In light of retired Colonel Professor Dr. Süleyman Çelik’s testimony titled “Two NATO Memories” and the events that transpired at the 2026 Ankara NATO Summit, this article examines the tension between the legal framework of NATO’s Article 5 and its political implementation. While Article 5 establishes the alliance’s foundational principle of “one for all, all for one” collective defense, its activation is contingent upon consensus and political will. It is argued that Israel and the Greek Cypriot Administration, not being formal members, cannot legally benefit from this article, and that even strategic members like Turkey lack an automatic military intervention guarantee in the event of a material attack. The fragility of NATO’s “security guarantee” discourse against the alliance’s operational flexibility and the interest calculations of member states is revealed.
The Picture Reflected from the Summit and a Historical Testimony
NATO’s 36th Summit was concluded in Ankara with the alliance’s solidarity rhetoric. The final declaration emphasized “unwavering commitment” to the Washington Treaty’s Article 5 and the transatlantic bond, announced that defense expenditures had reached approximately 4 percent of gross domestic product, and stated that new defense procurement agreements exceeding 50 billion dollars had been signed among allies.
However, the most striking moment of the summit occurred during NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s interview with Sky News Arabia. Rutte avoided giving a direct answer to the question of whether Article 5 would be activated in a potential Turkey Israel conflict, instead evading the question by stating that President Erdoğan was a “wise leader” and that Turkey would “avoid entering a situation that would get out of control.” This evasive response constitutes a critical finding confirming that Article 5 is a political decision making process rather than a legal automatism.
This current development must be read together with Çelik’s memory from 1972 in Erzincan. Çelik, then a first lieutenant, was silenced by the colonel next to him and told that this situation was a “NATO secret” when he asked “Is Israel a NATO country?” in response to a scenario implying Israel was under protection during a NATO exercise. Çelik’s visa issue at the Canadian border in 1987 also reveals a similar picture: despite his NATO Travel Order document, Canadian police did not allow him to cross due to Turkey being newly added to the visa list, though the issue was resolved with a 48 hour emergency visa provision. These two events, one historical and one current, lay bare NATO’s dilemma particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East: while the alliance engages in strategic planning for non member actors, it remains ambiguous about how it will fulfill its collective defense commitment to its own members.
Legal Framework and Limitations of Article 5
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty constitutes the legal foundation of NATO’s collective defense principle. According to the article’s text, an armed attack against one or more member countries in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against all members. In this case, each member, exercising the right of self defense recognized under Article 51 of the UN Charter, has agreed that they will assist the Party or Parties so attacked.
However, the most critical phrase in the article’s wording contains ambiguity regarding how assistance will be provided: “such action as it deems necessary.” This expression envisions that assistance could be military, political, diplomatic, or logistical in nature. Article 5 grants member states broad discretion in how they will assist an attacked ally.
For Article 5 to be activated, two fundamental conditions must be met. The first is that the attack must be a direct and serious attack on NATO territory, military forces, vessels, or aircraft. The second is that the North Atlantic Council, the alliance’s highest decision making body, must decide by consensus whether the attack falls within the scope of Article 5. This consensus requirement transforms the implementation of Article 5 into a political process and can prevent its activation due to a member’s veto or abstention.
Historically, Article 5 has been invoked only once, following the September 11, 2001 attacks, in favor of the United States. In other crises, particularly in response to Turkey’s requests, the consultation mechanism under Article 4 has been preferred. This demonstrates that the implementation of Article 5 depends on political will and that military intervention is not the alliance’s primary preference.
Israel, the Greek Cypriot Administration, and Article 5: Actors Outside Legal Scope
For the article to be applicable, the attacked party must be a NATO member, and the attack must be directed at NATO territory in Europe or North America. This legal boundary makes it clear that actors such as Israel and the Greek Cypriot Administration, even if they have close cooperation with NATO, cannot benefit from the protection provided by Article 5.
However, a striking contradiction emerges here. The “NATO secret” Çelik encountered in the 1972 exercise indicates that Israel is de facto under protection. Although NATO does not provide any guarantee to Israel in formal treaty texts, in operational planning and strategic scenarios, Israel is treated as being under the alliance’s protective umbrella. This demonstrates how the legal text of Article 5 can be suspended or expanded in practice through political preferences.
Exercise scenarios may include allied interests and strategic planning, but they do not create a binding defense obligation. This situation lays bare the gap between NATO’s operational planning and its legal obligations. Law becomes “cuckoo” in the face of political needs; treaty texts are flexibly interpreted in line with the alliance’s strategic interests.
The same situation applies to the Greek Cypriot Administration. Although not a NATO member, it is placed under de facto protection in line with the alliance’s strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and benefits from an unnamed security guarantee. This is another example of how the legal text of Article 5 is circumvented by the alliance’s political preferences.
Rutte’s Response: Article 5 Surrendered to Politics
Rutte’s dismissal of the question posed in Ankara with the response “Erdoğan is a wise leader” is the clearest confirmation that Article 5 is a political tool rather than a legal guarantee. For NATO to be activated in an incident, the attacked country must be a member and the attack must be evaluated within the scope of the treaty; otherwise, Article 5 does not “work.”
Rutte’s approach demonstrates that even the alliance’s most fundamental security promise is shaped not by mutual trust among member states but by the current political conjuncture and the interests of major powers. A concrete threat to an ally’s security can be dismissed with “wisdom” rhetoric rather than direct military intervention.
So how would NATO respond in the event of an attack on Israel or the Greek Cypriot Administration? Rutte’s failure to answer this question suggests that de facto protection for these countries would also be activated with the same political flexibility, that is, to the extent that it serves the alliance’s interests. While Article 5 does not even function automatically for allies, the de facto protection provided to non members is entirely a product of political preference. Law remains secondary in the face of this preference.
The “23 Cent Soldier” Syndrome: Historical Background
When describing his visa experience at the US Canada border, Çelik notes that this situation reminded him of the “23 cent soldier” story. This story points to Turkey’s admission process to NATO and the alliance’s tendency to view Turkey as a strategic “sacrificial pawn.” According to Çelik’s account, the fact that the Turkish soldier, who saved Americans surrounded by the Chinese at Kunuri during the Korean War by sacrificing 745 martyrs, cost only 23 cents compared to an American soldier was one of the fundamental reasons for Turkey’s admission to NATO in 1952. Soros’s later statement that “your best export product is your military” also confirms this reality.
Çelik emphasizes that this historical background fuels distrust toward current relations by stating: “We were supposedly allies, supposedly brothers in arms. But they don’t even let you into their countries. This meant that we are truly just a sacrificial pawn or bodyguard for NATO countries.”
This historical perspective explains the double standard in the functioning of Article 5. While NATO uses Turkey for its own interests, it does not show the same sensitivity to Turkey’s security concerns. Yet the same alliance, due to its strategic interests, provides de facto protection to non member actors such as Israel or the Greek Cypriot Administration, effectively treating them as “secret members.”
Conclusion: The Gulf Between Security Rhetoric and Reality
NATO’s Article 5, while legally a foundational and binding principle, remains in practice overshadowed by political will, consensus, and great power dynamics. The 2026 Ankara Summit and Rutte’s evasive response have definitively demonstrated that this article is not an “automatic military intervention” guarantee, but rather a product of intra alliance political negotiation and interest calculations.
More significantly, Çelik’s memories reveal that NATO experiences a serious contradiction between its legal texts and de facto implementation. Although Article 5 formally only guarantees members, actors such as Israel and the Greek Cypriot Administration benefit from an unnamed protection in line with the alliance’s strategic preferences. This demonstrates that law is sacrificed to politics, and treaty texts to current interest calculations.
Çelik’s 1972 memory shows that although Israel was included in NATO planning, it was legally outside the scope of Article 5; the 1987 Niagara border incident strikingly reveals how even a NATO ally can be treated as “second class” in alliance countries. Çelik’s conclusion from these memories is clear: “We should never forget that we are ’23 cent soldiers’ and never be fooled by rhetoric!”
This political game conducted through NATO’s Article 5 demonstrates how flexible and functional legal texts can be rendered. While the alliance provides security guarantees to non member actors in line with its strategic interests, it can dismiss the security concerns of member countries like Turkey with political courtesy rhetoric.
For Turkey, this situation is a warning that must be heeded. Despite the alliance’s “unwavering commitment” rhetoric, entrusting security solely to the NATO umbrella constitutes a strategic risk. Given the conflict potential in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, the activation of Article 5 is not guaranteed even for member countries, let alone non member actors, particularly for “peripheral” countries like Turkey.
Turkey must strengthen its national power and regional alliances within the framework of Atatürk’s principle of “Peace at Home, Peace in the World,” and define its position within NATO not as an open “ally” but as an actor maintaining the flexibility required by its interests. While NATO’s Article 5 offers a strong guarantee in text, political reality has shown that it will only function when aligned with the alliance’s common interests. In this system where law has become “cuckoo” and political preferences are determinative, Turkey’s most solid guarantee must be its own national power.
References
Çelik, Süleyman. “Two NATO Memories.” Azim ve Karar, July 10, 2026.
Çelik, Süleyman. “NATO: Are We Allies or Sacrificial Pawns?” Google Groups, May 17, 2019.
“Decisions Taken at the NATO Summit in Every Aspect.” Analiz Gazetesi, July 10, 2026.
Türkoğlu, Ertuğrul. “Decisions Taken at the NATO Summit in Every Aspect.” Analiz Gazetesi, July 10, 2026.
“What is NATO’s Article 5 and in What Cases Does It Come into Effect?” Yeni Şafak, March 3, 2026.
Eraslan, Yeşim. “International Law Expert Assoc. Prof. Dr. Erkiner’s Comment on Trump: If America Attacks, Article 5 Does Not Apply.” Türkiye Gazetesi, March 16, 2026.
Özalp, Güven. “What is NATO’s Article 5 and When Does It Come into Effect?” BBC News Turkish, March 4, 2026.
“Analysis of NATO’s Founding Treaty Article 5 in Terms of Acts of Attack.” Journal of Diplomatic Studies, vol.2, no.2, 2020, pp.1-10. Bursa Uludağ University.
“NATO’S MOST CRITICAL ARTICLE! What is NATO’s Article 5 and What Does It Mean for Turkey?” Yeni Birlik Gazetesi, March 4, 2026.
“WHAT IS IN NATO’S ARTICLE 5! What Happens If It Is Activated, Does It Mean Military Intervention?” Yeni Birlik Gazetesi, March 4, 2026.
“WHAT IS NATO’S ARTICLE 5! Will Support Be Given If Turkey Is Attacked?” Yeni Birlik Gazetesi, March 5, 2026.
Sefa Yürükel
Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
Aarhus University, 1997
Independent Researcher
Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures.
