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Chairs: Madeleine K. Albright, Chair, Albright Stonebridge Group LLC, and Stephen J. Hadley, United States Institute of Peace
\nDirector: Steven A. Cook, Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies<\/p>\n
Turkey is a rising regional and global power facing, as is the United States, the challenges of political transitions in the Middle East, bloodshed in Syria, and Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. As a result, it is incumbent upon the leaders of the United States and Turkey to define a new partnership “in order to make a strategic relationship a reality,” says a new Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)\u2013sponsored Independent Task Force. The bipartisan Task Force is chaired by former secretary of state Madeleine K. Albright<\/strong> and former national security adviser Stephen J. Hadley<\/strong>, and is directed by Steven A. Cook<\/strong>, CFR’s Hasib J. Sabbagh senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies. The Task Force includes twenty-three prominent experts who represent a variety of perspectives and backgrounds.<\/p>\n “Turkey may not yet have the status of one of Washington’s traditional European allies,” the report explains, “but there is good strategic reason for the bilateral relationship to grow and mature into a mutually beneficial partnership that can manage a complex set of security, economic, humanitarian, and environmental problems.” The relationship should reflect “not only common American-Turkish interests, but also Turkey’s new stature as an economically and politically successful country with a new role to play in a changing Middle East,” argues the Task Force in the report, U.S.-Turkey Relations: A New Partnership<\/strong><\/em>.<\/em><\/p>\n Turkey is more democratic, prosperous, and politically influential than ever before. Still there are worrying domestic developments that raise questions about Turkey’s democratic practices. According to the Task Force, these concerns include: “the prosecution and detention of journalists, the seemingly open-ended and at times questionable pursuit of military officers and other establishment figures for alleged conspiracy against the government, the apparent illiberal impulses of some Turkish leaders, the still-unresolved Kurdish issue, and the lack of progress on a new constitution.”<\/p>\n The Task Force finds that overall, Turkey is not well understood in the United States. The Task Force “seeks to promote a better understanding of the new Turkey\u2014its strengths, vulnerabilities, and ambitions\u2014in order to assess its regional and global role and make recommendations for a new partnership of improved and deepened U.S.-Turkey ties.”<\/p>\n To make the vision for a new U.S.-Turkey partnership a reality, Ankara and Washington should observe the following principles:<\/p>\n ==========================================<\/p>\n Independent Task Force Report No. 69<\/p>\n Madeleine K. Albright and Stephen J. Hadley, Chairs U.S.-Turkey U.S.-Turkey Relations<\/p>\n A New Partnership<\/p>\n Independent Task Force Report No. 69<\/p>\n Madeleine K. Albright and U.S.-Turkey Relations<\/p>\n A New Partnership<\/p>\n The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think The Council on Foreign Relations takes no institutional positions on policy issues and has no affiliation The Council on Foreign Relations sponsors Independent Task Forces to assess issues of current and critical For further information about CFR or this Task Force, please write to the Council on Foreign Relations, Copyright \u00a9 2012 by the Council on Foreign Relations\u00ae, Inc. This report may not be reproduced in whole or in part, in any form beyond the reproduction permitted This report is printed on paper that is FSC\u00ae certified by Rainforest Alliance, which promotes environmentally Task Force Members<\/p>\n Task Force members are asked to join a consensus signifying that they Madeleine K. Albright<\/p>\n Albright Stonebridge Group<\/p>\n Henri J. Barkey<\/p>\n Lehigh University<\/p>\n Elmira Bayrasli<\/p>\n Richard R. Burt<\/p>\n McLarty Associates<\/p>\n Soner Cagaptay<\/p>\n Washington Institute Steven A. Cook<\/p>\n Council on Foreign Relations<\/p>\n Edward P. Djerejian<\/p>\n James A. Baker III Institute William M. Drozdiak<\/p>\n American Council on Germany<\/p>\n Stephen J. Hadley<\/p>\n U.S. Institute of Peace Brookings Institution<\/p>\n Parag Khanna<\/p>\n New America Foundation<\/p>\n Clark B. Lombardi<\/p>\n University of Washington Aliza Marcus<\/p>\n World Bank Group<\/p>\n Larry C. Napper<\/p>\n George Bush School of Denise Natali<\/p>\n Institute for National Joseph W. Ralston<\/p>\n The Cohen Group<\/p>\n Gregory Saunders<\/p>\n BP America Inc.<\/p>\n Patrick N. Theros<\/p>\n U.S.-Qatar Business Council<\/p>\n vi Task Force Members Contents<\/p>\n Foreword ix Task Force Report 1 Appendixes 52 Foreword<\/p>\n The relationship between Turkey and the United States was built in Since the Justice and Development Party came to power in 2002, the To be sure, Turkey\u2019s transition is not yet complete. Journalists and Foreword<\/p>\n consumer spending that is unlikely to be sustainable. Concerns also This Council on Foreign Relations\u2013sponsored Independent Task Within each section of the report, the Task Force offers recommendations The Task Force further recommends exploring a Turkish-American There is much the United States can do, the Task Force says, to promote I would like to thank the Task Force\u2019s chairs, Madeleine K. Albright Foreword<\/p>\n this project. I am thankful to all of the Task Force members and observers I am grateful also to Anya Schmemann, CFR\u2019s Task Force Program Richard N. Haass<\/p>\n President<\/p>\n Council on Foreign Relations Acknowledgments<\/p>\n The report of the Independent Task Force on Turkey is the product of In particular, I would like to thank our distinguished chairs, Madeleine I am very grateful for the Task Force members\u2019 and observers\u2019 time I am thankful to several people who met with and briefed the Task The chairs and I had the fortunate opportunity to travel to Turkey for Acknowledgments<\/p>\n CFR members also provided valuable input on the report. The Washington I extend additional thanks to CFR\u2019s Publications team, which Task Force Program director Anya Schmemann was instrumental to I am grateful to CFR President Richard N. Haass and Director of While this report is the product of the Independent Task Force, I take Steven A. Cook<\/p>\n Project Director<\/p>\n Task Force Report<\/p>\n Introduction<\/p>\n Among the most important developments in international affairs of the Although left out of the exclusive club of countries widely regarded as Some trends are worrying, however: the prosecution and detention U.S.-Turkey Relations<\/p>\n some Turkish leaders, the still-unresolved Kurdish issue, and the lack On the economic front, dangers lurk in Turkey\u2019s consumption- The goal for the United States, which has long-standing diplomatic, Ankara was never a client of Washington in the traditional sense of Despite general agreement in both Washington and Ankara of the Introduction<\/p>\n remains subject to debate. Certainly on a range of issues, especially U.S.-Turkey Relations: A New Partnership Overall, political, diplomatic, and military ties between the United There should be no doubt that Turkey is a close ally of the United The truth is that Turkey is unlike most other countries: it is both a Political, DiPlomatic, anD military ties<\/p>\n A mythology surrounds U.S.-Turkey relations suggesting that Washington U.S.-Turkey Relations: A New Partnership with a New Turkey<\/p>\n Americans in Korea in the early 1950s, and that Turkey was an important Difficulties arose over Cyprus in the 1960s with the Johnson administration The deterioration of Turkey-Israel relations since 2008, which has Yet even if some tension and mistrust mark the history of the U.S.Turkey U.S.-Turkey Relations<\/p>\n country. Turkey was among the first allies to offer troops to the American Finally, Turkey has agreed to base a critical NATO anti-missile system As Turkey\u2019s current dispute with Israel and its approach to Iran (for The Task Force believes that the United States and Turkey have, for For that reason, the American and Turkish governments must deepen U.S.-Turkey Relations: A New Partnership with a New Turkey<\/p>\n from the highest levels down. This will place Turkey and the United recommenDat ions<\/p>\n The United States needs to recognize that today it is dealing with a dramatically Indeed, the United States needs to see Turkey as a potential strategic \u2013 U.S.-Turkey Relations<\/p>\n \u2013 In a departure from the dialogue with China, which includes only Beyond these process-oriented recommendations, the United U.S.-Turkey Relations: A New Partnership with a New Turkey<\/p>\n Washington must also try again to help the Turks and Armenians Also, the United States must not neglect the Cyprus problem just economic relations<\/p>\n Although political, diplomatic, and military ties are well developed, U.S.-Turkey Relations<\/p>\n entrepreneurship initiatives, which led to its hosting role for the Global A strengthened economic partnership not only advances U.S. commercial High-level focus sends an important signal of interest in the economic recommenDat ions<\/p>\n For a start, a long-term vision for bilateral trade is needed. Pursuing a It is time for the United States and Turkey to expand on the 1990 U.S.-Turkey Relations: A New Partnership with a New Turkey<\/p>\n Yet policymakers in the United States and Turkey should not be limited Establishing a TAP of course poses certain technical challenges, Beyond these broad policy initiatives, U.S. officials should encourage Turkey\u2019s Transformation: Recent Reforms<\/p>\n To understand Turkey\u2019s external relations, one must understand Turkey\u2019s Political reforms<\/p>\n The AKP\u2019s most significant achievements are the political changes the During this time, the Turkish Grand National Assembly passed In an effort to expand personal freedoms and rights, Turkey\u2019s mixed Turkey\u2019s Transformation: Recent Reforms<\/p>\n The reform packages also chipped away at the ability of Turkish The reform packages also included a series of changes that either By far the most significant alterations to the military\u2019s capacity to Finally, the new regulations significantly downgraded the power of U.S.-Turkey Relations<\/p>\n to the Cabinet Council.\u201d Moreover, the MGK secretariat, which the One way of ensuring that officers adhered to the new regulations was The practical effect of these reforms on Turkish politics and Turkey\u2019s Certain powerful political actors, the military in particular, were social changes<\/p>\n The AKP\u2019s success between 2003 and 2005 was, in part, a function Turkey\u2019s Transformation: Recent Reforms<\/p>\n differentiated, and many Turks wanted a more liberal and democratic The AKP did not initially attract a broad spectrum of voters, however. Overall, some of the most important social changes to occur in Indeed, Turkey\u2019s long-running kulturkampf between religious and U.S.-Turkey Relations<\/p>\n economic reforms<\/p>\n Turkey\u2019s strong economic growth over the past decade has contributed When the AKP first came to power, Turkey\u2019s gross domestic product The groundwork for Turkey\u2019s economic transformation was actually Ozal\u2019s reforms received a boost three years after his death when, in The foundations for Turkey\u2019s more recent economic success were Turkey\u2019s Transformation: Recent Reforms<\/p>\n wide latitude to undertake an overhaul of the economy as minister of The AKP has been the primary political beneficiary of Dervis\u2019s Despite concerns within the Turkish business community that the Turkey\u2019s Transformation: The Way Ahead<\/p>\n For all of the AKP\u2019s achievements over the past decade, Turkey boasts There are other challenges as well. The positive press surrounding Democratic reform Among these issues, it is perhaps Turkey\u2019s political trajectory\u2014which Turkey\u2019s Transformation: The Way Ahead<\/p>\n Despite the AKP\u2019s early achievements, Ankara\u2019s record is by no For example, the government has imposed an enormous and seemingly In addition, the AKP has used its parliamentary majority to alter U.S.-Turkey Relations<\/p>\n Turkey\u2019s judicial system has for decades failed in important ways to The AKP\u2019s frustration with the existing judiciary was understandable, The government has sought similar types of solutions with other The Turkish government has also sought to impose mandatory Turkey\u2019s Transformation: The Way Ahead<\/p>\n made voluntary. Compromising Internet freedom is not confined to Although the public was able to alter the government\u2019s approach to It has also caught the attention of the Obama administration. In a July If there is an area that I am concerned about with recent actions Clinton also strongly suggested that it was actually the responsibility On balance, it is clear that though the AKP took dramatic steps in Despite the AKP\u2019s June 2011 electoral success, in which the party garnered U.S.-Turkey Relations<\/p>\n approach to critical issues for Turkey\u2019s future, notably a new constitution. At the same time, questions about the AKP\u2019s commitment to liberal recommenDat ions<\/p>\n Over the past decade, Turks have demonstrated that they are capable In its place, the United States and other democracies have a role to Turkey\u2019s Transformation: The Way Ahead<\/p>\n democracy does not mean that those with the most votes can impose The constitution can help establish the proper relationship between The enduring protection of political rights requires that they be Yet a new constitution should not be the only measure of Turkish U.S.-Turkey Relations<\/p>\n Halki will finally reopen. As a final matter, Ankara should reduce the Turkey could go a long way toward putting to rest questions about Finally, a major challenge to Turkish democracy is the weakness of the KurDish issue<\/p>\n In the past, much of the underlying rationale for Turkey\u2019s semi- Turkey\u2019s Transformation: The Way Ahead<\/p>\n separatism\u2014notably Kurdish nationalism. When Mustafa Kemal The Kurdish conflict is one of the most sensitive issues in Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan and his party have attracted large numbers The problem with this approach was, however, its underlying U.S.-Turkey Relations<\/p>\n Erdogan dropped the initiative, although subsequent PKK violence Although many Kurds are well integrated into the political and social Currently, Turkish society remains deadlocked politically over The United States and other partners of Turkey should encourage The United States does not have a direct role in Turkey\u2019s historic conflict recommenDat ions<\/p>\n American policymakers must be mindful that the relationship Turkey\u2019s Transformation: The Way Ahead<\/p>\n issue facing Turkey, but given the current improved relations between At the same time, support for the PKK both within and outside The United States can also use its influence with the Kurdish leadership U.S.-Turkey Relations<\/p>\n the economy<\/p>\n The Turkish economy has tripled in the past decade on the strength of Turkey\u2019s economic decision-makers are well respected internationally, Turkey\u2019s economic success has both enabled and motivated a more Turkey\u2019s Transformation: The Way Ahead<\/p>\n pursued a sophisticated campaign to attract foreign direct investment. Moreover, as evidence of Turkey\u2019s attractive business climate, With all the buoyancy of the Turkish economy, potential problems recommenDat ions<\/p>\n The United States can do little to help shield the Turks from Europe\u2019s U.S. and Turkish firms in third markets that can help Turkey, generate U.S.-Turkey Relations<\/p>\n finance ministries or treasury departments and central banks of important Washington can also do more to promote further-liberalizing energy<\/p>\n Turkey is poised to become a more important actor in the global energy Already approximately 4 to 6 percent of global oil supplies passes Turkey\u2019s Transformation: The Way Ahead<\/p>\n the importance of a new Samsun-to-Ceyhan pipeline project. Both Supplying Europe\u2014still the world\u2019s largest economies\u2014with critical The Turkish government projects that its own gas needs will double As an example of the new Great Game, there are six competing proposals In late October 2011, a major breakthrough took place. The Turkish U.S.-Turkey Relations<\/p>\n the Western companies of the Shah Deniz consortium (BP, Total, and The IGA fundamentally altered the political and commercial landscape Finally, it is important to highlight that Turkey does not necessarily recommenDat ions<\/p>\n If the complicated politics and economics of Caspian Basin gas reveal Turkey\u2019s Transformation: The Way Ahead<\/p>\n instead to pay a transit fee. To have any hope of becoming an energy In the meantime, Ankara can be a regional energy link and play an Overall, the United States can continue to play an important role in Foreign Policy: Turkey\u2019s New Role<\/p>\n Turkey\u2019s transformation has not been confined to economic and Today, Turkey is an influential player in the Middle East and North the miDDle east<\/p>\n Although it seems entirely appropriate for Turkey to want to broaden That the AKP\u2019s lineage can be traced back to the founding of Turkey\u2019s Foreign Policy: Turkey\u2019s New Role<\/p>\n about Ankara\u2019s efforts to forge a new path in the Middle East. After all, This Western orientation, especially Ankara\u2019s NATO membership, the arab WorlD<\/p>\n At the same time that the AKP was actively engaged in EU-related The AKP\u2019s rise intrigued political activists in the Arab world, U.S.-Turkey Relations<\/p>\n provided a lesson on how Islamists could not only overcome barriers Arabs were also keenly interested in the West\u2019s response to the AKP, A second trial came in the summer of 2007, when the General Staff The Arab world\u2019s interest in Turkey dovetailed well with Ankara\u2019s Although no Turkish government has tried to play the kind of role Foreign Policy: Turkey\u2019s New Role<\/p>\n rise suggests that something other than ideology is driving Turkish foreign For example, the end of the Cold War\u2014a conflict whose overarching Finally, public opinion has mattered more in the formulation of Turkish In addition to the structural determinants of Turkey\u2019s foreign policy, U.S.-Turkey Relations<\/p>\n arab uPrisings<\/p>\n Turkey\u2019s emerging regional leadership seems to place Ankara in a Still, for all the investment, goodwill, and concomitant influence it After initially opposing NATO military action in favor of a negotiated The Assad regime\u2019s continuing use of violence against its people\u2014 After the failure of a UN Security Council resolution and a range Foreign Policy: Turkey\u2019s New Role<\/p>\n to the Syrian vice president and establish a national unity government, Prime Minister Erdogan\u2019s tour of Cairo, Tunis, and Tripoli in fall Still, even as Egyptians struggle to build a new political system and U.S.-Turkey Relations<\/p>\n totally devoid of influence. After all, the Egyptian Current Party\u2014an It is, however, Egypt\u2019s rejection of strategic ties that highlights what recommenDat ions<\/p>\n The United States and Turkey have an opportunity to cooperate in helping Foreign Policy: Turkey\u2019s New Role<\/p>\n Despite these deficits, the Arab world is so politically dynamic and so More broadly, Washington and Ankara have several opportunities An important role that Turkey can fill is as a regional economic U.S.-Turkey Relations<\/p>\n parts of the Arab world. Turkish business is already active in the region, israel<\/p>\n It was actually Israel, not the Arab world, that first became a focal Bilateral military ties made strategic sense for both countries at the Yet an undeniable diplomatic and political dynamic also drove Turkey- Foreign Policy: Turkey\u2019s New Role<\/p>\n For Ankara, the political and diplomatic benefits of alignment with By any measure, the relationship between Turkey and Israel benefited Subsequent disagreements over Gaza, Iran, and the Mavi Marmara U.S.-Turkey Relations<\/p>\n recommenDat ions<\/p>\n The estrangement of two strategic allies of the United States certainly Although stable Turkey-Israel relations are important to both countries the euroPean union anD nato<\/p>\n Since almost the time the AKP came to power, a drumbeat of articles Foreign Policy: Turkey\u2019s New Role<\/p>\n euroPean union<\/p>\n It remains, however, that President Gul during his short stint as prime Since that time, however, Ankara\u2019s experience with Brussels has EU officials have often made the case that the problems with Turkey\u2019s Despite Turkish suspicions about European anti-Muslim sentiments, U.S.-Turkey Relations<\/p>\n European leaders have floated, such as a so-called privileged partnership recommenDat ions<\/p>\n Turkey\u2019s bid for EU membership remains on life support only because At the same time, however, the onus is on Turkey to uphold its commitments The impasse in Turkey\u2019s bid for EU membership should not, however, Foreign Policy: Turkey\u2019s New Role<\/p>\n Ankara and Paris (and to a lesser extent Berlin) in North Africa should nato<\/p>\n The same questions concerning Turkey\u2019s place in the West or the East Concerns circulated in Turkey about the placement on its territory U.S.-Turkey Relations<\/p>\n be regarded as a hostile act in Tehran. In addition, given the deterioration In the end, however, Turkey, which has a clear interest in demonstrating recommenDat ions<\/p>\n The tension over territory and territorial waters in the Aegean is Previously, Turkey has played an important role in forging cooperation Conclusion<\/p>\n Turkey is clearly a country in transition. As with all countries undergoing As a result, it is incumbent upon policymakers to make every effort aPPenDix a<\/p>\n Recent History: The Rise of the Justice Steven A. Cook<\/p>\n The nature of Turkey\u2019s ruling, center-right Justice and Development In many ways, the AKP is both the expression and engine of the new In May 2001, young reformers under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Although Prime Minister Erdogan had been an effective ward politician Despite doubts among observers, Prime Minister Erdogan and Appendix A: Recent History<\/p>\n number of existing activists and constituents from the Islamist Virtue Critics charged that the leaders of the new party were engaged in dissimulation Yet it was not just the crushing economic crisis of 2000\u20132001 or Although rural Turks moved into the cities seeking jobs in the newly Still, this was not enough for the Islamists to come to power in their U.S.-Turkey Relations<\/p>\n Islamist movement, which traces its roots to 1969 and the election of When they established the AKP, Prime Minister Erdogan and President Prime Minister Erdogan, President Gul, and their associates had In addition, according to AKP intellectuals and activists, the party\u2019s Appendix A: Recent History<\/p>\n Turkey, Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk), had declared that his ultimate goal aPPenDix b<\/p>\n What Is the Gulen Movement?<\/p>\n Alexander Brock<\/p>\n The Gulen movement, which is named for its founder Fethullah Gulen, Muhammed Fethullah Gulen was born in 1941 in the village of Beginning in 1966, when he was managing the Kestanepazari Quran Appendix B: What Is the Gulen Movement?<\/p>\n philosophy and his movement, which combines spirituality and a commanding On May 1, 1971, in the aftermath of the March 12 \u201ccoup by memorandum,\u201d Gulen\u2019s emphasis on education and altruism appealed to many The 1980s were years of rapid growth for the Gulen movement, The February 28, 1997, military intervention, which Turks refer to In 2008, a Turkish court acquitted Gulen of the charges dating back U.S.-Turkey Relations<\/p>\n the movement toDay: fethullah gulen Gulen\u2019s supporters overlap with supporters of the ruling Justice and Yet the extent to which, if at all, the AKP and Gulenists coordinate The Gulen movement and the AKP align on two important substantive Appendix B: What Is the Gulen Movement?<\/p>\n Despite the apparent mutual support, however, there is evidence of controversy<\/p>\n The evident Gulenist influence in Turkish politics, combined with the The central source of controversy surrounding Fethullah Gulen is You must move in the arteries of the system without anyone noticing Against the backdrop of the AKP\u2019s rise to power in 2002 and the U.S.-Turkey Relations<\/p>\n police force, judiciary, and media apparatuses, is central to much of the An additional source of suspicion is the Ergenekon investigation, conclusion<\/p>\n The suspicion surrounding the Gulen movement almost exclusively According to the movement\u2019s detractors, Gulen sympathizers and The degree to which this alleged conspiracy is connected to Fethullah Endnotes<\/p>\n 1. 1209146546290\/4937885-1331724092518\/TurkeyCPSFY12.pdf. 62 world_meast_syria-unrest_1_local-coordination-committees-president-bashar- 13. Task Force Members<\/p>\n Madeleine K. Albright is chair of Albright Stonebridge Group, a Henri J. Barkey is the Cohen professor of international relations at Troubled Triangle: The United States, Turkey and Israel in the New Middle Elmira Bayrasli writes about global innovations and entrepreneurship Task Force Members<\/p>\n Endeavor, served as the chief spokesperson for the Organization for Richard R. Burt is the managing director for Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow and director of the Turkish Research Task Force Members<\/p>\n modern Turkish history was the first offered by Yale in three decades. Steven A. Cook is Hasib J. Sabbagh senior fellow for Middle Eastern Edward P. Djerejian served in the U.S. Foreign Service for eight presidents, Task Force Members<\/p>\n Presidential Distinguished Service Award, the Department of State\u2019s William M. Drozdiak has been president of the American Council on Stephen J. Hadley is a principal at RiceHadleyGates, LLC, an international Task Force Members<\/p>\n international business advisory firm. Hadley served as the assistant Robert W. Kagan is a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Parag Khanna is a senior research fellow at the New America Foundation, Task Force Members<\/p>\n PhD from LSE, and bachelor\u2019s and master\u2019s degrees from the School Clark B. Lombardi is associate professor of law and adjunct associate Aliza Marcus is a foreign policy writer and expert on Turkey\u2019s Kurds. Larry C. Napper is senior lecturer at the George Bush School of Task Force Members<\/p>\n to U.S. ambassador Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus. In U.S. assistance to Central Europe and the Balkans, administering a Task Force Members<\/p>\n Joseph W. Ralston completed in 2003 a distinguished thirty-sevenyear Gregory Saunders is the senior director, international affairs, responsible Patrick N. Theros served as U.S. ambassador to Qatar from October Task Force Members<\/p>\n executive director of the U.S.-Qatar Business Council in March 2000. Vin Weber is co-chairman and partner of Mercury\/Clark & Weinstock Task Force Members<\/p>\n Jenny B. White is associate professor of anthropology at Boston Ross Wilson is director of the Atlantic Council\u2019s Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Task Force Members<\/p>\n Nur O. Yalman is a professor of social anthropology and Middle Eastern Ahmad Zuaiter is a founding partner of Jadara Capital Partners, LP. Task Force Members<\/p>\n Dubai, as a portfolio manager and founder of the Arab Gateway Fund. Task Force Observers<\/p>\n Alan Makovsky is a senior professional staff member (Democratic) James C. O\u2019Brien is a principal of Albright Stonebridge Group, a Victoria Taylor is an international affairs fellow in residence at the Task Force Observers<\/p>\n and has worked to promote U.S. economic interests in Turkey, Greece, Independent Task Force Reports<\/p>\n Published by the Council on Foreign Relations<\/p>\n U.S. Education Reform and National Security U.S. Trade and Investment Policy Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations<\/p>\n Samuel W. Bodman and James D. Wolfensohn, Chairs; Julia E. Sweig, Project Director U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula U.S. Immigration Policy U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy Confronting Climate Change: A Strategy for U.S. Foreign Policy<\/p>\n George E. Pataki and Thomas J. Vilsack, Chairs; Michael A. Levi, Project Director U.S.-Latin America Relations: A New Direction for a New Reality<\/p>\n Charlene Barshefsky and James T. Hill, Chairs; Shannon O\u2019Neil, Project Director U.S.-China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A Responsible Course<\/p>\n Carla A. Hills and Dennis C. Blair, Chairs; Frank Sampson Jannuzi, Project Director Independent Task Force Reports<\/p>\n National Security Consequences of U.S. Oil Dependency<\/p>\n John Deutch and James R. Schlesinger, Chairs; David G. Victor, Project Director Russia\u2019s Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do<\/p>\n John Edwards and Jack Kemp, Chairs; Stephen Sestanovich, Project Director More than Humanitarianism: A Strategic U.S. Approach Toward Africa<\/p>\n Anthony Lake and Christine Todd Whitman, Chairs; Princeton N. Lyman and J. Stephen In the Wake of War: Improving Post-Conflict Capabilities<\/p>\n Samuel R. Berger and Brent Scowcroft, Chairs; William L. Nash, Project Director; Mona K. In Support of Arab Democracy: Why and How<\/p>\n Madeleine K. Albright and Vin Weber, Chairs; Steven A. Cook, Project Director Building a North American Community<\/p>\n John P. Manley, Pedro Aspe, and William F. Weld, Chairs; Thomas d\u2019Aquino, Andr\u00e9s Iran: Time for a New Approach<\/p>\n Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert M. Gates, Chairs; Suzanne Maloney, Project Director An Update on the Global Campaign Against Terrorist Financing<\/p>\n Maurice R. Greenberg, Chair; William F. Wechsler and Lee S. Wolosky, Project Directors Renewing the Atlantic Partnership<\/p>\n Henry A. Kissinger and Lawrence H. Summers, Chairs; Charles A. Kupchan, Project Director Iraq: One Year After<\/p>\n Thomas R. Pickering and James R. Schlesinger, Chairs; Eric P. Schwartz, Project Consultant Nonlethal Weapons and Capabilities<\/p>\n Paul X. Kelley and Graham Allison, Chairs; Richard L. Garwin, Project Director New Priorities in South Asia: U.S. Policy Toward India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan Marshall Bouton, Nicholas Platt, and Frank G. Wisner, Chairs; Dennis Kux and Mahnaz Independent Task Force Reports<\/p>\n Finding America\u2019s Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy<\/p>\n Peter G. Peterson, Chair; Kathy Bloomgarden, Henry Grunwald, David E. Morey, and Emergency Responders: Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared<\/p>\n Warren B. Rudman, Chair; Richard A. Clarke, Senior Adviser; Jamie F. Metzl, Iraq: The Day After (Chairs\u2019 Update)<\/p>\n Thomas R. Pickering and James R. Schlesinger, Chairs; Eric P. Schwartz, Project Director Burma: Time for Change<\/p>\n Mathea Falco, Chair Afghanistan: Are We Losing the Peace?<\/p>\n Marshall Bouton, Nicholas Platt, and Frank G. Wisner, Chairs; Dennis Kux and Mahnaz Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge<\/p>\n Morton I. Abramowitz and James T. Laney, Chairs; Eric Heginbotham, Project Director Chinese Military Power<\/p>\n Harold Brown, Chair; Joseph W. Prueher, Vice Chair; Adam Segal, Project Director Iraq: The Day After<\/p>\n Thomas R. Pickering and James R. Schlesinger, Chairs; Eric P. Schwartz, Project Director Threats to Democracy: Prevention and Response<\/p>\n Madeleine K. Albright and Bronislaw Geremek, Chairs; Morton H. Halperin, Director; America\u2014Still Unprepared, Still in Danger<\/p>\n Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman, Chairs; Stephen E. Flynn, Project Director Terrorist Financing<\/p>\n Maurice R. Greenberg, Chair; William F. Wechsler and Lee S. Wolosky, Project Directors Independent Task Force Reports<\/p>\n Enhancing U.S. Leadership at the United Nations<\/p>\n David Dreier and Lee H. Hamilton, Chairs; Lee Feinstein and Adrian Karatnycky, Project Improving the U.S. Public Diplomacy Campaign in the War Against Terrorism<\/p>\n Carla A. Hills and Richard C. Holbrooke, Chairs; Charles G. Boyd, Project Director Building Support for More Open Trade<\/p>\n Kenneth M. Duberstein and Robert E. Rubin, Chairs; Timothy F. Geithner, Project Director; Beginning the Journey: China, the United States, and the WTO<\/p>\n Robert D. Hormats, Chair; Elizabeth Economy and Kevin Nealer, Project Directors Strategic Energy Policy Update<\/p>\n Edward L. Morse, Chair; Amy Myers Jaffe, Project Director Testing North Korea: The Next Stage in U.S. and ROK Policy<\/p>\n Morton I. Abramowitz and James T. Laney, Chairs; Robert A. Manning, Project Director The United States and Southeast Asia: A Policy Agenda for the New Administration<\/p>\n J. Robert Kerrey, Chair; Robert A. Manning, Project Director Edward L. Morse, Chair; Amy Myers Jaffe, Project Director A Letter to the President and a Memorandum on U.S. Policy Toward Brazil<\/p>\n Stephen Robert, Chair; Kenneth Maxwell, Project Director State Department Reform<\/p>\n Frank C. Carlucci, Chair; Ian J. Brzezinski, Project Coordinator U.S.-Cuban Relations in the 21st Century: A Follow-on Report<\/p>\n Bernard W. Aronson and William D. Rogers, Chairs; Julia Sweig and Walter Mead, Project Independent Task Force Reports<\/p>\n Toward Greater Peace and Security in Colombia: Forging a Constructive U.S. Policy<\/p>\n Bob Graham and Brent Scowcroft, Chairs; Michael Shifter, Project Director Future Directions for U.S. Economic Policy Toward Japan<\/p>\n Laura D\u2019Andrea Tyson, Chair; M. Diana Helweg Newton, Project Director First Steps Toward a Constructive U.S. Policy in Colombia<\/p>\n Bob Graham and Brent Scowcroft, Chairs; Michael Shifter, Project Director Promoting Sustainable Economies in the Balkans<\/p>\n Steven Rattner, Chair; Michael B.G. Froman, Project Director Non-Lethal Technologies: Progress and Prospects<\/p>\n Richard L. Garwin, Chair; W. Montague Winfield, Project Director Safeguarding Prosperity in a Global Financial System: Carla A. Hills and Peter G. Peterson, Chairs; Morris Goldstein, Project Director U.S. Policy Toward North Korea: Next Steps Reconstructing the Balkans<\/p>\n Morton I. Abramowitz and Albert Fishlow, Chairs; Charles A. Kupchan, Project Director Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions<\/p>\n Michel Rocard, Chair; Henry Siegman, Project Director; Yezid Sayigh and Khalil Shikaki, U.S. Policy Toward Northeastern Europe The Future of Transatlantic Relations<\/p>\n Robert D. Blackwill, Chair and Project Director U.S.-Cuban Relations in the 21st Century<\/p>\n Bernard W. Aronson and William D. Rogers, Chairs; Walter Russell Mead, Project Director Independent Task Force Reports<\/p>\n After the Tests: U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan<\/p>\n Richard N. Haass and Morton H. Halperin, Chairs Managing Change on the Korean Peninsula<\/p>\n Morton I. Abramowitz and James T. Laney, Chairs; Michael J. Green, Project Director Promoting U.S. Economic Relations with Africa<\/p>\n Peggy Dulany and Frank Savage, Chairs; Salih Booker, Project Director U.S. Middle East Policy and the Peace Process Differentiated Containment: U.S. Policy Toward Iran and Iraq<\/p>\n Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, Chairs; Richard W. Murphy, Project Director Russia, Its Neighbors, and an Enlarging NATO<\/p>\n Richard G. Lugar, Chair; Victoria Nuland, Project Director Rethinking International Drug Control: New Directions for U.S. Policy<\/p>\n Mathea Falco, Chair Financing America\u2019s Leadership: Protecting American Interests and Promoting American Values<\/p>\n Mickey Edwards and Stephen J. Solarz, Chairs; Morton H. Halperin, Lawrence J. Korb, A New U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan<\/p>\n Richard N. Haass, Chair; Gideon Rose, Project Director Arms Control and the U.S.-Russian Relationship<\/p>\n Robert D. Blackwill, Chair and Author; Keith W. Dayton, Project Director American National Interest and the United Nations<\/p>\n George Soros, Chair Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S. Intelligence<\/p>\n Maurice R. Greenberg, Chair; Richard N. Haass, Project Director Independent Task Force Reports<\/p>\n Lessons of the Mexican Peso Crisis<\/p>\n John C. Whitehead, Chair; Marie-Jos\u00e9e Kravis, Project Director Managing the Taiwan Issue: Key Is Better U.S. Relations with China<\/p>\n Stephen Friedman, Chair; Elizabeth Economy, Project Director Non-Lethal Technologies: Military Options and Implications<\/p>\n Malcolm H. Wiener, Chair Should NATO Expand?<\/p>\n Harold Brown, Chair; Charles A. Kupchan, Project Director Success or Sellout? The U.S.-North Korean Nuclear Accord<\/p>\n Kyung Won Kim and Nicholas Platt, Chairs; Richard N. Haass, Project Director Nuclear Proliferation: Confronting the New Challenges<\/p>\n Stephen J. Hadley, Chair; Mitchell B. Reiss, Project Director To purchase a printed copy, call the Brookings Institution Press: 800.537.5487. The Council on Foreign Relations sponsors Independent Task Forces to assess issues of cur not necessarily every finding and recommendation. Each Task Force member also has the servers participate in discussions, but are not asked to join the consensus.<\/p>\n Task Force Members<\/p>\n Madeleine K. Albright<\/p>\n Albright Stonebridge Group<\/p>\n Henri J. Barkey<\/p>\n Lehigh University<\/p>\n Elmira Bayrasli<\/p>\n Richard R. Burt<\/p>\n McLarty Associates<\/p>\n Soner Cagaptay<\/p>\n Washington Institute for Near East Policy<\/p>\n Steven A. Cook<\/p>\n Council on Foreign Relations<\/p>\n Edward P. Djerejian<\/p>\n James A. Baker III Institute for William M. Drozdiak<\/p>\n American Council on Germany<\/p>\n Stephen J. Hadley<\/p>\n U.S. Institute of Peace Brookings Institution<\/p>\n Parag Khanna<\/p>\n New America Foundation<\/p>\n Clark B. Lombardi<\/p>\n University of Washington School of Law<\/p>\n Aliza Marcus<\/p>\n World Bank Group<\/p>\n Larry C. Napper<\/p>\n George Bush School of Government and Denise Natali<\/p>\n Institute for National Strategic Studies<\/p>\n Joseph W. Ralston<\/p>\n The Cohen Group<\/p>\n Gregory Saunders<\/p>\n BP America Inc.<\/p>\n Patrick N. Theros<\/p>\n U.S. Qatar Business Council Mercury\/Clark & Weinstock<\/p>\n Jenny B. White<\/p>\n Boston University<\/p>\n Ross Wilson<\/p>\n Atlantic Council of the United States<\/p>\n Nur O. Yalman<\/p>\n Harvard University<\/p>\n Ahmad Zuaiter<\/p>\n Jadara Capital Partners, LP<\/p>\n www.cfr.org<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Chairs: Madeleine K. Albright, Chair, Albright Stonebridge Group LLC, and Stephen J. Hadley, United States Institute of Peace Director: Steven A. Cook, Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies Overview Turkey is a rising regional and global power facing, as is the United States, the challenges of political transitions in the Middle […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":83,"featured_media":53582,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[89],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-53581","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-turkey"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/53581","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/83"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=53581"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/53581\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/53582"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=53581"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=53581"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=53581"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}\n
\nSteven A. Cook, Project Director<\/p>\n
\nRelations
\nA New Partnership<\/p>\n
\nStephen J. Hadley, Chairs
\nSteven A. Cook, Project Director<\/p>\n
\ntank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives,
\njournalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order
\nto help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other
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\nwith the U.S. government. All views expressed in its publications and on its website are the sole responsibility
\nof the author or authors.<\/p>\n
\nimportance to U.S. foreign policy and provide policymakers with concrete judgments and recommendations.
\nDiverse in backgrounds and perspectives, Task Force members aim to reach a meaningful consensus
\non policy through private and nonpartisan deliberations. Once launched, Task Forces are independent of
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\nforward an additional or dissenting view. Members\u2019 affiliations are listed for identification purposes only
\nand do not imply institutional endorsement. Task Force observers participate in discussions, but are not
\nasked to join the consensus.<\/p>\n
\n58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10065, or call the Communications office at 212.434.9888. Visit CFR\u2019s
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\nAll rights reserved.
\nPrinted in the United States of America.<\/p>\n
\nby Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law Act (17 U.S.C. Sections 107 and 108) and excerpts by
\nreviewers for the public press, without express written permission from the Council on Foreign Relations.<\/p>\n
\nresponsible, socially beneficial, and economically viable management of the world\u2019s forests.<\/p>\n
\nendorse \u201cthe general policy thrust and judgments reached by the group,
\nthough not necessarily every finding and recommendation.\u201d They participate
\nin the Task Force in their individual, not institutional, capacities.<\/p>\n
\nfor Near East Policy<\/p>\n
\nfor Public Policy, Rice University<\/p>\n
\nRobert W. Kagan<\/p>\n
\nSchool of Law<\/p>\n
\nGovernment and Public Service,
\nTexas A&M University<\/p>\n
\nStrategic Studies<\/p>\n
\nVin Weber Nur O. Yalman
\nMercury\/Clark & Weinstock Harvard University
\nJenny B. White Ahmad Zuaiter
\nBoston University Jadara Capital Partners, LP
\nRoss Wilson
\nAtlantic Council
\nof the United States<\/p>\n
\nAcknowledgments xiii<\/p>\n
\nIntroduction 3
\nU.S.-Turkey Relations: A New Partnership with a New Turkey 6
\nTurkey\u2019s Transformation: Recent Reforms 14
\nTurkey\u2019s Transformation: The Way Ahead 20
\nForeign Policy: Turkey\u2019s New Role 36
\nConclusion 51<\/p>\n
\nEndnotes 61
\nTask Force Members 63
\nTask Force Observers 75<\/p>\n
\nthe throes of the Cold War. For decades, their interaction was dominated
\nby political and military considerations relating to Europe,
\nespecially how best to meet the Soviet strategic challenge and how
\nbest to manage the complex and frustrating Turkey-Greece-Cyprus
\ntriangle. More than twenty years after the end of the Cold War, however,
\nthose traditional priorities are making way for a new agenda that
\nreflects not just changes in the international system but also Turkey\u2019s
\nremarkable transformation from a military-dominated society to a
\nfledgling democracy and rising power in a greater Middle East experiencing
\nunprecedented upheaval.<\/p>\n
\ncountry has achieved far-reaching, albeit still incomplete, reforms. The
\npolitical system is more representative than it was a decade ago and
\nthe role of the military in the political system has been substantially
\nreduced. The country\u2019s GDP has more than tripled, making Turkey
\none of the world\u2019s top twenty economies; plans to join the top ten economies
\nwithin the next ten years appear ambitious but not out of the
\nquestion. Turkey is also playing a larger role on the diplomatic stage,
\nfeaturing in negotiations over Iran\u2019s nuclear program and serving as
\nan example for many in a Middle East searching to find a larger role for
\nIslam in political life.<\/p>\n
\ngovernment critics are arrested in troublingly high numbers and progress
\non concluding a new, more fully democratic constitution has been
\nunnecessarily slow. The government has not gone beyond small, initial
\nsteps to better integrate its Kurdish minority. While economic growth
\nhas been impressive\u2014on the order of 6 percent per year over much of
\nthe past decade\u2014much of the dynamism has been fueled by buoyant<\/p>\n
\nremain within and outside Turkey about the influence of Islam in the
\ncountry\u2019s politics.<\/p>\n
\nForce report examines the various trends in Turkey and assesses their
\nconsequences for U.S. policy toward the country and the region more
\nbroadly. The report begins by taking stock of the modern U.S.-Turkey
\nrelationship, noting strains over the past decade stemming from differences
\nover policy toward Iraq. The Task Force then considers the
\npolitical, social, and economic reforms Ankara has made in recent years
\nalong with threats to further progress. The report also includes a discussion
\nof Turkey\u2019s potential role as a regional energy hub and its growing
\nimportance to foreign policy debates within and beyond its traditional
\nreach in NATO and Europe.<\/p>\n
\non how the United States can support Turkey\u2019s continued
\nemergence and build a deeper working relationship that acknowledges
\nAnkara\u2019s growing importance. It encourages the United States and
\nother democracies to urge Turkish leaders to follow through with their
\ncommitment to writing a new constitution that better protects minority
\nrights and basic freedoms and clearly defines the relationship between
\nmilitary and civilian authorities.<\/p>\n
\nPartnership to deepen trade and economic ties and calls on the two countries
\nto expand bilateral trade and investment. The Task Force advocates
\ncontinued liberalization of Turkish law on intellectual property, tax,
\nand business regulations. And it calls on the United States to work with
\nTurkey as it becomes a more important actor in the energy sphere.<\/p>\n
\nconstructive collaboration in foreign policy, from partnering with
\nthe Turkish development agency on regional aid to supporting Turkey\u2019s
\nburgeoning role as a regional economic engine. Close consultations
\nare warranted on regional challenges, including stopping the violence
\nin and bringing political change to Syria and frustrating Iran\u2019s bid for
\nnuclear weapons and regional primacy. American support for rapprochement
\nbetween Turkey and Israel is also encouraged.<\/p>\n
\nand Stephen J. Hadley, for their dedication to and active involvement in<\/p>\n
\nwhose expertise on Turkey helped shape the report.<\/p>\n
\ndirector, whose contributions and efforts have been instrumental since
\nthe project\u2019s inception. I would finally like to extend my thanks to Project
\nDirector Steven A. Cook for his keen work incorporating many different
\nperspectives into a valuable report on this critical country.<\/p>\n
\nMay 2012<\/p>\n
\nmuch work and effort by the dedicated members and observers of this
\nTask Force, and I am appreciative of the time, attention, and expertise
\nthey devoted to this project.<\/p>\n
\nK. Albright and Stephen J. Hadley, for their strong leadership
\nand attentive direction. It has been a true pleasure to work with both
\nof them and the members of their staffs, in particular Fariba Yassaee,
\nRobyn Lee, Katie Jackson, and Abbey Watson.<\/p>\n
\nand attention and for their invaluable expertise and guidance. Many
\nmembers submitted detailed comments and feedback throughout the
\nwriting process; special thanks go to Henri Barkey, Aliza Marcus, Greg
\nSaunders, and Clark Lombardi for their written contributions. I would
\nalso like to thank Elmira Bayrasli, William Drozdiak, Larry Napper,
\nRoss Wilson, and Patrick Theros for their insightful input and written
\ncomments on drafts of the report.<\/p>\n
\nForce group, including Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and
\nEurasian Affairs Philip H. Gordon, Special Assistant to the President
\nand Senior Director for European Affairs Elizabeth Sherwood-
\nRandall, and Daniel Friefeld of the Office of the Special Envoy for Eurasian
\nEnergy. In addition, Task Force member Greg Saunders gave a
\npresentation to the group.<\/p>\n
\nconsultations that informed this report. We benefited from briefings by
\ngovernment officials in Ankara as well as by representatives from the
\nprivate sector and civil society in Istanbul. The Task Force delegation
\nis also appreciative of the numerous Turkish officials who offered their
\ntime and insight as well as of U.S. ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone
\nand his staff.<\/p>\n
\nMeetings team organized an event in Washington, DC, with
\nTask Force member Henri Barkey; the New York Meetings team organized
\nan event in New York, led by Task Force member Aliza Marcus;
\nand the Corporate Program organized a roundtable in Washington,
\nDC, led by Task Force members Greg Saunders and Ross Wilson.<\/p>\n
\nassisted in editing the report and readying it for publication, and CFR\u2019s
\nCommunications, Meetings, Corporate, External Affairs, Outreach,
\nand National teams, who all worked to ensure that the report reaches
\nthe widest audience possible.<\/p>\n
\nthis project from beginning to end, offering invaluable advice and guidance.
\nShe and Kristin Lewis of CFR\u2019s Task Force Program accompanied
\nus on our trip to Turkey; Kristin was extremely helpful on several
\nfronts and helped ensure that the Task Force ran smoothly. My research
\nassociate, Alexander Brock, who authored the appendix on Fethullah
\nGulen, deserves huge credit and thanks for his research and assistance
\nwith the report. His predecessor, Lauren Linakis, helped get this project
\noff to a strong start.<\/p>\n
\nStudies James M. Lindsay for giving me the opportunity to direct this
\neffort.<\/p>\n
\nresponsibility for its content and note that any omissions or mistakes
\nare mine.<\/p>\n
\npast decade is the emergence of Turkey as a rising regional and global
\npower. Turkey has long been an important country as a stalwart member
\nof the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an aspirant to
\nEuropean Union (EU) membership, and an important link between the
\nWest and the East. Yet the changes in Turkey over the past decade have
\nbeen so dramatic\u2014with far-reaching political and economic reforms,
\nsignificant social reforms, and an active foreign policy\u2014that the country
\nis virtually unrecognizable to longtime Turkey watchers. Today
\nTurkey is more democratic, prosperous, and politically influential than
\nit was five, ten, and fifteen years ago.<\/p>\n
\nrising powers\u2014Brazil, Russia, India, China, and, most recently, South
\nAfrica (the BRICS)\u2014Turkey very much belongs in the category of
\neconomically successful countries that are emerging global powers.1 If
\ncurrent trends in Turkey persist and the international system continues
\nto undergo a redistribution of power, Turkey will in the coming decade
\nbe among the most important actors in the broad region surrounding
\nand beyond it. Turkey is rapidly becoming a critical energy link between
\nEurope and Asia. It has sought to play a constructive role in the Middle
\nEast as that region undergoes unprecedented change, especially in Iraq,
\nwhere\u2014despite recent tension\u2014Ankara has become a force for stability.
\nAs other American allies prepare to leave, Turkey has remained
\nsteadfast in its support for NATO\u2019s mission in Afghanistan. And on the
\neconomic front, Turkey is an increasingly visible player in the Group of
\nTwenty (G20).<\/p>\n
\nof journalists, the seemingly open-ended and at times questionable
\npursuit of military officers and other establishment figures for alleged
\nconspiracy against the government, the apparent illiberal impulses of<\/p>\n
\nof progress on a new constitution. How these issues are resolved will
\nhave a major impact on the future of Turkey and its democracy. Indeed,
\nfor all the positive political change that the Justice and Development
\nParty (AKP) oversaw in 2003 and 2004, Turkish leaders have sometimes
\nresorted to authoritarian measures to intimidate and curb opposition to
\ntheir agenda.<\/p>\n
\nfueled growth, which has led to a large and growing deficit in the current
\naccount, and in its robust links to the ailing economies of the EU. Turkey\u2019s
\ndynamic foreign policy has, at times, also raised tension between
\nWashington and Ankara. Still, these problems do not diminish the significance
\nof Turkey\u2019s transformation or the potential opportunities for
\nthe future of U.S.-Turkey relations.<\/p>\n
\npolitical, and military ties with Turkey, based in large part on the vestiges
\nof the Cold War, is to modernize the bilateral relationship in a
\nway that reflects not only common American-Turkish interests, but
\nalso Turkey\u2019s new stature as an economically and politically successful
\ncountry with a new role to play in a changing Middle East. Turkey may
\nnot yet have the status of one of Washington\u2019s traditional European
\nallies, but there is good strategic reason for the bilateral relationship
\nto grow and mature into a mutually beneficial partnership that can
\nmanage a complex set of security, economic, humanitarian, and environmental
\nproblems. This is precisely what the United States wants
\nfrom Turkey. Although a vibrant bilateral relationship already exists,
\nthere is an opportunity to institutionalize the relationship further and
\nexpand issues of common interest.<\/p>\n
\nthe term, but nevertheless the asymmetry of power between the two
\ncountries frequently dictated a particular pattern of relations in which
\nTurkey often believed it was pursuing policies in favor of U.S. interests
\nat the expense of its own. Given the emerging changes in the international
\norder, especially the political dynamism in the Arab world, a new
\npartnership is needed between the United States and Turkey, given their
\nshared interests in Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus,
\nthe eastern Mediterranean, and Central Asia.<\/p>\n
\nvalue of a strategic partnership, precisely what this means and entails<\/p>\n
\nin the Middle East, the United States and Turkey have in recent years
\nhad different expectations of each other. These differences should not
\npreclude the development of a partnership, in particular as Ankara has
\nmoved closer to Washington\u2019s position on Syria and Iran. The new
\nTurkey, however, is not well understood by U.S. administration officials,
\nmembers of Congress, or the public. This report seeks to promote a
\nbetter understanding of the new Turkey\u2014its strengths, vulnerabilities,
\nand ambitions\u2014in order to assess its regional and global role and make
\nrecommendations for a new partnership of improved and deepened
\nU.S.-Turkey ties.<\/p>\n
\nwith a New Turkey<\/p>\n
\nStates and Turkey are robust. In particular, the personal relationship
\nbetween President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
\nErdogan has been important in moving bilateral relations forward.
\nUnlike in the past, Turkey is among the first group of countries that
\nAmerican officials call on regarding foreign policy issues of importance
\nto the United States. Indeed, President Obama spoke with Prime Minister
\nErdogan by telephone at least thirteen times in 2011, signifying a
\nstrong working relationship between them.<\/p>\n
\nStates, albeit one with an independent outlook. In this respect, it resembles
\nsome of Washington\u2019s traditional European allies.<\/p>\n
\nformal ally and a country with which the United States has had difficult
\nrelations from time to time, and this will continue to some extent. At
\nthe root of this reality is Turkey\u2019s distrust of the United States, which
\nis deep, and the result in part of an asymmetry of power. Washington,
\ntoo, is distrustful of Ankara, but much less so, partly because the United
\nStates is the superpower and approaches issues with a level of confidence
\n(which may be off-putting) that enables Washington to be or
\nappear to be \u201cmagnanimous.\u201d In trying to move forward in this relationship,
\nthe United States needs to begin to build trust, which is among the
\nmost difficult tasks ahead.<\/p>\n
\nand Ankara have, through six decades, worked closely and with
\nlittle friction. It is true that Turkish soldiers fought and died along with<\/p>\n
\nNATO partner during the long Cold War. Yet as close as this relationship
\nwas, it was hardly ever smooth.<\/p>\n
\nand again in the early 1970s when, after Turkey\u2019s invasion of
\nthe island in response to a Greek-led coup that Ankara believed placed
\nthe minority Turkish Cypriots in danger, the United States placed an
\narms embargo on its NATO ally. The efforts of the Armenian-American
\ncommunity to convince the U.S. Congress and successive administrations
\nto recognize the 1915 mass killing of Armenians as genocide
\nhave often resulted in bilateral tension. In the 1990s, differences
\nconcerned human rights. The U.S. invasion of Iraq also created tension
\nbetween Washington and Ankara\u2014the result of both the Grand
\nNational Assembly\u2019s inability to pass legislation allowing U.S. forces
\nto use Turkish territory to open a northern front against Saddam Hussein,
\nand the post-invasion instability in Iraq that coincided with a
\nresumption of PKK terrorist attacks on Turkey. Ankara\u2019s 2010 trilateral
\nTehran Research Reactor agreement with Brazil and Iran, as well
\nas Ankara\u2019s subsequent vote against applying United Nations Security
\nCouncil (UNSC) sanctions on the Iranian regime, raised questions
\nin U.S. policymaking circles about Turkey\u2019s commitment to the
\nWestern alliance.<\/p>\n
\ncomplicated U.S.-Middle East policy and increased tension in the eastern
\nMediterranean, has also drawn the interest of a U.S. Congress that
\nhas not always been friendly to Turkish concerns. In addition, public
\nopinion polls in Turkey consistently reveal unfavorable impressions
\nof the United States among the Turkish public, an attitude that vexes
\nAmerican policymakers. This is a problem that can damage the bilateral
\nrelations, especially now that public opinion matters more than
\never before in Turkish foreign policy. Although Turkish leaders clearly
\nvalue the relationship, with the exception of former prime minister and
\npresident Turgut Ozal, they have rarely defended the U.S.-Turkey alliance.
\nThat must change.<\/p>\n
\nrelationship, Ankara\u2019s geostrategic importance to Washington
\nremains undiminished. For example, Turkey has gone from being a
\npotentially destabilizing factor in Iraq to an important partner in the
\nreconstruction, economic development, and territorial integrity of the<\/p>\n
\neffort in Afghanistan and has been a mainstay of the international
\nforce there, although most Turkish troops do not participate in operations
\nbeyond Kabul, with the exception of provincial reconstruction
\nteams in Wardak and Jawzjan. And, after initial stumbles, Ankara and
\nWashington have worked collaboratively to respond to the uprisings in
\nthe Arab world, particularly in Libya and Syria.<\/p>\n
\nradar on its territory, which Washington considers an important component
\nof European security. Ankara had initially hesitated for fear of
\nantagonizing Iran, but Tehran\u2019s apparent complicity in Syria\u2019s bloody
\ncrackdown has convinced Turkish policymakers to alter their approach
\nto Iran. Still, controversy remains concerning the radar installation.
\nTurkey has insisted that no data may be shared with Israel, but Prime
\nMinister Erdogan\u2019s domestic opposition has raised concerns that Israel
\ncould nevertheless receive tracking information. At the Munich Security
\nConference, however, U.S. defense secretary Leon Panetta told
\nthe press that the radar in Turkey is intended for the defense of NATO
\nand that the United States has a separate and robust program of missile
\ndefense cooperation with Israel.<\/p>\n
\na time) suggest, there will be areas of geopolitical importance where
\nAnkara and Washington, as well as Brussels, are likely to disagree.
\nThis is not unusual, even for close allies, but to mitigate potential friction
\nat those inevitable moments of heightened tension, Turkey and
\nthe United States must build a stronger infrastructure of bilateral
\ncooperation.<\/p>\n
\nthe most part, common goals on issues of mutual importance. When
\nWashington and Ankara have diverged, such as in the dispute over
\nUNSC sanctions against Iran during the summer of 2010, the ability of
\nthe two states to handle the fallout has paid dividends for an enhanced
\nrelationship going forward. The situation demonstrated to both countries
\nthat a public dispute between Washington and Ankara has no
\npolitical or diplomatic upside\u2014an invaluable lesson for future differences
\nbetween the United States and Turkey.<\/p>\n
\nthe process of consultation that President Obama and Prime Minister
\nErdogan established and institutionalize it across both governments<\/p>\n
\nStates in an advantageous position to deal with problems and crises as
\nwell as cushion the inevitable disagreements.<\/p>\n
\nchanged Turkey and, as a result, that the bilateral relationship
\nbetween Washington and Ankara is undergoing fundamental change.
\nAmerican officials, members of Congress, and other observers must
\njettison their stereotypes of Turkey. In particular, the decline in the
\nrole of the military in Turkish political life does not mean that Turkey is
\ninexorably headed toward theocracy or movement away from NATO.
\nThe rise of the religiously oriented AKP party is not inconsistent with
\ndemocracy, modernization, or economic liberalism. The United States
\nmust not view the sum of U.S.-Turkey relations through the narrow
\nprism of particular issues, whether they be Armenia, Israel, or ties to
\nNATO. On the contentious issue of Armenia and the massacres of
\n1915, for example, the United States has a moral interest in working
\nwith all sides to clarify the historical record. But the U.S.-Turkey relationship
\nis much broader than the Armenian tragedy, the parlous state
\nof Turkey-Israel relations, or the false debates about Turkey\u2019s place in
\nthe West. And the relationship can and should be expanded further as
\nwell as deepened. The overlapping strategic interests and potential for
\ngreater U.S.-Turkey cooperation should not be forfeited for specific
\npolitical interests.<\/p>\n
\npartner with which it has a relationship comparable not only with newer
\npartners, such as India and Brazil, but ultimately with its closest allies,
\nsuch as Japan and South Korea. Turkey needs to see the United States in
\nthe same way, recognizing, however, that for all the potential in the new
\nU.S.-Turkey partnership, there are limitations to what the two countries
\ncan effectively achieve without adherence to the following principles:<\/p>\n
\nequality and mutual respect for each other\u2019s interests
\n\u2013
\nconfidentiality and mutual trust
\n\u2013
\nclose and intensive consultations to identify common goals and strategies
\non issues of critical interest that will provide mutual benefit<\/p>\n
\nno surprises in their respective foreign policies, especially in important
\nareas of interest to either country
\n\u2013
\nrecognition that there will inevitably be differences, and therefore
\nthat they must work together to manage them so that they do not
\ndamage the relationship
\nTo convert these principles into practical policies and concrete
\nresults, the United States and Turkey need to continue to further
\nstrengthen the close relationship forged by their two national leaders
\nand extend the principles to their respective administrations at every
\nlevel and across all relevant departments and agencies. Toward that end,
\nWashington and Ankara should establish a government-wide forum for
\ncabinet-level engagement on the model of the Strategic and Economic
\nDialogue with China or the strategic-level consultations with Israel.<\/p>\n
\nthe highest levels, Turkey and the United States should also conduct
\nfrequent and routine talks between their foreign policy and national
\nsecurity organizations to develop a common strategic framework and
\nlong-term perspective on the core issues of common concern. This dialogue
\non foreign policy and national security issues should be deepened
\nto the level of U.S. assistant secretaries and their Turkish counterparts
\nand should become frequent and routine at that level. In addition, intensive
\ninteraction and cooperation between the two countries in the field
\nand between their respective diplomats, military personnel, and intelligence
\nofficers is critical.<\/p>\n
\nStates and Turkey have resources, assets, and skills that will be complementary
\nin places that have not historically been areas of U.S.-Turkey
\ncooperation, including helping various Arab countries achieve democratic
\ntransitions; ending the bloodshed in Syria through the departure
\nof President Bashar al-Assad and the creation of a democratic, cross-
\nsectarian outcome; and dealing with the challenge posed by Iran\u2019s
\npursuit of nuclear weapons, support for terror, and intervention in the
\naffairs of its neighbors. Ankara and Washington must continue cooperating
\nto help sustain the economic and political progress in Iraq and
\nto assist Iraqis in resolving the remaining cross-sectarian problems
\nand tensions. In addition, both countries continue to have a mutually
\nreinforcing role to play in working to bring about stability, security,
\nand peace in Afghanistan and Pakistan.<\/p>\n
\nmove forward with the 2009 Turkey-Armenia protocols that held out
\nthe possibility of normalization of relations between the two countries.
\nChange to the status quo there will likely improve Ankara\u2019s relations
\nwith Yerevan, which will also ease the periodic tension between Turkey
\nand the United States over the Armenian issue and help pave the way
\nfor the leadership role in the Caucasus that Turkey desires. It would also
\nimprove the atmosphere for a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh
\nproblem, and the United States should be actively encouraging such a
\nresolution.<\/p>\n
\nbecause it seems intractable. The discovery of large deposits of natural
\ngas off the island\u2019s southern coast has the potential to increase tension
\nbetween Nicosia and Ankara given Turkey\u2019s insistence that Turkish
\nCypriots share in any economic benefits resulting from the island\u2019s natural
\nresources. Finally, as Turkey becomes more active commercially
\nand diplomatically in Africa, Washington and Ankara should develop
\ncooperative programs and initiatives there.<\/p>\n
\ntrade and investment remain a weak link in the U.S. relationship with
\nTurkey. Bilateral trade reached only $15 billion in 2010 and remains
\noverly dependent on large U.S. defense and aircraft sales. The parties
\nare giving increased attention to the economic relationship. During
\nPresident Obama\u2019s April 2009 visit to Turkey, he and President Abdullah
\nGul pledged to strengthen the economic pillar of the relationship.
\nIn October 2010, the United States and Turkey launched a cabinet-level
\neconomic commission, the Framework for Strategic Economic and
\nCommercial Cooperation, and a Turkey-U.S. Business Council. In
\nDecember 2011, Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. reinforced Washington\u2019s
\ninterest in economic ties with Turkey when he traveled to Istanbul
\nfor the Global Entrepreneurship Summit that Turkey hosted. Indeed,
\nTurkey is a priority country for numerous U.S. economic efforts. As
\npart of the National Export Initiative, it is one of six next-tier markets
\nto which the United States hopes to double exports by 2015. Turkey\u2019s
\nactive entrepreneurial sector makes it an ideal partner country for<\/p>\n
\nEntrepreneurship Summit in December 2011.<\/p>\n
\ninterests; it also reinforces the broader relationship. Increased
\ntrade and investment can also contribute to increased people-to-people
\nties, helping build constituencies for the relationship in both countries.<\/p>\n
\nrelationship, but without concrete steps and private sector interest,
\nthis component of the relationship will continue to be pushed off
\nthe agenda by more pressing political and military issues. As a result,
\nthe United States and Turkey must explore new ways of deepening an
\nunderdeveloped economic relationship that will not only benefit both
\ncountries economically but also provide a cushion for ties during times
\nof stress.<\/p>\n
\nU.S.-Turkey free trade agreement (FTA) would be the best approach.
\nThere is a widely held view, however, that Ankara\u2019s relations with the
\nEU preclude such an agreement. But it is unclear whether the barriers
\nare political or legal. Given the benefits to both countries, the matter
\nshould be seriously explored to see whether these barriers, if real, could
\nbe overcome\u2014especially since Turkey seems to have been able to enter
\nFTAs with many other states. In any event, Turkey and the United
\nStates should also adopt a variety of other measures to enhance their
\neconomic relationship.<\/p>\n
\nBilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) and the 1999 Turkey-U.S. Trade and
\nInvestment Agreement (TIFA). One way to do this is to negotiate a
\nnew BIT with improved provisions for dispute resolution and investor
\nprotections. Another is to increase the frequency of the yearly discussions
\nthat take place under the TIFA in an effort to overcome obstacles
\nthat U.S. companies have had in the areas of alternative energy, genetically
\nmodified foods, and pharmaceutical industries in Turkey, and that
\nTurkish companies have encountered while exporting their goods to
\nthe United States in the areas of steel and other sectors.<\/p>\n
\nto the BIT and TIFA frameworks. Rather, officials in Washington
\nand Ankara must think bigger. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
\nthat the United States envisages for Asia contains a variety of elements
\nthat are applicable to the U.S.-Turkey economic relationship. To be sure,
\nthe TPP has a much broader scope than a \u201cTurkish-American Partnership\u201d
\n(TAP), but incorporating the TPP\u2019s emphasis on market access,
\nregulatory compatibility, business facilitation, assistance for small and
\nmedium-sized enterprises, and promotion of trade in cutting-edge
\ntechnologies would significantly bolster economic ties.<\/p>\n
\nsome of which may involve the EU-Turkey Customs Union agreement
\nas discussed earlier. As a result, the TAP could be part and parcel of
\nlarger discussions about the establishment of a transatlantic free trade
\narea, but it should not be held hostage to them. A TAP would strengthen
\nwhat is currently considered the weakest link in the U.S.-Turkey relationship,
\npotentially spur deeper economic ties across the Atlantic, and
\nserve the Turkish-American diplomatic, political, and military alliance.
\nIf obstacles to a TAP prove insurmountable, the parties might try a more
\nlimited agreement focused on services, investment, and an intellectual
\nproperty rights accord.<\/p>\n
\ngovernors, mayors of large cities, and business association leaders
\nto undertake trade missions to Turkey. The Turkish market of almost
\neighty million consumers is largely unknown to most American businesses,
\nsave large firms such as Boeing, Microsoft, Citibank, IBM,
\nFord Motor Company, and Motorola. Although some well-developed
\nTurkish business organizations are dedicated to promoting small and
\nmedium-sized enterprises, there are no corresponding U.S. organizations,
\nwhich hampers American access to Turkey\u2019s dynamic and growing
\nmarket.<\/p>\n
\ninternal political, social, and economic development and its recent
\nhistory. Over the course of the past decade, Turkey has simultaneously
\nbecome more European, more Muslim, more democratic, and more
\nmodern. In addition, Turkey\u2014an economic underachiever only ten
\nyears ago\u2014now boasts the world\u2019s seventeenth-largest economy and
\nhas ambitions to be one of the world\u2019s top ten economies by 2023.<\/p>\n
\nparty presided over shortly after coming to power. Indeed, the reforms
\nthat Ankara undertook in earnest to meet the EU\u2019s criteria for beginning
\nmembership negotiations in 2003 and 2004 had a dramatic effect
\non Turkish politics.<\/p>\n
\nno fewer than seven comprehensive legislative reform packages and a
\nvariety of major constitutional amendments under the auspices of two
\nAKP governments. The changes fell under broad categories of judicial,
\nhuman rights, economic, minority rights, and foreign policy reforms.
\nAnd though many of these legislative changes are not controversial, a
\nsignificant number helped undermine the semiauthoritarian core of
\nwhat had been Turkey\u2019s military-dominated political system.<\/p>\n
\ncivilian-military state security courts were abolished, an entirely new
\npenal code was established, the death penalty was banned, amendments
\nto the antiterror law made it more difficult to prosecute citizens based
\non speech alone, and some prohibitions on broadcasting and teaching
\nin Kurdish were lifted.<\/p>\n
\nelites\u2014military officers and the civilian establishment\u2014to undermine
\ntheir political opponents. For example, the new AKP-dominated parliament
\namended Articles 76 and 78 of the constitution to make it more
\ndifficult to ban political parties and politicians from the political arena.
\nWithout these changes, Prime Minister Erdogan, who had been banned
\nfrom politics and imprisoned, would have been able to serve as party
\nleader but not as prime minister.<\/p>\n
\ndiminished the Turkish General Staff\u2019s autonomy or compromised
\nthe channels through which the military had historically influenced
\npolitics. The AKP pushed through the Grand National Assembly several
\nchanges to various government boards through which the armed
\nforces exercised influence. Military representatives were removed from
\nTurkey\u2019s Council of Higher Education and High Audio-Visual Board.
\nEstablished after the military coup of September 12, 1980, these bodies
\nwere useful platforms from which the senior command could ensure
\nKemalist orthodoxy by prohibiting Islamism, Kurdish nationalism, and
\nsocialism from university curricula and the media.<\/p>\n
\nimpose its will on civilian politicians were made to the National Security
\nCouncil (known by its Turkish acronym, MGK). First, the parliament
\nincreased the number of civilians on the council to outnumber
\nthe five officers who held seats. Second, a civilian was appointed secretary-
\ngeneral of the MGK, a position that has always been reserved for
\na senior officer. In addition, to further limit the influence of the MGK,
\nthe Grand National Assembly reduced the number of council meetings
\nfrom monthly to bimonthly, unless the prime minister or president of
\nthe republic specifically requested the MGK to convene.<\/p>\n
\nthe MGK and its secretariat. Article 118 of the military\u2019s 1982 constitution
\ndirected the government to \u201cgive priority consideration to the
\ndecisions of the National Security Council,\u201d which, given patterns of
\ncivil-military relations, was tantamount to an order. Under the AKP\u2019s
\nseventh political reform package, however, the duty of the MGK was
\nredefined: \u201cReaching advisory decisions regarding the designation,
\ndetermination, and implementations of the state\u2019s security policies
\nwithin the prescribed frameworks, determining a method for providing
\nthe necessary coordination, and reporting these advisory decisions<\/p>\n
\nmilitary staffed, was stripped of its executive powers. Consequently,
\nthe secretariat no longer has the capacity to conduct its own national
\nsecurity investigations.<\/p>\n
\nthrough control of the budget. The funds allocated to the MGK secretariat
\nwere placed under the exclusive control of the prime minister
\nrather than the chief of the General Staff. Finally, the new regulations
\nlifted the veil of secrecy on the decrees that \u201cgoverned the activities
\nof the National Security Council General-Secretariat,\u201d which would
\nhenceforth be published in the Official Gazette.<\/p>\n
\nfour-decade effort to join the EU was dramatic. In October 2004,
\nthe Commission of the European Union found that the institutional
\nchanges that Turkey had undertaken met the EU\u2019s Copenhagen criteria,
\nwhich laid out clear benchmarks that Ankara had to meet to begin
\nmembership negotiations. As a result, the commission recommended
\nthat the European Council begin accession talks with Turkey, which
\nopened in 2005.<\/p>\n
\nopposed to the political changes that the AKP undertook. Yet the
\nTurkish General Staff was constrained from undermining either the
\nEU-related reforms or the AKP because of extraordinary popularity
\nof the reforms at the time (2003\u20132004). By some measures, anywhere
\nbetween 60 and 70 percent of the Turkish public supported the AKP\u2019s
\nconstitutional reform packages. Had the military moved against the
\nAKP or blocked the reforms, it would have risked the standing of the
\narmed forces with the public\u2014which perennially stood at 90 percent
\napproval\u2014and damaged the military\u2019s long-standing narrative that it
\nwas the engine of Turkey\u2019s modernization and democratization.<\/p>\n
\nof the fact that although the principles of Kemalism\u2014the ideology
\nespoused by Ataturk\u2014remained important political and cultural
\ntouchstones for many, Turkish society had become more complex and<\/p>\n
\npolitical order.2<\/p>\n
\nUrban cosmopolitan elites, big business, and large numbers of
\naverage Turks turned out for the AKP only after the party established
\na track record. Indeed, in 2002, the AKP rode to power a somewhat
\ndisjointed coalition composed primarily of pious Muslims, Kurds, and
\nTurkish nationalists. The party only received 34 percent of the vote,
\nbut its 363 seats in parliament made it possible to pass the EU-inspired
\nreforms with relative ease.3<\/p>\n
\nTurkey during the AKP era are related to religion and the expression of
\nit in the public sphere. The AKP has made it more acceptable and safer
\nfor Turks to express their Muslim identity. For example, with the help
\nof the opposition Nationalist Movement Party, AKP passed a constitutional
\namendment in 2008 lifting the ban on the hijab (headscarf) at
\npublic universities. Even though the courts overturned the amendment,
\nit is clear that pious women are showing up in fashionable areas of Istanbul,
\nrestaurants, and professional offices\u2014places they were previously
\nunwelcome. Even though there is no hard evidence that more women
\nare donning the hijab, this development, which is related to the rise and
\nconfidence of a new, more religiously conservative middle and upper-
\nmiddle class, has unsettled Turkey\u2019s secular establishment, which fears
\nIslamization of Turkish society.4<\/p>\n
\nsecular Turks has not been settled. Turks are undoubtedly freer to
\nexpress their religious beliefs in ways they were unable to before\u2014a
\npositive development, representing an overall improvement in personal
\nand political freedoms in Turkey. And though the AKP has given impetus
\nto a process in which Turks are discarding the political and societal
\nconstraints of Kemalism in favor of a more diverse and complex society,
\nsecularist concerns are not entirely overblown. Pious Turks feel more
\ncomfortable under the changes the AKP has wrought, but secular Turks
\nfeel less secure. To ensure social stability and a democratic trajectory, it
\nis thus incumbent on the new establishment to reassure secular-minded
\nTurks that their way of life has a place in Turkish society, even if secularists
\nfailed to do the same for observant Muslims during their long
\nperiod of ascendancy.<\/p>\n
\nto the dramatic changes in Turkish society and solidified the AKP\u2019s
\npolitical dominance. A combination of reforms, International Monetary
\nFund (IMF) discipline, and the AKP\u2019s overall management of the
\neconomy has produced a remarkable economic transformation. Indeed,
\nthe Turkish economy has gone from being perennially troublesome and
\nIMF-recidivist to a European and global success story.<\/p>\n
\n(GDP) was $231 billion; in 2010 it stood at $736 billion. From
\n2002 through 2007, the Turkish economy grew by an average of over
\n6 percent a year. Exports have more than tripled, annual inflation has
\ndropped from highs of 60 to 80 percent in the 1990s to a more palatable
\n6 to 10 percent in the past decade, and interest rates have dropped
\ndramatically. In 2010, GDP expanded by 9 percent\u2014placing Turkey
\namong the top ten fastest-growing global economies.5 Foreign direct
\ninvestment (FDI), which amounted to $684 million in 1990, increased
\nexponentially to $9.1 billion in 2010. Turkey also now boasts a vibrant
\nand expanding middle class.6<\/p>\n
\nlaid three decades ago when then prime minister Turgut Ozal began
\ntearing down Ankara\u2019s experiment with the policy of import substitution
\nindustrialization in favor of a free-market economy. In many ways,
\nOzal set the stage for the emergence of the so-called Anatolian Tigers\u2014
\nsmall and medium-sized businesses in central cities such as Konya and
\nKayseri that over time have become major exporters and have challenged
\nthe predominance of Turkey\u2019s traditional, large holding companies,
\nwhich are under the control of a relatively few prominent families.<\/p>\n
\n1996, Turkey and the EU signed a customs union agreement that paved
\nthe way for a dramatic increase in Turkish exports into Europe. The
\nagreement was a boon to Turkish business, which gained greater access
\nto the EU\u2019s vast market, and, in response to European competition,
\nTurkish firms were forced to become more efficient and productive.
\nThis, in turn, helped Turkish producers in other parts of the world.<\/p>\n
\nlaid during a wrenching economic crisis in 2001 and 2002 when World
\nBank economist Kemal Dervis was lured home to Turkey and given<\/p>\n
\neconomic affairs under then prime minister Bulent Ecevit. Dervis
\nmost importantly instituted sweeping deregulation and banking sector
\nreform. The latter in particular sought to root out corrupt practices
\nwithin state-owned financial institutions that benefited politicians but
\nled to a collapse of confidence in the banking sector.<\/p>\n
\nreforms, and the relationship with the IMF has disciplined Prime Minister
\nErdogan\u2019s populist impulses. Initially, the prime minister and
\nhis team sought to temper the IMF\u2019s conditions as the AKP sought to
\nincrease wages and pensions for civil servants; maintain price supports
\nfor the agricultural sector; delay a proposed public procurement law,
\nwhich was intended to clean up the crony capitalism and nepotism that
\nwas rife in public contracting; and undertake a tax amnesty. Ultimately,
\nthe exigencies of instilling confidence in international investors and
\nAnkara\u2019s need for further IMF assistance forced the AKP to drop or
\ndramatically alter its policies in these areas.<\/p>\n
\nappeal of populism might be too great for Prime Minister Erdogan,
\nwhen Turkey finally ended its IMF program in 2007, the AKP maintained
\nmacroeconomic discipline. Indeed, the AKP\u2019s economic team
\nhas proved pragmatic, working both to ensure the conditions necessary
\nfor Turkey\u2019s spectacular growth and to help Turkey weather the 2008
\nglobal economic downturn. Finally, the party\u2019s pro-business policies
\nhave been a significant source of domestic support, particularly from
\nthe emerging class of global entrepreneurs.<\/p>\n
\na political system, foreign policy, economy, and society that remain
\nvery much in transition. For example, although Turkey is more democratic
\ntoday than it was when the AKP first came to power, it is not a
\nconsolidated democracy\u2014a condition under which \u201cdemocracy is self-
\nenforcing . . . when all the relevant political forces find it best to continue
\nto submit their interests and values to the uncertain interplay of
\ninstitutions.\u201d7 Both Turkey\u2019s authoritarian legacies and the nondemocratic
\nremedies to which the AKP has sometimes resorted during its
\ntenure (discussed below) indicate that it is too early to declare Turkey a
\nmature, liberal democracy.<\/p>\n
\nAnkara\u2019s \u201cnew foreign policy\u201d and its potential leadership role in
\na changing Middle East hide a more uneven track record in Turkey\u2019s
\nforeign relations. Although Turkey has become the seventeenth-largest
\neconomy in the world, it continues to confront economic challenges,
\nsuch as high unemployment and a yawning current account deficit.
\nAdditionally, Turkish society continues to struggle with a number of
\ncomplicated fault lines, including religious-secular, Turkish-Kurdish,
\nand wealthy-poor.<\/p>\n
\nanD Political rights<\/p>\n
\nis intimately related to the religious-secular, ethnic, urban-rural, and
\nsocioeconomic divides\u2014that raises questions, but this is also an area
\nripe for opportunity.<\/p>\n
\nmeans universally positive. It must be recognized that the AKP was
\nunder political assault at times during its first six years in power. In 2008,
\nfor example, the party confronted the possibility of closure for allegedly
\nseeking to undermine the secular nature of the Turkish state. The Constitutional
\nCourt found evidence supporting the charges, but the AKP
\nwas not closed because the judges fell one vote short of the seven (out
\nof eleven) required to close a party. Instead, the AKP was forced to pay
\na $20 million fine. Even taking such political assaults into account, the
\nfact remains that since the party\u2019s landslide reelection in the summer of
\n2007, the government has backtracked on reforms and displayed at least
\na majoritarian view of democracy, if not an authoritarian streak. Still,
\ndemocracy is a continuous process, not an end point. Turkey finds itself
\nin the sometimes difficult process of a transition to more democratic
\npolitics, which will have both strides forward and setbacks.<\/p>\n
\npunitive tax fine on the Dogan media group, which is owned by
\nan opponent of the AKP; it has taken legal action against Koc Holding,
\nTurkey\u2019s top industrial conglomerate, in a manner that suggests the case
\nis politically motivated; and Prime Minister Erdogan has used a legal
\ninvestigation that initially targeted Turkey\u2019s so-called deep state\u2014an
\nalleged partnership of military, security, and intelligence officials who
\nguard Ataturk\u2019s legacy\u2014to go after the AKP\u2019s critics in the media, academia,
\nand the bureaucracy. Indeed, many Turkish liberals initially supported
\nwhat has come to be known as the Ergenekon Case as a critical
\nstep toward uprooting Turkey\u2019s national security state. Yet in time some
\nliberals soured on the investigation because of what they perceived as
\ndefects in the government\u2019s case against certain suspects and a lack of
\ndue process, which has fueled suspicions that the prosecution is politically
\nmotivated. More generally, the AKP has started to employ and rely
\non many of the same abusive judicial tactics that previous governments
\nused to silence critics, including long detentions of suspects pending
\ntrial and indictments that appear to be based on innuendo and gossip.<\/p>\n
\nthe constitution with little regard for the opposition. For example, the
\nconstitutional amendments of September 2010 raised some concerns
\nin Turkey and the West, although both the EU and the Obama administration
\npraised the changes affecting the judiciary. Few disagree that<\/p>\n
\nmeet international standards, and it is generally accepted that Turkey\u2019s
\njudicial selection process needs to be less politicized. When secular-
\nnationalist parties held power, these parties packed the courts with
\njudges who shared their worldview. After these parties were voted from
\npower, the judiciary prevented the new electoral majority from implementing
\npolicies that reflected the popular will. The 2010 reforms will
\ngive the Turkish government the ability to appoint new judges and fill
\nfuture vacancies with judges who better reflect the views of the majority.
\nThe AKP insists that its reforms will both improve the quality of the
\njudiciary and make it more representative. Critics worry, however, that
\nthe judiciary will become too responsive to the current political majority,
\nand their concerns need to be taken seriously.<\/p>\n
\nbut some argue that the reforms nevertheless have the potential
\nto replace one politicized group of judges with another. Some Turkish
\nand Western critics charge that the amendments do nothing to bolster
\nthe independence of the judiciary or the judicial system more generally,
\nthough other observers argue that the criticism is overblown and
\npoint out that the changes conform to EU criteria. Regardless, the best
\nsolution to the problem of a politicized judiciary would be to establish
\nappointment procedures that give people confidence in the quality and
\nimpartiality of judges, such as through requirements of supermajority
\nvotes for appointments to important courts. A new appointment process
\nmust be coupled with checks and balances that both ensure an independent
\njudiciary can function without improper interference from the
\nlegislative or executive branches and are limited to a sphere of authority
\nappropriate to the judicial branch.<\/p>\n
\nstate organizations that had become bastions of Kemalist orthodoxy,
\nsuch as the Turkish Academy of Sciences. Again, as with the judiciary,
\nthe AKP\u2019s answer to the ideological imbalance of the academy was to
\nimplement a rigged and politicized process rather than to establish
\nregulations and norms that would have protected Turkish science from
\npoliticization.<\/p>\n
\nInternet filters that were, spokesmen argued, intended only to protect
\nchildren. After a public outcry, fueled by suspicions that the AKP was
\nactually interested in quelling political dissent, the restrictions were<\/p>\n
\nthe AKP, however. In 2007, the Turkish judiciary\u2014after a legal case was
\nbrought before the courts by hardcore Turkish nationalists\u2014ordered a
\nban on the video-sharing website YouTube, on the basis of videos that
\ndisparaged the memory of Ataturk.<\/p>\n
\nthe Internet, freedom of the press and freedom of expression remain
\nserious concerns. More than ninety journalists are currently in Turkish
\njails. The arrests and general sense that freedom of the press has
\nbeen eroded\u2014despite reforms in 2003 to strengthen press freedom\u2014
\nprompted protests in Istanbul\u2019s Taksim Square in the spring of 2011.<\/p>\n
\n2011 appearance on CNN-Turk, U.S. secretary of state Hillary Rodham
\nClinton rebuked the Turkish government for its treatment of the press
\nand its policies on the Internet:<\/p>\n
\nin Turkey, it is . . . the area of freedom of expression and freedom
\nof the media. I do not think it is necessary or in Turkey\u2019s interest
\nto be cracking down on journalists and bloggers and the Internet,
\nbecause I think Turkey is strong enough and dynamic enough with
\nenough voices that, if there are differences of opinion, those will
\nbe drowned out in the marketplace of ideas.<\/p>\n
\nof the Turkish government to defend freedom of expression and freedom
\nof the press.<\/p>\n
\n2003 and 2004 to forge a more open, modern, and pluralist society,
\nquestions remain about Turkey\u2019s democratic transition. In some areas,
\nthe AKP-led government has used the same nondemocratic tools as its
\npredecessor, making it appear no more liberal than previous Turkish
\ngovernments.<\/p>\n
\n49.95 percent of the popular vote, the idiosyncrasies of Turkey\u2019s
\nelectoral law are such that even though Prime Minister Erdogan currently
\ncommands a majority in the 550-seat Grand National Assembly,
\nit represents the smallest number of seats since the AKP came to power
\nin 2002. The government will thus be forced to pursue a pragmatic<\/p>\n
\nThis is good news, given that the prime minister\u2019s critics harbor
\nfear that Prime Minister Erdogan, whom they accuse of having authoritarian
\ntendencies, will use the process to aggrandize his own political
\npower. This will be much harder in the current Grand National Assembly,
\nwhich, even as the AKP remains the dominant party, is unable to
\npursue fundamental political change on its own without having to rely
\non a referendum.<\/p>\n
\ndemocratic practices is not the only problem in Turkish politics.
\nTurkey\u2019s opposition parties are generally weak and deeply divided
\ninternally. Turkey\u2019s transition to democracy would be aided immeasurably
\nby the regeneration of traditional parties or the development
\nof new ones invested with democratic ideals that can serve as viable
\nalternatives to the AKP. Without such parties, the AKP will continue
\nto be the only serious choice for many Turks who, though they may
\nnot completely share AKP\u2019s worldview, nevertheless find even less to
\nsupport in either the Republican People\u2019s Party or the National People\u2019s
\nMovement Party, which hold 135 and 53 seats in the parliament,
\nrespectively.<\/p>\n
\nof undertaking a wide range of political and economic reforms. In light
\nof recent concerns about democratic reversals, however, the Task Force
\nrecommends that the United States and Turkey\u2019s other partners in the
\nCommunity of Democracies\u2014which was created in part for precisely
\nthis purpose\u2014offer Turkey support and advice toward reenergizing its
\npolitical reform program. It would be best if the EU could, as it did in
\n2003 and 2004, serve as an anchor of Turkish political change, but the
\nstalled EU membership negotiations make that impossible.<\/p>\n
\nplay in encouraging Turkey to write a constitution that will advance
\nand deepen Turkish democracy. They should encourage their Turkish
\ncolleagues to ensure that the drafting process is open, inclusive, and
\ntransparent. The resulting document should enshrine the principles of
\nboth majority rule and protection of minority rights, recognizing that<\/p>\n
\ntheir values on others.<\/p>\n
\nmilitary and civilian authority\u2014enshrining respect for the military
\nbut remaining under civilian control, free from military tutelage. It can
\nalso codify Turkey\u2019s unique approach to the relationship between religion
\nand the state\u2014using Prime Minister Erdogan\u2019s September 2011
\nstatement in Cairo about the importance of secular politics in Muslim
\nsocieties as a starting point\u2014and thus provide a useful model for postrevolutionary
\nMiddle Eastern states struggling with this question.<\/p>\n
\nembedded in a system of checks and balances: not just a popularly
\nelected parliament, but also a free press, independent political parties,
\nmechanisms for citizens to pursue their grievances through
\npolitically neutral institutions, and an independent judiciary. As discussed
\nearlier, this last element requires a judicial appointments process
\nthat provides public confidence in the quality and impartiality of
\nthose appointed and constitutional provisions that spell out clearly an
\nappropriate but limited role for the judiciary that is consistent with a
\ndemocratic system.<\/p>\n
\npolitical reform. After all, given the particularities of Turkey\u2019s electoral
\nlaws, it may not be politically possible for the Turks to write a new constitution.
\nAs a result, Washington and Ankara\u2019s other international
\npartners should urge the Turks to abolish or reform nondemocratic
\nlaws, regulations, rules, and decrees that, in tandem with the existing
\nconstitution, undermine Turkey\u2019s democratic practices. These include
\nArticle 301 of the penal code, which makes insulting Turkishness a
\ncrime. Despite the limited use of Article 301 recently, it remains in place
\nand thus contributes to persistent questions about Turkey\u2019s democratic
\ntransition. In addition, Turkey needs to abolish the internal service
\ncodes of the armed forces that previously served as the legal justification
\nfor the military\u2019s intervention in politics and legal provisions constraining
\nfreedom of religion, including those that prevent opening the
\nGreek-Orthodox Halki Seminary, which was shuttered in 1971. There
\nhas been progress on this latter issue. At the March 2012 Seoul Nuclear
\nSecurity Summit, President Obama congratulated Prime Minister
\nErdogan on the Turkish government\u2019s apparent decision to open the
\nseminary, though the Turkish government has not yet given a date when<\/p>\n
\nthreshold for parties to enter parliament, which stands at 10 percent and
\nlimits the voices represented in the Grand National Assembly.<\/p>\n
\nthe rule of law, criminalization of political differences, and press freedom
\nin Turkey by ending the investigations of the Ergenekon case\u2014
\neither completing the legal proceedings against those accused of
\ncrimes or releasing them\u2014and resolving the cases of the ninety-six
\njournalists now detained in Turkish jails. Turkey should also restructure
\nits court system to ensure timely trials that do not drag on for
\nyears, or even decades.<\/p>\n
\nthe opposition parties\u2014recognizing that a vibrant opposition is central
\nto democratic political systems. A number of measures could be undertaken
\nto address this problem and would benefit or be available to all
\npolitical parties, including the AKP itself, especially when it faces the
\nchallenge any party faces in making the transition from its founders to
\na long-lasting institution. Indeed, as the party is now into its third term,
\nquestions have arisen in Turkey about leadership succession within the
\nparty\u2014a particular concern if the prime minister or president leaves
\nthe political scene in the next few years. Whether part of the constitutional
\ndrafting process or not, Turkey\u2019s political parties law needs to be
\nbrought in line with those of its fellow members in the Community of
\nDemocracies. In addition, Turkey\u2019s partners within the Community
\nof Democracies that sponsor organizations such as the International
\nRepublican Institute or the National Democratic Institute should make
\nthem available to legal Turkish parties to offer technical advice on party
\nbuilding. They can also promote exchanges between political parties
\nfrom countries in the Community of Democracies and the full range
\nof legal Turkish parties on issues such as human rights, rule of law, and
\nthe protection of minorities. This could be part of a broader program of
\npeople-to-people exchanges, exchanges between civil society groups,
\nand congressional and parliamentary exchanges.<\/p>\n
\nauthoritarian political system was the perceived threat of ethnic<\/p>\n
\nfounded the Turkish Republic, he based his new political order and
\nsocial setting in part on the idea of Turkishness, which did not accommodate
\nother ethnic groups in the state carved from what remained
\nof the Ottoman Empire. From almost the beginning, many Kurds
\nresisted efforts at assimilation and repression of their language and
\nunique culture.<\/p>\n
\npolitics because it has often been violent. As a result, successive Turkish
\ngovernments have sought largely nondemocratic solutions to the challenge
\nthat Kurdish political, social, and cultural consciousness is perceived
\nto pose to the security and integrity of the Turkish state. To be
\nsure, Turkey\u2019s leaders and citizens have had good reason for these fears.
\nAt one end of the spectrum, Kurdish nationalists have espoused separatism
\nand used violence in pursuit of their goals. The ensuing conflict
\nhas killed more than forty thousand people since the mid-1980s. At the
\nother end, many Kurds have sought redress of their grievances and have
\ndemanded cultural and linguistic rights through Turkey\u2019s political institutions.
\nNeither violence nor politics has been successful.<\/p>\n
\nof Kurds because the AKP is widely regarded as relatively more progressive
\non the Kurdish issue than other parties, except those political
\ngroups based on Kurdish identity, such as the pro-Kurdish Peace and
\nDemocracy Party (BDP) and its now-shuttered predecessors. In 2008,
\nPrime Minister Erdogan proposed a $12 billion development program
\nin Turkey\u2019s Kurdish southeast as a way of giving residents of the area,
\nwhich has been a bastion of support for the Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party
\n(PKK), a stake in the Turkish economy and thus, it was hoped, in the
\npolitical system. The plan was never implemented due to political
\nopposition.<\/p>\n
\nassumption that economic success would result in political quiescence.
\nIn 2008 and 2009, the AKP began promoting what was called a Kurdish
\nopening, which observers suspected would address in fundamental
\nways the Kurds\u2019 demands for a more inclusive politics. Ultimately, the
\nopening proved far smaller than initially hoped for, if only because it
\nwas purposefully ambiguous and thus easily left to wither and die once
\nopposition grew to any fundamental alteration of the status of Turkey\u2019s
\nKurdish citizens. It remains unclear exactly why Prime Minister<\/p>\n
\nmade it all the more difficult politically for the government to revive the
\nopening or pursue new outreach to the Kurds.<\/p>\n
\nlife of the country, resolving what is universally known as the Kurdish
\nproblem would do much to improve the quality of Turkish democracy.
\nThis issue is among the biggest obstacles to Turkey\u2019s democratic ambitions
\nand the root of many of its illiberal practices.<\/p>\n
\nextending greater cultural and political rights to Kurds, offering Prime
\nMinister Erdogan little incentive to tackle the issue again. However,
\nthe overwhelming mandate the government received in the July 2011
\nelections\u2014even if the vote did not give the AKP enough parliamentary
\nseats to change the constitution on its own\u2014provides an opportunity
\nfor Prime Minister Erdogan to pursue a new Kurdish initiative.<\/p>\n
\nPrime Minister Erdogan to pursue a more progressive approach to the
\nKurds of Turkey. With the armed forces less of a factor in Turkish politics,
\na major obstacle to a political solution for the Kurdish problem has
\nbeen removed. Turkey\u2019s two main opposition groups, the Republican
\nPeople\u2019s Party and Nationalist Movement Party, have often opposed
\ninitiatives related to Kurdish rights, yet recent elections indicate that
\ntheir political appeal is limited. Still, for all of the AKP\u2019s emphasis on
\nMuslim solidarity, it too has a core nationalist constituency that makes
\nit hard to advance a solution to the Kurdish problem, especially when
\nPKK violence is on the upswing.<\/p>\n
\nwith the Kurds, but has shown its support for Turkey by remaining
\nsteadfast in its opposition to the PKK. In the past, the Kurdish issue
\nmarred Ankara\u2019s relations with Iraqi Kurds. Turkey\u2019s efforts to improve
\nrelations with Iraq\u2019s Kurdistan Regional Government has paid off as
\nthe Iraqi Kurdish leadership has, in turn, encouraged a peaceful settlement
\nof Turkey\u2019s Kurdish issue.<\/p>\n
\nbetween the Kurds and the Turkish state is perhaps the most sensitive<\/p>\n
\nWashington and Ankara, President Obama has an opportunity to use
\nhis warm relationship with Prime Minister Erdogan and his personal
\nprestige among Turks to persuade them that a new Kurdish opening
\nwould be worthwhile. The United States should encourage Prime Minister
\nErdogan to build on the steps he took in late November 2011, when
\nhe apologized for the massacre of approximately thirteen thousand
\nAlevi Kurdish residents of Dersim (now Tunceli) between 1936 and
\n1939 and to make a new gesture toward Turkey\u2019s Kurdish community.
\nAlthough some Kurds were suspicious of Prime Minister Erdogan\u2019s
\nDersim gesture, believing it was more about competition between the
\nAKP and the opposition Republican People\u2019s Party, which controlled
\nthe government at the time of the killings, a taboo has been broken.
\nThere is an opportunity for the prime minister to build on the Dersim
\napology and the 2009 Kurdish opening to renew efforts to resolve the
\nKurdish problem.<\/p>\n
\nTurkey has not occurred in a vacuum. It is a natural response to decades
\nof estrangement and disaffection. While continuing to demand an end
\nto PKK violence, Washington should privately encourage Ankara to
\nundertake economic, educational, and cultural initiatives to ameliorate
\nthe alienation of large numbers of Kurds and answer their demands
\nfor official recognition of their identity. This is not only an imperative
\nfor the less developed and predominantly Kurdish southeast, but a
\nnational issue, as the combination of urbanization and decades of violence
\nhas moved large numbers of Kurds to other parts of the country.
\nFor example, Istanbul is now the largest Kurdish city in the world after
\nIrbil, Iraq. Washington should encourage Prime Minister Erdogan
\nto follow through with his intention to hold talks with the Peace and
\nDemocracy Party (BDP), which currently holds more than thirty seats
\nin parliament and controls almost all major municipalities in the southeast.
\n8 Talks between the government and the BDP would be a welcome
\ndevelopment because many Kurds look to the BDP to speak on their
\nbehalf and regard it as a natural partner for Prime Minister Erdogan in
\npursuing a solution to Kurdish demands for greater official recognition
\nand rights.<\/p>\n
\nin Irbil to double their efforts to pressure the PKK to abandon its
\narmed struggle against Turkey.<\/p>\n
\nunprecedented levels of foreign investment, export growth, and rising
\ndomestic consumption. Yet the country\u2019s rapid economic expansion
\nposes significant downside risks, and analysts remain concerned about
\noverheating. The current account deficit, which in 2011 was $77.2 billion,
\nballooned to nearly 10 percent of GDP before declining in early 2012,
\nand domestic credit growth have made Turkey vulnerable to external
\nshocks.9 Reflecting this reality along with weak European economies,
\nthe Turkish lira was the second-worst-performing emerging-market
\ncurrency in 2011. Inflation, which ruined Turkey\u2019s economy and reputation
\nin the 1980s and 1990s, rose in 2011. Some analysts warn that a
\nspeculative bubble has developed in the real estate market. Observers
\nexpect economic growth to slow in 2012; how much and whether the
\ngovernment can manage a soft landing are significant questions.<\/p>\n
\nbut concerns exist that Prime Minister Erdogan\u2019s political calculations
\nhave led the government to prioritize high growth at the expense of
\nmacroeconomic stability. Analysts have questioned the Turkish Central
\nBank\u2019s decision to not tighten monetary policy by raising interest rates
\nin the latter half of 2011. Rating agencies have raised concerns about the
\nbank\u2019s unorthodox monetary policy. The prime minister\u2019s public pronouncements
\nthat interest rates should be at zero, coupled with recent
\ncomments by Minister of Economy Zafar Caglayan complaining about
\nwhat he called the interest rate lobby, reinforce reservations about the
\nindependence of financial institutions such as the Central Bank. In
\nthe fourth quarter of 2011, however, the Central Bank did raise short-
\nterm interest rates, which had the desired effect of reducing consumer
\ndemand for credit and domestic production. This may have been precisely
\nwhat the Turkish economy needed to avoid overheating.<\/p>\n
\nactivist foreign policy. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu\u2019s approach
\nto Turkish foreign policy combines diplomatic engagement with commercial
\ndiplomacy. Consequently, Turkey has concluded seventeen free
\ntrade agreements with many more in negotiations, as well as numerous
\nagreements on visa-free travel for business people and tourists.
\nLarge Turkish business delegations traveling abroad have become a
\nprominent feature of Turkish commercial diplomacy. Ankara has also<\/p>\n
\nTurkish trade with the Middle East is now 26 percent of its total foreign
\ntrade, a figure that is likely to grow. In Africa\u2014not a traditional arena
\nof Turkish foreign policy\u2014Turkey opened twenty-one new diplomatic
\nmissions in 2010 and 2011 and completed customs union agreements
\nwith South Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Cameroon.<\/p>\n
\nin December 2011 Amazon.com signed a partnership deal with
\nCiceksepeti.com, a Turkish e-commerce site that allows customers
\nto send flowers and gifts all over Turkey; several major initial public
\nofferings will be floated in 2012. The government also plans legislation
\nrelated to stock and shareholding that will make Turkey an even more
\nattractive investment.<\/p>\n
\nloom, such as keeping inflation manageable (the IMF projects a 5 percent
\ninflation rate in 2012), reducing unemployment, and grappling
\nwith the continuing problem of the current account deficit. In addition,
\ndespite the considerable growth in trade and investment with and in the
\nMiddle East and burgeoning commercial ties to other regions, the bulk
\nof Turkey\u2019s economic activity remains with the EU, which is itself grappling
\nwith massive debt and slowing economies.10 A struggling EU is an
\nobvious problem for Turkish traders.<\/p>\n
\nslowdown, but it should do more to facilitate collaboration between<\/p>\n
\nopportunities for American firms, and promote better economic
\nfutures for countries of common interest. The United States needs
\nto make clear that it recognizes and supports Turkey\u2019s enormous economic
\nprogress and potential. It should also recognize that Turkey can
\nbe a force for the greater regional economic integration that is so essential
\nto bringing peace and prosperity to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central
\nAsia, and the Middle East.
\nIndeed, in recognition of Turkey\u2019s new role, the United States should
\njoin with other nations to sponsor seats for Turkey in the IMF executive
\nboard and an enhanced role in the G20. These institutions, as well as the<\/p>\n
\ncountries (including that\/those of the United States), should intensify
\ntheir interactions with their Turkish counterparts so as to assist
\nTurkey in addressing the main threats to its future economic health.<\/p>\n
\neconomic reform in Turkey that will spur next-generation economic
\ngrowth and more effective partnerships with U.S. and Western businesses.
\nImportant steps include more modern intellectual property
\nrights legislation and enforcement; deregulation and other steps to
\npromote markets and competition in the energy sector; more transparency
\nand predictability in the areas of taxes, tax enforcement, other
\nstate regulatory functions, and the rule of law; and labor market reform.
\nTo give this teeth, the United States should consider proposing some
\nkind of agreement or agreements to facilitate freer trade in services,
\nstrengthen investor protections, and\/or bolster competition, any of
\nwhich would be substantively useful, send important signals to traders
\nand investors, and avoid what may be policy or legal barriers to a bilateral
\nfree trade in goods agreement. Consideration should also be given
\nto an Overseas Private Investment Corporation\u2013backed fund for Turkish
\nentrepreneurs.<\/p>\n
\nmarket, but not because of any major find of resources. Indeed, Turkey is
\nenergy-resource poor. Instead, it is Turkey\u2019s strategic location, literally
\nin the middle of major energy producers and consumers who are eager
\nto diversify their supplies, that makes Turkey influential in this area.<\/p>\n
\nthrough Turkey via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline that connects
\nTurkey to Azerbaijan and the Caspian countries, the Kirkuk-
\nCeyhan pipeline connecting Turkey and Iraq, and transit through the
\nBosphorus Straits.11 Turkey, however, would like ultimately to decrease
\ntanker traffic that passes through the Bosphorus, citing environmental
\nhazards and dangers to the Istanbul population. The Turkish government,
\nfor example, has revived plans to build a thirty-mile canal from
\nthe Black Sea to the Marmara to bypass Istanbul, while others herald<\/p>\n
\nprojects, however, face considerable commercial, technical, environmental
\n(in the case of the Marmara), and political challenges.<\/p>\n
\nsupplies of natural gas will be the next \u201cGreat Game.\u201d Turkey will
\nplay a more substantial and, at times, indispensable role in European and
\nglobal trade for two interrelated reasons: Turkey\u2019s increasing demand
\nfor gas to meet its rapidly growing economy, and Turkey as a transit
\npoint for gas supplies coming from newly emerging producers\u2014initially
\nAzerbaijan and possibly later Central Asia and the Middle East.
\nAt the same time, Turkey and Europe seek to diversify domestic energy
\nsupply, a central component of both national energy security and their
\nforeign policy agendas.<\/p>\n
\nin line with Ankara\u2019s projections of Turkish GDP and income growth.
\nThe economic problems in Europe\u2014Turkey\u2019s largest export market
\nand the source of much of its FDI\u2014may ultimately force the Turks to
\nrevise their projections downward, but Ankara (and the Europeans)
\nwill still need to import gas to satisfy and diversify their energy needs.
\nUnder present conditions, Turkey will be short on gas toward the end
\nof the decade.<\/p>\n
\nfor shipping gas to Europe, initially from the giant Shah Deniz
\ngas field offshore of Azerbaijan (the largest natural gas field in the
\nCaspian Sea), and potentially in later years from Central Asia and the
\nMiddle East.<\/p>\n
\nprime minister and Azeri president signed a landmark Inter-
\nGovernmental Agreement (IGA) that, for the first time, permits the
\ntransit of gas across Turkey to Europe. The IGA also provides six billion
\ncubic meters per year of Azeri gas for Turkey\u2019s growing domestic
\nmarket, in addition to the initial transit of ten billion cubic meters per
\nyear of Azeri gas through a gas network upgraded by BOTAS, Turkey\u2019s
\npipeline owner and energy trading company, and\/or through a new
\nstandalone Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline project (TANAP). Azerbaijan\u2019s
\nstate oil company, SOCAR, and BOTAS initiated engineering
\nstudies in the spring of 2012 and intend on finalizing a suitable transit
\noption by the summer of 2013. In parallel, SOCAR and BOTAS invited<\/p>\n
\nStatoil) to take equity stakes in the TANAP.<\/p>\n
\nfor the Great Game. First, it provides the essential political assurance
\nto Europe that Turkey is committed to contributing to European
\nenergy security. Second, it not only opens the door for the transit of
\nAzeri gas but also encourages the development of additional sources of
\nnatural gas for European markets. Third, it signals another critical step
\nin the operationalization of the Southern Corridor. Equally important,
\nTurkey\u2019s landmark political commitment effectively closed the door
\non efforts among some to access and develop Iranian energy supplies.
\nTurkey and Azerbaijan must complete and implement IGA soon, or
\npotential suppliers from Central Asia and consumers will hesitate to
\nmake the investments needed for gas to flow.<\/p>\n
\nperceive or certainly separate its energy policy from its foreign and
\neconomic policies. The IGA reflects the integration of Turkish foreign
\nand energy policy, satisfying Turkish domestic demand and promoting
\nregional imperatives while demonstrating again its attachment and
\ncommitment to Europe. On Iran, moreover, Iranian supply to Turkey
\nwill play an increasingly marginal role and certainly not a critical source
\nof supply for the Turkish domestic economy in line with Turkish foreign
\npolicy perception of Iran as a problematic neighbor. Turkey now has
\nmore options, and its commitment to the development of transit and
\nthe Southern Corridor will further enhance its foreign and economy
\nmargin of maneuver.<\/p>\n
\nanything, it is that Turkey\u2019s role in supplying gas to Europe will be critical.
\nStill, Turkey has a long way to go before it becomes the energy hub
\nthat Turkish leaders envision. Turkey needs investment in its energy
\ninfrastructure, and even with the enormous new supplies coming from
\nShah Deniz II, there will still not be enough gas for the storage and trading
\nactivities necessary to properly consider Turkey a hub. Further, producers
\nwill be reluctant to allow Turkey to reprice their gas, preferring<\/p>\n
\nhub, Turkey will need to liberalize its energy market, gain the necessary
\nforeign investment to make significant infrastructure investments
\nin such things as storage facilities, and gain access to adequate assured
\nenergy supplies.<\/p>\n
\nimportant role in Europe\u2019s efforts to diversify its supplies. To achieve
\nthis goal and secure the energy resources it needs, Turkey should, on a
\nregional basis, encourage the development of diverse energy transport
\nroutes, work to prevent the emergence of choke points and monopolies
\nen route, and develop a range of sources for oil and gas.<\/p>\n
\nfacilitating the arrangements needed among suppliers and consumers.
\nIf these are obstacles moving forward, Washington may need to
\nbecome involved at political levels, as it did in the development of the
\nBTC oil pipeline.<\/p>\n
\ndomestic policy alone. After years of being an important but somewhat
\ncautious international actor, with varying degrees of success, Turkey is
\npursuing a more dynamic foreign policy that has ranged well beyond
\nareas of traditional concern, such as Europe, NATO, the Balkans, and
\nthe security of the Aegean and Black seas.<\/p>\n
\nAfrica, plays important roles in Afghanistan and Pakistan, is deepening
\nits ties with Russia, and is active in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
\nAnkara is also expanding its presence in Africa and Latin America,
\nfollowing the lead of Turkish business professionals, who have made
\nmodest investments in these regions. Despite Turkey\u2019s aspirations, the
\nTask Force has chosen to focus its analyses and recommendations on
\nthe Middle East\u2014an area of Turkish foreign policy activism\u2014the EU,
\nNATO, and the United States. Given all the focus on Turkey and its relations
\nwith the West against the backdrop of the AKP\u2019s Islamist roots
\nand Ankara\u2019s changing role in the Middle East, it is only appropriate to
\nhighlight these areas.<\/p>\n
\nand deepen its relations with its neighbors and other countries to the
\nsouth and east, the shift in policy under the AKP has been so dramatic
\nthat it has led both Western and some Turkish observers to question
\nwhether Turkey is shifting away from its traditional foreign policy
\nposture.<\/p>\n
\nIslamist movement in the late 1960s only accentuated concerns<\/p>\n
\nTurkey had long been a tepid and wary observer of Middle Eastern politics,
\ndevoting most of its diplomatic energy to the institutionalization of
\nrelations with Europe and the United States.<\/p>\n
\nwas\u2014before the rise of the AKP\u2014a source of mistrust in the Arab
\nworld. More profoundly, the combination of the Ottoman colonial
\nlegacy in the Middle East and Kemalism\u2019s official policy of la\u00efcisme\u2014
\nwhich seemed irreligious to many in the Middle East\u2014sowed a divide
\nbetween Turkey and the Arab world. Finally, the insular quality of Turkish
\npolitics after World War I resulted in a foreign policy that traditionally
\nsought to avoid entangling Ankara in the politics, rivalries, and
\nconflicts of the Middle East. That has now changed.<\/p>\n
\nreforms, the Turkish government began pursuing a multidimensional
\nforeign policy that included renewed relations with Russia, the Caucasus,
\nand, in particular, the Arab world and Iran. As part of this strategy,
\nAnkara sought to use its good offices in negotiating Arab-Israeli
\npeace, especially on the Syria track; held itself out as a problem-solver
\nin Lebanon; played a constructive role in Iraq beginning in 2008; sought
\nto broker a Saudi-Syrian rapprochement; and took a hard line on Israeli
\npolicy in the Gaza Strip. This outreach came in tandem with renewed
\nArab interest in Turkey and its politics, which was primarily a result of
\nthe AKP\u2019s electoral success.<\/p>\n
\nwho wondered whether any lessons were to be learned from Turkish
\nIslamists\u2019 accumulation of political power in an officially secular political
\nsystem. For both Arab liberals and mainstream Islamists, the AKP
\nhad something important to offer. From the perspective of Arab liberals,
\nif the AKP could be emulated in the Arab world, it would go a long
\nway to resolving a central problem of Arab politics whereby citizens
\nwere often forced to choose between the authoritarianism of prevailing
\nregimes and the perceived theocracy of Islamist groups. Indeed,
\nan Arab AKP-type party would give people a way out of this dilemma,
\nproviding hope for a more democratic future. For Islamists, the AKP<\/p>\n
\nto political participation, but could also come to power and, with broad
\npublic support, embark on a wide-ranging program to dramatically
\nremake a once-hostile political arena.<\/p>\n
\nregarding the AKP as a proxy of sorts for the Muslim world\u2019s relations
\nwith Europe and the United States. The first test came when the Turkish
\ngovernment brought to parliament a request to allow American forces
\nto traverse Turkish territory to invade Iraq. Although 264 deputies
\nvoted for the resolution and 250 voted against it, there were 19 abstentions.
\nThose abstentions were critical because Article 96 of the Turkish
\nconstitution requires that \u201c[u]nless otherwise stipulated in the Constitution,
\nthe Turkish Grand National Assembly shall convene with at
\nleast one-third of the total number of members and shall take decisions
\nby an absolute majority of those present.\u201d The combination of \u201cno\u201d
\nvotes and abstentions was actually more than the number of deputies
\nwho supported the measure. Consequently, the American 4th Infantry
\nDivision was denied access to Turkish territory, forcing an alteration
\nof U.S. war plans. The Grand National Assembly\u2019s action, which was
\nwidely interpreted in the Arab world as a \u201cno\u201d vote that reflected both
\nTurkish public opinion and the emergence of a new, more democratic
\nTurkey that was not a client-state of the West, was warmly received in
\nmany Middle Eastern countries, where opposition to the invasion of
\nIraq was near universal.<\/p>\n
\nsought to prevent Abdullah Gul from becoming president. The EU was
\ncritical of the military\u2019s move and, after an initial stumble, the United
\nStates also clearly signaled its disapproval of the attempted intervention
\nin Turkey\u2019s political process.<\/p>\n
\ninterest in strengthening its links to the Arab states and Iran. Although
\nsome observers questioned whether Turkey\u2019s approach to the countries
\nof the south and east was related to the Islamist roots of the AKP, the
\nparty\u2019s approach to the Middle East showed more continuity than these
\ncritics suggested.<\/p>\n
\nin the Middle East that Ankara has sought since the AKP came to
\npower, that Turkey\u2019s outreach to the Arab world predates the AKP\u2019s<\/p>\n
\npolicy in the region. Indeed, deeper structural reasons for Turkey\u2019s
\nactivism in the Middle East\u2014which has become more pronounced in
\nthe past decade\u2014explain divergent policies between Washington and
\nAnkara in a number of significant areas.<\/p>\n
\nsecurity threat bound Washington and Ankara together\u2014has
\nallowed Turkey to explore new opportunities not just in the Middle
\nEast, but also in Eurasia. In addition, as noted, Turkey\u2019s need for natural
\ngas gave impetus to improved relations with Iran. Those energy
\nneeds only intensified with Turkey\u2019s economic boom over the past
\ndecade. There were also economic factors that led to Ankara\u2019s deepening
\nrelationship with Syria (now soured). As discussed above,
\nAnkara reasoned that increased cross-border trade would contribute
\nto economic development in Turkey\u2019s southeast, which would diminish
\nKurdish separatism.<\/p>\n
\nforeign policy since the AKP came to power. This was bound to be
\na problem for the United States, given the anti-Americanism that has
\nlong been a feature of Turkish politics combined with a more generalized
\nhostility toward Washington after the invasion of Iraq, which had
\nan adverse effect on Turkish security. Anger toward the United States
\nand a public that is sympathetic to the Palestinians\u2014and does not necessarily
\nregard countries like Iran and Syria as foes\u2014have translated
\ninto an approach to the Middle East that has sometimes conflicted with
\nthat of the United States, particularly with regard to Iran and the Arab-
\nIsraeli conflict.<\/p>\n
\nwhich have propelled Turkish activism in the Middle East, propitious
\ntiming has benefited Prime Minister Erdogan and his three foreign ministers\u2014
\nAbdullah Gul, Ali Babacan, and currently Ahmet Davutoglu\u2014
\nin their efforts to remake Turkey into a regional leader. For example,
\nby the time the AKP came to power in 2002, the power of the leading
\nArab states was on the wane. Moreover, the United States was increasingly
\npreoccupied with Iraq (and Afghanistan) in the past decade. This
\nyawning gap in regional leadership presented an opportunity for the
\ncharismatic Prime Minister Erdogan, who was only too happy to step
\nin where others would not or could not.<\/p>\n
\nstrong position to help influence the trajectory of politics in countries
\nlike Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and potentially others as the Arab
\nuprisings move beyond their one-year anniversary. Among observers
\nin the Middle East, Turkey, and the West, much discussion has centered
\non the Turkish model, in which a party with Islamist patrimony presides
\nover liberalization of both the political system and the economy. Thus
\nit seems that Turkey is well placed to offer insights and lessons to Arabs
\nstruggling to achieve their revolutionary objectives.<\/p>\n
\nhas developed over the past decade, Ankara was unable to leverage that
\nprestige to sway the behavior of either Libya\u2019s Muammar al-Qaddafi or
\nSyrian president Bashar al-Assad, two leaders the Turks studiously cultivated
\nduring the AKP\u2019s tenure.<\/p>\n
\nsolution between Qaddafi and Libya\u2019s Benghazi-based rebellion,
\nAnkara was forced to accept that its powers of persuasion with the
\nLibyan leader were limited. In Syria, Turkey was slow to move away
\nfrom President Assad, seeking a solution to the Syrian uprising through
\ndialogue and reform. Yet as the Syrian regime stepped up its use of force
\nagainst peaceful protesters with the assistance of Tehran, Ankara\u2019s
\ngood offices proved of little value in bringing the insurrection to an end.
\nIn addition, Syrian efforts to quell the protests through violence have
\ncreated a flow of refugees across the Syria-Turkey frontier.<\/p>\n
\nby the early spring of 2012, the UN estimated that more than nine thousand
\nSyrians had died at the hands of Syrian forces\u2014precipitated a
\nsuspension of diplomatic relations between Ankara and Damascus and
\nthe imposition of Turkish sanctions on Syria.12 The measures include
\na 30 percent tax on products coming from Syria, a freeze of Syrian
\ngovernment assets in Turkey, and a ban on financial transactions with
\nSyria\u2019s central bank. Developments in Syria have both contributed to
\nsharpening an implicit competition between Turkey and Iran and provided,
\nin the words of one Turkish interlocutor, \u201ca more realistic view
\nof the region.\u201d<\/p>\n
\nof initiatives that demanded President Assad delegate his authority<\/p>\n
\nAnkara has amplified its anti-Assad rhetoric and has been at
\nthe center of discussions about humanitarian corridors and possibly
\narming the Free Syrian Army. Ankara\u2019s steady rhetorical pressure on
\nDamascus and apparent desire to be a leader in resolving the Syrian
\ncrisis is a welcome sign. Turkish activism will bolster the Arab League
\nand could help provide political cover for Western countries nervous
\nabout the consequences of international humanitarian intervention
\nin Syria. Yet Turkey remains deeply concerned about a full-fledged
\ninternational effort to arm the Syrian opposition, fearing civil war
\nand chaos along its borders with the likely attendant refugee flow.
\nInstead, Ankara is seeking to play a leading role within the Friends of
\nSyria group, which is trying to isolate the Assad regime and pressure
\nDamascus through increased sanctions, and is supporting UN envoy
\nKofi Annan\u2019s efforts to find a political solution to the Syrian crisis. As
\nthe situation in Syria deteriorated just prior to the tenuous April 12,
\n2012, ceasefire, Turkey\u2019s foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu sought to
\nrally international action to stem the tide of Syrian refugees across the
\nborder. There are rumors that Ankara, in response to Syrian shelling
\nthat landed on Turkish territory, might invoke Article 5 of the North
\nAtlantic treaty, which states that \u201can armed attack against one or more
\nof them [NATO allies] in Europe or North America shall be considered
\nan attack against them all.\u201d<\/p>\n
\n2011 was intended to demonstrate that Turkey\u2014as major powers such
\nas Egypt struggle to realize its revolutionary promise and Saudi Arabia
\nseeks to contain regional political upheaval\u2014can play an influential
\nrole in nurturing Arab transitions. Prime Minister Erdogan was
\ngreeted with a hero\u2019s welcome in Cairo both because he called for
\nformer Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak to listen to the demands
\nof the Egyptian people early on in the January 25, 2011, uprising and
\nbecause of what many Egyptians regard as his principled stand on
\nthe Palestinian issue. While in Cairo, Prime Minister Erdogan made
\nimportant statements about the compatibility of secular politics and
\npious societies, which angered Egyptian Islamists but encouraged
\nEgyptian secularists.13<\/p>\n
\ngrapple with a collapsing economy, they are likely to look internally
\nfor solutions to their own political problems. To be sure, Turkey is not<\/p>\n
\noffshoot of young Muslim Brothers\u2014fashions itself as the Egyptian
\nversion of the AKP, and former Muslim brother Abdel Monem Abul
\nFutouh regards himself as an \u201cEgyptian prime minister Erdogan.\u201d But
\nCairo maintains its pretensions of regional leadership dating back to
\nthe Nasser period and is unlikely to allow the non-Arab Turks to usurp
\na regional leadership role that Egyptians believe is rightly and naturally
\ntheirs. Consequently, Egyptian officials were noticeably cool
\ntoward Foreign Minister Davutoglu\u2019s proposal to establish a strategic
\npartnership in the region, arguing that although Cairo welcomed
\nTurkish investment, Egypt was not interested in the alignment that
\nTurkey sought.<\/p>\n
\nwill most likely be Turkey\u2019s most enduring source of regional influence:
\ninvestment. Turkey, with its spectacular economic growth rates, fearless
\nentrepreneurs, flush balance sheets, well-developed banks, and a
\ngovernment with pretensions of regional leadership, can be an engine
\nof Middle Eastern economic growth. Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya (as well
\nas possibly Syria and Yemen) need investment, infrastructure development,
\nand technical assistance to put their economies back together,
\nand Turkey could be a source of all three.<\/p>\n
\nforge a more democratic and prosperous Middle East. The United
\nStates has already identified this opportunity and has sought to work
\nwith Turkey on \u201csoft landings\u201d for Arab countries that have experienced
\nuprisings. Turkey is not only a good partner in this effort, but is
\nalso Washington\u2019s only partner with enough clout in enough countries
\nin the region to play this role. Arabs are genuinely interested in the political
\nreforms Turkey undertook in the early 2000s and its recent economic
\ndevelopment. Yet the Turks are not the only regional players. The
\nQataris, Saudis, and Egyptians would all like to play leading regional
\nroles, and the Turks will confront a number of challenges, including the
\nhistoric Arab distrust of Turks dating back to the Ottoman Empire and
\nthe simple fact that they are not Arabs.<\/p>\n
\nlacking in regional leadership that the time may well be ripe for Turkey
\nto play a more leading role. This is why Turkey is tightening its ties with
\nHamas as the organization\u2019s previous patron, the Assad regime, falters.
\nWashington may not like the Ankara-Hamas ties, but the development
\ndoes hold out the possibility that under Turkish tutelage, the organization
\nmight be willing to eventually meet the demands of the Middle
\nEast Quartet: recognize Israel, renounce violence, and uphold all international
\nagreements between the Palestinian Authority and Israel.
\nThis is a tall order, because it is essentially asking Hamas to relinquish
\naspects of its agenda that have made it successful in the past, but Ankara
\nshould be given a chance to pursue this goal. Presently, no other political
\nactor in the region is as well positioned as Turkey to try. Moreover,
\nAnkara\u2019s relations with Hamas should be viewed as part of a broader
\neffort to diminish the influence of Iran in the region that includes ties
\nto Iraq\u2019s Iraqiya Party and, more recently, stepped-up pressure on the
\nAssad regime.<\/p>\n
\nto work together in supporting the emergence of a more democratic
\nMiddle East.AlthoughtheEgyptianshavebeencooltoTurkey\u2019sregional
\nleadership, a U.S.-Turkey partnership in Tunisia, Libya, and a post-
\nAssad Syria has potential. Although Ankara has increased its development
\nassistance in recent years, the Turkish International Cooperation
\nAgency (TIKA) does not have the same capacity of its American counterpart,
\nthe U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). But
\nthe two agencies could partner to bring development assistance to the
\nArab countries that need and want it. Through cooperative ventures,
\nTIKA could build its capabilities, and the United States could benefit
\nfrom its association with Turkey, which enjoys considerable goodwill in
\nparts of the Middle East. Ultimately, however, USAID and TIKA can
\ndo only so much; the uprisings in the Middle East are an Arab story, and
\noutsiders will have limited influence in shaping its outcome.<\/p>\n
\nengine. If Turkish leaders can somewhat insulate the economy from the
\nadverse effects of Europe\u2019s troubles\u2014as they are trying to do by diversifying
\ntrade and investment to countries south and east of Anatolia\u2014
\nTurkey will be well positioned to provide the kind of investment and
\nemployment opportunities so badly needed in North Africa and other<\/p>\n
\nbut more is always better. The United States should extend financing,
\nguarantees, and political risk insurance to Turkish businesses that
\npartner with American firms that want to invest in the Middle East.
\nThe United States has already announced $2 billion in financing for
\nprojects in the Middle East, but American firms would benefit from
\npartnering with Turkish companies that have more experience in the
\nregion and have demonstrated less sensitivity to the region\u2019s present
\npolitical uncertainty.<\/p>\n
\npoint of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East, reflecting a strategic
\nconsensus among the Turkish military establishment, Washington,
\nand Jerusalem in the mid-to-late 1990s. The centerpiece of the
\nrelationship emerged in February 1996 when the Turkish General
\nStaff announced that it had struck a training agreement with the Israel
\nDefense Forces (IDF).<\/p>\n
\ntime. After all, Israelis and Turks were outsiders in a region that they
\nregarded as either explicitly or implicitly hostile. In particular, the
\nTurkish and Israeli military establishments perceived Syria and Iran as
\nprimary threats to their respective national securities. Both militaries
\nbelieved they had much to gain from the agreements in the area of counterterrorism,
\nwhere the Turks were battling the PKK and Israel was
\nfocused on the challenge from Hamas and related groups. In addition, a
\nrobust trade relationship was closely linked to the security relationship.<\/p>\n
\nIsrael relations throughout the 1990s. A primary goal of Israeli foreign
\npolicy has long been to break out of the diplomatic isolation that
\nresulted from the Arab-Israeli conflict. For Jerusalem, upgrading diplomatic
\nrelations with a large, predominantly Muslim country adjacent
\nto the Middle East was a major diplomatic achievement. That the subsequent
\ndevelopment of bilateral military ties placed Israel\u2019s primary
\nregional antagonists on the defensive further enhanced Turkey\u2019s value
\nas a strategic partner.<\/p>\n
\nIsrael lay primarily in Washington. Outside the U.S. foreign policy
\nestablishment, Ankara does not have a natural constituency in Washington.
\nThe Turkish-American community is not as well organized as
\nGreek-and Armenian-Americans are. The Turks had long understood
\nthat good relations with Israel meant the goodwill of pro-Israel groups
\nin the United States, which could be useful in fending off Greek-and
\nArmenian-American advocacy efforts so inimical to Turkey. Ankara\u2019s
\nstrategy was largely successful. In what was to some an astonishing
\nirony, Israel\u2019s supporters in the United States\u2014the majority of which
\nare American Jewish organizations\u2014helped shield Turkey from congressional
\nefforts to recognize the mass killings of Armenians in April
\n1915 as genocide.<\/p>\n
\nboth countries militarily, economically, and diplomatically. Of
\nparticular importance to Israel, Turkey played a behind-the-scenes role
\nfrom 2006 to 2008 in trying to secure the release of Sergeant Gilad
\nShalit from captivity in Gaza, and in 2008 in mediating between Syria
\nand Israel. It was also a benefit to the United States in that the close
\ncoordination between Israel and Turkey kept common foes like Iran on
\nthe defensive; provided Israel with an additional strategic relationship
\nin the region, which might give Jerusalem the confidence to move forward
\non the peace process; and established Ankara as another potential
\ntrusted interlocutor between Israelis and Arabs.<\/p>\n
\nincident of May 2010 precipitated a deterioration in Turkey-Israel relations.
\nThe outcome was Ankara\u2019s decision to downgrade relations
\nwith Jerusalem to the second secretary level in September 2011. The
\nimmediate cause for Turkey\u2019s decision was Israel\u2019s continued refusal to
\napologize or pay compensation for the deaths of eight Turkish citizens
\nand a Turkish-American during an Israeli raid on the Mavi Marmara,
\nwhich was part of a flotilla of six ships that had sought to run Israel\u2019s
\nblockade of Gaza. In particular, after the UN investigation into the episode\u2014
\nknown as the Palmer Report\u2014that reaffirmed Israel\u2019s legal right
\nto establish and enforce a naval blockade of the Gaza Strip but still criticized
\nIsrael\u2019s use of force and treatment of detained activists, the Israelis
\nconcluded there was no reason to issue an apology.14 Turkey, in turn,
\nrejected the report\u2019s conclusions as politically motivated.<\/p>\n
\ncomplicates Washington\u2019s efforts to ensure peace and stability in the
\neastern Mediterranean. Tension over gas exploration off the southern
\ncoast of Cyprus raises concerns of possible naval confrontation
\nbetween Turkey and Israel.15 It does not seem that either country actually
\nwants to raise the level of tension, but accidents and miscommunications
\ncould lead to escalation. The two nations need to communicate
\nin appropriate channels to develop procedures to avoid such undesired
\nescalation. Interested parties, including the United States, also need to
\nengage with Turkey and Cyprus to avoid a confrontation over exploitation
\nof natural gas resources.<\/p>\n
\nand the United States, domestic political calculations among leaders
\nin Ankara and Jerusalem block any way out of the Turkish-Israeli
\nimpasse, at least currently. One bright spot, however, is trade. Despite
\nthe late 2011 downgrading of relations, the overall volume of trade
\nbetween the two countries has actually risen. Turkey\u2019s imports of Israeli
\nproducts have increased by 54 percent, and exports to Israel by 24 percent.
\nEconomic ties may thus be a possible vehicle for rapprochement.
\nThe United States should encourage the interests of both Turks and
\nIsraelis in maintaining economic links in lieu of the seemingly fruitless
\nsearch for an end to the estrangement between Ankara and Jerusalem,
\nas beneficial as that might be for the United States. Promoting economic
\nties will, however, provide a cushion that will facilitate mending
\npolitical ties in the future.<\/p>\n
\nhave asked, \u201cWho Lost Turkey?\u201d or \u201cIs Turkey Turning East?\u201d16 Much
\nof this work says less about Turkey and the AKP than the view among
\nsome in the West that secular nationalists are always preferable to liberal
\nIslamists. That Turkey has pursued a broader and more independent
\nforeign policy that has upgraded Ankara\u2019s ties with the Arab world
\nand Iran as its ties with Israel have cooled has intensified suspicion of
\nAKP and its intentions.<\/p>\n
\nminister in late 2002 and early 2003 and subsequently Prime Minister
\nErdogan initially strongly supported Turkey\u2019s bid to join the European
\nUnion. Indeed, in 2003 and 2004, when the AKP-dominated parliament
\npassed seven reform packages, both leaders indicated that the reforms
\nwere directly related to Europe\u2019s criteria for beginning formal membership
\nnegotiations. Those negotiations began in March 2005.<\/p>\n
\nbeen generally unhappy. To accede to the EU, Turkey must complete
\nnegotiations with the European Commission on the thirty-five chapters
\nof EU law. Turkey and the EU have opened and closed only a single
\nchapter, and individual EU governments have placed holds on a variety
\nof other chapters, including justice, freedom, and security and judiciary
\nand fundamental rights, bogging down Turkey\u2019s membership negotiations.
\nThis has had a negative effect on the Turkish public, which continues
\nto support membership in Europe but is deeply skeptical that the
\nEU will ever admit a large Muslim country into the fold.<\/p>\n
\nmembership are related to the divided island of Cyprus, Turkey\u2019s
\nstill-questionable human rights practices, unfulfilled promises to give
\ngreater cultural and linguistic freedom to Turkey\u2019s Kurds, and massive
\ntransfer of resources to Turkey from the EU that would be necessary to
\nbring the Turkish economy into line\u2014even with all of its dynamism\u2014
\ngiven the gap in per capita income between Turkey and EU members.
\nBut many European countries simply do not want Turkey in the EU
\nand are using these arguments as an excuse. In fact, there are good reasons
\nto believe that each of the issues can be resolved. Turkey should
\nnot let frustration and bitterness at how it is being treated on membership
\nget in the way of entering into beneficial, functional agreements
\nwith the EU.<\/p>\n
\nTurkey remains, at least rhetorically, committed to full EU membership.
\nIndeed, the institutional and economic linkages to Europe that
\nhave developed since Turkey struck an association agreement with the
\nEuropean Economic Community in 1963 remain critical to Turkey for
\nboth economic and political reasons. Although these ties would continue
\nto grow under the various alternative arrangements that some<\/p>\n
\nbetween Turkey and the EU, Ankara rejects these compromises,
\narguing that there is no actual political, legal, or diplomatic reason to
\nabandon Turkey\u2019s bid for full membership. Turkish leaders also readily
\nacknowledge that the application process has been beneficial for Turkey
\nand has helped propel democratic and economic reforms.<\/p>\n
\npolitical disincentives exist on both sides to calling off negotiations and
\nending Turkey\u2019s candidacy. The EU does not want to be accused of being
\nanti-Muslim, and Turkey does not want to give the EU an easy way out
\nof this membership conundrum. As a matter of principle, however, the
\nUnited States should continue to support Turkey\u2019s bid for EU membership
\nas it works to further institutionalize a Washington-Ankara partnership.
\nAs part of this support, the United States should press its EU
\npartners to remove the obstacles for Turkish citizens to obtain Schengen
\nvisas. Easier movement of people across borders could improve
\nrelations between Turks and the EU and potentially change European
\nattitudes toward Turkey\u2019s EU membership.<\/p>\n
\nto Brussels, which include continued political reform and the
\nopening of Turkish ports to Cypriot traffic. The latter issue, in particular,
\nis extraordinarily sensitive given the conflict on Cyprus and the widely
\nheld narrative in Turkey, the United States, and the EU that Ankara and
\nthe island\u2019s Turkish community did what they could to resolve the problem
\nby voting overwhelmingly in support of the 2004 Annan Plan even
\nas the Greek Cypriots voted against it in large numbers. For Turks, the
\nfact that Cyprus had already gained entry into the EU (though not formally
\nuntil a week after the failed referendum17) undermines Brussels\u2019
\ncredibility when it comes to the conflict and discourages a reasonable
\ndialogue between the parties.<\/p>\n
\npreclude the development of robust relations between Ankara
\nand Brussels. Indeed, as the world changes rapidly, it would be a missed
\nopportunity for Turkey and Europe to allow the EU membership issue
\nto stand in the way of cooperation. The emerging rivalry between<\/p>\n
\nbe replaced with cooperation. The French colonial legacy is still too
\nfresh in the area for France to go it alone in the region and, though
\nTurkish entrepreneurs may be interested in investment opportunities,
\nTurkey\u2019s capacity to assist North African political development
\nwould benefit from EU partners. It is important to emphasize that the
\ndevelopment of Turkey-EU relations is not and should not be a substitute
\nfor Turkey\u2019s membership in Europe. Rather, better ties between
\nAnkara and Brussels may be a way to improve Turkey\u2019s bid ultimately
\nto join the EU.<\/p>\n
\nhave been asked concerning Ankara\u2019s commitment to the future of
\nNATO. There are no indications that Turkey, which became a signatory
\nto the North Atlantic Treaty in 1952, has lost interest in the alliance.
\nMoments of tension have arisen, of course, including a reluctance
\nto participate in NATO modernization and most recently Turkey\u2019s
\ninitial reluctance to support NATO\u2019s operation Unified Protector,
\nwhich helped drive Libya\u2019s Muammar Qaddafi from power. Turkey
\nis not unique in this regard, however. Tensions between NATO and
\nother alliance members are not new, notably with France. In addition,
\nGreece\u2014another NATO ally\u2014has expressed concern over Turkey\u2019s
\nmilitary operations in the Aegean, which Athens claims have violated
\nGreek airspace and territorial waters in more aggressive ways than in
\nthe recent past. The Turks counter that their patrols are routine and
\ndo not indicate a shift to a more aggressive posture. Whether or not
\nGreece\u2019s claims about the Turkish military are warranted, Ankara is
\nnot seeking a break from NATO by stirring up trouble in the Aegean.
\nIt would, of course, be better for the alliance if whatever outstanding
\nterritorial issues between the countries were resolved, but this type of
\nbreakthrough does not seem to be in the offing.<\/p>\n
\nof an early-warning radar for NATO\u2019s antimissile defense system.
\nAnkara, which takes seriously the idea of having peaceful ties with all of
\nits neighbors regardless of the character of their regimes\u2014its so-called
\nzero-problems policy\u2014was concerned that hosting the system would<\/p>\n
\nof its relations with Israel, Turkey objected to sharing data from the
\nradar installation with Israel.<\/p>\n
\nits commitment to the Western alliance, agreed to the radar station.
\nAlthough critics of AKP\u2019s Turkey would like to seize on the Libya and
\nantimissile system episodes as evidence of Ankara\u2019s drift from NATO
\nand the West more generally, Turkey\u2019s behavior is similar to that of
\nother NATO members who balance their national interests with those
\nof the alliance. No real evidence suggests that Turkey does not continue
\nto value its NATO membership in the ways it once did. The alliance
\nis one of the primary and most visible institutional links to the West
\nand, as Turkey\u2019s relations with the EU remain at a standstill, the ties to
\nNATO are more important than ever.<\/p>\n
\nlong-standing, but Washington should use its diplomatic and political
\ncapital to contain the dispute. Greece is wracked with unprecedented
\npolitical and economic crises and represents no threat to Turkey. Turkey
\nshould avoid anything to suggest that Ankara seeks to take advantage
\nof Athens\u2019 current troubles. Moreover, the potential for accidents and
\nunintended escalation is great. This would set Turkey-Greece relations
\nback and would make it harder to come to a solution for competing territorial
\nclaims in the Aegean. Currently, the best Washington can do is
\nbuild on previous confidence-building measures that established direct
\ncommunications between the Turkish and Greek militaries by forming
\na trilateral military contact group of senior naval and air force officers
\nfrom the United States, Turkey, and Greece to deconflict Turkish and
\nGreek forces and help prevent territorial violations.<\/p>\n
\nbetween the Atlantic alliance non-NATO members. The United
\nStates should encourage Turkey to continue its outreach in regions
\nsuch as Central Asia and Africa, which would enable NATO to develop
\nstronger links with critical countries in these regions.<\/p>\n
\nfundamental change, there have been both dramatic steps forward
\nand worrying developments. Overall, however, Turkey\u2019s story over the
\npast decade is a good one. The country is economically more successful,
\nmore representative politically, and playing a more influential role
\nin its region and beyond. For the United States, Turkey has always been
\nan important, if at times complicated, ally. Challenges in the bilateral
\nrelationship surely remain, but as this report indicates, there is a long
\nlist of policies and innovative ideas that will help both countries forge a
\ngenuinely new partnership.<\/p>\n
\nto develop U.S.-Turkey ties in order to make a strategic relationship
\na reality. To do otherwise would be to miss a historic opportunity to
\nset ties between Washington and Ankara on a cooperative trajectory
\nin Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean, Middle East, and Africa for a
\ngeneration.<\/p>\n
\nand Development Party<\/p>\n
\nParty (AKP) has been the subject of a polarizing debate in the West. The
\nprevailing discussion has often lacked nuance, complexity, and a sense
\nof history, which hampers a clear-sighted analysis of the opportunities
\nand challenges for the United States in updating its ties with Turkey.<\/p>\n
\nTurkey, given its social conservatism, economic liberalism, and muscular
\nforeign policy. Yet the party is a newcomer to Turkish politics, having
\nbeen founded only in August 2001. Where did this party, which has had
\na seemingly singular impact on Turkish politics, come from? What were
\nthe economic, social, and political conditions that made its rise possible?
\nAnd what are the prospects for its continued political success?<\/p>\n
\nErdogan (now Turkey\u2019s prime minister) and his colleague Abdullah Gul
\n(now Turkey\u2019s president) defied the elders of Turkey\u2019s Islamist movement
\nwhen they broke from the group\u2019s traditional leadership, promising
\na new political organization that would be dynamic, reformist,
\npragmatic, and technocratic and that could lead Turkey to a new, more
\ndemocratic future. A few months later, the AKP was founded.<\/p>\n
\nduring the 1980s and mayor of Istanbul (1994\u201397) and President
\nGul was a high-profile official in Necmettin Erbakan\u2019s government
\n(1996\u201397), the founding of the AKP did not initially seem to bode well
\nfor Turkey\u2019s Islamists. Indeed, by precipitating a historic schism within
\nthe movement, Prime Minister Erdogan and President Gul seemed to
\nbe playing into the hands of the Turkish political-military establishment,
\nwhich viewed the Islamists as a reactionary threat to Turkey\u2019s
\nsecular, republican system.<\/p>\n
\nPresident Gul were good to their word. They brought with them a large<\/p>\n
\nParty, leaving a moribund old guard behind; struck a reformist posture;
\nand, when it came time for the 2002 national elections, drafted a party
\nplatform that was virtually indistinguishable from what Turkey\u2019s rightof-
\ncenter parties had produced over the previous years.<\/p>\n
\nin an effort to advance the Islamization of Turkish politics
\nand society. Yet many Turks, unhappy over a painful economic crisis
\nthat began in late 2000 and after a decade of unstable ruling coalitions,
\ngave the AKP the benefit of the doubt. In the November 2002 parliamentary
\nelections, roughly 34 percent of Turkish voters who went to the
\npolls cast their ballots for the AKP, giving the new party 363 of the 550
\nseats in the Grand National Assembly.<\/p>\n
\nthe apparent incompetence of the then ruling coalition under Prime
\nMinister Bulent Ecevit that brought the AKP to power. Deeper socioeconomic
\nfactors were changing the nature of Turkish politics and the
\nelectorate well before the spring and summer of 2001, when Prime Minister
\nErdogan and President Gul were first outlining their plans for a
\nnew party. Over the course of the past two decades, Turkey has experienced
\ntwo interrelated shifts that have had a profound impact on the
\ncountry\u2019s politics and made the rise of the AKP possible. First, Turkey
\nhas become more urbanized. In 1990, only half the population lived in
\nurban areas, whereas today that proportion has climbed to 75 percent.18
\nSecond, this change is consistent with the Turkish economy\u2019s transformation
\nfrom one based primarily on agriculture to one with a strong
\nmanufacturing base.19<\/p>\n
\nemerging economy, they remained largely alienated and shunned by the
\nprevailing political elites. Islamist political parties such as the National
\nSalvation Party of the 1970s and its successor during the 1980s and
\n1990s, the Welfare Party, sought to mobilize the new arrivals with a
\nworldview and political agenda that matched their values and, importantly,
\nsocial services that helped ease the rural-to-urban transition.
\nThe combination of these served as a mechanism of political mobilization
\nthat helped form the core constituency of Turkey\u2019s Islamist political
\nmovement.<\/p>\n
\nown right. As much as the AKP was a natural evolution of Turkey\u2019s<\/p>\n
\nErbakan as an independent parliamentary deputy who represented
\nKonya in central Anatolia, it was also in many ways a novel Turkish
\npolitical party. Perhaps only Turgut Ozal\u2019s Motherland Party of the
\n1980s, though it was not part of the Islamist camp even if it shared a
\nconstituency, had as broad an appeal.<\/p>\n
\nGul held onto strategies their mentors had previously perfected,
\nnotably provision of social services for political mobilization. They also
\nretained a veneration for Turkey\u2019s Ottoman legacy. At the same time,
\nhowever, the AKP\u2019s leaders disposed of the anti-Western shibboleths
\nthat had become a hallmark of Erbakan\u2019s discourse and the platforms
\nof his parties. The AKP specifically sought a broad-based coalition
\nthat included its own pious constituency, Kurds, business leaders from
\ncentral Anatolia, urban cosmopolitan liberals, left-leaning social democrats,
\nnationalists, and average Turks, all of whom had grown weary of
\npolitical instability and economic crisis. It is true that large numbers of
\nsecularists voted for the Welfare Party in 1995, but Erbakan never commanded
\nthe big political tent that Prime Minister Erdogan and President
\nGul eventually built, especially after the AKP\u2019s first term (2002\u20132007).<\/p>\n
\na view of the West distinctly different from that of the elders of the
\nIslamist movement. The leaders of the AKP believed that hostility
\ntoward the West had done significant damage to Turkey\u2019s Islamists by
\nmaking it easier for the secular establishment to repress them. With
\nfew allies in Washington or western European capitals, even fewer were
\nwilling to protest when various coups and other military interventions
\nshuttered Islamist parties and banned their leaders.<\/p>\n
\nultimate goal was the development of a truly secular society. Instead of
\na French-inspired system of la\u00efcisme, in which the government controls
\nreligion to prevent it from entering the public sphere, the AKP sought
\na secularism more akin to Switzerland, before it banned the construction
\nof minarets, or to the United States, where individuals are free to
\nexercise and espouse their religious beliefs as they see fit without fear of
\nrepression. For the AKP\u2019s thinkers, the best way to ensure religious freedom
\nwas not to distance Turkey from the West, but rather to join with
\nit. Even well before a European Union existed, the father of modern<\/p>\n
\nwas to lift Turkey to the level of \u201ccivilization,\u201d meaning Western civilization.
\nYet the AKP\u2019s rationale for pursuing integration with the West
\nwas a significant twist on Turkey\u2019s long-cherished goal of membership
\nin Europe.<\/p>\n
\nis a source of controversy in Turkey. Turks have widely differing views
\nabout the group and its aims. To secularists, Gulenists pose a threat to
\nthe secular foundations of the Turkish Republic. To Gulen\u2019s supporters
\nand others, the movement is far more benign, engaged in a broad effort
\nto develop an inclusive and tolerant interpretation of Islam through
\neducation (both secular and religious) and good works. The purpose
\nof this brief appendix is to provide some historical context to Gulen,
\nhis worldview, and the movement that bears his name. It is certainly
\nnot intended to be exhaustive, but rather a synthesis of what observers
\nknow about these issues so that policymakers can begin to better understand
\nan important debate in Turkish society.<\/p>\n
\nKorucuk, near the eastern frontier city Ezurum, in Turkey. Gulen\u2019s
\nformal education, which had been interrupted when his family relocated
\nto a village without an elementary school, resumed during his
\nadolescence largely through independent study. He obtained deep
\nknowledge in the secular sciences, literature, history, and philosophy.
\nOf the latter, he was attracted to and influenced by Western philosophers
\nsuch as Albert Camus and Jean-Paul Sartre. His knowledge
\nwould deepen in his early twenties during his military service, when
\nGulen\u2019s commander encouraged him to read Western classics, which
\nwere formative in the development of Gulen\u2019s subsequent educational
\nphilosophy. His religious education consisted of Quranic recitation
\nand memorization, Arabic language courses, exegetical interpretation
\n(tafseer), interpretation of the hadith, and exposure to Sufism. He
\nbegan preaching in 1958.<\/p>\n
\nschool in Izmir, Turkey, Gulen developed the bases for his educational<\/p>\n
\nknowledge of the secular sciences. Gulen\u2019s message was
\ninfused with anticommunist and nationalist sentiments, a recognition
\nof the Turkish state as the guardian of Islam, and calls to protect it from
\nboth domestic and foreign communist enemies.<\/p>\n
\nGulen was arrested for his religious activism with Turkish youth,
\non the charge that he was attempting to alter the religio-political orientation
\nof the state, but he was released in November of that year without
\na conviction.<\/p>\n
\nTurks, and by the mid-to-late 1970s, he was one of the most famous
\npreachers in Turkey.<\/p>\n
\nlargely due to a new political atmosphere under Turgut Ozal, prime minister
\nof Turkey from 1983 to 1989 and president from 1989 to 1993. Ozal
\nbelieved that emphasizing the \u201cMuslimness\u201d of the Turkish national
\nidentity would, if properly regulated by the state, provide an appealing
\nalternative to more radical Islamist groups that formed during the left-
\nright social conflict of the 1970s. The Gulen movement\u2019s worldview
\nmade it the perfect candidate for such a policy, known as the \u201cTurkish-
\nIslamic synthesis.\u201d Gulen\u2019s group subsequently acquired a number of
\nmedia outlets to spread its message. At the same time, the privatization
\nof Turkey\u2019s education system officially opened the door to the movement
\nto establish its own schools, which helped expand its influence in
\nTurkish society.<\/p>\n
\nas the \u201cpostmodern coup,\u201d targeted Islamist influence in Turkish society,
\nincluding the Gulen movement. In 1999, Gulen was charged with
\n\u201cestablishing an illegal organization in order to change the secular
\nstructure of the state and to establish a state based on religious rules.\u201d
\nBy this time, he had relocated to the United States due ostensibly to a
\ncardiovascular condition, but undoubtedly also to escape almost certain
\nincarceration.<\/p>\n
\nto 1999, freeing him to return to Turkey. However, he has chosen to
\nremain in the United States and currently resides in Pennsylvania with
\na small group of his followers.<\/p>\n
\nanD the aKP<\/p>\n
\nDevelopment Party (AKP). According to critics, the Gulen movement
\nhas sought to appropriate the AKP\u2019s political agenda through tight relationships
\nwith the party\u2019s leadership. Rumors abound concerning the
\nalleged Gulenist ties to various senior government ministers, including
\nPrime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul. A
\nformer Turkish interior minister once claimed that Gulenists make up
\n70 percent of the nation\u2019s police force.20 Opponents of both the AKP
\nand the Gulen movement express concern that the party\u2019s control
\nover the parliament and executive branch provides the Gulenists with
\nunprecedented reach into government institutions, thereby threatening
\nTurkey\u2019s secular political order.<\/p>\n
\nelectoral efforts is unclear, though Gulenists overwhelmingly supported
\nthe AKP in the 2007 and 2011 parliamentary votes. During the run-up to
\nthose elections, movement activists used Gulen-affiliated media outlets
\nto publicly endorse the party, something they had abstained from doing
\nin the past. Even then, however, Gulenist media outlets have been prime
\nvehicles for advancing the AKP\u2019s worldview. The daily Zaman was the
\nfirst to publish Prime Minister Erdogan and Bulent Arinc\u2019s \u201cnew discourse\u201d
\nin February2000,whichwascentralto whatwould become the
\nAKP\u2019s guiding principles.21 The Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfi (Journalists
\nand Writers\u2019 Foundation, GYV), which Gulen established, hosted
\nevents and workshops throughout the 1990s that were centered on
\nwhat would represent the AKP\u2019s views on the relationship between
\nIslamism and secularism. The AKP has also facilitated the introduction
\nof Gulenist thought into the mainstream education system.<\/p>\n
\npolicy issues. The first is the embrace of globalization in opposition
\nto isolationism. Both support Turkey\u2019s membership to the European
\nUnion and champion Turkey\u2019s private sector, especially its new trading
\nclass and efforts to attract greater foreign direct investment. The
\nsecond is the AKP\u2019s rhetorical commitment to incorporating religious
\nminorities into Turkish society, which dovetails with Gulen\u2019s emphasis
\non interfaith dialogue.<\/p>\n
\ntension between the prominent theologian and Prime Minister Erdogan.
\nGulen criticized the prime minister for reducing sentences given to
\nfootball officials who were charged and convicted of rigging matches.22
\nHe also spoke out against some AKP officials\u2019 expressed concerns about
\nthe length of pretrial detentions for persons accused of involvement in
\nthe Ergenekon plot.23 In addition, Gulen assailed the AKP for its handling
\nof the Mavi Marmara incident.24 All of that said, the relationship
\nbetween the Gulenists and the AKP is likely to remain strong despite
\nthese periodic spasms, in part because of the strong voter base that the
\nmovement provides for the AKP and the protection and relative freedom
\nthat the AKP offers Gulenists in their operations.<\/p>\n
\nsecrecy that surrounds Fethullah Gulen, his movement, and its affiliated
\norganizations, fuels suspicions that Gulen\u2019s ultimate goals may
\nnot be in line with the progressive Islam that he and his followers articulate
\nin public.<\/p>\n
\nthat, whatever his worldview, the movement\u2014a term Gulen himself
\nrejects\u2014that he leads seeks to use the organs of the state to indoctrinate
\nTurkish society with his ideas. For example, in one revealing passage
\nfrom a sermon, which was rebroadcast on Turkish television in 1999,
\nGulen stated:<\/p>\n
\nyour existence until you reach all the power centers . . . You
\nmust wait until such time as you have got all the state power, until
\nyou have brought to your side all the power of the constitutional
\ninstitution in Turkey.25<\/p>\n
\nideological kinship of and alleged personal ties between Gulenists and
\nTurkish government officials, this statement, especially when considered
\nin conjunction with the strong presence Gulenists have in Turkey\u2019s<\/p>\n
\nconcern about Gulen and his movement.<\/p>\n
\nwhich critics argue is a wide-ranging AKP-Gulenist effort to silence
\ntheir opponents and intimidate the public from speaking out against
\nthem, thus ensuring the continuation of their monopoly over the social
\nand political spheres.<\/p>\n
\narises from its ties to, and its overlap with, the ruling AKP, and its secretiveness
\nand what seems to some an almost conspiratorial character.<\/p>\n
\nthe AKP are able to carry out smear campaigns, investigations, detentions,
\nand convictions of political opponents through control of large
\nmedia outlets and a heavy presence in the police force and judiciary.<\/p>\n
\nGulen, however, is ultimately unclear. The financial and practical
\nindependence of Gulenist institutions and its members from each other
\nand from Fethullah Gulen himself make determining any such connection
\ndifficult. It is also difficult to pin down the interplay and dynamics
\nbetween the movement and Turkey\u2019s ruling AKP. But the Gulen movement
\nis clearly a player in Turkish politics and needs to be better understood
\nby the U.S. policy community.<\/p>\n
\nJack Goldstone, \u201cThe Rise of the TIMBIs,\u201d ForeignPolicy.com, December 2, 2011,
\n.
\n2.
\nThe six principles of Kemalism are republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism,
\nrevolutionism, and statism.
\n3.
\nAli Carkoglu and Ersin Kalaycioglu, Turkish Democracy Today: Elections, Protest, and
\nStability in an Islamic Society (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007), p. 214.
\n4.
\nAli Carkoglu, \u201cWomen\u2019s Choices of Head Cover in Turkey: An Empirical Assessment,\u201d
\nComparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, vol. 29, no. 3, p.
\n456.
\n5.
\n\u201cEconomic Outlook,\u201d ISPAT,
\nPages\/Economy.aspx; \u201cTurkey leads Europe in Economic Growth,\u201d ISPAT,
\nMarch 31, 2011,
\n2010-growth-8.9-percent-leading-europe.aspx; \u201cGrowth up in Second Quarter,
\nCurrent Account Gap Widens,\u201d Hurriyet Daily News, September 12, 2011, http:\/\/
\nwww.hurriyetdailynews.com\/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=growth-up-in-secondquarter-
\ncurrent-account-gap-widens-2011-09-12.
\n6.
\nConference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD Statistical Handbook (New York:
\nUnited Nations, 2010), .
\naspx?sCS_referer=&sCS_ChosenLang=en.
\n7.
\nAdam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern
\nEurope and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 26;
\nMetin Heper and E. Fuat Keyman, \u201cDouble-Faced State: Political Patronage and the
\nConsolidation of Democracy in Turkey,\u201d Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 34, no. 4 (1998),
\npp. 259\u201377; Ergun Ozbudun, \u201cTurkey: How Far from Consolidation?\u201d Journal of Democracy,
\nvol. 7, no. 3 (July 1996), pp. 123\u201338.
\n8.
\nMurat Yetkin, \u201cYeni K\u00fcrt stratejisi ve Irak baglantisi,\u201d Radikal, March 27, 2012, http:\/\/
\nwww.radikal.com.tr\/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalYazar&ArticleID=1083033&Cat
\negoryID=98.
\n9.<\/p>\n
\n10.
\n\u201cTurkey,\u201d European Commission, December 5, 2011,
\nbilateral-relations\/countries\/turkey.
\n11.
\nM. Rifat Hisarciklioglu, \u201cThe Global Energy Challenges and Turkey: Private Sector
\nPerspective,\u201d Turkish Policy Quarterly, vol. 9, no. 2 (2010), .
\ncom\/dosyalar\/files\/27-31.pdf.
\n12.
\n\u201cGraphic: Death Toll in Syria Reaches 6,000,\u201d Telegraph, February 7, 2012, http:\/\/
\nwww.telegraph.co.uk\/news\/worldnews\/middleeast\/syria\/9066804\/GraphicDeath-
\ntoll-in-Syria-reaches-6000.html; \u201cU.N. Takes Another Try at Syria Resolution,\u201d
\nCNN, February 10, 2012, <\/p>\n
\nEndnotes<\/p>\n
\nhuman-rights?_s=PM:MIDDLEEAST.<\/p>\n
\nSemih Ildiz, \u201cPM Erdogan\u2019s surprising message in Cairo,\u201d Hurriyet Daily News, September
\n15, 2011,
\npm-ErDogan8217s-surprising-message-in-cairo-2011-09-15.
\n14.
\nSir Geoffrey Palmer et al., \u201cReport of the Secretary General\u2019s Panel of Inquiry on the
\n31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident,\u201d September 2011,
\nmiddle_east\/Gaza_Flotilla_Panel_Report.pdf.
\n15.
\nThe tension between Turkey and Cyprus grew in the fall of 2011 over gas prospecting
\nalong both the island\u2019s southern and northern coasts. Ankara worries that the economic
\nbenefits to Nicosia from a major find would reduce incentive for the Greek Cypriot
\ngovernment to find a solution to the conflict that divides the island. For their part,
\nCypriot officials are concerned that Turkey\u2019s prospecting violates Cyprus\u2019s exclusive
\neconomic zone.
\n16.
\nJames Kittfield, \u201cWho Lost Turkey?\u201d National Journal, November 7, 2010, http:\/\/
\nwww.nationaljournal.com\/njonline\/ns_20100621_3616.php; Semra E. Sevi, \u201cTurkey
\nTurning to the East,\u201d Harvard Crimson, November 1, 2011, .
\ncom\/article\/2011\/11\/1\/turkey-married-east-eu\/; Doug Bandow, \u201cWho Lost Turkey?\u201d
\nReason, April 1, 2003, https:\/\/reason.com\/2003\/04\/01\/who-lost-turkey\/;
\nLandon Thomas Jr., \u201cTurning East, Turkey Asserts Economic Power,\u201d New York
\nTimes, July 5, 2010, .
\nhtml?_r=1&pagewanted=all.
\n17.
\nTask Force member Patrick Theros notes, \u201cTurkey accepted that the EU Summit decision
\nat Copenhagen in December 2002 to admit the Republic of Cyprus was final,
\neven if no final solution to the Cyprus problem was achieved prior to the May 1, 2004,
\nformal accession date.\u201d
\n18.
\nBulent Acma, \u201cEconomic Consequences of International Migration: Case Study of
\nTurkey\u201d (unpublished manuscript, Anadolu University, Department of Economics,
\n2000), p. 3; \u201cTurkey,\u201d CIA World Factbook,
\nthe-world-factbook\/geos\/tu.html.
\n19.
\nTurkish manufacturing is concentrated in chemicals and chemical products, textiles,
\nmetals, machinery, automobiles, and food and beverages.
\n20.
\n\u201cA farm boy on the world stage,\u201d Economist, March 6, 2008, .
\ncom\/node\/10808433.
\n21.
\nAhmet T. Kuru, \u201cChanging Perspectives on Islamism and Secularism in Turkey: The
\nG\u00fclen Movement and the AK Party,\u201d in \u201cThe Muslim World in Transition,\u201d p. 145.
\n22.
\nDaren Butler, \u201cDissent in Turkey\u2019s ruling party over match-fixing,\u201d Reuters, December
\n8, 2011,
\nidUKL5E7N83IL20111208.
\n23.
\nThomas Seibert, \u201cTensions between Turkey\u2019s ruling-AKP and Gulenics fester,\u201d
\nNational, December 26, 2011,
\ntensions-between-turkeys-ruling-akp-and-gulenics-fester#full.
\n24.
\nEmre Uslu, \u201cAn AKP-Ulusalci axis?\u201d Sunday\u2019s Zaman, March 14, 2012, http:\/\/www.
\nsundayszaman.com\/sunday\/columnistDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=274319
\n&columnistId=108.
\n25.
\nEdward Stourton, \u201cWhat is Islam\u2019s Gulen movement?\u201d BBC News, May 24, 2011,
\nhttps:\/\/www.bbc.co.uk\/news.<\/p>\n
\nglobal strategy firm, and chair of Albright Capital Management LLC,
\nan investment advisory firm focused on emerging markets. Albright
\nwas the sixty-fourth secretary of state of the United States. In 1997,
\nshe was named the first female secretary of state and became, at that
\ntime, the highest-ranking woman in the history of the U.S. government.
\nFrom 1993 to 1997, Albright served as the U.S. permanent representative
\nto the United Nations and was a member of the president\u2019s cabinet.
\nShe is a professor in the practice of diplomacy at the Georgetown
\nUniversity School of Foreign Service. Albright chairs both the National
\nDemocratic Institute for International Affairs and the Pew Global Attitudes
\nProject and serves as president of the Truman Scholarship Foundation.
\nShe also serves on the U.S. Department of Defense\u2019s defense
\npolicy board, and on the boards of the Council on Foreign Relations,
\nthe Aspen Institute, and the Center for American Progress.<\/p>\n
\nLehigh University in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. His most recent publications
\ninclude Iraq, Its Neighbors, and the United States, coedited with
\nScott Lasensky and Phebe Marr, and \u201cThe Broken Triangle: How the
\nU.S.-Israeli-Turkey Relationship Got Unglued,\u201d in William B. Quandt\u2019s<\/p>\n
\nEast. He also served on the State Department\u2019s policy planning staff
\nduring the Clinton administration.<\/p>\n
\nin the column \u201cEntreventures\u201d on Forbes.com. She is also a regular contributor
\nto Wamda.com, a platform for Middle Eastern entrepreneurs,
\nand Aslan Media, where she writes about Turkey. Over the past several
\nyears, Bayrasli has worked to support start-ups in emerging markets at<\/p>\n
\nSecurity and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina
\nin Sarajevo, and assisted former secretary of state Madeleine K.
\nAlbright. She is an advisory board member for the Turkish Women\u2019s
\nInternational Network and Turkish Philanthropy Funds and a mentor
\nfor the Women Innovate Mobile entrepreneur incubator. She is a regular
\nspeaker on innovation and start-ups. Bayrasli is currently writing a
\nbook on the obstacles to global entrepreneurship.<\/p>\n
\nat McLarty Associates. McLarty Associates counsels corporations
\nand financial institutions in the United States and abroad on strategic
\nplanning government issues, market access, mergers and acquisitions,
\nand political and economic risk issues. He also serves as U.S. chair for
\nGlobal Zero, an international campaign seeking long-term elimination
\nof nuclear weapons. Burt served in the Reagan administration as
\nassistant secretary of state for European and Canadian affairs and then
\nas U.S. ambassador to Germany from 1985 to 1989. Under President
\nGeorge H.W. Bush, he served as U.S. chief negotiator in the Strategic
\nArms Reduction Talks with the former Soviet Union. Burt is a senior
\nadviser to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a member
\nof the Council on Foreign Relations, a member of the Aspen Institute\u2019s
\nMiddle East Strategy Group, and a member of the executive board of
\nthe Atlantic Council. He also serves on a number of prominent corporate
\nboards.<\/p>\n
\nProgram at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He has written
\nextensively on U.S.-Turkish relations, Turkish domestic politics,
\nand Turkish nationalism, publishing in scholarly journals and major
\ninternational print media, including the Wall Street Journal, New York
\nTimes, Washington Post, International Herald Tribune, Jane\u2019s Defense
\nWeekly, Newsweek, and Newsweek Turkiye. He also is a regular columnist
\nfor the Hurriyet Daily News. He appears regularly on Fox News, CNN,
\nNPR, Voice of America, al-Jazeera, BBC, and CNN-Turk. A historian
\nby training, Cagaptay wrote his doctoral dissertation at Yale University
\non Turkish nationalism. Cagaptay has taught courses at Yale, Princeton
\nUniversity, Georgetown University, and Smith College on the Middle
\nEast, Mediterranean, and Eastern Europe. His spring 2003 course on<\/p>\n
\nFrom 2006 to 2007, he was Ertegun professor at Princeton University\u2019s
\nDepartment of Near Eastern Studies. Cagaptay is the recipient of
\nnumerous honors, grants, and chairs, among them the Smith-Richardson,
\nMellon, Rice, and Leylan fellowships, as well as the Ertegun chair
\nat Princeton. He also serves as chair of the Turkey Advanced Area Studies
\nProgram at the State Department\u2019s Foreign Service Institute.<\/p>\n
\nstudies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). He is an expert on
\nArab and Turkish politics as well as U.S.-Middle East policy. Cook
\nis the author of The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square
\nand Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development
\nin Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey. He has published widely in a variety of
\nforeign policy journals, opinion magazines, and newspapers including
\nForeign Affairs, Foreign Policy, the Wall Street Journal, Journal of Democracy,
\nWeekly Standard, Slate, New Republic online, New York Times,
\nWashington Post, Financial Times, International Herald Tribune, and Survival.
\nCook is also a frequent commentator on radio and television. He
\ncurrently writes the blog From the Potomac to the Euphrates. Prior to
\njoining CFR, Cook was a research fellow at the Brookings Institution
\n(2001\u20132002) and a Soref research fellow at the Washington Institute
\nfor Near East Policy (1995\u201396). He holds a BA in international studies
\nfrom Vassar College, an MA in international relations from the Johns
\nHopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and both an MA
\nand a PhD in political science from the University of Pennsylvania.<\/p>\n
\nfrom John F. Kennedy to William J. Clinton, from 1962 to 1994.
\nPriortohisnominationbyPresidentClintonasU.S.ambassadortoIsrael
\n(1993\u201394), he was assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs in
\nboth the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations (1991\u201393). He
\nwas the U.S. ambassador to the Syrian Arab Republic (1988\u201391) and
\nalso served as special assistant to President Ronald Reagan and deputy
\npress secretary for foreign affairs in the White House (1985\u201386). After
\nhis retirement from government service in 1994, he became the founding
\ndirector of the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice
\nUniversity. His is the author of Danger and Opportunity: An American
\nAmbassador\u2019s Journey Through the Middle East. He has been awarded the<\/p>\n
\nDistinguished Honor Award, and numerous other honors, including
\nthe Ellis Island Medal of Honor and the Anti-Defamation League\u2019s
\nMoral Statesman Award. He is also a recipient of the Association of
\nRice Alumni\u2019s Gold Medal, the group\u2019s most prestigious award, for his
\nservice to Rice University. In 2011, Djerejian was elected a fellow of the
\nAmerican Academy of Arts and Sciences and named to the board of
\ntrustees of the Carnegie Corporation of New York.<\/p>\n
\nGermany since 2005. Previously, he was the founding executive director
\nof the Transatlantic Center in Brussels, Belgium, for the German
\nMarshall Fund of the United States. Drozdiak worked for two decades
\nas an editor and foreign correspondent for the Washington Post. He
\nwas chief European correspondent until 2001. From 1990 to 2000, he
\nserved as bureau chief in Paris and Berlin. For his coverage of NATO\u2019s
\nair war on Kosovo, he was part of a Post team selected as a Pulitzer Prize
\nfinalist for international affairs in 1999. From 1986 to 1990, Drozdiak
\nserved as foreign editor and supervised the Post\u2019s award-winning coverage
\nof the Middle East and the collapse of communism in the Soviet
\nUnion and Eastern Europe. Before that, Drozdiak worked as State
\nDepartment correspondent for Time magazine and covered the Middle
\nEast while based in Cairo and Beirut for Time and the Washington Star.
\nHe reported on the Israel-Egypt peace agreement, the fall of the Shah
\nof Iran, the assassination of Anwar Sadat, and the Iran-Iraq War. Drozdiak
\nplayed U.S. and European professional basketball from 1971 to
\n1978. He graduated from the University of Oregon with degrees in
\npolitical science and economics, earned a master\u2019s degree at the College
\nof Europe in Bruges, and studied at the Institute of European Studies at
\nthe University of Brussels.<\/p>\n
\nstrategic consulting firm, along with former secretary of state
\nCondoleezza Rice, former secretary of defense Robert Gates, and
\nformer State Department official Anja Manuel. Hadley previously
\nserved first as deputy national security adviser and then as national
\nsecurity adviser in the administration of George W. Bush. Before joining
\nthe Bush administration, he was a partner in the Washington, DC,
\nlaw firm Shea & Gardner and a principal in the Scowcroft Group, an<\/p>\n
\nsecretary of defense for international security policy under then secretary
\nof defense Richard B. Cheney from 1989 to 1993 and in a variety
\nof other capacities in the defense and national security field, including
\nas counsel to the special review board established by President Reagan
\nto inquire into U.S. arms sales to Iran (the Tower Commission), as a
\nmember of the National Security Council staff under President Gerald
\nFord, and as an analyst for the comptroller of the Department of
\nDefense. Currently, Hadley is a senior adviser on international affairs at
\nthe U.S. Institute of Peace and a member of the State Department\u2019s foreign
\naffairs policy board. He graduated magna cum laude and Phi Beta
\nKappa from Cornell University and received his JD degree from Yale
\nLaw School.<\/p>\n
\nInstitution. Kagan also serves as a member of U.S. secretary of
\nstate Hillary Clinton\u2019s foreign affairs policy board, as senior adviser to
\nthe Romney campaign, and as co-chairman of the bipartisan working
\ngroup on Egypt. He writes a monthly column on world affairs for the
\nWashington Post and is a contributing editor at both the Weekly Standard
\nand the New Republic. He served in the State Department from 1984 to
\n1988 as a member of the policy planning staff, as principal speechwriter
\nfor U.S. secretary of state George P. Shultz, and as deputy for policy
\nin the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. He is a graduate of Yale University
\nand Harvard University\u2019s Kennedy School of Government and
\nholds a PhD in American history from American University. His most
\nrecent book is The Return of History and the End of Dreams. His previous
\nbook, Dangerous Nation: America\u2019s Place in the World from Its Earliest
\nDays to the Dawn of the 20th Century, was the winner of the 2008 Lepgold
\nPrize and a 2007 finalist for the Lionel Gelber Prize. His acclaimed
\nbook Of Paradise and Power was on the best-seller lists of both the New
\nYork Times and the Washington Post.<\/p>\n
\na senior visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign
\nRelations, a visiting fellow at the London School of Economics (LSE)
\nIDEAS, and director of the Hybrid Reality Institute. He is author of The
\nSecond World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order and How
\nto Run the World: Charting a Course to the Next Renaissance. He holds a<\/p>\n
\nof Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He is a Young Global
\nLeader of the World Economic Forum and a fellow of the Royal Geographical
\nSociety.<\/p>\n
\nprofessor of international studies at the University of Washington in
\nSeattle. He received his JD from Columbia University in 1998, where
\nhe served as editor in chief of the Columbia Journal of Transnational
\nLaw, and completed his PhD in 2001 at Columbia University\u2019s Department
\nof Religion (Islamic Studies). He teaches courses in Islamic law,
\nconstitutional law, and law and development. He is the author of State
\nLaw as Islamic Law in Modern Egypt and of numerous articles on Islam,
\ncomparative constitutional law, and the rule of law in the Muslim world.
\nHe is senior editor of the forthcoming Oxford Encyclopedia of Islam and
\nLaw. Lombardi has also worked on numerous legal reform projects in
\nthe Muslim world. Prior to joining the University of Washington, Lombardi
\nclerked for the Honorable Samuel A. Alito, then on the U.S. Court
\nof Appeals for the Third Circuit, and also practiced law with Cleary
\nGottlieb in New York.<\/p>\n
\nShe has written about Turkey and regional issues since the late 1980s and
\nwas based in Istanbul for Reuters in the 1990s. She has also worked for
\nthe Boston Globe and Bloomberg, and between 1997 and 2000 reported
\nout of Israel and Germany. Her book on the Kurdistan Worker\u2019s Party
\n(PKK), Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence,
\nwas translated into Turkish. Marcus currently works as a communications
\nconsultant to the World Bank and, separately, continues to write
\non Turkey and the Kurdish problem both for U.S. and Turkish publications.
\nHer specialty is the PKK, how it wields power and directs the
\nKurdish movement in Turkey, and what this means for peaceful resolution
\nof the Kurdish problem.<\/p>\n
\nGovernment and Public Service at Texas A&M University and serves
\nas director of the Bush School\u2019s Scowcroft Institute of International
\nAffairs. From March to July 2008, Napper served as co-leader of the
\nIraq Governance Assessment Team, which made recommendations<\/p>\n
\n2005, Napper completed a thirty-one-year career in the U.S. Foreign
\nService, which included ambassadorships in Kazakhstan (2001\u20132004)
\nand Latvia (1995\u201398). From 1998 to 2001, Napper was coordinator for<\/p>\n
\n$600 million budget for development and postconflict reconstruction.
\nFrom 1991 to 1994, Napper directed the State Department\u2019s Office of
\nSoviet Union Affairs, reorganizing the office following the collapse
\nof the Soviet Union and establishing diplomatic relations and resident
\nmissions in each of the independent states that emerged from the
\nformer Soviet Union. From 1974 to 1994, Napper served in diplomatic
\nassignments in Romania, Moscow, southern Africa, and Washington.
\nNapper received the Secretary of State\u2019s Career Achievement Award,
\ntwo Presidential Meritorious Service Awards, and the State Department\u2019s
\nDistinguished Honor Award for leadership during the December
\n1989 violent overthrow of the Ceausescu dictatorship in Romania,
\namong other awards. Napper holds a BA in history from Texas A&M
\nUniversity and an MA in government and foreign affairs from the University
\nof Virginia. He served as an officer in the U.S. Army from 1969
\nto 1972.
\nDenise Natali is the Minerva chair at the Institute for National Strategic
\nStudies of the National Defense University. Over the past two
\ndecades she has traveled, lived, and worked in the Kurdish regions
\nof Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Syria and has authored numerous publications
\non Kurdish politics, economy, and identity, including The Kurdish
\nQuasi-State: Development and Dependency in Post\u2013Gulf War Iraq and
\nThe Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey, and
\nIran, which received the 2006 Choice Award for Outstanding Academic
\nTitle. Her current research is on federalism and the political
\neconomy of post-Saddam Iraq. Natali also specializes in postconflict
\nrelief and reconstruction, having worked for the U.S. Office of Foreign
\nDisaster Assistance and international NGOs in Peshawar, Pakistan,
\nand post\u2013Gulf War Iraqi Kurdistan, respectively. Natali received a PhD
\nin political science at the University of Pennsylvania and a master of
\ninternational affairs at Columbia University\u2019s School of International
\nand Public Affairs. She has also studied at the L\u2019Institut National des
\nLangues et Civilisations Orientales in Paris, the University of Tehran,
\nand Tel Aviv University.<\/p>\n
\nAir Force career as commander, U.S. European Command, and
\nsupreme allied commander Europe, NATO. As NATO commander,
\nRalston contributed to preserving the peace, security, and territorial
\nintegrity of the NATO member nations while commanding approximately
\nsixty-five thousand troops from thirty-nine NATO nations and
\nothers participating in ongoing operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
\nKosovo, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. He also led
\nthe efforts to integrate the three nations that were admitted to NATO
\nin 1999 and oversaw the process to invite seven nations to join NATO
\nin 2002. His previous assignment was as commander of the U.S. Air
\nForce Air Combat Command at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. He
\nhas also commanded the Alaskan Command. Ralston also served as
\nvice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1996\u20132000), the nation\u2019s second-
\nhighest-ranking military officer. In that role, Ralston chaired the
\npowerful Joint Requirements Oversight Council, which validated the
\nrequirements for nearly every program of the Department of Defense.
\nIn September 2006, President Bush appointed him the special envoy for
\ncountering the Kurdistan Worker\u2019s Party (PKK), a terrorist organization
\ndesignated by the United States, Turkey, and the European Union.<\/p>\n
\nfor U.S. and governmental relations in support of British Petroleum\u2019s
\n(BP) international portfolio of assets and commercial activities.
\nHe joined BP\u2019s Washington office in 2004. Saunders was previously
\nposted to BP\u2019s global headquarters in London and to BP Algeria. In
\nAlgiers, Saunders served as the director for communications and
\nexternal affairs, responsible for corporate responsibility, reputation
\nmanagement\/branding, relationship management, and community
\noutreach in support of BP\u2019s $5 billion portfolio of gas and oil exploration
\nactivities. Prior to joining BP, Saunders culminated a career with
\nthe U.S. government, including assignments in Asia, Africa, Europe,
\nand the Middle East. He has a BS in engineering from West Point, an
\nMA in international relations from the Naval Postgraduate School, and
\nan MBA from the George Washington University. He speaks French
\nand Portuguese.<\/p>\n
\n1995 to November 1998. Theros assumed office as the president and<\/p>\n
\nTheros served in a variety of positions during his thirty-five-year career
\nin the U.S. Foreign Service, including as political adviser to the commander
\nin chief, Central Command (CENTCOM), deputy chief of mission
\nand political officer in Amman, and charge d\u2019affaires and deputy
\nchief of mission in Abu Dhabi. Immediately before his appointment
\nto Qatar, Theros served as deputy coordinator for counterterrorism,
\nresponsible for the coordination of all U.S. government counterterrorism
\nactivities outside the United States. In 1992, Theros was awarded
\nthe president\u2019s Meritorious Service Award for career officials and the
\nSecretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service. He also
\nearned four Superior Honor Awards over the course of his career. In
\n1998, His Highness the Emir of Qatar Shaikh Hamad bin Khalifah Al-
\nThani presented Theros with the Qatari Gold Medal of Merit for distinguished
\nservice.<\/p>\n
\nand Mercury. He served in the U.S. House of Representatives
\nfrom 1981 to 1993, representing Minnesota\u2019s Second Congressional
\nDistrict. He was a member of the appropriations committee and an
\nelected member of the House Republican leadership. In 2004, Weber
\nwas the Bush-Cheney \u201904 Plains States regional chairman. He has
\nbeen featured in numerous national publications and is a sought-after
\npolitical and policy analyst, appearing frequently on major television
\noutlets. Washingtonian magazine named Weber fifth in its list
\nof Washington\u2019s top fifty lobbyists. Weber is former chairman of the
\nNational Endowment for Democracy. He serves on the Board of the
\nCouncil on Foreign Relations and co-chaired the Independent Task
\nForce on U.S. Policy Toward Reform in the Arab World. Weber is
\na former member of the U.S. secretary of defense\u2019s defense policy
\nboard advisory committee and also served on the U.S. secretary of
\nstate\u2019s advisory committee on democracy promotion. He is a senior
\nfellow at the University of Minnesota\u2019s Humphrey Institute and is
\ncodirector of its Policy Forum. Weber is a board member of several
\nprivate sector and nonprofit organizations, including ITT Educational
\nServices, the Lenox Group, and the Aspen Institute, for which
\nhe served on the Middle East strategy group. Prior to opening Clark
\n& Weinstock\u2019s DC office in 1994, Weber was president and codirector
\nof Empower America.<\/p>\n
\nUniversity, is former president of the Turkish Studies Association
\nand of the American Anthropological Association\u2019s Middle East Section,
\nand sits on the board of the Institute of Turkish Studies. She has
\nreceived numerous grants and fellowships from, among others, the
\nSocial Science Research Council, the MacArthur Foundation, the
\nNational Science Foundation, and Fulbright-Hays. She is author of
\nMuslim Nationalism and the New Turks; Islamist Mobilization in Turkey:
\nA Study in Vernacular Politics, which won the 2003 Douglass Prize for
\nthe best book on Europeanist anthropology; and Money Makes Us
\nRelatives: Women\u2019s Labor in Urban Turkey. She has authored numerous
\narticles on Turkey and on Turks in Germany and lectures internationally
\non topics ranging from political Islam and nationalism to
\nethnic identity and gender issues. White has been following events
\nin Turkey since the mid-1970s. All of her books have been translated
\ninto Turkish. She writes a blog on contemporary Turkey that averages
\none thousand visitors a month and was named by Foreign Policy
\nas one of two blogs on Turkey that President Obama should read:
\nhttp:\/\/kamilpasha.com.<\/p>\n
\nCenter and a lecturer in international affairs at George Washington
\nUniversity. A U.S. Foreign Service officer for thirty years, he served as
\nambassador to Turkey from 2005 to 2008 and to Azerbaijan from 2000
\nto 2003. Earlier postings abroad included Moscow, Prague, and Melbourne,
\nAustralia. Among Washington assignments, Wilson served as
\nchief of staff for Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick (2005),
\nan aide to Secretaries Lawrence Eagleburger and Warren Christopher
\n(1992\u201394), chief U.S. negotiator for the Free Trade Area of the Americas,
\nand principal deputy to the ambassador-at-large for the new independent
\nstates of the former Soviet Union (1997\u20132000). A recipient of
\nthe President\u2019s Meritorious Service Award and other honors, Wilson
\nholds a bachelor\u2019s degree from the University of Minnesota and master\u2019s
\ndegrees from Columbia University and the U.S. National War
\nCollege. He is chairman of the board of the Institute of Turkish Studies
\nand a member of the Academy of American Diplomacy, the American
\nForeign Service Association, the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma, and
\nthe Washington Institute of Foreign Affairs.<\/p>\n
\nstudies, emeritus, in the Department of Anthropology at Harvard
\nUniversity. He is also a senior fellow of the Harvard Society of Fellows
\nand a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Yalman is
\na member of the Association of Social Anthropologists of Great Britain
\nand a trustee of Koc University and Robert College, both in Istanbul.
\nHe is also a member of the International Relations Forum of Turkey.
\nYalman was a fellow of Peterhouse at Cambridge University and professor
\nof social anthropology at the University of Chicago before joining
\nHarvard. His fieldwork is in Sri Lanka, India, Iran, and Turkey. He is
\nfamiliar with the Balkans, the Arab countries, Central and Southeast
\nAsia, and Japan. Yalman speaks French, German, Turkish, some Persian,
\nSinhalese, Italian, and Arabic. His interests include the anthropology
\nof religion, social and political conditions in the Middle East and
\nSouth Asia, and political and intellectual developments in other parts
\nof Asia. His publications include Under the Bo Tree; A Passage to Peace:
\nGlobal Solutions from East and West (with Daisaku Ikeda; also in Japanese);
\n\u201cIslam and Secularism\u2014Plato and Khomeini: Questions Concerning
\nthe Open Society and its Enemies\u201d; and papers on religion,
\npolitics, ethnicity, nationalism, and secularism.<\/p>\n
\nHe has over nineteen years of experience as an investment professional,
\nserving senior roles in the investment advisory, trading, and portfolio
\nmanagement functions. Most recently, Zuaiter was a portfolio manager
\nat Soros Fund Management (SFM) in New York and Istanbul, where
\nhe managed a long\/short emerging markets fund with core emphasis
\non frontier markets. Prior to SFM, Zuaiter spent four years at Morgan
\nStanley Investment Management, also as a portfolio manager responsible
\nfor several long-only mandates in the emerging markets space,
\nwith core focus on Europe, Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) markets.
\nZuaiter also managed the Turkish Investment Fund, the Eastern
\nEurope Fund, and the Emerging Europe, Middle East, and Africa
\nFund. Previously, Zuaiter was a portfolio manager and analyst at Scudder
\nKemper Investments, leading a team of regional analysts covering
\nEMEA markets and managing two emerging markets portfolios. Prior
\nto that, Zuaiter held senior positions at EFG-Hermes in Cairo, serving
\nas head of regional proprietary trading, and at SHUAA Capital in<\/p>\n
\nBefore that, Zuaiter served as a senior position trader with Merrill
\nLynch & Co., where he was responsible for Brazil, Colombia, and Chile
\ntrading books. Zuaiter earned a degree in business administration from
\nGeorgetown University and an MBA from Harvard Business School.<\/p>\n
\non the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (HCFA), where he covers
\nthe Middle East, Turkey, and the Caucasus. At the State Department,
\nwhere he worked from 1983 to 1994, he variously covered southern
\nEuropean affairs and Middle Eastern affairs for the Bureau of Intelligence
\nand Research. He also served as political adviser to Operation
\nProvide Comfort (1992) and as special adviser to special Middle East
\ncoordinator Dennis Ross (1993\u201394). At the Washington Institute for
\nNear East Policy, a private think tank where he worked from 1994 to
\n2001, Makovsky wrote and published widely on various Middle Eastern
\nand Turkish topics. He also founded and directed the Washington Institute\u2019s
\nTurkish Research Program. He has been with HCFA (formerly
\nthe House International Relations Committee, or HIRC) since 2001.<\/p>\n
\nglobal strategy firm, and a member of the management and investment
\ncommittees of Albright Capital Management, an affiliated investment
\nadvisory firm focused on emerging markets. O\u2019Brien served in the U.S.
\ngovernment for twelve years, including as special presidential envoy for
\nthe Balkans and principal deputy director of policy planning at the U.S.
\nState Department. He earned a BA from Macalester College in St. Paul,
\nMinnesota, a master\u2019s degree from the University of Pittsburgh, and a
\nJD from Yale Law School.<\/p>\n
\nCouncil on Foreign Relations (CFR) in Washington, DC. She is a career
\nForeign Service officer at the U.S. Department of State. Taylor joined
\nCFR from the Department of State\u2019s Office of Southern European
\nAffairs. As the Turkey desk and southern European economic affairs
\nofficer, she managed a wide range of bilateral policy issues with Turkey<\/p>\n
\nand Cyprus. From 2008 to 2009, Taylor worked in the Office of Iranian
\nAffairs, where she managed the nonproliferation and Iranian foreign
\npolicy portfolio. Since joining the State Department in 2003, she has
\nserved as an economic officer at the U.S. Embassy in Tunis, Tunisia
\n(2006\u20132008); as the political and economic officer at the U.S. Consulate
\nin Lahore, Pakistan (2006); and as a vice consul at the U.S. Embassy
\nin Islamabad, Pakistan (2004\u20132005). Taylor holds a BA in international
\nrelations and diplomatic history from the University of Pennsylvania
\nand an MSc from the London School of Economics and Political Science
\nin development studies. She speaks French, Mandarin, and Urdu.<\/p>\n
\nJoel I. Klein and Condoleezza Rice, Chairs; Julia Levy, Project Director
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 68 (2012)<\/p>\n
\nAndrew H. Card and Thomas A. Daschle, Chairs; Edward Alden and Matthew J. Slaughter,
\nProject Directors
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 67 (2011)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 66 (2011)<\/p>\n
\nRichard L. Armitage and Samuel R. Berger, Chairs; Daniel S. Markey, Project Director
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 65 (2010)<\/p>\n
\nCharles L. Pritchard and John H. Tilelli Jr., Chairs; Scott A. Snyder, Project Director
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 64 (2010)<\/p>\n
\nJeb Bush and Thomas F. McLarty III, Chairs; Edward Alden, Project Director
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 63 (2009)<\/p>\n
\nWilliam J. Perry and Brent Scowcroft, Chairs; Charles D. Ferguson, Project Director
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 62 (2009)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 61 (2008)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 60 (2008)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 59 (2007)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 58 (2006)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 57 (2006)<\/p>\n
\nMorrison, Project Directors
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 56 (2006)<\/p>\n
\nSutphen, Deputy Director
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 55 (2005)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 54 (2005)<\/p>\n
\nRozental, and Robert Pastor, Vice Chairs; Chappell H. Lawson, Project Director
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 53 (2005)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 52 (2004)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 40B (Web-only release, 2004)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 51 (2004)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 43C (Web-only release, 2004)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 50 (2004)<\/p>\n
\n(Chairmen\u2019s Report)<\/p>\n
\nIspahani, Project Directors
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 49 (2003)
\nCosponsored with the Asia Society<\/p>\n
\nShibley Telhami, Working Committee Chairs; Jennifer Sieg, Project Director; Sharon
\nHerbstman, Project Coordinator
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 48 (2003)<\/p>\n
\nProject Director
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 47 (2003)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 43B (Web-only release, 2003)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 46 (2003)<\/p>\n
\nIspahani, Project Directors
\nChairman\u2019s Report of an Independent Task Force (2003)
\nCosponsored with the Asia Society<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 45 (2003)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 44 (2003)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 43 (2003)<\/p>\n
\nElizabeth Frawley Bagley, Associate Director
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 42 (2002)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 41 (2002)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 40 (2002)<\/p>\n
\nDirectors
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 39 (2002)
\nCosponsored with Freedom House<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 38 (Web-only release, 2001)<\/p>\n
\nDaniel R. Lucich, Deputy Project Director
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 37 (2001)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 36 (2001)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 33B (2001)
\nCosponsored with the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 35 (2001)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 34 (2001)
\nStrategic Energy Policy: Challenges for the 21st Century<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 33 (2001)
\nCosponsored with the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 32 (2001)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 31 (2001)
\nCosponsored with the Center for Strategic and International Studies<\/p>\n
\nDirectors
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 30 (2000)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 29 (2000)
\nCosponsored with the Inter-American Dialogue<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 28 (2000)<\/p>\n
\nInterim Report (2000)
\nCosponsored with the Inter-American Dialogue<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 27 (2000)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 26 (1999)<\/p>\n
\nThe Future International Financial Architecture<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 25 (1999)
\nCosponsored with the International Institute for Economics<\/p>\n
\nMorton I. Abramowitz and James T. Laney, Chairs; Michael J. Green, Project Director
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 24 (1999)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 23 (Web-only release, 1999)<\/p>\n
\nPrincipal Authors
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 22 (1999)<\/p>\n
\nZbigniew Brzezinski, Chair; F. Stephen Larrabee, Project Director
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 21 (1999)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 20 (1999)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 19 (1999)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 18 (1998)
\nCosponsored with the Brookings Institution<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 17 (1998)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 16 (1998)<\/p>\n
\nHenry Siegman, Project Coordinator
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 15 (1997)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 14 (1997)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 13 (1997)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 12 (1997)<\/p>\n
\nand Richard M. Moose, Project Directors
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 11 (1997)
\nCosponsored with the Brookings Institution<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 10 (1997)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 9 (1996)
\nCosponsored with the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 8 (1996)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 7 (1996)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 6 (1996)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 5 (1995)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 4 (1995)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 3 (1995)<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 2 (1995)
\nCosponsored with the Seoul Forum for International Affairs<\/p>\n
\nIndependent Task Force Report No. 1 (1995)<\/p>\n
\nNote: Task Force reports are available for download from CFR\u2019s website, www.cfr.org.
\nFor more information, email publications@cfr.org.<\/p>\n
\nrent and critical importance to U.S. foreign policy and provide policymakers with concrete
\njudgments and recommendations. Diverse in backgrounds and perspectives, Task Force
\nmembers aim to reach a meaningful consensus on policy through private and nonpartisan
\ndeliberations. Once launched, Task Forces are independent of CFR and solely responsible
\nfor the content of their reports. Task Force members are asked to join a consensus signifying
\nthat they endorse \u201cthe general policy thrust and judgments reached by the group, though<\/p>\n
\noption of putting forward an additional or a dissenting view. Members affiliations are listed
\nfor identification purposes only and do not imply institutional endorsement. Task Force ob<\/p>\n
\nPublic Policy, Rice University<\/p>\n
\nRobert W. Kagan<\/p>\n
\nPublic Service, Texas A&M University<\/p>\n
\nVin Weber<\/p>\n