the Republic of Turkey and the Armenian Genocide\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Pulat Tacar[1]<\/strong> and Maxime Gauin[2]<\/strong><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Degerli dostlarim, sevgili meslekdaslarim 25.04.2012<\/p>\n\n\n\n European Journal of International Law (EJIL) yaklasik bir yil once kendilerine yayimlanmak uzere yollanan – \u0130svec’te mukim bir Ermeni tarafindan kaleme alindigini yaptigimiz inceleme sonucunda ogrendigimiz-<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cState Identity, Continuity and Responsibility: The Ottoman Empire,<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n the Republic of Turkey and the Armenian Genocide\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n bir makale taslagini karsi gorus (cevap) yazmam talebi ile bana yolladi. Sagligim uzun sure bilgisayar onun de calismama olanak saglamamaktaydi. Bu talebi reddedersem, “Turklere yazdik cevap vermek istemediler ” gerekcesi ile -ulkemiz hakkinda gercekten cok agir ve asilsiz suclamalar iceren- bu yaziyi herhalde yayimlayacaklarini dusunerek, Ankara’da doktorasini yapmakta olan Fransiz Maxime Gauin’in yardimini rica ettim. Ekte sundugum cevabi yazdik ve 24.04.2012 tarihinde EJIL’e yolladik.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 13 sahifelik bu yazimiz 35 sayfalik makaleye cevap teskil ediyor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n EJIL bu cevabimizi yayimlar mi ? Bilmiyorum. Rahatsiz olacaklarini ve Ermeni militanlarin serrinden korkacaklarini sanirim. En azindan yayimlamazlar ise, orijinal makaleyi de yayimlamazlar insallah<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ayrica, bilimsel dergilerde adet oldugu uzere, makaleye verilecek cevabimiza, orijinal makale yazarinin verecegi cevabi da yayimlamak istediklerini bana bildiren EJIL’e , yazar, makale hakkindaki yorumumuza cevap verirse, buna verecegimiz cevabi da birlikte yayimlamalari gerektigini hat\u0131rlattim.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yazimizi bilgi ve degerlendirmenize sunuyorum. Yorumumuzu okumak zahmetine katlanacak arkadaslar, meslekdaslar goruslerini bildirirlerse sevinirim.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Saygilari\u011fmi sunarim. Dostlukla<\/p>\n\n\n\n Pulat Tacar<\/p>\n\n\n\n —————–<\/p>\n\n\n\n Reply to \u201cState Identity, Continuity and Responsibility: The Ottoman Empire,<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n the Republic of Turkey and the Armenian Genocide\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Pulat Tacar[1]<\/strong> and Maxime Gauin[2]<\/strong><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n We have been asked by the European Journal of International Law<\/em> to write a reply to a manuscript titled \u201cState Identity, Continuity and Responsibility: The Ottoman Empire, the Republic of Turkey and the Armenian Genocide\u201d. The said manuscript accuses Turkey of \u201cpracticing a denialist policy\u201d with regard to \u201cthe act of genocide committed during 1915-1916,<\/em>\u201d demanding it \u201cmake itself responsible for its own internationally wrongful acts committed against Armenians and other Christian minorities,\u201d <\/em>and also accused it of \u201cexpanding the massacres beyond its borders into the Caucasus and the territories of the independent Republic of Armenia.\u201d According to the same manuscript, there is a state succession and continuation of responsibility from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic, and the Republic must assume full responsibility for and should also repair the injury caused by the Ottoman Empire.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Armenian question is especially sensitive, among other reasons because of the long accumulation of prejudices against Turks[3], Armenian terrorism of 1973-1991[4], the Armenian invasion and occupation of western Azerbaijan since 1992[5], or more recently the virulent anti-Turkish stance of Anders Breivik in his manifesto[6] and the various campaigns or attacks by Armenian nationalists.[7] Instead of easing the tensions, the manuscript fuels them through the provocative[8], defaming,[9] irredentist[10] remarks of its author who harbors in his writings the colors of a political pamphleteer.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On this sensitive issue our main objective is to restore much-needed understanding and fair as well as reconciliatory dialogue between the Armenian and Turkish people and all interested parties, including scholars.[11]<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe right to truth\u201d encompasses all the aspects of the truth and all the pages of history; in short, \u201ca just memory.\u201d Thus, initiatives for dialogue between those who defend different views should be promoted. In this respect, the creation of joint commissions foreseen by the protocols between Armenia and Turkey will no doubt serve the cause of reconciliation, even if parties to the conflict insist on highlighting their views on the different aspects of \u201ctheir truth.\u201d We believe, like the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, that history is not frozen or rigid forever; that assessments categorized as historical truth cannot be conclusive, and that the assertions related to historical knowledge develop. Consequently, research on history is continuous.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Paul Ricoeur,[12] who has received international recognition with his book titled Memory, History, Forgetting<\/em>, criticized the concept of \u201ccollective memory\u201d and pointed out that some ideologies have been formed under the auspices of this concept concerning the warning\u2014reminded frequently by local and foreign scholars or politicians\u2014on \u201c<\/em>completing the task of memory.\u201d Paul Ricoeur emphasized that not the \u201ctask of memory\u201d but a \u201cstudy of memory\u201d process should be developed in our minds. He further stated that discussions around \u201crightful memory\u201d create a difficult picture vis-\u00e0-vis those who are forced somewhere to exceedingly remember their sorrows, and who may somewhere else equally face the position of those who tend to excessively forget that conviction and punishment are the task of judges. The citizen must resist \u201cforgetting\u201d and at the same time should possess a \u2018just memory.\u2019 The task of the historian is not to accuse or exculpate, but to understand; the \u2018study of memory\u2019 is open to improvement and its feature of d\u00e9familiarisation<\/em> [13] outweighs the task of memory.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n As we address our comments to the European Journal for International Law<\/em>, we intend to focus mainly on the international law aspects of the question.<\/p>\n\n\n\n I. Why Turkey does not qualify the tragic events of 1915-1916 as genocide?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The main incrimination of the author is that Turkey denies recognizing the 1915-1916 Armenian genocide. Let us scrutinize if such an accusation is legally sustainable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe concept of the \u201cArmenian genocide\u201d is being used in a historical and political rather than in a legal perspective. It has become a catchword which reveals deep scars in the Armenian collective memory. Learned legal discussions on the issue of genocidal intent are of little or no relevance to the perception by the Armenians of one of the most defining moments of their history [14]\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The term \u201cgenocide\u201d is a legal term; it describes a crime specifically defined by the 1948 Genocide Convention and must be addressed accordingly. The existence of the crime of genocide can be legally determined only by the judges of a competent tribunal on the basis of the prescribed legal criteria and after a fair and impartial trial. The Genocide Convention does not allow for convictions on genocide by legislatures, scholars, pamphleteers, politicians or others. Some historians, sociologists, politicians and even political scientists who dealt with these issues tend to describe almost any incident which involves a significant number of dead[15] as genocide; they sometimes purposely mislead those who are not familiar with the law; they created an \u201cArmenian taboo\u201d and now they are prisoners of it.[16] Indeed,<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cTo term the events of 1915 as genocide is to detach genocide from its legal definition and to use it for political or moral purposes. Whether it is sound to keep hammering on a legal term based on non-legal considerations is doubtful\u2026 it adds to a wrong conceptualization of the legal system and eventually could lead to a devaluation of the norm itself\u2026\u201d [17]<\/p>\n\n\n\n But, Armenians and some of their supporters have deliberately set aside the legal aspects of the issue, because \u2013they thought- it would weaken their genocide claims. They have chosen to adopt a dogmatic political approach to underline the tragic nature of the incidents so that they can make genocide claims more easily acceptable by the public.[18]<\/p>\n\n\n\n Dolus specialis – <\/em>special intent<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The most important characteristic of the Genocide Convention is that for the crime of genocide to exist, acts must have been committed with the intent to destroy the protected groups as such<\/em>. The mental or subjective element (mens rea<\/em>) is a constituent of that crime. The concept of \u201cgeneral intent,\u201d which is valid for ordinary crimes, is inadequate in the identification of acts of genocide.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Sociologically and psychologically, the intent \u201cto destroy a group as such\u201d emerges in the most intensive stage of racism. Racial hatred is quite different from the ordinary animosity laced with anger, which parties engaged in a substantial dispute may feel toward one another. Racial hatred is a deeply pathological feeling or complicated fanaticism. Anti-Semitism is an example in this context.[19]<\/p>\n\n\n\n According to the Genocide Convention, the intent to destroy a group must be in the form of \u201cspecial intent,\u201d dolus specialis,<\/em> beyond any doubt. This crucial aspect of the crime of genocide has been underlined by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in paragraph 187 of its verdict on Bosnia Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro[20]: The International Court of Justice (ICJ) examined the allegations by Bosnia and Herzegovina and conducted long and detailed investigations regarding the alleged atrocities, the findings of which are grouped according to the categories of prohibited acts described in Article II of the Genocide Convention. With regard to killing members of the protected group, the Court found that massive killings throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina were perpetrated during the conflict. However, with the exception of Srebrenica, the Court was not convinced that those killings were accompanied by the specific intent on the part of the perpetrators to destroy in whole or in part the group of Bosnian Muslims. So, if the \u201cspecial intent\u201d is not proven beyond any doubt, judicially an act cannot be qualified as genocide. The cases of civil war, rebellion, and mutual killings should not be confused with the crime of genocide.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A competent tribunal to judge the genocidal acts<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Moreover, the existence of the crime of genocide must be decided by a competent tribunal. Article VI of the 1948 Genocide Convention on the subject reads as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n The issue of a competent tribunal had been debated extensively by the International Preparatory Conference of the 1948 Genocide Convention. The question of determining a competent tribunal was resolved[21] after lengthy discussion and the above-mentioned text was approved. During the discussions, a proposal of \u201cuniversal repression\u201d was rejected[22]. Universal repression foresees the judging of the suspects by any tribunal of any state. Without a valid decision from a competent court, an act cannot legally be qualified as genocide.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Turkish government and the overwhelming majority of Turks, as well as other governments [23] and many scholars or experts reject qualifying the tragic events of 1915 as genocide, because the sine qua non<\/em> legal conditions incorporated in the 1948 Genocide Convention have not been fulfilled. These torts may be legally qualified criminal acts foreseen by the Ottoman Penal Code and \/ or mutual killings.[24]<\/p>\n\n\n\n On this occasion we would like to underline that, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey Mr. Ahmet Davuto\u011flu very clearly stated he was not insensitive to the sufferings of the Ottoman Armenians, but was expecting the same understanding from the Armenian side with regard to the plight of the Muslim Ottomans which equally suffered during the same tragic events.[25] The Turkish government has more than once declared that it was ready to consider and eventually accept the conclusion of historians and legal experts who will meet to study the tragic events of 1915-1916; but Yerevan refused.[26] Regardless, Ankara has supported the Vienna platform since 2004, which in 2009 published a large compilation of documents.[27] Turkey fully opened its archives\u2014unlike the Armenian Revolutionary Federation and the Armenian Patriarchate at Jerusalem\u2014, and, according to Dr. Hilmar Kaiser, a supporter of the \u201cArmenian genocide\u201d label, there is no evidence for deliberate destruction of Ottoman documents.[28]<\/p>\n\n\n\n Other general principles of international criminal law on internationally wrongful acts<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Thos who refer to internationally wrongful acts in the context of 1915 events, should also take into consideration the following principles of international law:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cNulla crimen sine lege\u201d[29] and \u201cNulla poena sine lege\u201d[30]<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The governing principles of criminal law are also valid for the crime of genocide: \u201cNulla crimen sine lege,<\/em>\u201d which means no crime shall exist without law, and \u201cNulla poena sine lege,<\/em>\u201d which means no person shall be punished without a law foreseeing such punishment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ne bis in idem<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The principle \u201cNe bis in idem<\/em>\u201d[31] means that no person shall be tried with respect to conduct which formed the basis of crimes for which the person has been convicted or acquitted by the competent court.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Turkish government and the great majority of Turks do not deny that Ottoman Armenians, together with Muslim and other Ottoman citizens, were the subject of a great tragedy[32] during the 1915-1916 events, that they lost their lives, properties, families as well as their homes. During the relocation or the transfer of a population within the borders of Ottoman territory, a number of military personnel or civil servants and other members of the population committed crimes in spite of orders given by the Ottoman government to protect the lives and properties of the displaced Armenians.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The 1915-1916 trials by the Ottoman government for crimes against Ottoman Armenians<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n In this respect it should be underlined that the criminality associated with the tragic events and the relocation of the Ottoman Armenians during the years 1915-1916 was addressed by the Ottoman judiciary. Individuals or members of the groups who attacked the Armenian convoys and officials who exploited the Armenian plight, neglected their duties or abused their powers were court-martialed and punished.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 1915, more than 20 Muslims were sentenced to death and executed for such charges.[33] Following a report of Talat Pasha, the Ottoman government created three commissions[34] to investigate the complaints of Armenians and the denunciations of civil servants. As a result, in March-April 1916, 1673 Muslims\u2014including captains, lieutenants, first and second lieutenants, commanders of gendarme squads, police superintendents, and mayors\u2014were sent to martial courts. 67 were sentenced to death, 524 were sentenced to jail, 68 received other punishments such as forced labor, imprisonment in forts, and exile. Since the author of the manuscript stresses the alleged \u201cconfiscation\u201d of Armenian properties by the Ottoman State, it is not unimportant to notice that several people were sentenced to death for plunder, and that other death sentences were justified not only by murders, but also by robberies.[35]<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 1919, the Ottoman government asked its Spanish, Dutch, Danish and Swedish counterparts to send impartial investigators of the Anatolian events of WWI. The demand went in vain because of British pressure.[36]<\/p>\n\n\n\n Furthermore, the occupying British forces brought 144 Ottoman officials to Malta to judge them in a tribunal for presumed war crimes and crimes against Armenians. The author misrepresents the case of those 144 Ottoman officials interned in Malta from 1919 to 1921. They were released after more than two years of unsuccessful investigation by a British prosecutor and his staff. The occupying powers had not found enough evidence in the British, U.S. and Armenian archives, or in the Ottoman documentation seized by the British army. The statement of the author that the archives had been destroyed does not reflect the truth. It is known that at that time the British government relied on an Armenian researcher Haig Khazarian in its hunt for incriminating evidence against Ottoman officials brought to Malta. The British also requested the U.S. government\u2019s help for this purpose, but received the response that there was not enough evidence there. If even the slightest proof existed at the hands of British authorities\u2014enough to inculpate the prisoners at Malta\u2014the trials would surely have taken place against the Ottoman citizens which were sent to Malta to face trial.[37]<\/p>\n\n\n\n Malta\u2019s prosecutor refused to use the material of the courts-martial of 1919-1920. Indeed, the trial of the ministers in 1919 was legally null and void, since it took place as a court-martial. According to the Ottoman Constitution, the ministers had to be judged only by the High Court for the crimes committed in the exercise of their responsibilities. As early as 1919, the right to appeal the sentences was suppressed. The courts-martial of 1919-1920 did not allow the right of cross-examination, which exists even at Guantanamo. In April 1920, Damat Ferit Pasha even banned the defendants from hiring a lawyer. After the final fall of Damat Ferit, the right to appeal and hire a lawyer was restored. All the surviving convicts of April-October 1920 appealed the decisions, and they were acquitted of all or most of the charges. These decisions took place when Istanbul was still occupied by the Entente.[38]<\/p>\n\n\n\n Malta\u2019s prosecutor did not adopt the allegations against the Ottoman Special Organization (SO) unit. Actually, the Special Organization took no part in the forced Armenian displacements and massacres and no observer of WWI accused this unit of crimes against Armenians. Many years after WWI, Mr. Dadrian, followed by Mr. Ak\u00e7am, seriously distorted their material and invented references to the SO which actually do not exist in the records. For instance, they reverted purely and simply the sense of the Memoirs of Arif Cemil Denker, a officer of SO during WWI, seriously distorted the Memoirs and the statements and another officer, E\u015fref Ku\u015f\u00e7uba\u015f\u0131, and falsely alleged that the martial-courts of 1919-1920 found the Ottoman SO guilty for Armenian deportation and massacres. Mr. Dadrian and Mr. Ak\u00e7am also neglected the relevant Ottoman military documents.[39]<\/p>\n\n\n\n The eastern front<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n According to the author:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Turkey did continue the same internationally wrongful acts, even expanding the massacres beyond its own borders into the Caucasus and the territories of the independent Republic of Armenia…<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n We assume that the author wants to refer to the 1920 Turco-Armenian war. Much is written about that tragic period. One of the correct evaluations about the stated period was made by the then-Prime Minister of Armenia Hovannes Kachaznuni. He wrote:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Despite these hypotheses there remains an irrefutable fact. That we had not done all that was necessary for us to have done to evade war. We ought to have used peaceful language with the Turks whether we succeeded or not, and we did not do <\/em>it. [\u2026] With the carelessness of inexperienced and ignorant men we did not know what forces Turkey had mustered on our frontiers. When the skirmishes had started the Turks proposed that we meet and confer. We did not do so and defied them.<\/em>[40]<\/p>\n\n\n\n We would strongly recommend that those who are interested be acquainted with the realities of that time to consult this book. This may help them refresh their memories. Furthermore, we should add that the Russian, United States, British and Turkish archives are full of documents which prove the atrocities committed by the Armenian forces in eastern Anatolia during that period. A fact which some leaders of the Armenians are proud of and do not deny.[41]<\/p>\n\n\n\n After the end of the Turco-Armenian War, the Kars Treaty was signed on October 13, 1921 by the delegates of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia and Turkey. The intervention of the then-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia Mr. Muravian, who attended the Kars Peace Treaty Conference on September 22, 1921, is also worth mentioning to reflect the Armenian position at that point. He said:<\/p>\n\n\n\n We have not come here with antagonistic feelings and we have no intentions of presenting here the controversial issues we have inherited from the former nationalist governments. We are only admirers of the brave struggle which the preserving people of Turkey engaged in. We carry a sincere wish, and we are absolutely convinced that a nation which defends its country will be victorious and the enemy will be defeated.<\/em>[42]<\/p>\n\n\n\n Is The War of Independence a Myth Invented By Kemalists?<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n The author alleges that \u201cThe \u201cWar of Independence\u201d is a myth invented by Kemalists; that it was not against the occupying Allies, but rather a campaign to clear Turkey from remaining \u201cnon-Turkish elements.\u201d Even Taner Ak\u00e7am does not assume such an absurd [43] stance. The author should ask himself the reason why France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Greece and other powers signed the Treaty of Lausanne which ended WWI and the War of Independence if this war had been a myth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Kemalist movement was by no means hostile to the non-Muslims and was supported, not only by most of the Turkish Jews[44], but also by a portion of Istanbul\u2019s Armenians, like the Karabetian Society and the Deputy Director General of the Ottoman Bank (promoted Director general during WWI), Ber\u00e7 Keresteciyan (1870-1949), future deputy of the Turkish National Assembly from 1935 to 1946. [45]<\/p>\n\n\n\n Contrary to the author\u2019s false allegations, the National Liberation Government even tried to keep the Christian population of Cilicia at the end of 1921\u2014in vain, because of the Armenian nationalist propaganda.[46] Similarly, the exodus of most of the Christians of western Anatolia is chiefly due to the torched earth policy of the Greek army in 1922.[47]Most of the allegations of \u201cmassacre\u201d against the National Liberation Movement were proven to be false.[48]<\/p>\n\n\n\n II. Pacta sunt servanda<\/em> and lex specialis<\/em> principles governing the liabilities and legal responsibilities of the Ottoman State and of the Republic of Turkey<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n After WWI and the War of Liberation, Turkey concluded international agreements to put an end to the wars and insurgencies disrupting the country and region\u2019s peace since 1914. Some of these agreements contained amnesty clauses<\/em>. The amnesties aimed to cover the humanitarian dimensions of the tragic past.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To ignore these agreements and the declarations is in contradiction to the jus specialis<\/em> principle foreseen by Article 55 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts and also the principle of pacta sunt servanda<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Let us briefly examine the Lausanne, Kars and Ankara treaties as well as the agreement between the United States and Turkey on all compensation demands.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Treaty of Lausanne<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The Treaty of Lausanne signed on July 24, 1923 included a Declaration of amnesty according to which Turkish nationals, and reciprocally nationals of the other signatory powers of the Treaty of Lausanne, who were arrested, prosecuted or sentenced prior to November 20, 1922, benefited from an amnesty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In addition, the Treaty of Lausanne, in ending the war between Turkey and other powers, decreed that former Ottoman citizens, who resided in countries that were separated from Turkey by Article 31 of the Lausanne Treaty and who had automatically gained citizenship of that country by Article 30, would have the right within two years to choose Turkish citizenship. Through these decrees, all the Armenians who were on that day outside the borders of Turkey and who retained Turkish citizenship, and those Armenians who were in those countries separated from Turkey, obtained the right to return to Turkey if they so wished. Article 6 of the Amnesty Declaration attached to the Lausanne Treaty states regarding the same subject:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Turkish Government which shares the desire for general peace with all the Powers, announces that it will not object to the measures implemented between 20 October 1918 and 20 November 1922, under the protection of the Allies, with the intention of bringing together again the families which were separated because of the war, and of returning possessions to their rightful owners.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n It is apparent that this article concerned the individuals who were forced to emigrate, and who returned to their homes during the period of armistice and occupation. At that time, Turkey announced that these procedures, prepared under the control of the occupation powers, would be maintained without modification. According the U.S. archives[49], 644,900 Armenians returned and settled in Anatolia after the war and right before the Treaty of Sevres.[50]<\/sup> By returning to Ottoman territories in 1918\u20131919, many Armenians regained some of their properties they had left behind during the 1915 transfer of population. For instance, the number of properties returned by April 30, 1919 was recorded as 241,000. This comprised approximately 98% of the immovable properties[51]<\/sup>. Records also state that some problems and injustices took place during the application of the regulations[52]<\/sup>. The possibility of judicially challenging these injustices continues to exist. Two recent decisions of the local courts in Adana and in Sar\u0131yer (Istanbul) which returned properties to one Lebanese and one Turkish citizen of Armenian origin prove that those who possess appropriate documents may present their cases to a competent court, and if unsatisfied to bring the file to the European Court of Human Rights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It has already been mentioned that Ottoman citizens who committed crimes during the transfer of population were punished in courts-martial held during 1915-1916 pursuant to the Ottoman Penal Code.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Article 65 of the Treaty of Lausanne stipulates that property of individuals who had foreign citizenship when the war started and whose possessions in Turkey had been confiscated would be returned to them. Article 95 gave a deadline for inquiries on this matter. Section VIII and paragraph six of the Lausanne Treaty on the Declaration of Amnesty declared the Turkish government\u2019s intent to not contest the measures carried out under the auspices of the English and French during the period between 1918 and 1922 regarding Armenians scattered around outside Turkish borders returning and their properties being given back to them. According to this, Armenians wanting to return to Turkey would return. Arrangements were made concerning the measures for Armenians whose properties were returned to them; they would maintain their validity, a timeframe was determined for the Armenians to make their requests, and in order to resolve possible disagreements that could arise, a Special Civil Claims Tribunalwas created. Judges of various countries to stand by Turkish judges were also foreseen in these courts[53].<\/p>\n\n\n\n Liquidation of the Ottoman debts and other economic aspects<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Finally, Articles 46-63 of the Lausanne Treaty were about the liquidation of the debts of the Ottoman State. The Republic of Turkey paid all the Ottoman debts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n According to Article 58 of the Treaty of Lausanne, the parties to the treaty reciprocally renounced all claims for the loss and damage suffered between August 1, 1914 and June 6, 1924 as a result of acts of war or measures of requisition, sequestration, disposal or confiscation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Articles 65-72 also entailed economic clauses; in the section of properties, rights and interests, all legal interests and interests related to properties of those subjected to relocation were protected. Article 74 entailed special provisions related to insurance contracts and in relation, prescription. The following take into account those provisions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Moscow and Kars Treaties<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The Moscow Treaty of March 16, 1921 was signed between Turkey and Russia. Thereafter, the Treaty of Kars was concluded between Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia on October 13, 1921. The Treaty Kars signed before the Treaty of Lausanne settled the conflicts between Turkey and Armenia as well as the other Caucasian republics. This Treaty stated in Article 15 that \u201ceach of the Contracting Parties agrees to promulgate a complete amnesty to citizens of the other Party for crimes and offenses committed during the course of the war on the Caucasian front.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n The \u201cmurders and atrocities\u201d were by no means limited to actions of Turks and other Muslims against Armenians. The investigation of Captain Emory H. Niles and Arthur E. Sutherland in eastern Anatolia during the year 1919 led them to conclude \u201c<\/em>First, that Armenians massacred Moslems with many refinements of cruelty, and second that Armenians are responsible for most of the destruction done to towns and villages\u201d<\/em> (our emphasis).[54]<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n The Ankara Treaty with France<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Some of the tragic events took place in territories occupied by France, where Armenian groups cooperating with France committed massacres against the Muslim population. The Ottoman Muslims retaliated. The Ankara Treaty signed on October 20, 1921 between France and Turkey had foreseen the parties promulgating a total amnesty for the crimes committed in that occupied territories. Article 5 of the Ankara agreement reads as follows: \u201cBoth sides will announce a general amnesty in the evacuated area, following the occupation of this area.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Once again, the amnesty was far from concerning only Turks. French courts-martial sentenced many Armenians for banditry, robbery, rape and assassination against Turkish civilians, and more generally the large scale of atrocities and destruction\u2014by arson in particular\u2014is confirmed by many French, British and American sources, in addition to the Turkish ones.[55]<\/p>\n\n\n\n Those treaties constitute lex specialis<\/em> in legal terms.[56] [57]<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n Claims Settlement Agreement with the United States<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The Republic of Turkey, which settled the issue of Ottoman debts in accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne,also paid 899,840 U.S. dollars (dollars of 1930s) to the United States government for distribution to its citizens based on the Agreement of December 24, 1923 and Supplemental Agreements, concluded and implemented between the U.S. and Turkey[58]. The Supplemental Agreement of October 25, 1934 concluded by the two governments foresaw a settlement of the outstanding claims of the nationals of each country against the other; Article II of the agreement is as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The two Governments agree that, by the payment of the aforesaid sum [$1,300,000], the Government of the Republic of Turkey will be released from liability with respect to all of the above-mentioned claims formulated against it and further agree that every claim embraced by the Agreement of December 24, 1923, shall be considered and treated as finally settled. <\/em>[59]<\/p>\n\n\n\n The last U.S. report in 1937 finally estimated that the principal and interest amounts to $899,840 [60], It is remarkable that not a single claimant with an Armenian name was considered by the American civil servants to have made a credible case of seizure and\/or destruction of property. [61]<\/p>\n\n\n\n Conclusion: Turkey did not renege on its obligations under the 1948 Genocide Convention.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The fact that Turkey does not recognize the 1915-1916 events as a crime of genocide does not violate the 1948 Convention. One should underline that if Armenia had seen the slightest proof with regard to the responsibility of Turkey on the matter, it would have attempted to bring the case before the ICJ many years ago.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It should be clear from the above that<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n a) the Turkish Republic paid all the Ottoman debts;<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n b) the tribunals of the Ottoman State judged those who infringed on Ottoman laws during the relocation of the Ottoman Armenians;<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n c) amnesty has been declared for all other suspects and\/or criminals.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n We believe that no one now has the right to make any kind of demand from Turkey regarding the events which took place before the signing of the above mentioned Moscow, Kars, Ankara, Lausanne Treaties[62] and the Claim Settlement Agreement with the United States.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Finally, we are in the opinion that those who complain of an internationally wrongful act for which the Turkish Republic is responsible may be well advised to take their lamentations to the relevant international institutions like the United Nations, the International Court of Justice [63], the Council of Europe or any other similar establishment, instead of disseminating unfounded and misleading accusations.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] <\/sup>Pulat Tacar has been Co-Chairperson of the Turkish National Commission for UNESCO (1995-2006); he was Ambassador of Turkey to UNESCO (1989-1995), Ambassador of Turkey to the European Communities (1984-1987) and to Jakarta (1981-1984). He is the author of many books and articles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] Maxime Gauin is a researcher at the International Strategic Research Organization (USAK, Ankara) and a Ph.D. candidate at the Middle East Technical University.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] Justin McCarthy, The Turk in America. The Creation of an Enduring Prejudice<\/em>, (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010).<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] \u201cASALA: We All Believed In One Idea: Party,\u201d .com\/2012\/04\/3348-asala-we-all-believed-in-one-idea.html ;Maxime Gauin \u201cRemembering the Orly Attack,\u201d Review of International Law and Politics<\/em>, VII-27, September 2011; Michael M. Gunter, Pursuing the Just Cause of their People. A Study of Contemporary Armenian Terrorism<\/em>, (Westport-New York-London: Greenwood Press, 1986); Michael M. Gunter, Armenian History and the Question of Genocide<\/em>, (New York-London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011); Francis P. Hyland, Armenian Terrorism: the Past, the Present, the Prospects<\/em>, (Boulder-San Francisco-Oxford: Westview Press, 1991); International Terrorism and the Drug Connection<\/em>, (Ankara: Ankara University Press, 1984); Andrew Mango, Turkey and the War on Terror. For Forty Years We Fought Alone<\/em>, (London-New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 11-13; Bil\u00e2l N. \u015eim\u015fir, \u015eehit Diplomatlarimiz <\/em>(Our fallen-martyr diplomats) (1973-1994)<\/em>, (Ankara-Istanbul: Bilgi Yay\u0131nevi, 2000), two volumes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1]Antoine Constant, L\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan<\/em>, (Paris: Karthala, 2002), pp. 343-344 and passim.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] \u201cNorwegian Hitman Was Obsessed With Turkey,\u201d Today\u2019s Zaman<\/em>, July 25, 2011, news-251593-norwegian-hitman-was-obsessed-with-turkey.html<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] For example: Bahar Senem \u00c7evik-Ersayd\u0131, \u201cDehumanization in Cartoons: A Case Study of the Image of the Turk in Asbarez <\/em>Newspaper,\u201d Review of Armenian Studies<\/em>, n\u00b0 24, 2011, pp. 103-121: \u201cReviewing and shaping the already traumatized Diaspora identity with hostile feelings towards another group will most likely result in an unresolved trauma. […] The image of the Turk within Diaspora Armenians could be summarized as being worthless, inhuman, murderer, barbaric and savage\u201d <\/em>; Jugement du tribunal de grande instance de Lyon, 27 avril 2010 (Gauin c. Nissanian), IMG\/pdf\/JugementTGILyon27042010.pdf<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] Like the recurrent comparison between the late Ottoman Empire and the Nazi Germany. On this point, see T\u00fcrkkaya Ata\u00f6v, \u201cThe Jewish Holocaust and the Armenians,\u201d in Armenians in the Late Ottoman Period<\/em>, (Ankara: TBMM, 2001), pp. 315-344, altilar\/tobi\/e-library\/TheArmenians\/TheHolocaust.pdf ; and Y\u00fccel G\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc, The Holocaust and the Armenian Case in Comparative Perspective<\/em>, (Lanham-Boulder-New York-Toronto-Plymouth: University Press of America), 2012.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] Page 18 of the manuscript: \u201cThe Stalinist cleaning allowed Kemal to effectively eliminate all potential political rivals and opponents<\/em>.\u201d This slander by the author is an unfortunate example which demonstrates the state of his mind. The whole world knows Mustafa Kemal Atat\u00fcrk as one of the great leaders of the 20th<\/sup> century. On the political nature of the Kemalist regime, see among others Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey. Third Edition<\/em>, (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 290; Maurice Duverger, Les Partis politiques<\/em>, (Paris : Le Seuil, 1981), pp. 375-377 ; and Sal\u00e2hi R. Sonyel, Atat\u00fcrk, the Founder of Modern Turkey<\/em>, (Ankara: TTK, 1989).<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] Page 17 of the manuscript: \u201cthe demand…of the reunification of West Armenia and the Republic of Armenia in the Caucasus<\/em>\u201d reflects the irredentist dream of the Armenian nationalist to create \u201cGreat Armenia.\u201d Furthermore, page 20 of the manuscript: \u201cMost of the total losses claimed were from Turkish Armenia<\/em>.\u201d \u201cWestern Armenia\u201d and\/or \u201cTurkish Armenia\u201d exist only in the minds of irredentist militant Armenians.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] For comparative analyzes, consult: Serdar Palab\u0131y\u0131k, \u201cA Literature between Scientificity and Subjectivity: A Comparative Analysis of the Books Written on the Armenian Issue,\u201d Review of Armenian Studies<\/em>, IV-11\/12, 2007, http:\/\/www.eraren.org\/index.php?Lisan=en&Page=DergiIcerik&IcerikNo=476<\/a> ; Hakan Yavuz, \u201cContours of Scholarship on Armenian-Turkish Relations,\u201d Middle East Critique<\/em>, XX-3, Fall 2011, pp. 231-251, 19436149.2011.619761<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] Paul Ricoeur, La m\u00e9moire, l\u2019histoire, l\u2019oubli<\/em>, (Paris: Le Seuil, 2000).<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] Defamiliarization or ostranenie (\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) is the artistic technique of forcing the audience to see common things in an unfamiliar or strange way, in order to enhance the perception of the familiar.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1]Hans Wilhelm Longva, \u201cThe concept of genocide in international law, A wound not healed,\u201dConference on Turkish-Armenian relationship, University of Oslo, February 1st, 2010.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] William A. Shabas, Genocide in International Law<\/em>, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 7; Guenter Lewy, \u201cCan There Be Genocide Without the Intent to Committ Genocide?\u201d, Journal of Genocide Research<\/em>, IX-4, December 2007, pp. 661-674 (second edition in Essays on Genocide and Humanitarian Intervention<\/em>, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2012).<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1]Ahmet \u0130nsel and Michel Marian, Dialogue sur le tabou arm\u00e9nien<\/em>, (Paris: Liana Levi, 2009).<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] Der Jan van der Linde, \u201cThe Armenian Genocide Question and Legal Responsibility,\u201d Review of Armenian Studies<\/em>, n\u00b0 24, 2011, pp. 123-151<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] G\u00fcnd\u00fcz Aktan \u201cThe Armenian problem and International Law,\u201d in T\u00fcrkkaya Ata\u00f6v (ed.), Armenians in the Late…<\/em>, pp. 263-614, altilar\/tobi\/e-library\/TheArmenians\/InternationalLaw.pdf<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1]Aktan ibid p. 270<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1]Para 187 \u201cArticle II (of the Convention) requires a further mental element. It requires the establishment of the intent to destroy in whole or in part the protected group as such. It is not enough to establish, for instance in terms of paragraph. (a) That unlawful killings of members of the group have occurred. The additional intent must also be established and is defined very precisely. It is often referred to as the \u201cspecific intent\u201d (dolus specialis). It is not enough that the members of the group are targeted because they belong to that group that is because the perpetrator has a discriminatory intent. Something more is required. The acts listed in Article II, must be done with the intent to destroy the group as such in whole or in part. The words \u201cas such\u201d emphasize that intent to destroy the protected group.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] See Travaux pr\u00e9paratoires Doc. E\/794 page 294 and 97, the meeting of the Conference page 360 and following pages<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] <\/sup>With regard to the \u201cPower to Exercise Universal Repression\u201d or \u201cUniversal Repression\u201d (see: April 5, 1948. Doc. E\/794. pp.29-33) The Committee rejected a proposal in this respect (Ibid, p.32).Those rejecting the principle of universal repression argued as follows: \u201c … universal repression is against the principles of traditional law; permitting the courts of one State to punish crimes committed in another state by foreigners will be against the sovereignty of the State; as genocide generally implied the responsibility of the State on the territory of which the crime was committed, the principle of universal repression would imply national courts to judge the acts of foreign governments. The result will be dangerous international tensions.<\/em>\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] The British government on many occasions officially declared its position on the matter. On April 14, 1999 the Foreign Office spokesperson Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale said that \u201cthe British government has not recognized the events of 1915 as indications of genocide\u201d; On February 7, 2001, acting on behalf of the British Government, Baroness Scotland of Asthal declared: \u201cThe government, in line with the previous British governments, have judged the evidence not to be sufficiently unequivocal to persuade us that these events should be categorized as genocide as defined by the 1948 United Nations on genocide….The interpretation of events in Eastern Anatolia in 1915-1916 is still the subject of genuine debate among historians<\/em>.\u201dThe UK government did not accept qualifying as genocide the 1915 events. The Israeli government refused to accept the parallelism between the Holocaust and the tragic events of 1915. The Ambassador of Israel Rivka Kohen in Yerevan declared on February 7, 2002, during a press conference that \u201cthe 1915 events couldn\u2019t be considered genocide because the main killings in these events were not planned and the Ottoman government had no intention to destroy a nation or a group of people as such. As a well-known fact many people from the Armenian and Muslim groups had lost their lives in these events. The Holocaust is unique. At this stage nothing should be compared with the Holocaust<\/em>.\u201d On April 10, 2001 the Nobel Prize-awarded Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Perez said that \u201cthe fate of Armenians in Anatolia was a tragedy, not genocide<\/em>.\u201d He added: \u201cArmenian allegations are meaningless. We reject attempts to create a similarity between the Holocaust and the Armenian allegation. If we have to determine a position on the Armenian issue it should be done with great care not to distort the historical realities<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1]Justin McCarthy, Esat Arslan, Cemalettin Ta\u015fk\u0131ran and \u00d6mer Turan, The Armenian Rebellion at Van,<\/em> (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006), p. 265: \u201cThe slaughter of Muslims that accompanied the Armenian revolt in Van Province inexorably led first to Kurdish reprisals on the Armenian, then to a general and mutual massaccre of the people of the East. The Armenian revolt began an intercommunal war, in which both sides, fearing their own survival, killed those who, given the chance,would have killed them.The result was unprecended horror. History records few examples of mortality as great as that suffered in Van Province.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] \u201cWWI Inflicted Pain to Everyone, Davuto\u011flu Says,\u201d H\u00fcrriyet Daily News<\/em>, December 30, 2011 .com\/wwi-inflicted-pain-on-everyone-davutoglu-says.aspx?pageID=238&nID=10325&NewsCatID=338; \u201cTurkey \u2018Ready to Share Pain\u2019 With Armenians,\u201d H\u00fcrriyet Daily News<\/em>, March 1, 2012, .com\/turkey-ready-to-share-pain-with-armenians.aspx?pageID=238&nID=14993&NewsCatID=338<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] For example: Anatolian News Agency, April 11, 2005; \u201cYerevan Rejects Turkish PM Erdogan\u2019s Dialogue Letter,\u201d The Journal of Turkish Weekly<\/em>, April 14, 2005, news\/8050\/yerevan-rejects-turkish-pm-erdogan-s-dialogue-letter.html ; Interview of Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan to Charlie Rose, September 27, 2007; \u201cTurkey\u2019s Proposal Clears Last-Minute Snag in Zurich,\u201d Today\u2019s Zaman<\/em>, October 12, 2009, news-189623-100-turkeys-proposal-clears-last-minute-snag-in-zurich.html ; Michael M. Gunter, Armenian History and\u2026<\/em>, pp. 125-129.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] \u0130nan\u00e7 At\u0131lgan and Garabet Moumdjian (ed.), Archival Documents of the Viennese Armenian-Turkish Platform<\/em>, Klagenfurt-Vienna-Ljubjana-Sarajevo: Wieser Verlag, 2009.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] \u201cWe should be really careful about not mixing information. Anything about the CUP archives is sheer speculation. We don\u2019t have any indication that they have been destroyed<\/em>.\u201d Hilmar Kaiser, interview to Aztag<\/em>, September 22, 2005. See also \u201cHistorian Challenges Politically Motivated 1915 Arguments,\u201d Today\u2019s Zaman<\/em>, newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&link=170297 ; Y\u00fccel G\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc, \u201cWill Untapped Ottoman Archives Reshape the Armenian Debate?\u201d, The Middle East Quarterly<\/em>, XVI-2, Spring 2009, pp. 25-42, ottoman-archives-reshape-armenian-debate<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1]Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Article 22.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Article 23.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Article 20.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] Shimon Perez: Statement in April 2001: \u201cWhat happened to the Armenians was a tragedy, but not genocide<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres\u2026<\/em>, p. 111.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] Yusuf Hala\u00e7o\u011flu, Facts on the Relocation of Armenians. 1914-1918<\/em>, (Ankara: TTK, 2002), pp. 84-86; Hikmet \u00d6zdemir and Yusuf Sar\u0131nay (ed.), Turkish-Armenian Conflict Documents<\/em>, (Ankara: TBMM, 2007), p. 294.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] Yusuf Hala\u00e7o\u011flu, The Story of 1915. What Happened to the Ottoman Armenians?<\/em>, (Ankara: TTK, 2008), pp. 82-87; Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres\u2026<\/em>, p. 112; Yusuf Sar\u0131nay, \u201cThe Relocation (Tehcir<\/em>) of Armenians and the Trials of 1915-1916,\u201d Middle East Critique<\/em>, XX-3, Fall 2011, pp. 308-314.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] Yusuf Hala\u00e7o\u011fu, Facts on the\u2026<\/em>, p. 99 and annexes XX-XXI.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1]Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres\u2026<\/em>, pp. 122-128; Bil\u00e2l N. \u015eim\u015fir, \u201cThe Deportees of Malta and the Armenian Question,\u201d in Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (1912-1926)<\/em>, (\u0130stanbul: Tasvir Press, 1984), pp. 26-41; Bil\u00e2l N. \u015eim\u015fir, Malta S\u00fcrg\u00fcnleri<\/em>, (Ankara-Istanbul: Bilgi Yay\u0131nevi, 2009); Sal\u00e2hi R. Sonyel, \u201cArmenian Deportations: A Re-Appraisal in the Light of New Documents,\u201d Belleten<\/em>, January 1972, pp. 58-60; Sal\u00e2hi R. Sonyel, The Displacement of Armenians: Documents<\/em>, (Ankara: TTK\/Baylan Matbaas\u0131), 1978.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] Ferudun Ata, \u0130\u015fgal \u0130stanbul\u2019unda Tehcir Yarg\u0131lamalar\u0131<\/em>, (Ankara: TTK, 2005); Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres\u2026<\/em>, pp. 79-82; Erman \u015eahin, \u201cA Scrutiny of Ak\u00e7am\u2019s Version of History and the Armenian Genocide,\u201d Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs<\/em>, XXVIII-2, August 2008, p. 307, files\/news\/pdf\/Erman-Sahin-Review-Article.pdf<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] Ferudun Ata, \u0130\u015fgal \u0130stanbul\u2019unda Tehcir…<\/em>, pp. 193, 199, 201 and 204; Edward J. Erickson, \u201cArmenian Massacres: New Records Undercut Old Blame,\u201d The Middle East Quarterly<\/em>, XIII-3, Summer 2006, pp. 67-75, armenian-massacres-new-records-undercut-old-blame ; Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres\u2026<\/em>, pp. 82-88 and 221; Erman \u015eahin, \u201cA Scrutiny of\u2026\u201d, pp. 310-312; Erman \u015eahin, \u201cReview Essay: The Armenian Question,\u201d Middle East Policy<\/em>, XVII-1, Spring 2010, pp. 151, 153 and 162, n. 48, http:\/\/www.turkishcanadians.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/armenian_question.pdf<\/a> ; Stanford J. Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I<\/em>, (Ankara: TTK, tome I, 2006), pp. 373-409; Arslan Terzio\u011flu, \u201cThe Armenian Deportation in Line With National and Foreign Sources of Information,\u201d in Sel\u00e7uk Erez and Mehmet Saray (ed.), Uluslaras\u0131 T\u00fcrk-Ermeni \u0130li\u015fkileri Sempozyumu<\/em>, (Istanbul: Istanbul University Publications, 2001), pp. 321-358.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] The Armenian Revolutionary Federation Has Nothing to Do Anymore<\/em>, (New York: Armenian Information Service, 1955), pp. 9-10, http:\/\/ia600602.us.archive.org\/14\/items\/armenianrevolution00katc\/armenianrevolution00katc.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] Ermeniler Taraf\u0131ndan Yap\u0131lan Katliam Belgeleri\/Documents on Massacre Perpetrated by Armenians<\/em>, Ankara, two volumes, 2001; Kara Schemsi, Turcs et Arm\u00e9niens devant l\u2019histoire<\/em>, (Geneva: Imprimerie nationale, 1919), http:\/\/louisville.edu\/a-s\/history\/turks\/turcs_et_armeniens.pdf<\/a> See also n. 37.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] K\u00e2muran G\u00fcr\u00fcn, The Armenian File<\/em>, (\u0130stanbul: \u0130\u015f Bankas\u0131, 2007), p. 339 (1st<\/sup> English edition, Nicosia, 1985).<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] For a comprehensive study of this war: Stanford Jay Shaw, From Empire to Republic: The Turkish War of National Liberation, 1918-1923. A Documentary Study<\/em>, (Ankara: TTK, 2000), five volumes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] Sal\u00e2hi R. Sonyel, Minorities and the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire<\/em>, (Ankara: TTK, 1993), pp. 439-441.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1] Mim Kemal \u00d6ke, The Armenian Question<\/em>, (Ankara: TTK, 2001), pp. 196-202 and 210-216; Mim Kemal \u00d6ke, \u201cThe Response of the Turkish Armenians to the \u2018Armenian Question\u2019 (1919-1926),\u201d in Armenians in the Ottoman\u2026<\/em>, pp. 71-88; Stanford J. Shaw, From Empire\u2026<\/em>, volume III-1, p. 1050. See also Rapport hebdomadaire, 23-29 mars 1920, 15-21 juin 1920, Service historique de la d\u00e9fense nationale (SHDN), 4 H 58, dossier 1.<\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/04\/pulat-tacar.jpg\")
<\/figure>\n\n\n\n
<\/strong>The Malta Investigation<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n