JewishTimes.com<\/p>\n
Baltimore, Maryland<\/p>\n
Why the Islamic democracy rocked ties with Israel and the West<\/p>\n
Dr. Robert O. Freedman<\/p>\n
Special to the Jewish Times<\/p>\n
Ideally, relations between two allied countries are composed of
\ncommon interests and values. This has been the case in U.S.-Israeli
\nrelations since 1967, when strategic cooperation against the Soviet
\nUnion and its Arab allies was reinforced by the fact that both the
\nUnited States and Israel were vibrant democracies.<\/p>\n
When only common interests hold two countries together, the
\nrelationship is far less solid, as in the case when the United States
\ncooperated with the Soviet Union during World War II against Nazi
\nGermany, only to drift into the Cold War immediately thereafter when
\nGermany had been defeated.<\/p>\n
In the case of Israel and Turkey, initially there were both
\ncommon interests and common values when the relationship between
\nthe two countr\u00c2 ies reached its zenith in the late 1990s, as both
\ncountries opposed Syria and were the only genuine democracies in the
\nauthoritarian Middle East. In the last decade, however, and especially
\nsince the coming to power of the Islamic AKP (Justice and Development)
\nParty in 2002, relations between the two countries have deteriorated
\nas their common interests disappeared, and Turkey was transformed from
\na secularist democracy to an increasingly intolerant Islamic state.<\/p>\n
Indeed, the future of the Turkish-Israeli relationship appears to
\ndepend upon whether the AKP is again victorious in next year’s Turkish
\nelection. How did we come to this point?<\/p>\n
Turkish-Israeli Alliance Forms\u00e2~@\u00a8Following the collapse of the Soviet
\nUnion in 1991, Turkey, which had prided itself as being the southern
\nbastion of NATO against the Soviet Union, looked around for a new
\nforeign policy focus. There were two goals:<\/p>\n
\u00e2~@\u00a2 Entry into the European Union, which Turkey had been seeking
\nfor several decades.<\/p>\n
\u00e2~@\u00a2 Step into what Turkish leaders thought would be a political vacuum
\nin Central Asia and Azerbaijan following the collapse of the Soviet
\nUnion, and the emergence of the independent states of Kazakhstan,
\nUzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan — all of whom
\nhad a Turkic heritage.<\/p>\n
The Turkish leaders quickly found, however, that the leaders of the new
\nstates had no desire to replace one “big brother” (Russia) with another
\n“big brother” (Turkey). In any case, the Turkish leadership soon found
\nitself embroiled in the rapidly escalating civil war with its Kurdish
\ncommunity, led by the terrorist PKK organization, particularly in the
\nsoutheast part of Turkey. The Kurdish revolt was aided and abetted by
\nSyria, which harbored the Kurdish opposition leader, Abdullah Ocalan.<\/p>\n
The defensive agreement between Greece — another enemy of Turkey —
\nand Syria in 1995 prompted Turkey to respond. The next year, a major
\ndefense agreement between Israel and Turkey was signed. As a result,
\nSyria, which borders Turkey on its north and Israel on its southwest,
\nwas forced to divide its military forces. The agreement also enabled
\nIsraeli pilots to train in Turkey, Turkish pilots to train in Israel,
\nand provided for extensive anti-terrorism cooperation.<\/p>\n
A Pact’s Benefits\u00e2~@\u00a8The growing defensive relationship led to major
\nIsraeli arms deals with Turkey, particularly of refurbished and
\nupgraded tanks and planes. By the late 1990s, the Turkish-Israeli
\npact was paying Turkey major dividends. In 1998, Turkey issued an
\nultimatum to Syria to expel Ocalan or face a Turkish invasion. With
\nIsraeli military forces on its southern border on the Golan Heights,
\nSyria had no choice but to comply; Ocalan was expelled, later to
\nbe captured by the Turks with the help of both U.S. and Israeli
\nintelligence, which led to a Turkish- Kurdish ceasefire.<\/p>\n
There were other benefits as well:<\/p>\n
\u00e2~@\u00a2 In the late 1990s, Diaspora Armenians began pressuring the U.S.<\/p>\n
Congress to pass a resolution stating that the Ottoman Empire, the
\nTurkish Republic’s predecessor, had committed genocide against its
\nArmenian population during World War I. With the help of the American
\npro-Israel lobby, Turkey prevented the passage of the resolution.<\/p>\n
\u00e2~@\u00a2 The pro-Israel lobby helped to partially neutralize the
\nanti-Turkish American Greek lobby, which opposed American arms sales
\nto Turkey.<\/p>\n
\u00e2~@\u00a2 Israeli rescue crews came to the aid of Turkey after its 1999
\nearthquake.<\/p>\n
\u00e2~@\u00a2 The two countries — with U.S. forces — began a series of joint
\nmilitary exercises, code-named Reliant Mermaid.<\/p>\n
\u00e2~@\u00a2 Israeli visitors flocked to Turkey and trade between the countries
\nrose rapidly, crossing the $1 billion mark in 2002 and reaching $3.5
\nbillion in 2008. Israel was exporting military equipment\u00e2~@\u00a8to Turkey
\nand Turkish construction firms were undertaking projects in Israel.<\/p>\n
Course Change<\/p>\n
This warm relationship, however, changed in the first decade of
\nthe 21st century. That came in part because of a change of Turkish
\ninterests, and in part because of the increasingly Islamic focus of
\nTurkey’s new leadership.<\/p>\n
A number of changes came before the AKP’s 2002 rise to power, but
\nwere enhanced by the party’s political triumph.<\/p>\n
\u00e2~@\u00a2 Turkey sent aid to Greece following the latter’s 1999 earthquake,
\nas had been the reverse following Turkey’s earthquake that same year.<\/p>\n
This led to a gradual rapprochement between the one-time enemies.<\/p>\n
\u00e2~@\u00a2 Following Ocalan’s ouster from Syria, Turkish-Syrian relations
\ngradually improved. That accelerated when Bashar Assad succeeded his
\nfather, Hafez Assad, in June 2000.<\/p>\n
\u00e2~@\u00a2 Russian-Turkish relations, which were in a state of confrontation
\nduring most of the 1990s due to differences over the Kurds and
\nChechens, and Russian military aid to Greece improved as the Russians
\nagreed to sell Turkey large amounts of natural gas.<\/p>\n
\u00e2~@\u00a2 Although in 1999 Turkey was accepted for European Union candidacy
\n— and was told to undertake domestic reforms to gain admittance — the
\nTurks began realizing that the chance for EU membership was dimming.<\/p>\n
That was because of the 9\/11 al-Qaida attacks on the United States,
\nsimilar Islamic bombings in London and Madrid, the murder of a Dutch
\nfilmmaker by an Islamic terrorist, and Europe’s Muslim riots following
\nthe publication of cartoons of Muhammad in a Dutch newspaper. All of
\nthat convinced increasing numbers of Europeans that Islamic values
\n— even those of a “secularized” Muslim state such as Turkey —
\nwere not congruent with Europeans ones, reinforcing the opposition
\nof some European leaders to Muslim Turkey’s entry into the EU.<\/p>\n
Under these circumstances, Turkish leaders began to look to the
\nMiddle East as a new focus for their trade and foreign policy. This
\nwas reinforced when the AKP Party, led by Recep Erdogan, took power
\nin 2002. He had come from an Islamic background — and had been
\njailed for his Islamic views, but ran on a platform of moderation;
\nthe AKP victory came in large part because of a backlash against the
\nextensive corruption of the secular parties.<\/p>\n
Soon after taking office, Erdogan was confronted by a major foreign
\npolicy problem — the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Its three major negative
\nconsequences for Turkey and for U.S.-Turkish relations were:<\/p>\n
\u00e2~@\u00a2 The U.S. invasion raised the possibility of an independent
\nKurdistan bordering southeast Turkey, which could have a major
\nirredentist pull on the loyalty of the Turkish Kurds;<\/p>\n
\u00e2~@\u00a2 Perhaps seeing a new opportunity, the Turkish Kurds renewed
\ntheir guerrilla war against Turkey’s government;<\/p>\n
\u00e2~@\u00a2 And the U.S. was angry that the Turkish Parliament did not
\napprove the entry of U.S. forces into Iraq via Turkey.<\/p>\n
This all led to a deterioration of U.S.-Turkish relations and to
\na sharp rise in state-supported anti-American propaganda in the
\nTurkish media.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, the AKP government kept improving relations with its
\nneighbors, Greece, Syria and Russia, which had been begun by its
\npredecessors.<\/p>\n
One consequence was that Turkey appeared to have less need for a
\nstrong army, which remained highly suspicious of Erdogan and was the
\nmain bastion of Turkish secularism. Erdogan also added an Islamic
\ndimension to this “Zero Problems” policy. He sought to improve
\nrelations with the Islamic Republic of Iran and embraced Hamas —
\ndespite both having openly called for Israel’s destruction.<\/p>\n
Thus, in 1994, Erdogan made a formal visit to Iran and when, in the
\nsame year, Israel killed Hamas leader Sheikh Yassin, Erdogan called
\nthe Israeli act “state terrorism” and temporarily withdrew the Turkish
\nambassador from Israel. When Hamas won the 2006 Palestinian Legislative
\nCouncil Election, its leaders were invited to visit Turkey.<\/p>\n
To Erdogan, an Islamic foreign policy meant not only Islamic
\nsolidarity,but also the concept that Muslims can do no wrong — and
\nthat non-Muslims who act against Muslims should be severely censured.<\/p>\n
This view was increasingly evident on state-controlled TV, leading the
\nAmerican Council on Jewish-Turkish relations to issue the following
\ndeclaration when Erdogan visited the United States in June 2005:
\n“As we voice our support for Turkey, we hope to hear Prime Minister
\nErdogan’s confirmation of Turkey’s commitment to a strong and durable
\nalliance with the United States, his unequivocal denunciation of
\nfrequent anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism in the Turkish media,
\nand his determination to curb them.”<\/p>\n
Erdogan, however, did not curb the Turkish media’s anti-Americanism
\nand the anti-Semitism, which set the scene for a further deterioration
\nof both Turkish-American and Turkish-Israeli relations.<\/p>\n
Domestically, Erdogan sought to bolster Turkey’s potential entry to
\nthe EU by implementing reforms such as improving the conditions of
\nthe Kurds, curbing the power of Turkey’s secular military, allowing
\nwomen to wear headscarves in state buildings (including universities)
\nand at state events, but was rebuffed on the headscarves issue by
\nthe Turkish courts, also major advocates of secularism.<\/p>\n
Erdogan Cements Power\u00e2~@\u00a8Re-elected in 2007 with 47 percent of the
\nvote (compared to 37 percent in 2002), Erdogan set out immediately to
\nattack and weaken the Turkish military, which had strongly opposed his
\nelection.\u00e2~@\u00a8He commenced an investigation of the so-called Ergenekon
\nplot of the Turkish Military, which Erdogan claimed sought to overthrow
\nhis government. Not only were high-ranking military officers arrested,
\nso also were a number of his secular opponents. This angered and
\nworried Turkish secularists.<\/p>\n
Next, Erdogan’s government imposed a multi-billion-dollar fine on the
\nowner of a Turkish media outlet that opposed him, raising questions
\nat home and in the EU about Turkey’s freedom of the press.<\/p>\n
Some thought this was related to attempts to stifle discussion of
\ncorruption charges against members of the AKP, which both sullied its
\nreputation and lessened its chances to be re-elected.\u00e2~@\u00a8Erdogan then
\ntried to push a series of amendments through the Turkish Parliament
\nthat, among other things, would enable him and the AKP majority to add
\ntheir supporters to secular dominated judicial institutions such as
\nthe Turkish Supreme Court. While the effort failed, Erdogan secured
\nsufficient votes to put them to a national referendum, which will
\ntake place in September 2010.<\/p>\n
In foreign policy, Erdogan embarked on a more radical Islamic policy.<\/p>\n
He publicly welcomed Sudanese President Hassan al-Bashir, who had
\nbeen indicted by the International Criminal Court for genocide. “It
\nis not possible for a Muslim to commit genocide,” Erdogan said.<\/p>\n
He also sought to mediate (with Brazil’s help) a solution to the
\nIranian nuclear problem. This angered the United States, which
\nsaw a possible diversion from its desired U.N. sanctions against
\nIran. When Turkey subsequently voted against the sanctions resolution,
\nU.S.-Turkish relations were chilled further.<\/p>\n
Erdogan, now seeing Turkey as a major Middle East mediator, sought
\nto mediate between Israel and Syria. This effort ended in December
\n2008 when Israel invaded Gaza to end Hamas rocket attacks, an action
\nseverely condemned by Erdogan.<\/p>\n
The Turk’s other foreign policy initiatives included signing a
\npreliminary treaty with Armenia in October 2009.<\/p>\n
Once signed, an AKP leader reportedly said, “Now we don’t need the
\nJews anymore,” a reference to the aid American Jews, as part of the
\npro-Israel lobby, had given to Turkey in the U.S. Congress to prevent
\nthe passing of an Armenian genocide resolution.<\/p>\n
Erdogan then offered amnesty to members of the PKK who returned to
\nTurkey peacefully from their bases in Iraqi Kurdistan.<\/p>\n
However, the major change in Turkey’s foreign policy came in the
\nsharp deterioration of relations with Israel, which appears Erdogan
\nhimself carefully orchestrated.<\/p>\n
In January 2009, following Israel’s invasion of Gaza, Erdogan bitterly
\nattacked Israeli President Shimon Peres at the Davos World Economic
\nForum. “When it comes to killing, you well know how to kill,” he
\nsaid before storming out of the meeting. Upon returning home, Erdogan
\nwas greeted with cheers, perhaps convincing him that an anti-Israeli
\npolicy would play well in Turkish politics.<\/p>\n
Then, during 2009, an anti-Israel, anti-Semitic TV series depicting
\nIsraeli soldiers deliberately murdering Palestinian babies was telecast
\non Turkish national TV.<\/p>\n
Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon confronted the Turkish
\nambassador about this and Erdogan responded by calling Israel “the
\ngreatest threat to peace in the Middle East.”<\/p>\n
Erdogan then canceled Israeli participation in the joint military
\nexercise with the United States, which was to take place, in part,
\nin Turkey.<\/p>\n
Most recently, in the aftermath of the recent May flotilla incident,
\nthe only ship that resisted the Israeli takeover was organized
\nby the IHH, an Islamic “charity” association in Turkey that had
\nbeen involved in past terrorism (including, according to a French
\nmagistrate, an attempt to blow up Los Angeles International Airport,
\nas well as ties with al-Qaida).<\/p>\n
The IHH clearly sought to provoke a conflict with Israel and Erdogan
\nseized on the deaths of nine members of the organization to escalate
\nhis conflict with Israel. He demanded an apology from Israel,
\nand threatened to cut all ties with Israel unless the apology was
\nforthcoming.<\/p>\n
Initially, it appeared he could exploit the conflict for major domestic
\npolitical gain, as even the main Turkish opposition parties, the CHP
\nand the MHP, also condemned the Israeli attack.<\/p>\n
Nonetheless, it remained to be seen if Erdogan can ride an anti-Israeli
\npolicy to re-election in next year’s Turkish elections, given the
\nmajor domestic and foreign policy problems now plaguing the AKP.<\/p>\n
What The Future Holds<\/p>\n
In the last year, Erdogan has encountered a series of foreign policy
\nand domestic problems that threaten the chances of the AKP in next
\nyear’s elections.<\/p>\n
First, his initiative to improve relations with Armenia appears to
\nhave foundered as the Armenians have refused to make concessions
\nto Azerbaijan. As Turkish-Armenian relations began to deteriorate,
\nDiaspora Armenians again raised the genocide issue in the U.S.<\/p>\n
Congress, and without the pro-Israeli lobby willing to assist Turkey on
\nthe issue — which it is not, given Erdogan’s anti-Israeli rhetoric —
\nthe resolution now has a much greater chance of passing.<\/p>\n
Second, Erdogan’s opening to the Kurds has backfired. His amnesty offer
\nto the PKK led to a Kurdish political rally welcoming returning PKK
\nguerrillas, and the Kurdish party in Turkey’s parliament was banned.<\/p>\n
Even worse, the PKK rebellion has heated up with strikes against
\nTurkish officials and army officers all over Turkey; one of the major
\nattacks originated in Syria, and the Erdogan government has been
\nhard put to suppress the rebellion. Also, recent polls show that 58
\npercent of Turks oppose Erdogan’s Kurdish policy.<\/p>\n
A great irony is that Turkey remains dependent on Israeli-supplied
\ndrones to track the Kurds. For this reason alone, it is doubtful that
\nwhatever his bluster, Erdogan will cut all ties with Israel.<\/p>\n
It should also be noted that not only has Erdogan alienated the Kurds,
\nhe is also unpopular with Turkey’s Alawite community, which fears
\nincreasing Sunni Islamization of Turkey. Both groups are likely to
\noppose the AKP in next year’s election. Indeed, before the flotilla
\nincident, the AKP polled only 29 percent — a sharp drop from its
\n2007 gains.<\/p>\n
Finally, the main Turkish opposition party, the CHP, has a new and
\nvibrant leader in Kemal Kilicdaroglu. He has criticized Erdogan’s
\ndomestic policy as creating an “empire of fear” in Turkey, and has
\ngone so far as to accuse the Erdogan government of being fascistic. He
\nalso has raised questions about Erdogan’s links to \u00c2 the IHH and has
\nsuggested that the Turkish government could have prevented the flotilla
\nconfrontation. Even one of the CHP’s spiritual leaders, Fethullah
\nGulen, has questioned Erdogan’s policy in the flotilla incident.<\/p>\n
In sum, as next year’s Turkish election draws closer, Erdogan may
\nwish to play the Israel card in his re-election bid. Nonetheless,
\ngiven his domestic and foreign policy problems, even vitriolic attacks
\non the Jewish state might not suffice to guarantee an AKP victory.<\/p>\n
Turkey-Israel Dates<\/p>\n
1949 — formal relations established<\/p>\n
1996 — military cooperation accord signed<\/p>\n
1998 — joint naval maneuvers<\/p>\n
1999 — large Israeli rescue team sent after Turkey’s earthquake<\/p>\n
2000 — free trade agreement signed<\/p>\n
2002 — Recep Tayyip Erdogan wins Turkish prime ministership<\/p>\n
2009 — Erdogan storms off stage at Davos Summit as Israel’s Shimon
\nPeres speaks<\/p>\n
2009 –Turkey calls Israeli actions in Gaza “crimes against humanity”<\/p>\n
2010 — popular Turkish soap opera depicts Israeli agents kidnapping
\nTurkish babies<\/p>\n
2010 — Turkey recalls ambassador from Israeli following Gaza-bound
\nflotilla raid<\/p>\n
2010 — Turkey suspends 16 bilateral agreements with Israel<\/p>\n
Dr. Robert O. Freedman is Peggy Meyerhoff Pearlstone Professor of
\nPolitical Science Emeritus at Baltimore Hebrew University and is
\nvisiting professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University,
\nwhere he teaches courses on the Arab-Israeli conflict and Russian
\nforeign policy. Among his recent books are: “Russia, Iran And The
\nNuclear Question: The Putin Record” and “Contemporary Israel.”<\/p>\n
Comments<\/p>\n
<\/span><\/p>\n Turkey’s Tarnish<\/p>\n Sadly, by their supporting Turkey’s denial and diminishment of the Imagine, helping a country like Turkey cover up mass murder. It does Specifically, these Jewish groups and their constituents have lost Neutral? You mean that after having done incredible damage to the In the end, their collusion with Turkey proved to be highly damaging Much of the story is here: .<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" JewishTimes.com Baltimore, Maryland Why the Islamic democracy rocked ties with Israel and the West Dr. Robert O. Freedman Special to the Jewish Times Ideally, relations between two allied countries are composed of common interests and values. This has been the case in U.S.-Israeli relations since 1967, when strategic cooperation against the Soviet Union and its […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":83,"featured_media":40468,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[89],"tags":[3044,593],"class_list":["post-20374","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-turkey","tag-mavi-marmara","tag-united-nations"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/20374","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/83"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=20374"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/20374\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/40468"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=20374"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=20374"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=20374"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
\nArmenian genocide, Jewish American groups such as the ADL, AJC, JINSA,
\nand others have lost all moral credibility.<\/p>\n
\nnot get much worse than that. The author sees this as a mere political
\nshortcoming, but it is much much more.<\/p>\n
\ncredibility when it comes to genocide. It is now clear that such
\norganizations, being demonstrably insincere about genocide, use the
\nHolocaust only for political purposes. That harms not just them but
\nthe cause of genocide prevention. How can the ADL, AJC, etc. now speak
\nagainst Holocaust denial when they themselves have engaged in the
\nsame or worse behavior? And let’s be clear that neitherthe national
\nADL nor the AJC has ever issued a truly unambiguous acknowledgment
\nof the Armenian genocide. Moreover, they continue to say that they
\nare neutral concerning the Armenian genocide resolution.<\/p>\n
\ncause of genocide recognition and to Armenians, the ADL and AJC are
\nnow content to just sit back and be neutral? Amazing.<\/p>\n
\nto themselves and of little benefit. It’s sad.<\/p>\n