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# Reading the Eastern Question through the Prism of Orientalism: Hubris, Founding Genealogy and James Bryce

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HAKAN ERDAGÖZ

## Abstract

*Can Edward Said's concept of Orientalism be useful to reinterpret the widely accepted and long-lasting perceptions about the atrocities committed against the Armenians during World War I? And, why? Presenting important insights to comprehend this issue in a more sophisticated fashion, Orientalism helps deconstruct and reconstruct the existing discourses that have produced a particular kind of knowledge and way of thinking about the 1915 events. I argue that the historical perception of catastrophic events regarding the minorities prior to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was immensely linked to British wartime propaganda, which ideologically and politically demonized the Turco/Ottoman image. It forged discourses, pseudo-knowledge, otherization, and imaginary that legitimized a self-assumed accountability to remove the kind of anachronism the Ottoman Empire displayed. Thus, the effects of British wartime propaganda surpassed the consequences of the Ottoman Empire's own failure to do its "homework," which was about implementing reforms for the Christian minorities, especially the Armenians as assigned by the Great Powers, primarily Britain. In order to concretize my argument, I examine British liberal, Lord James Bryce (1838–1922) and the Orientalist discourse he often employed in circulating disingenuous depictions of the Turks and the Ottoman Empire.*

**Keywords:** *Orientalism; James Bryce; Ottoman Empire; the Armenian Question; Blue Book; World War I; the Eastern Question; collective memory*

## Introduction

This paper seeks to answer the following question: “Can Edward Said’s concept of Orientalism be a useful to deconstruct the existing discourses that have produced particular kind of knowledge and way of thinking about the atrocities committed against the Armenians during WW I? And, why?” Ever since its publication, Edward Said’s *Orientalism*<sup>1</sup> has generated paradigmatic shifts, which engendered novel discussions on certain themes such as gender, race, literary criticism, colonialism, and post-colonialism. Informed by *Orientalism*, some historians elegantly broached new discussions and discussed its relevant implications in the contexts of Russia and the Balkans after the

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collapse of the Soviet Union.<sup>2</sup> It goes without saying that *Orientalism* has literally become a bible for a post-modern reading of the Arab-Middle East. However, Orientalism for a long time remained limited to discussions on colonialism and post-colonial era. Geopolitically this refers to mainly the Arab Middle East, North Africa, and Southeast Asia. The Ottoman Empire had never been colonized by the Great Powers. However, we can confidently argue that in the early twentieth century with its semi-colonized structure in the global politics, the Europeans' attitude toward the Ottoman Empire in terms of the political language used and the policies pursued was no different from the ones toward the colonized world. Then the question becomes why does not the scholarship approach the late Ottoman history through the prism of Orientalism? The fact that the Turkish War of Liberation between 1918 and 1922 became successful and precluded possibly further stages of colonization does not make Orientalism irrelevant. I maintain that Orientalism in its geopolitical operationalization best fits into the then Europe's nearest *Other*, notably the late Ottoman state.

In addition, *Orientalism's* popularity and relevancy do not appear on discussions pertaining to the Ottoman Empire, Turco-Ottoman Islam, the Middle East and the Balkans as part of the legacy of imperial zones. Since Said's arguments about Orientalism can be considered transhistorical<sup>3</sup>, which is not strictly limited to a time period or era in a particular region, scholars found great latitude to expand more on archaic periods of Orientalist discourse, which can be seen in studies dealing with socio-cultural backdrop of East-West relations during the high Middle Ages and early modern period. For this reason, most of the works that directly or indirectly examines some aspects of the Ottoman Empire through the lenses of Orientalism falls into this category.<sup>4</sup> Interestingly, there is an obvious negligence in literature insofar as to examine the last century of the Ottoman Empire and its relations with the Great Powers through the prism of Orientalism, which started with the Eastern Question and culminated in WW I.<sup>5</sup> This is important because not only does this perception help us historicize Orientalist discourse, but it also helps us comprehend the immediate correlation between ideological origins of Orientalism and *realpolitik*. Looked at this way, WW I, as the beginning of an end, and finally as the culmination of total confrontations, was also a final solution for the century-old Eastern Question, in which geopolitical concerns were merged with ideological ones: Partition of the Ottoman Empire and liberation of "oppressed Christian minorities" from the savage of this "Asiatic-despotic darkness". The last stage of these episodes, notably WW I, however, is absent in this literature.

This paper unassumingly aspires to respond and points to such a negligence and incuriosity in the literature of the period. It seeks to contextualize WW I and the Eastern Question in light of Orientalist writings of British wartime propagandist James Bryce, who was a historian, politician, and the ambassador to the U.S. Bryce's unrelenting anti-Turco/Ottoman campaign embodied in the so-called *Blue Book*<sup>6</sup> and hence originated a particular form of Euro-American discourse and mentality regarding the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the paper is driven by pinpointing the origins of this origination. As the founding scriptures, the propaganda books constituted the ground for *genociding* the past events. By using Bryce's reports and writings as primary sources, I try to demonstrate a textual analysis of Orientalist discourse in the making of public opinion about the asymmetrically judgmental representations of Muslims and Christians. British wartime propaganda and its conceptual fathers, who purposefully and feignedly employed Orientalist jargon in the appraising of events on the minorities and originated asymmetric stories to influence the public opinion, are very crucial to assess under which the solution for the Eastern Question became legitimate and took place during WW I.

With this aim in mind, I seek to analyze the role of Orientalist discourses, which further reinforced their leverage through wartime propaganda in the solution of a century-old international crisis, notably “global mishandle of the decay of the Ottoman Empire,” which in turn created a series of intractable problems regarding the nationalities.<sup>7</sup> I argue that the historical perception of catastrophic events regarding the minorities prior to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was immensely linked to British wartime propaganda, which ideologically and politically demonized the Turks (Ottomans and Muslims all being used as a synonym). It forged discourses, pseudo-knowledge, *otherization*, and imaginary that legitimized a self-assumed accountability to remove the kind of anachronism the Ottoman Empire displayed. Thus, the effects of British wartime propaganda surpassed the consequences of the Ottoman Empire’s own failure to do its “homework,” which was about implementing reforms for the Christian minorities, especially the Armenians as assigned by the Great Powers, primarily Britain. I intend to demonstrate this finding by offering an interpretive analysis of James Bryce who was an extremely influential figure at the time. I focus on his political language by placing it within the context and reading “between the lines” of his writings that were always accompanied by a particular kind of motivation.

It has been proven that much of the reports of policy-makers during WW I are nothing more than fabricated, pseudo-historical sources. These texts include those of Arnold Toynbee, the British historian, who worked for the Intelligence Department and the British Foreign Office between 1912 and 1919; Baron Hans von Wangenheim, the German Ambassador to Constantinople between 1912 and 1915; Henry Morgenthau, the American Ambassador to Constantinople between 1913 and 1916; and James Bryce. It is a deplorable thing that the events of 1915 have been studied on the basis of those reports for long. With this in mind, my particular inquiry in this paper is twofold: deconstruction and reconstruction. Firstly, I intend to demonstrate Orientalist discourse of British wartime reports by putting them into the historical and political context. In doing so, I hope to contextualize history and Orientalist discourse, which has been for a long time ignored by the scholarship on late Ottoman Empire. Secondly, I hope to raise critical questions that would hopefully force us to rethink on the origins of our debates and knowledge of what we know of popular histories regarding the “sins of Turkish past.” This paper consists of three main parts. In the first place, I provide background on the Ottomans’ political affairs with the Great Powers prior to WW I in order to illustrate the existing norms and discourses on the Ottoman state that Bryce and British wartime propaganda exercised. The second and core section of this paper presents and interprets the data based on what Bryce wrote. I provide evidence for Bryce’s anti-Ottoman campaign by primarily relying on his reports, political essays, and op-eds pertaining to the Ottoman Empire and the Christian minorities. In doing so, I shuttle between his texts and the historical context. Lastly, the concluding remarks briefly summarize Bryce’s Orientalist enterprise and commission.

### **The Eastern Question and Its Background**

Although after the Congress of Vienna of 1815 (Second Congressional Institution since Westphalia of 1648) the term “Sick Man of Europe” was coined by the Russian Tsar Nikolai I, the Eastern Question became an utmost priority in the European powers’ agenda after the Crimean War of 1853–1856. In the midst of mid-nineteenth century European diplomacy, the possibility of Russia’s westward expansion in the Balkans against the Ottomans was precluded by the Crimean War. A unilateral Russian expansion

that may have occurred at the expense of territorial loss of the Ottomans was demarcated and this was guaranteed by Britain, France, and Austria. Following the Crimean War, the Ottoman Empire was considered to be part of the European Concert. This membership did not however provide the Ottomans with necessary power to secure their state as the British started changing the European balance and pre-existing paradigms regarding the statehood in the aftermath of the Crimean War. The Eastern Question, which came into play with the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878 and the Congress of Berlin, in this respect is further significant because it initiated international problematization of Ottoman statehood *vis-a-vis* modern European statehood.

Following the victory with the decisive help of Britain and France against the Russians, the immediate price the Ottoman Empire had to pay was increasing economic concessions made for the British, which in turn further exacerbated internal socio-economic dynamics of the Empire.<sup>8</sup> As the Ottoman elites undertook massive debts as a result of the foreign military and bureaucratic aid, the state preferred to pay back the loans by increasing the land taxes that concomitantly enraged the Orthodox Slav peasants and instigated rebels under the guidance of urban forces in the Balkans.<sup>9</sup> As the Ottoman state chose to suppress the groups of Orthodox peasant rebellions in the Balkans, the European state elites and diplomats acted promptly to politically and morally question the Ottoman *raison d'état*, a step which was motivated by the need for rescuing the Christian minorities and displacing the “*Ottoman Other*.”

This European involvement consisted of a strange combination of *realpolitik* on the one hand and on the other, ideology that embraced discourses on human rights, international law, and norms. On the eve of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1878, the main Russian drive, let alone the seizure of the Constantinople and Straits, was the discourse on humanitarian protection of the Orthodox Slavs. Modern popular histories tend to neglect one odd situation about the Russian involvement in the Eastern Question. Put concisely, regarded by the Europeans as “backward” and even un-civilized, how could the Russian Empire utilize the discourse on human rights against the Ottoman state while to a certain degree it was able to hypocritically conceal its own “backwardness” and treatment of the ethno-religious minorities? Indeed, the negative attitudes toward the Russian Empire, exemplified by the non-governmental circles of Europe at that time, tended to disappear in policy-making at intergovernmental level as Russia was politically an important actor in the nineteenth-century European political system. Furthermore, the Russian political elites were quick to be among the authors of the new civilization and law and order because they were aware of the discourse of backwardness and disdain the Europeans had for them.<sup>10</sup> It was this combination of raw power at the political level among the European states and an institutionalized ability to author knowledge and discourse to fashion the norms that redefined the global order then.

The Eastern Question as a long stretching problem in the nineteenth-century state of affairs was twofold: Should the implementation of a series of reforms by the Ottoman Empire for its Christian minorities as its “homework” fail, the partition was to take place.<sup>11</sup> Such imperialist and Orientalist attitudes toward the weakening of Ottoman state embodied in the image of the “Sick Man of Europe.” The image of Sick Man along with the image of “Asiatic Despot” fully entered European political lexicon as a result of the events that took place in the Balkans before the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. From that date onward, the European imagery continued to reproduce the means of this symbolic politics in different forms. Thus, this representation of impotency, “Sick Man” which was ironically at the same time meant to be “barbarous,” sought the opportunities to operationalize throughout the Ottoman lands from the Balkans to the Cauca-

sus, areas populated with the Bulgarians, Serbians, Albanians, Greeks (Rums), Circasians, Jews, and Armenians.<sup>12</sup>

That said, the Eastern Question had two legs: Liberation of Christian minorities, which meant the expulsion of Muslims from Europe and partition of the Ottoman Empire. However, as Davide Rodogno observes, the Eastern Question did not much focus on partition of the Ottoman Empire, but rather on a strong desire to expulse the Turks from Europe because “throughout the nineteenth century the five European powers (Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and Austria) saw the Ottoman Empire as an appendix to Europe.”<sup>13</sup> Following such a useful distinction, it is clear that the events, which began in the aftermath of the Congress of Berlin and led up to the Balkan Wars, can be seen as the first leg of Orientalism. According to the Treaty of Berlin, the Ottoman state ceded Cyprus, Ardahan-Batum-Kars (*Evlıye-i Selase*), Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina (annexed by the Austro-Hungarian Empire) while Bulgaria became autonomous. In general, the European and in specific the British entanglement with the Ottoman European territories and nationalities more or less rested on a particular model that was emulated by much of the Christian Slavs and some other ethno-religious communities in the Ottoman Empire. This model was empirically grounded on peasant reactions to centralization and heavy taxation, but formulated in an ethno-religious framework and manifested itself through insurgency and guerilla wars.<sup>14</sup> The Ottoman state’s approach to respond to these ethno-religious rebels was suppression, which in turn received a European monitoring in the name of human rights that was considered to be applicable only to the Christians. Curiously enough, when the same signs were given to the Armenians and they involved in insurgencies through what a historian calls the Bulgarian way,<sup>15</sup> the British and the Europeans did not jeopardize their security for the Armenians.

### **The Eastern Question in Discourse and *Realpolitik***

The instances of secession in the Balkans also stemmed from Europeans’ peace-driven concerns, which in turn precipitated a further expansion of the Family of Nations.<sup>16</sup> This is important insofar as the expansion of the Family of Nations, which excluded the *Ottoman Other*, was linked to Bryce and the like-minded European elites. In this respect, the Eastern Question came out of a context that was full of discourses such as peace, humanity, Christianity, progress, and civilization. In addition, the Europeans wanted to expand their national-state system as further as to the Balkans not only because the population in this region was to be made Christian out of a mosaic populations that also included Jews and Muslims for centuries, but also in *realpolitik* the Europeans imagined and tried to fashion a securely restored peace first in Europe. In this regard, the creation of Christian satellite states in the Balkans was significant for the Europeans in terms of both security and identity. Thus, any point beyond the imagined borders of the newly established Balkan states was considered unworthy. Accordingly, as early as 1876 when Otto von Bismarck stated that “the entire Orient is not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier,” he was understating priority of European peace over prosperity of the Christian minorities or the fate of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>17</sup> It is for this reason also why the Armenians were cheated by the Europeans, whom they came to see as guarantor of the Armenian national aspirations.

As this paper hopes to illustrate, British propaganda and Bryce’s endorsement regarding the broken promises for the Armenian aspirations proved this argument when the Ottoman Empire engineered its demography in the deportation of the Armenians by

referring to the founding principle of modern statehood, whose premises were institutionalized with the Congress of Berlin.<sup>18</sup> The synthetic creation of nation-states in the Balkans involved a reconfiguration based on inclusion and exclusion of individuals along ethno-religious lines. One of the most distinctive features of the post-Congress of Berlin era was the growing international legitimacy regarding how a nation-state should look like: It must be in the form of a sovereignty whose population should be ethnically and religiously homogenized.<sup>19</sup> In that, such a design ruled out that imperial citizenship could flourish and serve as an umbrella. It follows then that in such a setting there was no place for the “anachronistic Ottoman Empire.” Among the diplomatic circles, epistemic communities of Europe and within the public of European countries discourses concerning the idea of the displacement of the Ottoman Empire gradually took place as in the case of Bryce.

The emerging world polity after the Treaty of Berlin, 1878, which became more apparent with the Paris Peace Conferences of 1919, ruled out the earlier paradigm, the Congress of Vienna regarding the international legitimacy of statehood, that is, multi-ethnic and multi-religious empires were recognized as legitimate members.<sup>20</sup> The actors of the emerging world polity like diplomats, epistemic surroundings, and governments produced and diffused the norms and discourses regarding the statehood and this circuitry put leverage on states and in turn states in their specific contexts emulated those circulating ideas, ideologies, “blueprints,” and “models” that the global culture offered.<sup>21</sup> At this point, it is important to note that second leg of the Eastern Question, that is, its operationalization, which aimed to partition the Ottoman Empire, falls into WW I. The century-old Eastern Question was put into practice once the war broke out because WW I, which was ironically called the “Third Balkan War,” was the climax of “Balkan liberation struggles with the European state system.”<sup>22</sup> Thus, it is apt to see WW I as an epilogue to the Eastern Question. More importantly, as Mujeeb R. Khan also keenly discerns, the account thus far explained regarding the evolution of European based international system and its friction with the Ottoman Empire cannot be understood by solely relying on *realpolitik*, which often leaves out the role of identity.<sup>23</sup> This identity was heavily influenced by Christian political theology. The Europeans’ attitude toward the Ottoman state constructed discourses that were meant to delegitimize its imperial *modus operandi*. This construction highlights the modality and unidirectionality of discourses that the Ottoman state was irreformable and incorrigible.

Seen in this light, the described effect of Orientalist discourses and their operation on the diffusion of norms regarding human rights in international arena should also be taken into account rather than solely relying on *realpolitik*. This is necessary because the so-called international community at the time was referred to as the Family of Nations. Entrance into this community was quite difficult. Furthermore, to be a member of the Family of Nations meant to be Christian. Equally important is that the Family of Nations always involved an emotional, immaterial meaning-making. Unlike systemized and neutralized international organizations, the Family of Nations proceeded through complex, unstandardized, hegemonic, hypocritical, and even racist power relations. Accordingly, constructivist theories point out that states and their actors do not always follow a rational path and the socially constructed interstate system deems some activities “permissible (legitimate)” and some others “forbidden (illegitimate)”.<sup>24</sup>

In addition, the formation of international law and its hierarchical prescription regarding the places of people in this era were determined by quasi-institutional initiatives and discourses that aimed at categorization and elaboration. In other words, this was “a kind of cultural mapping of the world” that depicted the world based on Europeans’ superior-

ity over the rest of the world.<sup>25</sup> Since Europeans were advanced in political modernity and liberties they constituted the “civilized” and the “Family of Nations,” whereas the Ottomans, Chinese, and Japanese (until 1905 of their defeat of Russia) Empires were the “barbarians” because they had at least historically state tradition compared to the “savage” people of African races.<sup>26</sup> As for the Russian Empire, Europeans’ attitude for this country was inexplicit. While Russian identity that was marked by Orthodox faith was not seen as civilized in the eyes of Europeans, in global *realpolitik*, Russia was a key actor. Seen in this light, without these ambiguities and bewildering features of elite-run state, we would not be able to explain the Anglo-Russo collaboration that aimed for the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire during WW I. As Sean McMeekin provocatively argues, it is such a black box why British elites like Lloyd George, Edward Grey, James Bryce, and Arnold Toynbee jeopardized the “empire and a generation of its young men to satisfy Russian imperial ambitions that the British public had viewed with considerable distaste and alarm for over a century.”<sup>27</sup> Seen in this light, its totality and burden on mankind aside, it is not a hyperbolic statement that WW I is also a story of a premeditated destruction of the last castle of the Islamic civilization, that is, the Ottoman Empire.<sup>28</sup> This finding highlights the need for the recall that religious identity for membership/legitimacy in the Family of Nations was a precondition, which the Ottoman Empire did not meet. Arguments in this paper follow up this finding by squaring it into Bryce’s ideological attitude and Orientalism.

### **The Ottoman Empire on the Eve of WW I**

Having lost the Balkans, with its semi-colonized territories in Asia Minor and the Middle East, the Ottoman Empire was already encountering the anguish of how the century-old Eastern Question would really operate in *realpolitik*. Apprehended by the possibility of dissolution of the Ottoman state, the Young Turk government urgently needed an ally to dispel such a possibility. Right before WW I broke out, the Ottoman Empire’s financial struggle and Russia’s threatening position toward the Empire, illustrated by its reform demands for the Armenians, put an immense pressure on the Ottoman elites to become a partner with Germany.<sup>29</sup> Initially having offered a partnership to France and Britain and declined when the tension increased with the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo, situation for the Ottoman Empire was unsettling. By that time, Britain, France, and Russia were diplomatically bounded together against Germany, Italy, and Austria-Hungary. Thus, the Great Powers’ politics of reform for the eastern Anatolian Armenians, which was required from the Ottoman Empire, was indeed alarming in the twilight of WW I. In fact, in the eyes of Ottoman statesmen, the very worrying idea that the Armenians want to separate from the Empire had been swaying like Damocles’ sword since the Treaty of Berlin.<sup>30</sup> Throughout the late nineteenth century, however, it became clear that the Ottomans’ apprehension was no exaggeration. It is also important to note that in the meantime the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 was a turning point in the Eastern Question, which rested on two pillars: The 1878 Congress of Berlin and WW I. In the aftermath of the Balkan Wars, the Eastern Question became the Armenian question and focused on the ethno-religious manipulations in the eastern Anatolian borderlands.

That said, following the attempts to find an ally, the Ottoman Sublime Porte’s<sup>31</sup> search for an ally was responded by Wilhelmine Germany. The German Empire as a latecomer in the European colonial venture had much higher regards in the eyes of so-called Easterners as the Kaiser’s famous speech of 1898 in Damascus announced that he was the

protector of 300 million Muslims.<sup>32</sup> The Germans even tried to help disseminate Pan-Turkist ideas to manipulate the postwar Middle East in their favor. To this end, they hired a bogus professor and Orientalist, Ernst Jaeck for the official propaganda of Pan-Turkism and his advice, being supported by some German elites and even the Ambassador Wangenheim, showed the asperity that the Ottomans should leave Constantinople and resettle in Asia and the Middle East.<sup>33</sup> However, a more serious, minatory, and bold ideological commitment on the postwar political map of the Ottoman Empire came from the British policy makers/intellectuals Bryce and Toynbee. In a preface to Toynbee's *The Murderous Tyranny of the Turks* (1917), Bryce wrote that "If a Turkish Sultanate is to be left in being at all, it may, with least injury to the world, be suffered to exist in Central and Northern Asia Minor, where the population is mainly Mussulman ..."<sup>34</sup> This uncompromising remark and derisive tone, however, do not appear in the depiction of non-Muslim minorities of the Ottoman Empire, which had been seen until then as the main, cherished source for the Great Powers' humanitarian interventions.

This asymmetric setting is a very clear fact in much of the writings and reports of Morgenthau and Toynbee, who as policy-makers played a very influential role on the hypocritical European attitude, which revealed great sympathy for the Ottoman Christians and contempt for Muslim populace. Parenthetically, Toynbee was a young historian in his early twenties when he was involved in propaganda projects of the Wellington House<sup>35</sup> with Bryce. It is known that much of the propaganda works were undertaken by Toynbee's pen. Morgenthau, however, like Bryce was a close acquaintance of the US President Woodrow Wilson. His *Morgenthau's Story*, which also aimed at demonization of the Ottomans, was a propaganda work that was primarily penned by his Armenian secretary and advisers such as Hagop S. Andonian and Arshag K. Schmavonian.<sup>36</sup> In the final analysis, both Toynbee and Morgentahau, as well as Bryce, were a larger part of British propaganda. Their works were in collaboration with one another. However, for the reasons that will be clearer in this argument, the significance of Bryce cannot be stressed enough. The hypocrisy and hubris that were manifested in much of the depictions made by these men and that were accompanied by crude political schemes of *realpolitik* can be best squared into Said's *Orientalism*.

This paper does not discuss whether or not Bryce's and the British Foreign Office's reports are historically reliable and true. It contends that none of them are so. The paper rather concentrates on the creation of knowledge and particularly imposed discourses, which emanated from the British perceptions of the Turks/Ottomans. To interrogate this, I raise a number of questions. How is it possible that policy makers such as Bryce through their writings and reports were able to produce the kind of knowledge, which as *a priori* set the mode of thinking on the Turks/Ottomans for decades to come? What other forces were at work in the demonization of the Ottoman Empire besides wartime propaganda of the British state? What accounts for Bryce's elaboration that saw the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and her Christian minorities through a Manichean prism in which the former was represented by evil and darkness and the latter was symbolized by the good and light? What accounts for the extraordinary efforts of a public intellectual, such as Bryce, which went beyond the political interests of the British Empire like propaganda and policy-making? A final question that concerns us is how did the "terrible Turk" turn into "genocidal Turk"<sup>37</sup> and to what extent Bryce's Orientalist discourse and circulation of his texts account for this shift?

To respond these questions, it would be sufficient to look at the relationship between text and context in the case of Bryce. It is important to note that by 1914, Bryce as a champion of the Bulgarians' cause during the uprisings of 1876 and a close acquaintance

of another racist, British historian, Edward Freeman, was then a committed antagonist against the Ottoman Empire.<sup>38</sup> Thus, it is better first to provide a brief biographical sketch of Bryce and some aspects of his character as a public intellectual, which was embedded in the liberal worldview of the Victorian era. Bearing these points in mind, the rest of the paper will focus on the writings of Bryce and his significant role in the making of anti Turco-Ottoman historical perception.

### Bryce and Orientalism

Edward Said's core argument seems to be quite pertinent when we consider the immense role of religion and how it nourishes the double standards of Orientalist discourse. Religion of Islam lies at the heart of Orientalist discourse. This may become clearer when we consider the following question: Why Christian communities of the Orient, such as the Greeks, Bulgarians, Armenians, and Russians, seem to be excluded from Orientalist discourse? If these non-European Christians were regarded by the larger European community (the civilized nations) as non-civilized, what explains such a conundrum? What accounts for their exclusion from Orientalist discourse? I suggest that the Eastern Question provides a very proper ground to explain this contrast. The Europeans came to regard the Christian minorities of the Ottoman Empire as unfortunate prisoners of the Orient, notably Asiatic Darkness of the Ottoman Empire. The West constructed the Orient, but an Eastern Christian was an exception for the image of Oriental. Lastly, the Eastern Question is crucial not only to understand Orientalist mind-set, but also to understand how this mind-set operated in *realpolitik*. However, before discussing how Orientalist discourse operates in *realpolitik*, we need to consider how the discourse is generated through textuality. At this juncture, for the sake of this argument, it is better to shift the focus toward textuality and language, in which the kind of Orientalism Said portrays, fits into our discussion.

While describing Orientalism, Said argues that it should be taken as elaboration and distribution in which political, economic, social, and cultural discourses are disseminated in intellectual, literary and historical texts.<sup>39</sup> Furthermore, Said argues, Orientalist discourse, nourishing from "unevenly exchange" of these texts, "not only creates but also maintains; it is rather than expresses ..." <sup>40</sup> Thus, Said believes that Orientalism as an elaboration is an active, living mind that can be diagnosed in "the facts of textuality."<sup>41</sup> Said's abstract emphasis on textuality can be better concretized by Gayatri Spivak's conceptualization.<sup>42</sup> She interrelates textuality and the colonial making by arguing that:

... the notion of textuality should be related to the notion of the worlding of a world on a supposedly un-inscribed territory ... the imperialist project which had to assume that the earth that it territorialized was in fact previously un-inscribed. So then a world, on a simple level of cartography, inscribed what was presumed to be un-inscribed. Now this worlding actually is also a texting, textualising, a making into art, a making into an object to be understood ... Textuality is tied to discourse itself in an oblique way.<sup>43</sup>

For Spivak, as for Said, the act of writing as a producing force equals to the proportion and interdependency between text and context. Seen in this light, for Said, Orientalism becomes an intertextuality, meaning the perpetuation and endurance of a set of textual exchanges in which personal concerns of the writer merge with the political concerns, as in the case of the British, French, and American imperial encounters.<sup>44</sup> This point is very crucial as to how we should conceptualize the way we look at Bryce and his

anti-Ottoman campaign. This abstraction becomes more concretized if we consider the following passage in which his intellectual engagement in the Ottomans and Armenians is quite politicized:

In 1877 Europe had not yet awakened to know that there was an Armenian Question; and that question did not receive recognition as a matter of international concern until 1878, when it was dealt with in the Treaty of Berlin. Since then it has yearly grown in gravity, till the massacres of 1895 and 1896 have made it the most urgent and terrible difficulty that has appeared in the East for centuries. To understand its true character it is necessary to know something of the history of Turkey during the years that have passed since 1878; and so far as I know, no history of these years exists.<sup>45</sup>

### **Bryce and His Role in Context**

Bryce was motivated by such a reason when he needed to write about this particular subject as early as 1878. Perhaps one of the reasons for why he was impelled to undertake such an involvement came from the liberal worldview of the Victorian era. This era was characterized by the reciprocal influence of nascent social sciences including history writing and policy making in the British Empire.<sup>46</sup> Thus, the Victorians aimed to justify their superiority over other human societies, especially the Orient through historical inquiry that served the British “paternalism and utilitarianism.”<sup>47</sup> The public intellectual’s sense of responsibility for getting involved in libertarian issues was a commonplace. Born into a Scottish family in Ireland and intellectually raised in a diverse world, Bryce was perhaps one of the exemplars and last of cosmopolitan, liberal, aristocratic public intellectuals in the Victorian era, in which the imperial vision rested on two competing values: conservatism and liberalism. Clearly, the inception of the Victorian era in British political culture was marked by the replacement of earlier discourses, like dominance of aristocracy and mercantilism, by the new ones, like, democracy, “national character,” and reform; that is, as J.G.A. Pocock argues, “the end of early modernity and the birth of the modern.”<sup>48</sup> In fact, this era in global history is further important because it is characterized by intellectuals’ serious concerns regarding the British Empire’s universal prestige.<sup>49</sup> As Duncan Bell rightly puts, “arrogance and pride co-existed with apprehension and frustration.”<sup>50</sup>

Accordingly, one of the most obvious attributes of the modern social thought that emerged in this era was a dichotomous envisioning of the universe. Modernity’s binary thinking in Britain prescribed a clear-cut distinction between the civilized and non-civilized (civilization vs. savagery).<sup>51</sup> According to such a bifurcation, the non-civilized societies and states were determined based on a comparison of “gender relations,” societal structure, religion, “technological superiority,” “political institutions,” polity, all of which existed in the British Empire.<sup>52</sup> In a way, the characteristics of the “*Other*” or the “savage” that did not exist in the “civilized” nations became a point of reference to make this assessment. No wonder why then the non-civilized societies had incapacity to rule themselves; they had to be ruled. Such rationale ultimately paved the way to the idea of imperialist invasion and its justification.<sup>53</sup> For much of the British Empire, this justification showed itself in the harmony of 3-Cs (Christianity, commerce, and civilization). Unlike its French counterpart, the British imperialist vision was more fluid in penetrating into different “non-civilized” societies through a successful wed of missionary enterprise and commerce. As early as the eighteenth century, the missionary enterprise

turned its attention to the idea of bringing of civilization to the colonies through commerce. The reason for this justification was that “the sublime doctrines of the gospel are not to be addressed to heathens, because their untutored minds are not prepared to comprehend them.”<sup>54</sup> All in all, the similar patterns regarding the attitude and envisioning toward the non-European world existed throughout Europe, as in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands. This is certainly one aspect about a general European, in particular British *fin de siècle* that we should take into account when evaluating Bryce. Squaring Bryce’s intellectual and political career into such a picture helps us make sense of his Orientalist discourse on the Ottoman Empire.

As a professor of law and history, Bryce was a politically committed liberal who in his policy-making often reflected his compassion for the “oppressed” and hatred for the “oppressor.” His uncompromising commitment for the liberal ideals showed itself clearly when he opposed the British government’s policy toward the Boer Wars and Irish Home Rule, which aspired for an autonomous Ireland in the Empire. In a similar vein, Bryce sympathized with the Christian Armenians and he dedicated a considerable effort for their cause. One of the astonishing aspects about Bryce is that he was not an ordinary policy-maker because he publicly acted in support of libertarian and emancipatory causes as the British Empire’s *de facto* spokesperson in international arena. As one of Bryce’s biographers argues, he “was someone who made things happen ...” such as “the League of Nations,” “the Eastern Question Association,” “the English Historical Review,” and “Irish Home Rule.”<sup>55</sup> My contention, however, is that as much as liberating and meritorious in its own right, Bryce’s peace-driven humanitarian involvement that is marked by his intellectual character in policy making worked out dangerously consequential, thereby creating long-enduring prejudices and enmity toward the Turco-Ottoman identity.

The animosity and malevolence Bryce had toward Turks overshadowed his altruistic, humanitarian intentions. This is so because not only did he undertake an ardent propaganda campaign against the Ottoman Empire for the sake of the “oppressed Christian Armenians,” but also Bryce, along with some other figures, initiated the creation of knowledge on the Turks by textualizing and historicizing. This deadly aspect of politicization of knowledge becomes clearer if we keep in mind that he got involved in *realpolitik* not because of a pursuit of a political career or some other conventional interests, but rather because of his ideological commitment.<sup>56</sup> Equally important, Bryce’s deep engagement in the Ottoman political affairs is even beyond what Said explained as Orientalist discourse. It is thus more perilous than a typical Orientalist involvement.

### *The Impact of Bryce on Public Opinion*

Bryce as a crafty folk in his seventies was an ambassador to the United States between 1907 and 1913. He had great connections with American political and religious elites and he was often able to exercise great influence on the American public opinion; for instance, he was a close friend of the President Wilson.<sup>57</sup> Through his position as the British ambassador to the U.S., Bryce helped create a rapprochement between the U.S. and Britain. Owing his fame to his two-volume work, *The American Commonwealth*, published in 1888,<sup>58</sup> Bryce had been then considered as influential and keen as Alexis de Tocqueville when it came to the study of American polity.<sup>59</sup> In addition, having not received enough attention at home due in part to the declining popularity of liberal ideals, for Bryce the Progressive era of America with its high degree of attentiveness on civic issues such as the cause of the Irish and the Boers had become a priceless opportu-

nity to carry out his ideas and ideals.<sup>60</sup> The Armenian issue can certainly be considered with this fact in mind. Libertarian and cosmopolitan in his ideals, Bryce, who also adhered to the principle of “self-determination” was motivated by the Wilsonian ideals of internationalism when he asserted:

Our country is not the only thing to which we owe our allegiance. It is owed also to justice and humanity, owed to our fellow men in other countries as well as in our own. True patriotism consists not in waving the flag, but in ... striv[ing] that our country shall be righteous as well as strong.<sup>61</sup>

This messianic statement carries in itself very loaded implications to be unpacked, which can be illustrated by two groups of catchwords. These are “justice and humanity” on the one hand and “our fellow men” on the other.

It is safe to argue that the European conceptions of justice and humanity on a global scale that developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were direct outcomes of the Europeans’ colonial adventures, notably Orientalism. Euro-centric way of approaching the human conditions and diverse structures of human societies across the globe involved an asymmetric relationship in which the Europeans assumed a decisive superiority to correct the Orient’s infelicities. In the early nineteenth century, the Europeans came to regard the Ottoman Empire which rested on the principle of *millet* system for centuries as an unjust, anachronistic despotism and the “Christian minorities” that lived tranquilly and autonomously under the Sultanate until the nineteenth century as the “unfortunate humans” and “prisoners.”<sup>62</sup> For instance, during the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878, Bryce argued that the Turks

... have remained a conquering military caste, refusing equal rights to their subjects, maltreating and oppressing them in every conceivable way, and maintaining their ascendancy neither by superior numbers nor superior civilisation, but by the power of the sword.<sup>63</sup>

The modern European popular mind-set, especially throughout the nineteenth century created bigotry whose effects are drastically felt to date. This lack of knowledge and ignorance, and misrepresentation in the public had to do with mostly Victorian elites who wrote about the Ottomans and Muslims in newspapers, and journals like popular *Fortnightly Review* and *Contemporary Review* as they pleased.<sup>64</sup>

### *Bryce’s Strategy for Religion Based Identities*

When Bryce called “our fellow men,” he referred to the Christian human societies, not necessarily Muslims or Jews. It is seen that difference in religion both as a discourse and instrument in policy-making served as a useful categorization in Bryce’s manner in which he supervised and commissioned the Eastern Question Association. It is true that in the Progressive era Bryce’s messianic readiness to salvage the oppressed Christians was coming out of a context that they had been deeply saturated in the idea of civilized nations’ responsibility to correct and discipline the non-civilized nations. Moreover, it would be naïve to think of this enterprise as a purely humanitarian enthusiasm. Bryce knew that religious diversity and its institutionalized protection in a classical empire like the Ottomans served as a surrogate for ethnic differences of the subjects. Thus, Bryce grounded his cunning enterprise in turning religious coherence into ethno-religious disorder. Such a strategy was acknowledged by him when he contended that “a wise policy, foreseeing the inevitable, would endeavor to prepare for it, and would seek

in the elevation of the native races the means of excluding those neighbors whose real or supposed ambition excites so much alarm.”<sup>65</sup> Again at some point it becomes not quite possible to discern the ulterior drive here: On the one hand, Orientalist discourse which takes its essence from the might of the civilized British Empire and on the other, the dis-comforting future of this empire as a global cardinal that became manifested in policy-making. As Said makes it clear, there is a fine line between political knowledge and non-political knowledge, which becomes more and more blurry in its creation because no human effort or scholarly concern toward knowledge can be isolated from its immediate socio-cultural, political, and economic surroundings.<sup>66</sup> He argues that there is no way for a European Orientalist to be neutral toward the Orient. For Said, the production of knowledge on the Orient is inextricably tied to the boundaries drawn by Orientalist mode of thinking. To put in Said’s own words,

... it must ... be true that for a European or American studying the Orient there can be no disclaiming the main circumstances of his actuality: that he comes up against the Orient as a European or American first, as an individual second. And to be a European or an American in such a situation is by no means an inert fact.<sup>67</sup>

Furthermore, the very reason for why Bryce played his cards on religion is that this approach enabled him and the like policy makers like him to make simple value categorizations, and hence develop a mechanism in which shifts from one definition to another is swift, effective, and compelling to persuade the public. On a stereotyped portrayal of the Ottomans, Bryce argued that:

... the difficulty of fusing these races, or even of uniting them under a common system of law and administration, lies in the fact that the one force which controls them, the one channel in which most of their life flows, is religion. They have no patriotism, in our sense of the world, for they have neither a historical past (being mostly too ignorant for that exception) nor a country they can call exclusively their own. Religion is everything, since it includes their laws, their literature, and their customs, as well as their relation to the unseen world; and religion is not a fusing but a separating, alienating, repellent power. In ancient times there were in Western Asia and Europe pretty nearly as many religions as there were races, but these religions were not mutually exclusive, and required from their believers no hostility to other deities.<sup>68</sup>

Bryce further justified religious distinctions and capacities as such:

It is a matter not of race, but of religion, which is far more serious. No Moham-medan race or dynasty has ever shown itself able to govern well even subjects of its own religion; while to extend equal rights to subjects of a different creed is forbidden by the very law of its being.<sup>69</sup>

According to Bryce, the corrupt, rotten, and anachronistic Ottoman Empire was not only the very source of ferment because of its religion and its incapacity to rule itself, but also it crippled minority Christian nations, thereby impeded their capacity to rule themselves. One peculiar aspect about Bryce’s Orientalist discourse is the way in which it frequently made references to the idea of the “capacity to rule oneself.” He believed that the Armenians were unfit for self-government and independence.<sup>70</sup> This may seem surprising because one may think that Bryce would not see the Christian minorities of the Ottoman Empire as such given what we know of his sympathy for their liberation. None-

theless, Bryce made a nuance based on religious identity and prophesied about the prospect of the Christians and condescended toward the Muslims by stating that:

Degraded as they are, after age of slavery and ignorance, the Christian population nevertheless offer a more hopeful prospect than the Muslims; yet even the Muslims might, under a firmer and juster administration than they have yet enjoyed, an administration which should secure to every man the fruits of his industry, and give them the chance of learning from the West something more than its vices, become far more capable than they now seem of self-government and of a peaceful union, as equals instead of rulers, in a common state.<sup>71</sup>

Interestingly, for Bryce, the Armenian race had the capacity to become better because the Armenians had a solid sense of nationality unlike the Turks, who excelled in massacres.<sup>72</sup> Likewise, Bryce would argue that “... none of the subject races of Turkey is now fit for self-government.”<sup>73</sup> The lack of self-sufficiency that Bryce mentioned originated from the Ottoman Empire (Turks) and the indigenous Christian people were intoxicated by such backwardness. Based on Bryce’s ideas, we can infer that the Christian minorities’ lack of self-sufficiency can be ameliorated, but not of the Turks because theirs is unlikely and they are the very source of the trouble and original cause. Moreover, Bryce continued to depict Turks in racist terms.

They [Turks] are one out of several nations dwelling on the same soil, but not intermarrying or otherwise mingling, and having nothing in common except mutual hatred... they have remained a conquering military caste, refusing equal civil rights to their subjects, maltreating and oppressing them in every conceivable way, and maintaining their ascendancy neither by superior numbers nor superior civilization, but by the power of the sword.<sup>74</sup>

This double-standard treatment will have shown itself more clearly during WW I when the British government through the Wellington House employed every possible propaganda means to undertake an anti-Turco/Ottoman campaign.

### **The Wartime Propaganda**

In many respects, WW I is considered to be an experimental stage in terms of diversification of warfare, technology, statehood and advent of intelligence operations, and state-sponsored propaganda in modern history. As the war progressed further and when it became clear that this was not another Balkan war or a European war, statesmen and elites looked for alternatives to keep their societies mobilized. It follows then that WW I was not only about battles, warfare, and military. It was a totalizing process in which state-society relations underwent a mutation. In this sense, other than fighting in battlefields, the belligerents also involved in serious efforts to politically and morally shape their societies and hence, protract the war. To that end, propaganda as a nascent mechanism of modern state was largely utilized, especially by the British. Apprehended by the propaganda and intelligence operations of the Central Powers in the Middle East and India, the British politicians and elites invested great efforts and faith in the American factor in order for the Allies to win the war for all. Bryce as the most influential foreign figure in the American public life who had crucial contacts with important persons was the only person who enjoyed a considerable power to influence the public.

In the meantime, when the Germans earlier in the war invaded neutral Belgium and for the first time used aviation for bombing the civilians through Zeppelin in London attack, the

British elites had enough reasons to disentangle the German atrocities through norms pertaining to war crimes. When the deportation of Armenians later in 1915 took place, it was added to this larger British pool of propaganda. Furthermore, jeopardized by Russia's Jewish pogroms, which caused resentment among Jewish Americans and posed some strikes against possible American support, the British were aware that the German and Turkish atrocities against the civilians presented with them better chances to influence and persuade the American public.<sup>75</sup> To this end, in 1915 the British government required Bryce and Toynbee to write and compile a series of reports, illustrating the enemy atrocities committed against the "innocent, civilian people" like the Belgians and the Armenians from one-side point of view. Although *German Atrocities in Belgium*, just like the *Blue Book*, was seemingly written by Bryce, it is known that they were undertaken by the young scholar of that time period Toynbee.<sup>76</sup> In this respect, the Wellington House aimed at two specific targets in order to appeal to the American public and attract America to the war. The first propaganda book was on German atrocities against the Belgians and the second propaganda book in this project was *The Treatment of Armenians*, otherwise known as the *Blue Book*. When the report on the German atrocities against the Belgians was released by the Wellington House to the major American newspapers, its reception in the public was widespread as illustrated in a letter written by C.F.G. Masterman to Bryce:

Your report has swept America. As you probably know even the most skeptical declare themselves converted, just because it is signed by you! It was a great idea ... to do this piece of work, which will stand as historic document ... it was true—the world must know it; that it may never occur again.<sup>77</sup>

There are two things to note considering the American reception of British wartime propaganda. Firstly, the report on the *German Atrocities in Belgium* laid the pattern for the second leg of this propaganda project, that is, the *Blue Book's* depiction of the Armenians. Secondly, as Masterman rightly showed, Bryce's name was extremely influential in America, so much so that his words could be absorbed without questioning. As McCarthy forcefully argues, there is an obvious repetition between the portrayal of the events regarding the German atrocities against the Belgians on the one hand and the Ottoman atrocities against the Armenians on the other.<sup>78</sup> In this regard, things such as unverifiable sources of the reports, privacy principle of correspondents, and even ghastly depictions of the incidents like "cutting off women's breasts, bayoneting pregnant women, and murdering priests" could be considered as readymade templates of British wartime propaganda.<sup>79</sup>

In addition, the British had the privilege of controlling the channels of news to America by monopolizing the telegraph cable and by making itself the only option for America to communicate with Europe during the war.<sup>80</sup> Located at the heart of Europe, what was happening in Germany and its surrounding countries was easy to be observed. In the Ottoman Empire, however, with its Armenian communities located in a hard-to-penetrate area, the eastern Anatolia, the British had limited warrants to reflect what was happening on the ground. Thus, the British had no other way but to utilize the reports and observations of American and British missionaries who served in the region. The Christian missionaries' accounts were most of the time fully sympathized with the Christian Armenians who were meant to be "our fellow men" in Bryce's words. The British government had gone too far in creating an anti-Turkish image than it had in creating an anti-German image. The British government's underhanded propaganda machinery through the efforts of the Wellington House often applied a racist and fictitious tone by ascribing certain characteristics to the Turks/Ottomans such as "unfit to rule" and "well-equipped for massacre by nature."<sup>81</sup>

*The Blue Book and Its Themes*

In Bryce's so-called *Blue Book*, 59 reports came from missionaries and 59 reports came from the Armenians.<sup>82</sup> It is safe to contend that this propaganda book is a story of demonization of the Ottomans/Muslims. In addition to the Armenians and missionaries, the reports also came from supposedly eyewitnesses, many of them were European or American. The main argument of the book is a familiar one that the Muslim Ottomans deliberately involved in the extermination of the Armenians by deporting them. That said, the book was built upon by narrating some of the austere conditions and context of the time period. In this sense, some of the problems that the book discusses, such as deportations, dire conditions, and conversion to Islam, were the great problems in that specific context indeed. However, the book as a propaganda instrument is excelled at the utilization of these realities and feignedly, purposefully, selectively the dehumanization of the non-Christians involved in the larger catastrophic events. The main problem of the book that concerns us here is the point that it nearly never cites a single incident in which a Muslim was killed. All that happened was about the agony of the Armenians. Thus, the religious stereotype and antagonizing are the most striking aspects of the book.

A further elaboration in that story occurs concerning the innocence of the Armenians on the one hand and the Muslims and Ottoman government's demonization on the other. For instance, report of a college professor who witnessed the massacres claims that an Albanian from the town of S. "boasted in the café of how he had killed 50 Armenians."<sup>83</sup> In a similar tone, another report goes "it is said that one Persian Moslem had killed twenty-five persons, and said: 'I am not satisfied yet'."<sup>84</sup> In the same report, in Karacali,

a woman, fleeing with her children—her husband was abroad—met a Moslem mullah in her flight. He took the children, stripped them of their clothing, and threw them all into a stream, which was on the point of freezing. He then offered to marry the woman. On her refusal he left the woman on the road to her fate.<sup>85</sup>

Although Bryce and Toynbee explicitly held the Ottoman government responsible and spared the Muslim peasants, in many of the reports this seemingly neutral attitude toward the ordinary Muslims, which were regarded at least with a higher respect by the propagandists, blur with their lunatic atrocities against their Christian counterparts. For instance, according to a report of American missionaries, the reporter observed that

when one knows that three-fourths of the Moslems of this district [Urmia, northwest Iran], if not nine-tenths of them, were implicated in the plunder of Christian villages, and that many of them were parties to worse crimes, it is hard to have the same zest for work among them.<sup>86</sup>

Likewise, in his report, Mr. Shimmion, who graduated from Columbia University and lived in Urmia for about 14 years, was calling for the noble action as Bryce, Aneurin Williams, and some Americans did while he described the situation and the causes as "... this tyranny that has had us in its grip ever since Mohammedan rule began in our country."<sup>87</sup>

**Forced Conversion Stories**

Another peculiar theme on what Bryce wrote is the heavy emphasis on compulsory conversion to Islam. In many reports of the *Blue Book*, he deployed some tragic scenarios of religious conversion. For instance, according to one report from Arabkir, located in con-

temporary Erivan, such conversions happened between June 25 and July 8, 1915. It reads thus:

The Armenian population has been converted to Islam; it was a means of escaping from the forced migration. Orthodox Turks are given the wives of absent husbands or their daughters. We have been told that, according to an order from the Padishah, everybody must embrace Islam.<sup>88</sup>

In another report dated 13/26 July 1915, the reporter, an authoritative source in Constantinople was delivering the news that “We are hearing also from various places of conversions to Islam. It seems that the people have no other alternative for saving their lives.”<sup>89</sup>

It is true that if the Armenians would convert, they would be exempt from deportation. In this sense, there was a forced conversion. However, in many of the reports of the *Blue Book* pertaining to compulsory conversion, there is an obvious message that appeals to emotions and combines brutal, ghastly violence, and political reason. Furthermore, it is not our purpose here to test validity of these arguable historical claims. However, we can interrogate the structure and logic of these claims. Firstly, a combination of brutal violence and political reason as described in the reports are presented as a natural condition of the Ottoman rule that is supposedly an intrinsic part of it. This may well resonate with what we already know of Bryce’s dismissing views that equates Islamic rule historically with massacres.

Secondly, as widely known, compulsory conversion and missionary enterprise, as in the Christian-European countries, historically were not the case in the Ottoman Empire. Conversion was an instrument for survival of non-Muslims in the late Ottoman period, but that did not consume the entirety of other reasons behind the conversion such as benefits of material conditions and economic gains, elevation of social status, and results of mixed marriages and ethnic identity.<sup>90</sup> In other words, conversion of Armenians during the late Ottoman period was an outcome of instrumental/institutional drives of the Ottoman state rather than ideological/religious drives. In this respect, instances of conversion that the *Blue Book* describes strangely reminds one of infamous episodes that Isabelle of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon expelled Muslims and Jews and forced to convert them in the making of the modern Europe for the sake of religious homogeneity. Perhaps it was this historical legacy in mind when one report compared the Islamic conversion to the Medieval Christian conversions:

In order to exact confession they [the Young Turks] used all sorts of torture, only to be paralleled in the records of Medievalism and the Inquisition. I saw people unable to walk brought on donkeys to Dr. B.B. for treatment of their wounds and sores that they got from torturing and beating.<sup>91</sup>

### *Racism*

The fourth aspect about the dehumanization of the Muslims in the *Blue Book* appears as the racist language used and the way in which brutality is elaborated as an intrinsic part of Muslims. For instance, the dramatic and emotional exploitation of massacres through irresistible depictions such as murder and burning of pregnant women, children, orphans, babies, the elderly, and the disabled are to name but a few. The lunatic scenes that were presented in the *Blue Book* are further backed up by the “evil, dehumanized Muslims,” who enjoyed draconian persecutions and lost their sense of humanity. According to an eye witness account, “the object of massacres was not simply to kill,

but to torture.”<sup>92</sup> Furthermore, Muslims were described as “selfish,” “callous,” “indifferent to each other’s suffering” while Armenians were presented as “mutually helpful and self-sacrificing.”<sup>93</sup>

On a grander scale, all these aspects raised about the *Blue Book* are significant in the sense that these miniscule details of the events were the only account available to the larger public in the world. There was not another *Blue Book* available for many decades that would tell the story from the non-Christians’ point of view as a “historical” counter-argument. First and foremost, it was this hegemonic and asymmetrical normality that was set up in the first place regarding the creation of knowledge and its transformation in the public domain in the long-run. As a public intellectual of the late Victorian era, Bryce’s exclusive priority on the shaping of public opinion, which was embodied in the *Blue Book*, links to the larger argument of Orientalism and the dehumanization of Ottoman-Muslims.

#### *The American Impact on the Circulation of the Blue Book*

Before the *Blue Book* was published, the reports were separately published in major American newspapers such as The New York Times and The Chicago Herald and when the book came out it sold 1,000 copies.<sup>94</sup> The compilation of the reports in the *Blue Book* became possible through the accounts of eyewitnesses and American missionary enterprise. In a discussion on the twenty years of Armenian question in *Transcaucasia and Ararat*, Bryce had seen the American missionaries as an agent of enlightenment. He went on to saying that “they have been first to bring the light of education and learning into these dark places, and have rightly judged that it was far better to diffuse that light through their schools ...”<sup>95</sup> The main point here is the very close link to the American factor in the circulation of the British wartime propaganda in the American public and possibly America’s entrance to WW I. If the British wartime propaganda had to appeal to the American ethos, the German atrocities against the Belgians were not sufficient for that purpose. It needed elaboration and eloquence and the Armenian massacres would be a very fitting ground to endorse an anti-Ottoman/Turkish campaign in the international society. Perhaps the atrocities committed against the Armenians were much more profitable for the British enterprise because those who committed these massacres were the non-civilised and Muslims unlike the Germans. For instance, through the help of one of his comrades, Aneurin Williams, a liberal member of the British Parliament at that time, Bryce published a brief op-ed in the New York Times in 1915 and rallied American support for the innocent humans, Christians who suffered from the tyranny of the Muslim Ottomans appealing that the U.S. should warn Germany to stop the Turks.<sup>96</sup>

The *Blue Book* also reveals that in their corresponding, Bryce and the liberal Grey, otherwise then known as Viscount Grey of Falladon (who held a position in the British Foreign Office until 1916 and later appointed as Ambassador to the United States during the next couple years in the aftermath of the war) placed a heavy emphasis on the possible historical merit of these reports. To Bryce, the reports “should be put on record for the sake of future historians.”<sup>97</sup> Viscount Grey would respond that in the same fashion: The *Blue Book* was “a terrible mass of evidence” that must be circulated to check the oppressive Turks and it would also serve “as a mine of information for historians in the future.”<sup>98</sup>

Furthermore, the very motivation in creation of the *Blue Book* during WW I seems to be tied to two overlapping missions that were directly linked to the Eastern Question. Dwell-

ing on Orientalist discourse, Bryce believed that as part of their commitments and ideals the West should undertake the necessary initiatives to compose the post-war map. For instance, he stated that the *Blue Book*

is presented primarily as a contribution to history, but partly also for the purpose of enabling the civilized nations of Europe to comprehend the problems which will arise at the end of this war, when it will become necessary to provide for the future government of what are now the Turkish dominions.<sup>99</sup>

This envisioning put together Orientalism, wartime propaganda, and policy-making. Thus, it realized the conditions for the operationalization of Orientalism. It gave a final solution for the Eastern Question that had been lingering in Europe then over a half century.

### **The Armenian Issue**

It is a point of curiosity indeed that to what extent the British wartime propaganda was committed to the Armenian cause. As many scholars contend, the British and the larger European community (elites, epistemic communities, diplomats, politicians, etc.) continued to have the same indifference toward the Armenians' aspirations because of the *realpolitik*. Just as during the heyday of the Eastern Crisis and the period following the Congress of Berlin the Armenians were captivated with unrealized promises and expectations, during and after WW I the British repeated the same policy through non-involvement and non-intervention on behalf of the Ottoman Armenians. Moreover, the British and the authors of the *Blue Book* were primarily concerned with German propaganda in the United States due to the Russian mistreatment of Jews and hence, the German propaganda became more influential than the British propaganda to convince the US to enter the War.<sup>100</sup>

At this point, it is important to keep in mind that although the WW I came to an end with the U.S. declaration of war on Germany, the seeds of an enduring misconception regarding the Turks/Ottomans had already been sown. Tellingly, circulation of the reports the British government prepared was very effective because these reports certainly were written for a particular audience in mind. The reports were embraced by the epistemic communities, political and non-political elites, and media patrons, all of which were influential in the making of public opinion in an age when the technology and media relied only on text writing, which was then sufficient enough to shape and give a direction for how things on a particular subject should be viewed in a certain fashion. For instance, the Wellington House provided with the publisher of the *Blue Book* in America, G. P. Putnam's Sons 15,000 copies in order for the American elites to apparently to benefit from its content.<sup>101</sup>

### **The *Blue Book* and History Writing**

As known today, the propaganda book on German atrocities were proven to be fabricated. So is the *Blue Book*. However, the scholarship has been reluctant to acknowledge the spuriousness of the *Blue Book*. In other words, while in the German case, there is a consensus that the reports are the sole product of British war time propaganda, the scholarship has withheld this very same role of the British propaganda in the Turkish case.<sup>102</sup> Likewise, while in the German case these reports were dismissed, in the Turkish case the reports were cherished as a historical documentation of truth and regarded highly valu-

able.<sup>103</sup> At this point, the question that asserts itself is a normative one. Why is that? What accounts for this enduring double standard treatment that the scholarship has long clung itself into, if not a pardonable overlook? Orientalism as a living political language generationally and institutionally inherit its socio-cultural, “material investment” as a form of perpetuation in “academies, books, congresses, universities,” and “foreign-service” units.<sup>104</sup> To put in Said’s own words, “The scientist, the scholar, the missionary, the trader, or the soldier was in, or thought about, the Orient because he could be there, or could think about it, with very little resistance on the Orient’s part.”<sup>105</sup> Put concisely, Orientalism is still with us. Bryce’s legacy is still intact and unchallenged.

Another point here is how once a particular group of people in a particular geography (the Orient) was defined in the first place through textualizing and how this definition and origination set the terms for decades to come. This is to say how utilization of the *Blue Book* became a bible for the alleged Armenian genocide. In other words, as much as the founding genealogy that was constructed by Bryce and some other figures, there has been an immense corpus of literature that was produced by the Armenian and Western scholars and dedicated for the justification of the alleged genocide. This body of literature’s references to the *Blue Book* is significant in the sense that it helps explain how the image of “terrible Turk” turned into “genocidal Turk.” In this respect, there are still works emphasizing the genuine aspect of the reports.<sup>106</sup> Tragically, Ara Sarafian went into justifying the significance of the *Blue Book* as “... its detailed and scholarly nature, which lends itself into critical scrutiny even today.”<sup>107</sup>

In the contemporary era, the Eastern Question and the mind-set it designed have continued to work effectively among the post-Ottoman states, exemplified by their widespread misconception, hostile attitude, and overt contempt for each other throughout the twentieth century.<sup>108</sup> This antagonist attitude embodied most clearly in historical perception with which the Kemalist Republic of Turkey antagonized the Arab world and the Slavic Balkan world and of course the Armenians antagonized the Turks and the Ottomans. For instance, historian Maria Todorova observes two major periods in the history of the Balkans as far as “historical legacy” is concerned. She argues that the first was the impact of Eastern Roman Empire (so-called Byzantium) because this era constituted the cultural origins of the region, in which Orthodox Christianity is embedded; and the second was the Ottoman legacy, which perpetuated over five centuries.<sup>109</sup> Furthermore, she adds that there can be two interpretations of this legacy: One is “legacy as continuity” and the other is “legacy as perception,” which became very apparent in most of the newly established nation-states of the Balkans prior to WW I.<sup>110</sup>

Following such an incisive macro-historical distinction, the question becomes why the “legacy as perception” overpowers the “legacy as continuity.” Although it is plausible to see the anti-Ottoman perception of post-Ottoman societies as a result of their nation-state building in the twentieth century, this view does not explain why this (mis)-perception still persists.<sup>111</sup> One peculiar feature of anti-Ottoman perception and its embodiment in history writings have revolved around the truth claims pertaining to the Ottoman Empire’s mistreatment of its minorities. Truth claims in history-writing, however, blur the line between history and memory.

History and memory are different things and they refer to different statuses of reality. While the former is a discipline, requiring critical interrogation on the basis of a narrative, the latter is purposefully selective and heavily subjective. Likewise, the knowledge gained through memory cannot be considered historical knowledge because the discipline of history requires “inferential” and “organized” knowledge that is what is absent in memory.<sup>112</sup> When creating the *Blue Book* through eyewitness accounts, the British intel-

lectuals saw their enterprise as manifestation of truth and history. However, as the twentieth-century British historian and thinker Robin George Collingwood argues, history-writing based on the testimony of authorities is not history, but rather “scissor-and-paste history” which he sees as a method that is “a century out of date.”<sup>113</sup> In that sense, history-writing of this kind and its unquestioned reception on later historiography have responsibility in how presently we look at the Armenian question of 1915. Moreover, this kind of history as a source of knowledge and “truth” creates discourses that produce unquestioned devotion to a memory with a disciplinary and moralist motivation.

## Conclusion

Through this historical analysis, I hope to have demonstrated that the Europeans and their readymade norms, rules, techniques, tactics, and the cognitive models they devised and developed that ultimately helped create a common negative perception about the Turco/Ottoman image, force us to rethink our discourses and debates. As I have suggested, not only did Bryce orchestrate a construction pertaining to the evil-like image of the Turk, but also his “legacy,” which facilitated to construct the truth regarding the 1915 events through cognitive shorthand and certain manipulative assumptions, and turned this discourse of barbarity into a combination of moralist and legal discourses on genocide in the second part of the twentieth century. Let us also keep in mind that the way truth is constructed in the first place does not invalidate that truth has multiple options to consider. Seen in this light, there appears four main points, which can account for Bryce’s involvement and role on the fate and perception of Turco/Ottoman identity. The first aspect is the constitutive relationship between *realpolitik* and the British Orientalism that were operationalized during the Great War. Orientalist and racist British wartime propaganda provided the British policy-makers with fitting opportunities. By commissioning the propaganda reports, the British camouflaged the Allies’ own atrocities and killings in the war. Moreover, Bryce’s extraordinary engagement by deploying Orientalist motifs and reasons that moralistically reinterpreted and reshaped the international norms, made an impact on American public, whose ethos at the time primarily rested on progressivism and idealism.

As much as *realpolitik* and propaganda, Bryce’s commission in the broader Eastern Question is marked by his ideological and dismissive views on the Orient, most notably the Ottomans/Turks. Bryce’s influence worked at two levels. In this respect, a second aspect is that Bryce was a long-time committed campaigner against the Ottoman Empire in international arena. As the founder member of the Eastern Question committee, Bryce’s anti-Ottoman campaign had relatively a longer past. In Britain and Europe, he was one of the first and most famous pundits for the need for creating and circulating common knowledge about the Ottomans and their political system, history, religions, etc. Incidentally, there is a distinction that needs to be made about Bryce’s study of the Orient. Unlike earlier generations of Orientalists, his study of the Orient raised the Muslim/Ottoman question whose formulation was already done based on the emerging European-driven universal values and norms because their initial premises were already laid out after the Congress of Berlin. Put concisely, the peace-driven European tactics were developed throughout the then long-lasting Eastern Question in which the displacement of Balkan Muslims was established through deportation, homogenization, and ethnic cleansing.

The third aspect is that Bryce’s most obvious contribution to the distorted Ottoman identity was his very influential ties to America. Studying its history and making

immense connections in different states, Bryce was well aware of the important role of public opinion in Progressive America. In this respect, the liberating and peace-driven political position that Bryce presented in America was in ideal accordance with the context of this country. What is more, by selling the Armenian massacres to the American public, Bryce made his subtlety as a behind the scenes man indiscernible. This makes sense in the light of his seemingly non-partisan and humanitarian outlook, which the American public sympathized with. By doing so, in the eyes of many Americans, Bryce certainly was not either serving for the imperial aspirations or abetting the complicity of the British sins.<sup>114</sup> After all, it was this very public sentiment in America that Bryce could succeed in capturing and ultimately persuading America to join “the war to end all wars.” As an undisputed authority in America, Bryce’s depiction of the Armenian-Ottoman relations became very popular and continued to determine how an average person views this history.

And, the fourth aspect is that the British and Bryce’s responsibility is his personal disdain and enmity for the Turks. It is known that while he was a great admirer of the Germans and their culture, he was a hater of the Ottomans. Yet, he worked for the British government’s propaganda machinery in both commissions. It is safe then to conclude that as much as religious distinction between the Germans and the Turks, Bryce’s own disinclination for the Turks created a double standard view about the Turco-Ottoman identity.

Finally, it is problematic if the scholarly efforts and historical inquiry only focus on the loss of Armenians and Christians pertaining to the incidents of 1915 while ignoring the similar incidents in which Jews and Muslims were also massacred. This hypocritical attitude becomes further dubious when we consider the role of Orientalism and shady politics of the Great Powers who fashioned the norms of international laws and politics full of inconsistencies and ambiguities. In this sense, making normative judgments through historical inquiry does not make sense because these norms that produced knowledge and discourses are grounded on nothing. Such an attitude would prevent us from reading history through a romanticized prism that delivers verdict on the evil and mourns for the victims. Certainly, the history yet to be written is beyond the good and evil.

## NOTES

1. Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, New York: Vintage, 1995.
2. For instance, see the writings of the following scholars: Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009; Mary Neuberger, *The Orient Within: Muslim Minorities and the Negotiation of Nationhood in Modern Bulgaria*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004; Daniel R. Brower and Edward J. Lazzarini, eds., *Russia’s Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700–1917*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997; Michael Khodarkovsky, *Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500–1800*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004; David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye *Russian Orientalism: Asia in the Russian Mind from Peter the Great to the Emigration*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010; Vera Tolz, *Russia’s Own Orient: The Politics of Identity and Oriental Studies in the Late Imperial and Early Soviet Periods*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011; Alexander S. Morrison, *Russian Rule in Samarkand, 1868–1910: A Comparison with British India*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008; Michael Kemper, “Red Orientalism: Mikhail Pavlovich and Marxist Oriental Studies in Early Soviet Russia”, *Die Welt Des Islams*, Vol. 50, No. 3, 2010, pp. 435–476; Michael Kemper and Artemy M. Kalinovsky, eds., *Reassessing Orientalism: Interlocking Orientologies during the Cold War*, New York: Routledge, 2015; Michael David Fox, Peter Holquist, and Alexander Martin, *Orientalism and Empire in Russia*, Bloomington: Slavica, 2006; and Robert Geraci, *Windows on the East: National and Imperial Identities in Late Tsarist Russia*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009; and Denis

- V. Volkov, *Russia's Turn to Persia: Orientalism in Diplomacy and Intelligence*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.
3. Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
  4. Ezel Kural Shaw and C. J. Heywood, *English and Continental Views of the Ottoman Empire, 1500–1800*, Los Angeles: William Andrews Clark Memorial Library, University of California, 1972; Aslı Çırakman, *From the "Terror of the World" to the "Sick man of Europe": European Images of Ottoman Empire and Society from the Sixteenth Century to the Nineteenth*, New York: Peter Lang, 2002; Jerry Toner, *Homer's Turk: How Classics Shaped Ideas of the East*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013.
  5. Two works are exceptions here: Davide Rodogno, *Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815–1914*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010; and Justin McCarthy, *The Turk in America: The Creation of an Enduring Prejudice*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010.
  6. Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, Documents Presented to Viscount Grey of Falldon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with a Preface by Viscount Bryce*, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1915. The legal author of the *Blue Book* is James Bryce, but in reality, as part of the British wartime propaganda, historian Arnold J. Toynbee wrote the book. For this reason, this collaborated book is cited in references as Toynbee's, but treated as that of Bryce throughout the text. McCarthy, *The Turk in America*, *op. cit.*, p. 236.
  7. Mark Mazower, *The Balkans: A Short History*, New York: The Modern Library, 2000, p. 81.
  8. M. Hakan Yavuz, "The Transformation of 'Empire' thorough Wars and Reforms: Integration vs. Oppression", in *War & Diplomacy, The Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 and the Treaty of Berlin*, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz and Peter Slugett, Salt Lake City, UT: The University of Utah Press, 2011, pp. 20–21.
  9. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
  10. Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea*, New York: Penguin, 2012, p. 70.
  11. Rodogno, *Against Massacre*, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
  12. For an interesting account of how Orientalist discourse was received among the Ottoman Armenians and fused with Russian populism, see Anaide Ter Minassian *Nationalism and Socialism in the Armenian Revolutionary Movement*, trans. A. M. Barrett, Cambridge: The Zoryan Institute, 1984, pp. 9–21.
  13. Rodogno, *Against Massacre*, *op. cit.*, p. 24.
  14. Yavuz, "The Transformation of 'Empire'", *op. cit.*, pp. 19–22.
  15. Minassian, *Nationalism and Socialism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 17–19.
  16. Rodogno, *Against Massacre*, *op. cit.*, pp. 25, 37.
  17. Sean McMeekin, "Benevolent Contempt: Bismarck's Ottoman Policy", in *War & Diplomacy, The Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 and the Treaty of Berlin*, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz and Peter Slugett, Salt Lake City, UT: The University of Utah Press, 2011, p. 82.
  18. Yavuz, "The Transformation of 'Empire'", *op. cit.*, p. 35.
  19. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
  20. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
  21. Ann Hironaka, *Neverending Wars: The International Community, Weak States, and the Perpetuation of Civil War*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005, pp. 10–14.
  22. Mazower, *The Balkans*, *op. cit.*, p. 79.
  23. Mujeeb R. Khan, "The Ottoman Eastern Question and the Problematic Origins of Modern Ethnic Cleansing, Genocide, and Humanitarian Interventionism in Europe and the Middle East", in *War & Diplomacy, The Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 and the Treaty of Berlin*, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz and Peter Slugett, Salt Lake City, UT: The University of Utah Press, 2011, p. 106.
  24. Tanisha M. Fazal, *State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007, p. 4.
  25. Mazower, *Governing the World*, *op. cit.*, p. 71.
  26. *Ibid.*, pp. 71–72.
  27. Sean McMeekin, *The Russian Origins of the First World War*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011, p. 241.
  28. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
  29. Mustafa Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 3.
  30. Minassian, *Nationalism and Socialism*, *op. cit.*, p. 5. According to Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin, 1878, the Ottoman state was to immediately implement the necessary reforms and improvements for the Armenians and ensure their protection against the Kurds and the Circassians. In addition, the progress the Ottoman state would make would be monitored by the *Great Powers* who supervised this commission.

31. The term Sublime Porte (Bâb-ı Âli) was the palace where the Grand Vizier and ministers of the Ottoman Empire met. It functioned as Foreign Ministry and foreign diplomats were welcomed at the Porte during the period of 1908–1918.
32. İlber Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu* [German Sphere of Influence in the Ottoman Empire], Ankara: Bireşik Yayınları, 1983, p. 16.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 136. According to Ortaylı, this man was in fact was a journalist, but was merited to be *honoris causa* professor by the king of Württemberg because supposedly he had good knowledge on the East. pp. 136–137.
34. James Bryce, “Preface”, in *The Murderous Tyranny of the Turks*, Arnold Joseph Toynbee, New York: G.H. Doran, 1917, pp. III–V.
35. Wellington House was the propaganda bureau of the British Empire during WW I. The headquarters at Wellington House was a branch of the Foreign Office.
36. Heath W. Lowry, *The Story Behind Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*, Istanbul: Isis Press, 1990, pp. 7–24.
37. M. Hakan Yavuz, “Orientalism, ‘Terrible Turk’ and Genocide”, *Middle East Critique*, Vol. 23, No. 2, 2014, pp. 111–126.
38. McCarthy, *The Turk in America*, pp. 84, 223.
39. Said, *Orientalism*, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
40. *Ibid.*
41. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
42. Mahmut Mutman, “Oryantalizmin Gölgesi Altında: Batı'ya Karşı İslam” [Under the Shadow of Orientalism: Islam against the West], in *Oryantalizm, Hegemonya ve Kültürel Fark* [Orientalism, Hegemony, and Cultural Difference], ed. Fuat Keyman, Mahmut Mutman, and Mesut Yeğenoğlu İstanbul: İletişim, 1999, p. 33.
43. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Criticism, Feminism, and the Institution”, in *The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues*, ed. Sarah Harasym, New York: Routledge, 1990, pp. 1–2.
44. Said, *Orientalism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 14–15.
45. James Bryce, *Transcaucasia and Ararat: Being Notes of a Vacation Tour in the Autumn of 1876*, reprinted edition, London: Macmillan, 1970, pp. VIII–IX.
46. Duncan Bell, “Victorian Visions of Global Order: An Introduction”, in *Victorian Visions of Global Order: Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth Century Political Thought*, ed. Duncan Bell, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 3.
47. K. Humayun Ansari, “The Muslim World in British Historical Imaginations: ‘Re-thinking Orientalism?’”, *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 1, 2011, p. 83.
48. Bell, “Victorian Visions”, *op. cit.*, p. 2; and J. G. A. Pocock, “Political Thought in the English-Speaking Atlantic, 1760–1790: Empire, Revolution and the end of Early Modernity”, in *The Varieties of British Political Thought, 1500–1800*, ed. J. G. A. Pocock, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 311, 317.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
50. *Ibid.*
51. *Ibid.* p. 10.
52. *Ibid.*
53. *Ibid.*
54. Andrew Porter, *Religion versus Empire?: British Protestant Missionaries and Overseas Expansion, 1700–1914*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004, p. 93.
55. John T. Seaman, Jr., *A Citizen of the World: The Life of James Bryce*, New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2006, p. 6.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
57. McCarthy, *The Turk in America*, *op. cit.*, p. 223.
58. James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, Two Volumes, New York: Macmillan & Co, 1888. <https://archive.org/stream/americancommonw18brycgoog#page/n5/mode/2up> (accessed 8 July 2019).
59. Seaman, *A Citizen of the World*, *op. cit.*, pp. 8–9.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
61. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 12.
62. It is important to note that the idea of *millet* system does not suggest a romanticized account of the Ottoman management of ethno-religious groups that is marked with excessive tolerance. However, political exclusion of minorities did not include an empirical exclusion through compulsion and vio-

- lence, thereby granting each ethno-religious group its own life in which primordial liberties like language, religion, and ethnicity were protected.
63. Bryce, *Transcaucasia and Ararat*, *op. cit.*, p. 423.
  64. Jeremy Salt, *Imperialism, Evangelism, and the Ottoman Armenians, 1878–1896*, Portland: Frank Cass, 1993, p. 21.
  65. Bryce, *Transcaucasia and Ararat*, *op. cit.*, p. 442.
  66. Said, *Orientalism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 9–10.
  67. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
  68. *Ibid.*, pp. 414–415.
  69. *Ibid.*, pp. 424–425.
  70. *Ibid.*
  71. *Ibid.*, pp. 442–443.
  72. James Bryce, *Essays and Addresses in War Time*, New York: The Macmillan, 1918, pp. 167–168.
  73. Bryce, *Transcaucasia and Ararat*, *op. cit.*, pp. 442–443.
  74. *Ibid.*, p. 423.
  75. Seaman, *A Citizen of the World*, *op. cit.*, p. 213.
  76. McCarthy, *The Turk in America*, *op. cit.*, p. 236.
  77. Quoted in Gary S. Messinger, *British Propaganda and the State in the First World War*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992, pp. 74–75.
  78. McCarthy, *The Turk in America*, *op. cit.*, p. 236.
  79. *Ibid.*
  80. *Ibid.*, p. 214.
  81. *Ibid.*, p. 222.
  82. *Ibid.*, p. 237.
  83. Toynbee, *The Treatment of Armenians*, *op. cit.*, p. 376.
  84. *Ibid.*, p. 581.
  85. *Ibid.*
  86. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
  87. *Ibid.*, p. 168.
  88. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
  89. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
  90. Selim Deringil, *Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 8–23.
  91. Toynbee, *The Treatment of Armenians*, *op. cit.*, p. 373.
  92. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
  93. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
  94. *Ibid.*, p. 240.
  95. Bryce, *Transcaucasia and Ararat*, *op. cit.*, p. 467.
  96. James Bryce, “Armenian Appeal by Bryce in Full”, *New York Times*, October 10, 1915.
  97. Toynbee, *The Treatment of Armenians*, *op. cit.*, p. XVII.
  98. *Ibid.*, p. XVIII.
  99. *Ibid.*, p. XXI.
  100. Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks and the Ottoman Nationalities: Armenians, Greeks, Albanians, Jews, and Arabs, 1908–1918*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2014, p. 68–9.
  101. McCarthy, *The Turk in America*, *op. cit.*, p. 231.
  102. *Ibid.*, p. 265.
  103. *Ibid.*
  104. Said, *Orientalism*, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
  105. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
  106. See Lillian Etmekjian, “Toynbee, Turks, and Armenians”, *Armenian Review*, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1984, p. 147; Ara Sarafian, “The Archival Trail: Authentication of the Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915–16”, in *Remembrance and Denial: The Case of the Armenian Genocide*, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1998; Richard G. Hovannisian ed., *The Armenian Genocide in Perspective*, New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1980; and Seaman, *A Citizen of the World*, *op. cit.*, pp. 211–213.
  107. Ara Sarafian, “Introduction”, in *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915–1916: Documents Presented to Viscount Grey of Fallador by Viscount Bryce in 1917*, ed. James Bryce and Arnold Toynbee, second edition, India: Garod Books, 2005, p. ix.

108. Süleyman Seyfi Ögün, *Türk Politik Kültürü* [Turkish Political Culture], Bursa: Alfa, 2000, p. 238.
109. Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, *op. cit.*, pp. 12–13.
110. *Ibid.*
111. Şener Aktürk, *Türkiye'nin Kimlikleri: Din, Dil, Etnisite, Milliyet, Devlet ve Medeniyet* [Turkey's Identities: Religion, Language, Ethnicity, Nationality, State, and Civilization], İstanbul: Etkileşim Yayınları, 2013, p. 41.
112. Robin George Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, London: Oxford University Press, 1946, p. 252.
113. *Ibid.*, p. 257.
114. Seaman, *A Citizen of the World*, *op. cit.*, p. 205.