{"id":21007,"date":"2010-07-31T23:09:19","date_gmt":"2010-07-31T21:09:19","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.turkishforum.com.tr\/en\/content\/?p=21007"},"modified":"2023-04-05T10:52:23","modified_gmt":"2023-04-05T07:52:23","slug":"turkey-and-the-united-states-how-to-go-forward-and-not-back","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/2010\/07\/31\/turkey-and-the-united-states-how-to-go-forward-and-not-back\/","title":{"rendered":"Turkey and the United States:  How To Go Forward (and Not Back)"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>July 28, 2010<\/p>\n<p>On Tuesday, July 28, Director of the Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center, Ross Wilson, spoke at a hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, entitled \u201cTurkey\u2019s New Foreign Policy Direction: Implications for U.S.-Turkish Relations.\u201d Soner Cagaptay, Director, Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Ian Lesser, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, the German Marshall Fund of the United States; and Michael Rubin, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, also testified.<\/p>\n<p>Recent tensions over Iran and Israel have called into question the direction of Turkey\u2019s orientation and especially its role in the Middle East. Ambassador Wilson acknowledged recent problems, urged these developments be viewed in the context of an overall relationship that had important strategic benefits, and emphasized the imperative of more effective engagement of Turkish leaders and public opinion on Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Middle East and other issues.<\/p>\n<p>Turkey and the United States:\u00a0 How To Go Forward (and Not Back)<\/p>\n<p>Statement for the Record<\/p>\n<p>Ross Wilson<br \/>\nDirector, Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center<br \/>\nAtlantic Council of the United States<\/p>\n<p>July 28, 2010<\/p>\n<p>House Committee on Foreign Affairs<\/p>\n<p>Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the honor of being invited to speak at this hearing on Turkey and U.S. Turkish relations.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Turkey is a fascinating, sometimes frustrating, often confusing and very important country in a key part of the world for the United States.\u00a0 Figuring it out is a challenge.\u00a0 It is tempting, but always misleading, to see black and white where grays are the dominant colors.\u00a0 One of the most useful observations I heard while I had the honor to serve as American ambassador in Ankara came from a colleague who had been there many years and left shortly after I arrived.\u00a0 He said, \u201cTurkey is one of those countries where the more you know, the less you understand.\u201d\u00a0 I hope that today\u2019s discussions will give me, and maybe others, more knowledge and understanding.<\/p>\n<p>The reasons for this hearing are self-evident.\u00a0 Questions are being asked about whether Turkey has changed its axis and reoriented its priorities, about whether it remains a friend and ally of the United States or is becoming, as Steven Cook of the Council on Foreign Relations recently suggested, a competitor or possibly a \u201cfrenemy.\u201d\u00a0 That this debate is happening ought to be disconcerting to Turks who argue \u2013 as many in the military, foreign ministry and government did to me \u2013 that the United States is Turkey\u2019s most important and only strategic partner.\u00a0 It frustrates the Obama Administration, which has invested heavily in U.S.-Turkish relations, including when the President visited Ankara in April 2009, when Prime Minister Erdogan came to Washington last December, and at the nuclear security summit here several months ago.<\/p>\n<p>Of course, there have always been ups and downs in U.S.-Turkish relations.\u00a0 Those who think they remember the halcyon days of yore should read their history.\u00a0 Looking at reports in the U.S. embassy\u2019s files put my problems into perspective while I was working there.\u00a0 Or consider a Turk\u2019s point of view.\u00a0 He or she might have thought the word frenemy (if it really is a word) applied to the United States when in 2003-2007 we barred cross-border pursuits of terrorists fleeing back into northern Iraq after attacking police stations and school buses, or when the United States imposed an arms embargo after Turkish forces intervened in Cyprus in 1974, or when we accepted the brutal overthrow of Turkey\u2019s civilian government in 1980.<\/p>\n<p>But to stick with our own perceptions and priorities, a lot of mainstream observers think that it is different this time.\u00a0 Whether fair or not, or correct or not \u2013 and I think this is not an accurate image, Turkey\u2019s picture in many circles here is monochromatic in unflattering ways:\u00a0 friend to Ahmadinejad and supporter of Iran, friend to HAMAS, shrill critic of Israel, and defender of Sudan\u2019s Bashir.\u00a0 The flotilla incident and Turkey\u2019s no vote on UN sanctions against Iran sharpened the issue.\u00a0 Several weeks ago, a senior U.S. military officer and great friend of Turkey confided to me with exasperation, \u201cWhat in the world are we going to do with Turkey?\u201d\u00a0 Uncertainty about Turkey and how to proceed with it is widespread.\u00a0 And that is at least as much a problem for Turkey \u2013 for Turks who value its five decade-old alliance with the United States, to which I believe Turkey is committed \u2013 as it is for anyone here.<\/p>\n<p>One thing we have to do about our exasperation is fill out the picture.\u00a0 How Turkey does see things, and what are its leaders responding to and trying to accomplish?\u00a0 Picture Turkey on a map and go around it.<\/p>\n<p>Iran<\/p>\n<p>Turkey borders on Iran.\u00a0 For Ankara, it is a problematic country, a rival for hundreds of years.\u00a0 Most Turks I talked to believe the recent rise of Tehran\u2019s influence has been fueled in part by the U.S. invasion of Iraq and its consequences and by the unresolved Israel-Palestinian conflict.\u00a0 They regard Iranian actions as inconsistent with Turkey\u2019s interest in a stable, peaceful region, and I think their local geopolitical contest for influence is one we underestimate.\u00a0 But Turks also have to live next to Iran and do not want its enmity.\u00a0 So Ankara\u2019s approach has been non-confrontational and continues to be so.\u00a0 It has worked indirectly to advance Turkey\u2019s interests, including by developing non-Iranian Caspian energy export routes, deploying troops to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon, supporting such moderates as Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri and Iraqi leader Ayad Allawi, and engaging Syrian President Asad, whom it apparently hopes to moderate by lessening his dependence upon \u2013 or prying him away from \u2013 Iran.<\/p>\n<p>Turkey does not want a nuclear-armed Iran.\u00a0 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and others worked in 2006-2007 to get Turkish buy-in for the approach taken by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany \u2013 the P5+1.\u00a0 They were successful.\u00a0 I believe that Turkish leaders took a tough line on Tehran\u2019s need to reassure the world by complying with its Non-Proliferation Treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency obligations.\u00a0 But the legacy of the Iraq weapons of mass destruction intelligence failures was that most Turks, including in the military and throughout the political elite, doubt the accuracy of Western intelligence on Iran\u2019s nuclear efforts and fear the implications of war more than they fear the possibility of an Iranian bomb.\u00a0 Hence the Turks insistence on negotiations \u2013 an insistence on which the Turks are not alone, including among our allies.<\/p>\n<p>Administration officials can speak more authoritatively than I can about how we came to cross-purposes on the Iran nuclear issue this spring.\u00a0 Suffice it for me to say that at the outset Ankara believed, with good reason, that the Obama Administration shared its objectives on the uranium swap proposal and backed its efforts.\u00a0 There were problems of timing, delivery and coordination, but this was not a rogue Turkey heading off in a new foreign policy direction with which the United States disagreed.<\/p>\n<p>Obviously, Turkey\u2019s no vote in the UN Security Council was unhelpful.\u00a0 In figuring out how we proceed on Iran with Turkey now, my overriding priority would be to comport ourselves in such a way as to ensure Ankara is with us in the next acts of the drama.\u00a0 I think the political, defense and security implications of what Iran is doing are very serious.\u00a0 Whatever the future brings, the situation requires us to have the fullest possible support of all our NATO allies, and geography puts Turkey at the top of that of that list.\u00a0 We can accomplish this through the fullest possible information sharing on what we know (and don\u2019t know) and involving Ankara in the diplomacy \u2013 not as mediator probably, but also not as a bystander.\u00a0 It is a partner; we expect it to act like one, and we should treat it as one.<\/p>\n<p>Iraq<\/p>\n<p>Turkey borders on Iraq, where we have poured so much treasure and youth.\u00a0 Over 90 percent of the Turkish public opposed the U.S. invasion in 2003, and a greater percentage opposes our presence there now.\u00a0 Despite this, Turkish authorities want us to stay.\u00a0 They fear, and I think the public at some level shares this fear, that we will walk away too early and then Turkey will face a chronic crisis.\u00a0 Or, worse, that Iraq might be taken over by some dangerous new tyrant, fall under the control of another neighboring power, break up, or become a home to anti-Turkish terrorists.\u00a0 The PKK problem along the northern Iraq border is especially serious, but at least 2-3 years ago, so were anti-Turkish al-Qaeda elements in Iraq.\u00a0 Since 2005 and especially after March 2008, Turkey has been a constructive player on Iraq.\u00a0 We asked it to help draw Sunni rejectionists out of violence and into politics, and it did.\u00a0 At our request, Turkey helped facilitate the U.S. engagement with Iraq\u2019s neighbors that the Baker-Hamilton Commission recommended.\u00a0 We asked it to deal with Kurdistan Regional Government leader Masoud Barzani.\u00a0 It has done so, getting help on the PKK problem and making itself a more effective player in supporting the Iraqi political process, which will be important as our own role declines.<\/p>\n<p>Turkey\u2019s role in Iraq is important and positive.\u00a0 To be frank, it got to be that way because American and Turkish leaders decided to overlook the March 1, 2003 disagreement at the start of the war and found common ground in helping Iraq stand back up.\u00a0 While it did not seem so simple at the time, in effect we dusted ourselves off and moved on.\u00a0 That is not a bad model for policymakers now.<\/p>\n<p>Middle East<\/p>\n<p>Turkey borders on Syria and the Middle East.\u00a0 Even before I left for Turkey, I heard people wonder what it was doing mucking about in Middle Eastern affairs.\u00a0 In the U.S. government, the people dealing with the Middle East are generally not responsible for Turkey, which is handled out of offices dealing with European affairs.\u00a0 But Ankara is far closer to Jerusalem than Riyadh is.\u00a0 (For comparison, Ankara is only a little farther from Jerusalem than Washington is from Atlanta.)\u00a0 There is Ottoman baggage with Arab populations that modern-day Turks do not talk much about, but Turkey is a Middle Eastern country.\u00a0 It is not surprising that Prime Minister Erdogan is popular there \u2013 of course, his populist rhetoric adds to that, as he intends.\u00a0 In any case, we should forgive Turks for thinking that they have a role there or that they are entitled to their own perspective.\u00a0 This seems especially the case when on the most important issues \u2013 Israel\u2019s right to exist, the goal of two democratic states, Israeli and Palestinian, living side by side in peace and security, and the need for a negotiated (not imposed) solution \u2013 Turkey\u2019s perspective is the same as ours.<\/p>\n<p>Within Turkey, in Israel and in the West, Prime Minister Erdogan has been criticized for his shrill rhetoric toward Israel, especially on Gaza.\u00a0 Turks do not, of course, universally support his government, but they do almost universally share his underlying view that Israeli-Palestinian stalemate has persisted too long, that what is happening to Palestinians is unfair, and that they need help.\u00a0 I was in Turkey shortly after the \u201cflotilla incident.\u201d\u00a0 I heard many views about whether the government\u2019s backing of the Mavi Marmara was wise, properly done or in Turkey\u2019s interest; no one I talked to, and as far as I could tell none of the people they talked with, thought that it was wrong.<\/p>\n<p>I don\u2019t know what the way forward on Middle East peace issues is.\u00a0 Clearly, Turkey\u2019s estrangement from Israel limits any role it can play for the foreseeable future.\u00a0 At no time soon will Ankara again be able to mediate between Syria and Israel \u2013an effort that showed its value in keeping channels open after Israel\u2019s September 2007 destruction of the Deir ez-Zor nuclear site in Syria.\u00a0 It is constructive that Senator Mitchell has included Turkey among the regional powers that he consults with from time to time, and I hope that continues.<\/p>\n<p>Caucasus<\/p>\n<p>Turkey borders on the Caucasus \u2013 Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.\u00a0 I know that you, Mr. Chairman, other members of this committee and many Americans have strong views about the Turkey-Armenia piece and about history that has not been entirely accommodated.\u00a0 The South Caucasus is a volatile and fragile part of the world, as Georgia 2008 reminded us.\u00a0 That conflict gave impetus to reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia.\u00a0 When President Sarksian and President Gul stood together in Yerevan a month after the Russian invasion of Georgia, the two leaders seemed symbolically to say, \u2018we have a vision of the Caucasus, it\u2019s not what just happened in Georgia, and we\u2019re determined to take on the most difficult issues between us to try to achieve it.\u2019\u00a0 Unfortunately, Armenian and Turkish leaders concluded that they could not go forward now to ratify the protocols that called for normalizing relations and opening the border.\u00a0 I think doing so can still build the confidence needed for resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and for Turks and Armenians to deal with their past, present and future together in a forthright manner.\u00a0 I hope that Congress can support that effort.<\/p>\n<p>In the interest of brevity, I have omitted mention of Cyprus, Greece, the Balkans and the Black Sea, and such other active items in U.S.-Turkish relations as energy, terrorism, Afghanistan and Pakistan.\u00a0 Suffice it to say that, in my view, on each of these we want fundamentally the same things, there are of course differences of view, and the United States and Turkey cooperate pretty well.<\/p>\n<p>Change in Turkey<\/p>\n<p>I noted earlier the rhetorical question of what other American ally borders on so many problems of such high priority to U.S. foreign policy.\u00a0 Looked at another way, is there another ally that has such a large stake in how so many problems that are so important to us get addressed?<\/p>\n<p>A Turkey that is stronger than at any time in a couple hundred years is now inclined to try to influence events on its periphery in ways that it was not in the past.\u00a0 It does so partly because it can, but also because it is good politics.\u00a0 This reflects important and positive changes in Turkey.\u00a0 When it comes to foreign policy, public opinion matters in a way it did not even just a few years ago.\u00a0 Decades of pro-market policies have made Turkey\u2019s the 16th largest economy in the world.\u00a0 Migration from rural areas to the cities and an expanding middle class are two other trends with huge political implications.\u00a0 In this more prosperous and confident Turkey, voters do not want their country to be a subject of others\u2019 diplomacy or a bystander on regional issues.\u00a0 They want to see their country acting.\u00a0 They expect their government to do so.\u00a0 They expect it to act wisely, and I think one of our jobs is to help it do so.<\/p>\n<p>My answer to my military friend\u2019s exasperated question, \u201cwhat in the world are we going to do with Turkey,\u201d is that we have no choice but to work with it and work with it and work with it.\u00a0 It is hard, it is frustrating, and maybe it is messy.\u00a0 It is harder now with a democratic ally in which power resides in several places \u2013 and that is in general a good thing.\u00a0 It is the only way to go forward and the only way not to go back into recrimination and anger that ultimately could put American interests in the region at risk.\u00a0 It requires steady senior-level engagement, visits to Turkey by members of Congress such as you, Mr. Chairman, and not letting differences that are mostly tactical overwhelm our strategic interests.\u00a0 I thought it was highly important that President Obama met with Prime Minister Erdogan on the margins of the recent G-20 Summit in Toronto a month ago.\u00a0 According to the account I heard, the meeting was long, and the President was very direct, tough and critical.\u00a0 That is what it will take.<\/p>\n<p>Thank you.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"removed_link\" title=\"http:\/\/www.acus.org\/highlight\/ross-wilson-house-testimony-us-turkey-relations\/transcript\"><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>July 28, 2010 On Tuesday, July 28, Director of the Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center, Ross Wilson, spoke at a hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, entitled \u201cTurkey\u2019s New Foreign Policy Direction: Implications for U.S.-Turkish Relations.\u201d Soner Cagaptay, Director, Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Ian Lesser, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, 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