership with Syria. Although many Western analysts argue that Turkey may be drifting away from the West under the AKP’s new foreign policy, the crucial support of the secular Turkish military must be considered before reaching any conclusion.

    Israeli and some Western sources criticize the AKP for following an ideological foreign policy agenda and seeking to decouple Turkey from its traditional transatlantic orientation, instead increasingly serving Islamist and Arab interests. The AKP, in contrast, presents its search for autonomy and normalization of its relations with its neighbors as reflecting geopolitical reality, and argues that this serves both Turkish and Western interests in the surrounding regions.

    The military leadership’s expression of support comes to the aid of the AKP as it pursues several controversial foreign policy initiatives. These include the rapprochement with Syria and criticism of Israel, notably during the Gaza crisis. This approach does not represent parochial “Islamist” concerns, but rather they enjoy the backing of broader segments of the Turkish political and military elite. Despite their occasional differences of opinion over domestic political issues, particularly on the question of secularism, the government and the military have managed to reach a consensus over foreign policy, which suggests that a simple distinction along Islamist versus secular might no longer be relevant to understand Turkish foreign policy.
    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-syrian-security-cooperation-testing-turkish-foreign-policy/

  • Turkey and Armenia’s Rapprochement Watched Carefully by Azerbaijan

    Turkey and Armenia’s Rapprochement Watched Carefully by Azerbaijan

    Turkey and Armenia’s Rapprochement Watched Carefully by Azerbaijan

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 82
    April 29, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    On April 22, the Foreign Ministries of Turkey, Armenia and Switzerland issued a joint announcement saying that Ankara and Yerevan had agreed to work toward improving their relations within the framework of a roadmap under Swiss auspices. United States’ diplomats were also closely involved in the talks which preceded the deal. Although the decision appears as a breakthrough in resolving this long-term dispute, significant obstacles remain before the completion of the rapprochement.

    The joint statement read as follows:

    “The two parties have achieved tangible progress and mutual understanding in this process and they have agreed on a comprehensive framework for the normalization of their bilateral relations in a mutually satisfactory manner. In this context, a road-map has been identified” (www.mfa.gov.tr, April 22).

    Subsequent statements from diplomatic sources clarified that no agreement has been signed and that the parties agreed to continue working toward fully normalizing their bilateral relations. Although the content of the ongoing talks were not disclosed officially, the deal is likely to include establishing diplomatic representations in their respective capitals, gradual re-opening of the border, Armenia’s recognition of Turkey’s international borders, and forming a joint committee of historians to examine the disputed events of 1915 (Sabah, April 24).

    Many observers believe that if the process can be concluded successfully, it will not only end the long-standing enmity within the South Caucasus, but it also will redefine the geopolitical map of the region -helping to connect Armenia with Western interests in the region. Therefore, the decision was welcomed by the international community as a constructive step toward reconciliation. A statement from the U.S. State Department commended these efforts and called on the parties to proceed with the talks without any preconditions and within a reasonable time frame.

    Initially this was anticipated against the background of the ongoing dialogue, which had accelerated over the past year. This was given a renewed impetus following Turkish President Abdullah Gul’s historic visit to Yerevan in September 2008. In addition to their various bilateral talks, the foreign ministers of both countries also met within the context of multilateral initiatives, raising expectations that a deal could be achieved. Earlier press reports speculated that the two capitals had agreed on a roadmap in late March, but they were debating the proper timing to announce this decision (EDM, March 27; Hurriyet Daily News, March 30). After Obama’s recent high profile trip to Turkey, Turkish-Armenian reconciliation was considered imminent.

    However, following Obama’s visit, Ankara stepped back from its commitment to find a solution in an effort to allay concerns in Baku. The Turkish Prime Minister and other officials declared publicly that they would avoid steps which might damage Azerbaijan’s interests, and Turkey would not re-open its border with Armenia unless the latter ended its occupation of Azerbaijani territories (EDM, April 17). These developments rendered an agreement less likely.

    The announcement that the parties had held secret talks and committed publicly to a roadmap represented a major breakthrough. Nonetheless, there have been conflicting accounts from each side as to whether concessions were made on preconditions to start the negotiations. The continued mystery surrounding the content of the talks may prove an obstacle to a final settlement. Nationalist forces and the opposition, both within Turkey and Armenia, remain opposed to the way in which the rapprochement is being conducted -in an absence of public scrutiny. Secret diplomacy is the key to achieving a breakthrough in such protracted disputes, and supporters of normalization on both sides insist that the governments should not bow to public pressure to abandon the process (www.ntvmsnbc.com, April 26). Nonetheless, the widening gap between the governments’ rhetoric and reality risks undermining this controversial foreign policy.

    The Armenian government came under intense domestic criticism, and a minor coalition partner withdrew from the government. Similar problems within Turkey have further complicated these efforts. The AKP government proceeded with the normalization without first preparing public opinion for such a radical decision. It has also failed to keep the opposition informed. Turkish opposition parties are now calling on the government to stop conducting diplomacy behind closed doors, and inform parliament of the current standing of the talks (Ortadogu, April 28).

    Moreover, the Turkish government is criticized for failing to give clear answers as to how the Turkish-Armenian roadmap might impact on Azerbaijan. Apparently, Turkey proceeded with the rapprochement without ensuring Armenia’s response to Azerbaijan’s demands, and this stance contradicted Ankara’s earlier statements that it would protect Baku’s interests. For some Turkish observers, this is an indication that the government did not have a genuine desire for reconciliation with Armenia, but it agreed the roadmap only to remove the word “genocide” from Obama’s April 24 message (Sabah, April 27). For others, Ankara’s zigzagging shows that it is acting opportunistically, which undermines the trust of its partners (Hurriyet Daily News, April 24).

    President Gul ruled out any damage to relations with Baku due to the roadmap, and maintained that it will serve the interests of both Baku and Ankara. The Turkish government is attempting to convince Azeri politicians that its efforts toward resolving its problems with Yerevan also promote Azerbaijan’s interests within international forums (Zaman, April 24). Nonetheless, Azerbaijan’s discomfort with these developments is well known.

    After noting that he was not in a position to tell Ankara how to handle its relations with Yerevan, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, said during a visit to Brussels, that Baku reserved the right to revise its policies according to the evolving realities in the region. Referring to the conflicting news about the content of the Turkish-Armenian roadmap deal, Aliyev added “The world, the region and the Azeris want to know whether the Karabakh issue was removed from the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. This is a simple question and has a simple answer” (Cihan Haber Ajansi, April 28).

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-and-armenias-rapprochement-watched-carefully-by-azerbaijan/

  • Reconciliation and Recriminations

    Reconciliation and Recriminations

    by Barbara Frye
    28 April 2009

    As their government makes overtures to an old foe, many Armenians still wait for an apology.

    YEREVAN | Standing in a threadbare tweed blazer on a sunny day in late April, Zohrab Shahbazyan brushed a tear from his cheek as he watched goose-stepping soldiers carry a large wreath across a plaza. Their destination was Yerevan’s hilltop memorial to 1.5 million Armenians killed or driven from their homes in Turkey nearly 100 years ago.

    Shahbazyan, 75, had come here on 24 April, the day in 1915 that the Ottoman government arrested more than 200 Armenian intellectuals. Most were killed in the beginning of a campaign to drive Armenians out of eastern Turkey during World War I. Many who survived the massacres were marched into the deserts of Mesopotamia and Syria without food or water.

    Like most Armenians in the homeland and throughout the country’s vast diaspora, Shahbazyan said he lost ancestors – 31 of 48 – in what his government and nearly two dozen others have termed a genocide. And like much of Yerevan, he had walked slowly up the hill today holding a single flower, which he would place on a ring around a flame at the center of the memorial.

     

    President Serzh Sargsyan (left) and other dignitaries attend a commemoration ceremony on 24 April in Yerevan. Photo by Barbara Frye.

    “Genocide is not just killing people. They exterminated the whole nation,” he said. “One and a half million Armenians were not buried on their land.”

    In its rituals – prayers by golden-robed leaders of the Armenian Apostolic Church, a visit from the president, an endless procession of flower-bearing pilgrims – the day was like nearly every 24 April since the memorial opened in 1967.

    But it was also different. This year it took place days after the governments of Turkey and Armenia had announced plans to open the border between the two countries, which has been closed since 1993. It was the latest in a series of remarkable events over the past two years that have included an invitation from Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan to Turkish President Abdullah Gul to attend a soccer match between the two countries in Yerevan and a public apology from a group of Turkish intellectuals to the people of Armenia.

    But Shahbazyan was ready to forgive only on condition that Turkey give up the territory that many Armenians (and Armenia’s now-superseded 1990 declaration of independence) refer to as “western Armenia.”

    Michael Gulyar had also come to pay his respects. At 19, he is more than 50 years Shahbazyan’s junior. His grandfather escaped the pogroms in Turkey, and of his family, he said, “They don’t want to find terms with the Turks.”

    But he has a different view. “Turkey has changed,” he said. “Many Turkish have a European mentality.”

    And while he condemns the killings and expulsions, he said he understands how complicated the idea of apologizing can be for Turkey. “Now it is difficult because when Turkey recognizes the genocide, they must give back land.” The question of reparations lingers, despite many officials’ efforts to discourage such expectations. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation, a political party that just left the governing coalition over the deal with Turkey, still calls for land and property in Turkey to be returned to the descendants of its Armenian owners.

    Outside Armenia, many analysts and diplomats have welcomed the Turkish-Armenian thaw, but inside the country, it’s clear that some are more ready than others.

    “We’re coming to the stage when we must speak more openly to the public about their neighbors,” Edward Nalbandian, the Armenian foreign minister, said. “If you live somewhere and all your neighbors will not be [your] friends, how could you live?”

    Armenia is largely isolated in its southern Caucasus neighborhood. In addition to the closed border with Turkey, movement and trade between it and its eastern neighbor, Azerbaijan, are frozen due to the conflict between the two countries over Nagorno-Karabakh, an enclave within Azerbaijan that is occupied by ethnic Armenians. The two sides fought a war over the land in the early 1990s and a sporadically broken cease fire is in place.

    Turkey closed its border with Armenia in 1993, in solidarity with its ally Azerbaijan after an advance by Armenian troops into Azerbaijani territory.

    For years, Armenian officials have insisted that the border closures have not hampered progress, and there is some evidence for that. For more than a decade before the financial crisis hit last year, the country’s economy grew annually by double digits and its poverty rate dropped. But, although Nalbandian said the diplomatic overtures began in May 2008, the August war between Georgia and Russia crimped Armenia’s trade flows and lent some urgency to a rapprochement with its western neighbor.

    Public opinion on the issue is difficult to gauge comprehensively. Some Armenian analysts caution against relying on opinion polls, but they note that Rule of Law, the political party most strongly against reconciliation, took just 7 percent of the votes in the most recent parliamentary elections.

    But those numbers don’t tell the whole story. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation took 13 percent of the vote. “Fifteen years of blockade have not produced the intended result,” said Kiro Manoyan, an ARF official, saying that there have been neither deaths from starvation nor economic disaster and that Armenia does not urgently need trade with Turkey. “It hasn’t been the end of us. We have managed to survive.”

    Manoyan said his party favors an open border, but without preconditions. Turkey has long demanded the withdrawal of Armenian forces from Azerbaijani territories ringing Nagorno-Karabakh, which Armenia deems a security zone for the enclave. Because Turkey has sent recent signals that it would not lift this condition, and because the governments have not released details of their agreement, Manoyan said he can only assume that the Armenian government is acceding to Istanbul’s demands.

    Like Manoyan, Stepan Safaryan, a member of parliament from the opposition Heritage Party, said, “The point is not whether we open the border. The point is how and at what price.”WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS

    With deep-seated enmities, the passage of time and the emergence of a new generation typically helps to heal wounds. But in Yerevan, not all the signs point in one direction.

    Adjacent to the genocide memorial sits a museum, opened in 1995. On commemoration day, parents led their children, some as young as 3 or 4, past old photos, enlarged to about 6 square meters, of Turkish soldiers posing proudly behind the decapitated heads of Armenian religious leaders, of an Armenian woman and her two young children who had starved to death and whose emaciated bodies had been left to bake in the desert sun, of white-coated Armenian doctors hanging from a gallows.

    Suren Manukyan, the museum’s deputy director, said, “We understand that it is very difficult for Turks to accept that their grandfathers were murderers. This museum is part of Turkish history, too. The recognition of the Armenian genocide is not just a problem for Armenian society. It’s a problem for Turkish society, too.”

    Manukyan said he sees a change in Turkey. “The first step is a discussion. I think in Turkey now we have this discussion.”

    The 2007 murder of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in Istanbul by a Turkish nationalist provoked an outcry in Turkey, with tens of thousands of Turks attending his funeral. In December a group of Turkish intellectuals posted an online apology for the events of 1915-1917 in the form of a petition. It has been signed by nearly 30,000 people around the world.

    “Who could envision, just one year ago, two years ago, that 30,000 Turks could sign a petition to ask for [forgiveness] from the Armenian people?” Foreign Minister Nalbandian said.

    Whether they will get it is an open question. Takoulte Moutoufian, 42, was among those parents bringing their children to the museum that day. Asked what she and her husband were teaching their two sons, ages 14 and 9, about Turks, she said, “That they are our enemy.”

       

    Barbara Frye is an editor with TOL.

  • Azerbaijan confirms participation in military drills in Georgia

    Azerbaijan confirms participation in military drills in Georgia

    BAKU, May 1 (RIA Novosti) – Azerbaijani troops will take part in controversial NATO military exercises in Georgia, the defense ministry said in a press release.

    The Cooperative Longbow/Cooperative Lancer 2009 exercises have been slammed by Russia despite reassurances from NATO that they will not involve feature light or heavy weaponry. Some 1,300 troops from 19 NATO countries and its partners are expected to participate, although Serbia, Moldova and Kazakhstan have withdrawn.

    Russian president Dmitry Medvedev said “NATO’s plans to hold exercises in Georgia…are an open provocation. Exercises must not be held there where a war has been fought,” and warned that the exercises could have negative consequences for those who made the decision to hold them.

    The announcement follows a meeting on Wednesday in Brussels between the Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer.

    Aliyev stressed Azerbaijan’s commitment to NATO-Azerbaijan relations and the country’s active participation in the Individual Partnership Action Plan.

    The row between Russia and the military alliance intensified on Thursday following the expulsion of two Russian diplomats to NATO over spying claims and the signing of a border protection agreement between Russia and Georgia’s former republic’s of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

    Russia recognized the two former republics as independent states following a brief war with Tbilisi over South Ossetia.

    The two Russian diplomats, one of whom is the son of Russia’s EU envoy Vladimir Chizhov, were expelled in connection with a spy scandal involving an Estonian official, Herman Simm, who was jailed for 12 years for handing over secret documents to Russian intelligence operatives.

    Russia’s foreign ministry called the move “scandalous” and added “Naturally, we will draw our own conclusions about this provocation.”

    And in a ceremony at the Kremlin on Thursday Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a joint border-protection agreement with the two former republics.

    NATO responded to the signing saying that the agreements were a “clear contravention” of a French-brokered ceasefire deal.

    And U.S. State Department spokesman Robert Wood said: “This action contravenes Russia’s commitments under the Aug. 12 cease-fire agreement brokered by French President Nicolas Sarkozy.”

    Russia expressed its surprise to the reaction with Foreign Ministry spokesman Andrei Nesterenko saying in a statement: “It is a surprising point to make as Russia has not signed any truce agreements with anyone in that region.”