Among the international security regimes, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime has a prominent rank due to the destructive power of the nuclear weapons over regional and global peace and stability. Since any failure, deception or deviation from the NPT Regime may bring about catastrophic outcomes; the regime is expected to have the ability and tools to cope with probable challenges.
The NPT Regime has come across with two major challenges in the recent decade: North Korea and Iran. Because North Korea withdrew from the NPT, it is no longer subjected to the NPT Regime, directly. Contrariwise, Iranis determined to stay as a state party to the NPT; thusly it is still subjected to the processes of the Regime.
Though, the Regime still did not confirm the character and extent of Iranian nuclear program. Iran has been demonstrating that it is possible to remain in the Regime without providing the necessary transparency to let the IAEA verify the absence of undeclared materials and inhibited activities. The question of my statement is “why the processes of the NPT Regime cannotspecify the nature and scope of Iran’s nuclear program?” I examine the processesof the Regime in order to determine the weaknesses of the Regime and toaddress them. The aforementioned processes are the procedures run by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN Security Council (UNSC)and the multilateral negotiations. I argue that, the Regime is modulated to cope with operational challenges and it remains relatively incompetent when a political challenge arises.