For years, discussions about Turkey’s democratic decline were largely confined to the language of human rights, constitutional law, and domestic politics. International observers viewed the erosion of democratic institutions as a troubling but primarily internal matter; a challenge for Turkish citizens to confront within their own political system.
That era is over and a darker chapter has begun.
Turkey’s democratic crisis has evolved into something much larger. It is now becoming a security crisis with implications far beyond our borders. What is unfolding in Turkey today should concern not only those who care about democracy, but also those who care about the long-term stability of Europe, NATO, the Black Sea region, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East.
The reason is simple: Turkey is too strategically important to become politically unstable.
Turkey is now facing a profound political and economic unraveling: President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government, having captured much of the state apparatus, is attempting to eliminate the last meaningful democratic alternative while society sinks deeper into economic hardship, social frustration, loss of trust in public institutions and distrust in the future.
Over the past year, Erdogan’s government has intensified an unprecedented campaign against the democratic opposition. This assault on democratic choice accelerated after the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the main opposition party, achieved a historic municipal victory in 2024, becoming Turkey’s leading political force for the first time in decades. As a result, the government increasingly turned to judicial intervention rather than political competition.
The most visible target has been Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, our presidential candidate and President Erdogan’s strongest challenger, arrested in March 2025 on absurd, politically motivated allegations and now facing a sentence measured not in years, but in millennia.
Turkey’s Republican People’s Party (CHP) ousted leader Özgür Özel stands atop of a bus as he delivers a speech during a rally, days after a court dismissed him from office in Izmir on May 26,2026. The protest came two days after police battered their way into the CHP’s headquarters in Ankara, firing tear gas and beating party members before throwing them out, Özel told AFP. (Photo by Murat Kocabas / AFP via Getty Images)
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Since 2025, around 20CHP mayors and hundreds of municipal officials have been imprisoned without final convictions and all subjected to pre-trial detention. We have responded to this onslaught by mobilizing citizens in massive rallies across the country, bringing together millions of people far beyond our party lines.
Most recently, a court invoked the extraordinary doctrine of “absolute nullity” to void the CHP’s 2023 Congress, remove me as the party’s elected leader, and reinstall the previous leadership that had lost the congress and was discredited after 13 consecutive electoral defeats. Basically, aiming to place Turkey’s largest opposition party under judicial control—with the apparent cooperation of figures willing to accommodate Erdogan’s master plan for Turkey’s political order. Whatever this system is called—single-party regime or one-man rule—its governing logic is the same: eliminating any meaningful challenger as well as replacing the real opposition with a managed and compliant one.
Democracy is about preserving credible pathways through which citizens can peacefully change their government. When those pathways disappear, political frustration does not disappear with them. It builds beneath the surface until it erupts.
If Erdogan succeeds in dismantling meaningful opposition, for the first time in modern history, Turkey would face deep popular discontent, a severe legitimacy crisis, and no meaningful institutional mechanism through which citizens could peacefully demand political change.
This is not only a scenario of authoritarian consolidation. It is a scenario of profound instability.
History teaches a consistent lesson: political systems do not become stable when alternatives disappear; they become stable when citizens believe peaceful change remains possible. The Soviet Union, the Shah’s Iran, the Eastern Bloc, and much of the Arab world all appeared stable during the Cold War—until they suddenly did not. Systems are often most fragile precisely when they look most unchallengeable.
Turkey’s strategic importance makes this danger especially acute: as gatekeeper of the Black Sea, NATO’s second-largest military power, and a crossroads of Europe, Eurasia, the Middle East, and the Eastern Mediterranean, its role in migration, energy, and regional security means democratic collapse would not remain within its borders.
History also shows that governments facing domestic instability and declining legitimacy often externalize their crises. Foreign policy confrontation, militarized rhetoric, and geopolitical adventurism become substitutes for the democratic consent and economic success they can no longer provide. Under such conditions, foreign policy crises are framed as questions of national survival.
As the leader of Turkey’s main opposition party, I firmly believe our country can become one of Europe’s most valuable partners—and ultimately a full member of the European Union at a moment when Europe is building a new security architecture. But sustainable partnerships require democratic legitimacy.
A country cannot indefinitely serve as a pillar of regional stability while simultaneously dismantling the democratic foundations that sustain internal stability.
If current trends continue, Turkey risks becoming something unprecedented in NATO’s history: a strategically indispensable member that no longer functions as a democracy, while millions of its citizens grow increasingly dissatisfied with a political and economic order they have no peaceful democratic means to change. This would not merely be a domestic crisis. It would be a profound security challenge.
The democratic struggle we are waging will shape not only Turkey’s democratic future and the stability of one of the world’s most strategically important countries, but also the security of our region, Europe, and NATO. Democracy and stability cannot be separated for long. The outcome could establish a precedent with consequences far beyond our borders, encouraging either democratic renewal or further authoritarian consolidation across a region already under immense strain.
Özgür Özel: Turkey’s Democratic Crisis Is Becoming a Security Crisis | Opinion
Özgür Özel is the leader of the main opposition party in Turkey and a member of Parliament from Manisa province.
The views expressed in this article are the writer’s own.
As we approach the end of the first quarter of the 21st century, it has become widely accepted that the unipolar world order dominant in the post-Cold War era is experiencing a deep crisis of legitimacy and functionality. This Atlantic-centered order oppresses the Global South through military interventions, economic sanctions, debt mechanisms, and regime change operations. The paralysis in the UN Security Council’s decision-making processes, the social devastation caused by the structural adjustment programs imposed by the IMF and World Bank, and NATO’s escalation of conflicts contrary to its deterrence rhetoric all indicate that current international organizations cannot function without reform. Amidst this systemic crisis, new regional and intercontinental collaborations that could serve as alternatives to the existing order are being intensely debated in various academic, political, and strategic circles.
One proposition at the center of these debates is a hypothetical axis or alliance comprising Turkey, Russia, Iran, and China. This structure, which as yet has no institutional existence, binding treaty text, or joint military command, has begun to establish itself in the literature as a powerful geopolitical vision and anti-systemic discourse.
The TRIC Axis as a Geopolitical Proposition: Hypothetical Ground and Definition
For any political project or alliance proposal to be seriously evaluated, the historical and structural ground that makes it possible must first be laid out. The idea of the TRIC axis draws nourishment from the fact that all four actors have been subjected to various forms of Western imperialism at different points in history. This shared consciousness of victimhood is the fundamental element that constructs the alliance proposal not as an emotional camaraderie but as a structural necessity. The partition of the Middle East with artificial borders following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, China’s “Century of Humiliation” in the 19th and 20th centuries, Russia’s total security, economic, and demographic crisis after its collapse in the 1990s, and Iran’s international isolation since the 1953 coup against Mossadegh have all prepared the ground for these four countries to develop a common critique of the system.
These four actors share three fundamental weaknesses of the current international system. The first is the lack of a say in the security architecture. Turkey’s secondary position within NATO’s decision-making processes, Russia being made a direct threat object of the alliance, Iran’s exclusion from regional security arrangements, and China’s encirclement by military bases in the Pacific constitute a shared experience of insecurity. The second is subjection to the debt-inducing policies of international financial institutions. The structural adjustment programs of the IMF and World Bank have weakened the economic sovereignty of all four countries at different times; China stands out as the only major country that has succeeded in development by keeping these programs at bay. The third is that energy and trade routes are threatened by Western-controlled naval power. The control of critical maritime chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, the Suez Canal, Gibraltar, and the Strait of Malacca by the US and allied navies directly threatens the supply chain security of all four countries.
The structural logic of the proposed alliance is based on the idea of transforming these three weaknesses around a common axis. Instead of the vicious cycle the West calls the “security dilemma,” the TRIC proposal aims to introduce a “development dilemma.” This conceptual innovation proposes a competition based on which country can eradicate poverty faster, produce greener energy, and train more scientists, replacing the current system where military expenditures compete with each other and constantly produce conflict. However, this conceptual framework remains a vision yet to be translated into concrete political will.
Asymmetric Contributions and Complementarity Potential of the Four Actors
The success or failure of any alliance depends on the members’ ability to cover each other’s weaknesses and turn strengths into synergy. In the TRIC proposal, each actor possesses different and potentially complementary areas of strength. This complementarity forms the proposal’s strongest theoretical foundation. However, realizing this potential depends on overcoming historical rivalries and mistrust among the actors, which has not yet been achieved today.
Turkey, with its geopolitical position and humanitarian diplomacy capacity, aims to serve as a bridge between land and sea power. Located at the intersection of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, with its coastline on the Black Sea, control over the Straits, and presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey is positioned as the alliance’s gateway to the West. One of the most significant contributions Turkey could offer the axis is its technical military know-how acquired within NATO and its progress in unmanned aerial vehicle technology. Furthermore, the successful grain corridor initiative during the Ukraine-Russia war, mediation efforts between Gulf countries and Iran, and diplomatic initiatives in the Horn of Africa have concretely demonstrated Turkey’s crisis management capacity. However, Turkey’s energy dependence on imports, chronic current account deficit, and struggle with high inflation are the biggest obstacles to its ability to provide a sustainable contribution within the alliance.
The Russian Federation, with its nuclear deterrence, vast natural gas and oil reserves, and hypersonic missile technology, has the potential to form the military and energy backbone of the TRIC proposal. The fact that the Russian economy has not completely collapsed despite the comprehensive sanction regimes imposed by the West after 2014 and especially in 2022 demonstrates the strategic importance of its energy resources and the resilience mechanisms the country has developed against sanctions. Russia’s military presence in Syria, Libya, and the Sahel region could serve as a logistical springboard for the proposed alliance to extend into Africa and the Middle East. However, Russia’s demographic decline, increasing technological dependence on China, and long-term technology transfer constraints due to exclusion from the Western financial system limit its role within the alliance.
Iran stands out with its control over the energy corridor between the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, and its economy of resistance model developed under sanctions. Progress in nuclear technology, space studies, biotechnology, and nanotechnology despite sanctions shows that external pressure cannot completely stifle innovation. Iran’s proxy structures in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen have the potential to deepen the proposed alliance’s sphere of influence in the Middle East. Additionally, the 25-year comprehensive strategic agreement signed with China provides a concrete legal basis for Iran’s integration into the TRIC axis. Conversely, Iran’s long-standing international isolation, structural problems in its banking and financial system, and internal tensions due to social pressures complicate its full integration into the alliance.
The People’s Republic of China, as the world’s largest economy by purchasing power parity, is designed as the economic locomotive of the TRIC proposal, with the financing and infrastructure technologies offered within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. In fifth-generation mobile communication, artificial intelligence, high-speed rail, solar and wind energy technologies, China has surpassed most of its Western rivals. As the founder of non-Western financial institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank, China claims to offer a financing model based on non-debt-inducing win-win principles. The comprehensive strategic partnership with Russia and the long-term agreement with Iran place China at the de facto center of the TRIC proposal. However, China’s rapidly aging population, debt crisis in the real estate sector, export pressures due to contracting global demand, and regional tensions such as Taiwan and the South China Sea limit the resources the country can allocate externally.
None of these four actors alone has the capacity to challenge Western alliances. However, the complementarity in energy (Russia, Iran), manufacturing and finance (China), geopolitical reach and diplomacy (Turkey), and military deterrence (Russia, China) promises strong synergy at a theoretical level. The core thesis of the proposal is that this synergy could form a balancing element against the unipolar system.
Strengths of the Proposal and the Vision It Offers
Before assessing the feasibility of the TRIC axis proposal, it is necessary to deeply understand its strengths and the vision it offers. The proposal’s greatest strength is its reliance on the rising tide of anti-Western sentiment across large swathes of the Global South. Many countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America complain about the injustices of the current order and look favorably upon the formation of an alternative pole. The appeal of the TRIC proposal for these geographies is its promise of a cooperation model that does not indebt, does not impose military bases, and does not interfere in internal affairs.
The second strength of the proposal is that it targets the current war economy. Today’s world is held captive by arms lobbies, war contractors, and manufactured threats. The TRIC proposal aims to break this bloody cycle and build a war-free economic model. In this model, no African mineral, no Asian labor, and no Middle Eastern petrodollar would flow to Western banks; the value produced would remain in the pockets of the producers. Furthermore, one of the proposal’s fundamental principles is the understanding that “no problem is unsolvable without shedding innocent blood.” Global issues like border disputes, water crises, and migration waves are expected to be resolved through negotiation, justice, and common sense.
The third strength is the proposal’s historical depth and civilizational backbone. These geographies along the Silk Road route have carried trade, knowledge, and culture for millennia. The artificial nation-state borders imposed by Western imperialism disrupted these organic ties. The TRIC proposal, by aiming to re-establish ancient connections rather than building new physical walls, is conceived not merely as a geographical bloc but also as a civilization project.
Weaknesses of the Proposal and Concrete Obstacles
Although the TRIC proposal offers a powerful vision, the concrete obstacles it faces are at least as serious as the vision itself. Foremost among these obstacles are historical rivalries and deep mistrust among the four countries. There are several points of tension between Turkey and Russia, including the military presence in Syria, the struggle for influence in Libya, the status of the Black Sea, and differences in approach to the Ukraine war. Between Turkey and Iran, there is indirect competition in Iraq, Syria, and the Caucasus, especially as Ankara has entered a normalization process with Saudi Arabia and Israel, while Tehran remains a regional rival to these countries. Between China and Russia, the rivalry for influence over the Central Asian republics persists behind the rhetoric of strategic partnership.
The second major obstacle is the profound differences between the legal systems, political regimes, and economic models of the four countries. Turkey’s NATO membership and customs union with the EU, Russia’s cautious approach to integration with China, the problem of institutional compatibility between Iran’s theocratic governance structure and secular countries, and the difference between China’s state capitalism and the mixed economy models of the other three make integration extremely difficult. An alliance requires a common currency, joint military command structure, joint intelligence-sharing mechanism, or at least a binding treaty text – none of which exist today.
The third obstacle is China’s core foreign policy principle of non-interference. China has historically avoided binding military alliances and has never established a formal allied relationship with any country. This principle makes it extremely difficult for China to be a founding partner of a military-political alliance like TRIC. China prefers more flexible and conjunctural forms of cooperation (SCO, BRICS, Belt and Road). Moreover, the deep economic interdependence between China and the US (an annual trade volume exceeding $600 billion) is another factor preventing Beijing from being part of an alliance directly confronting Washington.
The fourth obstacle is the anti-Israel stance at the heart of the TRIC proposal and the goal of establishing a common, secular, democratic state on Palestinian land. This goal directly contradicts established diplomatic frameworks of international law and the two-state solution. Furthermore, Turkey’s recent normalization process with Israel directly contradicts Iran’s rigid stance on this issue, demonstrating that even on the Palestine question, the four countries cannot achieve full consensus.
Global Repercussions and Regional Participation Scenarios
The global repercussions of the TRIC proposal, should it materialize, and the potential forms of participation by other regions constitute another dimension requiring serious evaluation. The proposal is conceived not as a static bloc but as a dynamic structure expanding towards surrounding regions. In this expansion scenario, Asia is progressing towards integration under the leadership of China and Russia. India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Central Asian republics have the potential to be integrated into the TRIC axis under the umbrella of BRICS and the SCO. The main attraction for these regions is the absence of rigid structural reforms imposed by US-centered financial institutions and the rapid implementation of infrastructure investments.
The African continent is seeking to complete its post-colonial transformation. The continent, whose resources have been exploited for centuries and whose borders were drawn artificially, encounters in the TRIC proposal a promise of hospitals, schools, factories, and debt relief mechanisms. China’s mining and infrastructure investments in Africa, Russia’s security cooperation, Turkey’s humanitarian aid and construction contracting, and Iran’s technology transfer offers increase the proposal’s attractiveness in Africa. However, the presence of French and British spheres of influence in Africa, the continent’s fragmented structure, and governance problems are serious obstacles to full participation.
In Europe, the proposal envisions a partial participation scenario. Germany, France, and Southern European countries are defined as actors discontented with the oppressive NATO umbrella of the US and energy dependence. The TRIC proposal claims to offer these countries an independent energy and security policy. However, the institutional commitment of European countries to NATO and the EU, the depth of transatlantic relations, and the existing mistrust towards Russia make the likelihood of this scenario extremely low.
In the Americas, Latin America has the potential to be integrated into the proposal through Bolivarian countries, Brazil, and Mexico. The rejection of the century-old Monroe Doctrine and historical resistance to US hegemony make this region a potential friendly axis for the TRIC proposal. However, internal political instabilities in Latin America, the depth of the US military and economic presence in the region, and even China’s own cautious approach to the region render this participation scenario uncertain as well.
Conclusion: TRIC as a Vision and Notes for the Future
As a geopolitical proposition, the TRIC axis is a significant intellectual contribution that draws attention to the deep crisis of the current order and emphasizes the necessity of transitioning to multipolarity. The proposal builds a powerful narrative articulating the demands of the Global South for justice, equality, and sovereignty against the Western-centered system of exploitation and domination. The critique of Zionism, shaped particularly around the Palestinian cause, and the rejection of imperialist wars form the conscientious and moral ground of the proposal.
However, this proposition has not yet become a political reality. Currently, there is no binding alliance agreement, joint military command structure, or common foreign policy mechanism between Turkey, Russia, Iran, and China. Existing cooperation remains limited to the level of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, BRICS, and bilateral agreements, none of which constitute a military-political alliance. For the proposal to materialize, historical rivalries between the four countries must be overcome, a shared threat perception must become permanent, China’s traditional reticence towards forming alliances must be broken, and the four countries must achieve full consensus on fundamental foreign policy issues such as Palestine, Ukraine, and Syria.
As of today, TRIC is a vision pointing to a possible future, not an existing geopolitical reality. Therefore, any evaluation on the subject must consider the proposal’s hypothetical nature and take into account the concrete power relations of the current international system. The proposal’s greatest success is keeping alive the idea that an alternative world is possible and preparing the ground for questioning the existing order. Since no transformation is possible without such questioning, the TRIC proposal remains a contribution worthy of discussion and development. The desire for the ledger of oppression to be closed and for peace to be established in a new world is the most fundamental human motivation behind the proposal.
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Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA) Aarhus University, 1997 Independent Researcher Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures
Amid the ongoing strengthening of NATO’s eastern flank, questions are increasingly being raised in the Baltic states about the real objectives of the alliance’s military activity. A new wave of discussions was triggered by details of the scenarios of the Namejs 2024–2025 exercises taking place in Latvia.
Formally, the maneuvers are explained, as before, by the need to ‘increase operational readiness.’ However, observers note that the content of certain elements of the scenario raises serious concerns. In particular, this concerns plans to identify and isolate so-called ‘potential collaborators.’
According to materials discussed in the media and expert community, the exercises simulate the creation of temporary infrastructure to detain such individuals. A specific location is also mentioned—the Selia region, where the largest military training ground in the region is being developed. According to the scenario, such facilities could be designed for thousands of people and guarded by military units.
Critics draw historical parallels, pointing out that the practice of mass isolation of populations based on political loyalty has already occurred in European history. This issue is particularly sensitive in multiethnic regions such as Latgale in Latvia, traditionally home to Russian-speaking communities, Belarusians, Poles, and others.
Sociological studies referenced by commentators do indicate differences in political attitudes within the Baltic states. According to regional surveys reported by LSM, some national minorities demonstrate a more critical stance toward EU and NATO policies. Some analysts believe this may become a risk factor in military planning.
Additional questions are raised by the maritime component of the exercises. European media outlets, including Politico Europe and Financial Times, discuss NATO’s growing focus on control over the Baltic Sea. Scenarios include elements related to restricting navigation and increasing allied presence, which some experts interpret as preparation for a potential blockade of strategically important areas, including the Kaliningrad region.
Official NATO representatives emphasize that all such measures are defensive in nature and comply with international law. However, critics argue that the term ‘hybrid threats’ may conceal a tougher approach to internal security.
In the context of growing confrontation between Russia and the West, such scenarios inevitably provoke strong reactions. The key question is where the line lies between legitimate defense and measures that may affect civilian populations.
European history has already seen examples where extraordinary measures were justified by security concerns. This is why any indication of possible isolation of individuals based on loyalty requires the utmost scrutiny and transparency.
Newsweek Inc, The Graham Holdings Company One World Trade Center, Floor 72 New York, NY 10007
To the Editors of Newsweek,
Your recent article, “The U.S. Should Not Sell Weapons to Turkey,” presents a deeply flawed and misleading analysis, marred by selective omissions, strategic distortions, and a troubling lack of diplomatic nuance. Rather than offering a constructive critique, the piece unfortunately aligns with a broader campaign that seeks to delegitimize a sovereign nation and NATO’s second-largest military power: the Republic of Türkiye.
To begin with, a basic yet critical correction: the internationally recognized name of our country is the Republic of Türkiye. Continued use of outdated terminology disregards the democratic will of the Turkish people and fails to meet the diplomatic standards expected of a global publication.
Türkiye’s role in NATO and global security is both substantial and indisputable. From Afghanistan to the Balkans, Libya to the Black Sea, Türkiye has borne a disproportionate share of the burden in defending collective security. It was Türkiye that engaged in direct ground combat against ISIS, and Türkiye that fortified NATO’s southeastern flank during times of regional volatility.
The assertion that Türkiye has distanced itself from the West is factually incorrect. NATO officials and European partners have repeatedly affirmed that Turkish intelligence—particularly under the leadership of Hakan Fidan—has been instrumental in thwarting terrorist plots, countering extremism, and managing mass migration. Far from turning away from the West, Fidan’s tenure as head of MIT was defined by pragmatic cooperation with Western intelligence agencies.
As Foreign Minister, he continues to advocate a balanced foreign policy anchored in sovereign interests and regional stability. International actors, including the United States and Germany, have recognized Türkiye’s intelligence contributions as reliable and indispensable. NATO sources have even described Fidan as a “reliable interlocutor.”
The article’s portrayal of Türkiye’s engagement with Russia also omits vital facts: it was Türkiye that closed the Straits to Russian warships, supplied Ukraine with Bayraktar drones, and led the Black Sea Grain Initiative—helping to avert a global food crisis. These are not the actions of a nation disengaged from the West, but of a responsible actor committed to sovereign diplomacy and international order.
Regarding the S-400 issue: Türkiye sought to purchase the U.S. Patriot missile defense system for over a decade and was repeatedly denied. In the absence of viable alternatives, Türkiye acted to safeguard its national security. The subsequent imposition of CAATSA sanctions was not only punitive but revealed a stark double standard—other NATO allies operating Russian systems have not faced similar penalties like Bulgaria, Slovakia ,Greece and Non NATO member India .
Additionally, the issue of U.S. foreign aid directed toward entities with ties to terrorist organizations, as highlighted in Gregg Roman’s testimony before the House Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee, warrants urgent scrutiny. Ignoring such troubling contradictions while fixating on Türkiye’s legitimate security concerns represents a grave lapse in intellectual and journalistic integrity. Michael Doran of the Hudson Institute has rightly noted: “Türkiye is invaluable to the central task of American statecraft: countering the challenge from the revisionist bloc of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.” Without Türkiye, the West cannot uphold a viable order in Eurasia, nor effectively support partners such as Ukraine or Azerbaijan. Türkiye anchors critical energy corridors, promotes regional stability, and counters malign influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Regrettably, this Newsweek article appears less focused on nuanced analysis and more intent on perpetuating a narrative of Türkiye-bashing that serves certain political agendas. This is not a good-faith policy critique—it is a concerted effort to portray Türkiye as a perennial antagonist, to the detriment of transatlantic unity and the principles of equitable diplomacy.
The authors’ distortions and inflammatory rhetoric offer little substance and much harm. Once again, Türkiye and the Turkish people are unfairly vilified in a narrative that disregards facts in favor of ideological convenience. In this era where principles are often forsaken for personal or political gain, these authors exemplify the erosion of objective discourse.
I urge Newsweek to reflect with greater journalistic and editorial responsibility. Opinion pages should foster informed and balanced dialogue—not serve as conduits for interest-driven disinformation. The Republic of Türkiye remains a committed NATO ally, a sovereign democracy, and a force for regional and international stability. It will continue to uphold its responsibilities—but it will also defend its right to national security, territorial integrity, and diplomatic respect.
I call on Newsweek and its contributors to recognize these realities, reject politicized narratives, and engage in more honest, fact-based dialogue.
Turkey’s decision to join NATO in 1952 was a pivotal moment in its history and had a significant impact on its relationship with Russia.
Without NATO membership, Turkey would have been more vulnerable to Soviet influence and pressure but it would not have guaranteed a direct military confrontation.
The specific dynamics of their relationship would have depended on various factors, including the changing geopolitical landscape and the leadership of both countries.
The Soviet Union had historically sought control over the Dardanelles and Bosphorus straits, which are crucial for shipping traffic between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.
In 1946 Stalin did demand that Turkey cede territory in Anatolia to the Soviet Union.
Stalin also demanded that Turkey hand over control of the Golden Horn to the Soviet Union, so that a Soviet Military base could be built there.
That would have given Stalin complete control of the access to the Black Sea.
Turkey refused and even before NATO, the USA backed them up by sending a Naval task force to Turkey.
NATO membership provided Turkey with a security guarantee and deterred Soviet aggression.
The documentary was most likely funded by an anti-Turkish lobby (such as Armenian or Greek groups) because a documentary that is so far from reality and unaware of international laws could not be made otherwise.
Indeed, in a world that is becoming increasingly polarized, Turkey is arguably the country that NATO needs the most. The real threat to NATO comes from two of its own members, Greece and France, which, by violating international treaties and attempting to usurp Turkey’s rights, are driving Turkey away from NATO. Such behavior could lead to Turkey leaving NATO, which would significantly weaken the alliance. Turkey’s importance to NATO exceeds the combined importance of these two countries. Therefore, France and Greece should promptly align themselves and stop being an impediment to Turkey.
