Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs Vol. 28, No. 2, August 2008
\nISSN 1360-2004 print\/ISSN 1469-9591 online\/08\/020303-17#2008
\nInstitute of Muslim Minority Affairs
\nDOI: 10.1080\/13602000802303235 <\/p>\n
A SCRUTINY OF AKCAM\u2019S VERSION OF HISTORY<\/p>\n
REVIEW ESSAY: A SCRUTINY OF AKCAM\u2019S VERSION OF HISTORY AND THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE
\nBy ERMAN SAHIN<\/p>\n
Book reviewed – A SHAMEFUL ACT: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility, TANER AKCAM, translated from Turkish by PAUL BESSEMER, 2006, New York: Metropolitan Books x \u00fe 376 pp., notes to p. 464, index to p. 483, $30.00 (hardcover), ISBN: 0-8050-7932-7<\/p>\n
ABSTRACT<\/p>\n
The tragic fate of the Ottoman Armenians during World War I, the massacres that
\naccompanied their forced migration, and the role of the Committee of Union and
\nProgress\u2014the ruling faction in the Ottoman government during World War I\u2014
\nconstitute one of the murkiest chapters in the modern history of the Middle East.
\nThis article argues that those who have dealt with this complex subject have not
\nalways respected the limits set by scholarly ethics and have failed to use their
\nsources scrupulously while engaging in distortions deliberate quoting out of context
\nand doctoring of data. At this point Taner Akcam\u2019s book, translated and distributed
\nby the Zoryan Institute, deserves particular attention, and therefore it is essential to
\nexamine this work with a closer scrutiny by checking and comparing the original
\nsources utilized by the author. The article will illustrate this point by a case study
\npresenting the discrepancies between the texts preserved in the original sources
\nand those presented by the author in his work. <\/p>\n
INTRODUCTION<\/p>\n
This book, dealing with the Armenian Question, is a substantially revised English version
\nof the author\u2019s earlier book, Insan Haklar\u0131 ve Ermeni Sorunu,1 published in 1999. The
\nbook is welcomed by many authors including Erik Jan Zu rcher who, on its back cover,
\nwrote that Taner Akcam\u2019s study is the \u201cstate of the art in this field\u201d. Elsewhere
\nStephen Feinstein described it as the \u201cbest book ever written on Armenian Genocide\u201d.
\nAkcam, a sociologist often credited as the first Turkish scholar to acknowledge the
\n\u201cArmenian Genocide\u201d, contends that there is no doubt that the \u201cscale of the operations
\nwould have been impossible without planning at the political center\u201d (p. 7). The readers
\nwould have welcomed a bibliography (a surprising omission in a heavily referenced
\nwork), tables and perhaps more than one map. However, despite revisions the trail of
\nerrors and inconsistencies still mar the book. Moreover the influence of Vahakn
\nN. Dadrian\u2019s earlier findings and arguments is also visible throughout Akcam\u2019s study.
\nThe book tells us little that is new, and suffers from inadequate understanding and
\nuse of sources. <\/p>\n
The book is divided into three parts:
\npart one discusses the Ottoman state and its non-Muslim subjects and covers the era of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and discusses Turkish nationalism;
\npart two deals with the events leading to the decision for executing genocide and its aftermath;
\npart three is devoted to investigation and prosecution of the crimes committed during the catastrophic events of 1915\u20131916. <\/p>\n
Unfortunately the book lacks a comprehensive conclusion and suffers from poor organization
\nand repetition. <\/p>\n
PRESENTING THE COURSE OF EVENTS<\/p>\n
In discussing the massacres of the 1890s the author does not mention the provocations
\ncarried out by the Armenian revolutionary groups that were also an important factor in
\nbringing about Muslim attacks on the Armenians. In the second chapter the author
\nquotes a single instance of this kind for a different occasion (p. 63). His argument,
\nhowever, is not a synthesis of the evidence presented. Instead of discussing how such
\nincidents shaped the course of events the author prefers to limit himself to pointing
\nout how the Turkish historiography makes use of them. <\/p>\n
Akcam suggests that the Ottoman Special Organization (Teskilat-\u0131 Mahsusa) (OSO)
\nhas been instrumental \u201cin implementing the Armenian genocide\u201d (p. 59); however,
\nthe documentary evidence does not support his claims.2
\n Moreover, in discussing the structure and the assignments of the OSO, Akcam incorrectly attributes a statement to Cemal Kutay (pp. 96\u201397) that was in fact made by Esref Kuscubasi.3<\/p>\n
In his discussion of the impact of the Muslim refugees the author offers a simplistic
\nand inaccurate assessment of the situation; for instance, we read that \u201c. . . between
\n1878\u20131904 some 850,000 refugees were settled in predominantly Armenian areas
\nalone\u201d (p. 87). In fact, the research based on primary documents establishes that
\nthe great bulk of these refugees were settled in the \u201cprovinces other than Eastern
\nAnatolia\u201d.4
\n In addition, such western provinces as Ayd\u0131n, Hudavendigar (Bursa) and
\nEdirne (Adrianople) where the refugees were settled in significant numbers can hardly
\nbe described as being predominantly Armenian. <\/p>\n
The author\u2019s discussion of the Ottomans\u2019 war aims and their entry into the war are also
\nproblematic for these are presented in too oversimplified a framework to be accepted
\nwithout an immense amount of equivocation. He maintains that the \u201cUnionists devoted
\na great deal of effort toward entering the war\u201d (p. 112). In fact, the Unionists devoted
\ntheir efforts towards securing an alliance with Germany, not entering the war. By means
\nof the alliance, they hoped to put an end to the Empire\u2019s political isolation while at the
\nsame trying to postpone the entry into the war as much as possible before they finally succumbed
\nto German pressure for armed action. As Mustafa Aksakal, the author of a scholarly
\nstudy on the Ottoman entry into the war noted, \u201cThe Ottoman leaders hoped either
\nto stay outside the war entirely or to enter it only in its final stages but they were equally
\nconcerned to preserve the alliance they had formed with Germany\u201d.5
\nAkcam also
\nasserts that by entering the war Unionists sought to pursue their \u201cPan-Turanist and
\nPan-Islamist objectives\u201d, and would also seek an opportunity to \u201cregain lost territories
\nespecially in the Balkans and seek revenge in the Christian communities\u201d (p. 112). He
\nalso lays considerable stress on the feelings of revenge, and concludes that \u201cit was this
\nkind of feeling that was used to justify the killing of Armenians\u201d (p. 117). <\/p>\n
RECONCILING FACTS WITH ASSUMPTIONS<\/p>\n
One wonders how an administration, which not only reconciled and established an alliance
\nwith Bulgaria but even made territorial concessions to bring it into the war on its
\nown side or which conducted negotiations with Greece to form a Balkan alliance,6 was
\nable to dream about seeking revenge in the Christian communities or regaining the
\nlost territories in the Balkans.
\nWhile there is no doubt that the disastrous results of the
\nBalkan wars had left many people with bitter feelings and painful memories it is doubtful
\nthat the Ottoman leadership was carried away by the simplistic and emotional ideals as
\nAkcamsuggests. As Feroz Ahmad pointed out, the Unionists started out \u201cwith the principal
\naim of guaranteeing the territorial integrity and maintaining sovereignty\u201d and
\nshowed \u201clittle concern\u201d toward such matters as Pan-Turanism, and \u201cthere was no question
\nof regaining Macedonia which had already proved to be an unduly expensive adventure\u201d.
\n7<\/p>\n
The author also discusses the role and the activity of convicts released in 1914; he
\nrefers to sources that, according to him, mention that these prisoners were \u201cactually
\ntrained in Istanbul for the purpose of carrying out the Armenian genocide\u201d (p. 136).
\nOn the other hand, he claims it is very likely that the \u201ckey decisions concerning the massacre
\nwere made within the CUP in Istanbul during March 1915\u201d (p. 152, and also
\np. 156). He provides no explanation, however, as to how the prisoners may be released
\nand trained in 1914 for the purpose of carrying out the genocide when there was no such
\ndecision yet (to judge from Akcam\u2019s own date). This is however, only one of the many
\ncontradictions and inconsistencies that the book contains. <\/p>\n
Akcam is also quite selective in his use of materials. He alleges for instance, that
\n\u201cimmediately after the [Sar\u0131kam\u0131s] defeat, Enver conveyed his thanks to the Armenian
\nPatriarchate for the sacrifice and heroism of the Armenian soldiers in the war\u201d (p. 143)
\non the basis of such a highly partisan account as that of Pastor Johannes Lepsius alone,
\nand tries to support this point by referring to German Consular reports concerning the
\nself-sacrifice shown by the Armenians (pp. 143\u2013144). Yet when discussing a different
\nmatter on page 197, we read that the German consuls \u201creported that during the
\nCaucasian campaign, the Armenian soldiers in the Ottoman Army turned their guns
\non the Turks\u201d. It is thus quite unlikely that Enver should have ever made such a statement
\nafter a Caucasian campaign in which the Armenian soldiers did indeed turn their
\nguns on the Turks. <\/p>\n
The author\u2019s inadequate understanding of Ottoman history also undermines the
\nvalidity of his explanations. For instance, he claims there is \u201cevidence that the [genocide]
\ndecision was made at the end of March, during the critical days of the Gallipoli
\nCampaign\u201d (p. 152), but the Gallipoli campaign began on 25 April 1915. Despite the
\nfirm insistence on March 1915 as the date of decision for the genocide, the author
\nfails to provide any credible \u201cevidence\u201d substantiating this thesis. Enver\u2019s remark
\nthat the threat offered by the Armenians can be quelled by removing them \u201cfrom the
\nplaces where they lived and sending them to other places\u201d is according to Akcam, the
\nevidence that there was a decision for genocide in March 1915. <\/p>\n
Akcam\u2019s tendentious mode of writing and selective use of sources become even more
\ntransparent when considering his use of trial proceedings. The proceedings that are
\nrecorded in various newspapers and journals do not always conform, and at times
\neven contradict each other. For instance, the statement and the admission he attributes
\nto Colonel Sahabettin (p. 200), which was supposedly made by S ahabettin at the eighth
\nsession of the Yozgat trial, is uncorroborated by two other newspaper versions8 while
\ncontradicted by a third,9 all of which also gave the proceedings of the same session. In
\nthe absence of original transcripts it is difficult to determine with any accuracy which
\none of these reflects a truer picture. The more recent research, therefore, casts doubt
\non Akcam\u2019s finding as he failed to include the other relevant material. <\/p>\n
INTERPRETING ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS<\/p>\n
One may also feel uneasy with Akcam\u2019s treatment of Ottoman archival documents since
\nwhenever the Ottoman documents seem to support his contentions he considers them
\ngenuine. On the other hand, when they contradict his views he consistently attempts
\nto dismiss them as part of a conspiracy, even if they are in fact the same documents.
\nThe most striking example of this dualistic approach is given when Akcam relies on a
\n\u201cgeneral circular from the Ministry of the Interior\u201d (p. 204), a document he earlier dismissed
\nas part of a \u201cgreat deception\u201d (p. 169) in relation to the exclusion of Protestants
\nfrom the relocation. Similarly, after having initially regarded the former Grand Vizier
\nSaid Halim\u2019s statement about his non-involvement in the process of the Armenians\u2019
\nrelocation as convincing (p. 156), the author subsequently expresses his doubts over
\nits sincerity (pp. 263\u2013265). <\/p>\n
Akcam\u2019s discussion of the estimates regarding the Armenian deaths also stands on
\nshaky ground. He admits that the available \u201cestimates are based on a political agenda\u201d
\n(p. 183). One would not expect to see that an author who can claim this should rely
\non a figure given by a government that has distinguished itself with its deep enmity
\ntowards the CUP. He upholds the figure of 800,000 killed Armenians given by Interior
\nMinister Cemal Bey, as true. In order to increase its credibility, he also claims this figure
\nwas the \u201cresult of the commission established\u201d by Mustafa Arif Degmer but fails to
\nadduce anything in support of this assertion. The same minister, Cemal Bey, in the
\nsame statement also declared that the CUP had annihilated four million Turks10 the
\nvery same CUP that according to Akcam was carrying out a policy of Turkification.
\nIs it conceivable to maintain that these claims as well as figures were not based on a
\npolitical agenda? <\/p>\n
The author\u2019s other claims in support of his numbers are also unconvincing or inaccurate.
\nHe relies on an ambiguous statement attributed toMustafa Kemal in a second-hand source
\nwhilst ignoring a first-hand account in which Mustafa Kemal had rejected the figures
\noffered by Minister Cemal as a slander (iftira).11
\n While the book published by the
\nTurkish Army\u2019s General Staff, Buyuk Harp\u2019te Turk Harbi [Turkish War in the Great War],
\nwas not on the \u201cissue of the World War I losses\u201d, its publication does not substantiate
\nAkcam\u2019s claims either; after all, it was a translation of a book published in Paris in 1926
\non the history of Ottoman participation in the World War by the French author Maurice
\nLarcher.12
\nYusuf Hikmet Bayur has never stated that the figure \u201c800,000\u201d should be
\nconsidered accurate for the Armenian losses; indeed, in discussing the Armenian Question
\nin the preceding part of his study, Bayur described Commandant M. Larcher\u2019s account of
\nevents which used the figure of 500,000 for the Armenian losses as being quite exaggerated.
\n13
\n Furthermore, in another work, Bayur has criticized Minister Cemal\u2019s statement,
\ncharacterizing it as the \u201cugliest indication\u201d of the Damat Ferit government\u2019s endless
\nefforts at appeasing victorious allies.14<\/p>\n
The author does not provide adequate discussion on the course of relocations that differed
\ndepending on local circumstances as well as the attitude of local officials and the
\nfew examples provided by Akcam are all carefully selected. While Akcam acknowledges
\nCemal Pasha\u2019s efforts in favor of Armenians he sheds little light on it. <\/p>\n
RELYING ON \u201cKEY\u201d SOURCES <\/p>\n
The key source of Akcam\u2019s allegations is the findings of 1919\u20131920 court-martials
\n(as well as the indictment of the main trial), which he upholds as true. But the legal
\nprocedures of these courts suffered from serious shortcomings and the reliability of
\ntheir findings was questionable.15
\nThe trials were conducted under the pressure of
\nthe victorious Allies and by the post-war Ottoman governments eager to heap any
\nblame on the CUP in order to forestall the dismemberment of the Empire and to
\nreceive more lenient treatment from the Allies.16
\n Commenting on this attitude of the
\nprosecution, the late Tar\u0131k Zafer Tunaya has remarked that the prosecutor was
\nblaming the CUP (for everything) by \u201cbeginning from the story of Eve and Adam\u201d,17
\nwhile other scholars have also expressed their skepticism over their findings18\u2014including
\nM. E. Yapp who noted that the \u201c1919 courts martial . . . cannot be taken entirely at
\nface value because they were conducted by a government which was anxious to pin
\nany blame on the CUP leaders\u201d.19<\/p>\n
According to Akcam\u2019s sources the CUP leader Cemal Pasha \u201chad indeed tried . . . to
\nease the situation for the Armenian deportees\u201d (p. 186) and yet was actually sentenced to
\ndeath by these courts. Falih R\u0131fk\u0131 Atay, seemingly a valuable source for Akcam, relates
\nhow Atay had to bribe the members of these courts with an amount less than 500 Lira
\nin order to save himself from execution, and how the decision for his execution was
\nmade even before he was tried.20
\nRefik Halid Karay, a staunch opponent of both the
\nUnionists and the nationalist movement in Ankara, and one who had a meeting with
\nthe judge and the members of the court over Atay\u2019s case, confirms that the decision to
\nexecute Atay was already arranged even before a trial.21<\/p>\n
Akcamcannot bring himself to admit the injustices committed by these courts; he does
\nnot even discuss the changes introduced by the Damat Ferit government, which even
\nbanned the defendants from hiring a lawyer22\u2014a process that constitutes the most
\nbasic right of a defendant in any system. Likewise he mentions the \u201cirregularities
\ninvolving Nusret\u2019s death sentence\u201d (p. 354) but does not elaborate on these irregularities.
\nThe author does not refrain from relying on questionable sources either. For instance,
\nthe alleged 1926 interview of Mustafa Kemal, on which he relies (pp. 345\u2013346), was
\nproven to be false years ago.23<\/p>\n
A LITANY OF ERRORS<\/p>\n
For an author claiming to have mastered the subject, Akcam makes too many factual
\nerrors which diminish the text\u2019s reliability as a point of reference:
\nThe Ottoman
\nEmpire was not considered the \u201cSick Man of Europe\u201d since the 1830s; the term was
\ncoined by the Russian Tsar in 1844 (p. 27).
\n Sasun was not a Cilician village; it was in
\nBitlis province (p. 41).
\n Yusuf Kemal Tengirsenk was not the second foreign minister
\nof the Turkish Republic but the second foreign minister of the Ankara Government
\nbefore the Republic was proclaimed (p. 46).
\n The last name of the Russian foreign minister
\nwas not Sazanov but Sazonov (pp. 98\u201399, 213 and index).
\nKurt Ziemke was not a
\nhistorian but a diplomat (p. 118).
\nHuseyin Cahit Yalc\u0131n was not the editor of Tanin
\nduring the war; he left Tanin in January 1914 (p. 143).
\nAlma Johansson was not a
\nSwiss nurse but Swedish (p. 150).
\nPozanti is not some 30\u201340 km from Adana but
\nabout 70 km (p. 158).
\nKayseri, Nigde and Eskisehir were not provinces but sanjaks
\n(subdivisions of provinces) (p. 177).
\nInterior Minister Cemal Bey\u2019s statement was not
\nmade on 18 March 1919; it first appeared in an interview with Cemal Bey in Le Moniteur
\nOriental on 13 March 1919 (p. 183).
\nThe book published by the Turkish Army\u2019s General
\nStaff was not on the issue ofWorldWar I losses (p. 183).
\n Hovhannes Kachaznuni was not
\nthe first president of Armenia but the first prime minister (p. 198).
\nThe governor of Van
\nwas not Cevdet Pasa but Cevdet Bey (p. 201).
\nThe surname of the former Van deputy
\nwas not Avras but Arvas (pp. 201, 326 and index).
\n The general circular from the
\nMinistry of the Interior was not sent to all Ottoman provinces (p. 204).
\nThe Greeks
\ndid not invade I zmir on 16 May 1919 but on 15 May 1919 (pp. 279, 294).
\n Friedrich
\nFreiherr Kress von Kressenstein was not a general but a colonel (p. 325).
\nMustafa
\nKemal\u2019s statement was not made in a closed session of the parliament but in an open
\nsession (pp. 346, 348).
\nNusret Bey was not the prefect (kaymakam) of Urfa but the subgovernor
\n(mutasarr\u0131f) (p. 351).
\nThe above mistakes are not just aberrations but typify the
\nwhole book. <\/p>\n
LOST IN TRANSLATION<\/p>\n
The translation errors represent another problem. The word \u201cekseriyet\u201d, for instance,
\ndoes not mean minority but majority. Therefore, the last part of the quote presented
\non page 97 should not read \u201c[a]reas . . . in which non-Turkish races and nations
\nformed a minority\u201d but should be \u201c[a]reas . . . in which non-Turkish races and nations
\nformed a majority\u201d.24
\n Basbakanl\u0131k does not mean Presidential but the Office of the
\nPrime Minister (p. 417, n. 65). <\/p>\n
The translation problems are not confined to just minor ones; the book gives
\nfundamentally different versions of events than its original Turkish. For instance,
\nwhen discussing the role of Colonel Seyfi, the original Turkish version of the book
\nprovides the following information: <\/p>\n
Following the armistice, on 13 December 1918, the daily Sabah declared that
\nas the officer responsible for the political department in Ottoman Military
\nHeadquarters in close coordination with Bahaettin Sakir, and in collaboration
\nwith the Special Organization, Colonel Seyfi was one of those who had planned
\nthe massacre of Armenians.25<\/p>\n
As might be seen, according to the Turkish version of the book, it is the Sabah newspaper
\nthat is making the assertion in question. However, in the present English book, this event
\nis suspiciously rendered as a confession by Colonel Seyfi rather than a declaration by
\nSabah while no date is given for relevant issue of the daily Sabah: <\/p>\n
After the 1918 armistice, the colonel [Seyfi] explained in the daily Sabah that,
\nas the officer responsible for the political department in Ottoman military
\nheadquarters in collaboration with the Special Organization and in close
\ncoordination with Unionist Bahaettin Sakir, he had been among those who
\nhad devised the plan for the murder of the Armenians. (p. 125) <\/p>\n
One cannot know whether this is an intentional manipulation or an innocent (but inexcusable)
\ntranslation error, or even who is to be blamed for it: the translator or Taner
\nAkcam who had revised the English text. At any rate, Akcam bears the responsibility
\nfor having allowed such errors to enter the text, the existence of which further undermines
\nthe reliability of his book. <\/p>\n
Typographical errors and inconsistencies in spelling of names further mar the book. In
\naddition, the reader whose knowledge of the existing literature is derived from this book
\nis likely to think that Edward J. Erickson\u2019s painstaking study \u201cThe Defeat in Detail: The
\nOttoman Army in the Balkans 1912\u20131913\u201d was released in 1972 (p. 392, n. 114)
\ninstead of 2003, or the seventh volume of the Genocide and Holocaust Studies journal
\nwas published in 1998 (p. 406, n. 78) instead of 1993. <\/p>\n
SOURCES DISTORTED<\/p>\n
Even if one is to ignore the subjectivist attitude of the author, there are more serious problems
\nwith Akcam\u2019s work. In preparing his book, Akcam appears to have altered and distorted
\nthe contents of the sources he has utilized.26 Some examples discussed below may
\nreiterate this point. <\/p>\n
On the Figures Given by Esref Kuscubasi and Celal Bayar<\/p>\n
In discussing the deportation of Christians in Western Anatolia, Taner Akcam\u2014by referring
\nto the autobiographical account of Esref Kuscubasi (a prominent agent of the
\nOSO)\u2014writes that: \u201cKuscubasi Esref claims that during the first months of the war
\nalone the number of \u2018Greek-Armenians . . . deported totaled 1,350,000\u2019\u201d (p. 106). In
\nthe original source, however, the number given by Kuscubasi is 1,150,000 and not
\n1,350,000 as incorrectly given by Akcam. Moreover, Esref Kuscubasi does not say they
\nwere \u201cdeported\u201d but taken to the interior: <\/p>\n
. . . [I]t was plainly visible that if the Greek-Armenian population in the Aegean
\nregion, concentrated especially in the coastal areas amounting to 1,150,000,
\nhad not been taken to the interior a short time before the outbreak of the
\nwar and during the first months of the war, then even the defense in Canakkale
\n[Gallipoli] would not have been possible.27<\/p>\n
In his note the author further claims that \u201cCelal Bayar, who draws extensively from
\nKuscubasi\u2019smemoirs gives separate figures for specific cities. The total number of
\nthese is the same as the figure above [i.e. 1,350,000]\u201d (p. 403, n. 150). Yet the total of
\nthese is not 1,350,000 as the reader is told but 760,000, which is in fact close to one half
\nof the figure above.28 It should be further noted that, in the case of the latter
\nfigure, Kuscubasi does not speak of any relocation but rather gives the figures for the
\npopulation concentration in specific regions.
\nOn the Memoirs of A. Mil (Arif Cemil (Denker))
\nIn a section of his book dealing with the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Congress in
\nErzurum, Taner Akcam falsely puts forward claims that have no basis in the original
\naccount. He writes that:
\nIn one document we read: \u201cThe necessary preparations have been made for
\nthose individuals . . . who have left Erzurum . . . Instructions for those things
\nthat are essential for our organization\u2019s freedom of action should be given.\u201d
\nThe author of this document confirmed that Bahaettin Sakir had wanted
\n\u201cthose people [mentioned in the telegram] apprehended on the way and liquidated\u201d
\n(p. 137).
\nHowever in the original account, Arif Cemil (Denker) quotes a letter from Hilmi Bey, the
\nCUP inspector for Erzurum, in which Hilmi Bey states that:
\n. . . The necessary preparations have been made for those individuals on whose
\ndepartures from Erzurum you have informed [us] with a cipher. I have made
\ndelivery to the persons required to get them [i.e. the individuals who departed
\nfrom Erzurum] regardless of anything . . . I hope to inform you on this matter in
\nabout two days. The command post should give the necessary instructions for
\nour organization\u2019s freedom of action to the persons required.29
\nAfter quoting this Arif Cemil (Denker) makes some comments on Hilmi Bey\u2019s letter by
\nstating that:
\nTwo points in Hilmi Bey\u2019s letter deserve attention. One of them is the apprehension,
\nmore precisely the liquidation of the persons on their way, whose
\ndepartures from Erzurum have been notified by Bahaettin Sakir.30
\nThe original account, as might be seen, makes no mention of Bahaettin Sakir\u2019s alleged
\ndemand for the liquidation of the persons in question and the only role attributed to
\nBahaettin Sakir Bey is his notifying of the mentioned individuals\u2019 departures. It is difficult
\nto understand how Akcam, based on the above source, concluded that \u201cthe author of
\nthis document confirmed that Bahaettin Sakir had wanted those people [mentioned in
\nthe telegram] . . . liquidated\u201d. Of minor importance is Akcam\u2019s misidentification of
\n\u201cthe author of this document\u201d, since its author was Hilmi Bey while the one making
\nthe so-called confirmation on which Akcam relied was Arif Cemil.
\nMore on the Memoirs of Arif Cemil (Denker)
\nIn attempting to describe the alleged genocide decision, which was supposedly made
\nduring March 1915, Taner Akcam again deliberately distorts his evidence in order to
\nback up his contentions:
\n. . . In addition to the question of the army command, fundamental changes
\nin the Special Organization\u2019s activities were also under discussion. \u201cThe
\nArmenians\u2019 anti-Turkish attitude and the help they gave the Russian army convinced
\n[Bahaettin Sakir] that dealing with the enemy within was as necessary as
\nthe enemy without.\u201d Having assembled evidence of Armenian gang activity in
\nthe region, Sakir now tried to persuade his friends in Istanbul that it was time to
\nget rid of this threat. It is very likely that the key decisions concerning the massacre were made
\nwithin the CUP in Istanbul during March 1915. \u201cIn these discussions a
\ndecision was made that Bahaettin Sakir Bey would resign from his duties pertaining
\nto the country\u2019s foreign enemies and concentrate solely on its internal
\nenemies.\u201d Sakir was put in charge of dealing with \u201cthe Armenians inside . . .
\nThese discussions concluded with the formulation of the Deportation Law.
\nWhen Bahaettin Sakir Bey returned to the Caucasian front a short time later
\nthe new arrangements had been completely determined\u201d. (pp. 151\u2013152)
\nAs his source for the sentences and phrases given within quotation marks in the above
\nquote, Akcam again cites the memoirs of Arif Cemil (Denker), who served with the
\nOSO during the War. However, this episode described by Akcam appears fundamentally
\ndifferent in the original source\u2014which reads as follows:
\nIn Istanbul now, Dr. Bahaettin Sakir Bey has decided to concentrate on the
\ncountry\u2019s internal enemies by abandoning the Special Organization\u2019s affairs
\nrelated to foreign enemies.
\nThis was because Dr. Bahaettin Sakir Bey has witnessed many facts during
\nthe period of four-five months he has spent in Erzurum and at different
\npoints of the Caucasian front. The attitude the Armenians have taken against
\nTurkey and the assistance they provided to the Russian army have convinced
\nhim [Bahaettin Sakir] that it was necessary to fear the internal enemies as
\nmuch as the external ones. The Armenians inside through formation of bands
\nwere threatening the rear of our army and were trying to cut our lines of
\nretreat.31
\n[. . .] In Istanbul Dr. Bahaettin Sakir Bey was busy with discussing the precautions
\nto be taken to save the army from a grave danger by placing these
\n[documents] to the attention of the CUP\u2019s Central Committee. These discussions
\nfinally resulted in the formulation of Relocation Law. When Dr. Bahaettin
\nSakir Bey returned to the Caucasian front after a while, the new situation had
\ncompletely come into existence. But again we will pass on without touching
\nthese matters. Because the issue of the Armenians\u2019 relocation was completely
\nout of the O.S.O.\u2019s scope.32 [Emphasis added]
\nThere are several problems about the way in which the author has made use of the
\npassage given in the original account:
\n1. The phrase signifying that it was necessary to \u201cfear internal enemies\u201d is
\naltered into a different one that reads \u201cdealing with the enemy within\u201d by
\nAkcam.
\n2. Akcam quotes the source as saying \u201cin these discussions a decision was made
\nthat Bahaettin Sakir Bey would resign from his duties . . .\u201d, whereas in the
\noriginal source it is Bahaettin Sakir himself deciding to focus on internal
\nenemies and there is no mention of a discussion where the alleged decision
\nfor Bahaettin Sakir\u2019s focusing on the internal enemies was taken. Thus the
\nphrase that reads \u201cin these discussions a decision was made that Bahaettin
\nSakir Bey would resign from his duties . . .\u201d has no basis in the original
\nsource and was evidently doctored in an effort to give the impression of
\nan official policy targeting the Armenians.
\n3. Similarly the statement that Bahaettin Sakir Bey was put in charge of dealing
\nwith \u201cthe Armenians inside\u201d has no basis in the original source and the text
\nis completely quoted out of context. The only reference to the \u201cArmenians
\ninside\u201d is made in connection with their formation of bands and the threat
\nthey posed to the army. And there is simply no entry suggesting that
\nDr. Bahaettin Sakir Bey was put in charge of (or instructed for) anything.
\n4. Although Akcam quotes the source as saying \u201cnew arrangements were completely
\ndetermined\u201d, the original account contains nothing regarding \u201cnew
\narrangements\u201d; rather, it states that a new situation had emerged. This
\nmanipulation, too, gives the impression of a policy targeting Armenians
\nfor which \u201cnew arrangements\u201d were determined even though such is not
\nthe case in the original source. Moreover, it is of the utmost significance
\nthat in Akcam\u2019s version a revealing section of the very document on which
\nhis case rests is missing. At the end was Arif Cemil\u2019s statement that \u201cthe
\nissue of the Armenians\u2019 relocation was completely out of the O.S.O.\u2019s scope\u201d.
\nOn Esref Kuscubasi\u2019s Statement
\nIn discussing the implementation of the relocation and the massacres the author
\ncontends that many members of the government were unaware of the genocidal policy
\nthat was secretly carried out by the party under the veil of a deportation decree. Like
\nDadrian,33 Akcam refers to the interviews made with Esref Kuscubasi to support
\nthis point:
\nAs Esref Kuscubasi put it, the government was never informed of the meetings
\nand plans related to the deportations and massacres. (pp. 156\u2013157)
\nIn the original account, after briefly talking about the activities of the OSO, Esref
\nKuscubasi does indeed state that, \u201cAs these [activities] were seriously kept \u2018secret\u2019,
\nthey were even unknown to the members of the cabinet\u201d. However, there are several
\nproblems with Akcam\u2019s utilization and interpretation of the autobiographical account
\nof Esref Kuscubasi. First of all, in the original account there is no mention of any
\nmeeting regarding the Armenian relocation or massacres nor is there any mention of
\nthe Armenians. Second, and more importantly, following the above sentence
\nKuscubasi relates that Talat Pasha too was among those cabinet members who were
\nnot informed of the activities of the OSO and had even complained about this matter:
\nAs these [activities] were seriously kept \u201csecret\u201d, they were even unknown to
\nthe members of the cabinet. In fact, I remember very well that one day Talat
\nPasha in a half serious and half joking manner had asked me: \u201cEsref Beyefendi,
\nis there any news about the government\u2019s organization that you could share
\nwith us?\u201d And he quietly whispered this in my ears lest others not hear. What
\nwere these activities that were regarded as so secret even to cause a person
\n[Talat] who was then, the Minister of the Interior and considered as the
\nnatural leader of the political party in power, to make it a matter of complaint
\nin such a manner?34
\nIn view of this information, Akcam\u2019s utilization and interpretation of Kuscubasi\u2019s
\nstatement and his efforts to establish a link between it and the massacres becomes
\nhighly problematic. Indeed if one is to accept Akcam\u2019s false paraphrasing, then
\nAkcam\u2019s whole theory of \u201ca genocidal policy under the supervision of Talat\u201d collapses
\nsince Talat Pasha, the person whom he credits with being the overall coordinator of massacres
\nand deportations is actually not informed on something that he allegedly supervises.
\nIt is clear that the author Akcam deliberately ignores the context and misleads his
\nreaders. The intention of such a manipulation is to lead readers into what is after all, a
\npre-arranged conclusion, at the expense of historic truth. <\/p>\n
On Ahmet Refik<\/p>\n
In discussing the participation of gangs in perpetrating the massacres Taner Akcam
\nwrites that: <\/p>\n
Ahmet Refik testified that the perpetrators of the massacres at Pozanti, some
\nthirty to forty kilometers from Adana, were \u201creorganized by gangs sent to the
\nCaucasus\u201d. (p. 158) <\/p>\n
To begin with, it should be noted that Ahmet Refik did not testify, but wrote a book.
\nMore importantly, in the book Ahmet Refik did not use the word massacre; rather,
\nthere is a single sentence referring to the assaults carried out by gangs without indicating
\nwhether they resulted in massacres or not: <\/p>\n
The [place] which the Armenians were most particularly afraid of was Pozanti.
\nThere [in Pozanti], the attack of gangs was making their hearts tremble
\n [in fear]. Which gangs were these? These were the gangs sent to the Caucasus in
\nthe name of Turanian policy [and] the union of Islam by the Unionist
\ngovernment.35<\/p>\n
It seems that the author feels no discomfort in substituting such words as \u201cattack\u201d and
\n\u201cmassacre\u201d and allowing his readers to make incorrect assumptions. <\/p>\n
On Huseyin and Abidin Nesimi<\/p>\n
According to Akcam, in some cases the government officials who resisted obeying orders
\nof annihilation were killed, and a kaymakam\u2019s son had confirmed this point:
\nIn several cases uncooperative officials were actually murdered. Huseyin
\nNesimi, the prefect of Lice, refused to obey the verbal order and asked for a
\nwritten copy. He was fired, called to Diyarbakir, and murdered on the way.
\nAbidin Nesimi, the prefect\u2019s son, wrote that the liquidation of government officials
\nwas ordered by Mehmet Resit, the governor of Diyarbakir, among others.
\nThe murdered include \u201cFerit, the governor-general of Basra, Bedri Nuri, the
\nlieutenant-governor of Muntefak, . . . Sabit, the deputy prefect of Besiri, Ismail
\nMestan a journalist.\u201d The reason for thesemurders was clear: \u201cThe administrative
\ncadre that opposed the massacre had to be liquidated . . .\u201d. (pp. 166\u2013167) <\/p>\n
Unfortunately it is not Abidin Nesimi but Taner Akcam who wrote that the government
\nofficials in question were liquidated on the orders of Mehmet Resit. What Abidin Nesimi
\nhad said36 was that during Resit\u2019s governorship some murders with unknown perpetrators
\nhad taken place: <\/p>\n
. . . When Dr. Resit was in Iraq and later during his governorship of Diyarbakir,
\nmany murders with unknown perpetrators took place. Most important among
\nthem, were those of Ferit, the governor of Basra, Bedri Nuri, the sub-governor
\nof Muntefak, my father Huseyin Nesimi, the prefect of Lice, and Sabit, the
\ndeputy prefect of Besiri and the journalist Ismail Mestan . . . It was impossible
\nto carry out the relocation of Armenians with the gendarme units composed of
\nCircassians and the members of the tribes of Bedirhani, Milli, KarakeCili who
\nwere the Kurdish militia. For this group was a cadre of pillage and plunder.
\nTherefore, this group could not carry out the relocation and turned it into a
\nmassacre. [And] the liquidation of the [administrative] cadre which would
\noppose the pillage and plunder was inevitable.37<\/p>\n
As regards to the complicity of Mehmet Resit38 in relation to the murder of his father,
\nAbidin Nesimi wrote the following: <\/p>\n
Did Dr. Resit give any orders for the murder of my father? Or did this event
\noccur without his knowledge? We can find the answers of these questions in
\nResit\u2019s memoirs. . .. In these [memoirs], Dr. Resit writes that he was extremely
\nrespectful towards my father and that my father had possessed the quality of
\nrendering great services to the nation and that it was impossible for him to
\ngive orders for the murder of my father. Quite naturally I cannot be expected
\nto have sympathies for Dr. Resit as my father was killed by a mobile gendarme
\nregiment that was recalled by this name. I have made researches on Dr. Resit.
\nI have inquired about Dr. Resit fromhis friends who had been in exile in Tripoli
\nwhere he was also in exile and from other persons especially from the governor
\nof Tripoli, Giritli Celal Bey. Both the deceased Cami Baykurt and Celal Bey
\nhad given testimony in his favor. I am of the opinion that Dr. Resit was a
\nwell-intentioned, yet narrow-minded person.39
\nThere are two significant problems with the way in which this account has been utilized:
\n1. Akcam has altered the sentence that reads \u201cthe liquidation of the [administrative]
\ncadre which would oppose the \u2018pillage and plunder\u2019 was inevitable\u201d
\ninto a different sentence that states \u201cthe administrative cadre that opposed
\nthe \u2018massacre\u2019 had to be liquidated . . .\u201d, which is yet another example
\ndemonstrating how freely the author is altering words and replacing them
\nwith his own insertions. As was the case in the Ahmet Refik instance, the
\nauthor substituted the words \u201cpillage and plunder\u201d with his own word
\n\u201cmassacre\u201d.
\n2. Abidin Nesimi nowhere writes that the liquidation of the mentioned individuals
\nand his father was done on the orders of Mehmet Resit. To the contrary,
\nAbidin Nesimi points to a source giving the answer to this question and the
\nsource in question indicates something entirely contrary to Akcam\u2019s
\nallegation. Once again, Akcam has attributed a false opinion to a source
\nthat does not support his claims.
\nThe Alleged Dual Mechanism
\nAkcam also makes some comments on the character of Talat Pasha, the Ottoman Interior
\nMinister (pp. 169\u2013170), which are intended to establish his argument that Talat\u2019s telegrams
\nordering the protection of Armenians were merely written for silencing foreign
\nambassadors and that these orders were subsequently cancelled by a coded cable, a
\nprocess he termed as a dual mechanism.40 While Akcam attempts to explain those
\ntelegrams shown to the foreign ambassadors in the light of this argument, he is unable
\nto explain numerous confidential and ciphered telegrams not intended for public
\nconsumption, which contain similar instructions. And in order to explain away such
\ninconveniences the author\u2019s theory is constructed upon selective use of sources and
\nthe manipulation of his sources.
\nAccording to Akcam, Falih R\u0131fk\u0131 Atay said that \u201csending an order only to cancel it
\nshortly afterward by coded cable was business as usual for Talat\u201d (p. 170). In this case
\nthe author displays another example of his going beyond the source he refers to, and
\nadding interpretations that are not contained in the original source. The original
\naccount of this episode, related by Atay, while not suggesting in any way that this is a
\n\u201cbusiness as usual for Talat\u201d, makes no reference either to an \u201corder\u201d sent earlier:
\nOne day, he [Talat] again called out for me from the office. There was an applicant
\n[man] next to him. He said: \u201cWrite a letter to the Mutasarr\u0131f [sub-governor]
\nof Izmit and recommend them to definitely do the work of this Gentleman\u201d.
\nI wrote and brought [the letter].He signed it. The (poor)man took the letter and
\nleft by giving his thanks. A little later, they had told me that the minister [Talat]
\nwanted to see me. I went [to see him]. He said: \u201cwrite a ciphered telegram to
\nthe Mutasarr\u0131f of Izmit and inform him that the letter I sent has no importance\u201d.41
\nThis is not quite the sort of evidence to substantiate such bold claims and the readers
\nmight want to see more convincing evidence in order to accept the high-profile claims
\nAkcam has advanced about Talat with respect to the relocation of Armenians. In his
\nenthusiasm to prove his theory of dual mechanism, Akcam further claims that:
\nOn 18 September 1915 cables sent from Kayseri, Eskisehir, Nigde, Diyarbak\u0131r,
\nreport that all the Armenians had been deported from these provinces and that
\nnone remained. (p. 177)
\nHowever, this is not at all the case in the documents to which Akcam refers. The telegram
\nsent from Eskisehir states that \u201cthe number of Armenians who were required to be dispatched
\namounted to 7000\u201d and that all (7000) of these Armenians were dispatched,42
\nwhich does not mean that no Armenians remained and that all were deported from
\nEskisehir.43 In the case of Kayseri, the telegram mentions the presence of 4911
\nArmenians consisting of the soldiers\u2019 families and, to a lesser extent, of Catholics
\nand Protestants who were left within the sanjak of Kayseri.44 It is again difficult to
\nunderstand how any scrupulous author can claim that no Armenians were left in the
\nmentioned places.
\nIn conclusion, Akcam misrepresents his sources and the documents that he relies on
\ndo not substantiate his thesis. Thus the author\u2019s case on the alleged dual mechanism
\nremains poorly documented and unconvincing.
\nAkcam also creates misleading impressions on the reader by juxtaposing disparate
\nevents. For instance, he quotes from a report that mentions an official named Huseyin
\nKaz\u0131m Bey who is said to be a good person trying to help and feed the Armenians
\nbut faces difficulties from authorities and he fears the extermination of Armenians.
\nImmediately after quoting this document, Akcam writes: \u201cHuseyin Kaz\u0131m . . . later
\nwrote in his memoirs that 200,000 people were sacrificed to the evil designs of
\nGovernment, in Lebanon alone\u201d (p. 186). Yet Huseyin Kaz\u0131m\u2019s statement had
\nnothing to do with Ottoman Armenians. Still less it had anything to do with a central
\ngovernment policy. Huseyin Kaz\u0131m uses the statement above in describing the
\ncorruption of the provincial authorities that was rampant during the war:
\nThere was a disgrace of silk corruption that no one can describe properly. The
\nbales of silks each of which amounted to 600 Lira (gold) in Germany and
\nSwitzerland, has been bought at 300 Lira from their owners by [exerting] all
\nkinds of threats pressures swearwords and insults . . . To benefit from the
\nmisery of the people, to be full through the hunger of the poor, and to find
\nlife through their death has become a custom in the country. And those who
\nfirst broke this ground had been the high officials of the Government. Then,
\nit was seen that thousands of innocent men, women and children died everywhere
\nin the most terrible manner. In the unfortunate Lebanon alone, the
\nnumber of those poor who fell victim to the evil designs of the government
\nreaches to 150\u2013200 thousand.45
\nBy combining two totally unrelated events out of sequence, Akcamchanges the meaning
\nof the original account, and misleads his readers. It is also important to note that the
\nnumber \u201c150\u2013200 thousand\u201d in Huseyin Kaz\u0131m\u2019s account has become simply
\n\u201c200,000\u201d in Akcam\u2019s text.<\/p>\n
CONCLUSION
\nThe examples displayed in this study cast doubt on Taner Akcam\u2019s approach as being
\nimpartial and scholarly. To the contrary, such manipulations point to an extremely
\npartisan attitude, dominated by preconceived ideas that in turn have led the author to
\nmanipulate the sources he has utilized in service of his pre-arranged conclusions.
\nAkcam\u2019s work suffers from a lack of honesty with which he has evidently approached
\nhis subject, and the implications of his intentional manipulations shed considerable
\nlight on the credibility that could be attached to his work. As Akcam himself stated
\nelsewhere, \u201csuspicion within the academic community as to whether or not sources
\nhave been honestly and accurately presented is something that can poison the entire
\nscientific milieu\u201d.46 Within this framework, Taner Akcam\u2019s dishonesty\u2014which manifests
\nitself in the form of numerous deliberate alterations and distortions misleading
\nquotations and doctoring of data\u2014casts doubt on the accuracy of his claims as well as
\nhis conclusions. Accordingly, serious readers and researchers alike should approach
\nAkcam\u2019s work and claims with a great caution. This tainted volume can neither be
\nconsidered \u201cthe state of the art in this field\u201d, as Erik Jan Zu rcher has written, nor the
\n\u201cbest book ever written on Armenian Genocide\u201d, as Stephen Feinstein claims but as
\nan example of poor editing, badly supported conclusions and, most importantly,
\nof unethical and partisan scholarship that calls for further, more balanced and
\nthorough research. <\/p>\n
NOTES
\n1. Taner Akcam,Insan Haklar\u0131 ve Ermeni Sorunu, Ittihat ve Terakki\u2019den Kurtulus Savas\u0131\u2019na [Human Rights and the Armenian Question, from the [Committe of] Union and Progress to Liberation War], Ankara: Imge Kitabevi, 1999.
\n2. Edward J. Erickson, \u201cRe-examining History: Armenian Massacres: New Records Undercut Old
\nBlame\u201d, Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3, Summer 2006, pp. 67\u201375; and Guenter Lewy, The
\nArmenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide, Salt Lake City, UT: The University of
\nUtah Press 2005, pp. 82\u201388.
\n3. Cemal Kutay, Birinci Dunya Harbinde Teskilat-\u0131 Mahsusa Ve Hayber\u2019de Turk Cengi [The [Ottoman]
\nSpecial Organization in the WWI and the Turkish Battle in Khayber], Istanbul: Tarih Yay\u0131nlar\u0131, 1962,
\npp. 17\u201318.
\n4. Nedim Ipek, Rumeli\u2019den Anadolu\u2019ya Turk Gocleri (1877\u20131890) [The Turkish Migrations from Balkans to
\nAnatolia (1877\u20131890)], Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1994, p. 207.
\n5. Mustafa Aksakal, \u201cDefending the Nation, The German-Ottoman Alliance of 1914 and the Ottoman
\nDecision for War\u201d, Unpublished PhD thesis Princeton University, NJ, 2003, p. 150.
\n6. Ibid, p. 139.
\n7. Feroz Ahmad, \u201cReview of Germany and The Ottoman Empire 1914\u20131918, by Ulrich Trumpener\u201d,
\nMiddle Eastern Studies Vol. 6, No. 1, 1970, pp. 104\u2013105. Also see Michael A. Reynolds \u201cThe
\nOttoman\u2013Russian Struggle for Eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus 1908\u20131918: Identity, Ideology
\nand the Geopolitics of World Order\u201d, Unpublished PhD thesis Princeton University, NJ, 2003.
\n8. Nejdet Bilgi, Yozgat Ermeni Tehciri Davas\u0131 [The Trial for the Yozgat Armenian Relocation], Istanbul:
\nKitabevi Yay\u0131nlar\u0131, 2006, pp. 205\u2013208, \u201cVakit Versiyonu\u201d [\u201cThe Daily Vakit Version\u201d] and
\npp. 208\u2013211, \u201cYeni Gazete Versiyonu\u201d [\u201cThe Daily Yeni Gazete Version\u201d].
\n9. Ibid, pp. 202\u2013205, \u201cMemleket Versiyonu\u201d [\u201cThe Daily Memleket Version\u201d].
\n10. Sina Aksin, Istanbul Hukumetleri ve Milli Mucadele [The Istanbul Governments and the National
\nStruggle], Vol. 1, Istanbul: Is Bankas\u0131 Yay\u0131nlar\u0131, 2004, p. 204; and Ferudun Ata, IsgalIstanbul\u2019unda
\nTehcir Yarg\u0131lamalar\u0131 [The Relocation Trials in Occupied Istanbul], Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 2005,
\npp. 141\u2013142.
\n11. Irade-i Milliye, 2 October 1919, quoted in Hulki Cevizoglu,Isgal ve Direnis 1919 ve Bugun [The Occupation and Resistance, 1919 and Today], Istanbul: Ceviz Kabugu Yay\u0131nlar\u0131, 2007, p. 25.
\n12. Maurice Larcher, La Guerre Turque dans la Guerre Mondiale [Turkish War in the Great War], Paris:
\nEtienne Chiron; Berger-Levrault, 1926, p. 602: \u201cL\u2019anatolie avait en outre perdu 500,000 mussulmans
\ndes vilayets orientaux, victimes ou fugitifs de la guerre; 800,000 Armeniens et 200,000
\nGrecs victimes de deportations ou de\u00b4ce\u00b4de\u00b4s dans les battalions de travailleurs\u201d [\u201cAnatolia had also
\nlost 500,000 Muslims from the eastern provinces as victims or fugitives of the war; 800,00
\nArmenians and 200,000 Greeks as victims of the deportations or those who died in the labor
\nbattalions\u201d].
\n13. Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, TurkInk\u0131la b\u0131 Tarihi [The History of the Turkish Revolution], Vol. 3, Part 3, Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1983, pp. 8\u20139.
\n14. Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Ataturk Hayat\u0131 ve Eseri [AtaTurk, His Life and Work], Vol. 1, Ankara: AKDTYK
\nAtaturk Arast\u0131rma Merkezi, 1990, p. 182.
\n15. Lewy, The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey, op. cit., pp. 73\u201382; Ata, Isgal Istanbul\u2019unda Tehcir Yarg\u0131lamalar\u0131 [The Relocation Trials in Occupied Istanbul], op. cit.; Falih R\u0131fk\u0131 Atay, Cankaya: Ataturk\u2019un Dogumundan Olumune Kadar [Cankaya, From Ataturk\u2019s Birth Till His Death], Istanbul: Bates, 1998, pp. 218\u2013230.
\n16. Husamettin ErTurk,Iki Devrin Perde Arkas\u0131 [Behind the Curtain of Two Eras],Istanbul: Hilmi Kitapevi,
\n1957, pp. 370\u2013373.
\n17. Tar\u0131k Zafer Tunaya, Turkiye\u2019de Siyasi Partiler [Political Parties in Turkey], Vol. 3, Istanbul: Iletisim
\nYay\u0131nlar\u0131, 2000, p. 674.
\n18. Andrew Mango, \u201cMinorities and Majorities\u201d, Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 23, No. 4, 1987, p. 519.
\n19. M. E. Yapp, \u201cReview of The History of the Armenian Genocide, by V.N. Dadrian\u201d, Middle Eastern
\nStudies Vol. 32, No. 4, 1996, p. 397.
\n20. Atay, Cankaya [Cankaya], op. cit., pp. 219, 223\u2013224.
\n21. Refik Halid Karay, Minelbab Ilelmihrab [From Gate to Mihrab], Istanbul: Ink\u0131lap-Aka Kitabevleri,
\n1964, pp. 195\u2013196.
\n22. Ata, Isgal Istanbul\u2019unda Tehcir Yarg\u0131lamalar\u0131 [The Relocation Trials in Occupied Istanbul], op. cit.,
\npp. 258\u2013259; Bayram Akca, \u201c1915 Ermeni Tehciri ve Urfa Mutasarr\u0131f\u0131 Nusret Bey\u2019in I dam\u0131\u201d
\n[\u201cThe 1915 Armenian Relocation and the Execution of Nusret Bey, the Sub-Governor of Urfa\u201d],
\nErmeni Arast\u0131rmalar\u0131 1. Turkiye Kongresi Bildirileri [Papers of the 1st Turkey Congress of Armenian
\nStudies], Vol. 2, Ankara: ASAM, 2003, p. 28; and Bayram AkCa, \u201cMondros Mu tarekesi\u2019nden
\nSonra Ermeni Tehciri Nedeniyle Kurulan Divan-\u0131 Harp Mahkemelerinde (Nemrut) Mustafa
\nPasa\u2019n\u0131n Rolu\u201d [\u201cThe Role of (Nemrut) Mustafa Pasha in the Court-martials Set Up for the
\nArmenian Relocation After the Armistice of Mudros)\u201d], Ermeni Arast\u0131rmalar\u0131 2. Turkiye Kongresi
\nBildirileri [Papers of the 2nd Turkey Congress of Armenian Studies], Vol. 1, Ankara: ASAM, 2007, p. 608.
\n23. Turkkaya Ataov, Another Falsification: Statement (1926) Wrongly Attributed to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Ankara: Sistem Ofset, 1988. For Mustafa Kemal\u2019s views on the Armenian Question, see Ismet
\nGorgulu , Ataturk\u2019ten Ermeni Sorunu [The Armenian Question from Ataturk], Ankara: Bilgi, 2002.
\n24. Kutay, Birinci Dunya Harbinde Teskilat-\u0131 Mahsusa [The [Ottoman] Special Organization in the WWI],
\nop. cit., p. 18: \u201cTurklerden gayr\u0131 \u0131rk ve milletlerin ekseriyeti teskil ettikleri yerlerde . . .\u201d.
\n25. Akcam, Insan Haklar\u0131 ve Ermeni Sorunu [Human Rights and the Armenian Question], op. cit., p. 213:
\n\u201cMu tareke sonras\u0131, Sabah gazetesi 13 Aral\u0131k 1918\u2019de Albay Seyfi\u2019nin, Osmanl\u0131 Karargah\u0131ndaki
\nSiyasi S ube\u2019nin sorumlusu olarak, Bahaettin Sakir ile yak\u0131n isbirligi iCinde, Teskilat-\u0131 Mahsusa
\neliyle Ermenilerin katledilmesini planlayanlardan oldugunu ac\u0131klad\u0131\u201d.
\n26. Since the book under review is the English translation of another book, one might wonder whether it
\nis the translator who is to be blamed for the manipulations and the discrepancies with original
\nsources. However, the readers should be aware that the inaccuracies presented in this study are
\nalso present in the original Turkish version of Taner Akcam\u2019s study.
\n27. Kutay, Birinci Dunya Harbinde Teskilat-\u0131 Mahsusa [The [Ottoman] Special Organization in the WWI],
\nop. cit., p. 60: \u201c. . . Ege m\u0131nt\u0131kas\u0131nda ve bilhassa sahillerde yuvalanm\u0131s ve kumelenmis olan
\n1.150.000 Rum-Ermeni nu fus daha harbin baslamas\u0131ndan k\u0131sa zaman evvel ve harbin ilk aylar\u0131nda
\niCeri al\u0131nmam\u0131s olsa idi, C anakkale mu dafaas\u0131n\u0131n bile mumkun olam\u0131yacag\u0131 gun gibi asikar idi\u201d.
\n28. The population figures given by Esref Kuscubasi are as follows: \u201c120,000 in the region of Ayvalik
\ngulf; 90,000 in the C anakkale region (including the town itself); 190,000 in the capital of Izmir;
\n130,000 in the region from Urla peninsula and southeast Izmir to C esme; 80,000 in the environs
\nof Ayd\u0131n; 150,000 in the environs of Akhisar, and Manisa, Alasehir, Usak and its environs\u201d. Apart
\nfrom this Kuscubasialso gives figures for the Aegean islands of Mtylene, Chios and Samos.
\nHowever the Ottoman Empire had lost these islands in 1912\u20131913, therefore any Ottomancontrolled
\npopulation movement on these islands would be out of question. See Celal Bayar, Ben
\nde Yazd\u0131m: Milli Mucadeleye Giris [I Too Have Written: Joining the National Struggle], Vol. 5, Istanbul:
\nBaha Matbaas\u0131, 1967, p. 1576.
\n29. A. Mil, \u201cUmumi Harpte Teskilat\u0131 Mahsusa\u201d [\u201cThe [Ottoman] Special Organization in the Great
\nWar\u201d], Vakit, No. 13, November 15, 1933, p. 5: \u201cErzurumdan C\u0131kt\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 sifre ile bildirdiginiz
\neshas iCin tertibat\u0131 laz\u0131me al\u0131nm\u0131st\u0131r. HerCibadabat onlar\u0131 elde edebilmek iCin icap edenlere teslimat
\nverdim . . . Bu husus hakk\u0131nda bir iki gune kadar haber verecegimi umit ediyorum. Kumandanl\u0131k
\nteskilat\u0131m\u0131z\u0131n serbestii harekat\u0131 hakk\u0131nda icap edenlere talimat\u0131 laz\u0131me vermelidir\u201d. Arif Cemil,
\nBirinci Dunya Savas\u0131nda Teskilat-\u0131 Mahsusa [The [Ottoman] Special Organization in WWI], Istanbul:
\nArba Yay\u0131nlar\u0131, 1997, pp. 45\u201346. A. Mil is the pseudonym for Arif Cemil (Denker). His memoirs
\nwere first published pseudonymously in the Daily Vakit in 1933\u20131934. In 1997 these memoirs
\nwere republished by Arba Yay\u0131nlar\u0131 in the form of a book under the real name of its author, Arif
\nCemil (Denker). For readers\u2019 convenience, both items are cited in this review.
\n30. Ibid, No. 14, November 16, 1933, p. 5: \u201cHilmi Bey\u2019in mektubunda iki noktai nazar\u0131 dikkati celbeder.
\nBunlardan birisi Erzurumdan hareketleri Bahaettin Sakir Bey taraf\u0131ndan bildirilen baz\u0131 eshas\u0131n yolda
\nyakalanmalar\u0131, daha dogrusu imha edilmeleri . . .\u201d Arif Cemil, Teskilat-\u0131 Mahsusa [The [Ottoman]
\nSpecial Organization], op. cit., p. 46. <\/p>\n
31. Ibid, No. 98, February 10, 1934, p. 5: \u201cDoktor Bahattin Sakir bey Istanbul\u2019da art\u0131k teskilat\u0131 mahsusan\u0131n harici du smanlara taalluk eden islerinden sarf\u0131nazar ederek memleketin dahili dusmanlar\u0131yla mesgul olm\u0131ya karar vermisti. C unku Doktor Bahaettin Sakir bey Erzurumda ve Kafkas cephesinin diger noktalar\u0131nda gecirdigi dort bes ay zarf\u0131nda pek Cok hakikatlere sahit olmustu. Ermenilerin Turkiye\u2019ye kars\u0131 tak\u0131nd\u0131klar\u0131 tav\u0131r ve Rus ordusuna ettikleri yard\u0131m kendisinde harici dusman kadar dahili dusmandan da korkmak laz\u0131m geldig i kanaat\u0131n\u0131 has\u0131l etmisti. Dahildeki Ermeniler cete teskiliyle ordumuzun arkas\u0131n\u0131 tehdit ve hatt\u0131 ric\u2019at\u0131n\u0131 kesmeye Cal\u0131s\u0131yorlard\u0131\u201d. Arif Cemil, Teskilat-\u0131 Mahsusa [The [Ottoman] Special Organization], op. cit., p. 240. <\/p>\n
32. Ibid, No. 100, February 12, 1934, p. 5: \u201c. . . Doktor Bahaettin Sakir bey bunlar\u0131 Istanbul\u2019da Ittihat ve
\nterakki merkezi umumisinin dikkati nazar\u0131na koyarak orduyu Buyukbir tehlikeden kurtarmak iCin
\nal\u0131nacak tedbirleri muzakere ile mesgul bulunuyordu. Bu mu zakereler nihayet tehcir kanunun nesri
\nile neticelenmisti. Doktor Bahaettin Sakir bey bir muddet sonra Kafkas cephesine avdet ettigi
\nzaman yeni vaziyet tamamiyle taayyun etmis bulunuyordu. Fakat gene bu noktalara temas edemeden
\ngeCeceg iz. C unku Ermenilerin tehciri meselesi teskilat\u0131 mahsusa mevzuunun busbu tun haricinde
\nkalmaktad\u0131r\u201d. Arif Cemil, Teskilat-\u0131 Mahsusa [The [Ottoman] Special Organization], op. cit.,
\npp. 245\u2013246. <\/p>\n
33. Vahakn N. Dadrian, \u201cOttoman Archives and Denial of the Armenian Genocide\u201d, in The Armenian
\nGenocide: History, Politics Ethics ed. Richard Hovannisian, London: MacMillan, 1992, pp. 300\u2013301. <\/p>\n
34. Kutay, Birinci Dunya Harbinde Teskilat-\u0131 Mahsusa [The [Ottoman] Special Organization in the WWI],
\nop. cit., p. 18: \u201cBunlar gercekten gizli.. tutuldugu icin kabine azas\u0131n\u0131n bile mechulu idiler.
\nHatta cok iyi hat\u0131rlar\u0131m. Bir gun Talat Pasa, yar\u0131 saka yar\u0131 ciddi: \u2018\u2014Esref Beyefendi . . . Sizin
\nhukumet teskilat\u0131ndan bize anlatabileceginiz haberler yok mu?\u2019 demisti. Bunu da, digerlerinin
\nduymamas\u0131 icin yavasca kulag\u0131ma soylemisti. O tarihte Dahiliye Naz\u0131r\u0131 ve iktidarda olan siyasi
\nF\u0131rka\u2019n\u0131n tabii reisi say\u0131lan bir zat\u0131n dahi, boylecesine sitem mevzuu yapacak kadar mahrem addedilen
\nCal\u0131smalar\u0131 nelerdi?\u201d <\/p>\n
35. Ahmet Refik, Iki Komite Iki K\u0131tal [Two Committees Two Massacres], Ankara: KebikeC Yay\u0131nlar\u0131, 1994,
\npp. 38\u201339: \u201cErmenilerin en ziyade korktuklar\u0131 Pozant\u0131 idi. Orada, Cetelerin hucumu kalblerini
\ntitretiyordu. Bunlar hangi Cetelerdi? Ittihat hukumetinin Turan siyaseti, Islam ittihad\u0131 nam\u0131na
\nKafkasya\u2019ya gonderdigi Cetelerdi\u201d. <\/p>\n
36. In his memoirs Abidin Nesimi also discusses the Armenian question\u2014and his overall opinion is that
\nthe central committee of CUP wanted an orderly relocation of Armenians and did not want to harm
\nthe innocent Armenians but the Kurdish militia forces seized this moment as an opportunity for
\nplunder and massacre, and the CUP partly overlooked this situation but also attempted to punish
\nthe guilty. Given the sharp difference of this interpretation to the narrative of Akcam, the omission
\nof these details also leaves the reader with quite an unbalanced opinion as regards the murder of
\nthe officials mentioned as well as Abidin Nesimi\u2019s opinion on this issue. See Abidin Nesimi, Y\u0131llar\u0131n
\nIcinden [During the Years], Istanbul: Gozlem, 1977, pp. 41\u201345. <\/p>\n
37. Ibid, pp. 39\u201340: \u201cDr. Resit Irakta bulundugu donemde ve daha sonra Diyarbak\u0131r valilig i s\u0131ras\u0131nda
\nfaili bulunamayan birCok cinayetler olmustur. Bunlar\u0131n iCinde en onemlileri Basra Valisi Ferit\u2019in,
\nMu ntefek mutasarr\u0131f\u0131 Bedi Nuri\u2019nin, Lice kaymakam\u0131 babam Hu seyin Nesimi\u2019nin, Besiri kaymakam
\nvekili Sabit\u2019in, gazeteci Ismail Mestan\u2019\u0131n vb. olduru lmeleridir . . . Bu cerkez jandarma ekibi ve milis
\nKurtler olan Bedirhani, Milli ve Karakecili asiretleri mensuplar\u0131yla Ermeni tehcirinin gerceklestirilmesi imkans\u0131zd\u0131. Cunku bu kadro yagma ve talan kadrosudur. Bu yuzden bu kadro tehciri
\nyapamam\u0131s ve onu katliama donusturmustu r. Yagma ve talan\u0131 gerceklestirmeye muhalefet edecek
\nkadronun da tasfiyesi kac\u0131n\u0131lmazd\u0131\u201d. <\/p>\n
38. This article primarily aims to focus on the manner in which Akcam has utilized his sources. Therefore
\nthe role and the responsibility of Dr. Resit is beyond the scope of this study. On this matter, see
\nMithad Sukru Bleda, Imparatorlugun Cokusu [The Fall of the [Ottoman] Empire], Istanbul: Remzi
\nKitabevi, 1979, pp. 56\u201359. <\/p>\n
39. Abidin Nesimi, Y\u0131llar\u0131n Icinden [During the Years], op. cit., pp. 45\u201346: \u201cBabam\u0131n oldurulmesi olay\u0131nda
\nDr. Resit\u2019in bir emri var m\u0131d\u0131r? Yoksa bu olay onun bilgisi d\u0131s\u0131nda m\u0131 olmustur? Bu sorular\u0131n cevab\u0131n\u0131
\nDr. Resit\u2019in \u2018Mudafaaname\u2019 sinden ogrenebiliriz . . . Bu \u2018Mudafaaname\u2019 sinde Dr. Resit, babama kars\u0131
\nson derece hurmetkar oldugunu, vucudunun millete Buyukfaydalar b\u0131rakacag \u0131 nitelikte oldugunu,
\nonun oldurulmesine emir vermesinin imkans\u0131z oldugunu yazm\u0131st\u0131r. Pek dogald\u0131r ki, babam\u0131n bu
\nadla an\u0131lan seyyar jandarma mu frezesince olduruldugu icin Dr. Resit\u2019e kars\u0131 sempatim olamaz.
\nDr. Resit uzerine arast\u0131rmalar yapt\u0131m. Dr. Resit\u2019i surgun bulundugu Trablusgarb\u2019daki surgun arkadas
\n\u00b8lar\u0131ndan ve diger kisilerden, o zellikle Trablusgarb valisi Giritli Celal Bey den sorusturdum. Rahmetli
\nCami Baykurt da, Celal Bey de onun lehinde sahadette bulunmuslard\u0131r. Dr. Resit\u2019in iyi niyetli fakat
\ndar goru slu birisi oldugu kan\u0131s\u0131nday\u0131m\u201d. <\/p>\n
40. Guenter Lewy also characterizes the evidence presented by Taner Akcamfor his allegation of dual
\nmechanism as \u201cslim\u201d; see Lewy, The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey, op. cit., p. 112. <\/p>\n
41. Falih R\u0131fk\u0131 Atay, Zeytindag\u0131 [The Olive Mountain], Istanbul: Bates, 1981, pp. 24\u201325: \u201cBir gun
\nyine kalemden Cag\u0131rtm\u0131st\u0131. Yan\u0131nda bir mu racaatC\u0131 vard\u0131: \u2018Izmit mutasarr\u0131f\u0131na bir mektup yaz\u0131n\u0131z,
\nBeyfendinin isini mutlaka yapmas\u0131n\u0131 tavsiye ediniz\u2019, demisti. Yaz\u0131p goturdum. Imzalad\u0131, adamcag\u0131z
\nmektubu ald\u0131 ve tesekku r ederek gitti. Biraz sonra naz\u0131r\u0131n yine beni istedigini soylediler. Gittim:
\n\u2014Izmit mutasarr\u0131f\u0131na bir sifre yaz. Gonderdig im mektubun bir ehemmiyeti yoktur, diye bildir, dedi\u201d. <\/p>\n
42. Osmanl\u0131 Belgelerinde Ermeniler (1915\u20131920) [Armenians in Ottoman Documents 1915\u20131920], Ankara: Devlet Arsivleri Genel Mudurlugu , 1995, p. 96, Document 111: \u201cLiva dahilindeki Ermenilerden
\nihrac\u0131 \u0131\u02c6cab edenler yedi bin raddesinde olup kaffesinin sevk edilmis oldugu arz olunur\u201d. <\/p>\n
43. The official Ottoman statistics cite the Armenian population of Eskisehir as 8807, while according
\nto the figures adopted by the British it was 10,000; for the comparative figures see Meir Zamir,
\n\u201cPopulation statistics of the Ottoman empire in 1914 and 1919\u201d, Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 17,
\nNo. 1, 1981, pp. 100, 104. <\/p>\n
44. Osmanl\u0131 Belgelerinde Ermeniler (1915\u20131920) [Armenians in Ottoman Documents 1915\u20131920], op. cit., p. 94, Document 109: \u201c. . . dahil-i livada kalan do rt bin dokuz yu z on bir neferi asker a\u2019ilesi ve
\ncu z\u2019\u0131\u02c6 mikdar\u0131 Protestan ve Katolik bakayas\u0131 olmakla dahi yuzde bes nisbetinde koylere tevz\u0131\u02c6\u2019
\nk\u0131l\u0131nmakta oldugu ma\u2019ruzdur\u201d. <\/p>\n
45. Hu seyin Kaz\u0131m Kadri, Turkiye\u2019nin C oku su [The Fall of Turkey], Istanbul: Hikmet 1992, pp. 204\u2013205:
\n\u201cBir ipek yolsuzlugu rezaleti vard\u0131 ki bunu hakk\u0131yla tasvire kimse muvaffak olamaz. Almanya\u2019da ve
\nIsvicre\u2019de alt\u0131n para ile 600 yu z lira tutan her bir balya ipek sahiplerinin elinden bin bir tu rlu tehditler,
\ntazyikler, ku fu r ve hakaretler ile 300 kag\u0131da al\u0131nd\u0131 . . . Halk\u0131n sefaletinden yararlanmak, fukaran\u0131n
\naCl\u0131g\u0131yla doymak, o lumu yle hayat bulmak, memlekette al\u0131skanl\u0131k halini ald\u0131. Ve bu C\u0131g \u0131r\u0131 aCan
\nhukumetin Buyukmemurlar\u0131 oldu. O zaman her tarafta binlerce gu nahs\u0131z adamlar\u0131n, kad\u0131nlar\u0131n ve
\nCocuklar\u0131n en feci halde du sup oldu kleri goruldu . Yaln\u0131z su bedbaht Lubnan\u2019da hukumetin suikast\u0131na
\nkurban giden zavall\u0131lar\u0131n say\u0131s\u0131 150\u2013200 bine C\u0131kar\u201d. <\/p>\n
46. Taner Akcam, \u201cAnatomy of a Crime: The Turkish Historical Society\u2019s Manipulation of Archival
\nDocuments\u201d, Journal of Genocide Research, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2005, p. 273. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs Vol. 28, No. 2, August 2008 ISSN 1360-2004 print\/ISSN 1469-9591 online\/08\/020303-17#2008 Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs DOI: 10.1080\/13602000802303235 A SCRUTINY OF AKCAM\u2019S VERSION OF HISTORY REVIEW ESSAY: A SCRUTINY OF AKCAM\u2019S VERSION OF HISTORY AND THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE By ERMAN SAHIN Book reviewed – A SHAMEFUL ACT: The Armenian Genocide […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":83,"featured_media":33337,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[89],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-9022","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-turkey"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9022","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/83"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=9022"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9022\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/33337"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=9022"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=9022"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=9022"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}