Concerning “Turkey and Armenia at Loggerheads”[1]: Why Turkey should not do what David.L.Ellis recommends

Ali Hikmet ALP, Retired Ambassador:

Former Permanent Representative of Turkey to OSCE and the Minsk Group,former ambassador to China; former foreign policy adviser to the prime minister:

 

 

Several Western scholars continue to publish articles (rather pro-Armenian) about Turkish-Armenian relations, without scantiest attention to abundant documentation proving the falsity of the Armenian Diaspora’s one sided views and simple common sense. The failure of the initiative of the two governments to start a breakthrough in the present stalemate served as a new occasion for such attempts. Both governments knew well that the so called “Protocols” were political documents intentionally drafted in not-so-clear terms, to lessen underlying harmful political consequences and risks. That failure is course lamentable, but views expressed by some “scholars”, including the one written by David L.Phillips, Director of an Institute in the Columbia University, deserves a special attention as a good example of superficiality and wishful thinking.

Here are a few reasons why his views do not carry any depth and objectivity:

• The negative role of the Armenian constitutional court and the passive stand of the Armenian Government: Anybody familiar with international law and relations, in particular if he or she is not fully engaged ideologically or emotionally to a certain view, cannot fail to see that the responsibility of the failure of the so-called  “Protocols initiative” is not on the Turkish side, severely criticized by a majority of its own public opinion. Armenian Government had signed the so-called “Protocols” unwillingly, has brought them (knowing well the eventual outcome) to Constitutional Court, which attached several conditions contradicting the basic purpose of the operation, built on a painful step by step political solutions. Once the highest legal authority of Armenia declares them unlawful (on the basis of the preamble of the constitutional law), the only logical conclusion one can draw is that Armenian government cannot fulfill its obligations, including among others, a meaning full examination by a commission of historians the 1915 events and  initiation of a partial withdrawal from the occupied territories. Members of the Court knew well that the genocide thesis, being legally invalid unless the verdict is issued by a legitimate and impartial court according to international law, would be further worn out by the evidences and arguments presented by historians. In others words, the dominant Armenian position, “Accept first the guilt, then we may speak about what to do”, would be further eroded.  One of the main reasons for Turkey to ratify the protocols (and to restore relations) being thus undermined, nobody could anymore expect their approval in the Turkish Parliament.
• Armenian motives: It became obvious that even the recognition of “genocide” will not satisfy the majority on the Armenian side, which seeks compensation, reparations and even transfer of population. For the Turkish side such demands are not legally and politically possible, since the Turkish Government of that period had recognized for the displaced Armenians the right to return and to recover their property in two years period. Several of them (already immigrants to the USA, Europe and Russia) came in, sold their properties and left Turkey. The remaining property under the custody of the Government has been transferred to the ownership of the locals, mainly Kurdish population living in the area (Note that similar legislation is in force in the USA and Canada). An agreement was concluded between Turkey and the USA concerning the reparations to US citizens for the lost property. Turkey made the payments and the USA government certified that it has no more claims against Turkey.
• Azerbaijan factor: Mr.Phillips cannot be unaware of the special ties between Turkey and Azerbaijan. The conditionality of the Karabagh issue and other occupied territories for the full restoration of relations, although not expressed openly for political reasons, was one of the implied issues. Care was taken not to write them down in a manner liable to hurt the well known sensitivities. In fact, by accepting such wordings (something like the start of the withdrawal from Azerbaijan territories outside of Karabagh) the Turkish government showed a remarkable flexibility in order to facilitate an agreement. Prof.Phillips should know that positions of Turkey and Azerbaijan on this issue are legitimate, even the UN has recognized the illegality of the occupation.
• Effect of the normalization of relations on Armenia: It is presumed that normalization of formal relations between Turkey and Armenia will help a shift of Armenia towards the West. Such views are not supported by realities: Armenia is a military bastion of Russia, which has all the means (political, military and economic) to prevent the shift. Armenia’s alliance with Russia and basing facilities it offers are of vital importance for the Russian hegemony in the Caucasus and for its military influence in the Middle East. More than one million Armenians live in Russia; all important industries are in the hands of Russia or Russian companies (a price paid by Kotcharian government in Exchange of Russian support against Azerbaijan and Turkey). Armenia and its Diaspora, with their totally unrealistic, but easily exploitable belief of a “Turkish threat”, have volunteered for such an alliance.
• Stakes for Turkey and the Azerbaijan factor: Absence since 1992 of any concrete and sustainable progress on the issue of occupied territories is the main problem but it is not the only one.  The inflexible Armenian positions towards Turkey and Azerbaijan also on other issues pose additional hurdles on the road towards normalization. With the “Protocols” affair it became once again evident that Turkish moves and concessions without tangible quid pro from Armenian side will carry serious political risks for the government. Turkey cannot harm its relations with Azerbaijan for the sake of dubious improvements in its relations with Armenia.  Even if the deep cultural affinity and kinship between the Turks and Azerbaijanis are set aside, any move from the Turkish side harming seriously Azeri interests (and the change of position on the occupied territories would be the most salient one) cannot make sense in terms of political-strategic implications and economic benefits. Even the average Turkish citizen realizes the absurdity for Turkey to take the risk of undermining its very important economic interests with Azerbaijan, in exchange of meager potential benefits of normalization with Armenia. The undergoing gas and oil projects are best examples, while they do not tell the whole story.
• Present state of relations with Armenia: One should remember that Turkey was among the first to recognize the independent statehood of Armenia. In Armenia’s weakest periods before the Karabagh conflict, Turkey aided its neighbor also materially. However Armenia, still a safe haven for terrorists who killed dozens of Turkish diplomats, consistently followed anti-Turkish policies. The response of the Turkish governments has been much milder than one would expect, despite the absence of any signal that unilateral concessions from Turkey will serve to soften Armenian policies and claims. In the Western media,it is often said that Turkey imposes embargo on the trade with Armenia. This is wrong: Exports and imports are not prohibited, Turkish products are sold in Armenia (According to Wikipedia the volume of trade between Turkey and Armenia was $210 mil. In 2010). Even the illegal Armenian workers (estimated betwen40-60.000) in Turkey are tolerated. The problem for Armenia is not the trade embargo but cost increases resulting from transportation through Georgia. From Turkish perspective, there is not anything wrong with an indirect support to Georgian economy. Claims or expectation (supported by some in the bordering Turkish ‘vilayets’) that opening of the border will provide substantial economic benefits for Turkey cannot be correct. Armenian purchasing power is very low and it does not have much to sell to Turkey. The following World Bank figures give an idea about the size of the potential comparative benefits: In 2010. Per capita income in Armenia was about $3.000 for a population of 2.600.000, while for Azerbaijan it is $10.600 for a population over 9 million. Turkish enterprises are well established in Azerbaijan, but for them Armenia is a hostile territory.
• For Armenia the problem is more than closed land border: By occupying Karabagh and adjoining Azerbaijan territories and refusing anything less than annexation Armenia kept itself out of the Caucasian economic and political integration. For this mistake and lost opportunities nobody but itself is to be blamed. Oil and gas export routes which pass now through Georgia could have more easily and economically pass through Armenia, providing a non-negligible income. Although it receives substantial foreign aid from the USA, EU and its Diaspora, aid cannot replace the domestic productivity, particularly for a land-locked country without rich natural resources. The so-called “Turkish threat” is non-existent. Can anyone show a credible reason why Turkey would want to destroy Armenia? That “threat” is no more than a pretext for rapprochement and military alliance with Russia, in order to get Russian support to keep under occupation the territory of a neighbor, regardless of additional burdens for its political standing and economy. Turkey is in no way responsible for the ultra nationalistic Armenian policies and has no obligation, politically and morally, to make one-sided concessions unless Armenia behaves as a normal state and neighbor. It can get the support of the Christian countries for allegations of genocide but this and similar policies cannot have much beneficial effect on the living standards of its people.

 

We do not believe that on issues of moral responsibility Turkey needs the advice of Prof. Phillips, but he may try to be helpful to his own government, for example concerning the Middle East.

 

Ali Hikmet Alp, Former ambassador of Turkey to OSCE

https://www.zoominfo.com/people/Ali/Alp