Turkish Forum

Month: December 2009

  • Krekorian defeats Essel in L.A. City Council race

    Krekorian defeats Essel in L.A. City Council race

    December 9, 2009 | 12:06 am
    Assemblyman Paul Krekorian claimed victory tonight in the bitter and expensive race for the Los Angeles City Council seat previously held by City Controller Wendy Greuel.

    Krekorian, the former head of the Burbank Board of Education who was elected to the Assembly in 2006, defeated former film executive Christine Essel by a 14% margin with all precincts reporting.

    Krekorian’s win was a major rebuke to some of the city’s most powerful unions, which flooded the race with hundreds of thousands of dollars in independent expenditures to support his rival.

    At his campaign headquarters Tuesday night,  Krekorian said voters had united around “a common vision about a city government that is marked by integrity and accountability, for starters — a city government that actually works for the people of the San Fernando Valley.”

    “We’re all going to have to continue to work together and if we do, I think this is a time that all of us will be able to look back to and say that the reform of Los Angeles began tonight,”  Krekorian said.

    Essel could not be reached for comment Tuesday night.

    Essel also outspent Krekorian 2 to 1 in Tuesday’s runoff and the primary campaign, where they faced  eight other candidates.

    Outside groups, including the Los Angeles Police Protective League and the union representing workers at the city’s Department of Water and Power, spent nearly $1 million, setting a record for independent spending in a non-citywide race — with most of that money backing Essel.

    Both candidates grew up in the San Fernando Valley but moved into the 2nd Council District, which stretches from Sherman Oaks and Studio City to Tujunga, in May to run for Greuel’s seat.
    Essel argued that her three decades of business experience at Paramount Pictures Corp. made her uniquely suited to work on retaining businesses in Los Angeles and creating jobs. Krekorian said he had a better understanding of the issues facing residents of the district, after representing some of them in the Assembly. He courted neighborhood leaders throughout the race, promising to curb development and preserve open space.

    — Maeve Reston

    Photo: Candidate Paul Krekorian with his son Andrew, 4, votes Tuesday in the special election for the Los Angeles City Council 2nd District seat in the library at Ulysses S. Grant High School in the Valley Glen neighborhood of the San Fernando Valley. Credit: Brian Vander Brug / Los Angeles Times

  • Turkish top court bans pro-Kurdish party

    Turkish top court bans pro-Kurdish party

    Turkey’s Constitutional Court has voted to ban the country’s largest pro-Kurdish party on charges of connections to a terrorist organization PKK[1].

    DTP

    Turkey’s chief prosecutor Abdurrahman Yalcinkaya argued that the Democratic Society Party (DTP) took orders from the [2] (PKK).

    The DTP is the latest in a series of pro-Kurdish parties to have been closed down in Turkey.

    The case has been criticised by the EU, which Turkey hopes to join.

    The 11 judges in the Constitutional Court ruled that the DTP had become a “focal point of activities against the indivisible unity of the state, the country and the nation”, court president Hasim Kilic told reporters.

    He said DTP leaders Ahmet Turk and Aysel Tugluk had been stripped of parliamentary immunity and banned from politics for five years along with 35 other party members.

    All party assets would be seized by the treasury, Mr Kilic added.

    The DTP holds 21 seats in Turkey’s 550-member parliament.

    Some 40,000 people have died since the PKK launched an armed campaign in 1984. However, the government has recently sought to improve ties with the Kurdish minority.

    Analysts say the court’s ruling could derail the government’s initiative.

    1-

    2-

    *edited

    BBC

  • Is Turkey the Only Real Country in Middle East?

    Is Turkey the Only Real Country in Middle East?

    Watching Turkey’s significant foreign policy initiatives these days to cement good relations with its neighbors, I think I understand why: This is the only country in the Middle East region that acts like a normal, mature country. It has both: a democratic domestic system and an activist foreign policy, notes Rami G. Khouri.

    ISTANBUL — Every time I visit Turkey I ask myself what is it that makes me marvel at the many political and economic developments that make it stand out as the most impressive country in the greater Middle East. Watching Turkey’s significant foreign policy initiatives these days to cement good relations with its neighbors, I think I understand why: This is the only country in the Middle East region that acts like a normal, mature country.

    Turkey’s mix of lively domestic politics, dynamic social and cultural life, and strong and internationally expanding economy all come together through the agency of a government that actually leads by taking initiatives, but is also held accountable to the citizens through regular elections. Turkey is the only country in the Middle East region that has both a democratic domestic system and an activist foreign policy. It is refreshing to witness this phenomenon in contrast with the largely passive and often dysfunctional countries across the Middle East.

    The critical elements in Turkey’s success that others might learn from strike me as three in particular: freedom of speech and association that allow domestic politics to proceed in the direction defined by a majority of the citizenry; civilian authority over the armed forces and security agencies; and, pragmatic, humble realism in coming to terms with the realities of a pluralistic society where minorities demand rights that the majority should acknowledge.

    Take some of this month’s leading stories, for example. An ongoing investigation is looking into accusations that a group of armed services senior officers plotted to overthrow the ruling government by creating chaos in civil society, and the media is covering daily the questioning of former top officers.

    Domestically, the political scene and its links to ethnic pluralism remain vibrant, making this one of the rare places in the region where it is not possible to predict the outcome of the next election. Unlike the recent past when only the secular, nationalist Turkish identity was allowed to manifest itself, today the country more honestly addresses the reality of and the demand for equal rights and opportunities by Turkish Kurds, Alawis and others.

    The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has made significant overtures to the large Kurdish minority. Whether or not this approach works will be determined ultimately by the citizens, who sent a message in the local elections earlier this year that they were not fully satisfied. The AKP party’s votes and its municipalities won both declined, reminding us that in a truly democratic system the party in power must constantly respond to citizens’ needs and expectations — or lose power.

    Turkey no longer attempts the childish sloganeering that Arab ruling elites often use to try and depict all their citizens with a single phrase that is more about forced compliance with regime dictates than it is about responding to citizen rights. The healthy slippage the AKP experienced in the polls confirms that this country is ruled by popular will, rather than autocratic orders from a small band of rulers at the top. Erdogan and the AKP will now have to reconsider their unsuccessful strategy of appealing to nationalists, Kurds and the mild Islamists who comprise the AKP’s base. How refreshing to see a ruling party in a large Middle Eastern country having to adjust its policies and rhetoric in response to citizen votes!

    Turkey is also showing everyone else in the region how to do foreign policy in a sensible way, by acknowledging realities (e.g., Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq) and promoting stable political relations on the back of growing economic ties. As professor of international relations at Istanbul Bilgi University and columnist for the daily Habertürk Soli Ozel explained to me, Turkey in the past decade has taken advantage of developments initiated by others — the war in Iraq, Arab-Israeli stalemates — to reposition itself throughout the Middle East, while it simultaneously kept exploring stronger links with Europe. Formerly strained relations with Syria, Iraq, Greece, Armenia, Iran and others slowly improved, often hastened by mutual interests in the spheres of trade, water, energy and security – a policy “based on the principle of zero problems with the neighbors, designed to create zones of stability around the country, avoid confrontation and prepare the conditions for economic expansion,” Ozel explains.

    This requires comprehensive peace in the region, which Turkey has sought to prod by mediating and engaging where it could, while Israel “appeared incapable of changing its ways and seriously trying for a peaceful resolution of its conflict with the Palestinians,” he adds. The current Turkish-Israeli cool relations will return to normal soon, but in a context in which Turkey has strong, constructive ties with all other players in the region — a sound strategy that no other major power seems to have attempted.

    Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

    Copyright © 2009 Rami G. Khouri

    (Distributed by Agence Global)

    Source: www.middle-east-online.com/english/opinion/?id=36099, 07.12.09

  • Grave robbers steal former Cyprus president’s corpse

    Grave robbers steal former Cyprus president’s corpse

    Tassos Papadopoulos died of lung cancer in Nicosia in 2008, aged 74
    Tassos Papadopoulos died of lung cancer in Nicosia in 2008, aged 74

    Thieves have stolen the corpse of Tassos Papadopoulos, the former president of the Republic of Cyprus, police say.

    Mr Papadopoulos’ body was removed after his grave in Nicosia was broken into overnight, officials said.

    Marios Garoyan, leader of the former premier’s centre-right Diko party, condemned the act as a “heinous and terrible crime”, AFP reported.

    Mr Papadopoulos died of lung cancer in Nicosia in 2008, aged 74.

    The theft from the Deftera village cemetery in Nicosia was discovered a day before the first anniversary of his death.

    The motive for the theft remains unclear, investigators say.

    A veteran of Greek Cypriot politics, Mr Papadopoulos became president in 2003 but lost a bid for a second term in 2008. He was defeated by Demetris Christofias, a former coalition partner.

    One of his achievements was to oversee the Republic of Cyprus’s entry into the European Union in 2004.

    Source:  bbc.co.uk, 11 December 2009

    Mr Papadopoulos’ body was removed after his grave in Nicosia was broken into overnight, officials said.
    Marios Garoyan, leader of the former premier’s centre-right Diko party, condemned the act as a “heinous and terrible crime”, AFP reported.
    Mr Papadopoulos died of lung cancer in Nicosia in 2008, aged 74.
    The theft from the Deftera village cemetery in Nicosia was discovered a day before the first anniversary of his death.
    The motive for the theft remains unclear, investigators say.
    A veteran of Greek Cypriot politics, Mr Papadopoulos became president in 2003 but lost a bid for a second term in 2008. He was defeated by Demetris Christofias, a former coalition partner.
    One of his achievements was to oversee the Republic of Cyprus’s entry into the European Union in 2004Mr Papadopoulos’ body was removed after his grave in Nicosia was broken into overnight, officials said.
    Marios Garoyan, leader of the former premier’s centre-right Diko party, condemned the act as a “heinous and terrible crime”, AFP reported.
    Mr Papadopoulos died of lung cancer in Nicosia in 2008, aged 74.
    The theft from the Deftera village cemetery in Nicosia was discovered a day before the first anniversary of his death.
    The motive for the theft remains unclear, investigators say.
    A veteran of Greek Cypriot politics, Mr Papadopoulos became president in 2003 but lost a bid for a second term in 2008. He was defeated by Demetris Christofias, a former coalition partner.
    One of his achievements was to oversee the Republic of Cyprus’s entry into the European Union in 2004.

  • President Obama Meets with Prime Minister Erdogan – YouTube –

    President Obama Meets with Prime Minister Erdogan – YouTube –

    YouTube – President Obama Meets with Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan

  • Armenia engagement derailing Turkey’s energy policy

    Armenia engagement derailing Turkey’s energy policy

    by Ferruh Demirmen

    Türksam, December 9, 2009

    (Turkish Center for International Relations & Strategic Analysis)

    A misconceived engagement with Armenia has boomeranged beyond diplomacy to impact Turkey’s energy policy. The developments so far are already worrying, and further negative consequences may follow. Turkey’s energy policy is held hostage, and the culprit is a short-sighted Armenia rapprochement that has ignored Azerbaijan’s legitimate concerns on Nagorno-Karabakh.

    While some may view the energy “fallout” as a case of “unintended consequences” for Turkey,  the effects could have been foreseen easily.

    Background

    The secret, Switzerland-based Turkish-Armenian normalization process that surfaced in April 2009 in the aftermath of President Obama’s visit to Turkey, albeit launched with good intentions, turned out to be a disappointment for the Turkish side. The “road map” that was announced had a glaring omission: trustworthy preconditions or commitments requisite for normalization of bilateral relations.

    In particular, there was no assurance that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, vital for Azerbaijan, would be resolved before opening the Turkey-Armenia border. Baku was concerned, and Turkish-Azerbaijani relations soured.

    The two Turkish-Armenian protocols later initialed on August 31 and signed on October 10 confirmed the absence of any caveat on Nagorno-Karabakh, and further alienated Azerbaijan.

    For the better part of 2009 Turkey has been trying to placate Azerbaijan, with promises that it will not open the Turkey-Armenia border unless the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is first resolved.

    The promise is like a double-edged sword. If Turkey reneges on its promise to Azerbaijan, Turkish-Azerbaijani relations will receive a serious, possibly fatal blow. If Turkey keeps its promise, and Turkish-Armenian normalization fails as a result, Turkey will be criticized in the West for being insincere or manipulative on Armenia “opening.” Armenian “genocide” allegations in the US Congress will come to the forefront again. April 24, 2010 is not too far ahead.

    In either case, unless the Armenian parliament refuses to ratify the normalization protocols before the Turkish parliament does, Turkey will be the loser.

    That will be the price paid for an ill-conceived political process. Armenia has made it clear repeatedly that it sees no linkage between the normalization process and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. So, Turkey is facing a major quandary.

    At present, neither Turkey nor Armenia has submitted the protocols to their respective parliaments for ratification. The fate of the normalization process will hang heavily on the actions of the two parliaments. But for Turkey, and the West in general, some energy projects are at stake.

    The fallout on energy

    From energy point of view, worsening Turkish-Azerbaijani relations, if not stemmed, will come at a heavy price for Turkey. Alarmed at the Turkish-Armenian normalization talks conducted behind his back, an angry and resentful Ilham Aliyev, President of Azerbaijan, announced in May that, if forced, Azerbaijan would resort to military force to recapture the Azeri Nagorno-Karabakh territory it lost to Armenia in 1994. (See also recent analysis, ref. 1)

    Aliyev had the sympathy of Turkey and a host of other nations and several UN resolutions to back him up, but that was not enough. Peace talks mediated by the OSCE Minsk Group were also not producing palpable results. (Armenian-Azeri talks in Munich in late November were also inconclusive, ref. 1).

    To give credibility to his warning, or threat, Aliyev decided to play the gas card as a strategic tool. Partnership with Russia, at least on energy initially, was the strategy he had in mind. And Russia, given the opportunity to exploit the South Caucuses conflict, was more than willing to appear cooperative.

    The gas card Aliyev was mulling over was the Shah Deniz gas lying below the bed of the Caspian Sea. Aliyev was already unhappy over the prolonged, yet unresolved, dispute with Turkey over the price of Shah Deniz-1 gas that Turkey had been importing since July 2007. The price of gas was up for negotiation in April 2008, but discussions had reached a deadlock. Aliyev complained that Turkey was paying, at $120/1000 m3, one-third of the market price for gas, and Turkey’s counter offers were not high enough.

    On June 29, Russia’s Gazprom and Azerbaijan’s state-owned company Socor signed a gas agreement in Baku in the presence of respective presidents. The agreement stipulated that, starting in 2010, Gazprom would buy Azeri gaz, including, apparently, Shah Deniz-2 gas when it becomes available (currently in 2015). This would be the first time in Azerbaijan’s history that Azeri gas would be exported to Russia.

    The gas volume initially involved was small (annually 500 million m3), but it was announced that the volume would increase in future. Gazprom would have the right of first refusal on additional supplies of gas when available. The agreement paved the way for a broad Russian-Azerbaijani cooperation that could possibly extend beyond gas.

    The June 29 deal received further endorsement in Baku on October 14.

    The Russian-Azerbaijani accord was a clear message to Turkey, and the West in general, from Aliyev that Azerbaijan would keep its options open as far as exporting its gas from the planned Shah Deniz Phase-2 development. This cast doubt not only on future Shah Deniz-2 gas supplies to Turkey, but also on Azeri gas supplies to the planned west-bound Nabucco project that Turkey had boastfully committed itself to in Ankara on July 13 (ref. 2).

    To export its gas, Azerbaijan is now pursuing other options that circumvent Turkish territory: a subsea line in the Black Sea running from Georgia to Romania (White Stream project), tanker transport of compressed gas from Georgia to Bulgaria, and a swap or direct gas sale deal with Iran. Preliminary agreements have been signed on all of these. The existing pipeline connections with Iran and Russia would facilitate Russia and Iran options.

    Broader implications

    Turkey’s ill-founded Armenia engagement process, lacking any meaningful preconditions, is derailing Turkey’s energy policy. A distrustful Azerbaijan has now moved closer to Russia, and Shah Deniz-2 gas exports to Turkey for its domestic needs, as well as for onward transit to Europe via the planned Nabucco pipeline, are put in jeopardy.

    Import of Turkmen gas via a future Trans-Caspian pipeline, that could also feed the Nabucco pipeline, is also at risk. For Turkmen gas to reach Turkey via the Trans-Caspian pipeline, Azerbaijan’s cooperation is essential.

    Turkey needs Azeri gas in excess of the currently imported Shah Deniz-1 gas to diversify its gas supply sources and routes. Currently there is excessive (some 60%) dependence on Russian gas supplies for Turkey’s domestic needs.

    Despite its shortcomings, Nabucco project is still a vital project for Turkey both from energy and political point of view (ref. 2). If Nabucco does not receive throughput from Azeri or Turkmen sources, Turkey’s long-avowed strategic position as an energy corridor to the West will be seriously compromised.

    Public outcry stemming from alienation from the brotherly Azeri nation is also a price that Turkish policy makers must consider.

    The above considerations leave no doubt that the Ankara-Baku rift should be mended. The sooner the better. The onus of this burden rests mainly on Turkey, not Azerbaijan. Otherwise Azerbaijan will move even closer to Russia, and Turkey may have to do without new Azeri (Shah Deniz-2) gas supplies. That would be rather unfortunate.

    While it would entail a higher cost, Azerbaijan has options to export its gas without transiting Turkish territory.

    Aliyev has indicated a number of times that Azerbaijan is interested in the Nabucco project, but unless Turkey is more accommodating, that interest may go nowhere.

    All indications are that Turkey has overplayed its hand as far as its geographic position as an energy conduit, and has also stonewalled too long to meet reasonable Azeri requests for a gas price that closely reflects market conditions.

    Turkey should not be seen as being obstructionist for the implementation of the Nabucco project. In this connection, the possible ramifications of Turkey’s support for the rival South Stream project during the August 6 Russia-Turkey-Italy energy summit in Ankara were not lost on the EU, and may dampen the EU’s interest in Nabucco.

    It is telling that Austrian OMV (the flag-bearer for Nabucco), Italian ENI and French EDF have signed preliminary agreements with Gazprom recently about joint implementation of the South Stream project. In the light of these developments, one wonders whether the EU’s support for Nabucco is as good as before, and whether Turkey’s apparent wavering on Nabucco is playing a role. The financing problem of Nabucco is also at a standstill.

    Another fallout from strained Turkish-Azerbaijani relations could be the curtailment of the BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) throughput, with some of the crude diverted to the Russian and Georgian ports of Novorossiysk and Supsa, respectively. Lukoil, ExxonMobil and Devon, shareholders of AIOC (Azerbaijan International Oil Company) but not the BTC consortium, are already using these routes to export their entitlements from the ACG (Azeri-Chirag-Gunesli) field in Azerbaijan.

    Export of Kazakh crude through the BTC could also be delayed or blocked. An ominous sign in this respect comes from the Russian-Kazakh oil transit agreement signed in Yalta on November 20. The agreement signaled support for the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline, which Russia, at Turkey’s strong urging, recently endorsed. Samsun-Ceyhan will undermine plans to export Kazakh oil through a trans-Caspian pipeline link to the BTC.

    An irony for the US

    As a footnote to the above, it is also worth observing an irony in Turkey’s “opening” to Armenia. It is no secret that US pressure, in particular the urging of President Obama in person, played a key role in launching the Armenia engagement process. Yet, the process has not only damaged the close Turkish-Azerbaijani partnership, it has drawn Azerbaijan into Russia’s orbit of influence. This runs counter to the long-established US policy of weaning Soviet-era Turkic republics from Russia’s sphere of influence, in particular on energy.

    The maxim, “unintended consequences,”  describes this situation well for the US.

    Concluding remarks

    An ill-conceived political normalization process undertaken with Armenia has pushed a nervous Azerbaijan closer to Russia and has driven this small nation to seek alternative gas export options that circumvent Turkish territory. Future Azeri, and in the longer term Turkmen, gas imports to Turkey are jeopardized.

    Some of the throughput to the BTC may be diverted, and plans to channel Kazakh oil to the BTC may be cancelled or postponed indefinitely.

    In parallel, Turkey’s role to act as an energy corridor to the West is compromised.

    The energy projects impacted are all important for Turkey. If for no other reason than to safeguard these projects, it is vitally important that the Turkish-Azerbaijani relations are put back where they belong, and where they traditionally have been: good, friendly terms.

    Despite rosy statements from Turkish government circles, Turkish-Azeri relations are severely strained. Rapprochement with Armenia should not come at the expense of brotherly relations with Azerbaijan.

    Turkish policy makers who now claim the Turkey-Armenia border would not be opened until the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is resolved, should answer the question: If that were to be so, why did the normalization protocols signed with Armenia not contain the requisite precondition in the first place? It is no secret that the Armenia engagement started under external pressures, both from the US and the EU.

    The adverse energy-related effects stemming from the ill-conceived Armenia normalization process were no surprise, and could have been foreseen in advance.

    Those who are entrusted to lead the nation should be cognizant of the fact that one-sided foreign-policy initiatives that are launched without due consideration of underlying risks can have boomerang effects that may undermine national energy interests.

    If the rift in energy cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan deepens, in a sense it will be a betrayal of the legacy of the late Azerbaijani President Haydar Aliyev, who, with resolute determination, championed the realization of the BTC project despite many roadblocks. Turkey will bear the lion’s share of responsibility for this state of affairs.

    Separate from the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, the Armenia normalization process has ignored other legitimate concerns that are important for Turkey (ref. 3).

     A far-sighted national energy policy requires vision, foresight and perseverance. Whether Turkey’s policy makers have these traits, the readers should ponder.

     References cited

    (1)   “Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations in Munich and the possibility of war,” by Sinan Oğan, Türksam, Nov. 23, 2009.

    (2)   “Nabucco: A challenge for EU and a partially fulfilled promise for Turkey,” by Ferruh Demirmen, Eurasia Critic, September 2009.

    (3)   “Current Turkish ‘opening’ to Armenia cannot be supported,” by Ferruh Demirmen, Turkish Forum, October 9, 2009.

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