Metro Toronto Convention Centre, Toronto, Canada<\/p>\n
Potential Partnership in Global Economic Governance:
\nCanada\u2019s G20 Summit from Toronto to Turkey<\/p>\n
Saturday, June 26
\nG20 leaders arrive at the Toronto Airport Infield Terminal at the
\nLester B. Pearson Airport in Toronto
\n18:30 Official welcome and reception of G20 leaders and spouses by
\nStephen Harper, prime minister of Canada, and Laureen Harper, at the
\nRoyal York Hotel<\/p>\n
Sunday, June 27
\n09:00 Opening plenary session
\n12:30 Family photograph
\n17:00 Chair’s press conference<\/p>\n
Potential Partnership in Global Economic Governance:
\nCanada’s G20 Summit from Toronto to Turkey
\nJohn Kirton
\nCo-director, G20 Research Group
\nPaper prepared for a presentation at TEPAV, Ankara, and DEIK,
\nIstanbul, Turkey, June
\n7-8, 2010. Version of June 13, 2010.<\/p>\n
=============================================================<\/p>\n
http:\/\/www.g20.utoronto.ca\/biblio\/kirton-turkey-2010.pdf<\/p>\n
Potential Partnership in Global Economic Governance:
\nCanada\u2019s G20 Summit from Toronto to Turkey
\nJohn Kirton
\nCo-director, G20 Research Group
\nPaper prepared for a presentation at TEPAV, Ankara, and DEIK, Istanbul, Turkey, June
\n7-8, 2010. Version of June 13, 2010.
\nIntroduction
\nThe Challenge
\nIn less than two weeks the most powerful leaders of the world\u2019s 20 most systemically
\nsignificant countries arrive in Toronto, Canada for their fourth summit of the Group of
\nTwenty (G20). It will be their first meeting of the newly proclaimed permanent priority
\ncentre of international economic co-operation, the first co-chaired by an established and
\nemerging economy, and the first held in tight tandem with the older, smaller Group of
\nEight (G8) major power democracies.
\nIn Toronto the G20 leaders will confront several critical global challenges. The first is the
\nEuropean-turned-global financial crisis, erupting in May even before the previous
\nAmerican-turned-global financial crisis of 2007-9 had been solved. The second is the
\ndevastation to trade, investment and development that these financial-turned-economic
\ncrises cause. The third is the environmental and social problems they exacerbate, from
\nclimate change and energy to food and health. And the fourth is strengthening the G20
\nitself and the international financial institutions and other global bodies more generally,
\nto govern more effectively, equitably and accountably today\u2019s complex, uncertain,
\nintensely interconnected world.
\nCan Canada and Turkey work together at Toronto to cope with these and other challenges
\nthat the world confronts? At first glance, Canada and Turkey would appear to be
\ndistinctly different countries, within the global community and as members of the G20,
\nthe institutionalized club of systemically significant countries that was created in 1999 in
\nresponse to the Asian-turned-global financial crisis then and that leapt to the leaders\u2019
\nlevel in response to the American-turned-global financial crisis continuing today. Yet in
\nmany important ways, Canada and Turkey have much in common in their position and
\npotential performance in the G20.
\nKirton: Potential Partnership in Global Economic Governance 2
\nFirst, as forthcoming hosts of the G20 summit, with Canada serving in 2010 and Turkey
\nas early as 2013, they confirm the G20\u2019s institutional position and potential operation
\nperformance as a genuine club of equals, in which one of the least powerful members of
\nthe established G8 and then one that was not a G8 member have been quickly asked to
\nhost and chair the new summit club. Second, they share a geographic position as great
\nglobal connectors in a systemically dedicated club. A trans-continental Canada stands as
\na country of the Americas, Arctic, Atlantic and Pacific, and Turkey as one of Europe,
\nCentral Asia and the Middle East.
\nThird, they share an international institutional position as great global connectors through
\ntheir leading position in other institutionalized summit clubs that embrace the richest and
\npoorest countries, and communities of great diversity, from around the world. Canada is
\nthe second most powerful country in the Commonwealth and in the Francophonie that
\ntogether embrace half the countries in the world, and Turkey is a consequential member
\nand currently the chair of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).
\nFourth, they have long assumed their global responsibilities, notably as members of the
\nNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that won the Cold War, liberated Kosovo
\nfrom an erupting genocide in 1999, and fought with many other of today\u2019s G20 hosts and
\nmembers to defend the Republic of Korea from 1950 to 1953. The sixtieth anniversary of
\nthe outbreak of that war will be commemorated the day before the Toronto summit starts.
\nIn addition both are longstanding allies of the United States and are currently seeking to
\nenhance their association significantly with the European Union.1 Sixth, they contain a
\nrich multidimensional cultural and linguistic diversity within their domestic polities as
\nwell.
\nThe Debate
\nWith this configuration of characteristics and capabilities, how have Canada and Turkey
\nconnected within the G20, and how can they in the future, to serve their own interests and
\nbuild a better world? In the limited English-language literature on Turkey\u2019s role in the
\nG20 and its connection with Canada in this regard, different answers to these questions
\narise.
\nThe first school sees Turkey as an active participant in an inclusive club that combines
\ndeveloped and developing countries and the west and the rest. This is due to the priority
\nPrime Minister Recep Erdo\u011fan\u2019s places on the G20, and Turkey\u2019s crisis-bred concerns
\nabout the end of capitalism (\u015eekercio\u011flu 2009). The most recent expression of this school
\nportrays Turkey as an active G20 participant, teacher, co-operator and complier, due to
\nthe shock of its 2001 financial crisis and restructuring in its wake, and the confidence
\narising from its stability in the 2007-9 crisis, and its rising capabilities and status in the
\nworld (Aysan 2010).
\n1 It is worth noting that the Toronto Summit will open the day after the 60th anniversary of the start of the
\nKorean War on June 25, 1950.
\nKirton: Potential Partnership in Global Economic Governance 3
\nA second school sees Turkey as a status-seeking development advocate through G20
\nmembership, inclusion in an expanded Financial Stability Board (FSB) and Turkey\u2019s
\noffer to host the G20 summit soon. This is due to the threat from a Group of
\nThirteen\/Fourteen (G13\/14) competitor that would exclude Turkey from top-tier
\nmembership, Turkey\u2019s rising relative capabilities as the 6th largest economy in Europe
\nand the 17th largest in the world, and its financial stability amidst the crisis of 2007-2009
\n(Today\u2019s Zaman undated).
\nA third school portrays Turkey both as a status-seeking assertive advocate of
\nconservative economic ideas, but more importantly as a mediating leader of a new middle
\npower coalition. This is due to Turkey\u2019s financial stability, frustration with its bid for
\nmembership in the European Union (EU), its temporary membership on the United
\nNations Security Council (UNSC), and the choice of Istanbul as the capital of European
\nculture in 2010 (Saunders 2010).
\nA fourth school sees a stronger, skillful, undistracted Turkey acting at the G20\u2019s third
\nsummit in Pittsburgh to secure several tangible benefits: domestic political attention and
\nacclaim; greater voice and vote in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
\nBank; greater resources for those international institutions; support for Turkish exports;
\nan equal place in the new permanent priority centre of international economic cooperation
\nthat the G20 proclaimed itself to be; and an opportunity to meet more with
\nUnited States president Barack Obama (\u015eekercio\u011flu 2009b).
\nA fifth school urges a middle power Turkey to be the leading advocate of a non-western
\napproach and thus to move from member to leader to realize its own interests. These
\ninterests consist of advancing its international standing, energy security, Middle East
\npeace, global financial stability, reform of international financial institutions (IFI), its
\ninfluence in the western-dominated EU, International Monetary Fund (IMF), NATO and
\nUnited Nations (UN), and rendering effective and even permanent the G20 summit by
\nexpanding its agenda and adding a secretariat (Bradford and Linn 2009). This Turkish
\nrole arises because the G20 \u201cmirrors the emerging global cultural matrix\u201d and Turkey\u2019s
\nown dualistic identity and because Turkey stands at \u2018the crossroads of a multitude of
\ncritical geographies.\u201d
\nPuzzles
\nWhile each of these schools has much to contribute, none are based on a detailed
\nexamination of what Turkey has actually done and why it has done it in the G20 thus far.
\nNone offers a robust recognition of Turkey\u2019s vision of using the G20 to shape global
\norder for the benefit of others, rather than just itself, as it did at the first G20 summit in
\nNovember 2008. Nor is there any hint of Turkey\u2019s essential character as a Western
\ndemocracy in actively animating Turkey\u2019s place in, approach to and accomplishments in
\nthe club. Also absent is any explicit awareness of Turkey\u2019s longstanding position as an
\nAmerican ally and its importance in shaping Turkey\u2019s membership and participation in
\nthe club. And none provide an explicit place for any form of a Canadian-Turkish
\nrelationship, partnership or co-leadership. as dedicated, multicultural democracies, in
\nusing and shaping the G20 to create a global order on these ideals.
\nKirton: Potential Partnership in Global Economic Governance 4
\nThe Thesis of Canada and Turkey as Critical Connectors
\nThis study argues that Canada and Turkey have served and can serve as critical
\nconnectors and democratizing co-leaders to make the G20 the intended genuine club of
\nequals providing the effective global governance based on democratic openness and
\nrespect for diversity. This is due to their similar shift from consumers to producers of
\nglobal financial and economic security, their global geographic, status and international
\ninstitutional position as great connectors, and their devotion to open democracy and
\ndiversity as polities today.
\nBut to transform their past accomplishments and potential assets into actual performance,
\nthey must meet several challenges that await. First, Canada, as host and co-chair of the
\nG20 Toronto Summit on June 26-27, 2010, must advance the G20\u2019s broad but bounded
\nbuilt-in agenda, respond effectively to the new European-turned-global crisis and make
\nthe G20 function as a genuine institutionalized, systemic summit club where the
\ndiplomacy of equals, the diplomacy of leaders and the diplomacy of the future can
\nflourish to produce effective results (Kirton 2010). Second, Turkey must build on this
\nfoundation to design and implement a G20 strategy that goes beyond using its
\nmembership and potential hosting to enhance its status and advance immediate interests
\nto meet the core challenges that the full G20 and global community commonly confront.
\nAnd third, Canada and Turkey must find a way to work together more closely to have the
\nG20 realize its full potential from Toronto in 2010 to Turkey in the years ahead.
\nCanada\u2019s G20
\nCanada and the G8
\nCanada has long known what it is like to be excluded from the inner circles of global
\ngovernance, despite its striking systemically significant capabilities and the world\u2019s clear
\nneed for them (Kirton 2007). Canada was excluded from the Permanent Five (P5)
\nmembers of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 1945, from Berlin Dinner-4
\nof NATO since 1948, and from the Group of Five (G5) finance ministers who first started
\nmeeting in the Library of the White House in 1973 and continued without Canada and
\nItaly until 1986.
\nCanada was also physically absent from the first G8 summit of six leaders, held at
\nRambouillet, France, in November 1975. But even before it opened, its architect Henry
\nKissinger had promised the Canadians that there would be a second summit, which the
\nU.S. would host and invite Canada to.
\nKissinger knew that he needed Canada inside his new concert. He needed it not as
\nanother loyal North American ally to support whatever the American president proposed,
\nor to balance Europe\u2019s Italy that the French had allowed in at Rambouillet. Rather
\nKissinger, the ultimate realist, coldly calculated Canada\u2019s relative capabilities in their
\nglobal context and quickly concluded that Canada\u2019s first tier capabilities in oil, minerals,
\nfood and soft commodities were needed inside the concert to stop the copycat cartels
\nsprouting everywhere in the wake of the oil embargo of the Organization of Petroleum
\nKirton: Potential Partnership in Global Economic Governance 5
\nExporting Countries (OPEC) in October 1973 and the uranium fuelled Indian nuclear
\nexplosion in May 1974. Such capabilities have continued to give Canada great relevance
\nin the 21st century, where Prime Minister Stephen Harper has accurately called Canada
\nan emerging energy superpower and an emerging clean energy superpower in the world.
\nPower was backed by principle. In Kissinger\u2019s conception and construction, the G8 was a
\nmodern democratic concert, designed and devoted, as its first communiqu\u00e9 proclaimed, to
\nprotect within its members and to promote globally, the values of \u201copen democracy,
\nindividual liberty and social advance.\u201d Canada was then a durable democracy, indeed a
\ncharter member and great European-American connector of the North Atlantic political
\ncommunity, with a democratic tradition dating back on its British side and through its
\nown sovereign to the Magna Carta of 1215. As Prime Minister Harper put it, in his news
\nconference at the conclusion of the 2009 Pittsburgh G20 summit, Canada stood out as a
\ndemocratic country, unbroken by foreign occupation, civil war or civil strife for
\ncenturies.
\nIn the initial Group of seven (G7), Canada supported its American ally when convenient,
\nand its French and British mother countries too. It also allied with the rapidly rising
\nglobal powers of Japan, German and Italy, as the other powers still excluded from the
\nUNSC-P5 and, along with Italy and Japan, from the Berlin Dinner 4 too. Liberal Prime
\nMinister Pierre Trudeau\u2019s close relationship with Social Democratic Chancellor Helmut
\nSchmidt of Germany helped contain a France that a few years before had actively tried to
\ndestroy Canadian unity and thus the survival of Canada itself. The two also led the G7 is
\nnorth-south dialogue and development and in instituting the world\u2019s first effective regime
\nagainst terrorist attacks in the air.
\nIn 1979 Canada\u2019s Progressive Conservative Prime Minister Joe Clark in 1979 supported
\nSchmidt in having the G7 produce the first, most ambitious and most effective climate
\nchange control regime the world has ever seen. Schmidt\u2019s impressive leadership arose in
\npart because he knew the world had to go off coal, in part to save the lives of the many
\nTurks who were dying of accidents while working in Germany\u2019s many coal mines.2
\nCanada as the world\u2019s leading power in uranium and a top tier power in nuclear
\ntechnology induced the G7 to deal not only with conventional energy, but also nuclear
\nenergy and then nuclear proliferation as well, in a crusade where its closest soul mate was
\nantinuclear Japan.
\nBy the time it hosted its first G7 summit at Montebello in 1981, Canada, focused the
\nsummit for the first time on north-south development. As host, Canadian prime minister
\nPierre Trudeau talked the new U.S. president Ronald Regan into attending a North-South
\nsummit in Cancun to prepare for global negotiations for a new world order between the
\nrich North and the poor South. Backed by Japan, Germany and Italy, Canada also made
\nthe G7 explicitly a new, effective centre of global security governance in the world.
\n2 On May 21, 2010 it was reported that rescuers in Turkey found the bodies of 28 miners in a damaged coal
\nmine, making the methane-gas explosion three days earlier one of the deadliest mine accidents in Turkey
\nin recent years.
\nKirton: Potential Partnership in Global Economic Governance 6
\nCanada thus had a vision of world order, on both the defining North-South economic and
\nEast-West security dimensions that it successfully advanced through its place in the G7.
\nCanada\u2019s Conception, Creation and Chairing of the G20 Finance, 1999-2008
\nThis Canadian tradition or reaching out across existing divides to embrace rising powers
\nfrom a more diverse world dated back to Canada\u2019s role in creating the modern,
\nmultiracial Commonwealth in 1947 and 1960, and the Francophonie in 1986.3 It
\ncontinued in 1988 when G7 leaders, meeting in Toronto, identified the emerging process
\nof \u201cglobalization,\u201d recognized the relevance of the rapidly rising Asian economies and
\ncalled for \u201cthe development of informal processes which would facilitate multilateral
\ndiscussions of mutual concern and foster the necessary co-operation.\u201d
\nIn 999 Canada\u2019s finance minister, Paul Martin, conceived and co-created with American
\ntreasury secretary Larry Summers the G20 forum of finance ministers and central
\nbankers. They induced the G7 finance ministers and G8 summit formally to create the
\nG20 along with the new Financial Stability Forum (FSF) in 1999. Canada chaired the
\nfirst three annual autumn meetings, and expanded the club\u2019s mission from financial
\nstability and sustainable growth to globalization that works for the benefit of all. When it
\nhosted the second meeting in Montreal it also vastly expanded the agenda and secured a
\nnew \u201cMontreal Consensus\u201d to replace the discredited Washington one. When New York
\nand Washington were devastated by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the
\nmultilateral organizations headquartered there could not meet, Martin stepped up to host
\nthe third G20 meeting in nearby Ottawa. Here he successfully focused on terrorist
\nfinance, the American\u2019s core security rather than financial pre-occupation at the time. He
\nthus helped the brand new Bush administration in the United States bond to a body
\ncreated only two years earlier by the domestic political rivals it had just defeated at home.
\nCanada\u2019s Crusade for an L20, 2004-05
\nWhen Paul Martin became Canada\u2019s Liberal Party leader and prime minister at the end of
\n2003, he saw the demands for more inclusive, effective global governance growing, in
\nfinance, economics, development and fields such as health and infectious disease too
\n(Martin 2005). He knew the G20 finance forum he had co-founded was working well. He
\njudged the alternative, of ad hoc, constricted, or variable subject specific inclusion, which
\nthe G8 had been started experimenting with in 2003, to be an inferior approach. He
\nconcluded the time had come to elevate the G20 finance to the leaders\u2019 level, to meet as
\nthe demand required on any burning issue of the day. He suggested that the first such
\nmeeting be held on the margins of the UN summit in September 2005, focused on avian
\ninfluenza and infectious disease. He secured the agreement, with various degrees of
\nenthusiasm and acquiescence, from virtually all G20 members save one, George Bush.
\nEven he may have come if the topic had been terrorism. But if it had been, other leaders
\nmight not. Thus, no G20 summit was held.
\n3 It was also apparent in 1955 when Paul Martin senior brokered.
\nKirton: Potential Partnership in Global Economic Governance 7
\nG20 Summitry, 2008-09
\nWhen Lehman Brothers collapsed on September 15, 2008, both U.S. president George
\nBush and Canada\u2019s Conservative prime minister Stephen Harper came to the conclusion
\nthat a summit was needed in response. Among the many alternatives on offer in those
\ncrisis ridden times, notably a G8 plus summit preferred by Sarkozy, Bush decided that he
\nwould host a summit, in Washington and that it must be the G20 one (Price 2009). With
\nonly 24 days to prepare the summit he needed an existing institution, of proven
\nperformance, dedicated to the solving the particular crisis of the moment by restoring
\nfinancial stability and sustained growth. Thus the first G20 summit was held on
\nNovember 15, with no members of the G20 finance forum removed, and only Spain and
\nthe Netherlands added as temporary guests.
\nAt Washington Harper, as one of the few leaders with economics expertise or experience,
\nstood out in calling for exit strategies along with stimulus and joining in the leaderscreated
\nconsensus on open markets and freer trade. Back home Harper reversed his firm
\npolicy of running fiscal surpluses, to engage in deficit spending to deliver his fair share of
\nthe stimulus the Washington summit had agreed. He stood first among G20 members in
\ncomplying with the anti-protectionist promise made there. Indeed, he unilaterally made
\nthree moves to remove tariffs on imports of capital equipment, making Canada the first
\nG8 member to have its manufacturing sector become tariff free.
\nAt the second G20 summit in London on April 1-2, 2009, Harper focused on reforming
\ndomestic financial regulation and freer trade, while contributing US$10 billion as
\nCanada\u2019s fair share of the overall package of US$1.1 trillion for development (including
\ntrade finance) that the summit raised. Canada subsequently stood fourth among the 20
\nmembers in complying with the commitments made by the leaders at London.
\nAt the third G20 summit in Pittsburgh on September 24-25, 2009, Harper called for
\nstaying the course on stimulus until a private sector led recovery was assured, while
\nsimultaneously designing the smart exit strategies to be started when it was, prospectively
\nwithin a year. On the eve of the Pittsburgh Summit Harper unilaterally gave the African
\nDevelopment Bank CA$2.6 billion in additional callable capital so it could meets its
\nmembers\u2019 development needs in the poorest region, composed of a quarter of the
\ncountries, in the world. And Harper agreed that he would accept the responsibility of
\nhosting and co-chairing with the successfully developed, democratic Republic of Korea
\nthe subsequent, fourth G20 summit. It will take place in Toronto, Canada\u2019s largest city
\nand financial capital, on June 26-27, 2010.
\nTurkey\u2019s Position, Performance and Perspective in the G20
\nTurkey\u2019s Global Position and Interests
\nTurkey will come to the Toronto Summit as an open, diverse, democratic society and
\npolity situated at a critical geographic crossroads of a globalizing community, Turkey,
\nlike Canada confronts growing global vulnerabilities that even its rising capabilities
\ncannot cope with on their own. It has thus long looked to international institutions of
\nKirton: Potential Partnership in Global Economic Governance 8
\nbroadly multilateral and globally plurilateral kinds, including those delivered at the
\nsummit level, to solve at their global source the challenges that its citizens confront at
\nhome. Turkey thus has an essential interest in making global institutions adequate,
\nappropriate and effective in meeting its and the world\u2019s need, and in enhancing its
\nposition, responsibilities and resulting influence in them to this end. Thus Turkey\u2019s core
\ninterests have been getting into the G20 finance from the start as an equal, having the
\nsame G20, among the many alternatives on offer, elevated to the leaders-level to cope
\nwith the American\/Atlantic-turned-global financial crisis erupting in 2007, and having
\nthe G20 summit transformed into the permanent, priority forum for international
\neconomic governance in the world. It has been strikingly successful on all three. Its one
\nremaining challenge and ultimate interest is to shape the same G20 as an effective global
\ngovernor guided by Turkey\u2019s distinctive vision of global order needed by today\u2019s and
\ntomorrow\u2019s world.
\nTurkey\u2019s Treatment and Transformation in the G8
\nTo comprehend the scale of the accomplishment of Turkey getting in as an equal from
\nthe start of a G20 that Canada conceived and co-created, it is necessary to examine
\nbriefly the cadence of Turkey\u2019s place in the earlier and continuing comparable club \u2014
\nthe democratically devoted G8.
\nBefore the advent of G20 summitry, Turkey had only a fragile, if strengthening place in
\nthe predecessor centre of global governance, the G8. During the 35 years of G8
\ngovernance since its start in 1975, Turkey\u2019s relevance was directly recognized only four
\ntimes: at the US hosted first genuine G8 summit (with Russia added) in 1997, the Italianhosted
\n2001 summit, the US-hosted 2004 summit and the Italian-hosted summit in 2009.
\nBut during this period, Turkey\u2019s treatment steadily progress on several dimensions, from
\nbeing a problem producing old security threats in the region through to a partner in
\nsolving general global problems by pioneering a new global order around the world, to a
\nparticipant with a seat at the table in the G8 itself.
\nIn 1997, the G8 noted Turkey in paragraph 88 in the context of Cyprus, calling on Turkey
\nand Greece to do everything possible to contribute to a solution of the Cyprus problem
\nand to work toward solving their bilateral disputes with regard to the Aegean through
\nearly meetings of the \u201cWise Men.\u201d Thus Turkey was portrayed, along with NATO
\nmember Greece, as a source of the old Westphalian security threats of boundary disputes,
\nterritorial control and sovereign statehood for the Aegean and Mediterranean region.
\nTurkey and Greece were admonished and appealed to for action to solve these problems
\nby itself.
\nBy 2001, the G7 only Statement, while welcomes progress in emerging market
\neconomies in strengthening their domestic financial systems and underlying fiscal
\npositions, added: \u201cRecent measures taken in Argentina and Turkey represent positive
\nsteps in this direction. We commend these efforts and encourage the continued
\nimplementation of their reform programs in close collaboration with the IMF and other
\nrelevant international institutions.\u201d Turkey had now become an emerging market
\neconomy, along with a fellow G20 member, in regard to a global economic problem that
\nKirton: Potential Partnership in Global Economic Governance 9
\nthe newer non-state created and controlled vulnerability brought. It was one whose
\ndomestically intrusive and internationally institutionalized actions were applauded, not
\nadmonished.
\nIn 2004, Turkey was invited by host George Bush to participate in the G8 summit for the
\nfirst time. This was due to Turkey\u2019s position as a democratic leader in the Broader
\nMiddle East and North Africa and the Muslim world. The White House announcement
\nreleased on May 26, 2004, titled \u201cPresident Bush Invites Turkey to G8 Summit as
\nDemocratic Partner,\u201d read: \u201cPresident Bush has invited Turkish Prime Minister Erdo\u011fan
\nto meet with leaders of G8 countries and regional partners from the broader Middle East
\non June 9, 2004, in Sea Island, Georgia. He looks forward to a discussion of how the G-8
\ncan support political, economic, and social freedom in the broader Middle East and North
\nAfrica, and to Turkey\u2019s contribution to this effort. Turkey\u2019s participation in specific
\nprograms to advance key reforms in this region, especially on democracy, will foster
\ncollaboration among G8 and EU countries, Turkey, and regional partners.\u201d
\nTurkey chose to come. At the summit Bush held a lunch with Turkey and other countries
\nfrom the Middle East, which national security advisor Condoleezza Rice (2004) reported
\non as follows: \u201cOn Wednesday, June 9th … During lunch, the G8 leaders will be joined
\nby the leaders of Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Turkey and Yemen. This is an
\nopportunity for the G8 to discuss how it can support freedom and political, economic and
\nsocial progress in the Middle East, and to hear from these leaders about their efforts to
\npursue democracy and reform in their countries, as well as to hear about Turkey\u2019s success
\nin developing secular democracy in a country with a mainly Muslim population.\u201d
\nThe Chair\u2019s Summary of the 2004 G8 summit began: \u201cWe met at Sea Island for our
\nannual summit to advance freedom by strengthening international cooperation to make
\nthe world both safer and better. Leaders from Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan,
\nYemen and Turkey joined us at Sea Island.\u201d In the G8 communiqu\u00e9, Turkey now stood
\nfront and centre at the very start. Turkey had been transformed into a G8 participant with
\na seat at the table of this leaders-level, top tier club. It was the only G20 member in this
\ninvited group, and the largest, leading country from a region that had expanded to
\nembrace the Middle East and Asia as a central global concern. Turkey thus acquired a
\nfront-line role in general global governance, from winning the war against he new
\nsecurity threat of terrorism to creating a new global order based on democratic values as a
\nwhole. It had gone from being the source of a small problem to a key part of the solution
\nof the greatest global threat of the time.
\nThe 2004 summit\u2019s outside participation represented an alternative to the expanded
\nparticipation formula that the G8 had pioneered in France in 2003 and that it returned to
\nin Britain in 2005, Russia in 2006, Germany in 2007, and Japan in 2008. It was centred
\non a growing partnership with the Group of Five (G5) of Brazil, China, India, Mexico
\nand South Africa (with no Middle East state at all) and then the broader Major
\nEconomies Forum (formerly the Major Economies Meeting of 16) with G20 members
\nTurkey, Saudi Arabia and Argentina left out. A third threat to Turkey\u2019s inclusion in the
\ncentre of global governance came in the vision of Italy\u2019s Silvio Berlusconi and France\u2019s
\nKirton: Potential Partnership in Global Economic Governance 10
\nNicolas Sarkozy of having non-democratic Egypt represent the Middle East, perhaps
\neven for the latter in the form of an institutionalized G14.
\nHowever, Turkey defeated the threat, in part because of its membership in the new G20
\nsummit. On November 12, 2008, Berlusconi, the incoming host of the G8 summit in
\n2009, held the first ever Italian-Turkish summit in Turkey\u2019s western province of Izmir. It
\ntook place immediately before the first G20 summit in Washington DC on November 15,
\nwhich both leaders would attend. The Izmir meeting was to discuss the participation of
\nTurkey and some other countries in the G8 (November 10, 2008, Anadolu Agency). Due
\nto the G20, Turkey was moving more into the more exclusive, more multi-subject, more
\ndemocratic G8 club
\nTurkey thus arrived again at the G8 summit in 2009, after an absence of five years. It
\ncame along with almost 40 leaders for the discussion of food security on the final day.
\nWhile Turkey\u2019s status was diluted by the large numbers, the food security initiative
\nendorsed that day, backed by US$20-22 billion in new money, was the signature
\nachievement of the summit overall. In this way Turkey helped make the G8 that year a
\nsuccess. It also used its G8 participation for a high-profile achievement that responded
\ndirectly to the top international issue on the minds on the minds of Turks at home (see
\nbelow).
\nTurkey as a Founding Democratically Diverse Member of the G20, 1999
\nLong before Turkey started partially participating in the G8 club, it had become a full
\nequal founding member of the G20 in 1999. It did so because Turkey was a democratic
\npart of the west and a proven democratic pillar in the Middle East region and Muslin
\nworld beyond.
\nTurkey had not been on everybody\u2019s list as a candidate for inclusion in the G20 when the
\nclub was being designed. Its financial and economic weight and systemic significance
\nwas in doubt back then. It was ultimately accepted due to the American-Canadian-led
\noverall strategy of linking Turkey more firmly to the West. As one important component
\nof that strategy, the case for G20 membership proved persuasive. The calculation was
\nthat such a move was needed, given the precarious probability of EU membership for
\nTurkey. G20 association would help further solidify the relationship between Turkey and
\nthe West and deepen the democratic tradition in the country. As a soon-to-be consumer
\nrather than a producer of financial security when its financial crisis struck in 2001,
\nTurkey was admitted to the G20 (but not the EU it desired), in order to sustain Turkey\u2019s
\ncharacter as a stable, Muslim democratic polity in a Muslim-dominated Middle East.
\nTurkey\u2019s inclusion paved the way for it to receive the significant financial support it
\nneeded from the IMF in 2001.
\nIn the new global governance bodies born in 199, the G20 was the only one to put Turkey
\nin the top tier. In the new Financial Stability Forum it was left out. In the new
\nInternational Monetary and Finance Committee, embedded in the IMF, Turkey was not
\none of the 24 members, but only part of a constituency for which another country \u2013 a
\nEuropean middle power – spoke. Others were called upon to speak for the Middle East.
\nKirton: Potential Partnership in Global Economic Governance 11
\nTurkey has not yet hosted and chaired a G20 finance ministers meeting, even though non-
\nG8 members India, Mexico, China, South Africa, Australia, Brazil and Korea now have.
\nTurkey joined Group 2 in the chair rotation of the G20, along with India, Russia and
\nSouth Africa, when this arrangement was created a few years after the G20 finance
\nbegan. South Africa hosted the 2007 G20 meeting, and India the 2002 one. Thus either
\nRussia or Turkey would have been due to host the 2012 meeting, had the group follows
\nits rotation schedule devised some time ago. However, with France now inserted to host
\nthe G20 summit and finance ministers meeting (along with the G8) in 2011, the new
\nhosting order for the G20 has been redefined.
\nTurkey as a G20 Finance Participant
\nDuring the first decade of G20 finance ministers\u2019 meetings, Turkey made its mark. At the
\nvery first meeting in Berlin in December 1999, Turkey stood out as the emerging
\neconomy agreeing with Canada, the US and Germany, that stronger codes and standards
\nwere needed to govern global finance, thus broadening the consensus beyond the G7 to
\nembrace a larger, more diverse group.
\n, mostly notably in its successful quest for status-enhancing and effectiveness-inducing
\nvoice and vote reform at the IMF. At Berlin in 2004 Turkey, along with other developing
\nnations, wanted to know who would be behind a revision process of the IMF. At
\nAustralia in 2006 one of the achievements was getting the IMF directors to agree to a
\npackage of reforms including quota increases for the most significantly underrepresented
\ncountries, a group that included Turkey, along with China, Korea and Mexico. The G20
\nworked out the two-stage approach to reform which would be implemented in subsequent
\nyears. It was significant, and a vote of confidence, that the international community
\nlooked to the G20 to help deliver on IMF reform. And the G20 thus delivered an
\nenhanced status and influence for Turkey where the IMF acting alone had long failed.
\nIn 2007 Turkey began to bear of burden of making the G20 as an institution work. That
\nyear, of the three workshops held in preparation for the ministerial meeting, the one on
\nFiscal Elements of Growth and Development was hosted in Istanbul in July.
\nTurkey as a G20 Summit Participant
\nThe advent of G20 summitry was a further achievement for Turley. Prime Minister
\nErdo\u011fan very much enjoyed G20 summitry for the upgrade in status it represented, for
\nthe chance to meet G20 leaders face-to-face, and for the opportunity to have bilateral
\nencounters with other leaders \u2013 those of the US most of all but also France, Germany and
\nRussia.
\nWashington
\nIn G20 summitry, Turkey has been an eager participant since the start. At the first summit
\nin Washington, amidst the crisis of capitalism and the call for visionary solutions,
\nErdo\u011fan\u2019s priority was securing international regulation and supervision of domestic
\nfinancial systems. He stood with Sarkozy in this regard, in a flexible coalition across the
\nKirton: Potential Partnership in Global Economic Governance 12
\nG8-non G8 divide, even though Turkey itself was surviving the crisis with its domestic
\nfinancial system intact. They failed to achieve their desires.
\nLondon
\nTurkey attended the London summit sporting one of the strongest records in finance
\nwithin the G20. It also came as a member that could maintain its general public finance,
\naccording to an analysis prepared by G-20. This analysis showed that Turkey\u2019s inflation
\nwould drop in 2009 and 2010. G20 financial stimulate packages were expected to
\ncontribute between half and quarter percent to Turkey\u2019s and other members\u2019
\ngrowth.4 Turkish ministers and officials worked seriously to prepare for the Summit,
\nbased on Turkey\u2019s important position as an emerging economy. Its experience in
\ncontaining its own crisis in 2001 had a real value for the other countries afflicted now.
\nAt the summit, Prime Minister Erdo\u011fan secured Turkey\u2019s goal of becoming a full
\nmember of an expanded, strengthened Financial Stability Board (FSB).5 Following his
\nconversation with President Obama, Erdo\u011fan said that Turkey was a country that could
\nuse its communication network successfully with both the Middle East and the West.
\nObama in return underlined Turkey\u2019s leadership in the region and the importance of
\nworking together. At the summit\u2019s end, Erdo\u011fan said the decisions taken were \u201ccrucial to
\nminimize the effects of the global financial crisis\u201d (Journal of Turkish Weekly Friday,
\nApril 3, 2009). He added that the G20 countries had displayed a common will to
\nminimize the social impact of the crisis. \u201cAs G20 countries, we will continue to work
\nagainst the global crisis and shape a new international financial structure in the upcoming
\nterm \u2026 Turkey has made serious contributions to relevant efforts within the G-20. An
\nIMF delegation will arrive in Turkey in April. We are in a position to reach a result based
\non the talks between Turkey and the IMF.\u201d
\nPittsburgh
\nTurkey approached the Pittsburg summit saying its strong response to the economic
\ndownturn was that those of a developed OECD, not a developing or emerging country,
\nand thus that it warranted membership in the EU (BBC: 19 September 2009). The week
\nbefore the summit, Turkey\u2019s central bank cut its benchmark interest rate further to 7.25%,
\neven as tentative signs emerged that the country\u2019s economy was stabilizing. This showed
\nTurkey was contributing to the stimulus that the European and global economy still
\nneeded. After shrinking severely in the first quarter of 2009, Turkey\u2019s economy had
\nexpanded bout 5% in the second quarter. However, unemployment remained above 13%.
\nMarkets were wondering if Turkey would need a loan from the IMF, after the last one
\nhad expired over a year before.
\n4 Turkish finance minister Mehmet \u015eim\u015fek travelled to London on March 13 for the G20 finance ministers
\nand central bank governors meeting on March 14 to prepare for the London Summit in April. He also
\nmet with executives of the IMF and World Bank before returning to Turkey on March 15.
\n5 Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan stressed that reducing the impact of the current crisis and
\npreventing similar crises required a global approach. The G20 meetings play an important role. The
\nLondon Summit was important for international cooperation and coordination. Coordinated action was
\nvital in order to overcome the crisis with minimum damage. The world needed a new architecture in
\nwhich no country could say ‘I’m big, I’m special’.
\nKirton: Potential Partnership in Global Economic Governance 13
\nTurkey was thus in a strong position at the summit. It sought and secured its key priority
\nof making the G20 the permanent, priority centre of international economic co-operation.
\nFor here Turkey was a permanent, equal member of the top tier club. In the IMF and all
\nother international financial institutions that mattered, such as the European Bank for
\nReconstruction and Development (EBRD), Turkey was not.
\nWorking Together for the Toronto to Turkey Transition
\nToronto 2010
\nFrom this firm foundation, both Canada and Turkey approached the fourth G20 summit
\nin Toronto with confidence, in common and convergent ways.6 As the first G20 summit
\nco-chaired by an established G8 and emerging G20 only country, the Toronto summit
\nwas prepared on the basis of a broader and more balanced approach than the previous
\nones chaired by formerly hegemonic Britain and the United States alone.
\nTurkey\u2019s Standout Strengths
\nAmong the newly empowered emerging members of the G20, Turkey stood out in several
\nways. Amidst the new European-turned-global financial crisis catalyzed by the Greece\u2019s
\nbailout, Turkey comes (along with Korea, Indonesia, Brazil and Russia) as a once
\nconsumer-turned-provider of financial security \u2013 a sharp contrast to its arrival at the old
\nCanadian-chaired G20 in 2001. It also comes as stronger, more globally supportive
\neconomic power than its neighbour Greece, a country that is already inside a now
\nbeleaguered EU.
\nTurkey also comes as the only country that had raised its credit ratings by one or two
\ngrades despite the economic crisis; and could catch up with its growth before the
\neconomic crisis if it continued to grow around 5-5.5 per cent a year. Turkey had started to
\nrecover in the last quarter of 2009, even if unemployment, at 14.5% in January 2010,
\nremained a key concern (Anatolia news agency, Ankara, in English 0734 GMT 15 Apr
\n10). Turkey also comes as a country with expertise in Islamic finance which is a rising
\nsource of capital and investment in the world. It also comes with a leader who is a
\nfounding G20 summit veteran, as those of the United States, Japan and the United
\nKingdom are not.
\nThe Agenda
\nCanada\u2019s approach to its twin summits of the G8 in Muskoka on June 25-6 and the G20
\nin Toronto on June 26-7 is based on a few fundamental features. The first is a sharp
\ndivision of labour between the two summits, with the G8 doing its traditional
\ndevelopment and security agenda and the G20 doing its traditional finance and economics
\n6 The 2010 G20 preparatory meetings of sherpas were held in Mexico City in January 12, Ottawa on March
\n26-27, and Calgary on May 24-25. The fifth meeting will be held in Toronto on June 23-24.
\nKirton: Potential Partnership in Global Economic Governance 14
\none. Duplication will thus be avoided, the time for global governance doubled, and a
\nbroader range of issues covered than would otherwise be the case.7
\nThe Toronto G20 will thus deal fully with Turkey\u2019s key, well established priorities of IFI
\nreform in voice and vote and resources, trade, and development. It will add coping with
\nthe Euro crisis catalyzed by Greece next door, a crisis that affects Turkey more directly
\nand severely than Canada or other more distant states. It will also add the unemployment
\nthat afflicts Turkey, climate change, clean energy and the food security that its public
\nputs in first place among their concerns.
\nParticipation
\nSecond, each summit will have fewer participants than its predecessors, and allow the
\nG20 leaders to behave more as real leaders the way they do in the smaller, more
\nlikeminded, informal G8. As a result, under Canadian hosting and chairing of the G8 and
\nG20, Turkey\u2019s relative position is enhanced. At the 2010 G8 summit in Muskoka, the ten
\ncountries invited as guests are generally so small and new that they pose no threat to
\nTurkey\u2019s standing in the world.8 At Muskoka there will be no G8-G5 meeting and no
\nMEM-17 one. All the G5 and MEM members will be only at the G20 in Toronto, along
\nwith Turkey as a full equal all the time. Egypt will be absent from the G20. It has been
\ninvited to Muskoka, even though when Canada invited Egypt to the last G8 summit
\nCanada hosted, in 2002, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak chose not to come. To
\nToronto Canada has invited as weighty guests only Spain and the Netherlands, giving
\nTurkey\u2019s leader a chance to perform and lobby in ways that advance Turkey\u2019s European
\ninterests.
\nDomestic Acclaim
\nThird, this division of labour for the agenda and differing outside participation allows the
\nleaders of Turkey and Canada to respond well to the key concerns of their citizens and
\nvoters back home. This is of particular importance to leaders who might face an election
\nsoon, as Prime Minister Harper leading a minority government always might and Prime
\nMinister Erdo\u011fan might as well.
\nA GlobeScan poll of 25,000 respondents across 23 countries, taken for the BBC from
\nJune 19-October 13, 2009 showed those in Turkey rated the rising cost of food and
\nenergy as the most serious of the ten problems offered, rather than the extreme poverty
\nthat was in first place globally at 71% that will be dealt with at Muskoka or the
\nenvironment and pollution in second at 64% or climate change in sixth at 58%. Turks
\nalso rated terrorism as one of their top three global problems, along with those in India,
\nPakistan, Indonesia, Spain and the UK. Globally, food and energy prices stood first as the
\nissue that respondents had talked with friends and family about recently, while in Turkey
\n7 Trade may well be dealt with by the G8 as well as by the G20.
\n8 These are Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Malawi (as chair of the African Union), Nigeria, Senegal and South
\nAfrica, Columbia, Haiti and Jamaica. These ten, together with the G8\u2019s ten (including two from the EU)
\nmake up a different \u201cMuskoka G20,\u201d still small enough and democratically like-minded enough (save
\nfor Egypt) for productive discussions to be held.
\nKirton: Potential Partnership in Global Economic Governance 15
\nterrorism was in first place here. The Toronto G20 will deal with terrorist finance and
\nterrorism as a whole. Food is due to be dealt with at both summits.
\nIn Canada, the state of the global economy was the issue most talked about with family
\nand friends. A subsequent Canadian poll, taken from April 30-May 3, 2010 showed
\nthat\u2014Canadians saw global warming as the most important agenda item (at 33.7%)
\nfacing world leaders at the forthcoming Muskoka-Toronto summits, with economic
\nrecovery in second at (27.2%) (Nanos 2010). Climate will be dealt with at both summits .
\nMoreover Canadians felt Canada\u2019s place in the world was strongest in freedom,
\ndemocracy and human rights, with economic recovery second, open markets third, child
\nand maternal health fourth, nuclear security fifth and global warming in sixth and last
\nplace. The first issue will feature at Muskoka and the second at Toronto, allowing Canada
\nto play from its domestically perceived strengths at both summits it will host.
\nG20 summits have dealt, along with the economy, with terrorist financing from the start
\nand with food and energy since Pittsburgh in a serious way. The G20 finance forum had
\nlong had a strong track record here as well. There is thus a strong popular base for
\nTurkish and Canadian leaders in contributing to make the G20 a central global
\ngovernance forum.
\nFormat
\nFourth, Canada, Turkey and their colleagues have redesigned the G20 summit for
\nToronto so that finance ministers will be absent and the many heads of multilateral
\norganizations invited will sit in the second row, as civil servants usually do, and speak
\nonly when they are spoken to regarding their technical expertise. All leaders, including
\nTurkey\u2019s will thus have more airtime to speak and be heard, especially as the heads of
\nthese multilateral organizations overwhelmingly come not from Turkey but from other
\nstates.
\nThis format allows more flexibility and spontaneity for leaders, who could thus use their
\nsummit time together to address the crises erupting at the time. In this regard, financial
\nsanctions are relevant not only for terrorist finance but also against the North Koreans
\nthat have just attacked their neighbour to the south and against Iran against which a new
\nround of UN sanctions seems soon to come. President Obama used his Pittsburgh G20
\nsummit to send a message to a nuclear committed Iran. Given this precedent, the leaders
\nof Turkey and Brazil, along with a supportive South Africa, could use their free time at
\nToronto to advance their distinctive approach to this issue as well.
\nShaping the G20 System for the Future
\nLooking ahead, Turkey sees the G20 as a central institution of global governance in
\nwhich it is eager to play a leadership role. At the start of 2010, when the question of
\ndefining a hosting order for the now permanent G20 summit, after the French year in
\n2011, Turkey, along with Mexico and Russia, offered to accept this responsibility in the
\nnear term.
\nKirton: Potential Partnership in Global Economic Governance 16
\nTurkey\u2019s vision for the future G20 contains a desire to expand its agenda (Kim 2010). It
\nviews the G20 as having both the power and responsibility to address issues beyond the
\nfinance core. This is particularly the case as finance and economics affect people as a
\nwhole and their central concerns. It is also because the G20 finance ministers and central
\nbank governors have shown their capacity to make concerted efforts in broader field.
\nTurkey\u2019s central candidates for agenda expansion are climate change and poverty. These
\nare highly compatible with those of Korea as chair of the November 2010 summit and
\nwith similarly placed members such as Mexico and South Africa.
\nIt is far too soon to forecast what Turkey\u2019s key priorities might be when it hosts its first
\nG20 summit. But several appropriate and attractive candidates arise. One is the need,
\nbeyond the IMF\u2019s conditionality and even flexible credit lines, for additional financial
\nsafety nets and swaps that can be quickly deployed. A second is development that is
\ndriven more by the private sector, a vision that recently graduated Korea will advance at
\nits G20 summit in Seoul in November and might at Toronto too. A third is development
\namidst diversity and danger. A fourth is helping get the Millennium Development Goals
\n(MDGs) delivered by their fast approaching due date in 2015. A fifth is domestic
\nfinancial regulation that works for and with Islamic finance. A sixth is climate change
\nand clean energy, led by a Turkey on track to increase its share of renewables from the
\nexisting 20% to 30% by 2020.
\nMore broadly, as Turkey will be the first country from the Middle East to host the G20
\nsummit, its essential character as a country that durably respects democracy and diversity
\nwill stand out. It can thus pave the way to showing how development through democracy
\nand diversity can bring progress to that troubled region of the world, and to the global
\nMuslim community that lies beyond.
\nKirton: Potential Partnership in Global Economic Governance 17
\nReferences
\nAlexandroff, Alan S. and John Kirton (2010), \u201cThe \u2018Great Recession\u2019 and the Emergence
\nof the G20 Leaders\u2019 Summit,\u201d in Alan S. Alexandroff and Andrew Fenton Cooper,
\neds., Rising States, Rising Institutions: Can the World Be Governed? (Washington
\nDC: Brookings Press).
\nAysan, Ahmet Faruk (2010), \u201cCountry Fact Sheet \u2013 Turkey,\u201d in Christoph Pohlmann et
\nal., eds. The G-20: A \u201cGlobal Economic Government\u201d in the Making? (Freidrich
\nEberhart Stiftung: Berlin).
\nBradford, Colin and Johannes Linn (2009), \u201cThe G20 Summit \u2013 It\u2019s Significance for
\nWorld and for Turkey,\u201d Turkey\u2019s MFA Quarterly International Economic Issues,
\nand Brookings Paper, March.
\nKim, Cynthia J. (2010), \u201cAmbassadors divided over role of G20,\u201d The Korea Herald 27
\nMay
\nKirton, John (2010), \u201cProspects Progress through Partnership: Prospects for the 2010
\nMuskoka-Toronto Summits,\u201d June 4, www.g8.utoronto.ca
\nKirton, John (2010c), \u201cG8 and G20 Summitry: Prospects for 2010 and Beyond.\u201d Paper
\nprepared for the Center for Dialogue and Analysis on North America (CEDAN),
\nTecnologico de Monterrey (ITESM), Mexico City, March 11-12.
\nKirton, John (2010d), \u201cThe G20 Summit as an International Negotiation Process:
\nShaping the Systemic Summit Club for Toronto and Seoul.\u201d Paper prepared for an
\ninternational conference on \u201cG20 Seoul Summit: From Crisis to Co-operation,\u201d
\nhosted by the Korean Association of Negotiation Studies, sponsored by the Institute
\nof Foreign Affairs and National Security, Seoul, Republic of Korea, May 19-20.
\nKirton, John (2010b), \u201cAssessing G8 and G20 Performance, 1975\u20132009.\u201d Paper prepared
\nfor a panel on the \u201cRelevance and Legitimacy of the G8 and G20\u201d at the annual
\nconvention of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, February 17-20,
\n2010.
\nKirton, John (2010a), \u201cThe G20 Finance\u2019s Global Governance Network,\u201d in Alan S.
\nAlexandroff and Andrew Fenton Cooper, eds., Rising States, Rising Institutions:
\nCan the World Be Governed? (Washington DC: Brookings Press).
\nMartin, Paul (2005), \u201cA Global Answer to Global Problems,\u201d Foreign Affairs
\n(May\/June).
\nNanos, Nick (2010), \u201cGlobal Warming Top G8\/G20 Priority for Canadians,\u201d Nanos
\nPolicy Options Poll, June 2, 2010.
\nRice, Condoleezza (2004).
\n<www.g8.utoronto.ca\/summit\/2004seaisland\/rice040601.htm> (June 2010).
\nSaunders, Doug (2010), Globe and Mail May 29, 2010, video reporting. Available at:<\/p>\n
article1585508\/?cid=art-rail-g20
\n\u015eekercio\u011flu, Eser (2009), CIGI, July 8.
\n\u015eekercio\u011flu, Eser (2009b), \u201cNational Perspectives on Global leadership,\u201d NPGL
\nSoundings, September 27.
\nToday\u2019s Zaman (undated)
\nLink to the press briefing given by a Turkish official at the 2004 G8 summit
\nhttp:\/\/www.g8.utoronto.ca\/summit\/2004seaisland\/turkey040609.html
\nKirton: Potential Partnership in Global Economic Governance 18
\nAppendix A: G20 Compliance, London Summit 2009
\nMember Sept 2008 April 2009 September 2009
\nN=1 N = 5 N = CCN =
\nGermany +1 +1
\nUnited Kingdom +1 +1
\nFrance 0 +1
\nCanada +1 +0.8
\nEuropean Union +1 +0.8
\nAustralia +1 +0.8
\nRussia 0 +0.4
\nUnited States 0 +0.4
\nBrazil +1 +0.2
\nJapan +1 +0.2
\nSaudi Arabia +0.2
\nTurkey +0.2
\nItaly +1 0
\nMexico +1 0
\nSouth Africa +1 0
\nSouth Korea 0
\nChina 0 \u20130.4
\nIndia 0 \u20130.4
\nIndonesia 0 \u20130.4
\nArgentina 0 \u20130.6
\nAll Average +0.58 +0.23
\nG8 Average (9) +0.75 +0.62
\nNon-G8 Average (11) +0.50a \u20130.03
\nNote: G8 members are in bold.
\na Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and South Korea were excluded from this calculation due to lack of compliance data.
\nKirton: Potential Partnership in Global Economic Governance 19
\nAppendix B: Shocks 2009-2010
\nSubject Status Source Spread Speed Scale:
\nDeaths
\nScale:
\nDestruction
\nDemocracy
\nin Doubt
\nPolitical Security
\nAfghanistan War Old-New BMENA
\n(Afghanistan)
\nBilateral
\nBorder
\n(Pakistan)
\nRegional
\n(BMENA)
\nYes
\nKorea \u2013
\nCheonan
\nWar Old Asia (North
\nKorea)
\nBilateral
\nBorder
\n49
\nNYC Terrorism New Yemen-USA Africa-America 0 0
\nDetroit (Dec
\n12\/09)
\nTerrorism New USA 0 0
\nNew York City
\n(May 2\/10)
\nTerrorism New USA 0 0
\nMoscow (Mar
\n29\/10)
\nTerrorism New Russia N\/A 38 Yes
\nEnergy-Environment
\nHaiti Environment New
\nNatural
\nDisaster
\nAmericas (Dominican
\nRepublic)
\n30,000-
\n50, 000
\nChilean
\nEarthquake
\nEnvironment New
\nNatural
\nDisaster
\nAmericas N\/A N\/A 300
\nIcelandic
\nVolcano
\nEnvironment New
\nNatural
\nDisaster
\nEurope
\n(Iceland)
\nEurope-North
\nAmerica
\n1 day 0
\nGulf of Mexico Environment-
\nEnergy
\nNew \u2013
\nhuman
\naccident
\nUSA America-
\nMexico
\nApril 20-
\nongoing
\n11
\nFinance-Economy
\n2007-9
\nAmerican-
\nAtlantic
\nBanking-
\nFinance
\nNew USA-Britain-
\nGermany
\nGlobal 18 months 0 No
\nGreece Debt Sovereign Debt Old Greece Europe Weeks 3 Yes
\nEuropean Debt Sovereign Debt
\n(Bank)
\nOld (New) Europe Global 1 day 0 Yes
\nKirton: Potential Partnership in Global Economic Governance 20
\nAppendix C: Leader Continuity in G8\/G20 Countries
\nG8 # of
\nchanges
\nSummit 1
\n(Nov 1975)
\nSummit 2
\n(Jun 1976)
\nSummit 3
\n(May 977)
\nSummit 4
\n(Jul 1978)
\nSummit 5
\n(Jun 1979)
\nSummit 6
\n(Jun 1980)
\n# of summits
\nfor June 2010
\nLeader
\nFrance 0 d\u2019Estaing D\u2019Estaing d\u2019Estaing d\u2019Estaing d\u2019Estaing d\u2019Estaing Sarkozy = 4
\nUnited States 2 Ford Ford Carter Carter Carter Carter Obama = 2
\nBritain 2 Wilson Callaghan Callaghan Callaghan Thatcher Thatcher Cameron = 1
\nGermany 0 Schmidt Schmidt Schmidt Schmidt Schmidt Schmidt Merkel = 5
\nJapan 2 Miki Miki Fukuda Fukuda Ohira Ministersh Kan = 1
\nItaly 2 Moro Moro Andreotti Andreotti Andreotti Cossiga Berlusconi =
\n9
\nCanada 2 N\/A Trudeau Trudeau Trudeau Clark Trudeau Harper = 5
\nRussia N\/A N\/A N\/A N\/A N\/A N\/A Medvedev =
\n3
\nEuropean Union 0 N\/A N\/A Jenkins Jenkins Jenkins Jenkins
\nTotal: 10
\nG20 # of
\nchanges
\nSummit 1
\n(Nov 2008)
\nSummit 2
\n(Apr 2009)
\nSummit 3
\n(Sep 2009)
\nSummit 4
\n(Jun 2010)
\nSummit 5
\n(Nov 2010)
\nSummit 6
\n(2011)
\n# of summits
\nfor June 2010
\nLeader
\nUnited States 1 Bush Obama Obama Obama Obama Obamaa 3
\nBritain 1 Brown Brown Brown Cameron Cameron Cameronb 1
\nCanada 0 Harper Harper Harper Harper Harper Harperc 4
\nKorea 0 Lee Lee Lee Lee Lee Leed 4
\nFrance 0 Sarkozy Sarkozy Sarkozy Sarkozy Sarkozy Sarkozy 4
\nArgentina 0 Kirchner Kirchner Kirchner Kirchner Kirchner Kirchnere 4
\nAustralia 0 Rudd Rudd Rudd Rudd Rudd Unknown 4
\nBrazil 0 da Silva da Silva da Silva da Silva Unknown Unknown 4
\nChina 0 Hu Hu Hu Hu Hu Hu 4
\nGermany 0 Merkel Merkel Merkel Merkel Merkel Merkel 4
\nIndia 0 Singh Singh Singh Singh Singh Singh 4
\nIndonesia 0 Yudhoyono Yudhoyono Yudhoyono Yudhoyono Yudhoyono Yudhoyono 4
\nItaly 0 Berlusconi Berlusconi Berlusconi Berlusconi Berlusconi Berlusconif 4
\nJapan 2 Aso Aso Hatoyama Kan Kan Kan 1
\nMexico 0 Calder\u00f3n Calder\u00f3n Calder\u00f3n Calder\u00f3n Calder\u00f3n Calder\u00f3n 4
\nRussia 0 Medvedev Medvedev Medvedev Medvedev Medvedev Medvedev 4
\nSaudi Arabia 0 Abdullah Abdullah Abdullah Abdullah Abdullah Abdullah 4
\nSouth Africa 1 Motlanthe Motlanthe Zuma Zuma Zuma Zuma 2
\nTurkey 0 Erdo\u011fan Erdo\u011fan Erdo\u011fan Erdo\u011fan Erdo\u011fan Erdo\u011fang 4
\nTotal: 5
\nNotes:
\na. Assumes Barack Obama completes his term as president.
\nb. Assumes the coalition holds and no election is called.
\nc. Assumes no Canadian election is called before 2012.
\nd. Assumes Lee Myung-bak completes his term as president.
\ne. Assumes the 2011 Argentinian elections are not scheduled before the G20 summit.
\nf. Assumes no change in government. Next election date is variable.
\ng. Next election date is variable.
\nh. Masayoshi Ohira died a few days before the 1980 G7 Venice Summit. Japan was represented by Saburo Okita,
\nminister of foreign affairs, Noboru Takeshita, minister of finance, and Kiyoaki Kikuchi, the prime minister\u2019s personal
\nrepresentative (sherpa).
\nKirton: Potential Partnership in Global Economic Governance 21
\nAppendix D: Finance Experience of G20 Leaders in 2010
\nCountry Head Ministerial Experience Professional Experience Education
\nUnited States Bush 0 0
\nUnited States Obama 0 Lawyer
\nBritain Cameron 0 0 Economics
\nCanada Harper 0 Accountant MA Economics
\nKorea Lee 0 Businessman
\nFrance Sarkozy Budget, 1992
\nInterior, 2002, 2005
\nEconomy, finance, and
\nindustry, 2004
\nLawyer
\nArgentina Ki rchner 0 Lawyer
\nAustralia Rudd 0 0
\nBrazil Da Silva 0 0
\nChina Hu 0 0
\nIndia Singh Finance, 2008 Economist, IMF
\nGovernor of the Reserve
\nBank of India, 1982-1985
\nPhD Economics
\nIndonesia Yudhoyono 0 0 PhD Agricultural
\nEconomics
\nItaly Berlusconi 0 0
\nJapan Kan Finance Minister, 2010
\nDeputy Prime Minister
\nMexico Calder\u00f3n 0 0 MA Economics
\nRussia Medvedev 0 Lawyer
\nSaudi Arabia Abdullah Chair of the Supreme
\nEconomic Council
\n0
\nSouth Africa Zuma 0 0
\nTurkey Erdo\u011fan 0 0<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Metro Toronto Convention Centre, Toronto, Canada Potential Partnership in Global Economic Governance: Canada\u2019s G20 Summit from Toronto to Turkey Saturday, June 26 G20 leaders arrive at the Toronto Airport Infield Terminal at the Lester B. Pearson Airport in Toronto 18:30 Official welcome and reception of G20 leaders and spouses by Stephen Harper, prime minister of […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":83,"featured_media":782196,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[89,922],"tags":[120,1018],"class_list":["post-20095","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-turkey","category-world","tag-gulen","tag-recep-tayyip-erdogan"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/20095","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/83"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=20095"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/20095\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/782196"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=20095"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=20095"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.turkishnews.com\/en\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=20095"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}