Tag: Economics

  • The Two Phase Fallacy in Crypto Asset Investment: An In Depth and Visionary Critique of the Attributed Buffett Theory

    The Two Phase Fallacy in Crypto Asset Investment: An In Depth and Visionary Critique of the Attributed Buffett Theory

    Risk and opportunity being two sides of the same coin is perhaps the oldest truth of the investment world. This ancient wisdom makes the triad of risk assessment, market research, and position management indispensable in portfolio construction. The rationale behind simultaneously building deep positions in both cryptocurrency and stock markets lies beyond a mere intuitive impulse for diversification; it is a pursuit of exploiting complementary risk premiums and hedging against macroeconomic blind spots. However, when this ancient method of risk mitigation, namely hedging, begins to be sought not only between asset classes but also within the life cycle of a single asset, our mental models must be called into question. It is precisely at this juncture that a theory attributed to Warren Buffett’s finance classes, dividing cryptocurrency investment into two distinct phases, has been circulated.

    According to this theory, the first phase is the “pre IPO internal sale” phase, likened to the initial public offering (IPO) of a stock. It is argued that this is the period when a new crypto asset, before being listed on an exchange, rapidly attracts investment to form a large capital pool, thus experiencing the steepest price increase. This narrative highlights the allure of early stage liquidity and the existential capital needs of projects, whispering to the investor that the real gains lie here. The second phase is the post IPO phase, encompassing assets listed on exchanges, including established ones like Bitcoin. The theory asserts that in this stage, large capitalists execute massive sell offs to realize their tens of times profits gained during the internal sale phase, directly leading to a rapid price decline and a subsequent prolonged period of stabilization.

    According to the narrative, most crypto assets in the post IPO phase fall victim to a kind of “frenzied fundraising” period; when combined with the exit strategy of early investors, this closes the window of opportunity for new investors. Therefore, the theory prescribes avoiding investment in post IPO crypto assets as a long term, sustainable investment strategy. This approach is presented not merely as a market timing strategy but as a philosophy of risk aversion, as the asymmetric return potential in the early phase is deemed far more attractive compared to the structural disadvantages of the later phase. Yet, what matters here is as much the method itself as the figure of authority invoked to legitimize it: Warren Buffett.

    However, the claim that this theory belongs to Warren Buffett stands in stark opposition to Buffett’s own investment philosophy, crystallized over decades, and his public statements on cryptocurrencies. Buffett has repeatedly described cryptocurrencies as “rat poison squared,” “a mirage that produces nothing,” and “a bad ending”; he has never addressed an internal sale phase or a post IPO stabilization period as a technical framework. Thus, the “two phase model” under examination is, in fact, a myth of uncertain origin packaged under Buffett’s name, attempting to explain the unique dynamics of the crypto market. Approaching this model with academic depth and a visionary perspective, it is necessary to lay bare both its surface level appeal and its structural weaknesses, revealing what is missing and unheard.

    The Ontology of the Two Phase Model: The Allure and Fragility of the Pre IPO Internal Sale

    Although the pre IPO internal sale phase bears parallels to early stage venture capital in traditional finance, it takes a far more radical form within the crypto ecosystem, shaped by regulatory vacuums and asymmetric information environments. In this phase, projects use the funds raised under the promise of decentralization as liquidity pools; investors, meanwhile, commit capital at a stage where the project has yet to achieve product market fit and often exists as nothing more than a whitepaper. The model’s strongest aspect is making visible the psychological and financial reality of this stage: the urgent need for early liquidity creates upward pressure on price, and this pressure is fed by a narrative pump that lasts until the listing moment. Indeed, in projects with adequate due diligence and network effect potential, astronomical returns for participants in this phase have been empirically observed. The model succeeds in identifying the risk of late stage capital, which might be labeled “dumb money.”

    However, the model’s portrayal of this phase solely as the period of the fastest price increase entirely ignores survivorship bias. A vast majority of projects participating in the pre IPO phase never even reach the listing stage; they silently vanish due to technical inadequacy, internal team conflicts, fraud, or regulatory threats. While emphasizing the asymmetric returns that make this phase attractive, the model fails to sufficiently underscore the risk of the same asymmetry resulting in a total wipeout. Consequently, categorically declaring the internal sale phase as the best window of opportunity is only possible within a narrative economy that erases the stories of the losers. Moreover, since participation in internal sales is often contingent upon privileged circles, staking mechanisms on launchpads, or high capital thresholds, the strategy proposed by the model can be structurally inaccessible to the retail investor. This renders the model a semi deterministic narrative describing market dynamics rather than a functional investment guide.

    The Reductionist Reading of the Post IPO Phase and the Missed Layers of Value

    The model codes the post IPO period as a trap, characterized by major capitalists’ profit realization, and a phase to be avoided. This perspective undoubtedly captures a recurring pattern in the market: the supply shock created by the unlocking of early investors’ tokens and the deflation of the speculative bubble. Yet this reduction ignores the full complexity of market maturation and the price discovery process. Above all, the value accumulation generated over years by assets like Bitcoin and Ethereum in the post IPO phase empirically refutes the thesis of a “period to be avoided.” The selling pressure from capitalists creates a temporary supply demand imbalance; however, if the project’s core value proposition, network effects, and adoption curve are robust, the market navigates past this phase to establish a new equilibrium level. The model completely misses this rebalancing process and the potential for long term compound returns.

    Secondly, the post IPO phase is a period when institutional investors and regulatory frameworks enter the scene, transparency increases, and information asymmetry diminishes. Unlike the internal sale phase, the project’s technical roadmap, community governance, and financial reporting are more auditable here. The model’s wholesale dismissal of this phase as a desert where “the best opportunity has been missed” sets a cognitive trap by discouraging the investor from conducting in depth fundamental analysis. Furthermore, in the post IPO phase, risk management and yield optimization tools become available such as options strategies, staking yields, and liquidity mining which are only possible in mature markets. These tools pave the way for multi layered strategies based not just on price appreciation but on time value and volatility. By ignoring these layers, the model reduces crypto asset investment to a one dimensional buy and sell window.

    The Positive Aspects of the Theory: Intuitive Insight into Liquidity Architecture and Psychological Timing

    Despite all criticisms, the attributed two phase theory is valuable for popularizing certain observations about the functioning of cryptocurrency markets, thereby raising awareness. First and foremost, by framing the listing process of a new crypto asset as a liquidity event, the model cultivates the habit of monitoring the direction of fund flows among market participants. The dynamic between the capital raising pressure in the internal sale phase and the realization pressure post IPO points to a micro scale “smart money dumb money” distinction. Although oversimplified, this distinction offers a useful mental model for an investor just learning about market microstructure.

    Furthermore, the theory indirectly illuminates the behavioral finance dimension of speculative bubbles. The rapid price increase in the internal sale phase creates a “fear of missing out” (FOMO) among investors, while the post IPO decline and stabilization period triggers a tendency for “regret avoidance.” By intuitively capturing this emotional transition between the two phases, the model can help investors recognize their own emotional cycles. More importantly, the theory makes visible a critical question every investor must ask themselves: “Whose liquidity am I providing in this market?” This question forms the basis of risk management and builds a healthy skepticism toward position management. Therefore, the positive contribution of the theory lies not in presenting a correct investment strategy, but in dramatizing wrong strategies to warn the investor.

    Critical Deepening: The Fallacy of Attribution to Authority and the Collapse of the Intellectual Foundation

    The theory’s greatest and most difficult to repair damage stems from its grounding in a figure like Warren Buffett, the living legend of value investing. When Buffett’s words on cryptocurrencies are examined, his epistemological objection to this asset class is clear: cryptocurrencies are not productive assets, they generate no cash flow, and their value rests solely on the expectation that a next buyer will pay a higher price. To assume that a thinker with such a radical rejection would systematize crypto investment with a two phase strategy is an intellectual anachronism. This misattribution builds the model’s credibility on the appeal to authority fallacy (argumentum ad verecundiam), while actually striking it at its most vulnerable point: a lack of empirical and philosophical coherence.

    At this point, the most vital need the model leaves unaddressed becomes apparent: to make such a deterministic staging of any asset’s life cycle, a robust theoretical framework for its valuation is imperative. In traditional stock analysis, the pre IPO and post IPO distinction is supported by concrete metrics such as discounted cash flows, P/E ratios, and sectoral growth dynamics. Yet for crypto assets, such a universally accepted valuation methodology does not yet exist. The two phase model ignores this massive void, focusing solely on the momentum of price movement; that is, it attempts to derive an investment philosophy purely from price action without a value framework. However, Buffett’s true teaching rests precisely on this distinction between “price” and “value.” The theory, in trying to leverage Buffett, violates his most fundamental principle.

    Analytical Breakdown of Strengths, Weaknesses, Missing Elements, and Unheard Dimensions

    The strengths of the model lie in offering an intuitive narrative of market microstructure, making early and late stage liquidity dynamics visible, and functioning as a warning system to deter investors from blindly jumping into every listed asset. It can also enhance market literacy by prompting scrutiny of the incentive mechanisms of project founders and venture capitalists. Yet its weaknesses are severe: it systematically reflects survivorship bias, ignores post IPO value creation and the maturation process, fails to discuss the asymmetry of accessibility, and, most importantly, undermines its own credibility by grounding itself in a false authority. It falls into a circular logic trap that turns price movement into an investment thesis.

    Among the missing elements, foremost is how regulatory developments can radically alter the transition between the two phases. For instance, the internal sale process of a token classified as a security in a jurisdiction takes on an entirely different character due to legal risks. Similarly, the treasury management of decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) and the ability to program liquidity on chain complicate the “major capitalist sell off” pattern the model assumes. The most significant shortcoming is that the model treats investor psychology as an individual decision making process, but fails to account for how social media, the influencer economy, and coordinated community actions manipulate the transition between phases. The unheard need is precisely here: the necessity of grasping a crypto asset’s life cycle through a multi factorial, dynamic, and continuity based model that combines on chain data analytics, social sentiment analysis, and macro liquidity indicators, rather than through rigid phases.

    Visionary Outlook and the Need for Reframing

    The growing pains of cryptocurrency markets demand an epistemology that moves beyond building investment strategies solely on timing phases. The visionary investment approach of the future must set aside dichotomies like pre IPO and post IPO and instead conceptualize each asset as a “protocol economy.” The determining factors here are the genuine economic value the protocol generates (transaction fees, security budget, sustainability of staking yields), the resilience of governance mechanisms, and the quality of community participation. In such a framework, the internal sale phase transforms into merely a funding method, and the post IPO phase becomes the market’s testing of that funding method. The critical question for the investor should not be “Which phase am I in?” but rather “At what stage of this protocol’s value creation process am I positioned, and with which incentives am I aligned?”

    Moreover, the advantage provided by taking simultaneous positions across multiple markets lies precisely in offering the ability to transcend such reductionist phase models. When the cash flow and dividend focused valuation discipline of the stock market is combined with the adoption curve and network value focused valuation intuition of the crypto market, the investor learns to price two different risk factors simultaneously. This synthesis is not a strategy confined to either the internal sale phase or the post IPO phase; instead, it is the art of layered position management that reads global liquidity cycles, the diffusion speed of technological innovations, and regulatory arbitrage opportunities. The attributed Buffett theory is valuable as a starting point, even as a counter example, in the journey of learning this art; but when taken as a guide, it turns into a wall that severs the investor from the market’s most fertile hunting grounds.

    Conclusion and Recommendations

    The two phase model examined is a narrative that intuitively describes the speculative rhythm of the cryptocurrency market, yet reveals serious cracks when transformed into an investment doctrine. The model’s greatest weakness is its claim to be grounded in Warren Buffett’s value oriented, productive asset philosophy, which is an intellectual contradiction. Its positive aspects are raising awareness of liquidity dynamics and pushing the investor to question “whose exit liquidity they are providing”; its negative aspects are overlooking the return opportunities of the maturation period, regulatory transformation, and the need for fundamental valuation by reducing the market to two crude phases. The most significant deficiency is the absence of a holistic decision support system that integrates on chain metrics, social sentiment analysis, and macro liquidity conditions into a single framework.

    Recommendations for investors, framed by this analysis, can be listed as follows:

    Adopt an analysis discipline that evaluates any crypto asset not solely based on its listing phase, but on fundamental factors such as the genuine economic value the protocol generates, developer activity, and degree of decentralization.

    Limit participation in the internal sale phase to projects with a clear legal framework, transparent lock up periods and token distribution, and strong community commitment; manage this phase as a high risk venture capital position within a small slice of the portfolio, rather than a “get rich quick” scheme.

    View price declines in the post IPO phase as strategic accumulation opportunities in projects with a solid core value proposition; however, ensure you monitor the unlock schedule of early investors and the dilution effect on circulating supply.

    Leverage your multi market position advantage by examining the correlations between sector rotation in the stock market and adoption cycles in the crypto market; use the cash flow between the two markets as a risk barometer.

    Integrate metrics obtained from on chain data platforms (Glassnode, Dune Analytics, etc.) into your own investment process; adopt indicators such as whale movements, exchange inflows and outflows, and staking participation rate as an objective ground to replace phase narratives.

    Bibliography

    Buffett, W. E. (2018). Berkshire Hathaway 2017 Annual Shareholder Letter. Berkshire Hathaway Inc.

    Buffett, W. E. (2022). Transcript of the 2022 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Shareholders Meeting. CNBC Archives.

    Catalini, C., & Gans, J. S. (2018). “Initial Coin Offerings and the Value of Crypto Tokens”. MIT Sloan Research Paper, No. 5347-18.

    Fisch, C. (2019). “Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) to Finance New Ventures”. Journal of Business Venturing, 34(1), 1-22.

    Graham, B., & Dodd, D. L. (2008). Security Analysis (6th Edition). McGraw-Hill.

    Howell, S. T., Niessner, M., & Yermack, D. (2020). “Initial Coin Offerings: Financing Growth with Cryptocurrency Token Sales”. The Review of Financial Studies, 33(9), 3925-3974.

    Malkiel, B. G. (2019). A Random Walk Down Wall Street (12th Edition). W. W. Norton & Company.

    Nakamoto, S. (2008). “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System”. Bitcoin.org.

    Shiller, R. J. (2015). Irrational Exuberance (3rd Edition). Princeton University Press.

    Taleb, N. N. (2018). Skin in the Game: Hidden Asymmetries in Daily Life. Random House.

    Sefa Yürükel

    Danish ethnographer and social anthropologist (MA)
    Aarhus University, 1997
    Independent Researcher
    Fields of Research: International Politics, Public International Law, Geopolitics, Sociology, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Systems and Structures

  • Poor Richard’s Report

    Poor Richard’s Report

    Poor Richard’s Report

    Over 300,001 readers
    My Mission: God has uniquely designed me to seek, write, and speak the truth as I see it. Preservation of one’s wealth while providing needful income is my primary goal in these unsettled times. I have given the ability to evaluate study, and interpret world and national events and their influence on future of the financial markets. This gift allows me to meet the needs of individual and institution clients. I evaluate situations first on a fundamental basis then try to confirm on a technical basis. In the past it has been fairly successful.

    This is a classic letter. Please read it. Cheerio !!!!
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    “John Mauldin”
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    Thoughts from the Frontline Weekly Newsletter
    An Uncomfortable Choice
    by John Mauldin
    August 28, 2009

    In this issue:
    An Uncomfortable Choice
    What Were We Thinking?
    Frugality is the New Normal
    And Then We Face the Real Problem
    The Teenagers Are in Control
    Choose Wisely
    Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, New Orleans, Detroit, and More
    We have arrived at this particular economic moment in time by the choices we have made, which now leave us with choices in our future that will be neither easy, convenient, nor comfortable. Sometimes there are just no good choices, only less-bad ones. In this week’s letter we look at what some of those choices might be, and ponder their possible consequences. Are we headed for a double-dip recession? Read on.
    An Important Announcement
    But first, I want to make a very important announcement. There are not many times in a career when you can say that something new has been created in the financial services industry and that you have been a part of it. But now I can say that and, I must admit, with a little pride in helping to bring a new creation into the world.
    For years, Steve Blumenthal and I have shared a passion for bringing Absolute Return Strategies to all investors, not just the wealthy and institutional investors.
    I want to introduce you to a new mutual fund, one that is different than the typical long-only equity mutual fund. My friends and partners at CMG have created a mutual fund that is comprised of 9 different trading strategies, a “fund of trading strategies,” so to speak; and it’s one that I believe will be strategically suitable for the economic environment that I think we face. And, as a mutual fund, it is open to all investors.
    You can learn more about it by reading a report I have prepared, entitled “How to Deal with Volatility in Extraordinary Markets – Introducing the CMG Absolute Return Strategies Fund.” Simply click here.
    If you are an investment advisor or broker, you especially should read about this new fund and contact CMG directly for more information and reports. Full disclosure: as a consultant to the Advisor to the fund, my investment advisory firm does participate in the fees. And be sure and read all the disclosures and risk factors in the document.
    And now, let’s look at the choices we face.
    An Uncomfortable Choice
    As our family grew, we limited the choices our seven kids could make; but as they grew into teenagers, they were given more leeway. Not all of their choices were good. How many times did Dad say, “What were you thinking?” and get a mute reply or a mumbled “I don’t know.”
    Yet how else do you teach them that bad choices have bad consequences? You can lecture, you can be a role model; but in the end you have to let them make their own choices. And a lot of them make a lot of bad choices. After having raised six, with one more teenage son at home, I have come to the conclusion that you just breathe a sigh of relief if they grow up and have avoided fatal, life-altering choices. I am lucky. So far. Knock on a lot of wood.
    I have watched good kids from good families make bad choices, and kids with no seeming chance make good choices. But one thing I have observed. Very few teenagers make the hard choice without some outside encouragement or help in understanding the known consequences, from some source. They nearly always opt for the choice that involves the most fun and/or the least immediate pain, and then learn later that they now have to make yet another choice as a consequence of the original one. And thus they grow up. So quickly.
    But it’s not just teenagers. I am completely capable of making very bad choices as I approach the end of my sixth decade of human experiences and observations. In fact, I have made some rather distressing choices over time. Even in areas where I think I have some expertise I can make appallingly bad choices. Or maybe particularly in those areas, because I have delusions of actually knowing something. In my experience, it takes an expert with a powerful computer to truly foul things up.
    Of course, sometimes I get it right. Even I learn, with enough pain. And sometimes I just get lucky. (Although, as my less-than-sainted Dad repeatedly intoned, “The harder I work the luckier I get.”)
    Each morning is a new day, but it is a new day impacted by all the choices of the previous days and years. Tiffani and I have literally interviewed in depth well over a hundred millionaires, and talked anecdotally with hundreds over the years. I am struck by how their lives, and those of their families, come down to a few choices. Sometimes good choices and sometimes lucky choices. Often, difficult ones. But very few were the easy choice.
    What Were We Thinking?
    As a culture, the current mix of generations, especially in the US, has made some choices. Choices which, in hindsight, leave the adult in us asking, “What were we thinking?”
    In a way, we were like teenagers. We made the easy choice, not thinking of the consequences. We never absorbed the lessons of the Depression from our grandparents. We quickly forgot the sobering malaise of the ’70s as the bull market of the ’80s and ’90s gave us the illusion of wealth and an easy future. Even the crash of Black Friday seemed a mere bump on the path to success, passing so quickly. And as interest rates came down and money became easier, our propensity to acquire things took over.
    And then something really bad happened. Our homes started to rise in value and we learned through new methods of financial engineering that we could borrow against what seemed like their ever-rising value, to finance consumption today.
    We became Blimpie from the Popeye cartoons of our youth: “I will gladly repay you Tuesday for a hamburger today.”
    Not for us the lay-away programs of our parents, patiently paying something each week or month until the desired object could be taken home. Come to think of it, I am not sure if my kids (15 through 32) have ever even heard of a lay-away program, not with credit cards so easy to obtain. Next family brunch, I will explain this quaint concept. (Interestingly, I heard about a revival of the concept on CNBC radio, coming back from dropping Trey off at school this morning. Everything old is new again.)
    As a banking system, we made choices. We created all sorts of readily available credit, and packaged it in convenient, irresistible AAA-rated securities and sold them to a gullible world. We created liar loans, no-money-down loans, and no-documentation loans and expected them to act the same way that mortgages had in the past. What were the rating agencies thinking? Where were the adults supervising the sand box?
    (Oh, wait a minute. DThat’s the same group of regulators who now want more power and money.)
    It is not as if all this was done in some back alley by seedy-looking characters. This was done on TV and in books and advertisements. I remember the first time I saw an ad telling me to call this number to borrow up to 125% of the value of my home, and wondering how this could be a good idea.
    Turns out it can be a great idea for the salesmen, if they can package those loans into securities and sell them to foreigners, with everyone making large commissions on the way. The choice was to make a lot of money with no downside consequences to yourself. What teenager could say no?
    Greenspan keeping rates low aided and abetted that process. Starting two wars and pushing through a massive health-care package, along with no spending control from the Republican Party, ran up the fiscal deficits.
    Allowing credit default swaps to trade without an exchange or regulations. A culture that viscerally believed that the McMansions they were buying were an investment and not really debt. Yes, we were adolescents at the party to end all parties.
    Not to mention an investment industry that tells their clients that stocks earn 8% a year real returns (the report I mentioned at the beginning goes into detail about this). Even as stocks have gone nowhere for ten years, we largely believe (or at least hope) that the latest trend is just the beginning of the next bull market.
    It was not that there were no warnings. There were many, including from your humble analyst, who wrote about the coming train wreck that we are now trying to clean up. But those warnings were ignored.
    Actually, ignored is a nice way to put it. Derision. Scorn. Laughter. And worse, dismissal as a non-serious perpetual perma-bear. My corner of the investment-writing world takes a very thick skin.
    The good times had lasted so long, how could the trend not be correct? It is human nature to believe the current trend, especially a favorable one that helps us, will continue forever.
    And just like a teenager who doesn’t think about the consequences of the current fun, we paid no attention. We hadn’t experienced the hard lessons of our elders, who learned them in the depths of the Depression. This time it was different. We were smarter and wouldn’t make those mistakes. Didn’t we have the research of Bernanke and others, telling us what to avoid?
    In millions of different ways, we all partied on. It wasn’t exclusively a liberal or a conservative, a rich or apoor, a male or a female addiction. We all borrowed and spent. We did it as individuals, and we did it as cities and states and countries.
    We ran up unfunded pension deficits at many local and state funds, to the tune of several trillion dollars and rising. We have a massive, tens of trillions of dollars, bill coming due for Social Security and Medicare, starting in the next 5-7 years, that makes the current crisis pale in comparison. We now seemingly want to add to this by passing even more spending programs that will only make the hole deeper.
    Frugality is the New Normal
    I could go on and on, but I think you get the point. The time for good choices was a decade ago. It would have been more difficult at the time, so that is not what we did. And now we wake up and are faced with a set of choices, none of them good.
    Reality is staring back in the mirror at the American consumer, and especially the Boomer generation. The psyche of the American consumer has been permanently seared. We are watching savings beginning to rise and consumer spending patterns change for the first time in generations. Even as the authorities try to prod consumers back into old habits, they are not responding. Borrowing and credit are actually falling. Banks, for whatever reason, now want borrowers to actually be able to pay them back. Go figure.
    Frugality is the new normal. We are resetting the underpinnings of a consumer-driven society to a new level. It will require a major overhaul of our economy. The normal drivers of growth – consumer spending, business investment, and exports – are all weak, and it is only because of massive government spending that the second quarter was not as bad as the two previous quarters and that the coming quarter will be positive.
    But what then? How long can we continue with 10%-plus GDP deficits? We have an economy that is in a Statistical Recovery, fueled by government largesse. In the real world, we are watching unemployment rise, and it is likely to do so through the middle of next year. Deflation is in the air. Capacity utilization is near all-time lows. Housing numbers are only bouncing because of the government program of large tax credits for first-time home buyers and lower home prices. It will be years before construction is significant.
    We will be faced with a choice this fall and early next year. If you take away the government spending, the potential for falling back into a recession is quite high, given the underlying weakness in the economy. A few hundred billion for increased and extended unemployment benefits will not be enough to stem the tide. There will be a groundswell for yet another stimulus package. Another 10% of GDP deficit is quite likely for next year.
    As I (and Woody Brock) have made very clear in these e-letters, deficits that are higher than nominal GDP cannot continue without dire consequences. Good friend Richard Russell writes today:
    “The US national debt is now over $11 trillion dollars. The interest on our national debt is now $340 billion. This is about at 3.04% rate of interest. In ten years the Obama administration admits that they will add $9 trillion to the national debt. That would take it to $20 trillion. Let’s say that by some miracle the interest on the national debt in 10 years will still be 3.09%. That would mean that the interest on the national debt would be $618 billion a year or over one billion a day. No nation can hold up in the face of those kinds of expenses. Either the dollar would collapse or interest rates would go through the roof.”
    That would be at least 30% of the national budget. How would your household do, paying that much as interest? How can you operate when interest payments are 30% or more of the budget? Do you borrow to pay the interest? And the Obama administration openly admits to deficits of over a trillion a year for the next ten years, under very rosy growth assumptions. Anyone outside of Washington and rosy-eyed economists think we will grow 4% next year? I am not seeing many hands go up.
    And Then We Face the Real Problem
    If we do not maintain high deficits, it is likely we fall back into recession. Yet if we do not control spending, we risk running up a debt that becomes very difficult to finance by conventional means. Monetizing the debt can only work for a few trillion here or there. At some point, the bond market will simply fall apart. And it could happen quickly. Think back to how fast things fell apart in the summer of 2007. When perception of the potential for inflation changes, it changes things fast.
    The problem is that we are now in a very deflationary world. Deleveraging, too much capacity, high and rising unemployment, falling real incomes, and more are all the classic pieces of the formula for deflation.
    Let’s look at what my friend Nouriel Roubini recently wrote. I think he hit the nail on the head:
    “A combination of higher official indebtedness and monetization has the potential to yield the worst of all worlds, pushing up long-term rates and generating increased inflation expectations before a convincing return to growth takes hold. An early return to higher long-term rates will crowd out private demand, as lending rates on mortgages and personal and corporate loans rise too. It is unlikely that actual inflation will emerge this year or even next, but inflation expectations as reflected in long-term interest rates could well be rising later in 2010. This would represent a serious threat to economic recovery, which is predicated on the idea that the actual borrowing rates that individuals and businesses pay will remain low for an extended period.
    “Yet the alternative – the early withdrawal of the stimulus drug that governments have been dispensing so freely – is even more serious. The present administration believes that deflation is a worse threat than inflation. They are right to think that. Trying to rebuild public finances at a deflationary moment – a time when unemployment is rising, and private demand is still contracting – could be catastrophic, turning recovery into renewed recession.”
    There are no good choices. Nouriel, optimist that he is (note sarcasm), suggests that there is a possibility that the government can manage expectations by showing a clear path to fiscal responsibility that can be believed. And thus the bond markets do not force rates higher, thereby thwarting recovery.
    And technically he is right. If there were adults supervising the party, it might be possible. But there are not. The teenagers are in control. Instead of fiscal discipline, we are hearing increased demands for more spending. Please note that the very rosy future-deficit assumptions assume the end of the Bush tax cuts at the close of 2010. But raising taxes back to the level of 2000 does not make the projected future budget deficits go away.
    I mean, seriously, does anyone think Pelosi or Reid are going to lead us to fiscal constraint? Obama talks a good game, but he has not offered a serious deficit-reduction proposal, other than further tax increases. And by serious, I mean we need cuts on the order of several hundred billion dollars. The Republicans lost their way and their power (deservedly, in my opinion). Just as at the high school prom, the very few adults are being ignored.
    It is the proverbial rock and the hard place. Cut the stimulus too soon and we slide back into a deeper recession. Let the budget spin out of control for a few years and we will see inflation return, with higher rates and a recession. Raise taxes by 1.5-2% of GDP in 2010 and we are shoved back into recession.
    There are no good choices. If we do the right thing and cut the deficit, it means very hard choices. Can we keep our commitments to two wars and our massive defense budget? Medicare and Social Security reform are not painless. Education? Research? The “stimulus”? But cutting the deficit by hundreds of billions while raising taxes by even more than is already in the works, is not the formula for sustainable recovery.
    Have we grown up? Are there adults in the room? Sadly, I don’t think there are enough. We are still a nation of teenagers. We will do whatever we can to avoid the pain today. We will kick the can down the road, hoping for a miracle. Will we grow up? Yes, but the lessons learned will be hard.
    There are no statistical signs of an impending recession. We are not going to get an inverted yield curve this time, which made it relatively easy for me to predict recessions in 2000 and 2006. We are in a deflationary, deleveraging world. A far different world than in the past.
    I see little room for us to avoid a double-dip recession. It would take the skill and speed of former Cowboys running back Tony Dorsett hitting a very small hole in the line to break us into the open. I see no running back in our national leadership with such ability. As I have outlined above, recession could be triggered again in any number of very different economic environments. It all depends on the choices we make. But the choices lead to the same consequences, at least in my opinion.
    As I wrote in August 2000 and August 2006, I write again in August 2009: there is a recession in our future. I was early both of those times and I am early now, maybe two years early, though I doubt it. And as I pointed out both of those last times, the stock market drops an average of over 40% during a recession. When I was on Kudlow in October of 2006, I was given a hard time about my recession call and prediction of a bear market. I think it was John Rutherford who dismissed my bearish vision. And he was right for the next three quarters, as the market proceeded to rise another 20%. I looked foolish to many, but I maintained my views.
    You have choices. You can buy and hold (buy and hope?) or you can develop a strategic alternative. The next bear market, as I wrote in 2003 and in Bull’s Eye Investing, will likely be the bottom. (It takes at least three of them to really take us to the bottom.) But the next one will change perceptions for a long time. Valuations will drop. Savings will rise even more. And a generation will grow up. The adults will return. Chastened. Scarred. Shaken. But we will Muddle Through. That is what we do. Even my teenagers.
    Choose wisely.
    Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, New Orleans, Detroit, and More
    Only a month ago my fall schedule looked surprisingly light. And then reality hit. I will be at the Schwab conference in San Diego on September 15. If you are going to be there, drop me a note. That is my only trip in September. But then it gets interesting. I celebrate my 60th birthday the first weekend of October, then fly to New Orleans to be at the annual New Orleans Conference, October 8-11. The speaker line-up is better than ever. I find this to be one of the best conferences I go to very year. I have been attending on and off for over 25 years. You should think about this one.
    Then I will spend the next weekend in Detroit, then probably go to New York, then Philadelphia for a CMG conference October 20, then down to Houston, over to Orlando, stop to change clothes and pack at home, and then fly off on a whirlwind trip to Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, speaking at a series of CFA conferences. Orlando in mid-November … and nothing else so far. Switzerland and London in January.
    I recently did an interview with King World News that was quite frankly one of the best interviews I have ever done. Eric King really got me going. It is in two parts. I give you the link to the first part, and the second is in their archives. There are also interviews with a very serious group of names. I am flattered to be included. Click here.
    It is time to hit the send button. I am resisting the temptation to launch into politics, so I need to quit before I do. Suffice it to say, we could see some big changes as we work through our teenage years, back to adulthood.
    Speaking of good choices, the wedding last weekend was fabulous. I am delighted with my new son-in-law. Life goes on, even as my kids struggle to get enough hours of work and money. Henry is at UPS, and work hours are way down and they have a new son. Chad finally got a new job, which may give him enough hours to survive, but not a lot of money. For those of you who think I live in an ivory tower, I do have a view into the lives of seven kids who are very real people, as well as those of lots of friends. I am very well aware of how tough it is out there, and realize how blessed I am.
    You have a great week. Tomorrow I get to go the Dallas Cowboys game in the new stadium in a suite, courtesy of a friend who got the seats from Jerry Jones himself. Not sure where, but it sounds cool. Sometimes life gives you lucky breaks.
    Your amazed to still be writing after all these years analyst,

    John Mauldin
    [email protected]
    Copyright 2009 John Mauldin. All Rights Reserved

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