{"id":27130,"date":"2010-11-29T05:08:07","date_gmt":"2010-11-29T03:08:07","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.turkishforum.com.tr\/en\/content\/?p=27130"},"modified":"2014-01-05T22:46:56","modified_gmt":"2014-01-05T20:46:56","slug":"s-e-c-r-e-terdogan-and-ak-party-after-two-years-in-power","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/2010\/11\/29\/s-e-c-r-e-terdogan-and-ak-party-after-two-years-in-power\/","title":{"rendered":"S E C R E T:ERDOGAN AND AK PARTY AFTER TWO YEARS IN POWER"},"content":{"rendered":"
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 007211\r\n \"\"\r\n
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.<\/pre>\n
SIPDIS    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12\/14\/2029  TAGS: PREL<\/span> PGOV<\/span> PINS<\/span> ECON<\/span> TU<\/span><\/p>\n
<\/span> SUBJECT: ERDOGAN AND AK PARTY AFTER TWO YEARS IN POWER:<\/p>\n
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 007211 \r\n\r\nSIPDIS \r\n\r\nE.O. 12958: DECL: 12\/14\/2029\r\nTAGS: PREL<\/span> PGOV<\/span> PINS<\/span> ECON<\/span> TU<\/span>\r\nSUBJECT: ERDOGAN AND AK PARTY AFTER TWO YEARS IN POWER:\r\nTRYING TO GET A GRIP ON THEMSELVES, ON TURKEY, ON EUROPE \r\n\r\n(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: E.O.\r\n12958 1.4 (a,b,c,d). \r\n\r\n\u00b6<\/span>1. (C) Summary: PM Erdogan and his ruling AK Party seem to\r\nhave a firm grip on power -- if for no other reasons that\r\nthere is currently no viable alternative and inertia weighs\r\nheavily in politics.  Nevertheless, Erdogan and his party\r\nface enormous challenges if they are successfully to embrace\r\ncore principles of open society, carry out EU harmonization,\r\nand develop and implement foreign policies in harmony with\r\ncore U.S. interests.  End summary. \r\n\r\n\u00b6<\/span>2. (C) As PM Erdogan strode through the EU corridors of power\r\nDec. 16-17 with his semi-pro soccer player's swagger and\r\nphalanx of sycophantic advisors, he may have seemed a strong\r\ncandidate for European leader of the year.  A regional leader\r\nto be reckoned with for a decade to come.  The man who won\r\nTurkey the beginning of accession negotiations with the EU.\r\nWho broke loose three decades of frozen Turkish policy on\r\nCyprus.  Who drove major human rights reforms through\r\nparliament and through constitutional amendments.  Whose\r\nrhetorical skill, while etched with populist victimhood, is\r\nredolent with traditional and religious allusions that\r\nresonate deeply in the heartland, deeply in the anonymous\r\nexurban sprawls.  Who remains the highly popular tribune of\r\nthe people, without a viable or discernible political\r\nrival...outside his own ruling AKP. \r\n\r\n\u00b6<\/span>3. (C) In short, Erdogan looks unbeatable.  But is he?  And\r\nis he willing to give relations with the U.S. the leadership\r\nand momentum they need from the Turkish side? \r\n\r\n\u00b6<\/span>4. (C) Erdogan has a two-thirds majority in parliament.  Main\r\nopposition left-of-center CHP amounts to no more than a bunch\r\nof elitist ankle-biters.  There is currently no serious,\r\nbroad-based political alternative, owing to Erdogan's\r\nrhetorical dominance and control of the debate on social\r\nquestions close to the hearts of the center-right majority in\r\nTurkey; other party leaders' political bankruptcy; and the\r\nstultifying effect of current party and election laws on\r\nentry for younger, untainted political aspirants.  AKP argues\r\nthat the economy, at least from the perspective of macro\r\nindicators and continued willingness of emerging-market\r\nportfolio investors to buy the expectations and sell the\r\nfacts, appears to have stabilized.  Moreover, the authority\r\nof AKP's nationwide party machine is blurring with the\r\nTurkish State's executive power at the provincial and\r\ndistrict level and with municipal functions to an extent not\r\nseen since the days of the one-party state.  These factors\r\nseem set to continue for the foreseeable future. \r\n\r\n\u00b6<\/span>5. (C) Yet Erdogan and AKP face politically fateful\r\nchallenges in three areas: foreign policy (EU, Iraq, Cyprus);\r\nquality and sustainability of leadership and governance; and\r\nresolution of questions fundamental to creation of an open,\r\nprosperous society integrated with the broader world (place\r\nof religion; identity and history; rule of law). \r\n\r\nEU\r\n-- \r\n\r\n\u00b6<\/span>6. (U) Erdogan indexed his political survival to getting a\r\nnegotiation date from the EU.  He achieved that goal.  The\r\nWall Street Journal and other Western and Turkish media have\r\nopined that the EU owes Turkey a fair negotiating process\r\nleading to accession, with the Journal even putting the onus\r\non the EU by asserting that while Turkey is ready the\r\nquestion is whether Europeans are ready for Turkey. \r\n\r\n\u00b6<\/span>7. (C) But there's always a Monday morning and the debate on\r\nthe ground here is not so neat.  With euphoria at getting a\r\ndate having faded in 48 hours, Erdogan's political survival\r\nand the difficulty of the tasks before him have become\r\nsubstantially clearer.  Nationalists on right and left have\r\nresumed accusations that Erdogan sold out Turkish national\r\ninterests (Cyprus) and Turkish traditions.  Core institutions\r\nof the Turkish state, which remain at best wary of AKP, have\r\nonce again begun to probe for weaknesses and to feed\r\ninsinuations into the press in parallel with the\r\nnationalists' assertions.  In the face of this Euro-aversion,\r\nneither Erdogan nor his government has taken even minimal\r\nsteps to prepare the bureaucracy or public opinion to begin\r\ntackling the fundamental -- some Turks would say insidious --\r\nlegal, social, intellectual and spiritual changes that must\r\noccur to turn harmonization on paper into true reform.  The\r\nroad ahead will surely be hard. \r\n\r\n\u00b6<\/span>8. (U) High-profile naysayers like main opposition CHP\r\nchairman Baykal, former Ambassador Gunduz Aktan, and\r\npolitical scientist Hasan Unal continue to castigate Erdogan.\r\n But theirs is a routine whine.  More significant for us is\r\nthat many of our contacts cloak their lack of self-confidence\r\nat Turkey's ability to join in expressions of skepticism that\r\nthe EU will let Turkey in.  And there is parallel widespread\r\nskepticism that the EU will be around in attractive form in\r\nten years. \r\n\r\n\u00b6<\/span>9. (C) The mood in AKP is no brighter, with one of FonMin\r\nGul's MFA advisors having described to UK polcounselor how\r\nbruised Turkey feels at the EU's inconsistency during the\r\nfinal negotiations leading to Dec. 17 (EU diplomats in Ankara\r\nhave given us the other side of the story).  Gul was\r\nnoticeably harder-line than Erdogan in public comments in the\r\nlead-up to the Summit, and was harder-line in pre-Summit\r\nnegotiations in Brussels, according to UK polcounselor.\r\nThere was noticeable tension between Erdogan and Gul in\r\nBrussels according to \"Aksam\" Ankara bureau chief Nuray\r\nBasaran.  She also noted to us that when negotiations seemed\r\nto have frozen up on Dec. 17, Erdogan's advisors got phone\r\ncalls from Putin advisors urging Turkey to walk.  Basaran\r\nsays that at least some of Erdogan's advisors urged him to do\r\nso. \r\n\r\n\u00b6<\/span>10. (C) AKP's lack of cohesion as a party and lack of\r\nopenness as a government is reflected in the range of murky,\r\nmuddled motives for wanting to join the EU we have\r\nencountered among those AKPers who say they favor pursuing\r\nmembership...or at least the process.  Some see the process\r\nas the way to marginalize the Turkish military and what\r\nremains of the arid \"secularism\" of Kemalism.  We have also\r\nrun into the rarely openly-spoken, but widespread belief\r\namong adherents of the Turk-Islam synthesis that Turkey's\r\nrole is to spread Islam in Europe, \"to take back Andalusia\r\nand avenge the defeat at the siege of Vienna in 1683\" as one\r\nparticipant in a recent meeting at AKP's main think tank put\r\nit.  This thinking parallels the logic behind the approach of\r\nFonMin Gul ally and chief foreign policy advisor in the Prime\r\nMinistry Ahmet Davutoglu, whose muddy opinion piece in the\r\nDec. 13 International Herald Tribune is in essence a call for\r\none-way multi-cultural tolerance, i.e., on the part of the EU. \r\n\r\n\u00b6<\/span>11. (C) Those from the more overtly religious side of AKP\r\nwhinge that the EU is a Christian club.  While some assert\r\nthat it is only through Turkish membership and spread of\r\nTurkish values that the world can avoid the clash of\r\ncivilizations they allege the West is fomenting, others\r\nexpress concern that harmonization and membership will water\r\ndown Islam and associated traditions in Turkey.  Indeed, as\r\nAKP whip Sadullah Ergin confided to us recently, \"If the EU\r\nsays yes, everything will look rosy for a short while.  Then\r\nthe real difficulties will start for AKP.  If the EU says no,\r\nit will be initially difficult, but much easier over the long\r\nrun.\" \r\n\r\n\u00b6<\/span>12. (C) AKP also faces the nuts-and-bolts issue of how to\r\nprepare for harmonization.  In choosing a chief negotiator\r\nErdogan will need to decide whether the risks that the man he\r\ntaps will successfully steal his political limelight outweigh\r\nthe political challenge his choice will face since it will be\r\nthe Turkish chief negotiator's responsibility to sell the EU\r\nposition to a recalcitrant Turkish cabinet.  It is because\r\nthe chief negotiator is likely to be ground down between EU\r\ndemands and a prickly domestic environment that some\r\nobservers speculate Erdogan might give the job to his chief\r\ninternal rival Gul. \r\n\r\n\u00b6<\/span>13. (C) At the same time the government must reportedly hire\r\na couple thousand people skilled in English or other major EU\r\nlanguages and up to the bureaucratic demands of interfacing\r\nwith the Eurocrats who descend on ministries as harmonization\r\nstarts.  If the government continues to hire on the basis of\r\n\"one of us\", i.e., from the Sunni brotherhood and lodge\r\nmilieu that has been serving as the pool for AKP's civil\r\nservice hiring, lack of competence will be a problem.  If the\r\ngovernment hires on the base of competence, its new hires\r\nwill be frustrated by the incompetence of AKP's previous\r\nhires at all levels. \r\n\r\nQuestions About AKP Leadership and Governance\r\n--------------------------------------------- \r\n\r\n\u00b6<\/span>14. (C) Several factors will continue to degrade Erdogan's\r\nand AKP's ability to effect fair and lasting reforms or to\r\ntake timely, positive decisions on issues of importance to\r\nthe U.S. \r\n\r\n\u00b6<\/span>15. (C) First is Erdogan's character. \r\n\r\n\u00b6<\/span>16. (C) In our contacts in Anatolia we have not yet detected\r\nthat Erdogan's hunger for absolute power and for the material\r\nbenefits of power have begun to erode his grassroots\r\npopularity.  Others disagree.  Pollster and political analyst\r\nIsmail Yildiz has asserted in three lengthy expositions to us\r\nlate in Dec. that the erosion has started.  We note that (1)\r\nYildiz expressed frustration to us that the AKP leadership\r\ndid not respond to his offer to provide political strategy\r\nservices; (2) he is currently connected to mainstream\r\nopposition figures; and (3) he also runs a conspiracy-theory\r\nweb site.  So we treat his view cautiously.  However, judging\r\nby his references and past experience in the Turkish State,\r\nhe appears to have maintained conncetions with the State\r\napparatus and to have a network of observers and data\r\ncollectors in all 81 provinces. \r\n\r\n\u00b6<\/span>17. (C) Inside the party, Erdogan's hunger for power reveals\r\nitself in a sharp authoritarian style and deep distrust of\r\nothers: as a former spiritual advisor to Erdogan and his wife\r\nEmine put it, \"Tayyip Bey believes in God...but doesn't trust\r\nhim.\"  In surrounding himself with an iron ring of\r\nsycophantic (but contemptuous) advisors, Erdogan has isolated\r\nhimself from a flow of reliable information, which partially\r\nexplains his failure to understand the context -- or real\r\nfacts -- of the U.S. operations in Tel Afar, Fallujah, and\r\nelsewhere and his susceptibility to Islamist theories.  With\r\nregard to Islamist influences on Erdogan, DefMin Gonul, who\r\nis a conservative but worldly Muslim, recently described Gul\r\nassociate Davutoglu to us as \"exceptionally dangerous.\"\r\nErdogan's other foreign policy advisors (Cuneyd Zapsu, Egemen\r\nBagis, Omer Celik, along with Mucahit Arslan and chef de\r\ncabinet Hikmet Bulduk) are despised as inadequate, out of\r\ntouch and corrupt by all our AKP contacts from ministers to\r\nMPs and party intellectuals. \r\n\r\n\u00b6<\/span>18. (C) Erdogan's pragmatism serves him well but he lacks\r\nvision.  He and his principal AKP advisors, as well as FonMin\r\nGul and other ranking AKP officials, also lack analytic\r\ndepth.  He relies on poor-quality intel and on media\r\ndisinformation.  With the narrow world-view and wariness that\r\nlingers from his Sunni brotherhood and lodge background, he\r\nducks his public relations responsibilities.  He (and those\r\naround him, including FonMin Gul) indulge in pronounced\r\npro-Sunni prejudices and in emotional reactions that prevent\r\nthe development of coherent, practical domestic or foreign\r\npolicies. \r\n\r\n\u00b6<\/span>19. (C) Erdogan has compounded his isolation by constantly\r\ntraveling abroad -- reportedly 75 foreign trips in the past\r\ntwo years -- with a new series of trips planned for 2005 to\r\nRussia, \"Eurasia\", the Middle East and Africa.  Indeed, his\r\nstaff says 2005 is the \"year of Africa\", but they provide no\r\ncoherent reason why.  This grueling cycle of travel has\r\nexhausted him and his staff and disrupted his ability to keep\r\nhis hand on the tiller of party, parliamentary group, and\r\ngovernment.  He has alienated many in the AKP parliamentary\r\ngroup by his habit of harshly chewing out MPs.  Moreover, we\r\nunderstand that MUSIAD, an Anatolia-wide group of businessmen\r\ninfluential in Islamist circles who gave Erdogan key\r\nfinancial support as AKP campaigned prior to the 2002\r\nelections, is disaffected by Erdogan's unapproachability.\r\nJudging by comments to us of insiders in the influential\r\nIslamist lodge of Fethullah Gulen such as publicist\r\nAbdurrahman Celik, the lodge, which has made some inroads\r\ninto AKP (Minister of Justice Cicek, Minister of Culture and\r\nTourism Mumcu; perhaps 60-80 of 368 MPs; some appointments to\r\nthe bureaucracy), has resumed the ambivalent attitude it\r\ninitially had toward Erdogan and AKP. \r\n\r\n\u00b6<\/span>20. (C) Second is the coalition nature of AKP, the limited\r\nnumber of ministers whom Erdogan trusts, and the efforts of\r\nsome -- principally FonMin Gul but from time to time Cicek --\r\nto undermine Erdogan.  No one else in AKP comes close to\r\nErdogan in grassroots popularity.  However, Gul's readiness\r\nto deprecate Erdogan within AKP and even to foreign visitors\r\n(e.g., Israeli deputy PM Olmert) and his efforts to reduce\r\nErdogan's maneuvering room with hard-line criticisms of U.S.\r\npolicy in Iraq or EU policy on Cyprus have forced Erdogan\r\nconstantly to look over his shoulder and in turn to prove his\r\ncredentials by making statements inimical to good\r\nU.S.-Turkish relations.  We expect Erdogan to carry out a\r\npartial cabinet reshuffle early in 2005, but he will be\r\nunable to remove the influence of Gul. \r\n\r\n\u00b6<\/span>21. (S) Third is corruption.  AKP swept to power by promising\r\nto root out corruption.  However, in increasing numbers\r\nAKPers from ministers on down, and people close to the party,\r\nare telling us of conflicts of interest or serious corruption\r\nin the party at the national, provincial and local level and\r\namong close family members of ministers.  We have heard from\r\ntwo contacts that Erdogan has eight accounts in Swiss banks;\r\nhis explanations that his wealth comes from the wedding\r\npresents guests gave his son and that a Turkish businessman\r\nis paying the educational expenses of all four Erdogan\r\nchildren in the U.S. purely altruistically are lame. \r\n\r\n\u00b6<\/span>22. (S) Among the many figures mentioned to us as prominently\r\ninvolved in corruption are Minister of Interior Aksu,\r\nMinister of Foreign Trade Tuzmen, and AKP Istanbul provincial\r\nchairman Muezzinoglu.  As we understand it from a contact in\r\nthe intel directorate of Turkish National Police, a\r\ncontinuing investigation into Muezzinoglu's extortion racket\r\nand other activities has already produced evidence\r\nincriminating Erdogan.  In our contacts across Anatolia we\r\nhave detected no willingness yet at the grassroots level to\r\nlook closely at Erdogan or the party in this regard, but the\r\ntrend is a time bomb. \r\n\r\n\u00b6<\/span>23. (S) Fourth is the poor quality of Erdogan's and AKP's\r\nappointments to the Turkish bureaucracy, at party\r\nheadquarters, and as party mayoral candidates.  A broad range\r\nof senior career civil servants, including DefMin Gonul,\r\nformer Undersecretary of Customs Nevzat Saygilioglu, former\r\nForestry DirGen Abdurrahman Sagkaya, and many others, has\r\nexpressed shock and dismay to us at the incompetence,\r\nprejudices and ignorance of appointees such as Omer Dincer,\r\nan Islamist academic whom Erdogan appointed Undersecretary of\r\nthe Prime Ministry, THE key position in the government\/state\r\nbureaucracy.  Dincer is despised by the TGS.  Many\r\ninterlocutors also point to the weakness of Erdogan's deputy\r\nparty chairmen.  The result is that, unlike former leaders\r\nsuch as Turgut Ozal or Suleyman Demirel, both of whom\r\nappointed skilled figures who could speak authoritatively for\r\ntheir bosses as their party general secretary and as\r\nUndersecretary of the Prime Ministry, Erdogan has left\r\nhimself without people who can relieve him of the burden of\r\nday-to-day management or who can ensure effective, productive\r\nchannels to the heart of the party and the heart of the\r\nTurkish state. \r\n\r\nTwo Big Questions\r\n----------------- \r\n\r\n\u00b6<\/span>24. (C) Turkey's EU bid has brought forth reams of\r\npronouncements and articles -- Mustafa Akyol's\r\nGulenist-tinged \"Thanksgiving for Turkey\" in Dec. 27 Weekly\r\nStandard is one of the latest -- attempting to portray Islam\r\nin Turkey as distinctively moderate and tolerant with a\r\nstrong mystical (Sufi) underpinning.  Certainly, one can see\r\nin Turkey's theology faculties some attempts to wrestle with\r\nthe problems of critical thinking, free will, and precedent\r\n(ictihad), attempts which, compared to what goes on in\r\ntheology faculties in the Arab world, may appear relatively\r\nprogressive. \r\n\r\n\u00b6<\/span>25. (C) However, the broad, rubber-meets-the-road reality is\r\nthat Islam in Turkey is caught in a vise of (1) 100 years of\r\n\"secular\" pressure to hide itself from public view, (2)\r\npressure and competition from brotherhoods and lodges to\r\nfollow their narrow, occult \"true way\", and (3) the faction-\r\nand positivism-ridden aridity of the Religious Affairs\r\nDirectorate (Diyanet).  As a result, Islam as it is lived in\r\nTurkey is stultified, riddled with hypocrisy, ignorant and\r\nintolerant of other religions' presence in Turkey, and unable\r\nto eject those who would politicize it in a radical,\r\nanti-Western way.  Imams are for the most part poorly\r\neducated and all too ready to insinuate anti-Western,\r\nanti-Christian or anti-Jewish sentiments into their sermons.\r\nExceptionally few Muslims in Turkey have the courage to\r\nchallenge conventional Sunni thinking about jihad or, e.g.,\r\nverses in the Repentance shura of the Koran which have for so\r\nlong been used to justify violence against \"infidels\". \r\n\r\n\u00b6<\/span>26. (C) The problem is compounded by the willingness of\r\npoliticians such as Gul to play elusively with politicized\r\nIslam.  Until Turkey ensures that the humanist strain in\r\nIslam prevails here, Islam in Turkey will remain a troubled,\r\ndefensive force, hypocritical to an extreme degree and\r\nunwilling to adapt to the challenges of open society. \r\n\r\n\u00b6<\/span>27. (C) A second question is the relation of Turkey and its\r\ncitizens to history -- the history of this land and citizens'\r\nindividual history.  Subject to rigid taboos, denial, fears,\r\nand mandatory gross distortions, the study of history and\r\npractice of historiography in the Republic of Turkey remind\r\none of an old Soviet academic joke: the faculty party chief\r\nassembles his party cadres and, warning against various\r\nideological threats, proclaims, \"The future is certain.  It's\r\nonly that damned past that keeps changing.\" \r\n\r\n\u00b6<\/span>28. (C) Until Turkey can reconcile itself to its past,\r\nincluding the troubling aspects of its Ottoman past, in free\r\nand open debate, how will Turkey reconcile itself to the\r\nconcept and practice of reconciliation in the EU?  How will\r\nit have the self confidence to take decisions and formulate\r\npolicies responsive to U.S. interests?  Some in AKP are\r\njoining what is still only a handful of others to take\r\ntentative, but nonetheless inspiring, steps in this regard.\r\nHowever, the road ahead will require a massive overhaul of\r\neducation, the introduction and acceptance of rule of law,\r\nand a fundamental redefinition of the relation between\r\ncitizen and state.  In the words of the great (Alevi)\r\nAnatolian bard Asik Veysel, this is a \"long and delicate\r\nroad.\" \r\n\r\n\u00b6<\/span>29. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.\r\nEDELMAN<\/pre>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 007211 This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12\/14\/2029 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS ECON TU SUBJECT: ERDOGAN AND AK PARTY AFTER TWO YEARS IN POWER: S E […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":83,"featured_media":27131,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[89,34,922],"tags":[4581,1018,4540],"class_list":["post-27130","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-turkey","category-usa","category-world","tag-ak-party","tag-recep-tayyip-erdogan","tag-wikileaks"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/27130","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/83"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=27130"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/27130\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/27131"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=27130"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=27130"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=27130"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}