Annual Threat Assessment of the
\nIntelligence Community
\nfor the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence<\/p>\n
Dennis C. Blair
\nDirector of National Intelligence
\n12 February 2009<\/p>\n
February 2009<\/p>\n
February 2009<\/p>\n
FEBRUARY 2009<\/p>\n
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
\nANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT<\/p>\n
UNCLASSIFIED<\/p>\n
STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD<\/p>\n
Chairman Feinstein, Vice Chairman Bond, Members of the
\nCommittee, thank you for the invitation to offer my assessment
\nof threats to US national security. As in previous years, the
\njudgments I offer the Committee in these documents and
\nremarks and in my responses to your questions are based on the
\nefforts of thousands of patriotic, highly skilled professionals,
\nmany of whom serve in harm’s way. I am proud to lead the
\nworld’s best Intelligence Community and would like to
\nacknowledge the assistance provided by all the intelligence
\nagencies in preparing this report, in particular the National
\nIntelligence Council and CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence,
\nwhich contributed a substantial portion.<\/p>\n
SSCI ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nFar-Reaching Impact of Global Economic Crisis<\/p>\n
Far-Reaching Impact of Global Economic Crisis<\/p>\n
Forecasts differ significantly over the depth of the downturn. Industrialized countries are
\nalready in recession, and growth in emerging market countries, previously thought to be immune
\nfrom an industrialized country financial crisis, has also faltered, and many are in recession as
\nwell. Even China and India have seen their dynamic growth engines take a hit as they grapple
\nwith falling demand for their exports and a slowdown in foreign direct and portfolio investments.
\nGovernments worldwide are initiating monetary and fiscal stimulus programs designed to
\nstabilize and recapitalize their financial sectors, cushion the impact of stalling economic activity,
\nand eventually jumpstart a recovery, perhaps as early as late 2009. The IMF, which recently
\nreleased its revised forecast for 2009 projecting an anemic 0.5 percent increase in the global
\neconomy, warns that the risks to the global economy are on the downside.<\/p>\n
The financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises
\nin emerging market nations over the next year, prompting additional countries to request IMF or
\nother multilateral or bilateral support. Since September 2008, ten nations committed to new IMF
\nprograms intended to provide balance of payments support. All face the task of tackling
\neconomic problems in a less benign global economic environment. Unlike the Asian financial
\ncrisis of 1997-98, the globally synchronized nature of this slowdown means that countries will
\nnot be able to export their way out of this recession. Indeed, policies designed to promote
\ndomestic export industries-so-called beggar-thy-neighbor policies such as competitive currency
\ndevaluations, import tariffs, and\/or export subsidies-risk unleashing a wave of destructive
\nprotectionism.<\/p>\n
Time is probably our greatest threat. The longer it takes for the recovery to begin, the
\ngreater the likelihood of serious damage to US strategic interests. Roughly a quarter of the
\ncountries in the world have already experienced low-level instability such as government
\nchanges because of the current slowdown. Europe and the former Soviet Union have
\nexperienced the bulk of the anti-state demonstrations. Although two-thirds of countries in the
\nworld have sufficient financial or other means to limit the impact for the moment, much of Latin
\nAmerica, former Soviet Union states and sub-Saharan Africa lack sufficient cash reserves, access
\nto international aid or credit, or other coping mechanism. Statistical modeling shows that
\neconomic crises increase the risk of regime-threatening instability if they persist over a one to
\ntwo year period. Besides increased economic nationalism, the most likely political fallout for US
\ninterests will involve allies and friends not being able to fully meet their defense and<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nhumanitarian obligations. Potential refugee flows from the Caribbean could also impact
\nHomeland security.<\/p>\n
humanitarian obligations. Potential refugee flows from the Caribbean could also impact
\nHomeland security.<\/p>\n
The crisis presents many challenges for the United States. It started in the United States,
\nquickly spread to other industrial economies and then, more recently, to emerging markets. The
\nwidely held perception that excesses in US financial markets and inadequate regulation were
\nresponsible has increased criticism about free market policies, which may make it difficult to
\nachieve long-time US objectives, such as the opening of national capital markets and increasing
\ndomestic demand in Asia. It already has increased questioning of US stewardship of the global
\neconomy and the international financial structure.<\/p>\n
The November G-20 financial summit in Washington also elevated the influence of large,
\nemerging market nations. As was the case in the Asian financial crisis, China has an opportunity
\nto increase its prestige if Beijing can exert a stabilizing influence by maintaining strong import
\ngrowth and not letting its currency slide. But the United States also has opportunities to
\ndemonstrate increased leadership domestically, bilaterally, and in multilateral organizations such
\nas the WTO, APEC, and ASEAN. Recessions are a relative game, and historically the United
\nStates has proven more adroit at responding to them than most. The US tradition of openness,
\ndeveloped skills, and mobility probably puts it in a better position to reinvent itself. Moreover, in
\npotentially leading recovery efforts in coordination with the G-20, Washington will have the
\nopportunity to fashion new international global structures that can benefit all. Global
\ncoordination and cooperation on many fronts will be required to rebuild trust in the global
\nfinancial system and to ensure that the economic and financial crises do not spiral into broader
\ngeopolitical tensions.<\/p>\n
Turning the Corner on Violent Extremism<\/p>\n
I next want to focus on extremist groups that use terrorism. The groups with the greatest
\ncapability to threaten are extremist Muslim groups. In 2008 terrorists did not achieve their goal
\nof conducting another major attack in the US Homeland. We have seen notable progress in
\nMuslim opinion turning against terrorist groups like al-Qa’ida. Over the last year and a half, alQa’ida
\nhas faced significant public criticism from prominent religious leaders and fellow
\nextremists primarily regarding the use of brutal and indiscriminate tactics-particularly those
\nemployed by al Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) and al-Qa’ida in the Lands of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)-
\nthat have resulted in the deaths of Muslim civilians. Given the increased pressure posed by these
\ncriticisms, al-Qa’ida leaders increasingly have highlighted enduring support for the Taliban and
\nthe fight in Afghanistan and Pakistan and in other regions where they portray the West being at<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nwar with Islam and al-Qa’ida as the vanguard of the global terrorist movement. A broad array of
\nMuslim countries is nevertheless having success in stemming the rise of extremism and
\nattractiveness of terrorist groups. No major country is at immediate risk of collapse at the hands
\nof extremist, terrorist groups, although a number-such as Pakistan and Afghanistan-have to
\nwork hard to repulse a still serious threat. In the next section I will discuss at length the
\nchallenges facing us in Pakistan and Afghanistan where militant have gained some traction
\ndespite the successes against al-Qa’ida.<\/p>\n
war with Islam and al-Qa’ida as the vanguard of the global terrorist movement. A broad array of
\nMuslim countries is nevertheless having success in stemming the rise of extremism and
\nattractiveness of terrorist groups. No major country is at immediate risk of collapse at the hands
\nof extremist, terrorist groups, although a number-such as Pakistan and Afghanistan-have to
\nwork hard to repulse a still serious threat. In the next section I will discuss at length the
\nchallenges facing us in Pakistan and Afghanistan where militant have gained some traction
\ndespite the successes against al-Qa’ida.
\nQa’ida
\ntoday is less capable and effective than it was a year ago.<\/p>\n
In Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), al-Qa’ida lost significant
\nparts of its command structure since 2008 in a succession of blows as damaging to the group as
\nany since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001. Key leaders killed over the past year include
\nKhalid Habib, al-Qa’ida’s military chief and the fourth man in its chain of command; Abu Layth
\nal-Libi, who directed cross-border attacks against our forces in Afghanistan and was a rising star
\nin the organization; Abu Khabab al-Masri, the group’s leading expert on explosives and chemical
\nattacks and a driving force behind its terrorist plotting against the US Homeland and Europe; and
\nUsama al-Kini who was involved in the bombings of our Embassies in East Africa in 1998 and
\nlater became the chief planner of al-Qa’ida’s terrorist attacks in Pakistan.<\/p>\n
\u2022
\nThe loss of these and many other leaders in quick succession has made it more difficult for
\nal-Qa’ida to identify replacements, and in some cases the group has had to promote more
\njunior figures considerably less skilled and respected than the individuals they are replacing.
\nSustained pressure against al-Qa’ida in the FATA has the potential to further degrade its
\norganizational cohesion and diminish the threat it poses. If forced to vacate the FATA and locate
\nelsewhere, the group would be vulnerable to US or host-country security crackdowns as well as
\nlocal resistance, and probably would be forced to adopt an even more dispersed, clandestine
\nstructure, making training and operational coordination more difficult. Without access to its
\nFATA safehaven, al-Qa’ida also undoubtedly would have greater difficulty supporting the
\nTaliban insurgency in Afghanistan. It is conceivable al-Qa’ida could relocate elsewhere in South
\nAsia, the Gulf, or parts of Africa where it could exploit a weak central government and close
\nproximity to established recruitment, fundraising, and facilitation networks, but we judge none of
\nthese locations would be as conducive to their operational needs as their location in the FATA.<\/p>\n
In Iraq, we judge the maturation of the Awakening movement, Iraqi Security Forces
\ngains, and the subsequent spread of Sons of Iraq (SOI) groups, in combination with Coalition
\noperations against AQI leaders, have reduced AQI’s operational capabilities and restricted the
\ngroup’s freedom of movement and sanctuaries. Nevertheless, we judge the group is likely to
\nretain a residual capacity to undertake terrorist operations for years to come. I will focus on AQI
\nin greater detail when I discuss Iraq.<\/p>\n
Saudi Arabia’s aggressive counterterrorism efforts since 2003 have rendered the
\nKingdom a harsh operating environment for al-Qa’ida, but Riyadh is now facing new external<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nthreats from al-Qa’ida elements in the region, particularly from Yemen. Senior al-Qa’ida leaders
\nare focused on resurrecting an operational presence due to Saudi security actions over the past
\nfive years that have resulted in the death or capture of most identified Saudi-based al-Qa’ida
\nsenior leaders and operatives. Senior al-Qa’ida leaders view the Kingdom as a strategic target
\nowing to Bin Ladin’s longstanding objective of unseating the al-Saud family and the symbolic
\nvalue of attacking Western and Saudi targets in the land of the two holy mosques.<\/p>\n
threats from al-Qa’ida elements in the region, particularly from Yemen. Senior al-Qa’ida leaders
\nare focused on resurrecting an operational presence due to Saudi security actions over the past
\nfive years that have resulted in the death or capture of most identified Saudi-based al-Qa’ida
\nsenior leaders and operatives. Senior al-Qa’ida leaders view the Kingdom as a strategic target
\nowing to Bin Ladin’s longstanding objective of unseating the al-Saud family and the symbolic
\nvalue of attacking Western and Saudi targets in the land of the two holy mosques.<\/p>\n
Counterterrorism efforts by Indonesia, in some cases with US assistance, have led to the
\narrests and deaths of hundreds of Jemaah Islamiya (JI) operatives, including top leaders and key
\noperatives. In November, Indonesia executed three JI terrorists-Imam Samudra, Mukhlas, and
\nAmrozi-for their role in the 2002 Bali bombings. While the Intelligence Community continues
\nto assess that JI in Indonesia and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines are the two
\nterrorist groups posing threats to US interests in Southeast Asia, efforts by Southeast Asian
\ngovernments against both groups in the past few years have degraded their attack capabilities.<\/p>\n
The primary threat from Europe-based extremists stems from al-Qa’ida and Sunni
\naffiliates who return from training in Pakistan to conduct attacks in Europe or the United States.
\nWe have had limited visibility into European plotting, but we assess that al-Qa’ida is continuing
\nto plan attacks in Europe and the West. Al-Qa’ida has used Europe as a launching point for
\nexternal operations against the Homeland on several occasions since 9\/11, and we believe that
\nthe group continues to view Europe as a viable launching point. Al-Qa’ida most recently
\ntargeted Denmark and the UK, and we assess these countries remain viable targets. Al-Qa’ida
\nleaders have also prominently mentioned France, most likely in reprisal for the 2004 headscarf
\nban.<\/p>\n
The social, political, and economic integration of Western Europe’s 15 to 20 million
\nMuslims is progressing slowly, creating opportunities for extremist propagandists and recruiters.
\nThe highly diverse Muslim population in Europe already faces much higher poverty and
\nunemployment rates than the general population, and the current economic crisis almost certainly
\nwill disproportionately affect the region’s Muslims. Numerous worldwide and European Islamic
\ngroups are actively encouraging Muslims in Europe to reject assimilation and support militant
\nversions of Islam. Successful social integration would give most ordinary Muslims a stronger
\npolitical and economic stake in their countries of residence, even though better educational and
\neconomic opportunities do not preclude radicalization among a minority. Visible progress
\ntoward an Arab-Israeli settlement, along with stability in Iraq and Afghanistan, would help
\nundercut radicals’ appeal to Muslim foreign policy grievances.<\/p>\n
European governments are undertaking a wide range of policies to promote Muslim
\nsocial integration and counter radicalization. In addition to pursuing socioeconomic initiatives
\naimed at all immigrants, France, Germany, Italy, and several smaller European countries have<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nestablished various types of religious-based consultative councils composed of leading Muslim
\ngroups. Additionally, the United Kingdom has established the most diversified and energetic
\nofficial outreach program to Muslims, largely reflecting concern about homegrown terrorism
\nsince the July 2005 London attacks. Among other initiatives, the UK Government has promoted
\nthe creation of an advisory board on mosque governance, a committee of Muslim theologians,
\nand consultative bodies of Muslim women and youth. It also has held multiple high profile
\nconferences with Islamic scholars and government representatives from the Muslim world.
\nBritish police have made a conscious decision to seek the cooperation of non-violent radicals
\neven while political authorities have encouraged former radicals and Sufis to speak out against
\nhardline political Islam.<\/p>\n
established various types of religious-based consultative councils composed of leading Muslim
\ngroups. Additionally, the United Kingdom has established the most diversified and energetic
\nofficial outreach program to Muslims, largely reflecting concern about homegrown terrorism
\nsince the July 2005 London attacks. Among other initiatives, the UK Government has promoted
\nthe creation of an advisory board on mosque governance, a committee of Muslim theologians,
\nand consultative bodies of Muslim women and youth. It also has held multiple high profile
\nconferences with Islamic scholars and government representatives from the Muslim world.
\nBritish police have made a conscious decision to seek the cooperation of non-violent radicals
\neven while political authorities have encouraged former radicals and Sufis to speak out against
\nhardline political Islam.<\/p>\n
Despite these successes, al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and allies remain dangerous and
\nadaptive enemies, and the threat they could inspire or orchestrate an attack on the United States
\nor European countries. Under the strategic direction of Usama Bin Ladin and his deputy, Ayman
\nal-Zawahiri, al-Qa’ida remains intent on attacking US interests worldwide, including the US
\nHomeland. Although al-Qa’ida’s core organization in the tribal areas of Pakistan is under
\ngreater pressure now than it was a year ago, we assess that it remains the most dangerous
\ncomponent of the larger al-Qa’ida network. Al-Qa’ida leaders still use the tribal areas as a base
\nfrom which they can avoid capture, produce propaganda, communicate with operational cells
\nabroad, and provide training and indoctrination to new terrorist operatives.<\/p>\n
\u2022
\nWe lack insight into specific details, timing, and intended targets of potential, current US
\nHomeland plots, although we assess al-Qa’ida continues to pursue plans for Homeland attacks
\nand is likely focusing on prominent political, economic, and infrastructure targets designed to
\nproduce mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction, significant economic aftershocks,
\nand\/or fear among the population.
\n\u2022
\nIncreased security measures at home and abroad have caused al-Qa’ida to view the West,
\nespecially the United States, as a harder target than in the past, but we remain concerned
\nabout an influx of Western recruits into the tribal areas since mid-2006.
\n\u2022
\nAl-Qa’ida and its extremist sympathizers in Pakistan have waged a campaign of deadly and
\ndestabilizing suicide attacks throughout Pakistan, including the bombing of the Marriott
\nHotel in Islamabad in September, which killed 60 people and wounded hundreds.
\nAQIM. Al-Qa’ida’s other robust affiliate, al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb,
\nis the most active terrorist group in northwestern Africa and, in our assessment, represents a
\nsignificant threat to US and Western interests in the region. AQIM has continued to focus
\nprimarily on Algerian Government targets, but since its merger with al-Qa’ida in September
\n2006 the group has expanded its target set to include US, UN, and other Western interests and
\nhas launched progressively more sophisticated attacks, employing vehicle-borne improvised
\nexplosive device (VBIEDs), near-simultaneous bombings, and suicide bombings.<\/p>\n
\u2022
\nAQIM has conducted nearly a dozen attacks against Western targets to include a near-
\nsimultaneous VBIED attack against United Nations facilities and the Algerian Constitutional
\nATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nCourt in Algiers in December 2007, killing at least 47 and wounding more than 100. AQIM<\/p>\n
Court in Algiers in December 2007, killing at least 47 and wounding more than 100. AQIM<\/p>\n
\u2022
\nAQIM Europe-based cells act as financial support and facilitation nodes, but these cells could
\npossibly become operational at the direction of AQIM leadership.
\nWe assess that over the next year AQIM will continue to demonstrate its increased
\ncapability and commitment to senior al-Qa’ida leadership by attacking local and Western
\ninterests throughout North Africa and the Sahel. AQIM traditionally has operated in Algeria and
\nnorthern Mali and has recruited and trained an unknown number of extremists from Tunisia,
\nMorocco, Nigeria, Mauritania, Libya, and other countries. We assess some of these trainees may
\nhave returned to their home countries to plot attacks against local and Western interests.<\/p>\n
Al-Qa’ida in Yemen. Yemen is reemerging as a jihadist battleground and potential
\nregional base of operations for al-Qa’ida to plan internal and external attacks, train terrorists, and
\nfacilitate the movement of operatives. Al-Qa’ida leaders could use al-Qa’ida in Yemen and the
\ngrowing presence of foreign jihadists there to supplement its external operations agenda,
\npromote turmoil in Saudi Arabia, and weaken the Salih regime.<\/p>\n
\u2022
\nAl-Qa’ida in Yemen on 17 September 2008 conducted an attack against the US Embassy in
\nSana’a. The coordinated attack used two explosives-laden vehicles, suicide bombers, and
\nsmall-arms fire and killed six guards and four civilians. As of September 2008, the group
\nhad conducted 20 attacks against US, Western, and Yemeni targets, most carried out by the
\nsplinter faction, Jund al-Yemen.
\nEast Africa. We judge the terrorist threat to US interests in East Africa, primarily from
\nal-Qa’ida and al-Qa’ida-affiliated Islamic extremists in Somalia and Kenya, will increase in the
\nnext year as al-Qa’ida’s East Africa network continues to plot operations against US, Western,
\nand local targets and the influence of the Somalia-based terrorist group al-Shabaab grows. Given
\nthe high-profile US role in the region and its perceived direction-in the minds of al-Qa’ida and
\nlocal extremists-of foreign intervention in Somalia, we assess US counterterrorism efforts will
\nbe challenged not only by the al-Qa’ida operatives in the Horn, but also by Somali extremists
\nand increasing numbers of foreign fighters supporting al-Shabaab’s efforts.<\/p>\n
The Homegrown Threat<\/p>\n
We judge any homegrown extremists in the United States do not yet rise to the numerical
\nlevel or exhibit the operational tempo or proficiency we have seen in Western Europe. A range
\nof factors inside the United States may contribute to a lower incidence of homegrown cells
\ndeveloping. Nevertheless, we remain concerned about the potential for homegrown extremists
\ninspired by al-Qa’ida’s militant ideology to plan attacks inside the United States, Europe, and
\nelsewhere without operational direction from the group itself. In this regard, over the next year
\nwe will remain focused on identifying any ties between US-based individuals and extremist
\nnetworks overseas. Though difficult to measure, the spread of radical Salafi Internet sites that
\nprovide religious justification for attacks; aggressive and violent anti-Western rhetoric; and signs
\nthat self-generating cells in the US identify with Bin Ladin’s violent objectives all point to the
\nlikelihood that a small but violent number of cells may develop here.<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\n\u2022
\n\u2022
\ncommand,
\nAyman al-Zawahiri, such as with his November 2008 video message following
\nthe US Presidential elections. US-born al-Qa’ida members such as Adam Gadahn, who was
\nindicted by a US grand jury in October 2006 on charges of treason, providing material
\nsupport to a designated foreign terrorist organization, and aiding and abetting terrorists, also
\nparticipated in making these English-language propaganda messages.
\nThe Threat from Lebanese Hizballah<\/p>\n
Lebanese Hizballah continues to be a formidable terrorist adversary with an ability to
\nattack the US Homeland and US interests abroad. Hizballah is a multifaceted, disciplined
\norganization that combines political, social, paramilitary, and terrorist elements, and we assess
\nthat any decision by the group to resort to arms or terrorist tactics is carefully calibrated. At the
\nsame time, we judge armed struggle, particularly against Israel, remains central to Hizballah’s
\nideology and strategy.<\/p>\n
We assess Lebanese Hizballah, which has conducted anti-US attacks overseas in the past,
\nmay consider attacking US interests should it perceive a direct US threat to the group’s survival,
\nleadership, or infrastructure or to Iran. However, we judge Hizballah would carefully weigh the
\ndecision to take any action against the United States. Hizballah probably continues to support
\nproxy groups and individuals, which could provide the group plausible deniability for possible
\nattacks against the West or Israel.<\/p>\n
We assess Hizballah anticipates a future conflict with Israel and probably continues to
\nimplement lessons learned from the conflict in the summer of 2006. In a potential future
\nconflict, Hizballah is likely to be better prepared and more capable than in 2006.<\/p>\n
The “Arc of Instability”<\/p>\n
The large region from the Middle East to South Asia is the locus for many of the
\nchallenges facing the United States in the twenty-first century. While we are making progress
\ncountering terrorism, the roots and the issues related to the many problems in this region go
\ndeeper and are very complicated. The United States has strong tools-from military force to
\ndiplomacy in the region and good relationships with the vast majority of states. There is almost
\nuniversal recognition that the United States is vital to any solutions, and these can be brought to
\nbear in ways that benefit the United States and the region. I will begin with looking at individual
\nstates, but the Intelligence Community analysis I present here emphasizes the regional linkages
\nexacerbating problems and providing opportunities that are available for tackling the problems.<\/p>\n
The Changing Geopolitical Landscape in the Middle East<\/p>\n
In the Middle East, the revival of Iran as a regional power, the deepening of ethnic,
\nsectarian, and economic divisions across much of the region, and looming leadership succession
\namong US allies are shaping the strategic landscape. Hizballah and HAMAS have successfully
\nseized the mantle of resistance to Israel from moderate regimes with secular Arab nationalists
\nbeing discredited in the popular mind. Battle lines are increasingly drawn not just between Israel<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nand Arab countries but also between secular Arab nationalists and ascendant Islamic nationalist
\nmovements inside moderate Arab states. Iran’s influence in Iraq, its enduring strategic ties to
\nSyria, pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, and the success of Tehran’s allies-HAMAS and
\nHizballah-are fueling Iran’s aspirations for regional preeminence. Arab Sunni leaders are
\nstruggling to limit Iran’s gains; Saudi Arabia’s more activist regional diplomacy falls short of
\nsignificantly constraining Iran’s freedom of maneuver. Iran’s ambitions combined with
\nunresolved conflicts in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories represent the principal
\nflashpoints for intensified conflict in the region.<\/p>\n
and Arab countries but also between secular Arab nationalists and ascendant Islamic nationalist
\nmovements inside moderate Arab states. Iran’s influence in Iraq, its enduring strategic ties to
\nSyria, pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, and the success of Tehran’s allies-HAMAS and
\nHizballah-are fueling Iran’s aspirations for regional preeminence. Arab Sunni leaders are
\nstruggling to limit Iran’s gains; Saudi Arabia’s more activist regional diplomacy falls short of
\nsignificantly constraining Iran’s freedom of maneuver. Iran’s ambitions combined with
\nunresolved conflicts in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories represent the principal
\nflashpoints for intensified conflict in the region.<\/p>\n
In Tehran, Iran’s conservative faction continues to dominate the government. Supreme
\nLeader Khamenei has consolidated political power in his office, but his reliance on hardline
\nconservative elements-the IRGC, war veterans turned politicians such as President Mahmud
\nAhmadi-Nejad, and selected clerics-to bolster his authority has upset the earlier factional
\nbalance in Iranian politics.<\/p>\n
\u2022
\nAlthough the regime still comprises many competing factions, only those that support the
\nconcept of a powerful Supreme Leader and advocate revolutionary values now have a
\nsignificant voice in decisionmaking.
\nPresident Ahmadi-Nejad faces less than certain prospects for reelection in June because
\nhis management of the economy and aggressive foreign policy rhetoric have become sources of
\nsignificant domestic criticism and political friction. Ahmadi-Nejad’s economic policies have
\nreduced unemployment marginally, but have fueled significant inflation, providing his critics
\nample ammunition to question his competence. The sharp fall in global oil prices will add to
\nIran’s economic problems, but Tehran has a substantial cushion of foreign reserves to support
\nsocial and other spending priorities. Less energy revenues may also help to dampen its foreign
\npolicy adventurism.<\/p>\n
We expect Khamenei will attempt to manipulate the presidential election, largely by
\nlimiting the range of candidates. As he has in past elections, the Supreme Leader probably will
\nattempt to influence the decisions of individuals to run, monitor the vetting and approval of
\ncandidates, and influence media coverage of the campaign.<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\n\u2022
\n\u2022
\n\u2022
\nAlthough we expect that whoever is elected will be a strong supporter of the Islamic
\nRepublic, we note that the election of a more pragmatic figure may, over time, produce some
\nmoderation of Iranian behavior by introducing into the decisionmaking process a wider range
\nof options than those presented under Ahmadi-Nejad.
\nMilitarily, Iran continues to strengthen the three pillars of its strategic deterrence:
\nsurface-to-surface missiles, long-range rockets and aircraft for retaliation; naval forces to disrupt
\nmaritime traffic through key waterways; and unconventional forces and surrogates to conduct
\nworldwide lethal operations. Although many of their statements are exaggerations, Iranian
\nofficials throughout the past year have repeatedly claimed both greater ballistic missile
\ncapabilities that could threaten US and allied interests and the ability to close the Strait of
\nHormuz using unconventional small boat operations, anti-ship cruise missiles, and other naval
\nsystems. Some officials, such as Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Commander Major General
\nMohammad Ali Jafari-Najafabadi, have hinted that Iran would have a hand in attacks on
\n“America’s interests even in far away places,” suggesting Iran has contingency plans for
\nunconventional warfare and terrorism against the United States and its allies.<\/p>\n
Iran’s goals in Iraq include preventing the emergence of a threat from Iraqi territory,
\neither from the government of Iraq itself, or from the United States. To achieve this, Iran
\nprobably seeks a government in Baghdad in which Tehran’s Shia allies hold the majority of
\npolitical, economic, and security power. Iran also has sought to make the United States suffer
\npolitical, economic, and human costs in order to limit US engagement in the region and to ensure
\nthat Washington does not maintain a permanent military presence in Iraq or use its military to
\npressure or attack Iran.<\/p>\n
\u2022
\nIranian efforts to secure influence in Iraq encompass a wide range of activities, including
\nusing propaganda, providing humanitarian assistance, building commercial and economic
\nties, and supporting Shia elements fighting the Coalition. Iran has provided a variety of Shia
\nmilitants with lethal support including weapons, funding, training, logistical and operational
\nsupport, and intelligence training.
\n\u2022
\nWe judge Iran will continue to calibrate its lethal aid to Iraqi Shia militants based on the
\nthreat it perceives from US forces in Iraq, the state of US-Iran relations, Tehran’s fear of a
\nBa’thist resurgence, Tehran’s desire to help defend Iraqi Shia against sectarian violence, and
\nto maintain the ability to play a spoiler role in Iraq if Iran perceives the government of Iraq
\nhas become a strategic threat.
\n\u2022
\nDespite Tehran’s efforts, we judge Iraqi nationalism and the growing capabilities of the Iraqi
\ngovernment will limit Iranian influence in Iraq. Baghdad, for example, signed the US-Iraq
\nsecurity agreement despite Iranian opposition.
\nATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nIn Afghanistan, Iran has focused on promoting a friendly central government in Kabul
\nand limiting Western power and influence. Iran’s policy in Afghanistan follows multiple tracks,
\nincluding providing political and economic support to the Karzai government and developing
\nrelationships with actors across the political spectrum.<\/p>\n
\u2022
\nIran has opposed Afghan reconciliation talks with the Taliban as risking an increase in the
\ngroup’s influence and legitimacy.
\n\u2022
\nWe judge Iran distrusts the Taliban and opposes its return to power but uses the provision of
\nlethal aid as a way to pressure Western forces, gather intelligence, and build ties that could
\nprotect Iran’s interests if the Taliban regains control of the country.
\nIn the Levant, Tehran is focused on building influence in Lebanon and expanding the
\ncapability of key allies. Tehran continues to support groups such as Hizballah, HAMAS, and
\nPalestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), which it views as integral to its efforts to challenge Israeli and
\nWestern influence in the Middle East.<\/p>\n
\u2022
\nHizballah is the largest recipient of Iranian financial aid, training, and weaponry, and Iran’s
\nsenior leadership has cited Hizballah as a model for other militant groups. We assess Tehran
\nhas continued to provide Hizballah with significant amounts of funding, training, and
\nweapons since the 2006 conflict with Israel, increasing the group’s capabilities to pressure
\nother Lebanese factions and to threaten Israel.
\n\u2022
\nIran’s provision of training, weapons, and money to HAMAS since the 2006 Palestinian
\nelections has bolstered the group’s ability to strike Israel and oppose the Palestinian
\nAuthority.
\nWorsening Conflict in the Levant<\/p>\n
The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon are two places where the multifaceted
\nconnections of which I spoke are most pronounced in this arc of instability. Two non-state
\nactors, HAMAS and Hizballah, play prominent roles, while individual states that oppose US
\ninterests, such as Iran and Syria, also are prominent. In both these countries, we worry about
\nworsening conflict and the potential for growing violent extremism.<\/p>\n
Fighting between Israel and HAMAS in the Gaza Strip subsided in mid-January, leaving
\nin its wake hardened attitudes among Israelis and Palestinians, deepened Palestinian political
\ndivisions, and a widened rift between regional moderates-led by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and
\nJordan-and hardliners, including Iran, Hizballah, and Syria. A key challenge for US policy in
\nthe coming year will be finding ways to strengthen moderates and renew the potential for peace
\nnegotiations, lest post-conflict division and anger in the region further diminish prospects for
\npeace.<\/p>\n
With HAMAS in control of Gaza and Hizballah growing stronger in Lebanon, progress
\non a Palestinian- Israeli accord is growing more difficult. With Iran developing a nuclear
\nweapon capability and Israel determined not to allow it, there is potential for an Iran-Israeli
\nconfrontation or crisis on that issue as well. Moderate Arab states fear a nuclear-armed Iran,<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nwant progress on Palestinian settlement-the absence of which deprives US Arab allies of
\ncrucial political capital to defend strategic ties to the US and wish to sustain a moderate, state-
\ncentered politics for the region. Progress on the Israeli-Palestinian peace track would increase
\nopportunities for the US to broaden its engagement with Arab publics, including those aligning
\nwith the growing ideology of Islamic nationalism.<\/p>\n
\u2022
\nThe Israeli public appears broadly supportive of Israel’s military action and believes Israel
\nmust act decisively to prevent attacks from Palestinian-controlled territory. At the same
\ntime, Israel’s military actions in Gaza have deepened Palestinian anger towards Israel, both
\nin the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank, and sparked outrage and protests throughout the
\nArab and Muslim world.
\n\u2022
\nHAMAS and the Palestinian Authority are engaged in an intense competition, with both sides
\nseeking to emerge from the conflict in a stronger political position, but relations between the
\ntwo organizations have been further embittered by the crisis. The Palestinian Authority (PA)
\naccused HAMAS of needlessly provoking an Israeli attack and HAMAS, which has argued it
\n“won” by surviving the operation and continuing its control of Gaza, accused the PA of
\nessentially collaborating with the Israeli assault.
\n\u2022
\nThe moderate Arab states and regional hardliners are competing to shape the regional
\ndevelopments and public attitudes in the aftermath of the Gaza crisis. The moderates seek a
\nreconciliation of the Palestinian factions and the resumption of peace talks between Israel
\nand the Palestinians, while hardliners are encouraging HAMAS to retain its uncompromising
\nstance toward Israel. These opposing regional blocs are competing to take the lead in
\ndelivering humanitarian aid to Palestinians in Gaza. Moderate states support US efforts to
\nestablish a ceasefire and border security regime that will prevent the rearming of HAMAS,
\nwhile Iran is likely to lead an effort to provide weapons to HAMAS to build the group’s
\nmilitary capabilities.
\nTensions between HAMAS and Fatah have been elevated since HAMAS seized control
\nof the Gaza Strip in June 2007, and efforts to achieve reconciliation have failed. Both factions
\ncontinue to attack, harass, and detain members of the other group in the West Bank and the Gaza
\nStrip, deepening mutual resentment and making an accord between them difficult.
\nReconciliation talks between Fatah and HAMAS scheduled for November in Cairo did not occur
\nbecause HAMAS refused to attend the meetings, in part to protest ongoing PA security measures
\nin the West Bank targeting its members.<\/p>\n
\u2022
\nDisagreement between Fatah and HAMAS about a range of issues such as the timing of
\nnational elections and formation of a unity government could lead HAMAS to challenge the
\nlegitimacy of Abbas’s government and will remain obstacles to Fatah-HAMAS
\nreconciliation.
\nIn 2008, longstanding tensions worsened between anti-democratic Fatah elements, mostly
\nbut not exclusively the so-called “old-guard” and typically younger elements demanding internal
\nreforms within the faction, worsened in 2008 amid discussions over the location of and
\nattendance at Fatah’s long-delayed sixth General Congress. These internal conflicts threaten to<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nfracture the party and damage its prospects in the run-up to PA presidential and legislative
\nelections in 2009 or early 2010. There is no consensus among Fatah officials regarding a
\nreplacement for President Abbas, who has not groomed a successor, and no potential leader has
\ngained Fatah’s full support.<\/p>\n
fracture the party and damage its prospects in the run-up to PA presidential and legislative
\nelections in 2009 or early 2010. There is no consensus among Fatah officials regarding a
\nreplacement for President Abbas, who has not groomed a successor, and no potential leader has
\ngained Fatah’s full support.<\/p>\n
\u2022
\nThe Lebanese political scene has enjoyed a period of relative calm and reconciliation since
\nMay, probably because all Lebanese parties are focused on preparing and forging alliances
\nfor the National Assembly election in June 2009. Lebanese Christian voters, divided
\nbetween the two political camps, will be decisive in determining who wins a majority in the
\nelection.
\nThe security situation remains fragile in Lebanon, especially in the north, which saw
\nfighting between the Sunni and Alawi communities last summer. The Hizballah-initiated
\nviolence in May has left all sectarian groups-the Sunnis in particular-concerned about their
\nsecurity. The LAF’s limited response and the Hizballah-led opposition’s military strength have
\nreinforced the view that sectarian communities must defend themselves. All sides are working to
\ndevelop sectarian-based militia forces. Hizballah continues to bolster its military strength; since
\nthe 2006 war, the group has rearmed and trained additional personnel in preparation for possible
\nfuture conflict with Israel.<\/p>\n
Hizballah’s attempts to reconcile with other Lebanese parties are an effort to show the
\ngroup’s commitment to a Lebanese nationalist agenda in preparation for the election. They are
\nalso meant to reduce the damage done to Hizballah’s image by its armed takeover of parts of
\nBeirut in May.<\/p>\n
Since becoming President of Syria in June 2000, Bashar al-Asad has strengthened his
\nhold on power in Syria. Asad’s standing has been augmented by his perceived success in
\nweathering regional crises and international pressure and by the regime’s ability to highlight
\nSyria’s relative insulation from violence in Iraq and Lebanon. Within Syria, Asad has preserved
\nthe pillars of regime control established by his father while gradually using personnel turnover to
\nappoint loyalists and expand his power base.<\/p>\n
\u2022
\nSyrian leaders continue to exploit “resistance” to Israel and rejection of US pressure to unify
\nSyrians in support of the regime, despite broad dissatisfaction with economic conditions,
\nsome disappointment at the lack of political reforms, and quiet resentment by some Sunnis at
\ndomination by the Alawi minority.
\nATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nDamascus continues efforts to cement its influence in Lebanon by providing economic
\nand other support to its allies in the Lebanese opposition. Syria has exploited its role in helping
\nsecure the May 2008 Doha agreement, which ended Lebanon’s political violence last spring and
\nushered in a unity government, to improve relations with Europe and moderate Arab states.
\nSyria is poised to appoint an ambassador to Lebanon, and we judge Syria will continue to
\ninterfere in Lebanese affairs in pursuit of its own interests.<\/p>\n
Damascus continues efforts to cement its influence in Lebanon by providing economic
\nand other support to its allies in the Lebanese opposition. Syria has exploited its role in helping
\nsecure the May 2008 Doha agreement, which ended Lebanon’s political violence last spring and
\nushered in a unity government, to improve relations with Europe and moderate Arab states.
\nSyria is poised to appoint an ambassador to Lebanon, and we judge Syria will continue to
\ninterfere in Lebanese affairs in pursuit of its own interests.<\/p>\n
Syria probably will adjust its approach to the Iraq insurgency as Iraq’s situation evolves.
\nAs the United States withdraws, we assess Damascus will seek improved political and economic
\nties to Baghdad and is likely to support oppositionists opposed to a long-term US presence in
\nIraq. Syria will remain the primary gateway for foreign fighters entering Iraq. Syria condemned
\nthe 26 October 2008 US raid that targeted AQI foreign fighter facilitator Abu Ghadiyah and
\nstaged a temporary removal of some border guard forces. Damascus also closed US institutions
\nin Syria, including the Damascus Community School and the American Cultural Center.<\/p>\n
A More Stable Iraq as Counterbalance<\/p>\n
The positive security trends over the past year have endured and expanded, and a more
\nstable Iraq could counterbalance other negative trends in the region. Extremists in Iraq have
\nbeen largely sidelined by Coalition and Iraqi operations and dwindling popular tolerance for
\nviolence, and their attacks are no longer a major catalyst for sectarian violence. Iraqis now are
\nless inclined to resolve their differences through unsanctioned violence, and fewer Iraqis are
\ndying at the hands of their countrymen than at any time in the past two years. Indeed, communal
\nviolence is now at the lowest sustained levels since Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s government
\ncame to power. Improving security conditions in Iraq have given the Prime Minister an
\nopportunity to assert authority in previously denied areas of the country. Meanwhile, the
\nmaturation of the Awakening movement, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) gains, and the subsequent
\nspread of Sons of Iraq groups, in combination with Coalition operations against AQI leaders,
\nhave weakened AQI by largely forcing it out of strongholds such as Al Anbar and much of
\ngreater Baghdad.<\/p>\n
The main factors that have contributed to these positive trends are as follows:<\/p>\n
\u2022
\nFirst, Coalition operations and population security measures have been critical to reducing
\nviolence in Iraq. We judge Coalition support in the form of a credible, politically neutral
\nsecurity guarantor also has facilitated the ISF’s ability to deal with ethnosectarian issues.
\nATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\n\u2022
\n\u2022
\n\u2022
\nThird, the threat from AQI has continued to diminish. AQI, although still dangerous, has
\nexperienced the defection of members, lost key mobilization areas, suffered disruption of
\nsupport infrastructure and funding, and been forced to change targeting priorities. Indeed,
\nthe pace of suicide bombings countrywide, which we consider one indicator of AQI’s
\noperational capability, fell significantly during the last year.
\n\u2022
\nFourth, the threat of violence from most Shia militants has declined. Many Shia who looked
\nupon Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) in early 2008 as defenders against Sunni extremists
\neventually came to see the JAM as pariahs, leading Muqtada al-Sadr to announce last
\nsummer that most of his thousands-strong militia would set aside their weapons to become a
\ncultural organization and a counterweight to Western influence. Some Shia militant groups
\nsuch as Sadrist-affiliated groups and Kata’ib Hizballah (KH) probably will continue anti-
\nCoalition attacks and may engage in sporadic violence against Iraqi Government targets.
\n\u2022
\nLastly, the capabilities of the ISF have continued to improve. The ISF’s increasing
\nprofessionalism and improvements in warfighting skills have allowed it to assume more
\nresponsibility for Iraq’s internal security, as demonstrated by the successful operations
\nagainst Shia militants in Al Basrah, Sadr City, and Al \u2018Amarah, and against Sunni extremists
\nin Diyala and Mosul. Despite these improvements, the ISF remains dependent on the US for
\nenabling capabilities such as logistics, fire support, and intelligence.
\nWe assess political and security progress could be halted or even reversed by a number of
\nfactors, particularly if these challenges occur in combination.<\/p>\n
\u2022
\nDisputed internal boundaries. Resolving disputed boundaries, primarily in northern Iraq,
\nprobably will be the most fiercely contested political issue to face Iraq in the next several
\nyears and poses the greatest threat to government stability.
\n\u2022
\nPerceptions of Iraqi Government repression. Policies or actions of the Iraqi Government
\nperceived by segments of Iraq’s ethnosectarian population to represent a broad and enduring
\ncampaign of repression could lead to widespread violence.
\n\u2022
\nIncreased foreign support to insurgent or militia groups. We judge a large infusion of
\nforeign support could deepen and intensify the ensuing conflict if Iraqi militants and
\ninsurgents sought external assistance to challenge or destabilize the Iraqi Government.
\nIn addition to these challenges, Baghdad will confront more difficult choices about
\nspending priorities as a result of declining oil revenues as it simultaneously grapples with
\nsecurity force modernization, infrastructure investment, and expanding public payrolls. Iraq’s<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\neconomy will continue to depend heavily on hydrocarbon exports, government spending, and
\ncontinued security improvements.<\/p>\n
economy will continue to depend heavily on hydrocarbon exports, government spending, and
\ncontinued security improvements.<\/p>\n
\u2022
\nTurkish officials met with Kurdistan Regional Government President Barzani in October
\n2008, opening the prospect of closer ties between Turkey and the KRG. Like the rest of
\nEurope, the Turkish economy is feeling the effects of the global financial crisis. In mid-
\nNovember, Standard and Poor’s downgraded Turkey’s credit outlook from stable to negative.
\nIraq’s Sunni Arab neighbors are starting to reestablish an Arab presence in Baghdad, but
\nArab engagement is likely to be slow and halting over the next year. Jordan’s King Abdallah in
\nAugust became the first Arab head of state to travel to Baghdad since the fall of Saddam; he
\ndispatched an Ambassador to Iraq in October.<\/p>\n
Afghan-Pakistani Linkages<\/p>\n
In the past year, Afghanistan’s Taliban-dominated insurgency has increased the
\ngeographic scope and frequency of attacks. Taliban reaction to expanded Afghan and NATO
\noperations account for some of the increase in violence, but insurgents also have demonstrated
\ngreater aggressiveness and more lethal tactics. Efforts to improve governance and extend
\ndevelopment were hampered in 2008 by a lack of security in many areas and a general lack of
\ngovernment capacity and competency. The ability of the Afghan government, NATO, and the
\nUnited States to push back the Taliban and deliver security, basic governance, and economic
\ndevelopment will determine the continued support of the Afghan people for the government and
\nthe international community. Afghan leaders also must tackle endemic corruption and an
\nextensive drug trade, which erode the capacity of the government while diminishing public
\nconfidence in its already fragile institutions.<\/p>\n
Specifically, the security situation has deteriorated in many eastern areas of the country
\nand in the south and northwest. Taliban and affiliated insurgent groups have expanded
\noperations into previously peaceful areas of the west and around Kabul. The Taliban-dominated
\ninsurgency has expanded in scope despite International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and
\nOperation Enduring Freedom military operations targeting insurgent command and control
\nnetworks.<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nContinued progress has been made in expanding and fielding the Afghan National Army,
\nbut the shortage of international trainers in the field, high operational tempo, attrition, and
\nabsenteeism hamper efforts to make units capable of independent action. The Afghan National
\nPolice remains a largely untrained force with high rates of corruption and absenteeism.
\nLimitations to training, mentoring, and equipping combined with an ineffective Ministry of
\nInterior and large parts of the country that have not been effectively “cleared” hinder the
\nprogress and effectiveness of the policy.<\/p>\n
Continued progress has been made in expanding and fielding the Afghan National Army,
\nbut the shortage of international trainers in the field, high operational tempo, attrition, and
\nabsenteeism hamper efforts to make units capable of independent action. The Afghan National
\nPolice remains a largely untrained force with high rates of corruption and absenteeism.
\nLimitations to training, mentoring, and equipping combined with an ineffective Ministry of
\nInterior and large parts of the country that have not been effectively “cleared” hinder the
\nprogress and effectiveness of the policy.<\/p>\n
Kabul’s inability to build effective, honest, and loyal provincial and district level
\ninstitutions capable of providing basic services and sustainable, licit livelihoods erodes its
\npopular legitimacy and increases the influence of local warlords and the Taliban. The Afghan
\ngovernment has launched some initiatives, such as the Independent Directorate of Local
\nGovernance (IDLG), to address governance shortcomings, but corruption has exceeded culturally
\ntolerable levels and is eroding the legitimacy of the government. Both law enforcement and
\njudicial capacity, although somewhat improved, remain limited, and Kabul remains constrained
\nin its ability to deploy programs at the provincial and local levels.<\/p>\n
The Afghan government has no coherent tribal engagement strategy, but where Pashtun
\ntribal and government interests intersect, gains in local security, stability, and development are
\npossible. At the provincial level, governors who have proven themselves effective mediators of
\nlocal disputes among tribes and other local groups in their respective jurisdictions garner support
\nfrom Afghan audiences and the donor community.<\/p>\n
The Afghan drug trade is a major source of revenue for corrupt officials, the Taliban and
\nother insurgent groups operating in the country and is one of the greatest long-term challenges
\nfacing Afghanistan. The insidious effects of drug-related criminality continue to undercut the
\ngovernment’s ability to assert its authority outside of Kabul, to develop a strong, rule-of-law
\nbased system, and to rebuild the economy. Despite decreases in poppy cultivation in 2008,
\nopium production in Afghanistan remains historically high, and the country produces over 90
\npercent of the world’s supply with 95 percent of the crop grown in five contiguous provinces of
\nsouthwestern Afghanistan and over 60 perce3nt in one province alone, Helmand. In 2008,
\nfarmers grew 157,300 hectares of poppy, potentially producing an estimated 7,700 metric tons of
\nopium. Almost every province outside the southwest was either poppy-free or had a dramatic
\ndecrease in cultivation, due to a combination of effective local anti-poppy campaigns, better
\nsecurity unfavorable weather, and decreased opium prices relative to other crops, and improved
\ngovernance and security in key provinces. The United Nations estimates that the total value to
\nagricultural producers of Afghan opium in 2008 was $730 million-although the gap in<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nprofitability has narrowed. No improvement in the security in Afghanistan is possible without
\nprogress in Pakistan.<\/p>\n
profitability has narrowed. No improvement in the security in Afghanistan is possible without
\nprogress in Pakistan.<\/p>\n
In 2008 Islamabad intensified counterinsurgency efforts, but Islamabad’s record in
\ndealing with militants has been mixed as it navigates conflicting internal and counterterrorist
\npriorities. Pakistan’s leaders are facing enormous socio-economic challenges. Economic
\nhardships are intense, and the country is now facing a major balance of payments challenge.
\nIslamabad needs to make painful reforms to improve overall macroeconomic stability.
\nPakistan’s law-and-order situation is dismal, affecting even Pakistani elites, and violence
\nbetween various sectarian, ethnic, and political groups threatens to escalate. Pakistan’s
\npopulation is growing rapidly at a rate of about 2 percent a year, and roughly half of the
\ncountry’s 172 million residents are illiterate, under the age of 20, and live near or below the
\npoverty line. Among the needed reforms are measures to improve the transparency of
\ngovernment expenditures and impose taxes on wealthy landowners. Such reforms would reduce
\nthe opportunities for corruption among Pakistani political leaders, help to establish a more level
\npolitical playing field, and help build the confidence of average Pakistanis in their government.<\/p>\n
The Pakistani Government’s current plans will require intensified and sustained efforts to
\norchestrate the administrative, economic, educational, legal, and social reforms required to create
\nan environment that discourages Islamic extremism and encourages the development of human
\ncapital. This, in turn, requires effective political leadership focused on improving the capabilities
\nof Pakistani institutions for effective governance.<\/p>\n
WMD Proliferation Exacerbating Prospects for Middle East<\/p>\n
The ongoing efforts of nation-states to develop and\/or acquire dangerous weapons and
\ndelivery systems in the Middle East and elsewhere constitute another major threat to the safety of
\nour nation, our deployed troops, and our allies. (The threat posed by North Korea’s WMD
\nprogram is assessed below, in the section on Asia.) We are most concerned about the threat and
\ndestabilizing effect of nuclear proliferation. The threat from the proliferation of materials and
\ntechnologies that could contribute to both existing and prospective biological and chemical
\nweapons programs also is real. Most of the international community shares these concerns.<\/p>\n
WMD use by most nation states traditionally has been constrained by the logic of
\ndeterrence and by diplomacy, but these constraints may be of less utility in preventing the use of
\nmass-effect weapons by terrorist groups. Moreover, the time when only a few states had access
\nto the most dangerous technologies is long over. Technologies, often dual-use, circulate easily in
\nour globalized economy, as do the personnel with scientific expertise who design and use them.
\nTherefore, it is difficult for the United States and its partners to track efforts to acquire
\ncomponents and production technologies that are widely available.<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nWe assess countries that are still pursuing WMD programs will continue to try to
\nimprove their capabilities and level of self-sufficiency over the next decade. Nuclear, chemical,
\nand\/or biological weapons or the production technologies and materials necessary to produce
\nthem may also be acquired by states that do not now have such programs; and\/or by terrorist or
\ninsurgent organizations; and by criminal organizations, acting alone or through middlemen.<\/p>\n
We assess countries that are still pursuing WMD programs will continue to try to
\nimprove their capabilities and level of self-sufficiency over the next decade. Nuclear, chemical,
\nand\/or biological weapons or the production technologies and materials necessary to produce
\nthem may also be acquired by states that do not now have such programs; and\/or by terrorist or
\ninsurgent organizations; and by criminal organizations, acting alone or through middlemen.<\/p>\n
I want to be very clear in characterizing the Iranian nuclear program. First, there are
\nthree key parts to an effective nuclear weapons capability:<\/p>\n
(1)
\nProduction of fissile material,
\n(2)
\nEffective means for weapon delivery, and
\n(3)
\nDesign, weaponization, and testing of the warhead itself.
\nWe assessed in our 2007 NIE on this subject that Iran’s nuclear weapon design and
\nweaponization work was halted in fall 2003, along with its covert uranium conversion and
\nenrichment-related activities. Declared uranium enrichment efforts were suspended in 2003 but
\nresumed in January 2006 and will enable Iran to produce weapons-usable fissile material if it
\nchooses to do so. Development of medium-range ballistic missiles, inherently capable of
\ndelivering nuclear weapons, has continued unabated.<\/p>\n
We assess Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop
\nnuclear weapons until fall 2003. Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical
\ncapabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision were made to do
\nso.<\/p>\n
\u2022
\nIran continues its efforts to develop uranium enrichment technology, which can be used both
\nto produce low-enriched uranium for power reactor fuel and to produce highly enriched
\nuranium for nuclear weapons.
\n\u2022
\nAs noted, Iran continues to deploy and improve ballistic missiles inherently capable of
\ndelivering nuclear weapons.
\n\u2022
\nWe assess Iran since fall 2003 has conducted research and development projects with
\ncommercial and conventional military applications, some of which would be of limited use
\nfor nuclear weapons.
\nWe judge in fall 2003 Tehran halted its nuclear weapons design and weaponization
\nactivities and that the halt lasted at least several years. We assess Tehran had not restarted these
\nactivities as of at least mid-2007. Although we do not know whether Iran currently intends to<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\ndevelop nuclear weapons, we assess Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop
\nthem.<\/p>\n
develop nuclear weapons, we assess Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop
\nthem.<\/p>\n
We do not have sufficient intelligence reporting to judge confidently whether Tehran is
\nwilling to maintain indefinitely the halt of its previously enumerated nuclear weapons-related
\nactivities while it weighs its options, or whether it will or already has set specific deadlines or
\ncriteria that will prompt it to restart those activities. We assess Iran has the scientific, technical,
\nand industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons. In our judgment, only an Iranian
\npolitical decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would plausibly keep Iran from
\neventually producing nuclear weapons-and such a decision is inherently reversible. I reiterate
\nthat two activities of the three relevant to a nuclear weapons capability continue: development of
\nuranium enrichment technology that will enable production of fissile material, if Iran chooses to
\ndo so, and development of nuclear-capable ballistic missile systems.<\/p>\n
We assess convincing the Iranian leadership to forgo the eventual development of nuclear
\nweapons will be difficult given the linkage many within the leadership see between nuclear
\nweapons and Iran’s key national security and foreign policy objectives, and given Iran’s
\nconsiderable effort from at least the late 1980s to 2003 to develop such weapons. Our analysis
\nsuggests that some combination of threats of intensified international scrutiny and pressures,
\nalong with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security and goals might-if perceived by Iran’s
\nleaders as credible-prompt Tehran to extend the halt to the above nuclear weapons-related
\nactivities. It is difficult to specify what such a combination might be.<\/p>\n
We continue to assess Iran does not currently have a nuclear weapon. We continue to
\nassess Iran probably has imported at least some weapons-usable fissile material but still judge it
\nhas not obtained enough for a nuclear weapon. We cannot rule out that Iran has acquired from
\nabroad or will acquire in the future a nuclear weapon or enough fissile material for a weapon.
\nBarring such acquisitions, if Iran wants to have nuclear weapons it would need to produce
\nsufficient amounts of fissile material indigenously. We judge it has not yet done so.<\/p>\n
Iran made significant progress in 2007 and 2008 installing and operating centrifuges at its
\nmain centrifuge enrichment plant, Natanz. We judge Iran probably would be technically capable
\nof producing enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a weapon sometime during the 20102015
\ntime frame. INR judges Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of
\nforeseeable technical and programmatic problems.<\/p>\n
Iranian Missile Threat. Beyond its WMD potential, Iranian conventional military power
\nthreatens Persian Gulf states and challenges US interests. Iran is enhancing its ability to project
\nits military power, primarily with ballistic missiles and naval power, with the goal of dominating
\nthe Gulf region and deterring potential adversaries. It seeks a capacity to disrupt the operations
\nand reinforcement of US forces based in the region, potentially intimidating regional allies into<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nwithholding support for US policy, and raising the political, financial, and human costs to the
\nUnited States and our allies of our presence.<\/p>\n
\u2022
\nIran’s growing inventory of ballistic missiles-it already has the largest inventory in the
\nMiddle East-and its acquisition of anti-ship cruise missiles provide capabilities to enhance
\nits power projection. Tehran views its conventionally armed missiles as an integral part of its
\nstrategy to deter and if necessary retaliate against forces in the region, including US forces.
\nIts ballistic missiles are inherently capable of delivering WMD and if so armed would fit into
\nthis same strategy.
\nThe Terrorist CBRN Threat. Over the coming years, we will continue to face a
\nsubstantial threat, including in the US Homeland, from terrorists attempting to acquire
\nbiological, chemical, and possibly nuclear weapons and use them to conduct large-scale attacks.
\nConventional weapons and explosives will continue to be the most often used instruments of
\ndestruction in terrorist attacks; however, terrorists who are determined to develop CBRN
\ncapabilities will have increasing opportunities to do so, owing to the spread of relevant
\ntechnological knowledge and the ability to work with CBRN materials and designs in
\nsafehavens.<\/p>\n
\u2022
\nMost terrorist groups that have shown some interest, intent, or capability to conduct CBRN
\nattacks have pursued only limited, technically simple approaches that have not yet caused
\nlarge numbers of casualties.
\nIn particular, we assess the terrorist use of biological agents represents a growing threat
\nas the barriers to obtaining many suitable starter cultures are eroding and open source technical
\nliterature and basic laboratory equipment can facilitate production. Terrorist chemical attacks
\nalso represent a substantial threat. Small-scale chemical attacks using industrial toxins have been
\nthe most frequent type of CBRN attack to date. The chlorine attacks in Iraq from October 2006
\nthrough the summer of 2007 highlighted terrorist interest in using commercial and easily
\navailable toxic industrial chemicals as weapons.<\/p>\n
Al-Qa’ida is the terrorist group that historically has sought the broadest range of CBRN
\nattack capabilities, and we assess that it would use any CBRN capability it acquires in an anti-US
\nattack, preferably against the Homeland. There also is a threat of biological or chemical attacks
\nin the US Homeland by lone individuals.<\/p>\n
Rising Asia<\/p>\n
As the terrorism and proliferation threats persist across the “arc of instability,” East and
\nSouth Asia are poised to become the long-term power center of the world. China and India are
\nrestoring the positions they held in the eighteenth century when China produced approximately
\n30 percent and India 15 percent of the world’s wealth. These two countries are likely to surpass
\nthe GDP of all other economies except the United States and Japan by 2025, although the current
\nfinancial crisis may somewhat slow the momentum. Japan remains the second largest global<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\neconomy and a strong US ally in the region, but the global economic slowdown is exacting a
\nheavy toll on Japan’s economy. To realize its aspirations to play increased regional and global
\nroles will require strong leadership and politically difficult decisions. All together-Japan, the
\n“tiger” economies like South Korea and Taiwan as well as the rising giants of China and India
\npoint to the “rise of Asia” as a defining characteristic of the 21economy and a strong US ally in the region, but the global economic slowdown is exacting a
\nheavy toll on Japan’s economy. To realize its aspirations to play increased regional and global
\nroles will require strong leadership and politically difficult decisions. All together-Japan, the
\n“tiger” economies like South Korea and Taiwan as well as the rising giants of China and India
\npoint to the “rise of Asia” as a defining characteristic of the 21 century. China’s reemergence
\nas a major power with global impact is especially affecting the regional balance of power.<\/p>\n
As in the Middle East, the United States has strong relationships in East Asia-a network
\nof alliances with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia, and close
\npartnerships with other countries-and a longstanding forward military presence. Countries in
\nthe region look to the United States for leadership and for ways to encourage China to become a
\nconstructive and responsible player in the regional and global communities. Although China will
\nhave ample opportunity to play a positive role, it also poses a potential challenge if it chooses to
\nuse its growing power and influence in ways counter to US or broader international interests.<\/p>\n
China’s Transformation<\/p>\n
China is thirty years into a fundamental transformation that will take many more decades
\nto complete. Although there have been moments when the government’s effort to maintain
\ncontrol seemed on the verge of failure-notably the crisis on Tiananmen Square in 1989-the
\ngovernment has been remarkably successful in guiding reform. China has avoided the fate of
\nmost other socialist countries, suffering neither the economic and political collapse of the Soviet
\nUnion nor the stagnation of Cuba and North Korea.<\/p>\n
We judge China’s international behavior is driven by a combination of domestic
\npriorities, primarily maintaining economic prosperity and domestic stability, and a longstanding
\nambition to see China play the role of a great power in East Asia and globally. Chinese leaders
\nview preserving domestic stability as one of their most important internal security challenges.
\nTheir greatest concerns are separatist unrest and the possibility that local protests could merge
\ninto a coordinated national movement demanding fundamental political reforms or an end to
\nParty rule. Security forces move quickly and sometimes forcefully to end demonstrations. The
\nMarch 2008 protests in Tibet highlighted the danger of separatist unrest and prompted Beijing to
\ndeploy paramilitary and military assets to end the demonstrations.<\/p>\n
These same domestic priorities are central to Chinese foreign policy. China’s desire to
\nsecure access to the markets, commodities, and energy supplies needed to sustain domestic
\neconomic growth significantly influences its foreign engagement. Chinese diplomacy seeks to
\nmaintain favorable relations with other major powers, particularly the US, which Beijing
\nperceives as vital to China’s economic success and to achieving its other strategic objectives.
\nBut Beijing is also seeking to build its global image and influence in order to advance its broader
\ninterests and to resist what it perceives as external challenges to those interests or to China’s
\nsecurity and territorial integrity.<\/p>\n
Taiwan as an area of tension in US-China relations has substantially relaxed since the
\n2008 election of Ma Ying-jeou. The new Taiwanese President inaugurated in May has resumed
\ndialogue with Beijing after a nine-year hiatus, and leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are
\nnow cautiously optimistic that a new period of less confrontational relations has begun. Many<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\noutstanding challenges remain, however, and the two sides eventually will need to confront
\nissues such as Taiwan’s participation in international organizations. Beijing has not renounced
\nthe use of force against the island, and China’s leaders see maintaining the goal of unification as
\nvital to regime legitimacy.<\/p>\n
outstanding challenges remain, however, and the two sides eventually will need to confront
\nissues such as Taiwan’s participation in international organizations. Beijing has not renounced
\nthe use of force against the island, and China’s leaders see maintaining the goal of unification as
\nvital to regime legitimacy.<\/p>\n
Preparations for a possible Taiwan conflict continue to drive the modernization goals of
\nthe People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Chinese defense-industrial complex. It will likely
\nremain the primary factor as long as the Taiwan situation is unresolved.<\/p>\n
At the same time, we judge that China over the past several years has begun a
\nsubstantially new phase in its military development by beginning to articulate roles and missions
\nfor the PLA that go well beyond China’s immediate territorial interests.<\/p>\n
\u2022
\nFor example, China’s leaders may decide to contribute combat forces to peacekeeping
\noperations, in addition to expanding the current level of command and logistic support.
\n\u2022
\nChina’s national security interests are broadening. This will likely lead China to attempt to
\ndevelop at least a limited naval power projection capability extending beyond the South
\nChina Sea. This already has been reflected in Beijing’s decision in December to participate
\nin anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia.
\nMissile Capability. China continues to develop and field conventional theater-range
\nballistic and cruise missile capabilities that can reach US forces and regional bases throughout
\nthe Western Pacific and Asia, including Guam. China also is developing conventionally armed
\nshort- and medium-range ballistic missiles with terminally guided maneuverable warheads that
\ncould be used to attack US naval forces and airbases. In addition, counter-command, control,
\nand sensor systems, to include communications satellite jammers, are among Beijing’s highest
\nmilitary priorities.<\/p>\n
Counterspace Systems. China continues to pursue a long-term program to develop a
\ncapability to disrupt and damage critical foreign space systems. Counterspace systems, including
\nantisatellite (ASAT) weapons, also rank among the country’s highest military priorities.<\/p>\n
Nuclear Capability. On the nuclear side, we judge Beijing seeks to modernize China’s
\nstrategic forces in order to address concerns about the survivability of those systems in the face
\nof foreign, particularly US, advances in strategic reconnaissance, precision strike, and missile
\ndefenses. We assess China’s nuclear capabilities will increase over the next ten years.<\/p>\n
Indian Pragmatism<\/p>\n
Like China, India’s expanding economy will lead New Delhi to pursue new trade
\npartners, gain access to vital energy markets, and generate the other resources required to sustain
\nrapid economic growth. To sustain rapid growth, Indian governments also must maintain the
\npolitical support for economic reforms needed to drive the expanding economy.<\/p>\n
On the global stage, Indian leaders will continue to follow an independent course
\ncharacterized by economic and political pragmatism. New Delhi will not automatically support<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nor oppose positions favored by the United States or any other major power. Nonetheless, good
\nrelations with the United States will be essential for India to realize its global ambitions. Indian
\nleaders will seek benefits from American influence, trade, and technology. Strong ties to
\nWashington also will give India more confidence in dealing with China and in mitigating the
\ndangers posed by its long-time adversary, Pakistan. However, Indian leaders often will adopt
\npositions contrary to those favored by Washington. India will be concerned about China during
\nthe coming decade because of Beijing’s political and economic power and its ability to project
\nmilitary force regionally, but Indian leaders will strive to avoid confrontation with China.<\/p>\n
or oppose positions favored by the United States or any other major power. Nonetheless, good
\nrelations with the United States will be essential for India to realize its global ambitions. Indian
\nleaders will seek benefits from American influence, trade, and technology. Strong ties to
\nWashington also will give India more confidence in dealing with China and in mitigating the
\ndangers posed by its long-time adversary, Pakistan. However, Indian leaders often will adopt
\npositions contrary to those favored by Washington. India will be concerned about China during
\nthe coming decade because of Beijing’s political and economic power and its ability to project
\nmilitary force regionally, but Indian leaders will strive to avoid confrontation with China.<\/p>\n
India also will look for ways to safeguard its interests in light of the concluding civil war
\nin Sri Lanka and political uncertainty in Bangladesh and Nepal, which have experienced
\ndramatic transformations in government during the past year. New Delhi generally will be
\nsupportive of democratic forces in its smaller neighbors, while also being sensitive to the
\nopinions of the Tamil and Bengali communities within India.<\/p>\n
North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions<\/p>\n
In addition to a possible India-Pakistan conflict, Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions and
\nproliferation behavior threaten to destabilize East Asia. The North’s October 2006 nuclear test is
\nconsistent with our longstanding assessment that it had produced a nuclear device. Prior to the
\ntest, we assessed that North Korea produced enough plutonium for at least a half dozen nuclear
\nweapons. The IC continues to assess North Korea has pursued a uranium enrichment capability
\nin the past. Some in the Intelligence Community have increasing concerns that North Korea has
\nan ongoing covert uranium enrichment program.<\/p>\n
Pyongyang probably views its nuclear weapons as being more for deterrence,
\ninternational prestige, and coercive diplomacy than for warfighting and would consider using
\nnuclear weapons only under certain narrow circumstances. We also assess Pyongyang probably<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nwould not attempt to use nuclear weapons against US forces or territory unless it perceived the
\nregime to be on the verge of military defeat and risked an irretrievable loss of control.<\/p>\n
would not attempt to use nuclear weapons against US forces or territory unless it perceived the
\nregime to be on the verge of military defeat and risked an irretrievable loss of control.<\/p>\n
On the proliferation side, North Korea has sold ballistic missiles and associated materials
\nto several Middle Eastern countries, including Iran, and, in our assessment, assisted Syria with
\nthe construction of a nuclear reactor. We remain concerned North Korea could again export
\nnuclear technology. In the October 3 Second Phase Actions agreement, the DPRK reaffirmed its
\ncommitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how. We assess Pyongyang
\nis less likely to risk selling nuclear weapons or weapons-quantities of fissile material than
\nnuclear technology or less sensitive equipment to other countries or non-state actors, in part
\nbecause it needs its limited fissile material for its own deterrent. Pyongyang probably also
\nperceives that it would risk a regime-ending military confrontation with the United States if the
\nnuclear material was used by another country or group in a nuclear strike or terrorist attacks and
\nthe United States could trace the material back to North Korea. It is possible, however, that the
\nNorth might find a nuclear weapons or fissile material transfer more appealing if its own
\nstockpile grows larger and\/or it faces an extreme economic crisis where the potentially huge
\nrevenue from such a sale could help the country survive.<\/p>\n
We assess that poor economic conditions are fueling systemic vulnerability within North
\nKorea. Public statements by the regime emphasize the need for adequate food supplies. A
\nrelatively good fall harvest in 2008, combined with the delivery of substantial US food aid-
\n500,000 tons of grain have been promised and about one-third of this has been delivered-
\nprobably will prevent deterioration in the food security situation during the next few months.
\nHowever, we assess North Korea is still failing to come to grips with the economic downturn
\nthat began in the early 1990s and that prospects for economic recovery remain slight. In addition
\nto food, shortages in fertilizer and energy continue to plague the economy. Investment spending
\nappears is negligible, trade remains weak, and we see little progress toward economic reforms.
\nPyongyang has long been in default on a relatively large foreign debt and we assess that badly
\nneeded foreign investment will not take place unless the North comes to terms with its
\ninternational creditors and conforms to internationally accepted trade and financial norms, badly
\nneeded foreign investment will not take place.<\/p>\n
\u2022
\nPyongyang’s strategic posture is not helping its economy. Trade with Japan has fallen
\nprecipitously since the nuclear and missile tests of 2006, and, while commercial trade with
\nSouth Korea rose in 2008, South Korean aid and tourism to the North declined due to
\nincreased North-South tensions.
\nDespite this poor economic performance and the many privations of the North Korean
\npublic, we see no organized opposition to Kim Jong Il’s rule and only occasional incidents of<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nsocial disorder. Kim probably suffered a stroke in August that incapacitated him for several
\nweeks, hindering his ability to operate as actively as he did before the stroke. However, his
\nrecent public activities suggest his health has improved significantly, and we assess he is making
\nkey decisions. The state’s control apparatus by all accounts remains strong, sustaining the
\ndismal condition of human rights in North Korea.<\/p>\n
social disorder. Kim probably suffered a stroke in August that incapacitated him for several
\nweeks, hindering his ability to operate as actively as he did before the stroke. However, his
\nrecent public activities suggest his health has improved significantly, and we assess he is making
\nkey decisions. The state’s control apparatus by all accounts remains strong, sustaining the
\ndismal condition of human rights in North Korea.<\/p>\n
Russian challenges to US interests now spring more from Moscow’s perceived strengths
\nthan from the state weaknesses characteristic of the 1990s. US involvement in Iraq and
\nAfghanistan and general anti-Americanism have created openings for Russia to build alternative
\narrangements to the US-led international political and economic institutional order. Russia is
\nactively cultivating relations with regional powers, including China, Iran, and Venezuela to
\nincrease its ability to influence events. Moscow also is trying to maintain control over energy
\nsupply and transportation networks to Europe to East Asia, and protect and further enhance its
\nmarket share in Europe through new bilateral energy partnerships and organizing a gas cartel
\nwith other major exporters. Russia appears to believe the continued heavy dependence of
\nEuropean countries and former Soviet states on Russia’s state gas monopoly, Gazprom, provides
\nMoscow with political and economic leverage.<\/p>\n
Russia continues to rely on its nuclear deterrent and retaliatory capability to counter the
\nperceived threat from the United States and NATO. Moscow for the past several years has also
\nbeen strengthening its conventional military force to make it a credible foreign policy instrument,
\nboth to signal its political resurgence and to assert its dominance over neighboring states, like
\nGeorgia. Moscow has actively engaged in foreign military cooperation with countries such as
\nChina and Venezuela, in part to remind the United States and others of Russia’s global military
\nrelevance. Despite persistent challenges, including a long-term decline in the numbers and
\nquality of recruits and difficulties in keeping pace with the demands of weapons modernization,
\nthe Russian military defeated the Georgian military last August.<\/p>\n
Russian leaders recently have spoken positively about the possibilities for change in the
\nUS-Russia dynamic, but issues such as NATO enlargement, the conflict over Georgia’s
\nseparatist regions, and Missile Defense will continue to pose difficulties for the relationship and
\nunderscore the challenges of finding ways to engage with Russia. Even as it seeks to negotiate a
\nrobust post-START agreement, Moscow consistently stresses that the accession to NATO of
\nGeorgia and Ukraine would put existing arms control regimes and negotiations at risk and could
\nprompt Russian military countermeasures as well as increased pressure against Tbilisi and Kyiv.
\nRussia’s strong engagement with countries like Iran and Syria, including advanced weapons
\nsales, also has implications for US nonproliferation interests.<\/p>\n
Eurasia\/Caucasus\/Central Asia<\/p>\n
Six months after the fighting between Russia and Georgia over Abkhazia and South
\nOssetia last August, the separatist regions remain potential flashpoints. Moscow’s expanded
\nmilitary presence in and political-economic ties to these regions, along with continuing violence
\nincrease the risk of provocation, overreaction, or miscalculation leading to a resumption of
\nfighting. Although the political situation in Georgia has stabilized, President Saakashvili faces<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nincreasing criticism from the domestic opposition, and his reaction to that will either enhance or
\nset back Georgia’s democratic development.<\/p>\n
increasing criticism from the domestic opposition, and his reaction to that will either enhance or
\nset back Georgia’s democratic development.<\/p>\n
An increasingly assertive Russia and the fallout from the global financial crisis will
\ncombine to amplify the challenges facing Ukraine as it heads for a presidential election in Winter
\n2009-2010. Ukraine has moved toward democracy and Western integration despite numerous
\npolitical tests since independence. Progress will be difficult because of weak political
\ninstitutions, ongoing conflicts with Russia over gas pricing and contracts and the new exigencies
\nof the global financial crisis, which has dramatically revealed the underlying weaknesses of the
\nUkrainian economy and potentially Ukraine’s stability.<\/p>\n
In Belarus, the Lukashenko regime appears willing to cooperate with Russian efforts to
\ncounter US missile defense plans with Prague and Warsaw. However, Russia’s continuing
\nefforts to control key Belarusian economic sectors could prompt Minsk to improve ties with the
\nWest to balance Moscow. Lukashenko maintains an authoritarian grip on power and could
\nreturn to repressive measures if public discontent over the worsening economy turns to protest.<\/p>\n
The five Central Asian states-Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
\nTurkmenistan-with their highly-personalized politics, weak institutions, and growing
\ninequalities are ill-equipped to deal with the challenges posed by Islamic violent extremism, poor
\neconomic development, and problems associated with energy water and food distribution.
\nEnergy helped make Kazakhstan a regional economic force, but any sustained decline in oil
\nprices would affect revenues, could lead to societal discontent, and will derail the momentum for
\ndomestic reforms. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have heavily depended on migrant worker
\nremittances from both Russia and Kazakhstan for a significant portion of their gross domestic
\nproduct-up to 45 percent in the case of Tajikistan-and will be severely affected by the
\nfinancial crisis. Tajikistan, in particular, faces increased threats to internal stability from the loss
\nof these critical revenue streams. Ultimately, these challenges to regional stability could threaten
\nthe security of critical US and NATO lines of communication to Afghanistan through Central
\nAsia.<\/p>\n
The Balkans<\/p>\n
Events in the Balkans will again pose the greatest threat of instability in Europe in 2009,
\ndespite positive developments in the last year that included Kosovo’s peaceful declaration of
\nindependence from Serbia, the election of pro-EU leaders in Serbia, and offers of NATO
\nmembership to Croatia and Albania. The principal challenges to stability will come from the
\nunresolved political status of the Serb minority in Kosovo, particularly in northern Kosovo, and
\nBosnia-Herzegovina’s (BiH) continuing uneasy inter-ethnic condominium.<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nMore than 50 nations, including 22 of 27 EU members, have recognized the new state of
\nKosovo. In the coming years Pristina will depend on the international community for economic
\nand development assistance and to ensure Kosovo’s territorial integrity. Belgrade openly
\nsupports parallel Kosovo Serb institutions. It has used political and legal means to challenge and
\nundermine Pristina’s sovereignty and to limit the mandate of the EU’s Rule of Law mission
\n(EULEX) in Kosovo, which is meant to help Kosovo authorities build multi-ethnic police,
\njudiciary, and customs systems. This has reinforced the de facto separation of Kosovo into an
\nAlbanian-majority south and a Serb-majority north and frustrated the Kosovo Albanians.
\nKosovo Force’s (KFOR) presence will help deter widespread violence, however. Serbia’s
\nleaders espouse a European future, and President Tadic desires quick progress toward EU
\nmembership, but they are unwilling to abandon Belgrade’s stake in Kosovo to achieve that end.
\nBelgrade still looks for Moscow’s diplomatic support on this issue and recently concluded a
\nsignificant energy deal with Moscow, including sale of a majority stake in its state oil refinery.<\/p>\n
More than 50 nations, including 22 of 27 EU members, have recognized the new state of
\nKosovo. In the coming years Pristina will depend on the international community for economic
\nand development assistance and to ensure Kosovo’s territorial integrity. Belgrade openly
\nsupports parallel Kosovo Serb institutions. It has used political and legal means to challenge and
\nundermine Pristina’s sovereignty and to limit the mandate of the EU’s Rule of Law mission
\n(EULEX) in Kosovo, which is meant to help Kosovo authorities build multi-ethnic police,
\njudiciary, and customs systems. This has reinforced the de facto separation of Kosovo into an
\nAlbanian-majority south and a Serb-majority north and frustrated the Kosovo Albanians.
\nKosovo Force’s (KFOR) presence will help deter widespread violence, however. Serbia’s
\nleaders espouse a European future, and President Tadic desires quick progress toward EU
\nmembership, but they are unwilling to abandon Belgrade’s stake in Kosovo to achieve that end.
\nBelgrade still looks for Moscow’s diplomatic support on this issue and recently concluded a
\nsignificant energy deal with Moscow, including sale of a majority stake in its state oil refinery.<\/p>\n
Testing Times for Latin America<\/p>\n
Latin American economies, following five consecutive years of solid performance, are
\nfeeling the repercussions from the global financial crisis. We expect the region’s growth rate
\nwill fall substantially this year to about 1 percent from 4 percent for 2008. Exports from the
\nregion have averaged 20 percent growth for five years, but falling commodity prices and
\nslowdowns in major industrial markets have sharply reduced export growth in the fourth quarter
\nof 2008 and into 2009. Foreign direct investment flows through mid-year 2008 were on pace to
\nreach the record level of $110 billion in 2007, but are likely to have diminished in late 2008 and
\nprobably will continue to do so in 2009. Finally, after 10 years of worker remittances growing at
\nan average annual rate of better than 15 percent, remittances grew just 7 percent in 2007 and
\ngrew only 1 to 2 percent in 2008.<\/p>\n
Democracy in much of Latin American has established impressive roots over the past
\ndecade or so. In countries that comprise the bulk of the region’s GDP and population-like
\nBrazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru-pro-market policies have yielded important
\neconomic dividends that help fortify democratic gains. Brazil is becoming a leading regional
\npower and, along with others like Argentina and Chile, is trying to promote greater South
\nAmerican integration<\/p>\n
Developments in the last year, however, underscore the challenge that populist, often-
\nautocratic regimes still pose in the region. Venezuela attracts substantial, if declining, regional
\npopular support, but its influence is likely to diminish as its economic problems mount. Cuba,
\nthough an economic basket case, can still influence the Latin American left because of its so-
\ncalled “anti-imperialist” stance. Others like Bolivia, and to a lesser extent Argentina and<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nEcuador, have embraced populist policies and are likely to also lag behind. Some, such as Haiti,
\nhave become even poorer and still less governable. Basic law-and-order issues, to include rising
\nviolent crime and powerful drug trafficking organizations also confront key hemispheric nations,
\nas do uneven governance and institution-building efforts and performance in confronting chronic
\ncorruption. To maintain our political and economic influence in the region, the United States
\nwill be called upon to help the region’s governments address their growing security problems
\nand to deliver greater market access. Our use of bilateral trade agreements, and foreign aid
\nthrough the Millennium Challenge Account to less developed countries, helps cement sound
\neconomic policies and more effective governance.<\/p>\n
Ecuador, have embraced populist policies and are likely to also lag behind. Some, such as Haiti,
\nhave become even poorer and still less governable. Basic law-and-order issues, to include rising
\nviolent crime and powerful drug trafficking organizations also confront key hemispheric nations,
\nas do uneven governance and institution-building efforts and performance in confronting chronic
\ncorruption. To maintain our political and economic influence in the region, the United States
\nwill be called upon to help the region’s governments address their growing security problems
\nand to deliver greater market access. Our use of bilateral trade agreements, and foreign aid
\nthrough the Millennium Challenge Account to less developed countries, helps cement sound
\neconomic policies and more effective governance.<\/p>\n
Mexico<\/p>\n
Mexico’s sound fiscal and monetary policies will probably provide some insulation from
\nthe current global economic volatility. With 80 percent of its exports destined for US consumers
\nand low international oil prices, however, Mexico would take a strong hit from a prolonged US
\nrecession. Mexico’s Finance Secretariat cut growth estimates for 2008 to 1.5 percent, and
\nFinance Minister Carstens has openly acknowledged growth might contract by a percentage
\npoint this year. Mexico last experienced a fall in GDP in 2001. Unemployment late last year
\nwas almost 4.5 percent, up a point from 2007 and underemployment is even higher.
\nEmployment in the construction sector dropped more than 4 percent in the same time period,
\naccording to Mexico’s National Statistics Institute.<\/p>\n
The sharp economic downturn as yet shows no sign of hurting Mexico’s debt posture or
\nspurring northward migration. Mexico’s National Statistics Institute late last year indicated that
\nMexican emigration had dropped 42 percent since 2006, probably due to the decreased demand
\nfor labor in the United States. That trend probably will lead to declines in remittances, the
\nsecond largest source of foreign currency after oil exports, and increase pressure on the
\ngovernment to create jobs.<\/p>\n
Mexico remains the most important conduit for illicit drugs reaching the United States.
\nAs much as 90 percent of that cocaine known to be directed toward the United States, and some
\nColombian heroin, eventually transits Mexico before entering the United States. Despite recent<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nsuccessful efforts to counter precursor chemical diversion and drug trafficking, Mexico is the
\nchief foreign supplier of methamphetamine and marijuana to the US market and produces most
\nof the heroin consumed west of the Mississippi River. The corruptive influence and increasing
\nviolence of Mexican drug cartels, which are among the most powerful organized crime groups in
\nthe world, impede Mexico City’s ability to govern parts of its territory and build effective
\ndemocratic institutions.<\/p>\n
successful efforts to counter precursor chemical diversion and drug trafficking, Mexico is the
\nchief foreign supplier of methamphetamine and marijuana to the US market and produces most
\nof the heroin consumed west of the Mississippi River. The corruptive influence and increasing
\nviolence of Mexican drug cartels, which are among the most powerful organized crime groups in
\nthe world, impede Mexico City’s ability to govern parts of its territory and build effective
\ndemocratic institutions.
\nday
\ncartel operations, and has started to fragment Mexico’s powerful drug cartels. We assess
\nthat significantly more cocaine is diverting to Central America before moving into Mexico, a
\nshift that, in our judgment, mitigates some risks drug traffickers faced in Mexico but that also
\ncomplicates trafficking operations.<\/p>\n
As trafficking networks have come under increasing strain from President Calderon’s
\ncounternarcotics efforts, elements of Mexico’s most powerful cartels have become more
\naggressive. The assassination of the national police commissioner last May, the grenade attack
\nin a crowded plaza in Michoacan State last September and the execution of Brigadier General
\nmarco Enrique Tello Quinonez this month indicate cartel elements are increasingly willing to kill
\nhigh-level Mexican officials, retaliate against soldiers, and tolerate more collateral damage
\namong civilians not directly involved in the drug trade.<\/p>\n
Calderon has demonstrated his determination to address the problem of narcotics-related
\ncorruption at all levels of the government by launching Operation Cleanup. Most notably, this
\nhas led to the arrest of a former Deputy Attorney General and the head of Interpol in Mexico. In
\naddition, Calderon won approval in November of the 2009 federal budget, which increased
\noutlays in real terms to the Public Security Secretariat and the Attorney General’s Office by 69
\npercent and 29 percent, respectively.<\/p>\n
Colombia<\/p>\n
President Uribe is committed to an all-out effort to defeat the Revolutionary Armed
\nForces of Colombia by the time his term ends in 2010. His public statements indicate he is
\ndetermined to use Colombia’s security forces to maintain the systematic military pressure that
\nhas kept the FARC on the run, caused the FARC to lose territory, and degraded FARC command
\nand control. Among the major successes in 2008 were the deaths of key FARC leaders,
\nincluding members of the ruling Secretariat, a continued high number of FARC desertions, and
\nthe 2 July rescue of 15 hostages, including three US citizens.<\/p>\n
Despite these reverses, the FARC leadership has shown no signs it seeks to end hostilities
\nor participate in serious peace talks. The group has a record of resilience, and its chances for
\nsurviving as a viable insurgent force over the next several years will be aided by a still-cohesive
\nleadership structure, substantial drug revenues, and cross-border sanctuaries in Venezuela and
\nEcuador.<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nAlthough the FARC is unlikely to make a sustained comeback, it will still be able to
\nconduct small-scale guerrilla and terrorist attacks nationwide. Official and nonofficial US
\ncitizens remain at risk.<\/p>\n
Although the FARC is unlikely to make a sustained comeback, it will still be able to
\nconduct small-scale guerrilla and terrorist attacks nationwide. Official and nonofficial US
\ncitizens remain at risk.<\/p>\n
Bogota’s counterdrug successes-including capture and extradition of the leaders of the
\nNorth Valley Cartel, the last remaining large-scale drug cartel (besides the FARC), the targeting
\nof mid-level leaders, a strong security force presence in key drug transit and coca growing zones,
\nand its US-backed coca eradication program-have hampered FARC drug trafficking operations.
\nBogota’s strides in tackling corruption also have led to high-profile trafficker takedowns.
\nBogota arrested or killed important traffickers such as the Mejia Munera brothers, known as “los
\nMellizos,” in 2008 after the officials protecting them were removed from office. Colombian
\ninterdiction efforts resulted in an increase in seizures in 2008. Still, Colombia remains the
\nworld’s leading producer of cocaine and a key supplier of heroin to the US market. The US
\nGovernment’s 2007 imagery-based survey indicates 167,000 hectares in Colombia were planted
\nwith coca, as compared to 157,200 in 2006, a statistically insignificant increase. Although the
\ntotal area under cultivation remained nearly constant, aerial eradication reduced yield per hectare
\nby killing some plants inside of areas counted as fully under cultivation and causing some
\nfarmers to lose harvests before they could rehabilitate the field. This resulted in a reduction in
\npotential cocaine production from 550 metric tons in 2006 to 535 in 2007. Area under
\ncultivation in 2007 was slightly less than in 2001, the year when Plan Colombia support began to
\ntake hold, but potential production is about one quarter less, due to the effects of aerial
\neradication on yield. We are still compiling and assessing the data from 2008.<\/p>\n
Venezuela<\/p>\n
President Hugo Chavez is focusing on shoring up public support at home after his
\nopponents won five key states and the capital in November gubernatorial and mayoral elections.
\nChavez also must deal with growing public concern about violent crime and worsening
\neconomic conditions. Nevertheless, Chavez remains Venezuela’s most popular politician,
\naccording to a reputable local polling company, and controls the country’s key institutions. To
\nconsolidate his socialist “revolution,” Chavez has ordered a referendum for February aimed at
\nallowing indefinite reelection for all elected officials. His push probably reflects concern over
\ndwindling oil profits undercutting his ability to maintain popular domestic programs.<\/p>\n
Chavez probably will struggle to maintain economic growth in the coming years as oil
\nprices fall from their record highs. He has been unable to control high inflation and his statist
\neconomic policies have reduced drastically private-sector growth. Chavez also has failed to
\nmake sufficient investments in infrastructure, especially in the vital oil sector, necessary for
\nsustained growth.<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\n\u2022
\n\u2022
\n\u2022
\nIf the price of West Texas Intermediate oil stays below $50 per barrel for most of 2009,
\nChavez probably will be forced to make major cuts in domestic and foreign spending or to
\ndevalue the Venezuelan currency and draw down government hard currency reserves to
\navoid a major economic crisis.
\nChavez is likely to face new constraints in 2009 as he attempts to expand his influence in
\nLatin America. His willingness to spend oil revenue on foreign aid and his unstinting populist
\nmessage have paid some dividends, but repeated spats with foreign leaders have tarnished his
\nimage and falling oil prices could further undermine his ability to buy friends. Chavez’s approval
\nrating has been decreasing regionally, according to the 2008 Latinbarometer, a highly regarded
\nregional survey. Chavez has provided significant financial and political support to Evo Morales
\nin Bolivia and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua.<\/p>\n
Public disclosure of Chavez’s close ties with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
\nColombia (FARC), which were reflected in documents from the hard drives captured after the
\ndeath of a FARC Secretariat member in March, have forced Chavez, at least rhetorically, to
\nimprove relations with Bogota. We assess Chavez is likely to maintain his decade-long ties to
\nthe FARC by providing them safehaven because of his ideological affinity to the group and his
\ninterest in influencing Colombian politics.
\n\u2022
\nThe United States in September designated two senior Venezuelan Government officials and
\none former official under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act for materially
\nassisting the narcotics trafficking activities of the FARC.
\nChavez’s efforts to expand his reach beyond Latin America continue to give priority to
\nIran, Russia, and China. The personal relationship between Iran’s President Ahmadi-Nejad and
\nChavez drives strengthening bilateral economic and military ties, although the two countries are
\nstill struggling to overcome bureaucratic and linguistic obstacles to implementing accords.
\nVenezuela also is serving as a bridge to help Iran build relations with other Latin American
\ncountries. Chavez has given special attention in recent months to deepening political, economic,
\nand military ties to Russia. In late 2008, he announced his plans to build a nuclear power plant
\nin Venezuela with Russian assistance.<\/p>\n
Despite Caracas’s stated interest in purchasing more Russian, Chinese, and Spanish
\narmaments, worsening economic conditions probably will force Chavez to slow such
\nacquisitions. His $5.3 billion in military purchases since 2005 have attracted notice within the
\nregion, although Venezuela’s overall military capabilities remain plagued by logistic,
\nmaintenance and transportation shortfalls. Notable purchases from Russia include 24 Su-30MK2
\nfighters, helicopters, and assault rifles.<\/p>\n
Chavez’s growing ties to Iran, coupled with Venezuela’s lax financial laws and border
\ncontrols, and widespread corruption have created a permissive environment for Hizballah to
\nexploit. In June 2008, two Venezuelan-based individuals, one a Venezuelan diplomat, were
\nATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\ndesignated by the US Treasury Department as supporters of terrorism for reportedly providing
\nlogistical and financial support to Hizballah members.<\/p>\n
designated by the US Treasury Department as supporters of terrorism for reportedly providing
\nlogistical and financial support to Hizballah members.<\/p>\n
Cuba<\/p>\n
President Raul Castro’s record since formally taking power in February 2008 indicates
\nhis primary objective in the coming year will be to make Cuba’s dysfunctional socialist economy
\nmore efficient. His task has been made more difficult, however, by the extensive damage to the
\ncountry’s already weak agricultural sector and infrastructure by three major and successive
\nhurricanes last year. The global economic downturn will further slow growth, diminishing the
\nregime’s options for addressing public dissatisfaction with living conditions.<\/p>\n
Havana’s competent and immediate response to the hurricanes underscores the
\neffectiveness of regime controls and indicates that it remains capable of preventing a
\nspontaneous mass migration. Nevertheless, we judge that at a minimum the annual flow of
\nCuban migrants to the United States will stay at the same high levels of about 35,000 legal and
\nillegal migrants annually that have prevailed over the past several years.<\/p>\n
Raul almost certainly will continue to proceed cautiously on any reforms to the economy
\nin order to maintain elite consensus and avoid raising public expectations beyond what he is able
\nor willing to deliver. We have seen no indication in the modest changes he has implemented that
\nhe intends to abandon core Communist economic principles, such as state ownership of
\nproduction. On the political front, all indications are that Raul will continue to deny elements of
\ncivil society and pro-democracy dissidents the exercise of free expression.<\/p>\n
Venezuela’s preferential terms for oil sales and payments for Cuban medical personnel
\nand other technical specialists will remain Cuba’s economic lifeline, despite Cuba’s efforts to
\nattract other sources of foreign investment from countries such as China and Russia. President
\nChavez probably will prioritize aid to Havana over other foreign policy commitments.<\/p>\n
We assess Raul will continue his efforts to bolster Havana’s international legitimacy by
\nprojecting a more moderate political image. Nevertheless, Cuba almost certainly will remain
\nheavily involved behind-the-scenes in counseling and supporting authoritarian populist
\ngovernments in Latin America and otherwise seeking to undermine US influence across the
\nregion.<\/p>\n
Bolivia<\/p>\n
After nearly a year of sporadic unrest and rising tensions, President Evo Morales and
\nopposition legislators last October reached a compromise to allow a referendum in late January
\non a draft constitution that encapsulates much of Morales’ social and economic reform agenda.<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nThe compromise eased tensions following a string of violent protests last fall, but some leaders
\nin eastern departments rejected the compromise. Nevertheless, the referendum passed by a
\ncomfortable margin. The draft constitution leaves many contentious issues vague, which several
\ngovernment and opposition leaders have acknowledged probably will lead to further disputes
\nover implementation in the run-up to new presidential elections in December 2009.<\/p>\n
The compromise eased tensions following a string of violent protests last fall, but some leaders
\nin eastern departments rejected the compromise. Nevertheless, the referendum passed by a
\ncomfortable margin. The draft constitution leaves many contentious issues vague, which several
\ngovernment and opposition leaders have acknowledged probably will lead to further disputes
\nover implementation in the run-up to new presidential elections in December 2009.<\/p>\n
Chavez promised to protect Morales’s government and provided La Paz important
\nfinancial assistance. Since 2006, Venezuela has provided Bolivia more than $95 million in direct
\nfinancial aid.<\/p>\n
Africa: Falling Further Behind<\/p>\n
Africa has made substantial economic and political progress over the past decade.
\nHowever, the durability of the region’s recent positive growth trend, particularly among
\ncountries dependent on commodity exports and foreign capital inflows, will be tested by the drop
\nin commodity prices and recessions in the United States and Europe. Even before the financial
\ncrisis hit, the 6 percent GDP growth rate-although impressive-was insufficient to bring about
\nnecessary structural changes in the continent’s economy. Africa’s economic growth is led by a
\nsmall number of oil-producing countries, but even those countries without oil resources have
\nexperienced GDP growth rates far above their historical rates. Agriculture, the foundation of
\nmost African economies, is far from achieving self-sufficiency, but technical solutions and
\ninfrastructure enhancement have demonstrated their ability to boost production in Mali, Malawi
\nand Zambia. Further transformations remain uncertain in light of the EU’s continuing ban on
\ngenetically modified foodstuffs.<\/p>\n
In addition to fallout from the global financial crisis, Africa faces other economic,
\nsocietal and security challenges. Sub-Saharan Africa is confronting a shortage of skilled medical
\npersonnel, deteriorating health systems, and inadequate budgets to deal with diseases like
\nHIV\/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis. Transnational crime, especially the transshipment of
\nillegal drugs to Europe, and corruption are growing in various parts of Africa, weighing down
\nthe continent’s economic growth, reducing government efficiency, and undermining the security
\nservices of African states.<\/p>\n
China’s presence has grown substantially over the past decade. Total bilateral trade
\nbetween China and the continent has increased from less than $4 billion in 1995 to $100 billion
\nin 2008, but the EU and US still remain far larger economic partners for the region. China’s
\nobjectives are to secure access to African markets and natural resources, isolate Taiwan, and
\nenhance its international stature, all of which it has made progress on. Nevertheless, China’s role
\nhas generated local resentment as Chinese firms are seen as undercutting African competitors in<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nsecuring commercial contracts and falling short of standard local labor practices. Moreover,
\nthere is little discernible evidence of Chinese investments being used to incorporate Africa into
\nthe industrial “global value production chains” that are becoming the hallmark of integrative
\ntrade and FDI flows, especially in manufacturing in other regions of the world.<\/p>\n
securing commercial contracts and falling short of standard local labor practices. Moreover,
\nthere is little discernible evidence of Chinese investments being used to incorporate Africa into
\nthe industrial “global value production chains” that are becoming the hallmark of integrative
\ntrade and FDI flows, especially in manufacturing in other regions of the world.<\/p>\n
Although African governments’ political commitment to peacekeeping has increased
\nsignificantly over the last ten years, the capacities of the African Union, regional organization,
\nand individual African states to conduct peacekeeping operations have been stretched to the
\nlimit. Major troop contributing countries are becoming more wary and less capable of deploying
\npeacekeepers to potentially dangerous operations whose mandates and missions are unclear.<\/p>\n
The Democratic Republic of the Congo<\/p>\n
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, President Joseph Kabila has been unable to
\nconsolidate his control over the turbulent Eastern border region. In that area, rebel groups,
\nundisciplined soldiers, and ethnic militia have operated inside and outside of the DRC largely
\nwith impunity for many years and have been responsible for numerous acts of violence and
\nhuman rights abuses. The trouble has persisted, even with the help of the largest UN
\npeacekeeping operation in the world. Recently, however, Kabila has agreed to conduct joint
\nmilitary operations with nearby countries in an effort to root out some of these groups. As a
\nresult, Rwanda and Uganda have each sent forces into different parts of the border region,
\nRwanda into the North and South Kivu Provinces and Uganda into the extreme northeastern
\nregion. In the Kivus, Kinshasa and Kigali are both concerned about the remnant of the 1994
\nHutu-led Force for the Democratic Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). While not a military threat to
\nthe Tutsi-led government in Kigali at this time, the force is a threat to local Congolese
\ncommunities. With Kinshasa’s approval, Rwanda sent several thousand soldiers into the area to
\ndefeat, demobilize, or repatriate the FDLR. In return for Kinshasa’s cooperation, Kigali appears
\nto have dropped its support for a Congolese Tutsi rebel leader, General Laurent Nkunda. The
\nRwandans have arrested Nkunda and have him in custody. Moreover, his forces have divided,
\nsome joining up with Congolese government troops. In the northeast, the Ugandan-led military
\noperation (with both Congolese and Sudanese support) has so far been unsuccessful. Its
\nobjective is to eliminate the threat posed by the Ugandan rebel group known as the Lord’s
\nResistance Army (LRA), led by Joseph Kony. Congolese forces, in the near term, probably will
\nnot be able to reassert sufficient control over territory occupied by the LRA and other rebels
\ngroups or to stop sporadic outbreaks of violence.<\/p>\n
Nigeria<\/p>\n
Nigeria’s oil-rich Delta region, which supplies 10 percent of US oil imports and accounts
\nfor America’s largest investment in Sub-Saharan Africa, has been engulfed in civil strife for<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nnearly two decades. Widespread violence, criminality, and corruption have continued to disrupt
\nNigeria’s oil and gas production, costing the country millions of dollars in lost revenue.
\nInadequate governance and a total lack of accountability has put billions of dollars in the pockets
\nof corrupt leaders rather than in much needed development and infrastructure projects.
\nOpportunistic militants, many of whom are beholden to local political leaders who have armed
\nthem in the run-up to Nigeria’s last three national elections, have attacked oil facilities,
\nkidnapped Nigerian and foreign oil workers, and left much of the Delta lawless and
\neconomically ravaged. As result of the violence and criminal activity, Nigerian oil production
\ndeclined about 10 percent in 2008. Unstable political conditions and the fall in the price of crude
\noil probably will slow or deter additional foreign investment in the Delta, contributing to further
\nproduction drop-offs in the future. A turnaround in the current security environment is unlikely
\nsoon.<\/p>\n
nearly two decades. Widespread violence, criminality, and corruption have continued to disrupt
\nNigeria’s oil and gas production, costing the country millions of dollars in lost revenue.
\nInadequate governance and a total lack of accountability has put billions of dollars in the pockets
\nof corrupt leaders rather than in much needed development and infrastructure projects.
\nOpportunistic militants, many of whom are beholden to local political leaders who have armed
\nthem in the run-up to Nigeria’s last three national elections, have attacked oil facilities,
\nkidnapped Nigerian and foreign oil workers, and left much of the Delta lawless and
\neconomically ravaged. As result of the violence and criminal activity, Nigerian oil production
\ndeclined about 10 percent in 2008. Unstable political conditions and the fall in the price of crude
\noil probably will slow or deter additional foreign investment in the Delta, contributing to further
\nproduction drop-offs in the future. A turnaround in the current security environment is unlikely
\nsoon.<\/p>\n
As Sudan approaches two major landmarks in the implementation of the 2005
\nComprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the country remains plagued by violence in Darfur,
\nand the ruling National Congress Party’s (NCP) confidence in President Omar Hassan al-Bashir
\nmay be waning. The NCP and Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) are likely to
\npostpone national elections required to be held under the CPA by July 2009. Election delays are
\nunlikely to trigger a violent collapse of the CPA because both parties have strong incentives to
\nmaintain the status quo until at least 2011 when the South will vote on a referendum for
\nindependence. However, the parties will have to address critical benchmarks for wealth-sharing
\nand border demarcation contained in the CPA.<\/p>\n
\u2022
\nThe Darfur conflict has become increasingly complicated over the course of the past five
\nyears and is unlikely to be resolved in the near future. While bureaucratic and logistic
\nconstraints in New York and Sudan continue to delay full deployment of a 26,000-person UN
\npeacekeeping force, the UN mediator’s attempt to hold inclusive peace talks remains stymied
\nby rebel disunity and ongoing fighting, which, to date, has displaced more than 3 million
\npeople. Chadian-backed rebels based in Darfur have advanced on the Sudanese capital in the
\npast year, risking an escalated proxy war between Khartoum and N’Djamena.
\n\u2022
\nA pending request by the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) chief prosecutor for a warrant
\nto arrest Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir on charges of war crimes, crimes against
\nhumanity, and genocide has heightened Khartoum’s distrust of Western intentions, while
\ninducing Sudanese officials to appear cooperative with international peacemaking attempts in
\nthe short term. The ICC charges against Bashir may undermine his support in the NCP and
\namong Sudan’s military leadership.
\nSomalia<\/p>\n
Somalia has not had a stable, central government for 17 years and continues to be mired
\nin conflict. An UN-brokered agreement between the Somali Transitional Federal Government
\n(TFG) and key opposition leaders in mid-2008 is unlikely to bring peace to Somalia in the near
\nterm. In January 2009 Ethiopia withdrew the troops it deployed in late 2006 to protect the TFG
\nand oust the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC). Resurgent Islamic extremists are now fighting to
\nfill the void and expand their hold on territory throughout the country. A newly elected<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\npragmatic Islamist president may enhance the credibility of the TFG, but he will face multiple
\nchallenges maintaining the new ruling coalition, including the continued dominance of clan
\npolitics. The removal of Ethiopian troops, whose presence has alienated most Somalis, is likely
\nto reduce popular support for the extremist group, al-Shabaab al Islamiyah. However, the TFG
\nlacks a viable security service to defend its leaders and a modest African Union peacekeeping
\nforce has limited reach in Mogadishu. Violent power struggles between Islamist militias and
\nemerging local resistance groups could displace thousands of additional Somalis, exacerbating
\nalready dire humanitarian conditions.<\/p>\n
pragmatic Islamist president may enhance the credibility of the TFG, but he will face multiple
\nchallenges maintaining the new ruling coalition, including the continued dominance of clan
\npolitics. The removal of Ethiopian troops, whose presence has alienated most Somalis, is likely
\nto reduce popular support for the extremist group, al-Shabaab al Islamiyah. However, the TFG
\nlacks a viable security service to defend its leaders and a modest African Union peacekeeping
\nforce has limited reach in Mogadishu. Violent power struggles between Islamist militias and
\nemerging local resistance groups could displace thousands of additional Somalis, exacerbating
\nalready dire humanitarian conditions.<\/p>\n
Zimbabwe<\/p>\n
Zimbabwe continues to deteriorate under the brutal and corrupt rule of President Robert
\nMugabe. Over half the population is food insecure and public health facilities and schools have
\nbeen almost completely shut down. With over 60,000 infected, the recent cholera epidemic is
\ndramatic evidence of how far living conditions have plummeted in this once-prosperous and
\nrelatively well-developed country. Zimbabwe’s sharp decline has generated problems
\nthroughout southern Africa as millions of refugees have fled to South Africa, Botswana, and
\nMozambique and as the region’s well-publicized economic and security concerns have
\nfrightened foreign investors away. To date, Mugabe retains the support of his senior military
\nofficers and has shown little commitment to the power-sharing deal signed with the opposition
\nMovement for Democratic Change (MDC). Mugabe also has managed to hold on to the backing
\nof South Africa, a key regional player. Pretoria, which recently brokered a coalition agreement
\nbetween Mugabe and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change, remains unwilling,
\ndespite growing criticism at home and abroad, to apply stronger pressure on Mugabe to step
\naside or to undertake fundamental political and economic reforms. Mugabe and his ruling elite
\nare likely to remain in power until he loses the support of the security forces, South Africa steps
\nup its pressure, or social and economic conditions in Zimbabwe become substantially worse.
\nWith both political parties signing on to the recent power-sharing agreement, it will be up to
\nSouth Africa, the Southern African Development Community, and the African Union to carefully
\nwatch Mugabe’s actions and ensure that power is in fact shared and the MDC is allowed to lead.<\/p>\n
Drug Trafficking in West Africa<\/p>\n
Drug trafficking has become a major problem in West Africa, and the emergence of
\nGuinea-Bissau as Africa’s first narco-state highlights the scope of the problem and what may be
\nin store for other states in the region. Away from the scrutiny of local and international law
\nenforcement, drug traffickers, often departing from Venezuela by air and sea, have transported
\nlarge quantities of drugs, predominantly cocaine, from Latin America to European markets
\nthrough the porous borders of more that a half dozen West African countries. Traffickers have
\nsuccessfully co-opted government and law enforcement officials in these countries, further
\nundermining weak and economically impoverished governments who lack adequate law<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nenforcement and judicial capacity. ECOWAS sponsored a conference in Cape Verde in late
\n2008 to address this issue and the governments of Great Britain and France have conducted
\nlimited law enforcement and counternarcotics training in the region, but drug trafficking in West
\nAfrica probably will continue to expand in volume and scope in the absence of a concerted
\ninternational effort to stop it.<\/p>\n
enforcement and judicial capacity. ECOWAS sponsored a conference in Cape Verde in late
\n2008 to address this issue and the governments of Great Britain and France have conducted
\nlimited law enforcement and counternarcotics training in the region, but drug trafficking in West
\nAfrica probably will continue to expand in volume and scope in the absence of a concerted
\ninternational effort to stop it.<\/p>\n
Threats to the US Information Technology Infrastructure<\/p>\n
The US information infrastructure, including telecommunications and computer networks
\nand systems, and the data that reside on them, is critical to virtually every aspect of modern life.
\nThreats to our information technology infrastructure are an important focus of the Intelligence
\nCommunity. As government, private sector, and personal activities continue to move to
\nnetworked operations, as our digital systems add ever more capabilities, as wireless systems
\nbecome even more ubiquitous, and as the design, manufacture, and service of information
\ntechnology have moved overseas, the threat will continue to grow.<\/p>\n
This information and communications revolution also is enabling an unprecedented
\nability to spread ideas and influence large numbers of people. Nation-states and non-state groups
\nare taking an increasing interest in the role of mass media in shaping international opinions.
\nTerrorists will continue to be motivated to conduct spectacular attacks in part by the desire to
\nachieve maximum media exposure for their cause. Increasing global connectivity is enabling
\nradical groups to recruit and train new members, proliferate extremist ideologies, manage their
\nfinances, manipulate public opinion, and coordinate attacks. In the recent conflict in Gaza, for
\nexample, the media played an important role for both sides in shaping public perceptions of the
\nconflict. We can expect future adversaries to similarly employ mass media in an attempt to
\nconstrain US courses of actions in a future crisis or conflict.<\/p>\n
Further, the growing connectivity between information systems, the Internet, and other
\ninfrastructures creates opportunities for attackers to disrupt telecommunications, electrical
\npower, energy pipelines, refineries, financial networks, and other critical infrastructures. Over
\nthe past several years we have seen cyber attacks against critical infrastructures abroad, and
\nmany of our own infrastructures are as vulnerable as their foreign counterparts.<\/p>\n
\u2022
\nA successful cyber attack against a major financial service provider could severely impact
\nthe national economy, while cyber attacks against physical infrastructure computer systems
\nsuch as those that control power grids or oil refineries have the potential to disrupt services
\nfor hours to weeks.
\nNetwork defense technologies are widely available to mitigate threats but have not been
\nuniformly adopted due to associated costs, perceived need, operational requirements, and
\nregulatory constraints. This slow rate of adoption has allowed cyber attackers to keep up with
\nmany defensive advances. Meanwhile, advances in digital communications technology, such as
\nthe growth in wireless connectivity and the acceleration of network convergence with a variety
\ndata increasingly digitized and transmitted over the Internet, are creating new vulnerabilities in
\nour networks and new avenues for cyber attacks.<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nMalicious activity on the Internet also is rapidly increasing: spam-unsolicited email that
\ncan contain malicious software-now accounts for 81 percent of all email according to Message
\nLabs (Symantec); the Georgia Tech Information Security Center projects a ten-fold increase in
\nmalicious software targeting data in the coming year; and botnets-networks of hijacked
\ncomputers used to deliver spam or launch distributed denial of service attacks-are expected to
\ncompose 15 percent of all online computers in 2009. Ferris Research estimates that the total cost
\nof spam and all of the types of fraud that take advantage of spam’s impact is $42 billion in the
\nUnited States and $140 billion worldwide in last year, while McAfee estimates that global
\ncompanies may have lost over $1 trillion worth of intellectual property to data theft in 2008.<\/p>\n
Malicious activity on the Internet also is rapidly increasing: spam-unsolicited email that
\ncan contain malicious software-now accounts for 81 percent of all email according to Message
\nLabs (Symantec); the Georgia Tech Information Security Center projects a ten-fold increase in
\nmalicious software targeting data in the coming year; and botnets-networks of hijacked
\ncomputers used to deliver spam or launch distributed denial of service attacks-are expected to
\ncompose 15 percent of all online computers in 2009. Ferris Research estimates that the total cost
\nof spam and all of the types of fraud that take advantage of spam’s impact is $42 billion in the
\nUnited States and $140 billion worldwide in last year, while McAfee estimates that global
\ncompanies may have lost over $1 trillion worth of intellectual property to data theft in 2008.<\/p>\n
We assess that a number of nations, including Russia and China, have the technical
\ncapabilities to target and disrupt elements of the US information infrastructure and for
\nintelligence collection. Nation states and criminals target our government and private sector
\ninformation networks to gain competitive advantage in the commercial sector. Terrorist groups,
\nincluding al-Qa’ida, HAMAS, and Hizballah, have expressed the desire to use cyber means to
\ntarget the United States. Criminal elements continue to show growing sophistication in technical
\ncapability and targeting and today operate a pervasive, mature on-line service economy in illicit
\ncyber capabilities and services available to anyone willing to pay. Each of these actors has
\ndifferent levels of skill and different intentions; therefore, we must develop flexible capabilities
\nto counter each. We must take proactive measures to detect and prevent intrusions from
\nwhatever source, as they happen, and before they can do significant damage.<\/p>\n
We expect disruptive cyber activities to be the norm in future political or military
\nconflicts. The Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks and Web defacements that targeted
\nGeorgia in 2008 and Estonia in 2007 disrupted government, media, and banking Web sites.
\nDDoS attacks and Web defacements targeted Georgian government Web sites, including that of
\nGeorgian President Saakishvili, intermittently disrupting online access to the official Georgian
\nperspective of the conflict and some Georgian Government functions but did not affect military
\naction. Such attacks have been a common outlet for hackers during political disputes over the
\npast decade, including Israel’s military conflicts with Hizballah and HAMAS in 2006 and 2008,
\nthe aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Mumbai last year, the publication of cartoons caricaturing
\nthe Prophet Mohammed in 2005, and the Chinese downing of a US Navy aircraft in 2001.<\/p>\n
The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative. In January 2008, the
\nComprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) was adopted as national policy as part
\nof National Security Presidential Directive 54\/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23
\n(NSPD-54\/HSPD-23). With bipartisan support, Congress appropriated the vast majority of the
\nCNCI funding request in the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing
\nAppropriations Act of 2009.<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nThe CNCI addresses current cybersecurity threats, anticipates future threats and
\ntechnologies, and develops a framework for creating in partnership with the private sector an
\nenvironment that no longer favors cyber intruders over defenders. The CNCI includes defensive,
\noffensive, education, research and development, and counterintelligence elements, while
\nremaining sensitive throughout to the requirements of protecting the privacy rights and civil
\nliberties of US citizens. The CNCI is now making considerable progress in building a better
\nunderstanding of the cyber threat, developing concrete solutions, and approving detailed courses
\nof action. The Adminstration is now reviewing CNCI, to ensure it is consistent with its own
\ncybersecurity policy.<\/p>\n
The CNCI addresses current cybersecurity threats, anticipates future threats and
\ntechnologies, and develops a framework for creating in partnership with the private sector an
\nenvironment that no longer favors cyber intruders over defenders. The CNCI includes defensive,
\noffensive, education, research and development, and counterintelligence elements, while
\nremaining sensitive throughout to the requirements of protecting the privacy rights and civil
\nliberties of US citizens. The CNCI is now making considerable progress in building a better
\nunderstanding of the cyber threat, developing concrete solutions, and approving detailed courses
\nof action. The Adminstration is now reviewing CNCI, to ensure it is consistent with its own
\ncybersecurity policy.<\/p>\n
We cannot afford to discover successful cyber intrusions after-the-fact, accept disastrous
\nlosses, and then seek merely to contain them. It requires a broad alliance of departments,
\nagencies, and industry leaders to focus on countering the threat, mitigating vulnerabilities, and
\nenhancing resiliency in order to preserve our national security, national economy, and public
\nwelfare.<\/p>\n
Growing Transnational Organized Crime Threat<\/p>\n
Most organized criminal activities increasingly involve either networks of interconnected
\ncriminal groups sharing expertise, skills, and resources in joint criminal ventures that transcend
\nnational boundaries or powerful, well-organized crime groups seeking to legitimize their image
\nby investing in the global marketplace. Organized criminals and groups will increasingly pose a
\nthreat to US national security interests by enhancing the capabilities of terrorists and hostile
\ngovernments.<\/p>\n
Some organized crime networks, groups, and individuals also have invested in energy
\nand mineral markets in an effort to diversify and legitimize their business activities. Criminals’
\ncoercive tactics, underhanded business practices, opaque motives, and self-serving loyalties can
\nundermine the normal workings and integrity of these global markets. The most powerful, high-
\nprofile Eurasian criminal groups often form strategic alliances with senior political leaders and
\nbusiness tycoons and can operate from a relative safehaven status with little to fear of
\ninternational arrest and prosecution. The leaders of many of these groups go to great lengths to
\nportray themselves as legitimate businessmen and use front companies that give them more
\nmarket access and leverage. They also employ some of the world’s best accountants, lawyers,
\nbankers, and lobbyists to deflect and frustrate the efforts of authorities.<\/p>\n
The change in the structure and types of activities conducted by transnational criminal
\ngroups is making it increasingly difficult to identify and attack them. In particular, the<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nincreasing prevalence of loosely knit networks, the use of cyberspace and global financial
\nsystems, and political corruption have made it easier for them to hide their involvement, to
\nthwart law enforcement efforts, and to create images of legitimacy.<\/p>\n
increasing prevalence of loosely knit networks, the use of cyberspace and global financial
\nsystems, and political corruption have made it easier for them to hide their involvement, to
\nthwart law enforcement efforts, and to create images of legitimacy.<\/p>\n
Climate change, energy, global health, and environmental security are often intertwined,
\nand while not traditionally viewed as “threats” to US national security, they will affect
\nAmericans in major ways. The Intelligence Community has increased its focus on these three
\ncritical issues as a result of unprecedented developments in the last year.<\/p>\n
Access to relatively secure and clean energy sources and management of chronic food
\nand water shortages will assume increasing importance for a growing number of countries.
\nAdding well over a billion people to the world’s population by 2025 will itself put pressure on
\nthese vital resources. An increasing percentage of the world’s population will be moving from
\nrural areas to urban and developed ones to seek greater personal security and economic
\nopportunity. Many, particularly in Asia, will be joining the middle class and will be seeking to
\nemulate Western lifestyles, which involves greater per capita consumption of all these resources.<\/p>\n
The already stressed resource sector will be further complicated and, in most cases,
\nexacerbated by climate change, whose physical effects will worsen throughout this period.
\nContinued escalation of energy demand will hasten the impacts of climate change. On the other
\nhand, forcibly cutting back on fossil fuel use before substitutes are widely available could
\nthreaten continued economic development, particularly for countries like China, whose industries
\nhave not yet achieved high levels of energy efficiency.<\/p>\n
Food and water also are intertwined with climate change, energy, and demography.
\nRising energy prices increase the cost for consumers and the environment of industrial-scale
\nagriculture and application of petrochemical fertilizers. A switch from use of arable land for
\nfood to fuel crops provides a limited solution and could exacerbate both the energy and food
\nsituations. Climatically, rainfall anomalies and constricted seasonal flows of snow and glacial
\nmelts are aggravating water scarcities, harming agriculture in many parts of the globe. Energy
\nand climate dynamics also combine to amplify a number of other ills such as health problems,
\nagricultural losses to pests, and storm damage. The greatest danger may arise from the
\nconvergence and interaction of many stresses simultaneously. Such a complex and
\nunprecedented syndrome of problems could cause outright state failure, or weaken important
\npivotal states counted on to act as anchors of regional stability.<\/p>\n
Six to nine months ago we were worried about the implications of increasing high oil
\nprices: the situation has reversed sharply with oil prices falling to close to a third of their July
\n2008 peak of $147 per barrel in response to the sudden drop in world oil demand growth and
\nslower economic growth resulting from the global financial crisis. Although we believe the
\nlonger-term trend is toward high oil prices, the current lower oil prices reduce pressures on the
\nglobal economy. Emerging economies previously concerned about busting their budgets on fuel
\nand food subsidies are breathing a sigh of relief now that prices have fallen substantially over the
\nlast six months. Most forecasters expect global oil demand and oil prices to remain depressed<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nthrough 2009 as the financial turmoil continues to unwind. The decline in price may, however,
\nlead to delayed or cancelled investments in the upstream oil and gas sectors, creating the
\nconditions for another spike in oil prices once global oil demand recovers. We also are
\nconcerned that lower oil prices may weaken momentum toward energy efficiency and the
\ndevelopment of alternative sources of energy that are important for both energy and
\nenvironmental security. The fall in energy prices also has had the side benefit of undercutting
\nthe economic positions of some of the more troublesome producers.<\/p>\n
through 2009 as the financial turmoil continues to unwind. The decline in price may, however,
\nlead to delayed or cancelled investments in the upstream oil and gas sectors, creating the
\nconditions for another spike in oil prices once global oil demand recovers. We also are
\nconcerned that lower oil prices may weaken momentum toward energy efficiency and the
\ndevelopment of alternative sources of energy that are important for both energy and
\nenvironmental security. The fall in energy prices also has had the side benefit of undercutting
\nthe economic positions of some of the more troublesome producers.<\/p>\n
According to the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a
\nfailure to act to reduce green house gas emissions risks severe damage to the planet by the end of
\nthis century and even greater risk in coming centuries. In a fossil fuel-intensive scenario that
\nIPCC examined (A1FI), global average temperatures increase by almost four degrees centigrade.
\nIn such a scenario, water stored in glaciers and snow cover would decline significantly, reducing
\nwater availability in regions supplied by melt water from major mountain ranges, where more
\nthan one-sixth of the world population currently lives. Sea-level rise could be up to 59
\ncentimeters by the end of the century and would cause substantial flooding. Individuals in
\ndensely populated and low-lying areas, especially the mega deltas of Asian and Africa, where
\nadaptive capacity is relatively low, and which already face other challenges such as tropical
\nstorms or local coastal subsidence, are especially at risk. At a four-degree rise, according to the
\nIPCC, up to 30 percent of plant and animal species would be at risk of extinction, global
\nproductivity in cereals would decline, intensity of tropical cyclones would increase, and extreme
\ndrought areas would rise from 1 percent land area to 30 percent.<\/p>\n
The Intelligence Community recently completed a National Intelligence Assessment on
\nthe national security impacts of global climate change to 2030. The IC judges global climate
\nchange will have important and extensive implications for US national security interests over the
\nnext 20 years. Although the United States itself could be less affected and is better equipped
\nthan most nations to deal with climate change and may even see a benefit in the near term owing
\nto increases in agriculture productivity, infrastructure repair and replacement will be costly. We
\njudge the most significant impact for the United States will be indirect and result from climate-
\ndriven effects on many other countries and their potential to seriously affect US national security
\ninterests. We assess climate change alone is unlikely to trigger state failure in any state out to
\n2030, but the impacts will worsen existing problems such as poverty, social tensions,
\nenvironmental degradation, ineffectual leadership, and weak political institutions. Climate
\nchange could threaten domestic stability in some states, potentially contributing to intra- or, less
\nlikely, interstate conflict, particularly over access to increasingly scarce water resources. We
\njudge economic migrants will perceive additional reasons to migrate because of harsh climates,
\nboth within nations and from disadvantaged to richer countries.<\/p>\n
From a national security perspective, climate change affects lives (for example, through
\nfood and water shortages, increased health problems including the spread of disease, and
\nincreased potential for conflict), property (for example through ground subsidence, flooding,
\ncoastal erosion, and extreme weather events), and other security interests. The United States
\ndepends on a smooth-functioning international system ensuring the flow of trade and market<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\naccess to critical raw materials such as oil and gas, and security for its allies and partners.
\nClimate change could affect all of these-domestic stability in a number of key states, the
\nopening of new sea lanes and access to raw materials, and the global economy more broadly-
\nwith significant geopolitical consequences.<\/p>\n
access to critical raw materials such as oil and gas, and security for its allies and partners.
\nClimate change could affect all of these-domestic stability in a number of key states, the
\nopening of new sea lanes and access to raw materials, and the global economy more broadly-
\nwith significant geopolitical consequences.<\/p>\n
Multilateral policymaking on climate change is likely to be highly visible and a growing
\npriority among traditional security affairs in the coming decades. We observe the United States
\nis seen by the world as occupying a potentially pivotal leadership role between Europe, which is
\ncommitted to long-term and dramatic reduction in carbon emissions, and a heterogeneous group
\nof developing states wary of committing to greenhouse gas emissions reductions, which they
\nbelieve would slow their economic growth. As effects of climate change begin to mount, the
\nUnited States will come under increasing pressure to join the international community in setting
\nmeaningful long-term goals for emissions reductions, to reduce its own emissions, and to help
\nothers mitigate and adapt to climate change through technological progress and financial
\nassistance.<\/p>\n
Global Health<\/p>\n
Considerable empirical and theoretical studies have demonstrated the links between the
\nhealth of a population and economic growth and development. Highly publicized virulent
\ninfectious diseases-including HIV\/AIDS, a potential influenza pandemic, and “mystery”
\nillnesses such as the 2003 outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)-remain the
\nmost direct health-related threats to the United States. The most pressing transnational health
\nchallenge for the United States is still the potential for emergence of a severe pandemic, with the
\nprimary candidate being a highly lethal influenza virus. The World Bank estimates that if the
\nnext pandemic virus is similar to the one that caused the 1918 pandemic, it could kill 71 million
\npeople worldwide and cause a major global recession with global costs exceeding $3 trillion.
\nOther estimates, applying the 2.5 percent fatality rate from the 1918 pandemic to today’s
\npopulation, reach 180 million deaths worldwide. Current threats include H5N1 influenza, a virus
\nthat, while primarily a poultry disease, continues to evolve and expand its geographic range.<\/p>\n
Infectious diseases are not the only health indicators with strategic significance. Chronic,
\nnon-communicable diseases; neglected tropical diseases; maternal and child mortality;
\nmalnutrition; sanitation and access to clean water; and availability of basic health-care also affect
\nthe US national interest through their impacts on the economies, governments, and militaries of
\nkey countries and regions.<\/p>\n
\u2022
\nTerrorists and warlords have gained local and international stature and even power by
\nproviding health services governments could not. Widespread ill health in the youth cohort
\nATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nmay reduce a country’s pool of healthy and capable military recruits, a phenomenon that is<\/p>\n
may reduce a country’s pool of healthy and capable military recruits, a phenomenon that is<\/p>\n
Looking at specific states, the inability of the central government of Afghanistan to
\nprovide health-care and other services has helped to undermine its credibility while boosting
\nsupport for a resurgent and increasingly sophisticated Taliban. Wide incidence of traumatic
\nbirths, malnutrition, and disease put children there at high risk of impaired development,
\nundermining their prospects of attending school, engaging more productively in critical labor
\nsuch as agricultural production, and participating in other economic activity. In Iraq, a degraded
\nhealth sector, shortages of medical personnel, and infections stemming from deficient sanitary
\nconditions and lack of clean drinking water have undermined the credibility of the central
\ngovernment.<\/p>\n
Russia has the overall worst health indicators of any industrialized country. Poor health
\nof Russian children and young people combined with falling birthrates threatens Russian military
\nreadiness with a projected halving of eligible military recruits between 2005 and 2018. China’s
\nhigh incidence of chronic disease stemming in great part from heavy tobacco use threatens to
\nslow economic growth by incapacitating workers and incurring heavy health-care costs. The
\nhealth effects of environmental degradation are an increasing source of discontent in China.<\/p>\n
Venezuela and Cuba have been particularly adept at parlaying provision of charitable
\nmedical services to nationals of other countries into support in international forums such as the
\nUnited Nations. Hizballah’s provision of health and social services in Lebanon over the past 20
\nyears has helped to legitimize the organization as a political force in that country, while
\nHAMAS’s delivery of similar services was a factor in its legislative electoral success in the
\nPalestinian territories.<\/p>\n
Turning to US Homeland health security issues, existing international resources and
\nregulations will be inadequate to control transnational disease spread at least through the next
\ndecade. Movement of people, animals, and products through mass transportation, smuggling,
\nand commerce will continue to homogenize the already global environment. Incidents involving
\nchemical or bacterial contamination of imported food or trade goods, whether accidental or
\nintentional, are likely to increase as China and other developing countries struggle to implement
\neffective monitoring systems. A similar challenge involves ensuring the safety of imported
\ntherapeutic drugs and precursor products, as contaminated and counterfeit pharmaceuticals
\ncontinue to be a worldwide public health threat.<\/p>\n
Conclusion
\nThe international security environment is complex. No dominant adversary faces the
\nUnited States that threatens our existence with military force, but the global financial crises has
\nexacerbated what was already a growing set of political and economic uncertainties. We are
\nnevertheless in a strong position to shape a world reflecting universal aspirations and values that
\nhave motivated Americans since 1776: human rights; the rule of law; liberal market economics
\nand social justice. Whether we can succeed will depend on actions we take here at home-
\nrestoring strong economic growth and maintaining our scientific and technological edge and
\ndefending ourselves at reasonable cost in dollars without violating our civil liberties. It will also
\ndepend on our actions abroad, not only in how we deal with regions, regimes and crises, but also<\/p>\n
ATA FEB 2009-IC STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
\nin developing new multilateral systems, formal or informal, for effective international
\ncooperation in trade and finance, in neutralizing extremist groups using terrorism, in controlling
\nthe proliferation of WMD, developing codes of conduct for cyberspace and space, and in
\nmitigating and slowing global climate change.<\/p>\n
in developing new multilateral systems, formal or informal, for effective international
\ncooperation in trade and finance, in neutralizing extremist groups using terrorism, in controlling
\nthe proliferation of WMD, developing codes of conduct for cyberspace and space, and in
\nmitigating and slowing global climate change.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Dennis C. Blair Director of National Intelligence 12 February 2009 February 2009 February 2009 FEBRUARY 2009 INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT UNCLASSIFIED STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD Chairman Feinstein, Vice Chairman Bond, Members of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":83,"featured_media":782328,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[846,155,845,34,922],"tags":[3765],"class_list":["post-9599","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-business","category-palestinianna","category-scitech","category-usa","category-world","tag-al-qaeda"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9599","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/83"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=9599"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9599\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/782328"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=9599"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=9599"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=9599"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}