Armenians, Just as Bulgarians,

Should Demand Compensation from Turkey

Publisher, The California Courier

Bojidar Dimitrov, Bulgaria’s Minister in charge of the Agency for Bulgarians Abroad, stirred a hornet’s nest at the start of the new year by threatening to block Turkey’s accession to the European Union (EU), unless it paid billions of dollars in compensation for Bulgarians who were forcefully displaced during the Ottoman era.

Dimitrov said Turkey owed Bulgaria $20 billion for expelling hundreds of thousands of ethnic Bulgarians in 1913. The Republic of Turkey, which was founded in 1923, had assumed the obligations of the Ottoman Empire and agreed to make reparations in a 1925 treaty. However, thus far, Bulgaria has received no compensation from the Turkish government.

“Turkey is surely able to pay this sum, after all, it’s the 16^th largest economic power in the world,” Dimitrov said, capitalizing on a statement that Turkish officials often make, bragging about their country’s economic strength!

Dimitrov disclosed that the payment of compensation as required by the 1925 treaty is one of Bulgaria’s three pre-conditions in order not to veto Turkey’s admission to the EU. The other two pre-conditions involve energy and water management issues.

Veselin Ninov, a Bulgarian government spokesman, confirmed to the EUobserver on January 4, that Dimitrov’s announcement represented official state policy. He revealed that the dispute was being handled by a “Bulgarian-Turkish intergovernmental working group” and that Prime Minister Boyko Borissov would raise the compensation issue during his upcoming visit to Turkey.

Turkish officials reacted quickly and harshly! Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, repeating the same baseless accusations that Turkish leaders often make regarding the Armenian Genocide, alleged that the Turks suffered as much as the Bulgarians during that period. According to Zaman newspaper, Davutoglu warned that Bulgaria’s demands for compensation might harm bilateral relations, although, he confirmed that the two countries have been discussing “issues relevant to the mass transfers of Turks and Bulgarians during the last days of the Ottoman Empire.”

Bulgarian officials immediately backed down realizing that an open confrontation with Turkey on this issue may not be as beneficial to them as quiet, behind closed doors negotiations. Bulgaria’s Deputy Foreign Minister Marin Raykov sought to downplay Dimitrov’s demands by stating that his country did not make Turkey’s EU bid conditional on the resolution of the compensation issue for displaced persons. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Borissov rebuked Dimitrov, threatening to fire him should he make a similar statement in the future without first consulting him.

Minister Dimitrov quickly apologized in order to retain his job. Press official Veselin Ninov, however, was not as fortunate. He was fired for endorsing Dimitrov’s earlier statement.

For the time being, Bulgaria’s leaders may find it premature to openly link their demands for compensation from Turkey to its bid for EU membership, even though many Bulgarians have persistently demanded such reparations for decades. Consequently, this issue is bound to remain on the agenda of the two countries, undermining Turkey’s oft-stated claim that it has zero-problems or disputes with its neighbors.

Despite Prime Minister Borissov’s disclaimer, Bulgaria has now added yet another wrinkle to Turkey’s bid for EU membership which is becoming increasingly elusive. Already several European countries such as France, Germany, Holland, and Austria strongly oppose Turkey’s EU membership bid. Greece and Cyprus would not allow Turkey to join the EU, unless its troops withdraw from Northern Cyprus. Furthermore, it would be impossible for Turkey to join the EU without fulfilling one of its key requirements — open borders with all neighboring states. Turkey, thus, cannot become an EU member, unless it opens its border with Armenia, independently of the fate of the Armenia-Turkey Protocols.

Beyond the obstacles in joining the EU, Turkey is swamped with a large number of lawsuits filed against it in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Should it refuse to compensate Bulgaria for the 1913 refugees, it is likely to face more legal troubles.

However, Turkey’s record on winning lawsuits in the ECHR is not very good. It has already lost several major court cases for its occupation of Northern Cyprus. Also, Greek and Armenian minority foundations in Turkey have successfully recovered through the ECHR some of their real estate assets that were confiscated decades ago.

Encouraged by these successful lawsuits, Armenians living in Turkey and throughout Europe should seek legal redress through the ECHR for their countless losses suffered during the Genocide. Claims could be filed for the loss of personal property, bank accounts, real estate, monuments and churches.

No peace without justice!

No reconciliation without restitution!

Damage to Armenian National Interests

By Harut Sassounian [[email protected]]

Publisher, The California Courier

After months of bickering among Armenians the world over about the Armenia-Turkey Protocols, the Constitutional Court of Armenia on January 12 pronounced its judgment on whether the obligations stipulated by the Protocols comply with the constitution.

The Court’s task would have been relatively easier, if it were to simply deal with the legal aspects of the Protocols which would have required a yes or no decision followed by a brief explanation. Yet the fact that the Court’s verdict was eight pages long and contained scores of clarifications, interpretations, explanations, and restrictions, indicated that the Justices of the Court had to walk a tightrope between safeguarding Armenia’s relations with major foreign powers and minimizing the potential damage the Protocols could cause to the Armenian national interest.

Since the Court was apparently reluctant to reject outright these badly-negotiated and poorly-worded Protocols, it did the next best thing: accept the Protocols after placing a large number of restrictions on their legal interpretation and implementation. Thus, the Court’s decision partially vindicates all those who have been expressing their serious reservations regarding the negative aspects of the Protocols.

Here are some of the main interpretations and limitations that the Court placed on the Protocols:

1) The Court made all clauses of the Protocols conditional on the implementation of two main obligations: “establish diplomatic relations” and “open the common border.” The Justices thus made these two actions a necessary prerequisite for the fulfillment of all other obligations to be undertaken by Armenia and Turkey.

2) The Court narrowly interpreted the “open the common border” clause of the Protocols, indicating that Armenia was simply making a commitment “to resolve legal-organizational and institutional issues connected to safeguarding the normal operation of border checkpoints.” Significantly, the Court used the term “checkpoint” rather than “border,” thereby indirectly refusing to accord legal recognition to Armenia’s present boundary with Turkey. Since it was Turkey that closed the border, it alone is responsible for re-opening it. Armenia’s obligation, on the other hand, is limited to simply making the necessary administrative arrangements to permit passage through a checkpoint.

3) The Court ruled that only those international treaties that have been ratified under the constitution of the present Republic of Armenia could be considered legally valid. The clear implication is that border issues regulated by treaties pre-dating the Republic’s existence cannot be considered valid. This interpretation contradicts frequent Turkish declarations that the Protocols reconfirm Armenian territorial concessions to Turkey, specifically referencing the 1921 Treaty of Kars. Indeed, the Court pointedly downplayed the overall significance of these Protocols by mandating that all future treaties that establish and further develop relations between Armenia and Turkey require its specific approval.

4) The Court countered the text of the Protocols which included specific language about multilateral obligations, by asserting that the documents in question were “exclusively of a bilateral interstate nature.” The Justices thus precluded Turkey from interfering in the Karabagh (Artsakh) negotiations and making the improvement of Armenia-Turkey relations conditional on the resolution of that conflict.

5) The Court took issue with Turkish statements that the aim of the historical commission envisaged by the Protocols is to review the facts of the Armenian Genocide. The Justices clearly stated that the provisions of the Protocols could not contradict the preamble of the constitution which includes a reference to Armenia’s Declaration of Independence. Article 11 of the Declaration stated: “The Republic of Armenia stands in support of the task of achieving international recognition of the 1915 Genocide in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia.”

The key question now is what happens next?

At a minimum, the Constitutional Court has limited some of the damaging aspects of the Protocols by ruling that any laws emanating from the Protocols, after parliamentary ratification, cannot violate the constitution of the Republic of Armenia.

Of course, it would be far more preferable if the Parliament were to reject these Protocols outright. Regrettably, this is unlikely, as the Parliament is dominated by pro-government deputies. If rejection is not a possibility, the President of Armenia and the Parliament should at least consider specific reservations or changes to these Protocols in line with the Constitutional Court’s decision.

Failing that, Armenians who oppose the Protocols must pin their last hope on the Turkish Parliament’s insistence that it would not ratify the Protocols until Armenia withdraws from Artsakh. Should the Turkish Parliament not ratify the Protocols, it would be highly ironic if Armenians had to rely on Turkish actions in order to protect their national interest!