{"id":5094,"date":"2008-10-02T12:24:10","date_gmt":"2008-10-02T09:24:10","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/?p=5094"},"modified":"2014-01-01T20:16:27","modified_gmt":"2014-01-01T18:16:27","slug":"culpabilities-and-consequences","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/2008\/10\/02\/culpabilities-and-consequences\/","title":{"rendered":"Culpabilities and Consequences"},"content":{"rendered":"

<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Culpability matters. We cannot be \u2018forward-looking\u2019 unless we know who we<\/span><\/p>\n

are dealing with, what is driving them and what they are capable of. We also<\/span><\/p>\n

need to know ourselves, particularly when we share culpabilities with others.<\/span><\/p>\n

Culpabilities are shared in this conflict, but they are different in scale and in<\/span><\/p>\n

nature.<\/span><\/p>\n

The culpabilities of <\/span>Georgia<\/span>\u2019s President, Mikheil Saakashvili, are essentially<\/span><\/p>\n

those of temperament. He is ambitious, he is a gambler, and he wraps his<\/span><\/p>\n

ego around every problem. When he became President in January 2004, he<\/span><\/p>\n

set himself a priority: restoration of <\/span>Georgia<\/span>\u2019s territorial integrity; fatefully, he<\/span><\/p>\n

also set a deadline: the end of his first term. He totally misjudged the<\/span><\/p>\n

correlation of forces and, even less excusably, the mood of <\/span>Russia<\/span>. Although<\/span><\/p>\n

he understood that <\/span>Russia<\/span> had no respect for weakness, he wrongly and<\/span><\/p>\n

rashly assumed that it would respect toughness as a substitute for strength.<\/span><\/p>\n

Towards the aspirations and apprehensions of <\/span>Georgia<\/span>\u2019s de jure <\/em>citizens in<\/span><\/p>\n

Abkhazia and <\/span>South Ossetia<\/span>, he showed even less understanding. Finally,<\/span><\/p>\n

though the culpability was not exclusively his, he had an existential faith in the<\/span><\/p>\n

backing of the <\/span>United States<\/span>, which he manipulated and stretched. But he did<\/span><\/p>\n

not provoke this conflict. He was provoked by those who knew how to do it.<\/span><\/p>\n

The culpabilities of NATO were those of wishful thinking and bureaucratic<\/span><\/p>\n

formalism. It was not always so. After 1991, the <\/span>Alliance<\/span> understood that<\/span><\/p>\n

without integration, the ills and insecurities of <\/span>Central Europe<\/span>\u2019s immature,<\/span><\/p>\n

over-militarised, post-Communist democracies would pose threats to<\/span><\/p>\n

themselves and others. Although it grasped that the former <\/span>USSR<\/span> was more<\/span><\/p>\n

complex territory, it refused to treat it as forbidden territory, recognising that<\/span><\/p>\n

the restoration of \u2018zones of special interest\u2019 would have adverse<\/span><\/p>\n

consequences along <\/span>Russia<\/span>\u2019s periphery and inside <\/span>Russia<\/span> itself. These<\/span><\/p>\n

principles survived the events of 9\/11, but the means of securing them<\/span><\/p>\n

diminished. The elaborate architecture of NATO-Russia \u2018cooperation\u2019 and the<\/span><\/p>\n

focus on \u2018programmes\u2019 and process substituted for negotiation, blunted<\/span><\/p>\n

warnings and marginalised analysis of Russian policies and plans. For 17<\/span><\/p>\n

years, NATO almost completely ruled out the re-emergence of Russian<\/span><\/p>\n

military threats in <\/span>Europe<\/span>. Defence cooperation with <\/span>Georgia<\/span> advanced<\/span><\/p>\n

alongside an almost principled refusal to articulate a policy on its territorial<\/span><\/p>\n

conflicts or assess the dangers they posed.<\/span><\/p>\n

The culpabilities of the <\/span>United States<\/span> lay in over-confidence and neglect.<\/span><\/p>\n

Once Saakashvili was inaugurated, he became anointed by <\/span>Washington<\/span>, as <\/span><\/p>\n

Shevardnadze once had been, and the trepidations and warnings of less<\/span><\/p>\n

favoured members of <\/span>Georgia<\/span>\u2019s elite were ignored (even after the November<\/span><\/p>\n

2007 crisis bore them out). Command arrangements for the <\/span><\/p>\n

Sustainment and Stability Operations Programme were inappropriate for a conflict zone.<\/span>1<\/span><\/p>\n

Georgia<\/span>\u2019s vulnerability and importance, its mercurial leadership, the presence<\/span><\/p>\n

of US forces and the precariousness of the post-Bucharest security<\/span><\/p>\n

environment called for high level coordination and direction. There was none.<\/span><\/p>\n

Instead, by summer 2007 there were a multiplicity of agencies, freelancers,<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2018signals\u2019 and back channels leading nowhere.<\/span><\/p>\n

The culpabilities of the \u2018international community\u2019 were those of piety and<\/span><\/p>\n

impotence. Its leading institutions (the UN and OSCE) are deadlocked by the<\/span><\/p>\n

opposition of its leading members. Its mechanisms for conflict resolution<\/span><\/p>\n

institutionalise deadlock. It was never the territorial conflicts in <\/span>Georgia<\/span>,<\/span><\/p>\n

Azerbaijan<\/span>, <\/span>Armenia<\/span> and <\/span>Moldova<\/span> that were frozen, only the mechanisms of<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2018resolution\u2019. In practice, the mechanisms became the resolution, and it is not<\/span><\/p>\n

surprising that in 2004 Georgians elected a president who found this<\/span><\/p>\n

intolerable.<\/span><\/p>\n

The culpability of the <\/span>Russian Federation<\/span> is overshadowed by the problem it<\/span><\/p>\n

poses. Seventeen years after the Soviet collapse, <\/span>Russia<\/span> continues to define<\/span><\/p>\n

its interests at the expense of its neighbours. In Yeltsin\u2019s time the right of<\/span><\/p>\n

these neighbours to develop according to their own models and with partners<\/span><\/p>\n

of their own choosing was disputed in principle but in practice conceded for a<\/span><\/p>\n

complex of reasons, of which weakness was only one. Any concessions<\/span><\/p>\n

during the early years of Putin\u2019s presidency were the product of weakness<\/span><\/p>\n

alone.<\/span>2 <\/span>The threshold was crossed after 2004 thanks to the coloured<\/span><\/p>\n

revolutions and their evident failings, the West\u2019s further disregard of <\/span>Russia<\/span>\u2019s<\/span><\/p>\n

kto-kovo <\/span><\/em>(zero-sum) scheme of interests (Kosovo, enlargement, missile<\/span><\/p>\n

defence) and the re-emergence of usable Russian power.<\/span><\/p>\n

Russia<\/span>\u2019s culpability lay in priming the mechanism for war. The calibrated<\/span><\/p>\n

sequence of measures, political and military, undertaken after NATO\u2019s<\/span><\/p>\n

Bucharest<\/span> summit, the combat readiness of the 58<\/span>th <\/span>Army, the crescendo of<\/span><\/p>\n

provocations by South Ossetian forces peaking on 6-7 August and the<\/span><\/p>\n

presence of Russian \u2018peacekeepers\u2019 on the scene\u2014not to say all the Russian<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2018studies\u2019 of Saakashvili\u2019s aims and character\u2014belie official claims of \u2018disbelief\u2019 <\/span><\/p>\n

at news of the Georgian offensive.<\/span>3 <\/span>The occupation of Georgian ports and<\/span><\/p>\n

cities and the cutting of its transport arteries, threats to the <\/span>Baku<\/span>–<\/span>Tbilisi<\/span>–<\/span><\/p>\n

Ceyhan pipeline, the extension of the conflict to Abkhazia and the ethnic<\/span><\/p>\n

cleansing of Georgians from <\/span>South Ossetia<\/span> also belie <\/span>Russia<\/span>\u2019s \u2018humanitarian\u2019<\/span><\/p>\n

justification for intervention. Finally, the employment of components of the<\/span><\/p>\n

Black Sea Fleet, whilst supporting clear military objectives, followed a<\/span><\/p>\n

sequence of provocative statements (and, in <\/span>Crimea<\/span>, actions) regarding<\/span><\/p>\n

Ukraine<\/span> since <\/span>Bucharest<\/span> and obliges us to consider the wider geopolitical<\/span><\/p>\n

purposes of the conflict.<\/span><\/p>\n

<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Where To?<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Russia<\/span>\u2019s <\/span>Georgia<\/span> operation appears to be an assiduously planned tactical<\/span><\/p>\n

step in pursuit of a strategic goal that lacks a strategy. Those who planned it<\/span><\/p>\n

judged correctly that <\/span>Georgia<\/span>\u2019s incapacity and the West\u2019s divisions would<\/span><\/p>\n

enable <\/span>Russia<\/span> to transform the political and military landscape in the south<\/span><\/p>\n

Caucasus<\/span> and Black Sea Region without sanction or reprisal. Yet this does<\/span><\/p>\n

not mean there will be no long-term consequences for <\/span>Russia<\/span>. Neither does it<\/span><\/p>\n

mean that the West will agree to learn the lesson intended: in President<\/span><\/p>\n

Medvedev\u2019s words, that <\/span>Russia<\/span> \u2018will no longer tolerate\u2019 its \u2018behaviour\u2019 (or, by<\/span><\/p>\n

implication, influence) in <\/span>Russia<\/span>\u2019s \u2018regions of privileged interest\u2019. It will hardly<\/span><\/p>\n

advance this narrowly conceived aim if the West adopts a less charitable<\/span><\/p>\n

assessment of <\/span>Russia<\/span>\u2019s intentions or if the latest application of \u2018firm good<\/span><\/p>\n

neighbourliness\u2019 destroys the residues of friendship on <\/span>Russia<\/span>\u2019s periphery.<\/span><\/p>\n

Russia<\/span>\u2019s mood (resentment, vengefulness and the worship of power) has<\/span><\/p>\n

dominated reason, and so long as <\/span>Russia<\/span> is both bully and victim, it will draw<\/span><\/p>\n

errant and possibly dangerous conclusions whether others are meek or<\/span><\/p>\n

tough.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Georgian conflict has dealt a powerful blow to Medvedev\u2019s liberal project,<\/span><\/p>\n

insofar as it existed, and handed Putin as much de facto <\/em>power as he wishes <\/span>to take. The political and psychological pressures on the former to be as<\/span><\/p>\n

strong as the latter can only incapacitate him. The need for \u2018strength\u2019 makes<\/span><\/p>\n

him hostage to constituencies that will never be his (defence industry and the<\/span><\/p>\n

armed forces), it undermines his power to stand up to \u2018national\u2019 capital (those<\/span><\/p>\n

who do not derive their wealth from integration into the global economy) or<\/span><\/p>\n

fight for those who do, and it deprives him of authority abroad. To invert<\/span><\/p>\n

Kissinger\u2019s question, \u2018when there is a problem with <\/span>Russia<\/span>, who do you call?\u2019<\/span><\/p>\n

The conflict has unified the country, but in so doing it has made dissent more<\/span><\/p>\n

perilous and entrenched the positions of those who would be the first to suffer<\/span><\/p>\n

if a major and increasingly urgent reform of the bureaucracy, economy and<\/span><\/p>\n

energy sector took place.<\/span><\/p>\n

Yet then comes the question: for how long? For how long will the neoisolationists<\/span><\/p>\n

not see what the stock market collapse made obvious: <\/span>Russia<\/span>\u2019s<\/span><\/p>\n

dependency on the global economy? For how long will they ignore the<\/span><\/p>\n

economic and social costs of the country\u2019s \u2018legal nihilism\u2019? For how long will<\/span><\/p>\n

Russia<\/span>\u2019s derzhavniki <\/em>(great power ideologists) disregard the implications of<\/span><\/p>\n

the South Ossetian\/Abkhaz secession for \u2018national formations\u2019 in <\/span>Russia<\/span><\/p>\n

itself? What will happen when those who see these things are no longer<\/span><\/p>\n

quiet? Will things get better, or will they get worse before they get better?<\/span><\/p>\n

Today it is hard to say.<\/span><\/p>\n

Today it is also hard to say whether the West will recover its nerve or<\/span><\/p>\n

continue to neuter itself. Yet some changes are visible, and they are not<\/span><\/p>\n

entirely bad. It has become clear to all but the most besotted that the 1990\u2019s<\/span><\/p>\n

paradigm of \u2018partnership\u2019 has exhausted itself. Although many G7 leaders<\/span><\/p>\n

speak with conviction about the importance of maintaining cooperation with<\/span><\/p>\n

Russia<\/span>, few will pretend that cooperation is enough. Fewer now doubt<\/span><\/p>\n

Russia<\/span>\u2019s determination to resurrect its dominance over the former <\/span>USSR<\/span>, and<\/span><\/p>\n

whilst some would accommodate to this, virtually no one believes that a<\/span><\/p>\n

strong <\/span>Russia<\/span> is good for <\/span>Europe<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

By establishing the NATO-Georgia Commission, by mandating it to \u2018follow up<\/span><\/p>\n

the decisions taken at the Bucharest Summit\u2019 and by assessing the needs of<\/span><\/p>\n

the Georgian army, NATO has quietly let <\/span>Russia<\/span> know that the game is not<\/span><\/p>\n

over. The EU\u2019s agreement to conclude an association agreement with<\/span><\/p>\n

Ukraine<\/span> in 2009 sent the same message: integration with <\/span>Russia<\/span>\u2019s neighbours<\/span><\/p>\n

(and the EU\u2019s own) will intensify rather than diminish. Prime Minister Putin<\/span><\/p>\n

might be right to ask \u2018what is the West?\u2019 Whatever it is, it is not leaving.<\/span><\/p>\n

There would be much to lose if it did. The notion that spheres of influence,<\/span><\/p>\n

established at the expense of countries residing in them, will generate less misery <\/span><\/p>\n

than they did before 1914 or prove any more stable is based on myth<\/span><\/p>\n

rather than realism. Our task is not to vindicate <\/span>Russia<\/span>\u2019s outmoded paradigm<\/span><\/p>\n

of security, but create the conditions that will induce Russians, in their own<\/span><\/p>\n

interests, to question it. That will not be done by symbolic and provocative<\/span><\/p>\n

steps (e.g., MAP), but it will require practical measures to strengthen the<\/span><\/p>\n

security of neighbours and restore their confidence in the West and<\/span><\/p>\n

themselves.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/p>\n

James Sherr <\/span>September 2008<\/span><\/p>\n

<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Culpability matters. We cannot be \u2018forward-looking\u2019 unless we know who we are dealing with, what is driving them and what they are capable of. We also need to know ourselves, particularly when we share culpabilities with others. Culpabilities are shared in this conflict, but they are different in scale and in nature. The culpabilities of […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":83,"featured_media":462741,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[209,42],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5094","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-georgia-caucasus","category-russia"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5094","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/83"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5094"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5094\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/462741"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5094"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5094"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5094"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}