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  • Turkey Plans ‘Wall Street of Istanbul’

    Turkey Plans ‘Wall Street of Istanbul’

    Country to invest $2.6 billion to once more become ‘global center of commerce’

    By Marlene Y. Satter, AdvisorOne

    September 18, 2012 • Reprints

    It may not look like much now. But after $2.6 billion is plowed into a bare plot of ground in Atasehir over the next three years, the Istanbul suburb will be transformed into a sparkling ménage of high-rise buildings, a symbol of Turkey’s resumption of a position of power on the global commercial stage.

    Bloomberg reported Tuesday that the plan, advanced by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is an effort to create a one-square-mile “Wall Street of Istanbul” that will be known as IFC-Istanbul—the International Financial Center. Erdogan, whose Justice and Development Party was reelected last year, sees Turkey as a growing center of economic and political power that will make its presence known in the Middle East and southeastern Europe.

    Environment and Urbanization Minister Erdogan Bayraktar said in the report that once IFC-Istanbul is functioning, “Istanbul will assume its historical role as a global center of commerce.” The country’s financial industry has already seen substantial growth even as its economy as a whole expanded by 8.5% in 2011.

    This year alone, Mizuho Financial Group Inc. and Mitsubishi Corp. of Japan, Kuwait’s Burgan Bank SAK and OAO Sberbank of Russia all came to the city, either buying Turkish firms or opening their own offices.

    They have plenty of company; such institutions as Citigroup and HSBC Holdings already have a presence in Istanbul, although currently the financial heart of the city is located in the Levent and Maslak districts.

    Not to be outdone, the Istanbul Stock Exchange has also grown, expanding 26% this year and more than doubling in size since 2009. While still very small compared with New York and London, it is a respectable size, larger by just a bit than Frankfurt’s at $51 billion and almost four times the size of Dubai’s.

    While everything in Istanbul isn’t perfect—some development projects have stalled—foreign investment is soaring, with direct investment 25% higher in the first two months of 2012 than it was a year ago. CEOs and senior executives seek out the Billionaire Club for nightclub entertainment and new hotels, villas and apartments are going up all over the city—with restaurants and other amenities following to satisfy demand.

    “I had no idea how big Istanbul was until I was appointed here,” said Martin Spurling in the report. Spurling, chief executive of HSBC Bank in Turkey, added, “I was shocked. In terms of its location, history, culture, human potential and hospitality, Istanbul’s a great candidate to be an international finance center. We have to explain it to the world a little better.”

    via Turkey Plans ‘Wall Street of Istanbul’.

  • What Will Be the Real Costs of Turkey’s Involvement in Syria?

    What Will Be the Real Costs of Turkey’s Involvement in Syria?

    Demonstrators hold a banner as police use a water cannon and tear gas to disperse them during a protest against a government attempt to railroad a new education bill through parliament in Ankara March 29, 2012. (photo by REUTERS/Umit Bektas)
    By: Jihad al-Zein posted on Tuesday, Sep 18, 2012

    Is Turkey’s position today on the Syrian situation — and what has resulted from the revolution against the Baathist regime — the same as that of Pakistan toward Afghanistan, a position that has remained the same since the latter fell under Soviet occupation?

    About this Article

    Summary:

    Turkey’s stance on the Syrian crisis, having called for Bashar al-Assad’s removal, has sparked a polarization on religious and racial grounds that threatens Turkey’s modernity and secularism, writes Jihad al-Zein. For all the fear of a rising Islamist movement, the real headache facing Ankara is how to deal with Turkey’s Kurds and Alawites.

    Publisher: An-Nahar (Lebanon)
    Original Title:
    Will the Syrian Revolution Destroy Turkey as the Afghani Wars Destroyed Pakistan?
    Author: Jihad al-Zein
    Published on: Tuesday, Sep 18, 2012
    Translated on: Tuesday, Sep 18, 2012
    Translated by: Naria Tanoukhi and Rani Geha

    Categories : Turkey

    What potential repercussions could such a position have on Turkey? This article will attempt to answer this question in two parts, today and on Thursday [September 20].

    By virtue of its modernization achievements, Turkey is a country with a vast bourgeois elite as well as a large middle class. The latter carries the traditions of internal cohesion which stem from two sources: the state — meaning the Turkish nation — and the Western notion of the state.

    However, these two segments of society, which are characterized by both capitalism and globalization, do not trust that lower segments of society — which make up the majority of society — are able to preserve cohesion.

    Today, warnings abound against the increasing risk of internal disintegration. These warnings are not only being voiced by media commentators and opposition politicians — despite the significance of these voices — but by economic figures as well.

    With unprecedented levels of openness, they are touching on topics such as the competency of the Turkish army in confronting the Turkish insurgency, and making calls for reconsidering its combat and training composition.

    In a recent speech, Umit Boyner, president of the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association (TUSIAD), expressed her concern regarding the return of “authoritarianism” to political life in Turkey.

    On Friday [September 14], she said that the sharp polarization, hatred and hostility could destroy all of Turkey’s achievements in social, political and economic areas. This kind of warning implies that this body, which is seen as the strongest representative of prominent businessmen, is beginning to feel the threat of the current political stage on higher economic interests, and it is even threatening the structure of the entire country.

    Among the topics that are creating mounting tension and surprising those who follow Turkish affairs, myself included, is the issue of Turkish Alawites. During the recent period — especially since the outbreak of the Syrian revolution and the start of clashes between rebel forces and the authorities — Turkish Alawites have developed their own positions and made movements, specifically those in the Province of Hatay.

    In this province, Turkish Alawites have held demonstrations and have often clashed with Syrian refugees. A large Turkish (and Kurdish) Alawite minority lives in other areas in Anatolia, extending to Istanbul. This minority is estimated to constitute 12-15% of the 75 million Turkish citizens, according to some non-Alawites, and 20-25%, according to some Alawite institutions that now speak on behalf of that population.

    As I have said repeatedly, the exact number of Alawites inside Turkey lies somewhere between these conflicting figures, as is the case with the percentage of Copts in Egypt or the Shiites in Pakistan.

    However, the point worth raising is related to the prevalent idea often circulated verbally or in writing by Arab or Western observers of Turkish affairs, which is that the Arab Alawites in the areas of Iskenderun, Antakya and Ersuz differ religiously from the Turkish Alawites — the idea that they are not one “confession.”

    This widespread stereotype, I humbly claim based on my personal observations and readings, is incorrect. There may be some differences in their rituals as a result of nationalist Turkish-Arab-Kurdish (and Albanian) differences, but the content of the teachings is one.

    This is evidenced by the accounts of many Turkish and Western sociologists, who have publications in the Turkish language or translated into English in Turkish libraries. Some of these sociologists have attended religious gatherings, described them and reported on some of the sect’s religious texts.

    Here, two things are to be taken into account:

    First, when the modern Turkish state was born in 1923, millions of Anatolian peasants — including Alawites — moved to the big cities, especially Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara. This resulted in a new phenomenon among the Alawites.

    They publicly opened centers of worship in the big cities, calling these centers dirjas. There, they conducted their prayers, or at least the portion of which they chose to make public — what they called their “interpretation of Islam.” The relative Alawite openness about their religion was the result of Turkish democratic, social and economic modernity.

    I visited the Asian portion of Istanbul along with Folia Atasan, a Sunni Turkish friend and a sociology professor and researcher specializing in religious social studies. I saw what goes on in the dirjas there. I saw the Alawites practice their “very private ”religious rituals not in secret, but in public.

    Second, the Ottoman-era historic divisions of the Alawites in Turkey came from two sources: the popular base and the elite. The popular base are the historically isolated mountain peasants, which are the majority. The elite are of Sunni-Sufi-Bektashi origin, to which the Sunni Janissaries belonged. After the Janissaries in Istanbul were dissolved in 1826, they became a secretive Alawite sect found in the cities, especially the Balkan cities.

    Two things resulted from the Turkish experience. First of all, the Alawites became more socially integrated, whereby Alawite rituals became more public. Secondly, a unified Turkish trans-ethnic identity appeared. The Alawites spread out throughout Turkey.

    Even though they have always requested religious recognition, they have never had political demands. In the current political atmosphere, we should monitor the rise of the fundamentalist Sunni currents in the region and see whether they will have positive or negative effects in light of the Turkish involvement in the Arab transformation.

    The Islamist rise is a long-term danger to the Turkish modernist experience. It is not an imminent danger, despite the warnings of Turkish commentators. The bigger danger to Turkey’s cohesion and territorial integrity is the worsening Kurdish issue and the military confrontations happening in many areas.

    A commentator for Azzaman newspaper, Ihsan Dagi, said that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) now considers the Kurds to be “the new other” after it triumphed over “the first other,” i.e. the military guardianship over the state and society.

    He also said that the Kurds will be a major issue for Turkey for a long time to come. With the escalation of the armed Kurdish operations, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the AKP have adopted an ultra-nationalist classical “Ataturkian” discourse with regard to the Kurdish issue. Some Turkish intellectuals even spoke of “a change in the party’s identity.”

    Read more:
  • Is Turkey a Democracy?

    Is Turkey a Democracy?

    By Luke Godfrey on September 20, 2012

    Turkey is increasingly democratic, in recent years having renegotiated it’s own form of ‘social contract’ to more accurately reflect the socio-political aspirations of the population and challenge the domination of the political sphere by a secular elite. This has been facilitated by a change in the normative framework and the discrediting of the Kemalist regime. The source of legitimacy for governance is now widely understood to be ‘the masses’, long marginalised by the political elite and top-down modernisation, rather than the state, although this shift has resulted in tensions across Turkish society.

    A Definition of Democracy and Issues with Defining Democracy

    Democracy has been a contested concept since first put into practice, and over the course of history has often been viewed negatively. In this regard the context for democracy today is very different, with the concept often uncritically regarded as a universal good, rather than as a particular product of socio-political circumstance. Despite a general consensus over the positive nature of democracy in much of the world (concentrated in the West), it’s most ardent practitioners can be hard pressed to provide a definition which is not arbitrary, or simply reflecting an ethno-centric viewpoint. Often, democracy is conflated in the West with liberal values, or the concept is affixed with varying descriptions such as transitional or incomplete – these labels raise questions like why is it transitional? Is there then a universal teleological endpoint for all democracies? Additionally the instrumentalist use of ‘democracy’ such as by the USA in its invasion of Iraq has resulted in democracy “circulating as a debased currency” (Schimmter & Karl, 1991: 75). Given issues with the concept such as these it is no wonder that the meaning of democracy is highly contested and ambiguous.

    Schumpeter was one of the most influential democratic philosophers, defining democracy in terms of a specific institutional mechanism such as elections, on the grounds that the ‘common good’ was too varied/subjective (Knutsen, 2010: 110). Institutions and their associated processes are some of the common criteria for evaluating democracy, although others refer to democracy on the basis of civil rights and liberties or a social dimension related to living standards (Dalton et al, 2007: 144). Many definitions then depend on which of these frameworks or factors is prioritized – unfortunately this makes finding a definition which will find wider acceptance problematic, although Robert Dahl’s ‘polyarchy’ comes close (Dalton et al, 2007: 143). Measures such as the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Effective Democracy Index (EDI) attempt to quantify features such as the effective functioning of institutions, but are also prey to criticisms over the appropriateness of criteria used etc. (Knutsen, 2010: 113). Rather than constructing a typology, democracy should be understood as a negotiated concept, within the particular cultural and political context of a society, and with differing outcomes (Dalton et al, 2007: 152). Norms, values and institutions all play a role in the adoption, and expression of democracy – “What distinguishes democratic rulers from nondemocratic ones are the norms that condition how the former come to power and the practices that hold them accountable for their actions.” (Schimmter & Karl, 1991: 76). Schimmter & Karl identify broad participation, access to the political sphere not substantially limited by power structures or economics, and responsiveness (of the rulers) to influence from society, as integral to the concept of democracy (Schimmter & Karl, 1991: 84) and it is these criteria that will be used to evaluate the particular case of Turkey.

    An Artificial Turkish Identity

    Any discussion of democracy in Turkey requires an understanding of the socio-political context, given that some non-democratic aspects have been embedded in the state from its genesis. Since the creation of The Republic of Turkey, the state has followed the path of secular modernisation, along Western lines, as set out by Kemal Ataturk. This prioritised the creation of a strong and homogenised nation-state, led by a political elite, whilst the military assumed the ‘guardianship’ of a constructed Turkish identity as well as more conventional security duties (Bulut, 2006: 128). This top-down approach marginalised the positions of those outside of the elite, meaning there was no need to reconcile the different perspectives and interests of wider society (Gurbey, 2006b: 9). Legitimacy lay in the military and the state by virtue of the their role in the struggle for independence, rather than based on participation. Nationalism and construction of the ‘Other’ (usually Kurds and other non-Turkish identities) has for much of Turkish history been the primary means of political reproduction, allowing an elite to remain in control through casting others as a threat to the state (Bulut, 2006: 127) – a particularly effective tactic whilst the state enjoyed support as legitimate in and of itself, this meta-politics characterised as “derlin devlet” – the profound state (Gurbey, 2006a: 158).

    The Turkish nation-state, and identity was a product of top-down control by the elite, rather than an organic product of society. This goes some way towards explaining the authoritarian structures of Turkish society up to the present day – they were validated by the legitimacy of the army and the state, but were also a requirement in the artificial construction of communal identity by Kemal Ataturk and his followers. The creation of the Turkish state brought together a wide range of groups and identities including two distinct groups, the Kurds and the Alevi’s, but which were seen a threat to the strong nation-state and homogeneous Turkish identity. This perception of identities other than Turkish as a threat led to the institutionalism of suppression of those identities and autonomous civil society by the state (Gurbey, 2006b: 3). The state has long denied the legitimacy of groups that threaten the centralised authority and position of the elites (Gurbey, 2006b: 16), alienating and polarising large sections of society (Ahmadov, 2008: 18). An institutionalised and undemocratic Kemalist regime lies at the heart of the Turkish state, illustrated by bodies such as the National Security Council – “Established by Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution, the Council provides the military high command the opportunity to influence, pressure, and often dictate to the government in matters of national security [security defined very broadly].” (Ayoob, 2004: 458).

    The Role of Religion and Fundamental Schisms in Turkish Identity

    One of the key parts of the modernising project was the idea of a secular state, and this has been one of the flashpoints for societal tensions and coup d’état in Turkey, making it also key to the understanding of democracy in Turkey. The 1921 constitution sidelined and dismantled much of the social structure of religious society (Carkoglu & Kalaycioglu, 2007: 13). The division of Turkish identity from the religiosity of much of society created a paradox at the heart of the state, and one that was emphasised by the disparity in both power and perspectives between the secular centre and the more religious periphery (Carkoglu & Kalaycioglu, 2007: 66). Although few appear to support an Islamic state many regard religious people as oppressed by the state (Carkoglu & Kalaycioglu, 2007: 159). Secularism takes a unique form in Turkey, aggressive rather than neutral, with the state actively attempting to suppress independent expressions of religion across the public/private divide (Seufert, 2006: 137). Despite the construction of Political Islam as the ‘Other’, it has also been instrumentalised by the state, from the time of independence where Islam was a factor in the support of the Kurds and Alevi’s of the liberation struggle to the current day. Rather than the state being wholly secular it has a large department, the Diyamet, which co-opts and subjugates religion in Turkey through control of mosques and approved teachings etc. (Seufert, 2006: 139).

    Religion, like other aspects of Turkish society, is held subservient to the needs of the state, and the contradiction of a denial of religion whilst it remains a key part of society feeds the need for authoritarian methods of control given that this contradicts the norms and values underpinning attitudes amongst much of the population (Ayoob, 2004: 451). “The dichotomy between Islam and Turkish national identity is largely the creation of the secular elite, which considers itself to be the repository of Kemalist wisdom.” (Ayoob, 2004: 456). Unless the two can be reconciled the conflict between the two will remain a key obstacle to democratisation in Turkey, state structures and legislation imposing constrictions on much of society. This conclusion can be illustrated by the recent example of the Welfare Party, which was limited by the ‘February 28th Process’ and then closed down on the basis that it was a threat to the constitutive principles of the Turkish state (Gurbey, 2006b: 16). The AKP has made some progress in breaking down the artificial construction of Islam as a threat to the nation-state, and this will be discussed further in section 5.

    Economic Failures and the Undermining of Legitimacy

    Turkey has had a tradition of political participation dating back to the 1840′s, and elections were embedded in society by 1945, to an extent (Carkoglu & Kalaycioglu, 2007: 13). However politics until recently remained dominated by an elite, participation and access remaining constrained, with parties regularly outlawed and coup d’états against elected officials on the basis of the militaries status as ‘guardians’ of the constitutive principles of the state (Bulut, 2006: 127).  Leading up to the economic crash the secularist parties remained hostile to wider political participation and scrutiny of their actions, the system remaining on of closed patronage and alienating those isolated from it (Carkoglu & Kalaycioglu, 2007: 139). As the establishment appeared unable to meet the needs and expectations to manage the economic crisis this contributed to a further reduction in legitimacy for the status-quo system. The constructed Others, including the spectre of Political Islam, lost their salience as important issues for many voters, in part due to the state’s own success in eliminating threats such as the PKK leader Ocalan.

    More immediate economic problems came to the forefront, the Kemalist regime and associated parties discredited by their mismanagement, whilst the state lost it’s somewhat deified status as a result of reliance on the EU and IMF for rescue (Bulut, 2006: 130/1). This weakened the Kemalist discourse, but did not topple it entirely – instead there are dual forms of legitimacy contesting the other, the AKP drawing it’s legitimacy from democratic participation to push it’s agenda (Gurbey, 2006a: 158). It is these failures of the state which created the opening for new forms of governance, via democratic processes rather than the authoritarian state which brought about the economic crisis. “Turkish society was in search of an option that would offer something new and it wanted politics that addressed it’s worries and longings, not those of the rulers.” (Meral, 2010: 8). From 2001 the state could no longer operate in isolation from society, and as such can no longer oppose democratic reforms with the same degree of effectiveness as it lacks the legitimacy to do so in the face of a politicised and dissatisfied public.

    The AKP and a Hostile State

    The AKP’s election was not regarded by all as a step forwards for democracy, given it’s ‘mildly’ Islamist character it was suggested by many that the party was simply biding it’s time until it could convert Turkey to an Islamist theocracy. Commentators in the West regarded the 2002 with alarm, due to their own prejudiced perspectives against Islam (Meral, 2010: 20). However the AKP has positioned itself behind democratic values and human rights, focusing on political advantage rather than religious issues explicitly (Seufert, 2006: 144). By doing so the AKP has a position from which it can attack the Kemalist elite, whilst defending itself from accusations of wanting to ‘Islamise’ the state (Dagi, 2008: 28). Although it has introduced reforms from this position it has been occupied in power struggles with ‘the deep state’ and has to operate within the structure of a state which is largely hostile to it, battles in the courts and public statements illustrating the breadth of the struggle (Meral, 2010: 25). Organs such as the President’s office, when held by Ahmet Necdet Sezer vetoed legislation in the name of the state, in opposition of democratic processes (Meral, 2010: 10). The AKP has, and continues to compete against institutions, which derive their legitimacy from the Kemalist state, and the military imposed constitution. After nearing ten years in power the AKP is still seen by some as half-heartedly committed to democracy, with reforms not going far enough or addressing the right issues (Meral, 2010: 17).  The limited progress may stem from the continuing struggle with hostile elements such as the judiciary and military. Constitutional reform was watered down by the Constitutional Court, and only passed through referendum when it was fully blocked by the state apparatus – again illustrating the division of power and legitimacy in Turkish politics (Meral, 2010: 15). Despite progress in democratic reforms, to the extent that the EU opened accession negotiations, concerns are raised by some of the actions of the AKP – “Erdogan’s Putin-like power reflexes included pressure on the media and punishment of those that were critical of the AKP.” (Meral, 2010: 18). However, despite incidents with the media etc. the AKP has demonstrated a stronger commitment to democratic practices that it’s predecessors. “It has also demonstrated that the assumed dichotomy between secularism and democracy conjured up by the Kemalist elite in order to justify authoritarian secularism is false.” (Ayoob, 2004: 463). After winning 3 elections it shows that it reflects the aims and aspirations of society, whilst the reactive Kemalist  & military elites do not.

    The Challenge of Minorities

    Central to the evaluation of democracy in Turkey is the treatment of minorities with identities independent of the national Turkish one. For this the Kurdish minority are taken to be representative. On this front the signs are not as encouraging, with the AKP attempting little more than symbolic reform, leaving in place restrictions on minority access and participation. This can be seen in the AKP’s flirtation with easing restrictions on minority issues, which have not achieved much other than cosmetic reforms such as allowing television to broadcast in Kurdish. Extensive restrictions on Kurdish expression, from statutory limitations to violence show just how far this area still has to come, and this failure undermines democratic standards elsewhere (Gurbey, 2006a: 160).

    “However, some demonstrations in the south-east of the country related to the Kurdish issue continued to be marred by violence. Difficulties with the implementation of the Law on the duties and legal powers of the police, adopted in 2007, are still being reported, especially in the south-east. Impunity remains a problem for effective judicial and administrative investigations against members of the security forces who are involved in excessive use of force.” (Commission, 2010: 21).

    This short extract from the European Commission shows some of the issues and restrictions still facing minorities, both formal and informal. An AKP amnesty for ex-PKK fighters was not upheld, undermining the view that Turkey could come to accept pluralism and diversity outside of the homogeneous Turkish identity (Meral, 2010: 14). The ten per cent nationwide margin for parties has left a substantial portion of the population unrepresented in electoral politics since 1987 (Carkoglu & Kalaycioglu, 2007: 40), parties are still closed down by the state, and restrictions on civil association remain.  “Despite the reforms, the Turkish policy towards the Kurds remains full of contradictions.” (Gurbey, 2006a: 161). Similar restrictions affect the Alevi’s who practice a different variant of Islam to the one endorsed by the state. In December 2010 the Constitutional Court dissolved the Democratic Society Party, banning 37 members for acting against the ‘indivisible’ state, setting back the administrations ‘democratic opening’ for engaging with minorities (Commission, 2010: 7).

    Conclusions

    Today much of Turkey’s political system can be characterised as being democratic, and particularly under the AKP has been making considerable steps in further reforms. Both formal and informal participation in politics is quite high, surpassing some of the ‘consolidated’ democracies of the West (Carkoglu & Kalaycioglu, 2007: 18). A pluralist political structure allows for motivated actors to interact with the state to a greater extent than under previous administrations (Carkoglu & Kalaycioglu, 2007: 109). Despite progress there is still the potential for the military to intervene, and there is ‘repression potential’ latent in the political/legislative structure of the state (Carkoglu & Kalaycioglu, 2007: 111). Reforms have chipped away at the authoritarian structures built up over the years, but the process is likely to remain in flux as different groups compete in interpretations of the constitutive principles of the state (Gurbey 2006a: 157). The difficulty facing the AKP in reforming a constitution imposed by the military, despite their own democratic mandate, shows just how strongly some aspects of the Kemalist regime are embedded in the state structures. That they succeeded is a positive step – in Erdogan’s own words, “We have passed a historic threshold on the way to advanced democracy and the supremacy of law,” (Erdogan, 13/09/2010). The European Commission was less ebullient “Overall, the constitutional amendments are a step in the right direction . . . However, broad public consultation involving all political parties and civil society, with their full engagement, is needed to strengthen support for constitutional reform.” (Commission, 2010: 8). Elected bodies though are still restricted by this wider structure, the Kemalist value framework dominating discussion of constitutive aspects of the state. In the case of the AKP it is more tightly prescribed in case of a repeat of the February 28th Process, with court cases already brought along these lines although they were unsuccessful (Meral, 2010: 25). In the cases of minorities such as the Kurds Turkey still fails to apply the same democratic standards as in wider society, and this is one of the failings which must be addressed if Turkey is to call itself democratic rather than democratising. A characterisation such as “The wave of democratisation that swept over much of the world in the 1990′s appears to have bypassed Turkey.” (Kubicek, 2001: 34) now appears mistaken, but it would be equally mistaken to say that Turkey is on it’s inexorable way to full democracy (however it is defined). Instead the situation is fluid and may move towards further democratisation or away from it, especially given the ‘strained’ political situation in the words of the European Commission (Commission, 2010: 7). On the current analysis Turkey is largely democratic, allowing for participation and access through regular elections and other representative systems that help to determine the political discourse, and in a way seen as legitimate by most of society despite some key limitations in the areas of minorities and the influence of appointed rather than elected officials.

    Bibliography                                                                   

    Ahmadov, R. (2008) ‘Counter Transformations in the Center and Periphery of Turkish Society and the Rise of the Justice and Development Party’. Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol. 7, No. 2 & 3,  pp. 15-36

    Ayoob, M. (2004) ‘Turkey’s Multiple Paradoxes’. Published by Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Policy Research Institute.  pp. 451-463

    Bulut, E. (2006) ‘The social grammar of populist nationalism’. In ‘Turkey beyond nationalism: towards post-nationalist identities’. Edited by Kieser H-L. pp. 125-135. London, I.B. Tauris.

    Carkoglu, A., & Kalaycioglu, E. (2007). ‘Turkish democracy today’. London, I.B. Tauris.

    Dagi I. (2008) ‘Turkey’s AKP in Power’ Journal of Democracy, Volume 19, Number 3,  pp. 25-30

    Dalton, J.R. Shin, D.C. and Jou, W. (2007) ‘Understanding Democracy: Data from Unlikely Places’ Journal of Democracy, Volume 18, Number 4,  pp. 142-156

    European Commission (2010). Commission Staff Working Document: Turkey 2010 Report. Brussels, 9th November.

    Gunter, S. (2006) ‘Religion: nation-building instrument of the state or factor of civil society? The AKP between state- and society-centred religious politics’. In ‘Turkey beyond nationalism: towards post-nationalist identities’. Edited by Kieser H-L. pp. 136-146. London, I.B. Tauris.

    Gurbey, G. (a) (2006) ‘The urgency of post-nationalist perspectives: “Turkey for the Turks” or an open society?’. In ‘Turkey beyond nationalism: towards post-nationalist identities’. Edited by Kieser H-L. pp. 155-166. London, I.B. Tauris.

    Gürbey, S. (b) (2006) ‘Civil Society and Islam in Turkey’ Graduate Student Conference, Columbia University pp. 1-24

    Knutsen, C.H. (2010) ‘Measuring Effective Democracy’. International Political Science Review, 31: 109 pp.109-128

    Kubicek, P. (2001) ‘The Earthquake, Europe, and Prospects for Political Change in Turkey’. Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 pp. 34-47

    Meral, Z. (2010) ‘Prospects for Turkey’ Legatum Institute. pp.1-64

    Schmitter, P. C. & Karl, T. L. (1991) ‘What Democracy Is . . . and Is Not’. Journal of Democracy, Volume 2, Number 3,  pp. 75-88

    —

    Written by: Luke Godfrey
    Written at: Aberystwyth University
    Written for: Dr. Ayla Gol
    Date written: 04/2011

  • The Irada Story

    The Irada Story

    Islamic calligraphy is one of the highest forms of art that man has ever known. It venerates both the beauty and the majesty of Allah, His Book, and His Messenger, honoring the most blessed words from the most blessed of all creation and carrying with them his nur.

    Over the years, many other forms of Islamic art came to ornament these blessed words, and thus the art of calligraphy became more characterized by their beauty than their majesty.

    However, not always. Walking towards the Old Mosque (Eski Camii) in Edirne, Turkey, you’ll find something quite striking from a distance—numerous calligraphy pieces painted directly on the wall, larger than life. They are simple. They are majestic. They are stunning to behold. This mosque, one of the oldest of Ottoman history, captures the spirit of the early Sufi-sultans who established this legendary empire.

    It is in this spirit, we set out on a quest to capture the beauty of Islamic calligraphy combined with reviving the tradition of large majestic calligraphy directly on the wall and bring it into your home, as a reminder that helps us proceed forward, as a meaning of our ultimate purpose, as an expression of hearts longing for the Divine. Or in other words, increasing one’s Irada.

    The word Irada means to strive for something one wants or desires. Or, in a spiritual context, meaning striving for the Divine. With Irada Arts on your wall, this is what we aim to increase. With constant gentle reminders that are beautiful to look at and have a large majestic presence that cannot be overlooked, Irada Arts directs you to strive for what you want. Your walls talk, conveying to you messages that speak to your heart.

    The end result was Irada: Islamic Wall Arts.

    Irada: Islamic Wall Arts are quotes from Quran, Hadith, Islamic Poetry, Wise Sayings of the Pious, and so on, designed in English or Arabic, or both, of various sizes that can be applied onto the wall, seeming to the viewer as if calligraphy is painted directly on the wall.

    We think “outside the frame.” By removing the “frame” of traditional calligraphy and increasing the size of the calligraphy piece, the walls act as the frame. The effect is a beautiful piece of calligraphy whose majesty and presence is felt. The walls speak to you, addressing those who will listen, reminding those who forget, and helping us all proceed. With Irada, transform your home, office, or school into a profound place of inner worship.

    via The Irada Story.

  • Yavuz Baydar: Facing Turkey’s Past: Struma and 1915

    Yavuz Baydar: Facing Turkey’s Past: Struma and 1915

    Apology, in my opinion, is secondary. First and foremost, the emphasis should be on this society’s courage to face the sins of the past. We were deprived of it until today. This is a frightened society. I am not ashamed to say this: We were fed this fear, we were scared throughout all our lives. Our ruling system has been based on fear. We have to change that. The only way is to confront our past.

    These are the words of İshak Alaton, a prominent octogenarian Turkish businessman of Jewish origin. After releasing his memoirs not so long ago, Alaton has become more and more vocal, calling endlessly for an end to the bloody Kurdish conflict as one of the “wise men” ready to be part of a dialogue on reconciliation, asking for the courage to face the crimes that were committed during the collapse of Ottoman rule and asking citizens to speak out.

    When a ship called the Struma was dragged to the port of Old İstanbul in 1941, Alaton was a 15-year-old witness to the agony onboard. The 60-year-old vessel was the last hope of 769 Romanian Jews fleeing the Nazis, but its engines had stopped at the Black Sea end of the Bosporus. The issue led to pressure on Ankara from Adolf Hitler’s regime, and after 72 days of despair, the Struma was sent by Turkish authorities back into the Black Sea, where it was torpedoed by the Soviet navy. Only one person survived.

    “Those responsible for this in Ankara are, to my mind, murderers. This society, of which I am a part, has a problem with hiding from its past. We pretend that if we lock them away the problems will be gone. But the corpses that rot in there poison the air that we breathe. Is any serenity possible without confrontation? Let us do it, so that we can make peace with the past.”

    The Struma disaster, a hidden episode in the republic’s history, is the subject of a new book written by Halit Kakınç, and its preface is written by, yes, Alaton himself.

    It is not for nothing the subject of “genies out of the bottle.” is to persist on the agenda of Turkey, opened up in a sort of “Turkish perestroika” by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the past decade.

    And, only days after the release of the Struma book, another hit the shelves — a potential intellectual bombshell.

    “1915: Armenian Genocide” is its title and, not only due to its cover but also its groundbreaking content, it overwhelms many others on the subject that have been published. What makes the book outstanding and unique is that it was written by Hasan Cemal, an internationally renowned editor and columnist who is the grandson of Cemal Pasha.

    This kinship is key to understanding the book’s historic significance: Cemal Pasha was a member of the triumvirate, whose other parts were Talat and Enver Pasha, responsible for the Great Armenian Tragedy, which started with a mass deportation of Ottoman Armenians from their homelands and ended with their annihilation between 1915 through 1916.

    In his account, Hasan Cemal concludes it was genocide. He does not intend, or pretend, to argue his case like a historian would. His is a painful intellectual journey that takes us through his own evolution, a rather ruthless self-scrutiny of his intellectual past that amounts to an invaluable piece of private archeology.

    He has done this before. In other books, he questioned his “militarist revolutionary” past (in the ’60s and’70s), confronting boldly his own mistakes — his deep disbelief in democracy, plotting coups, his experience as newspaper editor, etc.

    But this one is even more personal.

    “It was the pain of Hrant Dink which made me write this book,” he told the press. Dink was a dear Turkish-Armenian colleague to many of us, as he was to Cemal. He was assassinated in broad daylight on a street of Istanbul by a lone gunman in January 2007, sending shockwaves around the world.

    “Look at my age; it’s been years and years that I have defended the freedom of expression. But should I keep secret some of my opinions, only for myself? Should I still have some taboos of my own? Should I still remain unliberated? Is it not a shame on me, Hasan Cemal?”

    In the preface, he writes: “We cannot remain silent before the bitter truths of the past. We cannot let the past hold the present captive. Also, the pain of 1915 does not belong to the past, it is an issue of today. We can only make peace with history, but not an ‘invented’ or ‘distorted’ history like ours, and reach liberty.”

    The pain of Dink’s memory — which scarred many of us so eternally — may have been a crucial point for it, but by turning a “personal taboo-breaking” into a public one, Cemal opened a huge hole in the wall of denial of the state. It broke another mental dam.

    This bold exercise in freedom of speech will, in time, pave the way for the correct path. It is up to the individuals of Turkey to do the same, and bow before their consciences. Perhaps this is why there has been such silence over this book in the days since its publication. It is also very difficult to find in bookstores. There are rumors that some chains are refusing to sell it. This may be true, but it cannot now be unpublished.

    The genie is out of the bottle but the ghosts of the past are also very much alive. The “silent treatment” is proof of that. If anything, it shows how frightened people are. Not only does the state owe an apology for the past, but an even bigger apology is necessary for enforcing, decade after decade, a mass internalization of denialism in this country.

    via Yavuz Baydar: Facing Turkey’s Past: Struma and 1915.

  • Headless Roman Statues Found In Turkey Show Antiquities’ Reuse

    Headless Roman Statues Found In Turkey Show Antiquities’ Reuse

    By: Stephanie Pappas, LiveScience Senior Writer

    Published: 09/18/2012 08:21 AM EDT on LiveScience

    Two headless Roman statues have been discovered holding up a medieval-era platform in Turkey — an example of antiquities being reused by later generations as humble building material.

    The ancient statues have lost their heads, but their clothing suggests that one was a representation of a local notable and the other an imperial office-holder, said R.R.R. Smith, who directs the New York University Excavations at Aphrodisias, an ancient Roman city in what is now Turkey. One statue dates back to about A.D. 200, while the other is from A.D. 450 or so. They were likely recycled by the 600s, Smith told LiveScience.

    “Preliminary study of the pottery associated with the deposition of the statues suggests they were built into the platform already in the seventh century,” Smith said. “That is, in the immediately ‘post-antique’ early medieval period.”

    Aphrodisias was near a marble quarry, and its statuary art flourished between about 30 B.C. and A.D. 600, during the era of the Roman Empire. Since 2008, Smith and his colleagues have been excavating “Tetrapylon Street,” a city boulevard that ran from the city’s sanctuary of the goddess Aphrodite to a major temple called the Sebasteion. The dig has turned up signs of what Smith called a “major conflagration” — collapsed columns, broken glass, fragmented mosaics and burned wood all in a chaotic mix. In August, archaeologists excavating above this layer of destruction found a built-up platform with two headless statues, positioned at a right angle from one another, used as a foundation. [See Images of the Statues and Dig Site]

    The speaker and the governor

    The near life-size statues probably lost their heads before they were repurposed as building material, Smith said. But even without faces, the statues tell a tale. The first, the one likely sculpted around A.D. 200, wears a cloak and tunic, the uniform of a notable citizen. The man was sculpted in a rhetorical posture, his right hand gesturing as if in mid-speech and his left hand grasping a carved scroll so detailed that the spiraling rolls of papyrus are visible.

    via Headless Roman Statues Found In Turkey Show Antiquities’ Reuse.